CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400040008-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 22, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

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Mach 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am not
sure that I recall this from the testimony
or conversations I had with members of
the staff of General Westmoreland, but
it is my recollection that no defoliants
have been used on any rice fields where
there was any hope whatever that the
rice could be harvested by the South
Vietnamese. It was used only on areas
where there was no possibility of anyone
except the Vietcong benefitting from the
harvesting of the rice.
I yield to the Senator from Missouri
[Mr. SYMINGTON] who has spent some
time in South Vietnam.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Much of this In-
formation with respect to defoliation has
been classified, but I would say to my
friend from Pennsylvania that the pri-
mary interest in this particular defolia-
tion is for clearing the jungles, in order
that our people know what they are
attacking when they attack such targets
as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to prevent am-
munition, troops and food from coming
down said trail to help the Vietcong in
their attacks against us.
Based on testimony received, the con-
trol of the use of these defoliants is very
tight. I believe the Senator would be
satisfied if he obtained the classified
testimony, that there has been relatively
little of it used for destroying any crops.
The testimony supplied me at this
moment by a member of the staff is in-
teresting, but I observe there have been
too many deletions to make it useful.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am hap-
py to have the Senator from Missouri
confirm what I have said. I said that a
small proportion of defoliation had been
on crops, and only in instances where
we knew that the harvesting of crops
would rebound to the benefit of the Viet-
cong by supplying them with essential
food.
It is very true that our position in the
war and the mistakes we have made have
been magnified all over the world. The
news photographers of television net-
works have been permitted to accompany
our people. The tragic pictures of little
children who have been wounded, of
mothers weeping over their dead, and
of those who are binding up their wounds
have been transmitted all over the world.
For every one of those instances there
have been a dozen instances in which the
Vietcong have deliberately done what we
have done accidentally, but we have not
had the means to present that to the
world. That is one of the disadvantages
of living in an open society.
Frankly, I think that in some cases the
disseminators of news should have been
more judicious in the showing of some of
these films and in the statements that ac-
companied the films that Indicated that
our soldiers were careless and were delib-
erately killing the civilian population.
Mr. SYMINGTON, I agree complete-
ly with the distinguished Senator from
Georgia. One of the tricks the Viet-
cong has been using is to wait until crops
were ready for harvesting, then to go into
the fields and out the men, women, and
children to pieces as they were working
to bring in the grain.
One of the chief reasons why it has
been necessary for the United States to
export grain to South Vietnam are the
clever ways in which the Vietcong have
combined to destroy both the people and
the grain when the people have, at-
tempted to harvest it. I associate myself
with the statement of the Senator from
Georgia concerning how little of this
story has been told in various films and
other media when they have been shown
to the American people.
Mr. CLARK. Is it not true that in
many instances the Vietcong prefer to
extort a tax from the people as a condi-
tion to letting them eat or market their
grain, as opposed to destroying it?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Georgia yield, to
permit me to reply?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. In many places
the Vietcong do impose a tax. The tax
apparently has been custom. It was one
of Ho Chi Minh's customs, when he
started his building of communism in
Vietnam long ago. It was part of the
effect to destroy all the people above
a certain economic level by imposing a
confiscatory tax in North Vietnam and
South Vietnam. In many places, if any-
body argued against the tax, he would, in
typical Vietcong fashion, be destroyed.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I recall
that in many areas the farmers were
compelled to abandon their crops to
avoid being forced to harvest it, and were
thus unable to take it with them. The
Vietcong collected the tax and left the
civilian population there without any
means of support, even though they had
harvested the crop. That has had a ter-
rific effect on the production of rice In
South Vietnam.
Mr. CLARK. To return briefly to the
question of chemical warfare, the Sen-
ator from Georgia and the Senator from
Missouri are aware, I know-the Senators
have said so-that war is a nasty busi-
ness. It is not always possible to fight
a war according to the Marquis of
Queensberry rules. The use of gas by
our troops in South Vietnam enabled the
Russians to mount a propaganda offen-
sive at the Disarmament Conference in
Geneva last week. They spent the bet-
ter part of a day, together with one or
two of their Communist allies, castigat-
ing the United States for violating the
Geneva Convention in connection with
the use of gas and chemical weapons.
It may well be that the use of gas is
reasonably humane-at least as humane
as shooting the enemy with artillery or
dropping bombs on them. It may also
be necessary. But I do point out the
adverse propaganda effect.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sen-
ator from Pennsylvania well knows that
the Russians are masters of propaganda.
They can seize a little, isolated incident,
take it out of context, and make it ap-
pear to be a terrible crime against hu-
manity. That was what I had in mind
when I was discussing the news releases
and matters of that kind.
The fact is that there is not a coun-
try on earth that is not using this type of
gas against its own people. The type of
gas we have used against the Vietcong is
what is referred to as "tear gas." This
type of gas is used by the police forces
6149
of every country to restore order when
matters get out of hand.
When it was announced that we were
using tear gas, naturally the Russians
seized on that and said that the United
States was using lethal gases in this war.
I have inquired into this matter and have
been told that we have used only tear
gas. We possess lethal gases, and we
have them in large quantities. They
have destruction powers almost beyond
description. But we have not sent one
container of lethal gas out of this coun-
try, much less used it against the Viet-
cong in South Vietnam. The gas we
have used is the same kind of gas that
the police force in New York, Chicago,
Philadelphia, or here in the city of
Washington has available to enable it to
maintain order.
Mr. CLARK. What is the view of the
Senator from Georgia and the Senator
from Missouri with respect to the effect
on personnel of the chemical defoliants
which we are using? Do they have an
adverse or lethal effect on the personnel?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I doubt
whether it has any serious effect on per-
sonnel. If we happen to be fortunate
enough to expose a vehicle on a road or
to pick up a few trucks coming down and
can knock them out, the defoliant has an
adverse effect on that immediate con-
tingent of troops or truck drivers. But
I doubt whether the defoliant itself has
had any lethal effect on the Vietcong
personnel. As a matter of fact, I think
we have done a great many things in
Vietnam that have been said to have a
tremendous effect, but that have been
magnified out of reasonable proportion.
Mr. CLARK. I invite the Senator's at-
tention now to the question of our bomb-
ing and the contemplated bombing of
North Vietnam. I am glad the Senator
from Missouri is in the Chamber, because
this is a subject in which he has inter-
ested himself deeply.
Referring to page 42 of the hearings,
do the Senators accept the statement of
Secretary McNamara?
The quantities of men and the quantities
of materiel involved in the infiltration into
South Vietnam are small.
I recall some statements in the news-
papers that the rate of infiltration of
men from the north was about 4,500 a
month. On the other hand, the Secre-
tary testified that throughout all of last
year only about 20,000 men infiltrated
from the north, with the exception of the
regular army battalions. The Secretary
said, as shown at page 42 of the hearings,
that he thought the infiltration from the
north was small.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It all de-
pends on what figure one regards as
being small.
Mr. CLARK. Would the Senator from
Georgia agree that 4,500 a month would
be about the correct figure?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I should
think that that is a fair estimate of
troops coming down from North Vietnam
at the present time.
Mr. CLARK. The 4,500 has reference
to personnel.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is
correct.
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March 22, 1.966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
run the Communist state already established
in North Vietnam and who who are now
directing the insurgency designed to bring
the southern part of the country under their
domination.
The tern "Vietcong" came into circulation
around 1956 as a means of distinguishing
some of the players in the current act of this
ongoing political drama from the players in
act II. "Vietcong" is a contraction of the
phrase "Vietnam Cong-San," which means,
simply, "Vietnamese Communist(s)." It is
a descriptive term, not necessarily pejorative
except, perhaps, in the sense of "If the shoe
fits. . . . ' It is a. useful, precise and, as we
shall see, accurate generic label for the in-
dividuals leading the present insurgent
movement, at all levels, and for the organ-
izational structure through which that in-
surgency is controlled and directed.
Not surprisingly, the reactions of many
whose concern with Vietnam is of recent ori-
gin are analogous to those of theatergoers
who walk into the middle of the third act of
an extremely complex drama ignorant of
what has gone before. To understand the
Vietcong insurgency, its relationship to the
North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi (the
D.R.V.) and to the National Liberation
Front and the People's Revolutionary Party
in South Vietnam (and "their" respective In-
terrelationships), it is essential to appreci-
ate the historical setting within which the
Vietcong movement developed and the ends
it was created to serve.
Throughout their almost four decades of
unremitting struggle for political power, the
Vietnamese Communists have demonstrated
great skill in coping with new problems and
great tactical flexibility in pursuing unwav-
ering strategic objectives. Yet, though skill-
ful in learning from past failures, they have
often become the victims of previous suc-
cesses. For the past) quarter-century the
Vietnamese Communists have been doc-
trinally addicted to the political device of a
broad front organization, dominated and
controlled from behind the scenes by dis-
ciplined Communist cadres, but espousing
general sentiments to which persons of all
political inclinations can subscribe (though
the formulation of these sentiments has in-
variably involved a special lexicon of key
terms to which Communists and non-Com-
munists attach radically different meanings).
They have always rigidly subordinated mil-
itary activity to political ends, and employed
it not to inflict strategic defeat on enemy
forces in the conventional sense, but as an
abrasive to wear down their adversaries' will
to fight and force their enemies to accept in-
terim political settlements favorable to the
continued pursuit of Communist political
objectives.
Because of this Vietnamese Communist
penchant for repeating political and military
stratagems, a knowledge of recent Vietnam-
ese history is particularly helpful in under-
standing the present insurgency. Although
westerners may be largely ignorant of the
scenario and detailed plot development of
the previous acts of Vietnam's continuing
political drama, the Vietnamese most decid-
edly are not. Virtually all politically minded
Vietnamese have spent at least their adult-
hood, if not their whole lives, during the
Communist struggle for power. Few indeed
have not had their lives altered, conditioned
or shaped thereby. Without appreciating
what the Vietnamese have lived through and
without recognizing some of the things they
know intimately-often from all-too-first-
hand experience-Westerners cannot hope to
understand the attitude of Vietnamese now
living south of the 17th parallel toward the
insurgency, the Vietcong, the National Lib-
eration Front and the Communist regime in
Hanoi.
Under the direction of the man who now
calls himself Ho Chi Minh, the Indochinese
Community Party was organized in January
1930. For the next decade the Vietnamese
Communists concentrated on perfecting their
organization, jockeying for position within
the rising anti-French nationalist move-
ment and attempting to undercut national-
lot leaders or groups whom they could not
subvert or bring under Communist control,
using any means available, including be-
trayal to the French.
In 1941, the Vietnamese Communists joined
a nationalist organization called the League
for Vietnamese Independence (Vietnam Doe
Lap Dong Minh Hoi-or Vietminh) which
was sponsored by the Chinese Nationalists as
a vehicle for harassing Japanese forces in
Indochina but swiftly subverted by the Viet-
namese Communists to further their own
political objectives. By 1945 the Vietminh
movement was under complete Communist
control, despite the continued presence and
subordinate participation therein of non-
Communist nationalist elements whose
names and talents the Communists were
more than willing to exploit. In the chaotic
aftermath of Japan's precipitate surrender,
the Communists used the Vietminh as a
device for seizing power in Hanoi and (on
September 2, 1945) proclaiming the existence
of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam"
under the presidency of Ho Chi Minh.
On November 11, 1945, in an effort to make
the Vietminh government more palatable to
non-Communist Vietnamese and to the Chi-
nese Nationalist forces then occupying Viet-
nam down to the 16th parallel, Ho formally
"dissolved" the Indochinese Communist
Party, though the impact of this gesture on
the discerning was considerably attenuated
when the same day witnessed the formation
of a new "Association for Marxist Studies."
Complete control over the Vietminh and the
subsequent resistance struggle, however, re-
mained unchanged in essentially the same
hands as those which control North Vietnam
and the insurgency below the 17th parallel
today .2
By the late spring of 1946, the fact of
Communist control over the Vietminh (de-
spite. the "nonexistence" of the party) was
becoming increasingly apparent, as was the
fact that Ho's- political maneuvering and
stalling negotiations with the returning
French were not going to work. In prepara-
tion for the inevitable struggle, Ho endeav-
ored to broaden the Communists' base of na-
tionalist support. In May 1948 he announced
the creation of a new "popular national
front" (Lien-Hiep Quoc Dan Vietnam),
known as the Lien Viet, whose announced ob-
jective was the achievement of "independ-
ence and democracy." The Vietminh was
6151
December 19, 1946, and its general course
is sufficiently well known to require no re-
hearsal here. The northern part of Viet-
nam constituted the principal theater of
military operations; the struggle in the south,
though intense, was primarily a terrorist
and harassing action designed to keep the
French off balance and prevent them from
concentrating either their attention or their
forces on the war in the north. Though the
Vietminh achieved these objectives, their ef-
forts in South Vietnam were beset with a
continuing series of problems. French con-
trol of the sea, air, and major overland routes
left the Vietminh in the south dependent
for supplies, reinforcements, cadres, and com-
munications on a tortuous set of jungle
tracks running through Laos (along the
western slopes of the Annamite Chain) which
came to be known, collectively, as the "Ho
Chi Minh trail." Saigon. politics were con-
siderably more complex than those of Hanoi,
and non-Communist Vietnamese political
groups were both more numerous and more
powerful in the south than they were in
the north. Furthermore, the Communist
leaders of the Vietminh had a series of com-
mand and control problems with their south-
ern organization which took several years
to resolve.
In 1945, the senior Vietminh representative
in southern Vietnam was a Moscow-educated
disciple of Ho Chi Minh and the Third In-
ternational named Tran Van Giau, whose
blatant ruthlessness and indiscriminate ter-
rorist tactics alienated key groups that the
Vietminh were anxious to bring into their
fold, such as the Hoa Hao, Ca.o Dai and Binh
Xuyen. Giau was accordingly recalled to
Hanoi in January 1946 and his duties as Viet-
minh commander in the south were assumed
by Nguyen Binh. Although eminently suc-
cessful in harassing the French and further-
ing the cause of the nationalist revolution,
Binh-a former member of the Communists'
most militant nationalist rivals, the
VNQDD-was never fully trusted by the
Communist high command in the north and
came to be considered excessively independ-
ent. In 1951 he was replaced by Le Duan, a
charter member of the Indochinese Commu-
nist Party who is now first secretary of the
Communist Party in North Vietnam and one
of the most powerful figures in the Hanoi
regime. Until 1954, and perhaps even later,
Le Duan continued to play a major role in
developing and directing the Vietminh orga-
nization in the south and in ensuring that it
remainded under firm Communist control.
However, in late 1952 or early 1953 he was
apparently compelled to share his authority
with Le Due Tho, the present head of the
North Vietnamese Communist Party's Orga-
nization Bureau and also a member of its
Politburo a
merged with, and eventually absorbed by, the The 1949 Communist victory in China had
Lien Viet, though its name remained to serve a profound influence on the course of events
as a generic label for those who participated in Vietnam, particularly after the Vietminh
in the subsequent armed struggle against the offensive in the fall of 1950 cleared the
French. The Communists also brought into French out of the frontier area and gave the
the Lien Viet two other small splinter parties Vietminh a common border with their new
which by then were under complete Com- Communist neighbor. The miliary conse-
munist control: the "Democratic Party," de. quences of ensuring Chinese Communist sup-
signed to appeal to "bourgeois elements" port to the Vietminh cause are fairly well
(i.e. urban trade, business, and professional known. The political consequences, less well
circles), and the "Radical Socialist Party," known in the West, were of at least equal
designed to enlist the sympathies of students significance.. With an increasingly powerful
and intellectuals. fraternal ally in immediate proximity, the
The war with the French broke out on Communist leadership of the Vietminh be-
2 Despite the Vietnamese Communists'
claim that their party did not "exist" under
any name from 1945 until 1951, on Aug. 31,
1953, the Cominform journal noted that
Vietnamese Communist Party membership
increased from 20,000 In 1946 to 500,000 in
1950.
?' During the Viet Minh era Le Duan and
Le Duc Tho apparently had a violent quarrel
over tactics which Ho Chi Minh himself had
to settle. The details of this dispute are still
obscure, but the resultant enmity between
these two men has never been completely
dissipated.
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and hence could not consider itself bound by
them?
Some of Ho's lieutenants felt that the
Geneva settlement had cheated them of the
full fruits of their victory, but on the whole
the Communists had no reason to be dis-
satisfied with the results. The land-reform
program was then in full cry and consolida-
tion of Communist control over the north
was the task immediately at hand. The
south could wait, particularly since its
chances of survival as an independent politi-
cal entity seemed nil at the time.
The Lao Dong leadership went through
the motions of overt compliance with the
provisions of the Vietnam, cease-fire agree-
ment, though in doing so they took a num-
ber of steps to preserve a subversive poten-
tial in the south and thus insure themselves
against unfavorable political contingencies.
In accordance with the agreement, some
50,000 Vietminh troops were regrouped in
specified areas below the 17th parallel and
taken north, along with 25,000-odd Vietminh
adherents and supporters. The Communists
were very careful, however, to leave behind
a network of cadres, which were instructed
to blend into the scenery, deny Communist
affiliation and agitate in favor of the sched-
uled elections. They also left behind a large
number of weapons caches (3,581 of which
were discovered between September 1954 and
June 1969) against the day when their south-
ern apparatus might have to augment politi-
cal action with armed forces. The composi-
tion of the units taken north was also care-
fully structured with an eye to possible
future needs. The Communists made sure
that many of the persons involved were
young, employing both coercion and impress-
ment to get the kind of people that they
wanted. Before they departed, personnel
designated for regroupment were strongly
encouraged or, in many cases, directly ordered
to contract local marriages and family alli-
ances in South Vietnam. These would stand
them in good stead if they ever had to
return.
In the aftermath of Geneva, the area
south of the 17th parallel was in a state of
political chaos bordering on anarchy. Ngo
Dinh Diem, who became Premier on July 7,
1954, had only the shell of a government, no
competent civil service, and a far from trust-
worthy army. In addition to all its other
difficulties, the Diem government was also
soon faced with an unexpected problem of
major magnitude: refugees from the north.
The myth that the Vietminh was a purely
nationalist movement to which virtually all
Vietnamese freely gave their political alle-
giance and that "Uncle Ho" was almost uni-
versally loved and esteemed by his com-
patriots was rudely shattered soon after
Geneva by what became, proportionately,
one of history's most spectacular politically
motivated migrations.
7 The American position was formally
enunciated by President Eisenhower in a
July 21, 1954, statement, which said in part:
"* * * the United States has not itself been
party to or bound by the decisions taken by
the conference, but it is our hope that it
will lead to the establishment of peace con-
sistent with the rights and needs of the
countries concerned. The agreement con-
tains features which we do not like, but a
great deal depends on how they work in
practice.
"The United States is issuing at Geneva a
statement to the effect that it is not pre-
pared to join in the conference declaration,
but, as loyal members of the United Nations,
we also say that, in compliance with the
obligations and principles contained in art.
2 of the United Nations Charter, the United
States will not use force to disturb the set-
tlement. We also say that any renewal of
Communist aggression would be viewed by
us as a matter of grave concern."
.Article 14(d) of the Vietnam cease-fire
agreement promised that civilians could
move freely to whichever "regrouping zone"
they preferred. The Communists accepted
this provision with a notable lack of en-
thusiasm, hindered its implementation in a
variety of ways and eventually, when its ap-
plication became altogether too embarrass-
ing, flagrantly violated it. Despite all Com-
munist intimidation, obstruction and har-
assment, however, some 900,000 people fled
from the north to the south uprooting them-
selves and their families in order to avoid
living under Ho Chi Minh's Communist
regime. (Given the relative population sizes,
this was the political equivalent of 9 mil-
lion Americans leaving the United States.)
As many as 400,000 more wanted to leave, and
were entitled to do so under article 14(d),
but were not permitted by the Communist
authorities to depart.
The 2-year period from 1954 to 1956 was
one of political progress and achievement in
South Vietnam that would have been con-
sidered impossible at the time of Geneva.
The situation which prevailed in the sum-
mer of 1956 forced Hanoi to take stock of its
prospects. The rather pro forma protests
made by North Vietnam at the passing of the
Geneva election deadline suggest that Ha-
noi's rulers were not so perturbed by the
fact that the elections were not held as they
were over the increasing disparity between
political life north and south of the 17th
parallel, a contrast considerably less than
flattering to their regime. The north was
just emerging from the throes of the land-
reform campaign and was in a state of eco-
nomic turmoil, while the south presented a
picture of increasing political stability and
incipient prosperity.
Hanoi accordingly recognized that more
decisive action would be required if the south
was to be brought under its control. In-
structions were transmitted to the Commu-
nist network left behind in the south direct-
ing these cadres to begin agitation and
political organization. The Lao Dong Party
set up a department of its central committee
called the Central Reunification Department,
which was made responsible for all matters
concerning individuals who had been re-
grouped to the north during the post-Geneva
exchange of forces. The following year
(1957) a PAVN major-general named Nguyen
Van Vinh, who had served in various respon-
sible posts in the south during the Franco-
Vietminh war, was named chairman of this
Reunification Department, an office he still
holds.
The 1956-58 period was unusually complex,
even for Vietnam. Diem, in effect, reached
his political high-water mark sometime
around mid-1957. After that, his methods
of operation, traits of character and depend-
ence on his family became set with ever
increasing rigidity along lines which ulti-
mately led to his downfall. Despite the un-
deniable progress of its early years, his gov-
ernment was never successful in giving the
bulk of the South Vietnamese peasantry
positive reasons for identifying their per-
sonal fortunes with its political cause. The
administrators Diem posted to the country-
side were often corrupt and seldom native to
the areas to which they were assigned, a
fact which caused them to be considered as
"foreigners" by the intensely clannish and
provincial peasantry. Land policies, often
admirable in phraseology, were notably weak
in execution and frequently operated to the
benefit of absentee landlords rather than
those who actually tilled the soil.
Such factors as these, coupled with the
still manifest consequences of a decade of
war, generated genuine grievances among
the peasantry which the Communists were
quick to exploit and exacerbate. Communist
cadres began their organizational efforts
among the disgruntled and the ill-served.
They harped on local issues and avoided
6153
preaching Marxist doctrine. Cells were
formed, village committees established and
small military units organized. A pattern of
politically motivated terror began to emerge,
directed against the representatives of the
Saigon government and concentrated on the
very bad and the very good. The former
were liquidated to win favor with the peas-
antry; the latter because their effectiveness
was a bar to the achievement of Communist
objectives. The terror was directed not only
against officials but against all whose opera-
tions were essential to the functioning of
organized political society: schoolteachers,
health workers, agricultural officials, etc.
The scale and scope of this terrorist and in-
surrectionary activity mounted slowly but
steadily. By the end of 1958 the participants
in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon
quite accurately termed the "Vietcong," con-
stituted a serious threat to South Vietnam's
political stability.
Despite the increasing trouble that Viet-
cong bands were causing and despite the
Vietcong's initial success in organizational
work, Hanoi was far from satisfied with the
pace of Vietcong progress and was particu-
larly chagrined at the movement's failure to
win a really significant political following.
Several Vietcong cadre members who were
subsequently captured have reported that in
late 1958 Le Duan himself was sent on an
extensive inspection trip in the south, and
that upon his return to Hanoi in early 1959
he presented a list of recommendations sub-
sequently adopted by the Lao Dong Central
Committee and referred to in Vietcong cadre
training sessions as "Resolution 15." These
recommendations laid out the whole future
course of the southern insurgency, including
the establishment of a National Liberation
Front to he controlled by the Central Com-
mittee of the South Vietnamese branch of
the Lao Dong Party and supported by a
South Vietnamese "liberation army." The
Front was to be charged with conducting a
political struggle, backed by armed force.
designed to neutralize the south and pave
the way for "reunification," i.e., political
domination by Hanoi. We can be certain
that some such decisions were made about
this time, for in May 1959 the Lao Dong
Central Committee declared that "the time
has come to struggle heroically and per-
severingly to smash [the GVN]."
The consequences of these Hanoi decisions
became increasingly apparent during the 18
months which followed the Central Com-
mittee's May 1959 meeting. The scale and
intensity of Vietcong activity began to in-
crease by quantum jumps. Communist mili-
tary moves in Laos secured the corridor area
along the North Vietnamese border and in-
filtrators from the north began moving down
the "Ho Chi Minh Trail": a few hundred in
1959, around 3,000 in 1960, and over 10,000
in 1961.
During 1959 and 1960 further evolution of
the various stresses within the South Viet-
namese body politic occurred. Diem's mili-
tary establishment had been designed to
counter the threat of conventional invasion
and proved ill suited to cope with insurrec-
tionary warfare. The quality of government
administrators grew worse rather than bet-
ter as Diem became increasingly inclined, in
making key appointments, to put loyalty to
himself and his family ahead of ability. His
agrarian policies, particularly the disastrous
"agroville" program of 1959, provided fresh
sources of rural discontent. The Vietcong
were quick to take advantage of the govern-
ment's errors and steadily heightened the
intensity of their terrorist activity. To com-
plicate matters further there were rising po-
litical pressures within the non-Communist
camp and a growing feeling that Diem had
to be ousted before his methods of govern-
ment made a Communist victory inevitable.
During the 1958-60 period, Hanoi's hand
in southern troubles was quite imperfectly
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6155
now. claims to be a coalition of over 40 who served briefly as Secretary General after dig up roads to harass government forces.
"associated organizations" which, collec- Hieu and before Phat. Described in official They serve as informants and couriers, or
tively, purport to represent virtually all NLF biographies as an "initellectwal. and go on purchasing expeditions to nearby gov-
shades and strata of South Vietnamese politi- ardent patriot," Kiem has spent most of the ernment-controlled market towns. Every-
eal and social life. This coalition includes past two decades as a leader in various Corn- one participates and ensures that his neigh-
three "'political parties": the PRP, the munist-front youth groups. Such figures as bor does so as well. All of this activity is
"Democratic Party" and the "Radical Social- these are the best the Front has been able to coordinated and directed by local NLF com-
ist Party." (The latter two bear al- come up with to staff Its most prominent mittees which where circumstances per-
most exactly the same names as the two public offices. Their organizational and revo- mit, assume the prerogatives and functions
minor parties allowed to exist in North Viet- lutionary talents may be impressive, but of local government. These local commit-
nam and are obviously intended to play simi- their personal stature and prestige among tees in turn are directed by superior eche-
lar roles.) In their present name or form, the South Vietnamese people are not. lons, capped, at least ostensibly, by the cen-
virtually none of its affiliated organizations v tral committee of the NLF itself.
antedates the founding of the NLF itself, The NLF's organizational structure is
many almost certainly exist only on Over the past 4 years the Vietcong have
Y y y paper, labored mightily to improve their image be- paralleled and controlled at each echelon,
and a careful analysis of the NLF's own prop- yond South Vietnam's borders and to enlist a a complementary PRP structure. Under the
he
aganda makes it clear that a goodly number broad spectrum of international support for general command of its central committee,
have identical officers, directorates, and staffs. their cause; to develop their oragnizational the PRP Is organized on a geographic basis
Some of these organizations, however, have structure within South Vietnam, thus through the various regions, provinces, and
acquired substance after the fact, as it were, strengthening their internal political post- districts down to the village level. Each
and now play important roles in the NLF's Lion; and to expand their military effort, to geographic echelon has a directing commit-
efforts to organize and control the rural facilitate achievement of their political goals tee responsible for controlling all PRPL-
populace. and if possible to generate an aura of invinci- hence all Vietcong, Including NLF-activities
It is fairly easy to devise an organizational bility capable of breaking their adversaries' within its area. These committees vary in
structure capable of lending verisimilitude will to continue the struggle, size and organizational complexity, even
to a political fiction, doubly so if one is try- The image-building campaign abroad has among equivalent geographic echelons, but
ing to deceive a foreign audience unversed in been designed to publicize the NLF and in- each one has a single chairman and several
local political affairs. Fleshing this strut- subordinate members or subcommittees with
ture out with live, known individuals to flate its prestige and reputation. Its goal specific functional responsibilities. The
occupy posts of public prominence is con- has been to get the NLF generally accepted number and nomenclature of these iune-
occupbly more difficult. The Vietcong ob- as an indigenous South Vietnamese political tional subcommittees also varies from area
coalition (admittedly with some Communist
viously hoped to attract to the NLF South members) which sprang up spontaneously to area, but they normally cover military
Vietnamese of personal stature and renown, affairs, economic and financial affairs, and
preferably individuals not immediately iden- to combat the harsh excesses of the U.S.-sup- what the Communists term "front affairs
tiflable as Communists or Communist sym- ported Diem regime, and which seeks only and civilian proselytizing," whose chairman
pathizers, who could enhance the Front's peace, democracy and reunification as pro- Is
responsible for controlling all NLF ac-
prestige and political attractiveness and pro- vided for in the Geneva agreements. Though tivity in that area. If the PRP organization
vide a more or less innocent facade behind moral-and, to some extent perhaps, physi- at that echelon is sufficiently well developed,
Viet-
which the NLF's Communist masters could cal-support may be afforded by North Viet- he in turn will have subordinate members
operate in secure obscurity. To date the ram and other fraternal socialist states (so of his PRP subcommittee to direct each of
Vietcong have been notably unsuccessful in the argument runs), the NLF is basically an the local associations affiliated with the NLF.
this regard, though the full measure of their independent political entity with a policy Though captured documents indicate that
failure is far better appreciated within South and will of its own. This campaign has been the Vietcong try to keep the level of overt
Vietnam itself than it is abroad. No Viet- waged through the propaganda disseminated PEP
by the Liberation News Agency, replayed and participation below two-fifths of the
namese of what could accurately be described echoed by Communist (and non-Communist) total membership of any given NLF com-
as significant personal prestige or profes- media throughout the world; through a just described the organizational structure we have
sional standing-not even one of known steady flow of messages from the Front to just described (reinforced by network of
leftist persuasion-has ever been willing to foreign governments and heads of state (par- covert PRP cells throughout the e NLF) keeps
associate himself publicly with the NLF or titularly of neutralist Afro-Asian nations); all components of the NLF at every level
lend it the use of his name. under complete PRP control.
The NLF's first Central Committee was not by ever increasing attendance at foreign The Vietcong's terrorist and military ap-
annaunced until March 1962, well over a year conferences and meetings (generally Com- paratus was developed and is directed by
Y munist or leftist sponsored) by a small this same organizational after the Front's supposedly spontaneous handful of indefatigable NLF represents- structure, which
creation. Though the committee purportedly tives; and by the establishment of perms- insures that armed activity at all levels is
had 52 members, the NLF was able to come nent NLF "missions" in Havana, Peiping, and rigidly kept under tight to party political objectives
control The
up with only 31 names, most of which were Moscow, Prague, East Berlin, Budapest, Cairo, Vietcong military establishment
virtually unknown even within South Viet- Djakarta, and Algiers. All of this activity has over 900, , full-time troops inclnow has
nam. The 41-member second (and cur- profited from the fact that knowledge of the over Vietnamese troregulars) over
rent) Central Committee, announced in realities of political life in South Vietnam merited and North supported something over
January 1964, is equally lacking in distinc- does not extend much beyond its frontiers; 100,000 rs something part-
partt-
tion. all of it has. been guided by a keen awareness time guerrillas. force, however,
The Chairman of the NLF's Presidium and of the effectiveness of incessant repetition was g built This whole hole fo, however,
Central Committee Is Nguyen Huu. Tho, a in converting myth to assumed reality, was for political reasons, to serve provincial lawyer with a long record Throughout South Vietnam, the Vietcong political ends.
s
work laying the inundations Vietcong political op-
of activit in Communist-s s at work l
y parroted causes have developed and employed the NLF lap- for for insurgency long before there was even
but of little political repute or professional paratus in their intensive effort to organize so much as a Vietcong hamlet self-defense
standing among his former colleagues at the the population (especially the rural popula- squad.
South Vietnamese bar, who generally cate- tion), involve it in their insurgency cam- The director of the military affairs sub-
gorize him as having been an avocet sans paign and bring it under their political committee (mentioned above) is frequently
brefs." The NLF's present secretary General domination. The detailed application of also the commander of the Vietcong force
(also the Secretary General of the "Democrat- this effort varies from locality to locality, attached to that geographic echelon. Vil-
ic Party" and the Chairman of the NLF's and is materially influenced by such local lage directing committees have village pla-
Saigon Zone Committee) is Huynh Tan Phait, factors as the relative degree of Vietcong toons under their control; district commit-
usually described in ELF propaganda as an strength in the area. The objective, how- tees, district companies; provincial commit-
"architect," though one would be hard ever, is always to secure total participation tees, provincial battalions. Regional com-
pressed to point to any edifices he has de- and total involvement on the part of the mittees have forces of regimental and multi-
signed. From 1945 until 1948 he apparently local population in order to establish total regimental size at their disposal, and the
served as a member of the Vietminh /Vietcong Vietcong control. They endeavor to per- whole Vietcong military establishment is
Executive Committee in Nambo and as the suade-and, if conditions permit, compel- subject to the direction of PRP's Central
Communists' propaganda chief for their every inhabitant of a given area to join and Committee. Throughout this military struc-
Saigon Special Zone. The NLF's First Secre- work actively in some NLF component or- ture, the same basic principles of organiza-
tary General (also .the Secretary General of ganization. Farmers are encouraged or tion and command relationship are uni-
the "Radical Socialist Party") was Nguyen forced to join the Liberation Peasants' Asso- formly applied. There is no such thing as
Van Hieu, now its principal traveling repre- ciatlon, women, the Liberation Women's As- a Vietcong military unit of any size inde-
sentative abroad. A former journalist and sociation; children, the Liberation Youth As- pendent of the party's political apparatus
teacher (some say of biology, some of mathe- sociation. Where Vietcong control is strong, or free from tight political control. Probably
matics), Hieu has ,been a Communist propa- no one escapes the net. Physically fit males no more than a third of the Vietcong forces
gandist since the late 1940's. The Chairman not sent off to some other Vietcong military are party members, but by virtue of its or-
of the NLF's External Relations (i.e. foreign unit serve in the local militia squad or self- ganizational mechanism the PRP controls
affairs and propaganda) Committee is Tran defense platoon; women, children, and old the "Liberation Army" in the same way that
Buu Kiem, a Central Committee member men help make bamboo stakes and traps or it controls the National Liberation Front.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1 9 6 6
An understanding of the Vietcong's orga- twice last fall (on Oct. 15 and Dec. 19) when
nizational structure enables us to recognize two public calls by the Vietcong for a
the real significance and function of the "general strike" went totally unheeded and
more than 50,000 persons infiltrated into produced no visible change whatsoever In
South Vietnam since the Lao Dong Party's the pattern of urban life.
.1959 decision to pursue its objective of po-
litical conquest by waging insurgent war.
Until mid to late 1963 these infiltrators were
virtually all ethnic southerners drawn from
the pool of regrouped Vietminh forces and
supporters taken north in 1954. They were
not foot soldiers or cannon fodder (at least
not until Hanoi began sending in whole
North Vietnamese units in late 1964 or early
1965). Instead they were disciplined, trained
and indoctrinated cadres and technicians.
They became the squad leaders, platoon
leaders, political officers, staff officers, unit
commanders, weapons and communications
specialists who built the Vietcong's military
force into what it is today. They also be-
came the village, district, provincial, and
regional committee chiefs and key commit-
tee members who built the Vietcong's po-
litical apparatus.
The earlier arrivals had had at least 5 days
of indoctrination and training In North Viet-
nam, or elsewhere in the Communist bloc,
before departing on their southern missions;
some of the later arrivals have had nearly a
decade of such preparation. Until the recent
sharp rise in Vietcong battlefield casualties,
approximately a third of all the personnel In
Vietcong military units at and above the dis-
trict company level were "returnees" trained
in the north. At least half of the member-
ship of most PBP district committees, and
an even larger proportion at higher echelons,
also appear to be "returnees." Without this
infiltration from the north, in short, the
present Vietcong organization could never
have been developed.
vI
The Vietcong insurgency is clearly a mas-
terpiece of revolutionary organization, but
its total effectiveness and real political
strength are extremely difficult to assess. The
bulk of the Vietcong's organizational efforts
have been expended in rural areas and it is
there that they are strongest. (The govern-
ment controls all of the cities, major towns,
and provincial capitals and all but a hand-
ful of the district seats.) There are indica-
tions, however, that sharply rising Vietcong
taxation rates, Increasingly frequent, resort
to impressment to secure troops, and the
Vietcong's manifest inability to deliver on po-
litical promises of earlier years are all begin-
ning to erode their base of rural support.
During; the past year nearly 800,000 refugees
fled from the hinterland to the vicinity of
government-controlled towns. Some of these
were fleeing from natural disasters, some
from the simple hazards of war (though the
direction in which persons of this category
opted to flee is significant), but many were
obviously endeavoring to get out'from under
the Vietcong. Furthermore, in assessing
Communist claims of control it should be
noted that over half of the rural population
voted in the May 1965 provincial elections,
despite Vietcong orders to boycott them.
In the cities, the Vietcong have an ob-
vious terrorist capability but are politically
quite weak-a fact of which they are aware
and. which, according to captured documents,
causes, them Considerable embarrassment.
They have been unable to turn the urban
political ferment of the past 3 years to any
obvious immediate advantage. None of the
participants in the genuine social revolution
now taking place in the urban areas of
South Vietnam has sought Vietcong support
or entertained overtures of political alliance.
Though they have undoubtedly penetrated
such groups as the Buddhists and the stu-
dents, the Vietcong have made no visible
headway in subverting or bringing them un-
der the NLF banner. Just how weak the
Vietcong are in the cities was demonstrated
Despite its leaders' obvious organizational
talents and revolutionary skills, the Viet-
cong movement is beset with a number of
fundamental weaknesses. It has no uni-
versally appealing theme in any way corn-
parable to the Vietminh's espousal of anti-
French nationalism. Persistent propaganda
efforts to portray the Americans as successor
imperialists to the French have simply never
taken hold. The concept of reunification has
relatively little appeal for peasants who re-
gard someone from the next province as an
alien. The idea of reunification does appeal
to politically minded urban elements, par-
ticularly to refugees from the north, but
within such circles there is a great reluctance
to accept the Vietcong's identification of re-
unification with political domination by the
present Hanoi regime. Having lived through
the sequence of historical events we have
outlined, politically conscious Vietnamese are
not easily deceived by the NLF's pretensions
to independence ,and freedom from northern
control, particularly since the military side
of the Vietcong insurgency is now being
waged with an ever larger number of North
Vietnamese troops.
The current struggle in. South Vietnam is
a historically rooted, political phenomenon
of infinite complexity, particularly since it
involves an externally directed Communist
drive for power interlarded with a genuine
indigenous social revolution. In analyzing
such a phenomenon, "truth" is often a func-
tion of one's angle of vision, and myth is not
always easy to distinguish from reality. De-
spite the fact that there are many aspects of
the current situation in Vietnam concerning
which confident assertion is a ,mark of ig-
norance or disingenuous intent, there are
certain aspects of the insurgency', and of the
Vietcong structure through which it is being
waged, which are not open to intellectually
honest dispute.
There are unquestionably many non-Com-
munists heroically serving in various com-
ponents of the National Liberation Front out
of a desire to redress genuine grievances or in
the honest belief that they are thereby help-
ing to build a better political structure for
their native land. As an organization, how-
ever, the NLF is a contrived political mech-
anism with no indigenous roots, subject to
the ultimate control of the Lao Dong Party in
Hanoi.
The relationship between the Vietcong and
the DRV is not that of politically like-minded
allies. Instead, it is essentially the relation-
ship between a field command and its parent
headquarters. Such relationships are never
free from elements of tension and discord.
Within the Vietcong movement, and even
within its controlling hierarchy, there are
unquestionably varying judgments (at least
privately held ones) about the wisdom of
present tactics and the best course of future
action. (There are obvious differences of
opinion regarding the struggle in Vietnam
even within the Lao Dong Party Politburo.)
Nevertheless, the whole Vietcong organiza-
tional structure and chain of command has
been carefully designed to minimize the risks
of insubordination. Though for tactical rea.-
sons the overt propaganda, outlets and spokes-
men of the NLF sometimes take political po-
sitions which differ at least in emphasis from
those emanating from Hanoi, the chances of
the Vietcong's developing or adopting it gen-
uinely independent political line In opposi-
tion to orders received from North Vietnam
through. the Lao Dong Party apparatus are
slight indeed.
Finally, although the Vietcong organiza-
tion is unquestionably a major factor in the
South Vietnamese political scene, the NLF
mechanism which it controls has no serious
claim to being considered, as Hanoi insists,
the "sole legitimate voice of the South Viet-
namese people." Were it ever to be accepted
as such, the record of what has happened in
North Vietnam in the years since 1951 makes
it abundantly clear what lies in store for the
more than 16 million Vietnamese who live
south of the 17th parallel, especially for those
who have resolutely fought against the Viet-
cong insurgency from its inception.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may yield on
the same terms to the distinguished sen-
ior Senator from Florida.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President., I shall
of course vote for the pending bill. I
supported the bill in committee. I sup-
port the bill now.
Mr. President, the Secretary of Agri-
culture, the Honorable Orville L. Free-
man, spoke at the Governor's Day lunch-
eon of the Florida Citrus Showcase
sponsored by the Florida Citrus Mutual
in Winter Haven, Fla., on Friday, Febru-
ary 18, 1966, just a week after his return
from Vietnam. His speech related in the
main to his observations in Vietnam,
with particular reference to food and the
agricultural situation there.
I feel that Secretary Freeman's speech
throws much light on conditions in Viet-
nam which are directly related to the
contents of the pending bill. I therefore
ask unanimous consent to have the Sec-
retary's speech printed in the RECORD in
full at this point as a part of my remarks.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows :
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE ORVILLE L. FREE-
MAN'S SPEECH AT THE GOVERNOR'S DAY
LUNCHEON OF THE FLORIDA CITRUS SHOW-
CASE, SPONSORED BY THE FLORIDA CITRUS
MUTUAL IN WINTER HAVEN, FLA., FEBRUARY
18, 1966
Mr. Toastmaster, distinguished officers and
leaders of Citrus Mutual, of the Citrus Show-
case, the mayor of this lovely community,
members of your state cabinet, your State
treasurer, your commissioner of agriculture,
members of the State legislature, leaders of
the citrus industry, ladies, and gentlemen,
I am delighted to be here. I am flattered
that you would ask me back again. I was
here with you about a year and a half ago
and enjoyed it thoroughly and am certainly
pleased to be here once again.
I want, today, to talk to you a little bit in
broad terms about agriculture in the world
In which we live. Agriculture is the key to
world peace. Agriculture is the key to the
victory in Vietnam.
First, however, I want to express my most
sincere commendation to you, your organi-
zations and to this industry, to the leader-
ship, the foresight you have shown, to your
excellent job of marketing. I remember,
quite vividly about a year ago, when your
distinguished executive vice president, Bob
Rutledge, who serves you so effectively, came
to my office and reviewed and discussed with
me some of your marketing plans. And I
listened with special interest because I have
been concerned. You had learned how, as
our agriculture has generally, to produce
mightily. Sometimes that really challenges
us in this country.
It is a blessed thing for which we ought
to be truly thankful, but we haven't always
learned how to live with that abundance,
how to market it, and how to effectively get
it where it is needed at the terms and con-
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6157
ditions and at the price where people will later the Vietcong infiltrate the area and take be done if agriculture is not in the forefront
utilize it. And so to note the excellent prog- the village all over again. And that's what in that effort. I said when I returned that
ress in your new plant, the fine reception is happening. What's got to be done is this: in this war, fertilizer is just as Important
of the new concentrate, to note some of the We've got to win the hearts and minds of as bullets, and so it is. The essentials for
good work you have done in marketing those poor people who have been promised effective agricultural production are ready,
abroad, I am glad to have the chance as the and promised and promised and abused and and we can make striking progress in agri-
Secretary of Agriculture to come here and decimated all these years. culture in Vietnam.
say to you, well done. Last year, 1,600 local government officials What I found, really, was far beyond my
A week ago today, I was in a little village were brutally murdered, some of them tor- expectations in light of the hardships under
in South Vietnam at a training camp called tured and captured, simply because they were which those people live. If you ever wanted
Vung Tau. I was sitting on a folding chair doing a good job. The Vietcong is on an or- to see a justification for some of our dollars
beside a canal listening to one of the most ganized, purposeful program of terror and to be spent on helping other people, take a
impressive men I have ever heard in my life. destruction. This would be the equivalent in look at agriculture in Vietnam. It has only
Dressed in a simple, black pajama, he out- the United States of 50,000 mayors and coun- been 10 years and yet those little farmers,
lined for me the course of training of the ty commissioners. Now if 50,000 local officials most of them tenants, or landowners with
rural construction cadres, made up of peasant in this country were murdered in one year- very small holdings, are using very modern
boys who volunteered to go back into their it's anybody's guess as to what it would practices of improved seed, fertilizer, chem-
home provinces and villages to hold those mean. Now these boys who go out of this icals, and pesticides, disease control in ani-
villages, to pacify those villages, after the camp are to work with the military in areas mals, and all the rest, whenever they can get
military has taken them away from the Viet- being pacified or already pacified. They are it. They don't want it free. They want to
cong. to go into an area in teams of 59 men. They buy it. But so far we haven't done as good
He was a tremendously impressive fellow. are highly trained; highly armed. They a job as we should, in making it available.
Some had likened him to a saint. He said know how to use those weapons. They are But where it has been available, they make
in a very soft voice that these young boys highly motivated to help the peasants, but every effort to get it.
are looking for some meaning in their lives they are ready to fight. But they don't go I talked to one peasant who walked 15
which had been wrecked by war. All their into the countryside to fight, they go there miles with a basket on his head to buy 50
lives had been `spent in a nation engaged in to build. pounds of fertilizer and get a little package
war. They have been pretty cynical, gen- And as Gen. Nguyen Due Thang, Minis- of seed and walked 15 miles back to his
erally, as to their stake in its future. And ter of Rural Construction, a very impressive little hamlet. He knew about fertilizer. He
he told a little legend, very simple, about the young Vietnamese'general, said to me, ,we knew about improved seed. All he wanted
beautiful lady and the dragon and how an don't go to hit and run, we go to hit and was a chance to use them, because, when he
accommodation between the lady and the stay." And they go to the villages-their does, his yield of rice goes up 50 percent.
dragon was developed and sustained. The home villages in many cases-and they seek And when yields go up 50 percent, he can
spiritual side of life was the beautiful lady, to get close to where those people live; to let buy his kids some clothes, and they have a
the materialistic and powerful side of life them know that their government believes in little money in the village to build a little
was the dragon, and the harmony of the two them, wants to help them, to give them a school. They then build a little better home.
was what gave meaning to life. stake in life. Then they have a stake in something. Then
He went on with some other legends, and I said to the general, "Well, now, I am the when the Vietcong come in after it, they are
then said in a soft voice, "to the Vietnamese, head of a cadre and I'm going into a village prepared to fight, and inform, and resist.
this is much more understandable than the that has just been reclaimed. What's the What we need to do is to integrate agricul-
material of communism. The boys who have first thing I do?" He said to me, "You keep tore effectively in the forefront of the second
gone out of here have learned to be for some- your mouth shut." I thought that was a front of this two-front war.
thing. They go out to secure and to hold pretty good answer. He said when those Last Sunday, I was on the coast about in
these villages and fight to hold them if neces- folks want some help, you help them to help the midlands in Vietnam in an area called
sary." themselves. You don't give them anything; Phan Rang. I stood on a little plot of land
And then he developed some of the symbol- because if you give them something, it's not on the coast that was plain sand. It had
ism which was a powerful part of this train- really theirs. If the Vietcong destroy it, it been sand dunes: It had been government
ing course. He gave me one of their gradua- is not their loss. But if you help them land. It had been levelled off. Chinese
tion pins. It has a T-H symbol on it, some- build something and the Vietcong destroys technicians from Taiwan were there. They
what like our owp 4-H Club symbol. He it, then it is their loss. worked with the Vietnamese farmers on new
drew a hammer and a sickle on the black- About 20,000 have been trained already, techniques in growing vegetables. An onion,
board, and then put the T-H over it. The and their training will be stepped up. The an adaptation of the Granex onion out of
hammer and the sickle were obliterated and Vietnamese Government has elected a num- Texas that had been adapted by one of our
he said these boys are obliterating that ham- ber of villages to be pacified with the help plant technicians-took them 4 years to do
mer and sickle everywhere around Vietnam, of these cadres. This is a hardheaded, hard- It-was being planted on that hectare of
We then looked at the rifle range. These hitting, systematic job of pacification. And land the peasant had gotten as a part of
men, he told me, fire more ammunition than it is, as I say, a thoroughly planned and pur- the land reform program. He netted on that
the regular troops that are trained for actual poseful one. It carries within it, I think, the 214 acres 200,000 piastres-that's $2,000 in
battle. Then we saw the classrooms where formula of victory. American money. Growing rice in the same
they get general exposure to health, voca- Now this is the meaning of the spirit of area, they were netting about $20 an acre.
tional, and agricultural training. Honolulu. I have just been back a few days That peasant had a little irrigation sys-
At the conclusion of their rural construc- and I have been rather shocked tQ find a good tem. He and a dozen others had gone to-
tion training, the night before they grad- bit of cynicism about this in some quarters. gether to buy a little gasoline engine pump
uate, they sit out all night long and make I have difficulty understanding that because for a shallow well. They had put in a little
up their minds whether they want to take in Honolulu the President dramatized for the Irrigation works-some shallow ditches. We
a pledge which is part of the graduation attention of the entire world the best in saw the water flowing out. Onions, garlic
ceremony next day, and take on the re- principles, the beat in standards, that this and other kinds of vegetables were growing
sponsibility for caring for the ideals which Nation has; that we built ourselves to great- profusely. I had a picture taken with him
he outlined; self-discipline, service, honesty, ness with service, humanitarianism, concern with a basket of onions and vegetables be-
mercy to the old, the sick and the needy. for the people. sides, of all things, a bright red motorbike.
This was couched in the traditional Viet- This is a second front of a two-front war. He had made a little money, the first thing
namese terms rather than ours but the mean- We have to win the tough, hard, difficult he wanted was a motorbike. Comparatively,
ing was exactly the same. military part of this war. But of equal im- you'd buy a Cadillac. And maybe he will
He said that during the new year celebra- portance has to be the second part, what one day, too. But a motorbike is a desirable
tion, the big ceremony of Vietnam, down they call a social revolution in Vietnam. The status symbol; it means transportation.
the road in a single military camp they had word revolution has a much more positive And in this same area, I went to the vil-
50 percent AWOL; in a military police train- cast to it, and it is broadly used, to give an lage where he lived. They had a little self-
ing school they had 25 percent AWOL. But identity, to give a meaning, to give a purpose help program to build a warehouse. The
there wasn't a single man in the rural con- to the lives of those people so that when the material was made available to them by the
struction cadre who left. I was tremend- Vietcong come in, the people will notify the Vietnamese Government with our help. The
ously intrested in this training center, be- authorities so they can be rooted out. If people built the warehouse themselves. They
cause they have a workable system and it's they hide the Vietcong, If they protect them, were renting space in it to dry garlic. The
based on hard experience that can win if they don't report them, then it is an almost rent was being paid. The village had made
peasant support and ultimately win the war impossible task. So there is a two-front, a little money and they were putting it in
in Vietnam. sharp, clear objective-an objective in which a school and a health clinic.
The military struggle is a bitter, difficult, I think we can feel pride, that we as a nation This was the only place I went in Viet-
complicated one. You don't know who the go out not only to stop the onrush of com- nam where the province chief could travel
enemy is a good share of the time. We munism, but also go on to start and carry at night out in the countryside. Most of
have the power and the resource and the forward the onrush of human and social the time they would go to see the people
fighting capacity to win the fighting war. betterment. during the day. This fellow said to me, "I
But that doesn't do much good if a week I submit to you here today that that won't don't bother these people who are working
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6158,' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1966
in the fields by going to see them in the I was impressed with them, with their I wonder if the committee is in ac-
daytime. I go out and see them in the albility and their dedication but also with cord with the view of the Secretary, that
night, when they are available." the fact that they area smart, tough .binich. it would not presently be useful from our
He was able to do that because his area They had to be to survive. Some of them overall point of view to attack Haiphong
was pacified. If the Vietcong move into that have been wounded six Mimes. They were either by bombing or mining.
area he would be notified. He was a tough fighting in the jungles almost before they view
soldier but he was very good with these peo- could walk. To survive that and the po- MWasr. RUSSELL a of i GGeeoorrggiaa. fashion That at view
ple, and it is not a normal mandarin attitude, laical wars, the coups and the rest, they
you know, to say, "I adapt myself to the peo- have to have something on the ball. And General Wheeler, as I recall, in his testi-
ple." Politicians do that in the United they know as sure as day follows night that many before the committee. I must say,
States. They do not normally do that in they can't win that war, repel that Invasion, with all due respect to General
Asia. But this philosophy was going for- and make Vietnam a free nation. unless they Wheeler-and I do have very genuine
ward. He could go out at night, because if can earn the support and loyalty of their respect for him-that in my opinion it
anybody infiltrated that area, he got the people. And so for that reason if for no flies in the face of commonsense to say
word. And when he got the word, he got the other reason, they are going about their that the closing of the harbor at Hai-
troops out there and the Vietcong didn't last business. They don't do It always like we
very long. This was an example of what can do. They are not as efficient and effective phong has a lower priority than the
be done. It isn't easy. as your Commissioner Of Agriculture here, bombing of the petroleum dumps, the
These peasants have been promised to for example, and your State Treasurer Not petroleum for which has come in. through
death. They are pretty skeptical; pretty as experienced in government, but they are Haiphong Harbor.
cynical. They have been terrorized, brutal- tough minded, alert, and determined. It seems to me it would be self-evi-
ized, murdered, taxed by both sides, run off I went to Vietnam and took with me at dent even to a lay mind that it would be
their land, run back on their land, and they the President's instructions 10 of the best the Stopper of
have been in this war for 20 years. But I agricultural specialists in this country in the more a bottle than effective to to pour close
out the contents
feel, really, that the sense of hopelessness fields of crops, chemicals, livestock, irriga-
and complacency that seems to permeate tion, and fishing--and we came back feeling and set the bottle back down to be
some parts of this country is not permanent. positive; not overwhelmingly optimistic, refilled. That is all that would be ac-
There is a base, for real hope; that we can building glowing word pictures, but feeling Complished by clearing the petroleum
win this war; that we can help these people. that there is a real purpose and that this is dumps, because the next day a tanker
This nation can be a real bastion for freedom not a hopeless morass, that this war can be could come into Haiphong and replenish
If we remember that this is a two-front war, won and that it is vitail',y important that it these dumps.
that force alone is ineffective, that to go along should be won. We also felt real pride in our There are a number of ways to close
with it you have to have service, accomplish- own profession of agriculture, because it is There
harbor other than bombing. I oe
ment, and build a stake in society. the key. Agriculture is the key in Vietnam,
A lot of people have asked me, "What as it is the key around the world in the great not committed altogether to closing the
about these young generals? Do they mean ;race taking place between food and people. harbor by bombing. It so happens that
it and will they do it?" It's hard to tell. On February 10, the President sent to the there is a narrow waterway leading into
You can only make a judgment. Congress a great message, a food-for-freedom the harbor. Two dredges work there
I spent 3 hours in an airplane with Gen- message, calling on this Nation to mobilize constantly. Those dredges could, be
eral Ky. He is 35 years old. He is the Prime its agricultural resources and to wheel them sunk by naval gunfire to close the harbor
Minister. He was the commanding general into action to help those nations who would It could be mined,
of their air corps; very colorful, very smart, help themselves so that this race can be won for it a could, short ort period. . desired, be bombed; n a
no particular background in government as and the world will be able to feed itself.
such. I met all the corps commanders and This is the greatest challenge we face down naval blockade could be established with
all the top generals. The ruling group is the road, a half dozen destroyers.
about a dozen. 1 found them, without ex- All of us who work in this great area, then, But I think it is self-evident that the
ception, bright and alert. They said the work not only to serve our Nation and our closing of the harbor itself would be more
right words, and they said them with feel- communities. We stand right at the heart- injurious to the war effort of the North
ing. beat of the future well-being of mankind. Vietnamese than bombing supplies, even
For example, General Ky said a number of A world that isn't fed, a? world plagued and
times: "It is a military war and a war for dogged by famine and desperation and trial- as important as a petroleum dump,
the hearts of our people. We cannot win one nutrition, is never going to be a peaceful which can be immediately replenished by
without winning the other. But the war for world. So as you skillfully carry forward another tanker coming into that harbor.
the hearts of the people is more than a mill- your work in this great industry, we join in It simply does not make sense to me to
tary tactic. It is a moral principle. We are seeking to use the power that comes with this say that closing the harbor has a much
trying to bring about a true social revolution. great capacity to produce and as a great free lower priority than these petroleum
We are instituting a program for a better Nation to use it effectively, so other people dumps.
society." can have as great a stake in freedom as we Mr. CLARK. So to that extent, the
tic then went on to say, "I think that the have and there is no stake where there is no Senator disagrees with Secretary McNa-
present government by and large has the con- food. Mara?
fidence of the people. I think it has a greater The challenge down the road is a great, one
measure of support than any of the pre- but is one that I think we can meet. I came Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Oh, yes,
vious governments. But that's not enough. back from Vietnam challenged but rea:,sured. indeed, I disagree flatly with him on that
We must have a government which has been We'll win this one as we have won them point, and also disagree with General
freely elected by the people. Despite the before. Wheeler.
many tasks we have on our hands today, I Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Press- I wish to add that at one time all the
feel we can take on one more. And one,
which next to winning the war I speak about, dent, will the Senator from Pennsylvania Chiefs harbor of f Staff Hthought should that have a closing the
very
is most Important and that is building permit us to have the yeas and nays on priority, and Haiphong o it is only o have a very
democracy in Vietnam." final passage? high
there has been any disagreement among
Prime Minister Ky saJd extemporaneously The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there ff.
when the Vice President left Saigon: "I am a sufficient second? There :is a sufficient the Mr. Joint Chiefs of of Staff.
Mr. President,
sure Mr. HUMPHREY, prior to his visit here, second, and the yeas and nays are
was not convinced of the ability of the young ordered. will the Senator yield?
generals, sometimes called the young Turks, Mr. CLARK. Mr. 1President, there has Mr. CLARK. Gladly.
to rule our nation. I'm sure that now he
numb recognize that we .are more civilian been some discussion. in the last couple
than the civilians, and we love freedom of minutes about the possible bombing Georgia brought up the point I intended
more than freemen and desire democracy or mining of Haiphong Harbor. I should to bring up, there is disagreement in
more than you do in the United States." like to call to the attention of the Sen- testimony before the committee. So .[
The Prime Minister grabbed a microphone ators the statement made by Secretary hope the American people will be in.-
in Honolulu at the conclusion of the press McNamara on page 177 of the record formed, and information not classified.
conference and said, "I'm not a war lord. Where he testified that since the tonnage There is disagreement among the mili-
I'm tired of fighting. I've been shot at all required for the support of enemy troops tary as to the importance of closing the
my life. I risk assassination every day. I in South Vietnam is relatively small, the harbor at Haiphong.
want to win this war and help my people."
He said, "I don't have a car. I don't have function of mining the harbor of Hai- Why should they not close that, har-
any property," and went on to say that his phong--and I imagine it would be the bor? Only two railroads come down
stake was one of service. same result from bombing the harbor of from China. One which we have not
Only time will tell how sincere and effec- Haiphong-would not materially affect been hitting since the resumption is the
tive these young generals are. the course of the war itself. railroad from the industrial section of
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Manchuria into Vietnam. The other It appears in the hearings that if we duce in any substantial way the contribution
railroad comes from west to east. From were to destroy the petroleum depots in of the North to South Vietnam.
the standpoint of commonsense and North Vietnam, and they got no fuel for Paraphrasing the Senator from Mis-
economy, why would they use that? But their trucks in the south, they-that is, sours, he said that if they are getting
we have been hitting that latter rail- the enemy-could move the quantities of their material .through Haiphong, it does
road. There are a few roads which in supplies now being moved by animal and not amount to anything, and if North
the main I understand are not in too by manpower. At page 299 of the hear- Vietnam is not contributing anything of
good shape. ings, Admiral McDonald asserted that substance to South Vietnam, meaning to
But nobody could know what is com- the Vietcong in South Vietnam need few the South Vietnamese, the anti-
ing through the Haiphong Harbor. Tes- petroleum items, because they walk Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Viet-
timony before the committee admits, a everywhere. cong.
very large majority of the oil moving into Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Well, that Mr. SCOTT. Yes, the Vietcong, in
North Vietnam comes through the har- is true when one measures their equip- other words-then said the Senator from
bor at Haiphong. Obviously, those ment against the vehicles that are op- Missouri, where are the Vietcong-if I
trucks that go down the Ho Chi Minh erated in modern warfare. can paraphrase him further-where are
Trail must have that oil to be used. But petroleum is still a very essential the Vietcong getting their supplies from?
Statements have been made that it is element of war. Most of the materiel What would the Senator from Georgia
thought relatively little ammunition that is carried from Haiphong down into say to that?
comes through the harbor; but who South Vietnam over the many branches Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would
knows what is in the boxes on the docks of the Ho Chi Minh trail is carried by say that they are getting it from a great
of that harbor? There is no reason for trucks. We have had the good luck many sources. As I stated a few mo-
anybody to extrapolate what the many once or twice lately to find a truck con- ments ago, undoubtedly thousands of
ships going into that harbor have on voy exposed on the roads and attack it hand grenades are being made in North
them. Anybody who looks at the map from the air, and have destroyed a great Vietnam. An iron foundry, I believe, is
knows the Haiphong Harbor is the eas- many of the trucks. located on the outskirts of Hanoi, or it
iest, least expensive, and most effective Those people, however, are resource- could be on the outskirts of Haiphong,
way of getting in the tremendous ful. We had evidence before the com- but they do have one iron foundry which
amounts of supplies coming into North mittee that they were using elephants does make some equipment; but, the
Vietnam to kill our troops in South Viet- to carry supplies, and that they were great bulk of their equipment, all of
nam. If anybody does not think most using large numbers of people, bearers, their sophisticated equipment, such as
of it;is coming through the harbor, where who can carry three or four times their 50 caliber machine guns, 55 millimeter
else it is coming from? own weight. recoilless rifles, their burp guns, and
The answer we hear is, "They don't Mr. CLARK. And bicycles. rifles-some of which have telescopic
need very much." But I was down in the Mr. RUSSELL ? of Georgia. Yes; that sights which can be favorably compared
Mekong Delta in recent weeks, and saw they would put on a bicycle 300 or 400 to any weapons we turn out, the great
hundreds of magnificent weapons-made pounds of equipment, and push it along. bulk of them come either from China or
mostly in China, but also quite a few They are very resourceful people. from Russia. Most of those which come
from Soviet Russia-on exhibit in the They have been engaged in a war of this from Russia are actually made at the
center of the town square in Can Tho. nature now for more than 20 years. Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia.
That exhibit showed to my satisfaction Mr. CLARK. Since the Japanese
where those weapons were coming from. moved in. Mr. SCOTT. Therefore, they have to
come down from China, not from Russia.
If they do not come over the railroad Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. They have
we are not attacking, and if they do not had a great deal of experience in it, and Earlier testimony indicates that the bulk
come from the harbor, where are they are probably the most efficient guerrilla of petroleum comes in through Haiphong,
coming from? As we know, the Com- fighters on earth today, and would com- yet I am told to ignore that.
munists do not have any logistic sup- pare favorably with any in recorded his- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It practi-
port in the way of air power. tory. cally all comes in through Haiphong.
Mr. CLARK. I say to my, friend, the Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend the Most of the weapons come in through
Senator from Georgia; I have only one Senator from Georgia, and I yield the Haiphong. That is the reason why I say
or two questions more. The hour is get- floor. that we should close the port at Hal-
ting late; we are almost ready to vote. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- phong. It is a natural step for us to take.
I should like, if I can, to finish it up. ^ dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum. Mr. SCOTT. I completely agree with
On page 178, the Secretary of Defense Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the the Senator from Georgia that it should
testified that the industries in North Senator withhold his request, and yield be closed in one of the several ways the
Vietnam contribute very little to the sup- to me for a moment? Senator has mentioned, but we are asked
plies used in the south for the prosecu- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to to believe something which, to me, is a
tion of the war. the Senator from Pennsylvania. semantic impossibility. We are asked to
He also said that wiping out the en- Mr. SCOTT. I mention to the distin- believe that North Vietnam contributes
tire industry of North Vietnam would guished Senator from Georgia that the nothing to South Vietnam, that anyway
have no measurable effect upon their distinguished Senator from Missouri it does not matter if petroleum does come
capability to furnish the supplies they [Mr. SYMINGTON] asked a question which in, although it does come into Haiphong
are presently supplying to the Commu- has not been answered, and I would ap- from Russia, that the economy of North
nist forces in South Vietnam. preciate the help of the Senator in sup- Vietnam really contributes nothing to
Does the Senator agree with that? plying an answer. South Vietnam and therefore we should
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No; I do Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank not worry about it. Admiral McDonald
not agree with it in into. I think it is the Senator for the compliment implied. clarifies the situation further by saying
substantially correct. But I have infor- Mr. SCOTT. I am sure the Senator that it does not matter about motorized
mation and we have had some evidence has information which would be helpful transportation because everyone in Viet-
that there is an iron foundry in the vi- and useful. nam walks, anyway. He goes on to ex-
cinity of Hanoi, which manufactures The reference made by the junior Sen- plain that last statement by saying that
literally millions of hand grenades that ator from Pennsylvania was to page 178, they walk from the 19th parallel but
are being used in this war. the testimony of Secretary McNamara, use motorized transportation from the
With that exception, I think that the wherein, he stated: north. If they use motorized transpor-
Secretary's statement is approximately The industry in the north is so small that tation from the north, let me observe
correct. it plays a very little role in the economy of that I know very little about motors but
Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator the north, and I think any of the analysts I do know that they require fuel, lubri-
from Georgia for his patience. I have who have studied the problem would say it cants; gasoline, yet we are told that while
one final question. could be completely eliminated and not re- this comes entirely from Russia yet the
No. 49-4
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CONGrRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1966
contribution from North Vietnam really
amounts to nothing to South Vietnam.
Now, let me say to the Senator from
Georgia, the more testimony I read, the
more confused I get. Can the Senator
help me find my way through this morass
of semantics?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I had as-
sumed that the statement referred to by
the Secretary referred mainly to princi-
pal weapons which might be manufac-
tured in North Vietnam. I do not be-
lieve that the Secretary would take a
position the weapons did not come
through, because North Vietnam is the
only place they could come from. I be-
lieve that he is referring to sources of
production more than he is referring to
sources of supply.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Georgia yield?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator will
recall in one of the hearings that cap-
tured North Vietnamese weapons were
displayed as coming from China or
Russia.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sena-
tor is correct.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Certainly, none
of them was manufactured in North
Vietnam.
[v[r. RUSSELL of Georgia. But they
had to come in through North Vietnam.
Mr. SCOTT. Well, if the contribution
of North Vietnam to South Vietnam is
not worth anything, in the words of the
Secretary-if the Secretary is right-
"it could be completely eliminated,
referring to the industry of the north,
and not reduce in any substantial way
the contribution of the North to South
Vietnam."
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.
Mr. SCOTT. He is bypassing the fact
that the North Vietnamese people are re-
ceiving oil and Chinese and Russian
weapons; is that not a fact?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As I stated,
[. thought the Secretary was referring to
sources of production and not sources of
supply.
Of course, North Vietnam has a very
limited industry. They do manufacture
some weapons, but the principal weap-
ons being utilized against us are made
in China or sent from Russia. They are
the two principal sources of supply.
They are supplying them with vast quan-
tities of sophisticated, deadly, and lethal
weapons.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the ap-
propriation for military construction re-
quested in this supplemental bill
amounts to $1,238,400,000, distributed
among the services as follows: Depart-
ment of the Army, $509,700,000; Depart-
ment of the Navy, $254,600,000; Depart-
ment of the Air Force, $274,100,000; and
Department of Defense, emergency fund,
$200 million.
I would like to point out that this is
only -a further increment to military
construction funds for southeast Asia.
To date we have already appropriated
for southeast Asia, approximately $417,-
700,000, distributed as follows: Army,
$162,200,000; Navy, $117,600,000; Air
Force, $137,900,000.
By the way of explanation, I would
like to point out that funds spent, funds
available, and the funds presently in this
bill will make a total appropriation for
military construction, southeast Asia,
amounting to $1,656,100,000.
In view of the urgency of this con-
struction money for southeast Asia, the
Military Construction Subcommittee of
the Appropriations Committee, did not
review the many projects in this bill in
our usually thorough manner, meaning
that we did not go into a detailed review
of each individual project and the hold-
ing of extensive hearings. A great deal
of the information concerning these
projects is classified; however, the De-
partment of Defense and the military
services did furnish the subcommittee
with classified information as to the lo-
cation of projects and the intended scope
of construction.
This bill contains language which will
insure that the Congress will be fully in-
formed as to how the Department of De-
fense and the military services expend
these appropriations. I am sure every-
one in this body knows my views con-
cerning the constitutional responsibility
of the Congress in matters of defense
policy. There is in this supplemental
bill, section 102, subsection B, language
which reads as follows:
(b) Within 30 days after the end of each
quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall ren-
der to the Committees on Armed Services
and Appropriations of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, a report with
respect to the estimated. value by purpose,
by country, of support furnished from such
appropriations.
I wish to point out to my colleagues
of the Senate that part of this construc-
tion money will be expended on perma-
nent facilities both in the United States
and overseas; for example, money will
be spent for construction on bases for
Guam, Okinawa, Wake Island, and in
the United States which I will discuss
later in this presentation.
A major construction effort is required
to provide the proper logistic base from
which to project our military operations
in South Vietnam. The major portion
of the military construction funds in
this bill :amounting to $736,600,000 is for
construction in South Vietnam; approxi-
mately $325 million is for facilities out-
side of South Vietnam to support our
logistics and communication bases; and
$63,421,000 is for construction in the
United States, which is solely to support
our southeast Asia operations. As fur-
ther examples, we plan to spend approxi-
mately $36 million in the Republic of
the Philippines mainly for supply and
operational facilities including hospitals
and utilities. Thirteen million, six hun-
dred and ninety thousand dollars is ear-
marked for Guam for hospitals and med-
ical facilities, operational facilities and
troop housing.
I would like to close, Mr. President,
by saying that the effectiveness of our
highly trained forces with their modern
equipment will be greatly enhanced
when the items contained in this mili-
tary construction program begin to be
used.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mc-
GOVERN in the chair). Pursuant to the
unanimous-consent agreement entered
into yesterday, the Senate will now pro-
ceed to vote on H.R. 13546.
The question is on the engrossment of
the amendments and third reading of the
bill.
The amendments were ordered to be
engrossed and the bill to be read a third
time.
The bill was :read the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
having been read the third time the ques-
tion is, Shall it pass? On this question
the yeas and nays have been ordered;
and the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce
that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr.
GORE] and the Senator from New Mex-
ico [Mr. MONTOYA], are absent on official
business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Indiana [Mr. BAYH1, the Senator from
Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from
Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], the Senator
from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the
Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Rus-
SELL], and the Senator from Alabama
[Mr. SPARKMAN 1, are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr.
BAYH], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr.
GORE], the Senator from Alabama [Mr.
HILL], the Senator from Michigan [Mr.
McNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Is-
land [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from
South Carolina [Mr. RUSSELL], and the
Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN],
would each vote "Yea."
Mr. DIRKSEN. I announce that the
Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is
absent on official business.
The Senator from California I Mr.
KUcHEL] is absent because of illness.
The Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER]
is necessarily absent.
If present and voting, the Senator from
New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from
California [Mr. KuCHEL1, and the Sena-
tor from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] would each
vote "yea."
The result was announced--yeas 87,
nays 2, as follows:
[No. 59 Leg.]
YEAS-87
Aiken
Fulbright
Mundt
Allott
Harris
Murphy
Anderson
Hart
Muskle
Bartlett
Hartke
Nelson
Bass
Hayden
Neuberger
Bennett
Hickenlooper
Pearson
Bible
Holland
Pell
Boggs
Hruska
Prouty
Brewster
Inouye
Proxmire
Burdick
Jackson
Randolph
Byrd, Va.
Jordan, N.C.
Riblcoff
W. Va.
Byrd
Jordan, Idaho
Robertson
,
Cannon
Kennedy, Mass. Russell, Gs..
Carlson
Kennedy, N.Y.
Saltonstall
Case
Lausche
Scott
Church
Long, Mo.
Simpson
Clark
Long, La.
Smathers
Cooper
Magnuson
Smith
Cotton
Mansfield
Stennis
Curtis
McCarthy
Symington.
Dirksen
McClellan
Talmadge
Dodd
McGee
Thurmond
Dominick
McGovern
Tower
Douglas
McIntyre
Tydings
Eastland
Metcalf
Williams, N.J.
Ellender
Mondale
Williams, Del.
Ervin
Monroney
Yarborough
Fannin
Morton
Young, N. Oak.
Fong
Moss
Young, Ohio
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NAYS-2
Gruening
Morse
NOT VOTING-11
Bayh
Kuchel
Pastore
Gore
McNamara
Russell, S.C.
Frill
Miller
Sparkman
Javits
Montoya
So the bill (H.R. 13546) was passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr.
RussELL] again has used his unmatched
military expertise and his strong and
articulate advocacy to obtain the Sen-
ate's overwhelming approval of the
defense supplemental appropriation.
Again, that outstanding statesman has
won for our fighting men, whose vital
needs he knows so well, the decisive sup-
port they deserve so much. All America
is grateful for his deep and abiding devo-
tion. For all America recognizes that
he, more than anyone, has assured the
reality of his avowed objective: To see
that our soldiers are better supplied than
any other fighting men on earth. No
man has worked harder to achieve that
goal.
The success of this vital appropriation
was due also to the efforts of the Senate's
highly able patriarch, the distinguished
chairman of the Appropriations Commit-
tee, the Senator from Arizona [Mr.
HAYDEN] who backed this measure with
the wise advocacy which has character-
ized his many decades of outstanding
service in this body. To the distin-
guished senior Senators from Rhode
Island [Mr. PASTORE] and from Missouri
[Mr. SYMINGTON], a debt of gratitude is
owed for their strong and articulate
support.
Additionally, we are indebted as always
to the distinguished senior Senator from
Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] for his
cooperative support. The eloquent plea
for swift and decisive Senate action by
the ranking minority member of the
Appropriations Committee helped im-
mensely to assure this great success.
We appreciate too the help given by
the distinguished senior Senator from
Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] and by the
junior Senators from South Dakota [Mr.
MCGOVERN] and Arkansas [Mr. FUL-
BRIGHT], whose analytical discussions
were typically provocative and enlight-
ening. To the distinguished senior Sen-
ator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] goes high
commendation for again applying his
cooperative .efforts to assure the prompt
and orderly action of the Senate on this
important measure.
Finally, I personally am grateful to the
Senate as a whole both for its swift and
efficient action and for giving its un-
equivocal backing to those brave fight-
ing men who deserve it so much.
DEATH OF MILTON KELLY, OF THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have just noticed on the AP ticker a
news item to the effect that an old and
good friend, Milton Kelly, Associated
Press reporter since 1930, died today in
George Washington Hospital after a long
illness.
I have known Milton Kelly for many
years. He was a man of sound integrity.
He was a fair man. He did his job well.
I have watched him in his illness over
the past several years. I have noticed
him come back time after time after
time, always with a cheery smile. He al-
ways did a good job. He was always con-
siderate of others.
It is with deep sadness that I note the
passing of Milt Kelly. Mrs. Mansfield
and I extend our deepest sympathy to
his family. Milt was a good friend and
a good man.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Pres-
Ident, I hope the Senator will per-
mit me to associate myself with all he
has said with respect to Milton Kelly.
It has been my pleasure and privilege
to deal with hundreds of members of the
press during my public career, which
has stretched over a number of years,
but I have never known a man I trusted
more completely in discussing matters
that would help him with the story, but
were not for publication, than I did
Milton Kelly. He was indeed a gentle-
man to the manner born, a man of
integrity and courage. We mourn his
passing, and extend our sympathy to his
family.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I, too,
wish to associate myself with the
remarks just made. It was with sadness
that I learned about the passing of Milt
Kelly. I knew him as a fine, searching
newspaperman, a fine reporter, a man of
great integrity and character.
I am saddened to hear the news of his
death. I am sure all of us extend to his
family our feelings of deep sadness and
affection.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
was saddened to learn of the passing of
G. Milton Kelly. Milt Kelly, as he was
affectionately known, was a highly re-
spected and capable journalist whose
pleasant and affable way won many
friends for him in his tenure as an Asso-
ciated Press reporter assigned to the U.S.
Senate.
His coverage of some of the most con-
troversial and heated investigations
which took place in the Senate during
his service here was noted for its objec-
tivity and fairness to all sides. Milt will
be sorely missed by the Members of the
Senate, his many friends, and by his
colleagues in the journalism profession.
AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE MES-
SAGES, FILE REPORTS, AND SIGN
BILLS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that during the
adjournment of the Senate following
today's session, the Secretary of the
Senate be authorized to receive messages
from the President of the United States
and the House of Representatives; that
committees be authorized to file reports;
and that the Vice President or President
pro tempore be authorized to sign duly
enrolled bills.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
FRIDAY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that when the
Senate completes its business today it ad-
6161
journ until 12 o'clock noon on Friday
next.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
TIRE SAFETY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that when S.
2669, the tire safety bill, is reported from
the Committee on Commerce it be made
the pending business.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MORSE. The bill just read is to
be the pending business on Friday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from
Montana expect disposition of that bill
on Friday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not know.
Mr. MAGNUSON. The bill as being
reported by the committee has been
worked over, and practically all of the
committee is unanimous in the reporting
of the bill. Several sections were modi-
fled and amended. I do not expect too
much opposition to the bill as reported.
The bill merely affects uniform tire
safety as against another bill on which
we are holding hearings which deals with
automobile safety.
Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator an-
ticipate a rollcall vote on Friday?
Mr. MAGNUSON. I would like to have
a rolicall vote on the bill when we are all
through with it. That depends on how
far we get with the bill on Friday.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Sena-
tor insist on a rolicall vote?
Mr. MAGNUSON. I would not insist
on a rolicall vote.
Mr. MORSE. I think if the Senator
wants it we should have it. It may be
necessary to rearrange our programs so
that those of us who do not wish to miss
rollcall votes may be present.
I do not understand why we quit on
Tuesday and reconvene on Friday.
Mr. MAGNUSON. This bill has not
been reported. We are working on the
report. I believe it will be filed late
today. It is doubtful. It may be tomor-
row morning. I would be glad to accom-
modate any Senators if there is sufficient
interest in a rolicall vote and the leader-
ship says we will vote on it at a time
certain on Monday.
Mr. MORSE. I am not speaking for
myself, although I am included in what
I say, but I am advised that several
Members of the Senate plan to be away
on Friday for various party affairs-I
mean political party affairs-and per-
haps we could have a vote on Monday
and not have a vote on Friday, in view
of the fact that there is this long post-
ponement from Tuesday until Friday
when we are ready to stay here during
the week and do business. I am ready
to stay Friday, but I wish to know if it
is necessary to cancel my engagement on
Friday to be here to cast my vote.
Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I would not
say that. We will see what we can do.
I am certain this can be worked out to
the satisfaction of all Senators.
Mr. MAGNUSON. The Senator from
Washington would bethe last to suggest
otherwise.
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.
USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the sen-
ate proceed to the consideration of Cal-
endar No. 1046, Senate 801.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will
be stated by title for the information
of the Senate..
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill, S. 801,
to improve the balance-of-payments
position of the United States by permit-
ting the use of reserved foreign curren-
cies in lieu of dollars for current expen-
ditures.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob-
jection to the present consideration of
the bill?
There being no objection, the bill was
considered, ordered to be engrossed for
a third reading, read the third time, and
passed, as follows:
3. 801
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America to Congress assembled, That any
foreign currencies held by the United States
which have been or may be reserved or set
aside for specified programs or activities of
any agency of the Government may be used
by Federal agencies for any authorized pur-
pose, except (1) that reimbursement shall
he made to the Treasury from applicable ap-
propriations of the agency concerned, and
(2) that any foreign currencies so used shall
be replaced when needed for the purpose for
which originally reserved or set aside.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the RECORD an excerpt from the re-
port (No. 1078). explaining the purposes
of the bill.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
The purpose of the bill is to permit Fed-
eral agencies to use any authorized foreign
currencies held by the United States which
have been or may be reserved or set aside
for specified programs or activities of any
agency of the Government. The bill would
require that reimbursement must be made
to the Treasury from applicable appropria-
tions of the agency seeking the funds and
foreign currencies so used must be replaced
when needed for the purpose for which orig-
inally reserved or set aside.
GENERAL STATEMENT
3. 801 was introduced by Senators Boars
and 1DOMINICK on January 28, 1965, and was
referred to the Banking and Currency Com-
mittee. Comments from the following agen-
cies were requested: Treasury, State, Agricul-
ture, and General Accounting. All of these
agencies have submitted favorable reports.
No objections to the bill have been brought
to the attention of the committee.
An identical bill, S. 2115, 88th Congress,
was considered by the committee and re-
ported to the Senate on March 3, 1964 (S.
Rept. 1932). S. 2115 passed the Senate on
March 6, 1964. The bill was referred to the
House Ways and Means Committee, but no
action was taken before adjournment.
8. 801 would provide on a permanent basis
authority which Congress has provided on an
annual. basis for the fiscal years 1964, 1965,
and 1966 by the Inclusion of an appropriate
provision in the Public Works Appropria-
tion Act for those fiscal years.
The following excerpt from the statement
made by Senator Boars when he introduced
the earlier bill explains clearly the way S.
801 is Intended to operate:
"If we had a million lire in an Italian
bank and the money was earmarked for an
educational exchange program, for instance,
the lire would simply lie there until .a pro-
~;ram, was begun requiring use of the hre.
"Under the change I propose, the dis-
bursing officer attached to our Italian Em-
bassy could draw out that money to pray au-
thorized U.S. obligation--;. Whether he drew
out 100,000 lire or 500,000 lire, or the whole
amount, the educational exchange program
Pn question would still be credited with a
million lure on U.S. Treasury books. When
the program needed the money, it would
be provided either from lire on hand ctr lire
purchased with dollars.
"The Embassy, on the other hand, would
have had its account lessened by the amount
of lire spent. The net effect of this book-
keeping and banking interchange would be
to use the available foreign funds and keep
U.S. dollars in U.S. hands."
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I
wish to thank the majority leader for
bringing up S. 801 at this time. IL will
be of substantial importance in solving
the balance-of-payments problem. It
occurs to me that it is a step that should
have been taken much earlier. I hope
that it will be possible for the House to
press forward early enough so that
action on the bill in that body can be
taken in this session.
Again, I thank the distinguished Sen-
ator from Montana for having brought
the bill up at this time.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It was a pleasure
to do so.
TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE
BUSINESS
By unanimous consent, the following
routine business was transacted:
REPORT ENTITLED "RESPONSES TO
INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NORTH-
EAST POWER FAILURE"?-REPORT
OF A COMMITTEE (S. REPT. NO.
1079)
Mr. MAGNUSON, from the Committee
on Commerce, submitted an interim re-
port of that committee entitled "Re-
sponses to Inquiries About the Northeast
Power Failure November 9 and 10, 1965,"
which was ordered to be printed.
EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A
COMMITTEE
As in executive session,
The following favorable reports of
nominations were submitted:
By Mr. MAGNUSON, from the Committee
on Commerce:
Rear Adm. Willard J. Smith? U.S. Coast
Guard, to be Commandant of the U.S. (:oast
Guard, with the rank of admiral;
Capt. William B. Ellis, Capt. Douglas B.
Henderson, Capt. Russell R. Waesche, Jr., and
Capt. Mark A. Whalen, for promotion to the
grade of rear admirals.
BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION
INTRODUCED
Bills and a joint resolution were intro-
duced, read the first time, and, by unan-
imous consent, the second time, and re-
ferred as follows:
By Mr. BENNETT:
S. 3117. A bill to provide for the free entry
of one mass spectrometer for the use of Utah
State University: to the Committee on
Finance.
By Mr. EASTLAND :
S. 3118. A bill to permit the city of Sena-
tobia, Miss., to count certain expenditures as
a local grant-in-aid to the east Senatobla
urban renewal project; to the Corrunittee on
Banking and Currency.
S. 3119. A bill to amend chapter 15 of title
38, United States Code, so as to prevent the
loss of veteran pension benefits as the result
of increases in social security benefits au-
thorized by the Social Security Amendments
of 1965; to the Committee on Finance.
S. 3120. A bill for the relief of Mr. and Mrs.
J. L. Pigford; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.
By Mr. BIBLE:
S. 3121. A bill to amend the District of
Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of
1958, as amended, to increase salaries of of-
ficers and members of the Metropolitan Po-
lice force and the Fire Department, and for
other purposes;
5.3122. A bill to amend the District of
Columbia Teachers' Salary Act of 1955, as
amended;
5.3123. A bill to amend the District of
Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of
1958, as amended, to increase salaries of of-
ficers and members of the Metropolitan Po-
lice force, and for other purposes; and
5.3124. A bill to amend the District of
Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of
1958, as amended, to increase salaries of of-
ficers and members of the Fire Department
of the District of Columbia, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on the District
of Columbia.
By Mr. DIRKSEN (for himself, Mr.
CURTIS, Mr. MUNDT, Mr. THURMOND,
Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr.
BENNETI', Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. LAUSCHE,
Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware, Mr. COT-
TON, Mr. CARLSON, Mr. JORDAN of
Idaho, Mr. PEARSON, Mr. TowER, Mr.
MURPHY. and Mr. DOMINICK:
S.J. Res. 148. Joint resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the United
States to permit voluntary participation in
prayer in public schools; to the Committee
on the Judiciary.
(See the remarks of Mr. DIRxsEN when he
Introduced the above joint resolution, which
appear under a separate heading.)
RESOLUTION
STUDY AND INVESTIGATION BY
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
OF ANY MATTER PERTAINING TO
THE DISPLAY AND USE OF THE U.S.
FLAG
Mr. TOWER submitted a resolution (S.
Res. 237) to authorize the Committee on
the Judiciary to make a study and in-
vestigation of any matter pertaining to
the display and use of the flag of the
United States, which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
(See the above resolution printed in
full when submitted by Mr. TOWER, which
appears under a separate heading.)
INVESTIGATION OF MATTERS PER-
TAINING TO THE DISPLAY AND
USE OF THE FLAG
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, present
law governs the display of our flag, which
stands as a symbol of our great Nation,
of our heritage of liberty and justice for
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SENATE
that the school milk program was devised
to combat.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the
terms of the unanimous-consent agree-
ment, the Senator from Pennsylvania
[Mr. CLARK] is recognized for not to ex-
ceed 1 hour, for debate on the bill H.R.
13546.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield, without losing his
right to the floor, for an insertion in the
RECORD and to suggest the absence of a
quorum?
Mr. CLARK. I would be happy to do
that, but I do not personally require the
calling of a quorum.
Mr. MANSFIELD.
that should be done.
HIGHER EDUCATION AND
CRISIS IN ASIA
based on a fragile, tacit agreement between
the great powers to live together in peaceful,
or competitive, coexistence. The event was
the coming to office in the United States of a
creative new administration, eager to
strengthen the developing detente with the
Russians and eager as well to use a respite
from international crisis to devise imagina-
tive new programs for the betterment of
American life. During the 3 years of his
administration, President Kennedy put for-
ward imaginative and well-conceived plans
for the improvement of health and educa-
tion, for the conquest of poverty, pollution
and blight, and for the spiritual enrichment
of American life.
President Johnson embraced and expanded
upon these innovations. Elected in 1964 by
a great popular majority and supported by a
great congressional majority, President John-
son was able to utilize his own extraordi-
I 'think nary political talents to make the 1st ses-
si n'of the 89th Congress the most produc-
ve in a generation. Vigorously executed
and adequately funded, the legislation
T adopted in 1965 can open the way to an
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to have printed
in 'the RECORD 'a speech by the distin-
guished Senator from Arkansas, the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee [Mr. FuLBRIGHT], at the 21st An-
nual Conference on Higher Education in
Chicago, Ill., on March 14, 1966.
The title of the speech is "Higher Edu-
cation and the Crisis in Asia," and I
think it is well worth the time of all
Senators to read and study most care-
fully.
There being no objection,, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE CRISIS IN ASIA
(Statement by Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT,
chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, before the 21st National
Conference on Higher Education, Conrad
Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Ill., Mar. 14, 1966)
A society has the right to ask two great
services of its educational institutions: the
cultivation of those qualities of the mind
which will help the society to avoid misfor-
tune and the cultivation of those intellectual
qualities which will advance 'the public hap-
piness. What the community expects of
higher education at any given time is deter-
mined by the extent to which it feels itself
endangered or secure. There is a kind of
Gresham's law of public policy: fear drives
out hope, security precedes welfare, and it is
only to the extent that a country is success-
ful in the prevention of bad things that its
institutions of learning are set free to con-
centrate on those pursuits which bring hap-
piness and beauty and fulfillment into the
lives of the people. -
For a whole generation our country was
greatly preoccupied with external dangers
and, accordingly, neglectful of those aspects
of the public happiness which require orga-
nized public programs and sizable public
expenditures. The reason for this, of course,
was the exacting demands of two World Wars
and an intractable cold war, which required
the massive diversion of resources from com-
munity life to national security. We felt
ourselves compelled to turn away from our
hopes in order to concentrate on our fears
and the public happiness became a luxury to
be postponed to some distant day when the
dangers besetting us would have disappeared
w
we need have. It
which seemed to promise a new era in our what has been Vdone foolishly and what the
national affairs. The trend was one toward answers to these questions imply for the
relative stability in international relations, future. It must ask how it came about that
era of abundance and opportunity for all
of our citizens. It seemed, a year ago, that
at long last our fears could give way to our
hopes, that we had indeed crossed a new
frontier and were in sight of the Great
Society.
Then came Vietnam. The war had been
going on for many years but before 1965
it had been a small and distant, war and, as
our leaders repeatedly assured us, a war
which would be won or lost by the Viet-
namese themselves. Then about a year ago
it became clear that the Saigon government
was about to lose the war and we radically
changed our policy. Intervening with a large
army of our own, we changed our role from
adviser to principal belligerent and ex-
panded what was essentially a civil war into
a contest between the United States and
Asian communism.
As a result of this radical change in Amer-
ican policy in southeast Asia, we must now,
after so brief an interlude, turn back once
again from our hopes to our fears, from the
advancement of the public happiness to the
avoidance of international disaster. The
President has been compelled to divert his
principal energies from implementing the
Great Society to the supervision of bombing
missions over North Vietnam; the Congress
has been diverted from debating future needs
in education and urban renewal to debating
the American involvement in a land war in
Asia and how we can control it; the American
people have been diverted from community
and family life to preoccupation once again
with foreign dangers, casualty lists, and the
fear of a wider war.
What does all this mean for higher educa-
tion? I most emphatically do not think that
the university must act like a recruit called
to the colors. I do not think that the
humanities must now give way to military
science, that civil engineering must give way
to military engineering, or that history and
philosophy must give way to computerized
"war games."
Unless it conceives itself as nothing more
than the servant of the party in power, the
university has a higher function to per-
form. The university, it is true, cannot
separate itself from the society of which it is
a part. Like the rest of us, it must now
divert some part of its energies from the
enrichment of the life of the individual to
the preservation of the life of the Nation.
But the community of scholars must do more
than accept misfortune and consider how it
can be overcome. It must ask how we came
to misfortune and
hether
we have had for so long to devote fio great
a part of our resources to war and its pre-
vention and it must ask whether we are con-
demned by forces beyond our control to
continue to do so. It can, like the Secre-
tary of State, ask what is wrong with the
"other side," but it must not fail to ask as
well what is wrong with our side, remem-
bering always that the highest devotion we
can give is not to our country as it is but to
a concept of what we would like it to be.
Whatever the circumstances' of the mo-
ment, whatever the demands of government
and industry on the Universities--and what-
ever the rewards for meeting these de-
mands-the highest purpose of higher edu-
cation is the enrichment of the life of the
individual and the advancement of the
eternal effort to bring reason and justice
and humanity into the relations of men and
nations. It is the further task of higher
education to analyze existing public poli-
cies with a view to determining whether
they advance or retard the realization of
basic human objectives and whether and
how they should be changed.
Applying these principles to the war in
Vietnam, it would seem to me that the ma-
jor service the university can perform for
the community is to seek answers to some
elemental question about means and ends.
The politician is usually preoccupied with
technique rather than purpose and with
immediate pressures rather than long-term
needs. His concern is largely focused on
the tactical questions of the war: What are
the probable effects of bombing or of not
bombing North Vietnam? What degree of
escalation is likely to bring the Chinese into
the war? What concessions, if any, are
likely to induce the enemy to negotiate?
The scholar, on the other hand, must pro-
vide the historical and philosophical founda-
tions on which wise political decisions can be
based. His proper concern is with questions
of means and ends, of motive and purpose:
To what extent is the war in Vietnam a civil
war, to what extent a war of international
aggression, to what extent a conflict of
ideologies? Does the American military in-
tervention in Vietnam strengthen our
alliances throughout the world, as the ad-
ministration believes, or does it weaken them,
as General de Gaulle's recent statement
would seem to indicate? 1 And perhaps the
most important questions of all: does this
war advance the freedom of southeast Asia
or make a mockery of it by subjecting the
region to great power domination? Does it
increase the security of the United States by
proving our resolve or reduce it by draining
our material and moral resources?
The universities have a critical respon-
sibility to meet in the crisis of our country's
relations with Asia. I believe that students
and professors all over the country have
acknowledged that responsibility and are
responding to it. I think that the student
protest movement, despite certain excesses,
has had a healthy effect in stimulating in-
formed discussion and awakening the na-
tional conscience. But the more significant
contribution of the university is made in the
library and the classroom, by teachers who
teach and students who study, by the rais-
ing and answering of elemental questions
about means and ends.
Our prospects for a decent and lasting
settlement in eastern Asia depend in great
part on our ability to apply the kinds of in-
sight and understanding that only broadly
based liberal education can provide. We
must bring to our efforts for peace in Viet-
nam and to our long-term relations with
China some of the perspectives of history and
' Press conference of Feb. 21, 1966, in
which he expressed fear that America would
drag her European allies into non-European
conflicts.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECOR]J - SENATE arc 22, 1966
philosophy and psychology. We must apply
the experience of the past with intelligence
and discrimination, separating those ex-
periences which seem to have general ap-
plication from those which are unique or
accidental. We must recognize that history
can be misleading as well as instructive, and
we must avoid the pitfall of simple and
literal analogy--such as the eternally
repeated example of Munich, which is so
often cited as an object lesson for cases which
it resembles only slightly or superficially.
We must utilize our knowledge of man and
his past in the only way it can be utilized,
not as a source of detailed prescriptions for
specific maladies but as a source of general
insight into the kinds of efforts that are
likely to succeed and the kinds that are likely
to fail, the kinds of policies that are likely to
advance peace and human welfare and the
kinds that are likely not to.
We must be prepared to examine each
situation and each problem on its merits and
we must be prepared, as only educated men
can be, to discard old myths In the light of
new realities. More important than any
single policy decision that we might make
is the strengthening of our capacity to re-
consider established policies in ,the light
of changing facts acid circumstances.
It is not so much change itself that the
universities can usefully encourage as the
capacity for change. Even in the case of
those of our present ,policies which are per-
fectly sound, it is not at all certain that we
would be prepared to alter these policies
quickly in response to a wholly new situa-
tion or an unforeseen opportunity. One of
the tealc problems of our policy is thus in-
tellectual rather than political. It is the
problem of freeing our minds from the dead
weight of habit and prejudice ,and stereotype
and of bringing to bear on foreign policy the
rich and diverse resources of liberally edu-
cated men.
.A related problem-{and one for which the
solution, if there is one, can only come from
higher education-pis ,the retention of the
capacity for honest individual judgment in
:i large organization in, which the surest
route to advancement is conformity with
a barren and oppressive orthodoxy. There
are many intelligent, courageous, and inde-
pendent-minded individuals in our Foreign
Serv".ice, but I have had occasion to notice
that there are also sycophants and con-
form.ists, individuals in whose minds the dis-
tinction between official policy and personal
opinion has disappeared. The universities--
and especially those schools and departments
whose graduates tend to enter public serv-
ice--have a special obligation to train po-
tential public. servants in rigorously ,inde-
pendent thinking and to acquaint 2,1lem as
well with the need for reconciling loyalty to
an organization with personal integrity. It
is an extremely important service for the
universities to perform because the most
valuable public servant, like the true patriot,
is one who gives a higher loyalty to his
country's Ideals than to its current policy
and who therefore Is willing to criticize as
well as to comply.
In recent weeks the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations has engaged in an experf-
icized on the ground that they conveyed an treaty steadily grew and the treaty was
image of the United States as divided over finally ratified by a vote of 81 to 19. Through
the war. Since the country obviously is the medium of open discussion and debate
divided, what was conveyed was a fact rather an existing consensus for peace as an objec-
than an image. The question arises whether tive was translated into a policy consensus
those who believe the hearings should not for the test ban treaty as a means of advanc-
have been held would have preferred to ing it.
maintain the image of unity even though it The committee is now once again drawing
were a false image, maintained at the cost on the resources of both Government and the
this time in the hope
l
ars,
of suppressing the normal procedures of community of scho
democracy and at the cost of denying both of increasing public knowledge of China and
our people and our Government the ad- of helping to lay the foundations for a true
vantages of a full, free, enlightened, and consensus about our relations with China.
responsible discussion of a national issue It is our expectation that these discussions
of the greatest importance. will generate controversy, possibly a great
No one challenges the value and impor- deal of controversy, and no doubt the com-
tance of national consensus, but consensus mittee will be criticized for fostering it. It
can be understood in two ways. If it is in- is perfectly true that we are fostering con-
terpreted to mean unquestioning support troversy and, for my own part, I do so with-
of existing policies, its effects can only be out apology, because there is nothing wrong
pernicious and undemocratic, serving to sup- with the honest and responsible airing of
press differences rather than to reconcile differences and, more important, because
them. If, on the other hand, consensus is controversy is the condition of intelligent
understood to mean a general agreement decisionmaking and the crucible in which a
on goals and values but not necessarily bn consensus as to objectives may be translated
the best means of realizing them, then and into a consensus of policy as well.
only then does it become a lasting basis of It is of great importance that we try to
national strength. It is consensus in this learn something more about the strange and
sense which has made America strong in the fascinating Chinese nation, about its past
past. Indeed, much of our national success and its present, about the aims of its leaders
in combining change with continuity can and the aspirations of its people. Before we
be attributed to the vigorous competition of can make wise political-and perhaps mili-
men and. Ideas within a context of shared tary-decisions pertaining to China, there are
values and generally accepted institutions, many questions to be asked and, hopefully,
It is only through this kind of vigorous com- answered: What kind of people are the Chi-
petition of ideas that a consensus of values nese? To what extent are they motivated by
can sometimes be translated into a true con- national feeling? To what extent by
sensus of policy. ideology? Why are the Chinese Communist
The hearings on Vietnam were undertaken leaders so hostile to the United States and
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee why do they advocate violent revolution
in the hope of helping to shape a true con- against most of the world's governments?
sensus, even at the cost of destroying the To what extent is their view of the world
image of a false one. They were undertaken distorted by isolation and the memory of
in the belief that both the American people ancient grievances? And to what extent,
and their Government would profit froman and with what effect on their government,
airing of views by forceful advocates from do the Chinese people share with us and
both within and outside the Government. with all other peoples what Aldous Huxley
They were undertaken in the belief that the has called the "simple human preference for
best way to assure the prevalence of truth life and peace"?
over falsehood is by exposing all tendencies We need to ask these questions because
of opinion to free competition in the market- China and America may be heading toward
place of ideas. They were undertaken in war with each other and it is essential that
something of the spirit of Thomas Jefferson's we do all that can be done to prevent that
words: "I know no safe depository of the calamity, starting with a concerted effort tci
ultimate powers of the society but the people understand the Chinese people and their
themselves; and if we think them not en- leaders.
lightened enough to exercise their control Higher education has a vital role to play
with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is in this inquiry into our relations with China
not to take it from them, but to inform their and Asia. The testimony of a necessarily few
discretion." Y experts before congressional committees is
Many times in the past the Senate Foreign obviously a limited channel for the resources
Relations Committee has served as the forum of our community of scholars, although it is
for a national debate and in some instances an exceedingly valuable one for politicians
its proceedings have had the effect of trans- like myself who do not have nearly the time
lating a consensus of values into a consensus we wish we had to study those matters of his-
of policy as well. One notable instance was tory and national character and aspiration
the debate on the nucleartest ban treaty in which are so pertinent to the decisions we
the summer of 1963. For 3 weeks the For- must make. But beyond their direct com-
eign Relations Committee, with members of municatthe ions n with politicians the and policy-
the Committee on Armed Services and makers
Energy also attending, met in open sponsibility ty of the class oom. wisdom in public
session to hear vigorous arguments for and The against the treaty by witnesses from the policy is, I feel certain, education at every
Government, from the universities, and from level. a certain degree eelligen U.S. Senator
n creative
other areas of private life. My only feeling point the way toward
at the time was that the non-Government policies as he se them; to a much greater
scientists and professors of politics, as dis- degree the Pres2ent of the United States can
interested individuals, were more influential do so; but the ultimate answer to the chal-
than the Government witnesses, who of lenge of excellence lies with public school
course were committed to the administra- teachers and university professors, with writ-
tion's policy. Each day's discussion was era and scholars and all those who in one way
transmitted to the American people through or another help to shape the minds, or fall
the press. The result was that the Foreign to shape the minds, of young Americans. "A
Relations Committee was able to serve simul- teacher affects eternity," wrote Henry Adams;
taneously as both an organ of Senate delib- "he can never tell where his influence stops." 41
eration and a form of public education. In The highest duty of higher education to-
the course of those 3 weeks and the Senate ward the community is to keep faith with its
floor debate that followed, support for the own essential purposes, which are the disin-
terested pursuit of knowledge and the culti-
meat in public education. With results
thus far that seem to me highly satisfactory,
the committee has made itself available as
a forum for the meeting of politicians and
professors and, more broadly, as a forum
through which recognized experts and
scholars can help increase congressional and
public understanding of the problems asso-
rioted with our involvement In Vietnam and
our relations with Communist China.
I believe that the public hearings on Viet-
nam, by bringing before the American people
a variety of opinions
perta and disagreements
ining to the war, have done far more
to strengthen our country's position than
to weaken it. The hearings have been crit-
2Thomas Jefferson, letter to William
Charles Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820.
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vation of the free and discriminating mind.
None of us-professor, politician, or private
citizen-truly serves the interest of the com-
munity by uncritical support of the policies
of the moment. All of us have the respon-
sibility to act upon a higher patriotism,
which is to love our country not as it is but
as we would have it be. And, in the words of
Albert Camus, "if at times we seemed to pre-
fer justice to our country, this is because we
simply wanted to love our country in justice,
as we wanted to love her in truth and in
hope"4
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum. '
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk'
will call the roll.
The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
PROXMIRE in the chair). Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE
APPROPRIATION, 1966
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursu-
ant to the unanimous-consent agree-
ment of yesterday, the Chair lays before
the Senate the unfinished business.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (H.R. 13546) making supple-
mental appropriations for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1966, and for other
purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent, despite the agree-
ment entered into yesterday, which en-
titles me to the floor for 1 hour when
the Senate comes in today, that I may
yield for 3 minutes to the Senator from
Texas [Mr. TOWER], and that the time
not be charged to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
SCHOOLS FACE CUTBACK IN
SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, a recent
proposal by the administration to cut
back school milk rations by $82 million
has received considerable attention in
the newspapers.
An article published in the Dallas
Morning News treats this subject and
points out the difficulties the school
lunch program will face if this proposal
is implemented.
I ask unanimous consent to have the
article printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Dallas (Tex.) News, Mar. 13, 19661
SCHOOLS FACE POSSIBLE CUTBACK-PLAN
WOULD HURT LUNCH PROGRAM
(By Dorothy Lillard)
AUSTIN, TEX.-Many Texas school officials
may be. crying over spilled milk and empty
platters if the Federal Government decides
to withdraw from their lunchrooms next
year.
4 Albert Camus, "Letters to a German
Friend," in Resistance, Rebellion, and Death"
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1960), p. 10.
The basis for concern is President John-
son's proposal to cut back school milk rations
by $82 million and emphasize the needy
youngster in the school lunch program.
The. Dallas independent school district,
which long has spurned the so-called Gov-
ernment platters and milk doles, would
have reason to be smug if the revised Fed-
eral plan places other districts in a bind.
Some observers say, however, that many Dal-
las civic leaders recently have exerted more
and more pressure for participation in the
Federal aid program.
If the Children Nutrition Act of 1966, the
President's plan, passes, Dallas school offi-
cials could feel even greater pressure to seek
aid for low-income youngsters.
Meanwhile Charles Hicks, school lunch co-
ordinator for the Texas education agency,
foresees serious curtailment of Texas pro-
grams in the near future.
Instead of a nickel reimbursement per
lunch, Uncle Sam might have to offer an
average 3 cents to the participating school
districts.
Milk reductions could force schools to
charge students 7 cents instead of 3 to 4 cents
per half pint.
Last year, Texas schools served 128 million
hot lunches in about 1,300 school districts.
In addition to the milk served with the
lunches, 94.5 million extra half pints were
served.
Currently Dallas, Highland Park, Richard-
son and Garland schools are joined by San
Antonio, Houston, and Fort Worth schools
in rejecting the national lunch program.
Unlike Dallas, the other three big schools do
participate in the milk programs. Fort
Worth and San Antonio schools also receive
surplus Government food,
The President's program, said to face seri-
ous opposition in Congress, calls for milk
subsidies to go to 3 million youngsters from
the neediest families rather than all the 18
million children who received it last year.
School lunch programs aided by low-cost
surplus food in Federal stock (a decreasing
supply) are expected to continue unchanged.
Free breakfasts are to be served in poverty
area schools, which are also scheduled to
receive money to equip kitchens and cafe-
terias.
Some have termed the "unchanged" de-
scription of the lunch program deceptive.
While the President has asked for $50 million
more in special assistance, his proposals cut
the actual cash and commodities by $19
million. The special grants are intended for
use in needy districts mainly.
"The cash provided in the lunch appropria-
tion and proposed Child Nutrition Act will
not be enough to meet these demands"? ex-
plained Hicks.
"The proposals do not provide for growth
and expansion of the local program."
"And I am very apprehensive of the situa-
tion which would develop if Houston, San
Antonio, Fort Worth, and Dallas should
decide to participate in the lunch programs,"
he added.
These areas represent more than 650 schools
and administrators would be hard pressed
to redistribute decreased funds to an in-
creased number of schools. Districts already
dependent upon the Federal lunch program
will face a fund reduction without the addi-
tion of the four most populous cities in the
State.
Hicks noted that Texas always refused to
administer on a variable cost basis-5 cents
on a lunch in district A areas and 2 cents on
the game lunch in district B areas.
"We will cut uniformly when necessary,"
Hicks said. "We now are experimenting with
the special assistance programs for the most
needy schools as one solution."
Annual funds for the special assistance,
which help pay up to 15 cents on a lunch,
will amount to $72,900 this year in Texas. If
the State receives proportionately the same
amount with the proposed $50 million in-
6139
crease, Hicks can count on about 12 times
as much or $875,900.
With this amount, administrators could
avoid elimination of the program in the
better off school districts, and just reduce
the reimbursement fee. The special assist-
ance funds would handle the bulk of the
extra emphasis on the needy.
The milk slashes will affect more schools
than the main lunch program. Under the
act, the cheap half pints are intended strictly
for the needy.
The milk program, which was started In
1954 because of heavy dairy surpluses, had
$103 million allocated to it last year. Presi-
dent Johnson has called for only $21 million
in his budget. Federal officials contend that
most schools should be able to pay the extra
cost and not the children. Districts usually
receive 1 cent for handling, which the Gov-
ernment says is usually more than needed.
Children pay 8 to 4 cents for half pints cost-
ing 6 to 8 cents.
Hicks said some districts take 11/2 cents
extra for handling, but often use the extra
to pay for free half pints given to needy
children.
"Cuts in the milk program will eliminate
it for most school districts in Texas or limit
it to schools within a district with a large
number of low-income children," said Hicks.
Actually the milk program could end up
operating only in south Texas and those
schools attended predominantly by Negroes
in low-income areas.
Ironically some Congressmen point out that
if the program is limited to low-income areas,
poor children in wealthy school districts
would have to do without milk, unless pro-
vides( from some other source.
Also, poorer Negro students, transferred
into formerly all-white districts by Federal
civil rights campaigns, might lose out on
free lunch and milk programs or be em-
barrassed by accepting Government hand-
outs where other students do not.
One educator cited an example in south
Texas where students who paid their own way
ate chicken while the free lunch students ate
inexpensive meat loaf the same day.
Hicks said the State is experimenting with
providing breakfast free to children in some
Austin schools and elsewhere.
"It is my understanding that most schools
serving free breakfasts use milk as the main-
stay," he said. "If the milk supply is cur-
tailed seriously, it will have an adverse
effect."
Hicks said the President's proposal to ex-
tend the feeding service to nonschool activi-
ties (camps, nurseries) might be longer com-
ing to Texas.
"I am happy to see that funds are being
made available for equipping lunchrooms and
also to assist the State In administering the
programs," he commented.
The State pays only costs of administering
the national lunch and milk programs.
Some States appropriate additional funds to
help the local districts pay for the actual
lunches.
One of the most vocal congressional critics
of the bill offered by the administration is
Representative J. J. PICKLE, of Austin, a form-
er member of the Texas Employment Com-
mission.
PICKLE testified before the Ways and Means
Committee last year and urged changes that
would protect the rights of State govern-
ments in this field. He plans to give his
views anew to the committee and to the
House when the bill reaches the floor.
The Federal lunch program, begun in 1946
under the National School Lunch Act, re-
imburses public and nonprofit schools about
5 cents a lunch. The children are charged
from 25 to 35 cents for the lunch. The re-
mainder of the cost is absorbed by the dis-
trict, with the addition of surplus Govern-
ment foods from the Department of Agricul-
ture. Hicks estimated that these supplies
contribute 10 cents to the average meal cost.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1966
Many children receive a free daily meal.
Local school authorities determine the needy
children and shoulder the extra expense.
Hicks said 6 to 7 percent of the daily hot
lunches are provided free in Texas. In addi-
tion, more free lunches are financed through
title I of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965. Districts qualify for
money on the basis of the number of low-
income families in their area.
Noting a current shortage of agricultural
supplies, Hicks said he recently was notified
that butter may not be available for school
consumption. The U.S. Department of Agri-
culture said it had been unable since Feb-
ruary to purchase supplies on the open mar-
ket in enough quantity to provide for the
schools.
"At this point, we don't know what to do
about the schools," wrote the Agriculture
officials.
EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, a pene-
trating editorial was published in the
Austin American on March 14, 1966,
which concerns our exports to Commu-
nist countries.
I ask unanimous consent to have this
article printed in the RECORD, so that I
may share this perceptive observation
with my colleagues.
I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania
for yielding to me at this time.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
IFrorn the Austin (Tex.) American, Mar. 14,
19661
A STRATEGIC QUESTION
State Secretary Dean Rusk in February
submitted to Congress the Department's 1964
report on operations under the Mutual De-
fense Assistance Control Act of 1951 also
known as the Battle Act, the U.S. law barring
shipment of strategic goods to Communist
countries.
The report shows that exports to Commu-
nist Countries in 1964 more than doubled
over the 1963 level, rising from $167 million
to almost $340 million. (U.S. trade with
Communist China, Cuba, North Korea, and
North Vietnam is, with minor exceptions,
prohibited.)
This expansion resulted primarily from in-
creased shipments of wheat but included
also other agricultural products. The report
showed that total free world exports to Com-
munist countries rose sharply from $5.6 bil-
lion in 1963 to $6.7 billion in 1964.
General U.S. imports from Communist
nations, according to the report, rose from
$85 million to $102.5 million in 1964, while
total free world imports from these coun-
tries rose slightly from $6.2 billion to $6.8
billion.
The report said the rise of more than a
billion dollars in Communist purchases from
the free world in 1964 was the largest increase
in any year since World War II. The report
said the balance of foreign trade between
the free world and the Soviet Union shifted
favorably in the direction of the free world.
It added that the largest single gains were
in exports and imports from Communist
China. Chinese exports for the first time
exceeded $1 billion.
It would be interesting to learn precisely
what goods are exported to Communist na-
tions.
The law says that no goods of a strategic
nature can be exported to Communist coun-
tries. But practically all goods have some
strategic value.
13UPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATION', 1966
The Senate resumed the considera-
tion of the bill (H.R. 1:3546) making sup-
plemental appropriations for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1966, and for other
purposes.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I con-
tinue with my speech, which was inter-
rupted last night by the recess of the
Senate around 7 o'clock.
At that time, I had made two prin-
cipal points. First, that I found myself
compelled to vote for the pending de-
fense appropriation brill, on the ground
that I could not conscientiously vote to
deny money needed for the safety of
American troops overseas. Second, that,
in my opinion, we should never have
been in Vietnam in the first place, com-
mitting large numbers of American
troops to a land war on the ground mass
of Asia.
I should now like to make my third
point: that, as of today, our military,
economic, and social posture in South
'Vietnam is far from favorable. We have
eliminated the danger of losing the war,
but we have not-at least, on the sur-
face-started to win it.
I quote from page 266 of the hearings
before the Armed Services Committee,
in response to a question from the Sen-
ator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], as to
whether we had improved our position
in South Vietnam during the past year,
had slipped back, or are today about
the same as we were a year ago, and
General Johnson, Chief of Staff of the
Army, replied:
I would say that we are about the same
as we were a year ago with regard to control.
His answer contains a couple of dele-
tions, but at a later point he stated-
and I paraphrase him that by reason
of our improved firepower we show some
improvement on total balance, but not
on provable results.
The status in South Vietnam at the
moment involves the vexing question of
how much terrain we and our allies con-
trol. In this regard, it has been extremely
difficult to get any categorical answer
out of either the Secretary of Defense
or the AID Administrator, to whom this
question was addressed at the time of
the hearings on the supplemental foreign
aid bill. There has been great com-
plaint as to whether an effective map
could be produced. Nothing really ef-
fective in the way of such a map was
produced before the Committee on For-
eign Relations.
However, on page 145 of the hearings
of the Armed Services Committee, a map
was produced before the committee
which, of course, is not copied in the
testimony.
Secretary McNamara made this point
with respect to who controlled the ter-
rain: The important points to note, he
said, are that the population is con-
centration in Saigon and the areas south
of Saigon, the rice bowl, the delta area,
and along the coast in these areas. He
made the further point that the area
fully controlled by the Vietcong was, to
some extent, sparsely populated.
Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that
the Mekong Delta, where a substantial
part of the wealth of the country is lo-
cated, has not been pacified. It is equally
clear that the area adjacent to a num-
ber of American bases has not been paci-
fied.
We find that in many of the areas
where, as a result of our search and
destroy tactics, we occupy the land as a
result of a successful assault, we are com-
pelled shortly thereafter to vacate the
terrain we have taken, and in many in-
stances the Vietcong have moved back in
short order.
Thus, I would raise the question, with
some confidence, that there is more
than a majority of the land mass in
South Vietnam and, possibly, even a ma-
jority of the densely populated land
mass which is not really secure for either
ourselves or our South Vietnamese al-
lies.
An additional important question is,
Who controls the population?
This is a rather deceptive matter be-
cause of the huge number of refugees
who have left the land and moved into
the more densely populated areas, par-
ticularly Saigon, and have no visible
means of support and, generally speak-
ing, are on the South Vietnamese equiva-
lent of relief.
Nevertheless, I read from page 146 of
the hearings where the Senator from
Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] ask the ques-
tion of Secretary McNamara:
How much of the population does the Viet-
cong control?
Secretary McNamara answered:
Well, the figures we have received from
South Vietnam say 23 percent of the popula-
tion.
Then he continued:
However, this morning, earlier, I gave an
estimate of Prime Minister Ky to the effect
that his government controls only 25 per-
cent of the population. Now, these figures
are not necessarily contradictory because of
the difference in the definition of "control."
Prime Minister Ky, when he gave the figure
25 percent as being controlled by the Gov-
ernment, was thinking of the population
that could participate freely and without
coercion.
Then he continued:
I think if you applied the definition of
control that our field representatives do,
both the political and military representa-
tives in South Vietnam, they would say that
the Government controls today 53 percent of
the population of the country, the Vietcong
control about 23 percent. That makes a
total of around 76 percent, and the remaining
24 percent is in the disputed areas.
Then he added this significant state-
ment:
I think that Ky's estimate is a much more
realistic appraisal of Government control
than is the 53 percent.
The importance of the discussion of
the terrain and population is clear when
we recall that we have recently approved
a substantial appropriation for economic
aid to South Vietnam, $175 million,
which will be used largely, although not
entirely, to bolster the South Vietnamese
economy, which is showing signs of sag-
ging, and the other $100 million is to be
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 6168 Approved For Release 2005/06/29: RECORD 044 SENATE
be here for many months. I appeal to
the distinguished chairman to give this
matter full consideration.
Mr. MAGNUSON. I think what the
distinguished majority leader meant was
that there is provision for an appeal to
the ICC in this case, but the Senator
from New Hampshire suggests that it
would be highly improbable that the ap-
peal coming from Missouri, situated as
it is, would be favorably received. But
you can appeal to the ICC.
Mr. SYMINGTON. There is not a
more fair and just man in this body than
the Senator from New Hampshire. I
appreciate his suggestion.
I yield to the Senator from Kansas.
Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I am
in accord with the statements made by
the Senators from Missouri, because I
have the same problem.
I wish to mention another problem
that deals along the same line. Kansas
is a State that has a. time zone change.
When you run into time zone difficulties,
you can have some real problems. We
have a division between central time and
mountain time, and I do hope that the
Interstate Commerce Commission, if we
cannot obtain the amendment suggest-
ed, which might be helpful even in our
own State, will give some consideration
to the problem.
Mr. MAGNUSON. They will still have
the right to move the time zones. As a
matter of fact, I am not sure that some
of the time zones should not be moved,
to make them correspond more nearly to
the traffic and the growth of population.
When the time zones were first set
out, they were more or less arbitrarily
selected. There was not too much testi-
mony or consideration of the problem.
Mr. CARLSON. It can create a real
problem, as the distinguished Senator
from Washington knows. I am fairly
in accord with the positions taken by the
Senators from Missouri. I sincerely hope
their problem can be taken care of.
Mr. MAGNUSON. I do not see any
other Senators on the floor from the Far
West. Yes, there is one over there. But
we would like the bill to stay as it is. It
would save us considerable trouble.
I think in some cases there is 3 or
4 hours difference in the time. That
means that many times people, at the
wrong time of the evening, try to get in
touch with one about some very im-
portant matter, and they forget about
the change in time, and cannot under-
stand why they have difficulty.
But uniformity is even more vitally
necessary for people who travel. The
situation as it exists is a most confus-
ing thing, and I am hopeful that the
State of Missouri will see the light and
come into the fold with the rest of us.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
yield to the Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. BASS. Mr. President, I am not
exactly sure what the amendment of the
Senator from New Hampshire Is. We
have a problem in Tennessee; most of the
State is on eastern time, but a portion is
on central time. As I understand the
Senator's amendment, it would mean we
could have four different times in Ten-
nessee.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Oh, no.
Mr, BASS. Will the Senator explain
what his amendment would do?
Mr. COTTON. The suggested amend-
ment is this: I fear that all the Senators
do not have copies of the bill, but on
page 6, the bill provides that all States
shall be on daylight saving time, except
that any State may by law exempt itself
from the provisions of this subsection
providing for the advancement of time,
but only if such law provides that the
entire State, including all political sub-
divisions thereof, shall observe the
standard time.
Now, my suggested amendment would
be to strike out the word "entire" and
insert in lieu thereof '.'or a single con-
tiguous part thereof," which would mean
that any State could select any part of
the State-it would not have to be just
half, it could be a third or any part of
the State-and retain standard time for
that part, but all the rest of tie State
would have to be on the other time; you
could no have four or five or six different
times.
Mr. BASS. And that would have to be
done by the State legislature?
Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes.
Mr. COTTON. That is right.
Mr. BASS. In other words, where we
have two time zones now, if the eastern
part of the State is on eastern standard
time, the rest of the State, even though
part of it might be on central time, would
have to go to daylight saving time?
Mr. COTTON. It would have to ad-
vance the clock 1 hour from whatever
time it was on, except for one section of
the State, one contiguous part thereof
that the State legislature could act upon.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
yield to my colleague from Missouri.
Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President,
I say to the Senator from Washington
and the Senator from New Hampshire
that the amendment suggested, we think,
would be very fair to Missouri. Our
situation is very unusual, with industries
on both sides of the State and the time
zone line nearly down the center. If that
could be split to not over half, it would
certainly be a move toward uniformity.
Mr. MAGNUSON. I hope the RECORD
will be clear that when the Senator from
New Hampshire uses the word "con-
tiguous," he means that literally, because
one of the important reasons for this bill
is that small areas can have different
times. But if you have one area which
is contiguous, which would be a large
area in the Senator's State, it is not as
bad as having a number of time zones ar-
ranged in spotted or patchwork fashion.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
yield to the distinguished Senator from
New Hampshire.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I move
that the Senate concur in the House
amendments, with an amendment which
I now send to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will state the amendment.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 6,
line 22, strike out the word "entire" and
after the word "State" insert the lan-
guage "or a single contiguous part there-
of:'
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion of
March 22, 1966
the Se'hator from New Hampshire [Mr.
COTTON] to concur in the House amend-
ments with amendments.
The motion was agreed to.
SHIPPING JAM IN VIETNAM
Mr. BASS. Mr. President, one of the
great problems in Vietnam is in the ship-
ping and unloading end of our supply
chain. It seems that we do a fairly good
job in moving the supplies as far as the
harbor areas of South Vietnam but at
that point, due to a lack of unloading
equipment and facilities, the ships pile
up in great numbers and wait for long
periods of time in order to be unloaded.
I have reports that some ships have
waited an excess of 100 days in the Viet-
nam harbors in order to be unloaded.
Approximately $1 million a day is being
lost because of this jam. Recently 100
ships were waiting in South Vietnamese
ports to be unloaded and another 100
were standing by in either the Philip-
pines or Okinawa to proceed to Vietnam
as soon as room could be created for them
to anchor and unload.
Such a shipping jam creates consider-
able hardship in a number of areas. For
instance the crews of these ships often-
times are not able to take shore leave,
some spending as much as 65 days in the
harbor before being able to go ashore.
In an area where daytime temperatures
sometimes approach 120? onboard the
ships, this creates a tremendous morale
problem. The United Seaman Service is
very concerned about this morale of our
seamen in Vietnam. This agency has
centers throughout the Pacific. Prior to
recent times, however, they had none in
South Vietnam. One has been estab-
lished in Saigon since Christmas of last
year and the service is attempting to es-
tablish more. They have been assured
by the Army that one is in the works in
the Cam Ranh Bay harbor construction
project. They are attempting to get
final Army approval to establish one at
Da Nang and one at Qui Nhon.
In addition, it creates a problem from
the standpoint of having enough avail-
able vessels to ship not only to South
Vietnam but to other parts of the world
For instance, at the present time, when
the Nation is engaged in the most serious
freight car shortage in its history, huge
numbers of freight cars are piled up in
west coast ports, unable to be unloaded
because there are no available ships on
which to place their cargo. This, I
hope, will be partially rectified by the
announcement last week by the Maritime
Administration that some 86 ships are
being taken from the Government's re-
serve fleets and assigned to steamship
companies for operation on behalf of the
Military Sea Transport Service. I un-
derstand that an additional 25 reserve
fleet ships are now undergoing reactiva-
tion, or are scheduled for breakout in the
next few months.
In addition to that, two Maritime Ad-
ministration employees are being as-
signed to South Vietnam to coordinate
the handling of these ships. It is hoped
that they will supplement the efforts of
general agents, subagents, and ship-
masters in the Vietnam area to assure
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400040008-6
March 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
The people of Missouri are unable to
reconcile the two time zones and have
expressed their desire to continue to
have a choice in this matter.
I therefore hope that the Senate will
vote against the House amendments to
S. 1404 and insist on the bill as passed
by the Senate last summer.
It is with regret that I see a bill that
was passed by the Senate on a basis that
was satisfactory to my State, amended in
the House. I am sorry that. more of my
colleagues are not present, because I be-
lieve if they were here my distinguished
colleague from Missouri and I might con-
vince them. that the Senate bill was a
better bill.
Mr. President, with that in mind. I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator withhold his request?
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the
Senator withhold his request?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
yield to the distinguished Senator from
New Hampshire.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I should
like to say to both distinguished Senators
from Missouri that our committee was
thoroughly cognizant of the situation,
not particularly with reference to Mis-
souri, but with reference to the possibil-
ity of this situation arising. We discussed
asking for a committee of conference in-
stead of moving to concur.
The reason that we are moving to con-
cur in the amendments of the House is
that the House approved their bill by a
vote of 292 to 93. Various amendments
were offered to the House bill. Those
amendments were voted down. One of
those amendments was the very amend-
ment in which the Senators from Mis-
souri are interested. That amendment
concerned the partition of States, rather
than having statewide control. Because
of the rather overwhelming vote of the
House, we decided to move to concur.
In fairness to the distinguished Sena-
tors from Missouri, when we presented
the bill to the Senate, it was originally
the bill of the Senator from Wyoming
I Mr. McGEE I and myself. It was a bill
that I had worked on for several years.
We very carefully took one step at a time
and tried to make uniform the date of
opening and closing of daylight saving
time and not interfere in any State,
although we felt that probably it would
be inevitable that this would happen.
A bus, a train, or an automobile passed
through 7 time changes while traveling
35 miles a couple of years ago. We had
the situation in which community X and
community Y would be on and off day-
light saving: time and the next commu-
nity would be on daylight saving and the
next community would be off.
I had hoped that this could have been
taken care of by permitting States to
vote to split their State in half, so that
there would not be such a hodgepodge
situation.
Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr.. President,
I think we could agree if that could be
done. That would be what we would
need.
Mr. COTTON. We were not trying to
force this situation on any State. We
considered the overwhelming vote in the
House and the fact that an amendment
embodying the desires of the two Sen-
ators from Missouri was voted down.
That was the reason that we voted to
move to concur.
Mr. SYMINGTON. What was the
vote when the Senate passed the meas-
ure?
Mr. COTTON. There was no rollcall
vote.
Mr. SYMINGTON. In other words,
it was unanimous in the Senate, but
some one-third of those voting in the
House voted against the amendment.
I have great confidence in the con-
ferees on this legislation because I
know what a superb committee it is.
The distinguished Senator for Washing-
ton [Mr. MAGNUSONI is chairman of the
committee, and the distinguished rank-
ing minority member is the Senator
from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON].
I know my friend from New Hamp-
shire is very sympathetic to the con-
cept of local option.
With all due respect to the situation
in which there were seven time changes
in 35 miles, one would have to go several
hundred miles in the State of Missouri
to encounter a change.
We hope that the Senator in charge of
the bill will take this measure to con-
ference rather than give up at this time.
This is a very important matter to the
people of Missouri. The thinking of the
people in Missouri is sharply delineated.
One could almost draw a straight line
down our State to show the division on
this subject.
I ask that the bill be taken back to
conference to establish what the people
of Missouri desire.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I want
to be perfectly frank with the Senator.
Were l: on a committee of conference, I
should try to come back with a com-
promise that would permit States to
determine whether they wanted local
option and not permit States to have
more than two time zones.
I think that would be a reasonable
ground of compromise. I have the feel-
ing that my distinguished chairman and
the others on our committee might well
feel the same way.
I have not discussed the subject with
them. We simply voted as we did be-
cause of the overwhelming vote in the
House. I would be the last one to try to
have the Senate push down the throat
of any State something that was an in-
convenience or a hardship. I am not
arguing contentiously on this matter.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, if
the distinguished chairman feels the
same way about it, and would take it to
conference, I am sure that the people of
Missouri and my colleague and I would
be entirely willing to accede to that and
have two time zones in the State.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield..
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
wish that the distinguished Senator and
his colleague, the two able Senators from
Missouri, would not ask to send the bill
back to conference. It is my belief that
it would not change what the Senate is
attempting to do now.
I would point out that there is an op-
tion in the House-passed bill which I
think would fit in with what the Senators
from Missouri are so valiantly and so
doggedly trying to accomplish, and that
is a right to petition to the ICC, which
could take into consideration an effective
case of this kind, as I understand the bill,
and perhaps give the Senators an outlet
and make it possible for them to achieve
the objective they desire.
Mr. COTTON. Will the Senator yield
at that point?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.
Mr. COTTON. That is a perfectly
natural inference for the distinguished
majority leader to draw, but I am afraid,
in fairness to the Senators from Mis-
souri, that recourse to the ICC would not
take care of their situation, because
Missouri is right in the middle of a time
zone. May I make this suggestion: We
do not need to go to conference. Would
the Senators from Missouri be satis-
fied-I think we have an amendment to
this effect; we have been working on it-
if instead of agreeing to the House bill
as passed, we agree to it with one amend-
ment, and that is that States could only
be split into two parts?
Mr. SYMINGTON. We would take
that.
Mr. LONG of Missouri. Yes, Mr. Pres-
ident, we would accept that.
Mr. MAGNUSON. We could send it
back to the House, but, of course, the
whole purpose for having this bill is to
get some uniformity through the coun-
try, and we were hoping that, if the
Senate passed the bill with the House
amendment, by 1967 the Legislature of
Missouri will say, "Well, let's not be dif-
ferent from everybody else; we will come
along."
The House deliberately pushed it up
for a year, until the legislature in the
Senators' State meets, as I understand.
But I can also understand how contro-
versial and deep seeded this time busi-
ness becomes in a State legislature, par-
ticularly where you have people who are
from nothing but the rural areas, as
against the people in the cities. I know
the problem.
I have no objection to doing what the
Senator from New Hampshire suggests.
I am hopeful, though, that we will re-
tain the part of the bill that says in
1967 or later that the States will come
along, so that we can get this uniform-
ity. I do not know whether the House
will accept that. I do not think they
have too deep feelings about any one
State, but that they would want to
make it uniform.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the
distinguished chairman of the committee
is being very fair. I think what the able
ranking Member, the Senator from New
Hampshire says is very logical. It is not,
in our case, just a matter of the country
against the city. We have two large
cities which feel differently.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes.
Mr. SYMINGTON. We are early in
the session now. We have had very little
trouble with the bill thus far. We will
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 March 22, 1966 .proved For f&ggMfQW/?9R &-fP67 .i 000400040008-6
logistic support for all general agency
ships. These men will also coordinate
the efforts of the military and the agents
to provide expeditious cargo discharge
and turnaround of all general agency
ships. Unfortunately, however, I believe
this is insufficient to solve the problem.
We need .great additional numbers of
barges, tugs, and floating cranes to sup-
plement those there in the unloading of
the ships.
Airpower has become increasingly im-
portant in recent years and is particu-
larly important in recent years and is
particularly important in South Vietnam.
However, two out of every three soldiers
fighting in Vietnam were moved there by
ship and 98 percent of the supplies to
support our troops in Vietnam have been
transported by ship. When this is real-
ized then it becomes obvious that our
merchant fleet is still a subject of tre-
mendous importance not only to our
economy but to the defense of our coun-
try.
Some improvements in the loading
time have been made recently in Saigon,
I am informed that military supplies are
removed at Saigon in 4 to 5 days and th(tt
nonmilitary supplies, such as provisions
under our AID program, are unloaded in
12 to 14 days. However, as late as last
week, there were 25 bags of mail undeliv-
ered to seamen. Thinking back to the
time when I was in the military service
during World War II, I can conceive of
nothing more damaging to morale than
nondelivery of mail to our people over-
seas.
Mr. President, to further compound
this shipping problem and to rub salt in
the quick, we have the allied problem of
ships of the free world servicing North
Vietnam and the Vietcong. The Depart-
ment of Defense admitted publicly that
119 free world ships entered ports serv-
icing the Vietcong during 1965. These
ships carried a total of $12.2 million
worth of goods, including some military
supplies. Mr. President, it is indeed
ironic that, at a time when Great Brit-
ain, for instance, is soliciting our support
in her boycott of Rhodesia, ships flying
the British flag are carrying supplies to
aid and abet our enemies.
Mr. President, let me say that from
reading a recent Washington Post arti-
cle, we have found a quotation from
Foreign Secretary Stewart of Great
Britain. He says:
The principle of preserving free trade is
important to us as a trading nation.
The article states:
But there are no signs that the Govern-
ment is planning any action to outlaw the
business transacted with the Hanoi regime.
The Foreign Secretary further states:
We have not got the legislative power to
order these ships not to trade (with North
Vietnam) except when it comes to strategic
goods, nor can we stop them- from flying
our flag. No case has yet been made out
for us to introduce new legislation.
Mr. President, it was not until the mid-
dle of February when our Government
finally decided that we should boycott
these ships. Since that time, ships car-
rying cargoes to North Vietnam have
been prohibited from carrying the U.S.-
sponsored cargoes. But even this boy-
cott only runs to the individual ships. It
does not run to the parent company own-
ing the ship.
Mr. President, our armed services have
been called the best equipped troops in
the world. However, it is impossible for
them to maintain this position unless
they get the supplies and equipment they
need to fulfill their mission. I, therefore,
hope a thorough investigation can be
made to survey the transportation re-
quirements for Vietnam by land, sea, and
air to insure that every necessary and
possible step is being taken to get our
men in and out of Vietnam on time and
with whatever arms and supplies
necessary.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Tennessee yield?
Mr. BASS. I am glad to yield to the
Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. I believe that the
Senator from Tennessee has made a
timely speech as well as a splendid sug-
gestion. The Senator is speaking about
a matter which is complicated from a
military standpoint, as well as from the
point of view of the rest of the traffic
there. I hope that he will follow up on
his own thoughts and suggestions, which
will be rendering a fine service to the
country.
Mr. BASS. I appreciate the state-
ment made by the distinguished Senator
from Mississippi, because of his impor-
tant position on the Armed Services
Committee and his keen awareness of
the needs of our troops in Vietnam.
SALE OF PARTICIPATION CERTIF-
ICATES IN FNMA
Mr.. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr.
President, last week the Senate passed
a bill to amend the Small Business Act.
During debate, the proponents of the
bill in speaking on behalf of the admin-
istration insisted that the extra interest
charges by selling these small business
mortgages would be less than one-quar-
ter of 1 percent. We who opposed this
bill insisted that the interest charge
would be at least one-half of 1 percent,
higher thereby representing an extra
charge to the taxpayers.
It is interesting to note, that the fol-
lowing day after the enactment of the
bill, the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation sold $410 million worth of par-
ticipation certificates. The interest rates
they paid was 0.6 percent higher than the
interest rates for corresponding Gov-
ernment issues.
At this point, I ask unanimous consent
that the announcement of that sale,
appearing in the Wall Street Journal of
March 17, be printed in the RECORD, fol-
lowed by a list of quotations of Treas-
ury bonds, along with the interest rates
on that same date.
There being no objection, the an-
nouncement and quotations were ordered
to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
PARTICIPATION CERTIFICATES OF $410 MILLION
IN THE GOVERNMENT MORTGAGE LIQUIDATION
TRUST, FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE Assocz-
ATION TRUSTEE
(New issue, dated April 4, 1966, due April 1
as shown below)
The participation certificates are serial
certificates issued in registered form only, in
denominations of $5,000, $10,000, $25,000,
6169
$100,000, $500,000, and $1 million. The
amounts, maturities, interest rates, and of-
fering prices of the participation certificates
are shown below. The principal, together
with the last installment of interest, is pay
able at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
upon presentation at such bank and surren-
der of the certificates. The interest is pay-
able by check, semiannually, on October 1
and April 1 in each year. The participation
certificates are not redeemable prior to ma-
turity. This advertisement is neither an
offer to sell nor a solicitation of 'an offer to
buy any of these securities. The offering
is made only by the prospectus, which may
be obtained from such of the underwriters
as are registered dealers in securities in this
State.
NEw YORK, N.Y., March 17, 1966.
Due
Apr. 1
Interest
rate
$20,000,000
1967
5.40
100
20,000,000
1968
5.45
100
20, 000000
1969
6
50
100
20, 000, 000
1970
.
5.50
100
20,000,000
1971
5.50
100
20, 000000
1972
6.50
100
20, 000,000
1973
6.50
100
20, 000000
1974
5
50
100
20, 000, 000
1075
.
5.50
100
20, 000,000
1976
5.45
100
42, 000,000
1977
5.45
100
42,000,000
1978
5.40
100
42, 000000
1979
5.35
100
42000, 000
1980
5.30
100
42:000,000
1981
5.25
100
GOVERNMENT, AGENCY, AND MISCELLANEOUS
SECURITIES
Over-the-counter quotations: Source on
request.
Decimals in bid-and-asked prices represent
32ds (101.1 means 101%2). (a) Plus 1/64,
(b) yield to call date, (c) approximate yield
at maturity.
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 1966.
Treasury bonds
P
vi
b
re-
ous
id
3%s, 1966, May----------
99.26
99.28
99.
26
4.38
3s,1966, August. . _ -_ _ _ _ -
99.6
99.8
99.
5
4.83
3y6s,1966, November----
99.1
90.3
99.
0
4.78
2 /2s,1962-67, June- _ _ _ _ _
97.21
97
23
97
21
4
40
3~s,1967, November--_-
98.1
.
98.3
.
98.
1
.
4.83
3%s,1068, may --__-_____
98.28
97.30
97.
28
4.90
3%s,1968, August. ------
97.6
97.8
97.
6
4.97
3%s1968, November----
'
97.9
97.11
97.
9
4.95
2Y,
1983. December----
04.15
94.17
94.
14
4.64
4 5, 1969, February---_-_
97.19
97.21
97.
19
4.78
231s,1964-S9, June__ ----
93.20
93.22
93.
18
4.62
4s, 1969, October________
96.29
96.31
96.
29
4
94
2s, 1964-69, December_
92.20
92.26
92.
20
.
4.65
2, 1965-70, March --___
92.13
92.17
92.
13
4.57
4s, 1970, February-----_
96.20
96.24
96.
21
4.92
4s, 1970, August ._____-
96.10
98.14
96.
11
4.91
2, 1966-71, March -----
91.0
91.4
91.
0
4.51
4s, 1971, August-___-_-__
95.14
95.18
95.
15
4.94
33s, 1971, November _ _ _
04.13
94.17
94.
15
5.00
4s, 1972, February-_____-
94.28
95.0
94.
30
4.99
23/s, 1967-72, June------
88.16
88.20
88.
22
4.81
4s, 1972, August __.______
94. 12
94.16
94.
15
5.01
2!/2s, 1967-72, Septem-
ber -----------------
88.0
88.14
88.
16
4.58
2s, 1967-72, December-
88.0
88.4
88.
6
4.57
4s, 1973, August -__-____
93.18
93.22
03.
18
5.03
4's, 1973, November- _ _
93.31
94.3
94.
0
5.07
4ys, 1974, February--___
93.28
94.0
93.
28
5.05
4Vs, 1974, May---------
?
94.24
94.28
94.
24
5.02
3 ~
_ _
s, 1074, November_
92.6
92.14
92.
6
4.96
4s, 1980, February.----__
92.20
92.28
92.
12
4.70
November ---
, 1980
3
87.22
87.30
87.
20
4.64
,
3 s, 1978-83,June ____-_
a
83.4
83.12
83.
0
4.66
33s, 1985, May_ ________
82.26
83.2
82.
22
4.59
43s, 1976-85, May - _ _ _ _ _
93.6
03.14
93.
4
4.78
3%s, 1900, February-----
83.4
83.12
83.
0
4. 86
43s, 1987-92, August ___-
92.30
93.6
92.2
8
4.70
4s, 1088-93, February----
90.2
90.10
89.3
0
4.63
43s, 1989-94, May_ _..___
90.28
91.4
90.2
6
4.70
3s, 1995, February-------
79.12
79.20
79.1
0
4.23
3s, 1998, November ---
82.2
82. 10
81.2
8
4.54
Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr.
President, this points out very clearly
what some of us argued at that time-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE March 22, 1966
that in order to camouflage the true defi-
cit, this administration is selling its as-
sets and by so doing, is paying an extra
one-half percent in interest rates. This
means that over the life of the $4.7 bil-
lion in securities, the administration
plans to sell altogether it will cost the
American taxpayers $600 million. To
cover up the true deficit, this adminis-
tration is selling its assets and using the
proceeds thereof to defray the normal
operating costs of the Great Society pro-
grams.
It is comparable, to selling part of the
furniture to pay for the cost of groceries.
STATEMENT BY UTAH COUNCIL OF
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, Salt Lake
City was one of the first cities in the
country where hearings were held on the
draft standards, criteria, rules, and reg-
ulations suggested by the Department of
Commerce to implement the Highway
Beautification Act of 1965. More than
100 witnesses appeared at the hearings
held on March 1 and 2-most of them
in opposition. It was the general con-
sensus that the guidelines were far too
stringent-in fact, that if put into op-
eration as drawn, they would practically
abolish the outdoor advertising industry.
The largest area of dissatisfaction was
In the regulations proposed for indus-
trial or commercial areas, rather than
those suggested for advertising on the
open highways. The definition of indus-
trial and commercial areas was ques-
tioned, and there was great discussion of
the so-called setback restrictions which
defined how far back from the street a
sign must be, what its height could be,
and how near the intersection it could be
placed.
One of the best statements submitted
was that of the Utah Council of Outdoor
Advertising. I ask that this statement
be carried in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY UTAH CbUNCIL OF OUTDOOR
ADvERTrsn.w
Reduced to its fundamental thrust, Public
Law 89-285, known as the Highway Beauti-
fIcation Act of 1965, provides that States that
fail to control outdoor advertising (U.S.C.,,
title 23, sec. 131) and junkyards (U.S.C.,,
title 23, sec. 136) are subject to a penalty of
10 percent each of the participation of the
Federal Government in its partnership with
the States on their roads program.
The act provides that the Secretary of
Commerce shall reach an agreement with
the several States in three principal cate-
gories, so far as the outdoor advertising in-
duistry is concerned:
1. They shall determine and define an un.,
zoned commercial or industrial area.
2. They shall establish standards for the
control of the advertising permitted in the
commercial and industrial zones and areas,
and
3. They shall provide for signs within the
right-of-way for areas at appropriate dis..
tances from interchanges on the Interstate
Systems on which signs giving specific in.-
formation with respect to food, gasoline, and
lodging, including specific brand names, may
be erected.
The act and its legislative history show an
intent to protest our areas of natural beauty
and scenic interest in the rural areas but to
leave the urban areas to present customary
use. Otherwise, this legislation would destroy
outdoor advertising and not control its order-
ly development as the act requires. The clear
command of section 131(d), title 23, United
States Code, is that standards to be estab-
lished after consultation with the States
with respect to size, lighting, and spacing
shall be consistent with customary use. The
statements by - Senator Moss, and Senator
RANDOLPH on February 4, and Senator
MUsxrE on February 16, which establish this
intent beyond argument, are annexed in the
appendix.
The act also provides that before the Sec-
retary promulgates standards, criteria, rules
and regulations in carrying out his agree-
ment with the States with respect to a defi-
nition of unzoned areas and regulation of
size, lighting, and spacing In the controlled
areas, that public hearings in each State
shall be held for the purpose of gathering all
relevant information on which to base such
standards. Secretary of Commerce John T.
Connor wrote a letter on September 14, 1965,
to the Senate Subcommittee on Public Works
from which we quote:
"The policy of the Bureau in reviewing
State determinations of unzoned commer-
cial or industrial areas would be developed
only after full consultation with the States
as well as with interested private business,
and every effort would be made to achieve
equitable treatment.
"The criteria to be followed in setting
the standards for billboards in both zoned
and unzoned areas, designated as commer-
cial or industrial, would be designed to as-
sist the advertising industry to achieve an
orderly development of this important and
legitimate business enterprise."
Notwithstanding the clear legislative in-
tent that the doctrine of customary use
shall be followed in urban areas, the Bu-
reau of Public Roads, a division of the De-
partment of Commerce, proffered in the Fed-
eral Register of January 28. 1966, six cate-
gories of draft standards, criteria, rules, and
regulations which are not only inconsistent
with the doctrine of customary use but are
radically violative o:[ it and would com-
pletely destroy outdoor advertising industry.
The evidence adduced at the public hear-
ings March 1 and 2 abundantly disclosed this
proposition. We shall hereafter refer to
this in somewhat more detail.
A particularly disturbing aspect of this leg-
islation lies in the following unusual con-
cept; 'the Federal Government here does not
legislate directly upon the people affected,
thereby escaping some of the direct whiplash
of public opinion and indignation, but rather
tells the State, in this case the State of
Utah, that unless you do as we say, we shall
withhold funds from you-a loss which our
State can ill afford. This is the use of raw
economic power unmasked and is subject to
ruthless abuse. The beginnings of abuse
have been evidenced already, because there
is absolutely nothing in the act that author-
ized the Secretary to proffer draft stand-
ards, criteria, rules, and regulations in ad-
vance, as he did; and published rules re-
stricting the public hearings to comments
and criticisms relevant to the issues as es-
tablished by him, as he did; and nothing
in the act permitted the Bureau of Public
Roads to further restrict the scope of these
hearings to comment and criticism on the
proffered criteria, as it did.
Section 303(a) of title 23, United States
Code, requires that before promulgation of
these standards necessary to carry out the
purposes of this act, the Secretary shall
hold public hearings in each State for the
purpose of gathering all relevant informa-
tion on which to base such standards, cri-
teria, rules, and regulations. The clear lan-
guage! of the act and the exclusionary con-
duct of the Department of Commerce are to
be compared, noted, and condemned.
OMISSIONS AND FAILURES OF THE SECRETARY'S
PROFFERED STANDARDS, CRITERIA, RULES, AND
REGULATIONS
The evidence produced at the hearings
raises some problems obviously not fully ap-
preciated before by the Department's plan-
ners, some of which are:
1. Standards for size, spacing, and lighting
accommodating the principle of customary
use is utterly impossible of linear delineation
unless a different set of criteria is established
for areas that vary within themselves, as
many have been shown so to do.
2. Any definition of an unzoned area that
restricts itself to buildings rather than use
of land area will produce anomalous and
ridiculous results.
3. The planner for the Secretary obviously
failed to take into consideration such legiti-
mate needs of the highway traveler as (a) on
the primary system small towns such a
Smithfield, Richfield, Logan, Vernal, and
Grantsville are set In rural areas which run
to the very boundary lines of the town. Yet
the approaches for 2, 4, 6, and as much as
10 miles prior thereto have historically been
used for advertising. Travelers depend on
these signs for a multitude of reasons. Many
businesses within these towns are completely
dependent on this type of advertising. No
provision has been made for this need. (b)
Some of these areas are now zoned agricul-
tural with sign structures permitted, yet
under this act and rules and regulations no
such signs would be permitted. (c) Many
Utah communities located more than one-
half mile off the interstate were shown to
have desperate need to advertise reasonably,
on the highway in order to avoid a financial
hardship and ruin, yet the planners have
made no provision for any such advertising.
The inherent vice in the Secretary's plan-
ners' approach to this problem in all cate-
gories has been their failure to realize that
a single set of standards are not capable of
universal application because of the variety
of needs found from area to area.
Historically in America business and trade
have followed the building of cross-country
highways and the transcontinental railroads.
Through our cities and towns these "main
highways" have carried the freight of the
Nation and along them have grown up the
highway service businesses for the conveni-
ence and requirements of the traveler and of
the people who reside there. In Utah all
but the five or six largest cities are what
might be called "one-street towns" insofar
as the business district is concerned, with a
concentration of stores and office buildings
in the central business area and other high-
way related businesses extending each way
to 'the outskirts of town. The main highway
has become the business street and residen-
tial areas have been built away from main
street in the quieter parts away from the
noise and confusion of trucks, buses, and
interstate commerce. It is only in the larger
cities that trucks are diverted onto truck
routes and bypasses from the main street.
This is the primary system-not the inter-
state.
On these one-street towns it will be seen
that the street runs through a central bu'ilt-
up business district, but with business also
extending from the center for several miles
along the highway in each direction out of
town into the country where you will find
service stations, drive-ins, bowling alleys,
bottled gas plants, dairies, cattle barns and
sheds, potato storage binds, loading docks,
fruit stands, and so on. The traveler is often
several miles out of town before he enters
the truly rural scene. The Secretary's stand-
ards do not provide for any advance adver-
tising in these approaches, if rural, and not
subject to his definition of an unzoned com-
mercial or industrial area.
Customary use in these areas has been in
accordance with local zoning provisions
which have permitted advertising signs in
agricultural zones. Such signs require no
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66
proved Forft&V&g8/1~61J9RJ&-WBP67ML,F000400040008-6
to $120 million, to permit acceleration of
soils mapping and application of conserva-
tion measures on the land.
Watershed planning and development is
another area where the backlog of work need-
ing to be done approaches staggering propor-
tions. A modest increase In funds-to $?10
million for watershed planning, and to $80
million for watershed protection-would help
give this program the added impetus it needs.
I know that this committee is well aware
of the benefits of the small watershed pro-
gram, particularly the multiple-purpose proj-
ects that have contributed so much to the
concept of local self-help in developing the
Nation's water resources for the benefit of the
community.
I can tell you that in Kansas we have made
impressive progress in many watershed areas
under this program. Yet, of 236 watersheds
that need attention-and there are others
that would benefit by further protection and
development-only 21 watershed projects
have been authorized for Operations assipt-
ance. There simply has not been sufficient
money made available to do the needed job.
Watershed protection and development re-
quires more substantial Federal support of
local cooperative efforts, as a matter of grow-
ing national concern.
In Kansas, and in nine other Western
States, the Great Plains conservation pro-
gram has given new life and hope to a vast
region of great potential. I am happy to say
that in Kansas at the beginning of the cur-
rent, fiscal year more than 1,725 farms and
ranches with a total of 1,660,000 acres were
being operated under Great Plains conserva-
tion program contracts. But throughout the
Great Plains States, approximately 5,000 ap-
plications for assistance under the program
have not yet been serviced. I believe this
program has proved its worth beyond any
question of a doubt, and that it should be
accelerated, as, indeed, the economic life of
the Nation in general is being accelerated in
this period of dynamic national growth.
An Increase in Federal support of the
Great Plains conservation program to $20
million would help reduce the backlog of
pending applications, and thereby bring the
Nation that much closer to solving its soil
and water conservation problems.
I believe these suggested Increases in the
budget of the Soil Conservation Service are
fully justified to assure the protection, devel-
opment, and proper use of the Nation's soil
and water resources, in order to meet the
long-term needs of the American people.
A COMBAT VETERAN SPEA
ON VIETNAM
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, an
excellent article by Jim Morris, who had
served for 5 years and 8 months in the
Army, was a captain of the Green Berets
in Vietnam, and was wounded three
times in action against the Vietcong, ap-
pears in the current issue of the Satur-
day Evening Post.
No one can question his credentials.
His article points out some of the
numerous follies which we have been and
are continuing to commit in our unde-
clared war in southeast Asia.
He also makes the very pertinent ob-
servation in the first paragraph of his
article, which I quote:
Our men are most efficient in killing, but
we can kill every North Vietnamese and Viet-
cong soldier in South, Vietnam, and still lose
the war.
I have been saying that for over 2
years now.
The facts he sets out just add up to
further evidence of the complete unjusti-
flcation and unwisdom of our being there
militarily. Unfortunately, the Nation
has now been committed by Executive
act to this undeclared war and thereby
condemned an increasing number of our
fine young men to slaughter.
I ask unanimous consent that the
article: "We Must Colonize Vietnam,"
be printed at this point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
WE Musr COLONIZE VIETNAM
(By Jim Morris)
(NOTE.-The author, 28, served 5 years in
the Army, with two tours--8 months-as a
captain in the Green Berets in Vietnam,
where he was wounded three times in' action
against the Vietcong. He left the Army last
June and now lives in Oklahoma City.)
Day after day I hear our military's reports
about how many Vietcong have been killed,
and it dismays me that so few Americans
realize killing alone does no real good. Day
after day I hear of the legislators and dip-
lomats squabbling over Vietnam policy, and
I wonder if they are talking about the same
country where I served with the special
forces-the Green Berets. Our men are most
efficient in killing, but we can kill every
North Vietnamese and Vietcong soldier in
South Vietnam, and still lose the war. Our
military and Government leaders meanwhile
ignore a basic fact. Escalation is not the
answer. South Vietnam is a country whose
Government is totally dependent on us. But
its leaders are running the place corruptly
and stupidly. We must force them to reform
or else forfeit the hope for a real victory.
The two most stable democracies in Asia-
Japan and the Philippines-were created
within forms molded by the American mili-
tary. But the billions of dollars we pour
into Vietnam go to a regime whose principal
characteristics are inefficiency and corrup-
tion. None of this will change of its own
accord; nor will more planes and tanks and
men, more Presidential conferences or Vice
Presidential tours, change the situation.
We are going to have to impose rule on this
country. We must use the only real weapon
we have: money.
Let me stress that I speak without anger
toward the U.S. Army, in which I served with
pride for more than 5 years, or special forces,
which is as much my religion as my former
outfit. But Green Berets live and fight with
the people, and so they acquire experiences
unavailable even to the highest American
officials, who make their tours under the
guidance of the Vietnamese mandarins. The
Vietnamese Government, since its inception,
has been the private preserve of these man-
darins, who comprise one of the most detest-
able oligarchies in the world. The late Presi-
dent Ngo Dinh Diem was one of the man-
darins, and control has remained within the
Vietnamese Establishment, which contends
with Vietcong for the support of the people.
Some choice. On one side is Saigon and on
the other the Vietcong, who would organize
the country into a system of interlocking in-
formants so tight it would make "1964" look
like an anarchy.
Since returning home, I have often heard
Americans talk offhandedly of the "corrup-
tion" and "misunderstanding" in places like
Vietnam, but I do not think they under-
stand what It really means In this war. In
the spring of 1964 the Rotary Club of Hawaii
donated a load of presents to the people of
Vietnam. For some reason it was decided
to give it all to the Montagnards of Phu
mien district, Phu Bon Province, in the
Central Highlands where our strike force was
operating. In short order the donation
turned into an extravaganza. Officials of the
Hawaii Rotary were flown in to make the
6185
presentation. Gen. Paul D. Harkins himself
flew down by helicopter to make a speech.
A large crowd of Montagnards was gathered
at the speakers' stand.
Back in Ceo Reo, the province capital,
meanwhile, the local Agency for Interna-
tional Development representative was fran-
tic. He had examined the cargo. In a so-
ciety where soap is just beginning to catch
on, there is a limited demand for 3,000
Barbie dolls.
In order to save the United States from
embarrassment, the AID man denuded his
warehouse, collecting all the farm imple-
ments he could find, along with wheat and
blankets.
The gift giving was a huge success, and the
VIP's departed in an orgy of mutual con-
gratulations. The day after, as we later
learned from our friends in the village, the
district chief, a lieutenant in the Vietnamese
army, seized all the farm implements and
other useful merchandise (the dolls were
spared) -and had them loaded on a truck,
donated to him by the U.S. Army, and
shipped to Pleiku, where they were sold.
This chief and another not far away had
a more regular system of acquiring income.
This technique was to move villages. Each
time a village family is resettled it is en-
titled to 1,000 piasters (officially about $14)
to establish its new home. But the villagers
received only 200 plasters, and ,the chiefs kept
the rest. Several times we tried to acquire
evidence to prove this corruption--.but who
is going to testify against a man whose duties
include those of judge, jury and executioner?
We figured that those two swine were each
worth a battalion to the Vietcong.
Although upper class Vietnamese officials
give lipservice to winning the people, they
are usually Incapable of understanding the
respect for human dignity which this re-
quires. About 2 months after the Rotary
Club incident, two of the Vietnamese guards
on the Ca Lui bridge decided to get a little
carbine practice. For their target they chose
an old lady in a 'village about 200 yards away.
They started kicking up dust at her heels
with their bullets. She ran across the field
toward her home and began climbing the
notched log that Montagnards use for lad-
ders on their stilted houses..
She was halfway up the ladder when one
of the bullets killed her. I don't think the
guards really meant to kill her; their marks-
manship isn't that good. One of our strike
force company commanders was a nephew of
the old lady, and he reported the incident
to us. My detachment commander and the
province adviser, an American major, went to
the province chief and told him the story.
The chief responded with an elegant shrug,
a legacy from the French, and said that he
doubted that it was true, but if it was, there
was nothing he could do about it, and why
bother? It was just another savage.
This is the way the mandarins normally
treat the Montagnards, who are 95 percent
of the population of the Central Highlands.
The Montagnard tribes have had wars among
themselves for many years, but they share a
hatred of the ethnic Vietnamese. The Mon-
tagnards fight the VC now because it pays
pretty well, and because they like Americans,
but all they need do is stop fighting the VC,
and the Highlands-the middle half of Viet-
nam-is lost. Should all the VC be killed
today, the Montagnards would launch their
own war for some form of autonomy. The
Hoa Hao and Cao Dai are religious sects
whose hierarchies want to carve their own
feudal flefdoms out of the country. The
Khmer Serei, a group of ethnic Cambodians,
wait the chance to reannex to Cambodia six
of the southern provinces along the Mekong.
All these groups have well-trained military
units, currently serving under the Vietna-
mese and fighting the VC. The idea that
the Vietnamese mandarins can, without re-
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NGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 22, 1966
form, mold these people Into a nation is a
mirage.
Of course there are competent people In
Vietnam now, but few have any chance to
rise to power, and we must force the man-
darins to give them the chance. There was
a second lieutenant named Luan in the Viet-
namese special forces. The first time we went
on patrol together he had a flunkie carry his
pack and he walked gaily along leaning on a
staff. He wore tailored camouflage fatigues
and dark glasses. He was elegant. Eight
miles down the trail the flunkie was still car-
rying his pack, but Luan was carrying the
pack of a private who couldn't make it. He
had. guts and he was smart. If we suggested
something In the afternoon, Luan had al-
ready done It in the morning. If it was ad-
vised in the morning, he had accomplished it
in the afternoon before. He would have been
an outstanding soldier in any army in the
world.
I made the mistake of mentioning to his
higher headquarters that he was a good
man. Two days later he was whisked away,
into some limbo that the Vietnamese army
maintains for pro-American lieutenants, and
replaced by a man who read maps upside
down and parades around with a rusty
sword. He is a lieutenant, and his father is
wealthy. In Vietnam, talent is dangerous,
for it threatens the establishment.
We brought in a prisoner once, a pretty
nice old man, the chief of a Vietcong-con-
trolled village. As a conversational opener,
the commanding officer asked him if he knew
Diem was dead.
He said no, but he was very sorry.
The commanding officer thought he had
misunderstood and asked the question again
and the answer came back the same.
The village chief thought Diem was a
friend of the commanding officer and he was
sorry his friend had died. He himself had
never heard of Diem, or Vietnam either, al-
though he knew who the Vietminh were
and in his extreme youth had been to Pletku
and seen a Frenchman. People like this
aren.'t worries about the Premier, whether
he be called Ky or Diem or Khanh. To them,
the district chief is the government. We
have counted on the Saigon Government to
win the districts, and they have failed. Yet
Americans acquire the friendship of these
people because they tender their own friend-
ship honestly.
Recently, our attention has been drawn to
the large-scale attack forces we have assem-
bled to sweep valleys and hillsides, and the
suggestion is that we are mounting an offen-
sive that can finally "win." In fact, the in-
filtration of North Vietnamese units has
distracted American forces into a gaudy, but
essentially diversionary, war. An insurgency
is a very special kind of war: A significant
portion of the population must find the gov-
ernment despicable; there must be a coun-
tryside to hide in; and there must be help
from the outside.
At no time within memory have the condi-
tions for guerrilla war been met so fully as
In the Republic of Vietnam. Thus the new,
escalated American attacks bring a danger
that we will delude ourselves with shows of
strength-a very real danger, for most Amer-
ican commanders, as well as most generals
giving advice back in the States, were
schooled in World War II and Korea. The
ramifications of guerrilla warfare do not
come easily to soldiers trained to think in
terms of real estate. We may conquer real
estate, kill Vietcong by the thousands, and
still lose the support of the people and thus
lose the war.
Yet the situation is not hopeless, in my
opinion. We have a dependency named
South Vietnam. So far It is a disaster. Now
we must get tough with the Saigon govern-
ment.
Our entire AID and military advisory ef-
fort :has been run from the top down, mean-
ing that we have entrusted the funds to the
mandarins. This has been a drastic mistake
we must rectify.
One of the Vietcong's principal techniques
is the creation of a shadow government. For
every government official they have an. equi-
valent VC official. The French called this
system parallel hierarchies. The Americans
have created a parallel hierarchy too, with
the AID and military-advisory effort, But
our parallel hierarchy cannot force changes
in the Vietnamese Government.
I am not suggesting that we use our
parallel hierarchy to get rid of inept ad-
ministrators by assassination and terror, as
the VC do. But I do recommend that Pro-
vince AID representatives should have final
veto on any money or goods which are dis-
tributed within the Province. They should
be encouraged to use this leverage to insist
on honesty, fair treatment, and the replace-
ment of corrupt officials. Whenever possible,
the replacement should be a respected local
leader. Our military advisers should have
all pay and supplies in their possession un-
til they are issued to the troops. It has
always been that way in the Special Forces,
and in our detachment the VC-kill ratio
between our troops and all other troops in
the Province, man for man, was 33 to 1 in
our favor. The people supported us because
they respected us, as they despised the man-
darins.
In this way, in a sense, we will be running
the country altogether-and such a program
may take a generation to succeed. But the
country cannot run Itself, and it is our re-
sponsibility. It is axiomatic in revolutionary
warfare that an insurgency can be resolved
in one of two ways. Either the legitimate
aspirations of the people are satisfied? or a
regime so cruel and oppressive is established
that the mere utterance of an antigovernment
remark results in prison or death. Unless
we force Saigon to provide the former, the
North Vietnamese will establish the letter.
We are successful at the killing, and well-
meaning about the diplomacy. But we must
accept this country on Its own terms. An
Australian colonel, chosen for Vietnam duty
because of his knowledge of the language,
of the people and of guerrilla warfare, once
summed it up well: "The Vietnamese have
a proverb which they don't quote to Ameri-
cans. He who gives and. asks nothing in
return is despised.'"
THE 48TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
LIBERATION OF' BYELORUSSIA
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, this
week narks the 48th anniversary of the
liberation of Byelorussia from domina-
tion by the Soviet Union. Sadly, here in-
dependence was shortlived lasting less
than 3 yeaxs. This is a very short time to
be free when you have fought and strug-
gled for freedom for so long. Having
been exposed to, and having experienced
freedom, the Byelorussian people, I am
convinced, will not lose faith and will
continue in their struggle to regain their
independence.
The history of this small but brave
nation offers clear and convincing evi-
dence that the right to self-determina-
tion is an aspiration that all oppressed
peoples share. Further, the oppressed
people of the world long for the day when
freedom once again will flourish in their
countries and will cast asunder those
totalitarian chains that will exploit a
nation's economic resources and oppress
the spirit and body of' the people.
It is important for us as free Ameri-
cans to remember, Mr. President, that all
the peoples of the world are not :free.
Many are struggling to achieve liberation
from the yoke of oppression and persecu-
tion; others are striving valiantly to
maintain their freedom.
Mr. President, we should particularly
remember that no one came to the aid of
Byelorussia in its struggle for Independ-
ence and today there are many small
countries that will fall to the same fate
without the support of the free world.
That is why our Nation is in Vietnam
today.
The history of the United States shows
that the securing of freedom does not
come easy or cheap, but as all Americans
know, the blessings of a free society are
well worth the price. The prayers and
thoughts of the American people, Mr.
President, are with the oppressed people
of the world and we sincerely hope that
all people will soon enjoy freedom and
independence.
A COMMONSENSE APPROACH TO
SOLVING CRIME
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, as we all know, the crime problem
In our country has reached a point where
many people worry about leaving their
homes at night for fear of being harmed.
We all need to look at this problem
and its effects on ourselves, our families,
our friends, and our property.
Some of the best "down to earth" ad-
vice on the subject came Monday,
March 21, 1966, from Deputy Chief
Lawrence A. Hartnett, who is chief of
detectives for the Metropolitan Police
Department.
Chief Hartnett spoke to the American
Newspaper Women's Club in Washing-
ton. Because the advice he offered ap-
pears to hit at the center of the problem,
I ask unanimous consent to have his ad-
dress printed In the RECORD for others to
read in Its entirety.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
An increase in crime is being experienced
throughout the United States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia has not been spared in the
general increase.
The impairment of the security of person
and property is a matter of major concern.
There are no quick or easy answers. A
tremendous effort must be exerted to identify
and eliminate the causes of criminal activity.
There has been in recent years much talk,
but little constructive action to deal with the
increase in crime.
Fortunately, since the President of the
United States has voiced his concern, more
interest and action has been generated to
seek a solution than ever before.
For too long, too little serious attention,
and too low a priority have been given toour
methods and agencies of law enforcement.
The policeman, the frontline soldier in the
war against crime, has been waging a lonely
battle. His burdens have been increasing
each day.
Police work and policing is no longer
merely the presence of a uniform policeman
on the beat. It is a complex, involved pro-
fessional position, requiring utilization of the
latest scientific detection, understanding,
and a willingness to work under rules and
decisions which would have confounded po-
licemen of yesteryear.
What is police work?
Primarily, the police are responsible for
preservation of the peace, protection of life
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March 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
I have said what I have today to show the
difficulties that we must overcome to get
these people to the conference table and the
difficulties that we will face when we have got
them there. I believe that those difficulties
are still further increased by the resumed
bombing in North Vietnam. It began a year
ago yesterday, on February 7. We were told
that it would discourage the Vietcong, check
the movement of troops and supplies from
north to south, and help to persuade Hanoi
to end the war. In those three purposes it
failed completely. Indeed, it strengthened
the Vietcong, it increased Hanoi's commit-
ment, and it stiffened their resistance, just as
Hitler's bombing stiffened our resistance in
1940-41.
i see no reason in logic or experience to be-
lieve that the resumed bombing will be more
successful now. U.S. generals have testified
that the bombing of the trails in Laos has
no military value, and anyone who under-
stands bombing and jungle trails will see how
likely it is that that is true. No doubt Presi-
dent Johnson sees no reason why bridges,
railways, and power stations in North Viet-
nam should be immune. But I say that if he
cares for Asian opinion, if he wants peace
and an early conference, as I am sure he
does, as a matter of hard political realism
he would do much better to call off the
bombing.
What else is needed to improve the hope of
peace? The Prime Minister spoke about the
status of the NLF. I believe that we must do
more to clarify what that status is to be. On
some days Mr. Rusk says that it is a matter
of marginal importance and that, of course,
agreement could easily be found once there
was a willingness to come to a conference.
On other days he says that he deals with
governments only and that the NLF is not a
government in any way. I sometimes wonder
whether, in the realities of political power,
the NLF is not quite as much a government
in rural South Vietnam as is the militarist
junta of Air Vice Marshal Ky, who boasts
that Hitler is the man he most admires.
In any case, the NLF has been, is and will
remain a major party in the war,: and it must
be an equal and accepted party in the con-
ference and in the peace. Without it, we
can be very certain that there will be no
conference and no settlement.
I believe that we must clarify the West's
commitment to the Geneva agreement of
1954. Washington repeats that it accepts
the essentials of that agreement, but what
does that mean? Does it mean what it
meant in 1955? Of course, details can be
varied, but the essentials of the Geneva
documents, as I have described them, are
crystal clear, and this time only honest in-
terpretations will suffice.
Would the West take a terrible risk, if
it agreed to carry out free elections which
brought Ho Chi Minh to power? Honorable
members have mentioned Tashkent, but
what is the supreme fact about Tashkent?
It is that the Soviet Government, instead of
trying to create trouble between two neigh-
bors, instead of trying to inflame a war from
which they might hope that their Commu-
nist Parties in India and Pakistan would
profit, took the initiative in securing a great
agreement, to which Mr. Kosygin made a
contribution second to none.
I call that the supreme fact about Tash-
kent, and surely it is the supreme proof that
the domino theory is nonsense. Of course,
much has happened to drive Ho Chi Minh
into Chinese arms, but all who know him
and his people say that he would follow an
independent line and he would be an Asian
Tito. In any case, so far as Vietnam is con-
cerned, the domino theory? repeated today
by President Johnson is simply nonsense.
I have shown that the war in Vietnam did
not start in some deep-laid plan in Moscow
or Peiping. I answer the honorable member
Who raised the point, that its ending, with
neutralization of north and south and mu-
tual armament reductions, would bring no
threat to Vietnam's neighbors. It is the war
itself which is the danger to Laos, Cambodia,
Thailand, and China. It is sheer illusion to
believe that Communist ideas can be de-
stroyed by guns and bombs. As the Prime
Minister said today, war creates the misery
and chaos in which communism breeds.
Let us end the war and then let us work
with Russia and perhaps with China to free
the Asian peoples from their ancient enemies
of serfdom, usury, ignorance, hunger and
disease.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
HON. ALBERT H. QUIE
OF MINNESOTA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 22,? 1966
Mr. QUIE. Mr. Speaker, I have made
a number of protests recently regarding
the administration's proposal to cut the
school milk and lunch program to the
bone,. affecting literally every school dis-
trict in the Nation.
The following editorial is an excellent
example of the kind of thinking that is
going on at the local level-the local
level that is so often overlooked in Great
Society programs-and I hope it draws
attention to the fact that people will
not tolerate the replacement of sound
established programs with new and ex-
perimental ones which also give more
control to Federal administrators.
The editorial follows:
[From the Albert Lea (Minn.) Evening
Tribune, Mar. 17, 1966]
THE WRONG PLACE FOR BUDGET CUT
The proposed Federal budget cut in school
lunch funds ought to be raising more con-
cern among local taxpayers.
A check with school district 241 officials
reveals that during the 1984-65 school year
the district received $22,609 in Federal aid
for the special milk program. In addition,
another $20,151 was allocated for the general
school lunch funds. That's more than $42,-
700 of our money that was returned here.
Now the Johnson administration has tick-
eted a cutback in funds from $202 million
this .year to $183,590,000, or almost $19 mil-
lion. Although it is impossible to know pre-
cisely how much this would affect the local
situation we believe Superintendent Lorne S.
Ward when he says, "It would hurt."
Why cut back what has been a successful
program for many years?
The administration says a redirection of
funds to needy families is needed and that
conditions to other programs are in order.
The local school district is experimenting
with titles I and II of the Federal Education
Act. We cannot yet properly evaluate the
results but we do know that the redtape in-
volved in applying for these programs is un-
believable.
We believe that anyone who says these pro-
grams are entirely free of obligation is wrong.
School officials have already been told that
they are to try and distinguish between the
poor and the rich student.
On the other hand it can be said almost
without exception that school lunch pro-
grams have had very few strings attached
over the years.
About 410,000 school lunches are served
daily in Minnesota schools. Participation
increased by 6.1 percent last year. Some
A1647
schools supply milk free to the students,
others charge a penny, another group charges
2 cents, and 107 other schools charge over 2
cents. The Albert Lea District assesses 2
cents per half pint.
Application of a needs test or poverty test
would mean that almost all students would
have to pay the full cost of the milk which
in Albert Lea is about 5 cents.
Presently, only a very small number of stu-
dents obtain free lunches because of low
family income. About 4 percent of students
get meals free but most of these receive
them in return for assisting with kitchen or
lunch line work.
The present program has proved itself, It
is money well spent. Let's keep it that way.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
of
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 22, 1966
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, the road
to peace, in any conflict between nations,
is at best a difficult and tortuous route.
As Ray Price points out in the follow-
ing column from the March 19, 1966, edi-
tion of the New York Herald Tribune, we
must be exceedingly careful in our use of
language and in any negotiations in
which we participate.
Mr. Price's column follows:
VIETNAM: BEWARE OUR OWN RHETORIC
(By Raymond K. Price, Jr.)
It is time for the United States to consider
seriously the dangers of being caught as a
prisoner of its own rhetoric on two crucial
issues in the Vietnamese confrontation: ne-
gotiations and free elections.
Both are-useful only as means to an end,
not as ends in themselves. Yet the rhetoric
'has tended to treat them as goals to be pur-
sued in and of themselves.
Certainly, in the abstract, it is far more
civilized to negotiate than to fight, to settle
differences over a conference table rather
than by the cruel means of war. But in
practice, negotiations can take on some of the
qualities of quicksand. And this is partic-
ularly true if one side (which would be ours)
has been conditioned to feel that, having
begun to negotiate, an agreement has to be
reached at whatever price has to be paid.
It should be axiomatic that if a war is
worth fighting, the peace is worth winning.
There are, of course, those who argue that
the Vietnamese war is not worth fighting, and
who would readily accept any course-even
precipitate withdrawal, and the certain take-
over of the south by the north-that would
extricate us from it. But these are few.
There are many more, however, who feel
uneasily that though we have to fight be-
cause we are engaged, we should never have
gotten engaged in the first place; who leap
at each new suggestion, however tenuous, of
a peace feeler; who insist (as Senator FUL-
BRIGHT said to Secretary Rusk) that if we
have failed to bring Hanoi to the bargaining
table, we, not they, must be doing something
wrong. These are the ones from whom the
strongest, if not the loudest, pressure for
negotiations qua negotiations comes. And
these are the ones who, if Hanoi relented and
did sit down to negotiate, would probably
press for concession after concession by our
own side to reach an agreement-any agree-
ment.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX March 22, 1 6u
So far, we have been saved from possible
(oily by the stupidity and stubbornness of
he enemy, who has not concealed his own
demand for total victory. When Hanoi pro-
ulaimed as a condition of any talks that the
National Liberation Front (a creature of the
North Vietnamese Communist apparatus) be
recognized as the sole genuine representative
of the people of South Vietnam, it was bad
public relations but an accurate reflection of
Ilanoi's war aims.
Suppose, however, Hanoi should decide that
it could win more at the conference table
than on the battlefield, or even that under
cover of negotiations it could gain a military
advantage. 't'his is by no means inconceiv-
able. The American build up, the effects of
which are only now beginning to be felt, has
radically altered the military balance. The
Vietcong are hurting; they have not even
been able to defend their own strongholds;
increasingly, the peasants no doubt sensing
where their own security lies, are cooperating
with the Government forces.
If Hanoi should suddenly decide to enter
negotiations, the United States would then
be faced with it test of will of another sort:
whether to stick to its guns, figuratively and
perhaps literally, with the prospect of peace
dangling in front of its eyes-if only we would
reach far enough. And the rhetoric of nego-
tiations has created a climate in which it
would be difficult not to overreach; difficult,
hat is, not to yield the very things we have
been fighting for merely because we have
been persuaded that there is something
:sacred about the fact of negotiating.
Free elections pose a comparable problem.
The mechanics of election present a stagger-
ing enough challenge in a nation torn by
guerrilla war, in which the Vietcong have
for years practiced wholesale slaughter of se-
lected civilians as a device of political terror,
and in which there are no clear fronts be-
hind which the people of one side and the
other can be reasonably secure in their pre-
sons.
in Vietnam, the problem is complicated by
the almost total lack of political sophistica-
tion among much of the farflung populace.
To suppose that Western parliamentary
democracy can be imposed, intact, on a war-
torn country alien to its traditions and with-
out its experience, is to suppose the highly
unlikely.
Yet elections, like negotiations, has become
a propaganda shibboleth, and the danger is
that we will lose sight of the vast gulf be-
tween our own experience and Vietnamese
experience.
Essentially, elections are a means of pro-
viding a responsive and responsible govern-
inent, under which personal liberties can be
secure. They can only be meaningful within
a framework of legal order which, among
other things, provides security against ter-
rorism. and the threat of reprisals. One goal
of the war is to establish such it framework.
Meanwhile, when talking of elections, we
should be careful to bear in mind the essen-
tial distinction between the electoral process
and what it is meant to achieve. Elections
held under conditions which might invite
their subversion by a skillful and cruelly
disciplined Communist apparatus would be
of no service to the cause of democracy, or to
the Vietnamese people.
Like so many things in this world, the
value of both negotiations and elections
depends crucially on the conditions under
which they are field. The danger is that we
will become so firmly committed to holding
them, that in order to do so, we will sacrifice
the conditions necessary to their success.
And if we sacrificed the conditions, we might
hind ourselves sacrificing South Vietnam.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
LION. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 22, 1966
Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, our
colleague, the Honorable DoN RuMsr:FELD,
of Illinois, has played a key role in at-
tempting to obtain for all Members of
Congress the properflow of information
from the executive branch. Mr. Rum:s-
F:ILD'S persistence is very properly and
effectively described in an editorial in
the Topeka, Kans., Capital-Journal on
March .13 which I am pleased to place in
the Raa'oRD:
CURE FOR THE "CREIICBILITY GAP"
For a long time the word "gap" was one
associated with geography. There was, for
example, the famed Cumberland Gap situated
near the point where Virginia, Tennessee,
and Kentucky meet. This structural fault
provided a natural passage through the
Cumberland mountains. Daniel Boone's
road to Kentucky ran through it and en-
couraged settlers to move west.
Most of our mountain areas have locally-
known "Horsethief Gaps" or other names
reminiscent of earlier days. We know of one
instance where a route through the
mountains was called "Bootlegger's Gap" for
good reason.
But the modern use of the word "gap" is
mostly in a different sense. John F. Ken-
nedy, when campaigning for the presidency,
had a lot to say about the "missile gap,"
which turned out to be something less than
a major gap, if it was a gap at all. And now
we are concerned with still another gap.
This one has become known as the "credi-
bility gap."
The term is derived from the complaint of
Washington newsmen, and Members of Con-
gress, that the Johnson administration is not
(1) putting out enough information about
what it is doing, and (2) coloring the news or
its activities to the point where its reports
are less than reliable.
There is sometimes a fine line between what
a government can safely permit to be known
and what it cannot. But the tendency in
Washington these days seems to be to man-
age the news.
This can be damaging to the Nation and. its
citizens. Editor J. Russell Wiggins of the
Washington Post wrote in his book, "Free-
dom or Secrecy":
"If a government repeatedly resorts to
lies in crises where lies seem to serve its best
interests, it will one day be unable to employ
the truth effectively when truth would serve
its interests best. A government that too
readily rationalizes its right to lie in a crisis
will never lack for lies and crises."
Associated Press newsman Saul Pett, in a
recent article on the "C:redibility Gap." said
there have been lies by the Government in
recent years and cited the following:
"In 1960, the government of Dwight D.
Eisenhower lied about the U-:2 plane shot
down over Russia.
"In 1961, through its Ambassador in the
United Nations, the government of John F.
Kennedy lied about the Bay of Pigs invasion.
"In each case, the deception was posed in a
moment of profound national pain. But in
neither did the President nor his*admints-
tration continue to suffer from a lingering
doubt about its word.
"The administration of Lyndon B. John-
son has had no single moment as traumatic
as the U-2 incident or the Bay of Pigs. It
has not been obliged to make public con-
fessions of attempted deception.
"And yet there lingers over Washington
today a cloud of doubt-large and gray in
the minds of some, small and white in the
minds of others."
One doesn't have to look far to find other
instances where the present administration
has more or less had to be "smoked out" on
international developments. There was the
peace feeler from Hanoi in 1964 which was
concealed until after the death of Adlai Stev-
enson. There was the case of the prime
minister of Singapore who claimed the CIA
had offered him it $3.3 million bribe in 1.960.
The State Department denied it but was
forced to admit it when the Singapore inin-
ister produced a letter from Secretary Dean
Rusk apologizing for the incident.
The optimistic assessments of Secretary
McNamara in the early years of the Vietnam
war, which turned out to be wrong, didn't
help the credibility of the Johnson admin-
istration.
And newsmen will not soon forget that
Arthur Sylvester, from the McNamara Penta-
gon, proclaimed the Government's right to
lie in emergencies.
President Johnson seems to go to extreme
effort to bottle up some of his intended ac-
tions which could have no actual bearing on
the peace and safety of the country. For
instance, he appointed Abe Fortas to succeed
Arthur Goldberg on the Supreme Court the
day after lie said he had not begun to con-
sider Goldberg's successor.
What is the answer to all this jockeying
to control the free flow of information?
It lies, we believe, in a measure now pend-
ing in Congress called the freedom of infor-
mation bill. A leading advocate of the bill,
which so far has only Senate approval, is
Representative DONALD RUMSFELD Of Illinois.
At 33, young RUMSFELD is a member of the
House Government Operations Committee
and of the Subcommittee on Government
Information and Foreign Operations which
has held hearings on the bill safeguarding
the public's right to know.
Representative RUMSFELD notes that when
the House hearings were completed in early
1965, every witness who testified supported
the legislation, except for every single wit-
ness sent to testify by the President on be-
half of the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment.
RUMSFELD realizes that governmental se-
crecy is nothing new, that it is as old as
government.
But, he said in a recent speech:
"The Johnson administration has been
particularly skillful and imaginative in its
use of secrecy and news manipulation as a
protective device. Within the last few
years, increased Government secrecy has re-
sulted in a marked loss of confidence by the
people in their Government.
"Talk of a 'credibility gap' and 'truth in
government' is heard increasingly."
Nobody wants to release information that
would be in the class of aid and comfort to
the enemy but neither does the public want
to be spoon fed political medicine. It would
be to the interest of the public if Congress
would approve the "freedom of informa-
tion" bill, which would require the Govern-
ment to make all public records available to
any citizen.
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A1658 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD APPENDIX March 22, 1966
Sion, and revolution. His plans have been in
constant operation from the time his mili-
tary forces administered the decisive defeat
to the French at Dienbienphu in May 1954.
The purpose of the Geneva accord was to
provide a means for Vietnam to stabilize it-
self and reunify through free elections. The
elections were never held. The plan has not
worked. If a return is made to the terms of
the Geneva accord it is obvious that the
agreements need strengthening, particularly
in the area of enforcement of the terms, and
it has been suggested that the United Na-
tions is best fitted for that difficult job.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 22, 1966
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, on
March 2, 1966, I addressed the House on
the subject of our situation in Vietnam
and urged that, following up on the sug-
gestions made by Senator ROBERT F.
KENNEDY, an international study be
launched, mobilizing the best possible
experts, first, to explore the experience
of various countries in which Commu-
nists have shared power with non-Com-
munists, including cases such as Czecho-
slovakia, where the result was a
Communist takeover, and other cases
such as France, Italy, Finland, and In-
donesia, where the result was the oppo-
site; and second, to recommend possible
arrangements for a system of shared
power in South Vietnam, including pro-
vision for elections, which would provide
safeguards, checks and balances, inter-
national supervision, and other guaran-
tees, so as to make the system as fool-
proof as possible against Communist
takeover.
Among the comments on this speech
which I have received is one from Prof.
Willis L. M. Reese of Columbia Univer-
sity, director of the Parker School of
Foreign and Comparative Law. While
Professor Reese differs with my conclu-
sion that the study I recommended be
carried on under private auspices, I be-
lieve his letter is a provocative one and
accordingly I commend it to my col-
leagues and readers of the CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD generally.
Professor Reese's letter follows:
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
New York, N.Y., March 16, 1966.
Hon. JONATHAN B. BINGTIAM,
Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR JACK: Thank you for sending me a
copy of your speech on the Vietnam situa-
tion. It strikes me as being the best speech
on the subject that I have read, and I con-
gratulate you with all my heart.
The one point about which I am dubious
is your suggestion that the question of what
terms might be offered the Vietcong should
be studied by an Independent group and be
financed by foundation funds. My present
inclination would be to say that this study
should be done by people selected by the ad-
ministration and should be financed with
Government funds.
I suppose that the adminstration must
already have given considerable thought to
what sort of terms to offer the Vietcong, in-
cluding the question of whether, and if so
on what terms, they might be permitted
to participate in the government of South
Vietnam. Certainly, a willingness to nego-
tiate would seem to suggest a willingness
to give something to the other side, and the
administration would certainly be delin-
quent if it has not given thought to what
it might give.
A difficulty that I can see with having
the job done privately is that so much time
might elapse before foundation -funds could
be procured and before the job could be
completed. It would be hard to get top-
notch people to work full time or nearly
full time on a job of this sort unless it were
pretty obvious that the administration was
behind the project and was in a hurry for
the report.
Also, the administration would presumably
be more inclined to accept the recommenda-
tions of a group selected byAt than those of
a group which had undertaken the study
on its own initiative or perhaps on the in-
itiative of a foundation. A report prepared
by an independent group might furthermore
be of some embarrassment to the adminis-
tration. It would presumably be made public
and this might make it difficult for the ad-
ministration to reject its conclusions if it
happened to disagree with them. On the
other hand, there would be at least one ad-
vantage in having the existence of such a
group made public. The Vietcong would
hear of t, and this might make them more
anxious to negotiate. If such publicity was
felt desirable, the administration could ap-
point persons outside its ranks to make the
study and make their names available to
the press. To be sure, the Vietcong would be
unlikely to believe that any group of men
appointed by the administration could be
unbiased. But, I suspect they would feel
the same way about any group composed
largely of U.S. citizens. What would count
in the long run would be the merit of the
proposals made by the group. Able persons
appointed by the administration should be
able to make as good proposals as anyone
else.
These are all matters of detail and do not
bear in anyway upon the excellence of your
general thesis.
Faithfully yours,,
WILLIS L. M. REESE.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. AL ULLMAN
OF OREGON
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 14, 1966
Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, I was
interested in a recent editorial appear-
ing in the Sunday Oregonian which com-
ments on the fact that American farmers
will be expected to grow more wheat be-
cause of the serious shortage of food in
some parts of the world, especially India.
The paper states:
The United States has been pouring mil-
lions of bushels into that famine-threatened
country under Public Law 480, the food-for-
peace programs. * * * President Johnson's
food-for-freedom program follows closely the
present arrangement, with greater emphasis
on efforts of recipients to increase their own
food production.
The Oregonian believes the knowledge
that "they are producing wheat to
alleviate hunger among the millions who
would starve without it" will be a great
satisfaction to American farmers.
Since the editorial deals with a sub-
ject of vital concern to us all at this time,
I offer it for the RECORD, where my col-
leagues may peruse its contents:
[From the Portland (Oreg.) Sunday Orego-
nian, Mar. 13, 19661
LOOSENED REINS
It now appears almost certain that the
total wheat allotment for next year will be
increased by 10 percent-from 49.92 to 55
million acres.
A late Department of Agriculture report
estimates that by July 1 the surplus stocks
of wheat in this country will have shrunk
to slightly below the 600 million bushels re-
garded as a necessary reserve against crop
failure, new demands and other emergencies,
including war. This is a supply 150 million
bushels less than was foreseen only last
October.
Last July 1, the carryover was placed at 81B
million bushels. The 1965 crop was a bumper
1,327 million bushels. Ordinarily, this would
have been more than enough to cover both
domestic and export demands. But the
Agriculture Department now estimates that
1537 million bushels will have gone into
domestic and foreign outlets by July 1, a
demand more than 200 million bushels in
excess of the crop.
Reason for the increased demand is the
serious shortage of food in some parts of
the world, especially India. The United
States has been pouring millions of bushels
into that famine-threatened country under
Public Law 480, the food-for-peace program.
Payment has been in Indian currency, for
which the United States has little use out-
side of India, and thus our grain shipments
may be regarded largely as gifts.
Hunger will continue to create a great
demand for American wheat in India and
elsewhere. President Johnson's food-for-
freedom program follows closely the present
arrangement, with . greater emphasis on
efforts of recipients to increase their own
,food production. No substantial reduction
in shipments from the United States can be
expected.
Therefore, the Federal Government's ob-
jective now must be to increase production,
rather than to reduce it, as it has tried to do
in the past in the face of huge surpluses.
Even this year, winter wheat growers are
being paid to divert part of their allotments
to other uses. Some 2.5 million acres of the
35 million allotted to winter wheat growers
may have been diverted by the end of the
signup period April 1. The average farmer
receives about $13.50 an acre on diverted
allotments.
Offer of diversion payments was withdrawn
this year, however, on spring wheat when it
became apparent that a larger crop was
needed to meet foreign demands. It is ex-
pected that no payments will be offered for
underplanting 1967 winter wheat and that
the allotments will be boosted to a total of
about 55 million acres.
It is good news to American wheat growers,
of which the Pacific Northwest has many,
that they most likely will be permitted to
grow more wheat. The price should be good
in view of the heavy demand.
There should be satisfaction for the grow-
ers, too, in the knowledge that they are pro-
ducing wheat to alleviate hunger among the
millions who would starve without it. Grow-
ing wheat for Government storage has not
pleased farmers any more than city people.
All Americans, even though they must
continue to pay heavily in taxes for the
wheat sent out in foreign aid, should be
happy that the reins are being loosened at
least a little on this country's amazingly
productive agriculture and that the food the
money buys is being put to good use.
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- APPENDIX A1657
handed to Its by the Senate. As the late
yarn Rayburn once remarked, "Legislation
is the art of the practical." We were prac-
tical and accepted the possible.
'roe situation in Vietnam has put us in a
similar position this year. If the adminis-
i;rution proposal falls short of reaching the
at:rti of true equality for Government work-
ers which we seek--as I believe they do--it
1:: b,.rause our country has many other prob-
lernh to solve and other worthy goals to strive
lor. Earlier I mentioned some of these-
rchools, clean air, clean water, roads and
d:m ':, space exploration, foreign aid. Our
icost immediate-and most grave--problem
li's in our commitment in Vietnam.
l'o protect this country's interests, as we
mutt do in Vietnam, to secure our children's
futures as we hope to do through our poverty
utui crime and other programs, we are going
to have to commit a large proportion of our
available resources. And while we are a
vigorous nation and these resources are in-
deed vast, our civil servants are being asked
to wait for some of the benefits to which
lies are entitled.
l,ra, me state at this time that I shall vig-
urou::ly oppose any attempt to make Federal
employees the only group to be denied needed
pay increases while other groups in ouY
socf~l?y are not so restricted. The net result
of such a policy would not just be a delay
for the implementation of the comparability
prir.ciple, it would be more in the nature of
a complete rout.
I can not about to ;et the comparability
gap grow any wider.
Tie major administration proposals--the
:suggested pay raise, the 55-30 retirement
plan, liberalized disability and survivor ben-
effte, a modest increase in the Government's
ennt ribution to the health benefits program-
will most likely pass the Congress this year.
I ar- hopeful that my bill to widen life in-
surance benefits will also pass, despite the
opposition of the administration. I am
afraid that other proposils must await fu-
ture developments.
Whatever the successes--or the compro-
mises--reached by this Congress in the areas
of pay, retirement, health, and insurance
benefits, we are committed to a rational and
equitable system of compensation for the
Federal worker. I will continue to work
towird the lull realization of that goal.
HON. LESTER L. WOLFF
01' NEW YORK
Ir1 l'HE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
't'ue.sday, March 22, 1966
Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, President
Johnson's new transport plan is a bold
new approach to a besetting American
problem, Long Island's Newsday states
cditorially.
lr, hails the proposed highway safety
pro,ram that includes Federal safety
standards for new cars and trucks.
'1he paper declares:
1'his is a gigantic program, of which the
bolt feature is the coordination of all types
of '.:.ransportation-on rubber, on rails, in
the water, and in the air.
']'his timely review of a pressing prob-
lem will merit the attention of my col-
leagues, and I therefore include this ar-
ticl,e in the RECORD.
A NEW TRANSPORT PLAN
President Johnson, moving boldly to but-
tress his program for the Great Society, has
asked Congress to establish a Cabinet-level
Department of Transportation. As a corol-
lary. he has recommended a 6-year 11725 mil-
lion highway safety program that includes
the creation of Federal safety standards for
new cars and trucks, and has endorsed a
pending bill that authorizes minimu:rn stand-
ards for tires.
This is a gigantic program. of which the
best feature it; the coordination of all types
of transportation-on rubber, on rails, in the
water, and in the air. It represents an effort
to improve all these modes of transport while.
at the same time, making them safer. The
probable overall costs have only been
sketched in. These will have to be weighed
out as they are put down on paper. But
it is hard to fault the purpose behind the
President's proposals.
The program starts gently as it affects the
auto manufacturers. The Governine rit would
set standards for safe performance of vehi-
cles--not involving a totally 'crash-proof"
car, which might have to be built like a
tank, but rather a car from which all obvious
interior and exterior hazards had been re-
moved. If in 2 years the manufacturers had
failed to comply with the regulations, their
vehicles would be barred from interstate
commerce.
The President's far-ranging program cov-
ers many items. including (1) The creation
with Federal help of a 2,000-,Wile-per-hour
supersonic air transport; (2) it new highway
safety and research center; (3) encourage-
ment to the misrcltant marine; (4) studies
and recommendations to eliminate jet air-
craft noises; and (5) a wrap-up, in the new
department, of nearly 100,000 employees and
an annual expenditure of nearly $6 billion.
The new Department would include the Fed-
eral Aviation Agency, the Coast Guard, the
Bureau of Public Roads, the Maritime Ad-
ministration, and the Office of the Undersec-
retary of Transportation. Safety activities
of other existing transportation agencies
would also he bound in.
All these proposals are worthy, if the execu-
tion equals the concept and if bureaucracy
does not take over, as so often is the case
with G:wcrnment agencies. The supersonic
transport is required to retain American
aerial supremacy on world trade routes,
rhongh of course the utmost effort is re-
quired to keep the cost within bounds.
.safety in every field of transportation is
essential. We lose, in highway accidents,
more than 50,000 American lives yearly.
Millions of others are injured. If the new
C:lbinet agency can reduce this wastage in
lives and an equal wastage in efficiency, it
will be well worthwhile. Now we all wait the
details of this bold new approach to a be-
setting American problem.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
Or
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday. March 22, .1966
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, the
Chicago Sun Times recently printed an
excellent analysis of the 1954 Geneva
accord, which is the subject of consider-
able discussion these days among those
who participate in the debate on Viet-
nam.
I have taken the privilege of including
this in the RECORD today because I be-
lieve the Chicago Sun Times has done
a truly remarkable job in summarizing
the full significance of the 1954 Geneva
accord.
The Sun Times article follows:
THE 1954 GENEVA AccoRD
Some of our readers have asked about the
General accord of 1954, mentioned frequently
in the efforts to find peace in Vietnam-
what it is and how it came about.
The Geneva conference, which ran fi om
April 26 to July 21, 1954, was called to settle
the question of reunifying Korea and re-
storing peace to Indochina. The Korean
question was not settled. The agreements
reached on Indochina have become known
as the Geneva accord. The accord is a com-
plicated document of 47 articles plus a long
annex to the agreement.
Broadly speaking, tile Geneva accord of
1954 put an end to the fighting between
France and the Vietminh forces under Ho
Chi Minh in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.
The accord deals primarily with Vietnam.
Separate peace documents were drawn up for
Laos and Cambodia.
Nine nations participated in the Geneva
conference. They were the United Kingdom.
the United States, France, Red China, the
Soviet Union, Laos, Cambodia., North Viet-
nam and South Vietnam.. Representatives
of France and North Vietnam signed the
accord. All of the rest of the participating
nations, except the United States, took
"note" of the Geneva accord and pledged to
respect the sovereignty and independence of
both Vietnams, Laos, and Cambodia.
The United States issued its own declara-
tion. It stated that it would refrain from the
threat or use of force to disturb the Geneva,
accord, cautioning that it-would "view any
renewal of the aggression in violation of the
agreements with grave concern and as seri-
ously threatening international peace and
security." The United States also pledged
itself to seek to achieve the unity of both
North and South Vietnam through free elec-
tions supervised by the United Nations to
insure fairness.
The major pronouncements of the Geneva
accord are few but weighty. Vietnam was;
partitioned at the 17th parallel, pending
elections which were to be held in 1956 for
the purpose of reunifying the nation.
The introduction of armaments which
would increase the military potential of
either side was specifically prohibited. The
accord also banned the introduction of any
additional military forces by either side or
the establishment of military bases. All hos-
tilities were to be ended and an Internationai
Control Commission, made up of representa-
tives from India, Canada, and Poland, was
established to supervise and enforce the
agreements.
It is a matter of historical dissent as to who
broke the rules of the Geneva accord first
and to What extent. However, it is par-, of
the record that barely 3 months after the
accord had been accepted the then Premier
Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam asked
President Eisenhower for assistance in the
form of military advisers and supplies to
meet the direct threat to his nation from
Communist guerrillas. The assistance Diem
sought was granted by the United States on
October 24, 1954. President Eisenhower in-
sisted that some reforms also be carried out
and sent his personal representative to South
Vietnam to supervise a broad program of
agrarian and economic reforms.
It is also part of the record that Ho Chi
Minh, North Vietnam's leader, had been an
active Communist since the early 1920's. He
had made public his plans to take over all of
Indochina by guerrilla infiltration, subver-
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March , 2, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
it requires stepped-up efforts by recipient
nations to improve their own production
capabilities, as a condition of receiving the
aid. So it is not merely a handout but an
effort to encourage food-short nations to
overcome their shortages.
This bill deserves the support of every
citizen in the form of letters to Congressmen.
For, in the words of a witness who testified
recently for the bill;
"A livable world cannot long exist in which
two-thirds of human beings never get enough
to eat, and the remaining third are overfed."
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. TENO RONCALIO
OF WYOMING
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, March 9, 1966
Mr, RONCALIO. Mr. Speaker, as
Congress pursues a cautious and delib-
erate course through a stream of complex
and serious national and international
issues, it is imperative that those matters
of a less crucial nature not be overlooked.
One of the seemingly less crucial prob-
lems that could be an unfortunate victim
of our well-intentioned preoccupation
with questions of paramount importance
is the appropriation for the school milk
and school lunch programs.
The Nation realizes that a certain de-
gree of fiscal restraint will be necessary
to insure our Government's capacity to
meet our serious challenges, particularly
our commitment in Vietnam.
The question is not whether increased
economy measures are needed, but
rather, where these economy measures
can be safely directed.
I submit that the school milk and
school lunch programs, proven and valu-
able Government services that they are,
should not be summarily sacrificed.
We should instead direct our paring
knives to appropriations for less proven
and less valuable services that can better
absorb cuts without serious impairment
of such widespread impact.
If the Vietnam conflict is to require
sacrifice on the part of certain Govern-
ment programs, there are alternatives
open to us. We may choose to begin by
temporarily restoring the excise taxes on
luxury items untouched by the recent tax
adjustment measure.
Another alternative would be a move
to effect reasonable reductions in cer-
tain antipoverty programs. Common-
sense dictates that when economy meas-
ures are required, they should begin with
those programs that have not as yet won
broad acceptance nor demonstrated posi-
tive effectiveness.
In order to place into perspective the
terrible impact of the proposed reduc-
tions, I would like to introduce some facts
on the situation in my State.
In Wyoming, with a population of ap-
proximately 340,000, some 32,000 chil-
dren in 273 participating schools were
served lunches during fiscal 1965. Dur-
ing that year, 5.2 million lunches were
served. Only 3 percent of the lunches
were served free to needy children. For
the remaining children, the cost of the
lunch was 27 cents a meal, with the Gov-
ernment absorbing 10 to 11 cents a lunch.
Wyoming received $222,000 in Federal
assistance for the lunch program.
Under terms of the proposed cut, the
Government would now pay 1 cent less
per lunch, which would mean Wyoming
would receive $40,000 to $50,000 less,
based on 1966 participation. This would
result in Government assistance of $170,-
000 to $180,000-instead of the $222,000
last year.
During fiscal 1965, milk was served in
314 schools with 3.6 million half pints of
milk served to Wyoming schoolchildren.
This was over and above the 5 million in-
cluded in the lunch program.
In the proposed budget, funds for this
program are cut from $103 million to $21
million, and milk is to be served only in
schools with no lunch program. This
reduction of four-fifths means that Wy-
oming could expect her share to be
$25,800-instead of the $129,000 received
in fiscal 1965.
These children have paid 3 to 4 cents
a half pint with the Government pro-
viding the other 3 cents. The immediate
consequence would be a doubling of the
cost of milk to the student.
This summary indicates to what a
great extent this reduction would work
a hardship on Wyoming students. I
know it cannot be any less severe in our
sister States, and with the total effect
calculated, this proposed reduction can
only be viewed as a serious threat to one
of the most beneficial of Government
programs.
The cost of these programs is actually
modest when we view them as an in-
vestment in the health of our Nation's
youth. The merits of establishing good
dietary habits for our youth is obvious.
Health is an essential factor in learning.
To restrict the chief impact to needy
students is to place them in a separate
and distinct category-an outlook so
contrary to our American equality con-
cept of a public school.
The school milk and lunch programs
have done more than any other Federal
program to improve the diet and health
of American students. Now we are
asked to assume the impossible task of
limiting it to the needy, when we know
that any ruling established will still hurt
deserving children. This program must
continue to be open to all students.
Because the merit is so apparent, per-
haps it is best to, emphasize the harm-
ful consequence of a reduction. The in-
creased cost would certainly cause some
students to withdraw from the programs
entirely, often to a totally unsatisfactory
situation.
The dairy industry, already troubled
by farmers leaving because of low in-
come, would be further damaged, since
these programs create and develop
markets for dairy products.
The milk program supplements the
dairy price support program because
markets are provided for Government-
purchased milk.. Otherwise, the Com-
modity Credit Corporation would have to
buy and store dairy surpluses-at a
direct cost of about $100 million-or al-
most the cost of the milk program in
1965.
A1663
Surely the scant savings ultimately
realized by this ill-advised budget cut
do not justify such a move. To con-
tinue the present program, as the public
most surely will demand, will merely
shift the burden to State governments
already beset by increasing pressures
upon their resources.
There is only one practical course open
to us-total restoration of the necessary
appropriations, for to handicap these
programs in the false name of economy
would be a grave disservice to the Nation.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 22, 1966
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, political
freedom and the individual security
which democracy can provide are rela-
tively new concepts in Asia. We must
not forget, however, that these things
are what the war is all about in Viet-
nam. It comes down quite simply to
whether the South Vietnamese shall have
a government imposed by force from the
north or the right to choose their own
government.
The following editorial from the
March 20, 1966, edition of the New York
Herald Tribune illustrates this dilemma:
VIETNAM : POLITICAL DILEMMA
When Buddhist monks in saffron robes
start fulminating, and crowds pour into
Vietnamese city streets, the United States
is always reminded of its most painful
dilemma in South Vietnam. One horn is
the stark fact that this unhappy country
has no kovernment-only an administration,
The other is that there can be no govern-
ment in any real sense until there is enough
peace and order to permit the people to es-
tablish one. Yet government is the essence
of the war in Vietnam; the reason why North
Vietnam and the United States are sending
in troops.
In cold logic, this need not present any
crisis of conscience in the United States.
The American purpose is to permit the South
Vietnamese to choose theirs own government;
the purpose of North Vietnam is to impose
one upon them-the same kind of Govern-
ment which Ho Chi Minh created in the
north at the cost of perhaps 100,000 lives
and nearly a million refugees. The Ameri-
can aim is not ignoble.
But an administration formed by military
men to fight a war is not likely to be the
kind that wins devotion from either the
peasantry or the intelligentsia. Nor, in a
nation as new as South Vietnam, has there
been time to erect the largely self-function-
ing bureaucracy that enables older states to
carry on even during wars and revolutions.
Wars, especially like that now being waged
in South Vietnam, seldom lend themselves
to the redress of grievances. The Commu-
nists appeal to those suffering economic
hardships by shooting landlords. Then, of
course, they shoot the peasants if the latter
do not join the local collective. But that
hardly comes under the head of reform.
The objective of any administration in a
country situated as South Vietnam now is
must be to give the people as efficient serv-
ices as can be rendered under the circum-
stances and to assure them that they will
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1661 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- APPENDIX March 2
eventually be permitted to set up a govern-
n)ent. it must enlist as broad support as
,)ossible.. But at the same time it cannot
bring into the leadership groups which,
whether from good or evil intent, will sabo-
Lage the war effort.
'I'bis is an ideal which no South
Vietnam- _e administration has yet achieved. There
has been conflict of ambition, there has been
unnecessary harshness, there has been cor-
r)iption. The best that can be said of the
-,en who have managed affairs in South
Vietnam is that they have been no worse
inn those who have floated to the top in
Most of the new nations, and better than a
,focal many. Also that their efforts are, in
i.he long run, infinitely more promising for
i. lie freedom and economic well-being of the
south Vietnamese people than the strait-
jacket imposed upon the North.
The role of the United States in all of this
is infinitely delicate. It is blamed for all
lie shortcomings of the Saigon leadership
;ind yet it cannot exert full control over
i. hat leadership without stultifying its own
position. It is accused of both action and
oiaction---and can have no assurance, In
any case. that its own selection of leaders
would be any better than those already in
charge. Nor is there any certainty that
movements stirring in the land---political
Ihtddhism, for example--are more than crude
power plays or less than attempted suhver-
r;fon.
With the unpleasant burden of so much
responsibility and such limited authority in
civil affairs, the United States must struggle.
't'here fire no easy answers for the political
dilemma, any more than for the war itself-
although the outcome of the war may well
hang upon the resolution of the dilemma.
]het what the American people must not do is
to be so sensitive to the constant and often
contradictory criticism leveled at the admin-
i:,tration in Saigon that they overlook the
wood for the trees, that they join the critics
in equating a temporary authoritarianism
there with the permanent slavery that Viet-
cong are trying by force and fraud to put in
i is place.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JEFFERY COHELAN
OP' i'ALIF'ORNIA
IN 'F'ril'l HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 22, 1966
Mi'. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, the de-
iense of our Nation is an awesome and
:sobering job. Everyone of us who serves
tie the Congress is daily made aware of
the complexities of this task. The man
:,rho today, at one of the most dangerous
,periods in history, bears the brunt of
i.llis enormous burden, is Secretary of
U Uefenst Robert McNamara.
As a former member of the Armed
rrvicec. Committee, as well as in my
current committee assignment, I have
had occasion to observe the Secretary at
close range and to be aware of the dedi-
cation. and ability he brings to his task.
Because the problems he tackles are
not easy of solution, because the deci-
r,i.tnfs he makes affect so many facets of
our public and private lives today, there
is an understandable tendency to be crit-
teal of the conduct of the Secretary of
Defense. But all of us owe a debt to Bob
McNamara for the magnificent job he
Has done. While we may disagree with
individual decisions he has made, none of
us should doubt his high motivation and
sincere dedication to the welfare of our
country.
Mr. Joseph Kraft's column in yester-
day's Washington Post, which follows, is
a reminder of the many criticisms leveled
at the Secretary as he endeavors to t ee-
oricile conflicting interests in the Depart-
ment of Defense for the common good of
all Americans:
MCNAMI.RA'S ENEMIES: V6STEI) INTERES S
D.isl'LAY HAND
(Ey Joseph Kraft)
Under cover of the Vie'.narnese war i mere
is being waged a dirty political fight ag, inst
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
The attackers are the scene old :professional
military men who have It all times ''hal-
lenged M:cNanlara.'s rational approach to de-
fense management. They are allied with the
same old vested interests in the defense in-
dustries. And they speak through the carne
old military tribunes of the Congress.
Only now they are using the :oial'usioi and
emotion of the wa.r to reopen argument'; lost
long ago on the merits. A. broad sampling
of this ugly technique comes newly to hand
with the publication of the Senate and Fl )use
Armed Services Committee hearing on the
supplemental defense appropriation bill for
this fiscal year.
for a starter, consider that old ches:nut,
tt:.e role of the heavy bomber, Secretary Mc-
Namara and his civilian aids found, and
convincingly demonstrated, that in a nu-
clear war, missiles would. be immeasurably
superior to manned bombers. They also
found that in nonnuclear war, medium
bombers were the most useful. .Accordingly,
they have been phasing out production of
the heavy bombers.
But Air Force bomber pilots die I;ard.
And they are now having their spokesman
intimate that if only heavy bombing in
North Vietnam were permitted, the ''trier
side would be on its knees. Here, for ex-
ample, is Senator STUART SYMINGTON, Demo-
crat, of Missouri, a former Secretary of the
Air Force.
"They have taken the Air Force, put it in
the ring, said make a good fight, then : riti-
cized it. You turn loose the naval an, and
Air Force air of this country against North
Vietnamese military targets and you are go-
ing to have a changing situation in bou.th
Vietnam."
Another outworn issue centers on the fa-
mous TFX or F=-111. a combined figiiter-
bom.ber which Secretary McNam.ara hail. de-
signed for combined use by both the Navy
and Air Force. Inevitably, the common de-
sign compromised out certain special fea-
tures that the Navy wanted, and other:, de-
sired by the Air Force. Still. the plane has
proved very effective.
But here is a sweet question on the matter
put to two Navy officials by Chairman L.
N[ENDEL REVERS, the Democrat,c Repres:'nta-
tive from Charleston. S.C.. with its big naval
base: "When you get by yourself at hor,le at
night * * * do you wish you had some other
plane rather than working on the 1 I. to
work aboard the carriers? If you had your
way, wouldn't you rather have someLli:ing
c'sc?"
And here is Representative WILLIS A H.
BATES, Republican, of Massachusetts. and
former naval officer, on the same subject:
"We have to remember that these planes
hero might fight the latest that somebody
else might have, and we cannot fight a com-
promise airplane against a r.oncompromised
airplane. If the situation should change
overnight in Vietnam, so that we would have
other planes against us, this is what we have
to be ready for. * * *"
Another issue long since settled con:.iders
the Navy attack plane. Instead of the heavy
and expensive A-6 Secretary McNa.ncsrn `aid
designed a lighter and cheaper attack air-
craft, the A-7. A part of the savings in
money and weight came in radar equipment,
and as a result, the A-7 is less able to fly
in bad weather than the A-6. St-.1], there
has been no important letup of naval air
attacks because of weather in Vietnam.
But the A-6 was built by the Grumfnan
Aircraft Co. of Long Island, while the new
A-7 contract went to another company. And
here is a typical question from Represei'L;-
tive OTIS PrcE, from a Long Island district
with not a few constituents who work for
Grumman:
-Does it make any sense to you to crn-
tinue to buy aircraft in large numbers which
are incapable of performing their mission .it
night, or in bad weather?"
On the surface, to be sure, these look like
reasonable questions and comments. But
the real purpose is to put into question the
whole system of analysis and choice that has
for the first time made it possible for the
civilian leadership to get a grip or, the de-
fense program. And if anyone has any
doubts on that matter, here is a revec[:ng
assertion by Repreentative BATES:
"The question that bothers me in all of
these hearings is the kind of planning.'
In the face of these attacks, it is east, to
see why Secretary McNamara somei.irnes
seems highhanded with the congressional
committees. The fact is that the only way
he could have amicable relations with the
committees would be to let them and their
allies in the defense industries and the nmili-
tary services run the defense programs. To
me anyhow, it is a supreme source of s?;iis-
faction that he continues to meet his
responsibilities.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATII'Ld
Tuesday, March 22, 1966
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, much
has recently been written about the lrreat
things that are happening in Chicago.
It is a source of pride to all of us from
Chicago that finally, after many years of
abuse and denegation, Chicago is now
being recognized as the most exciting
metropolis in America.
The complete transformation of the
Chicago Police Department is one of the
reasons, among many, for this revival of
respect for Chicago.
Chicago today has undoubtedly the
finest police force in the country. Two
men are responsible for this development.
One is Chicago Police Superintendent
Orlando W. Wilson, and the other is
Mayor Richard J. Daley, who had the
good judgment to hire Mr. Wilson.
The current issue of the highly re-
spected magazine, the Reporter, carries
an excellent article about Superintcnd-
ent Wilson.
I call this article to the attentio of
my colleagues by placing it today in the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
The article follows:
CHICAGO'S SCHOLARLY COY'
(By Hal Bruno)
CHICAGO:-While much of the rest of the
country is experiencing an increase in the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD APPENDIX. March, 22, 1966.
known to all nations. It is precisely because
there can be no question of our peaceful
intent, that Ho Chi Minh felt called upon to
defend his intransigent policies to the Com-.
munist world.
Unlike his stale polemic, the American
position is plain, simple and morally sound.
In essence it is:
That the United States is prepared for
discussions or negotiations without any prior
conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962;
That a reciprocal reduction of hostilities
could be envisaged and that a ceasefire
might be the first order of business in any
discussions or negotiations;
That the United States remains prepared
to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam
as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to
determine its own future without external
interference;
That the United States desires no contin-
uing military presence or bases in Vietnam;
That the future political structure in
South Vietnam should be determined by the
South Vietnamese people themselves through
democratic processes;
That the questions of the reunification
of the two Vietnams should be decided by
the free decision of their two peoples.
. But until an honorable settlement is
reached in honorable negotiations, the
United States will respect its commitments
and the human rights of self-determination
in South Vietnam. If aggression there is
permitted to succeed, the consequence will
be felt not only in Vietnam but in all the
world. We fight an enemy that has planned
its aggression. And history has taught us-
especially the history of the Nazi years-the
horrible lesson that retreat does not bring
safety and weakness does not bring peace.
We will continue to resist aggression, there-
fore, but we will continue to seek peace.
At this moment, the fighting goes on and
no one should be misled as to what is hap-
pening in South Vietnam. This is no more
a civil war between citizens of the South
than the Communist takeover of China was
a simple agrarian reform movement. The
Communist Government of North Vietnam,
aided by Peiping has led, supplied, equipped,
and sustained the fighting in the South.
Hanoi has sent its regular army forces into
battle and at least nine of its combat regi-
ments have been identified. The presence
of others is also evident. These North Viet-
namese army units have been identified by
many sources including neutral ones.
Hanoi has sent large mortars with a range
of up to 6 miles. These sophisticated weap-
ons are obviously not locally manufactured
guerrilla arms nor have they been captured
in the south. They are of foreign commu-
nist manufacture.
We want an end to terror and to violence
in Vietnam, but this end can only come when
communist aggression ceases and when our
adversaries are as ready as we are for an
honorable settlement.
Life Itself is the first human right. If it
is to have value, all men must learn-in the
words of the United Nations Charter-"to
practice tolerance and live together as good
neighbors." That is our wish for the people
of America, for the people of North and South
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. G. ELLIOTT HAGAN
OF GEORGIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 22, 1966
Mr. HAGAN of Georgia. Mr. Speaker,
the Atlanta Constitution has commented
editorially on Defense Secretary Mc-
Namara's assurance that the Armed
Forces are not overextended or suffering
shortages but are fully capable of meet-
ing their commitments anywhere.
The newspaper believes the defense
achievement to date "is a great tribute to
the Nation's adaptability and determina-
tion."
In the belief that many will want to
read this editorial, I am taking the liberty
of making it available for publication in
the RECORD:
MCNAMARA REASSURES UNITED STATES
Secretary of Defense McNamara assures
the country the Armed Forces are not over-
extended or suffering shortages but are "fully
capable" of meeting their commitments
anywhere. This news is welcomed in view of
the fact there have been charges that the
demands of the Vietnam war were depleting
the Nation's trained manpower to a danger-
ous degree.
The Secretary also disclosed that 20,000
additional men were on their way to join the
war against the Vietcong, bringing our total
forces in South Vietnam to 235,000. "Far
from overextending ourselves," the Secretary
declared, . "we have actually extended our
military position."
The country will hope that the Secretary
is right but it remains uncertain how many
troops finally will have to be sent to Viet-
nam to win a military victory, if it comes to
that. There are speculations that as many
as 400,000 will be needed by the end of this
year-more than the number in action dur-
ing the Korean war. At this stage, we may
expect troop strength to continue to climb.
In a press conference Wednesday, the Sec-
retary was candid enough to say that some
concepts and methods forged by him and
his experts have failed to meet the test of
the Vietnam war. "We have to develop new
methods to meet problems for which we had
old answers," he said. "Old answers are not
applying." Those who have followed the
course of the war will agree and hope that
the new answers have been found.
Concerning the buildup, the Secretary also
had a significant statement. "Never before,"
he declared, "has this Nation or any other
nation been able to place so large a force in
comb-at in so short a time and some 10,000
miles from its shores without calling up Re-
serves, extending active duty tours on a
widespread basis and invoking the kinds of
strict economic controls normally associated
with military emergencies."
The country still may have to resort to the
measures in the above statement but the
achievement to date is a great tribute to the
Nation's adaptability and determination.
We Cannot Afford Apathy About the
Hunger Problem
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. PAUL H. TODD, JR.
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 22, 1966
Mr. TODD. Mr. Speaker, there has
been over the past months a good deal of
very constructive discussion about the
worldwide population explosion and the
problems associated with it. Senator
GRUENING has held a number of very in-
teresting and Informative hearings in the
Senate. The House Agriculture Com-
mittee has considered the matter in con-
nection with the proposed food-for-
freedom legislation. Newspapers and
other communications media have de-
voted space and .time to discussing the
problem.
I would like to take this opportunity to
salute those who have had the courage to
lead and join in a rational dialog con-
cerning a subject which was once taboo
and upon which continued silence would
have been disastrous. The people as a
whole are becoming aware that the op-
tions are very simple: Either we under-
take to reduce the birth rate or we face
mass famine and political unrest.
The Battle Creek, Enquirer-News,
which serves the city of Battle Creek,
which I have the privilege of represent-
ing in Congress, has been one of the na-
tional leaders in bringing this problem to
public attention. Space in the paper has
been devoted to a discussion of the prob-
lem, and the paper has commented edi-
torially on the matter, always with per-
tinence and good taste.
A particularly informative editorial on
the matter appeared recently in the pa-
per, and I take this occasion to bring it to
the attention of the Members:
WE CANNOT AFFORD APATHY ABOUT THE
HUNGER PROBLEM
An Associated Press feature on the world
hunger problem, published in the Enquirer
& News Sunday, implied that people with
full stomachs do not become very concerned
about those who go hungry.
"Since the scope of the problem has been
poorly comprehended by the general public
in rich countries," the writer said, "there has
been a high degree of apathy toward the
plight of hungry millions."
If that is so, the time has come to abolish
that apathy and become concerned. The
day is not far away when the food problem
will reach the proportions of a disaster unless
more Is done to feed the underfed and to
increase farm production.
Coupled with this problem is the matter
of population control, and to that issue also
more attention must be directed. Comment-
ing on the problem earlier this year, four
Nobel Prize winners warned of a "new dark
age" of hunger, poverty, cannibalism, and
possible nuclear warfare if world population
growth were not checked.
The urgency of the problem is borne out
by a few figures:
There are 180,000 new mouths to be fed
every day-65 million a year.
If present trends continue, world popula-
tion will rise from the present 3.4 billion to
from 6 to 7.5 billion by the year 2000.
The growth, moreover, will occur mainly
in the underdeveloped nations where the
masses even now can be described as in a
state of conditioned starvation.
The United States, of course, has done a
great deal through its Food for Peace pro-
gram to avert famine in many nations. An
official of the United Nations Food and Agri-
culture Organization. has been quoted as say-
ing that had it not been for American food
surpluses, "the disaster would be upon us
right now."
This country must do still more, however,
if disaster in the form of death and unrest
fostered by nagging want is to be averted.
Governmental efforts in that direction are
embodied in the administration's Food for
Freedom bill, which would authorize a 5-year
program for furnishing food abroad to re-
place the present program when it expires
on December 31.
The purposes of the bill are to expand
international trade, to develop and expand
U.S.markets, combat hunger and malnutri-
tion, and encourage. economic development
in the developing countries with emphasis
on aid to countries determined to improve
their own agricultural production. Wisely,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A1G61
vin: people are needed In the industries pro-
vid:ng these, goods and services-the entire
.stet will pick up.
I :;Mould emphasize here that our program
is mot designed to help one area grow at the
expense of other areas- We do not want to
redistribute the wealth of the Nation and to
i?elr:a:ate economic activity from the more
prosperous regions to the depressed regions.
't'here is enough growth to go around, as our
rising gross national product indicates.
'I'I:Iere is an expanding, not a fixed, national
pie of potential for economic growth. Our
intoul.ion is to increase the contribution of
c;.eh region of the country to that national
lie,
tie. Koerber, I'm sure, got help of some
kind from the community when he was first
lief;inning his business, And one of the most
salient points of his story is the town raising
nr0,0o0 to enable him to keep his doors open
whin calamity struck. This is the kind of
i,a;al initiative and support our programs
demand, and what its success relies on.
I i this respect EDA Is very similar to other
(:feat Society programs. A tenet of the
treat Society is that enforced solutions will
never work. People in local communities
mull, want programs designed for their bene-
fit. Programs cannot attain their goals un-
i+?se a willingness to support the solution to
a. parl;icillar problem permeates the commu-
f 41 t,;
1 'i the case of EDA, possible recipients of
his is and grants must be willing to put up
part of the money for the project. And they
;iris, also fulfill other requirements, especial-
l,, that of developing on overall economic
clovelopment plan-which increases the
chances of the project's contributing to the
e'couotuic growth of the area.
Ii IJA programs--and those of the entire
l eeeral Government--not only rely on local
iuiliatlve. They seek to expand opportuni.-
:.ies for local initiative, both individual and
collective. For instance, the Bureau of Pub-
lic Roads builds roads. In so doing, it en-
:3blss an individual businessman who wants
ship his goods to a particular city to do
es . An EDA loan enables a community that
cciiits to attract industry to fulfill its desire.
Ii;n.ow this refutes a widespread impres-
c;io;i that the Government is out to control
all it can. But a careful examination of
individual Federal programs will verify what
i have said. These programs seek to be the
iseiping hand that so many communities cry
out for.
",Nell, Mr. Koerber, if I could report to the
i'ongress the presence of a growing industry
;;nrYi as yours and the presence of commu-
;,ity support such as exists here in De 1''uniak
;springs in every ear in the Nation which
concerns us, t would. be a very happy man
iarced, As we work with our programs, we
will keep both you and this community in
'nit' minds as we wort. in Washington toward
out goals of curing the economic wounds of
~.is;! Nation and increasing our national
'' ct1th,
Tile First ]Human Right-An Address by
the Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
ON' NEW YORK
11 THE HOUSE 01" REPRESENTATIVES
Tww;esday, March 22, 1966
Mr. MU:LTER. Mr. Speaker, on Jan-
itary 31, 1966, at a banquet in his honor,
Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg was the
recipient of the America's Democratic
! ogacy Award from the Anti-Defama-
tion League for his continuing cham-
pionship of freedom, justice, and equal-
ity.
in accepting the award Ambassador
Goldberg made the following address
which I commend to the attention of out
colleagues:
THE FIRST HUMAN RIGHT
(Nose.-Ambassador Goldberg calls it "life
i.tself'--and if it is to have value, all men
must learn "to practice tolerance and live
together as good neighbors.")
(By Arthur J. Goldberg)
President Kennedy once said, "Here on
earth God's work must be truly our own."
In practical terms, a dynamic world soci-
ety that has found ways to smash the atom
and to conquer space must now use its
genius and its resources to find new ways in
human relations so that all men will live
together in peace and harmony. There is no
other way to succeed in achieving a, world
community of nations safe from the scourge
of war.
In America we have long recognized the
inescapable fact that there is no dividing
line between equality and liberty- Indeed,
it was George Washington who wrote to
America's first Jewish congregation that a
truly free nation gives "to bigotry no sanc-
tion; to persecution, no assistance."
Our Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 196,,
gave a new voice and force to these wordy,
Every citizen in our Nation is now legally
committed to their implementation. Every
citizen has the obligation to do so not only
because we have new laws, but because the}
are good and morally sound laws.
Despite our new laws, however can we
say that there is no sanction of bigotry in
America? Can we say that equal opportu-
nity is now an accomplished fact? Can we
say it does not. exist in the factory, in the
office, in our labor unions, in the executive
suite of our corporations, in some of our
higher edutati.onal institutions? Can we
say if beginnings are made to eliminate ra-
cial discrimination, this extends to the elim-
ination of religious discrimination" Can we
say we have strppcd bigotry from our mind:
and hearts?
We are now only at the beginning of the
end. Writing civil rights measures against
discrimination into law gives us no moral
rights to pause in any phase of what must
be a never-ending light. There is no such
thing as a little bit of prejudice.
The aims that guide its domestically guide
us internationally. Whether at borne or
abroad we must move ahead in the gooc
company of those willing to stand up and to
speak up against injustice.
Seventeen years ago, the United Natiol
made notable., progress when it adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The'
declaration was a milestone in every sense,
but we must look to new horizons now. We
can no longer talk about how much we
loathe discrimination. The test of on
loathing must be the speed and effectiveness.
with which each and every nation turns up
the lights in its own house to end the dark
ness in which discrimination breeds and
dwells.
The lights did not shine brightly enough
when the International Convention on thr?
gtimination of All Forms of Racial D:iscrimi-
nation-adopted at the last session of thy',
General Assembly-omitted a specific refer-
ence to anti-Semitism as one of the partic
ular evils to be condemned.
With its evil history over the centuries and
the monstrous crime of 6 million Jews mur-
dered by the Nazis little more than a genera
tion ago, anti-Semitism demands condemna
tion by name- The U.S. delegation at the
U.N. will continue the fight to do so by rais
ing the issue again in the Human Right.;
Commission of the United Nations,
We will do so because our attitude is con-
sistent no matter what the violation of a
man's right-anti-Semitism, apartheid in
South Africa or the denial of rights to black
Africans in Rhodesia.
More than 100 years ago Lincoln observed
this Nation could not endure half free and
half stave. Surely it is an appropriate ques-
tion to ask whether any nation today can
endure one-fifth free and four-fifths slave.
The twin evils posed by Rhodesia and
South Africa point up the challenges that
face us not only in the United Nations, but
as a sovereign people deeply committed to
the freedom and the equality of the individ-
ual.
We know from our own national experi-
ence that the response to injustice can be
both emotional and extreme. Finding the
peaceful and speedy solution is not easy.
This is the problem that now confronts us
and other Western nations in our relation-
ships with the new African and the Asian
states It is quite understandable that they
are suspicious of promises and impatient of
results.
It is not easy to wipe out the evils of the
past centuries overnight. Yet the call is
universal both here and abroad-freedom and
equality-here and now. We must honor
this call and put an end to any form of
racism, or indeed any instance of discrimi-
nation, be it based on race, sex, language or
religion.
The great Court, on which I had the hon-
or to sit, said a little more than 2 years
ago that the concept of eliminating dis-
crimination with all deliberate speed never
contemplated indefinite delay. Indeed, it
cannot. The mortal blow to discrimination
will not be struck, however, when its most,
vicious elements will be ended but only when
all people everywhere will be concerned when
just one man somewhere has the least of his
rights trampled upon. The elimination of
all forms of discrimination and racism roust
be the companion goal of man's eternal
search for peace.
In Vietnam, the problem now occupying
so much of the attention and determination
of Americans, what we seek is nothing less
than one of the most basic human rights of
our day: that each person should have the
right and the opportunity to choose his own
destiny free from fear and free from farei'
Thomas Paine said at the time of the
American Revolution that "those who ex-
pect to reap the blessings of freedom, must,
like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting
it," Since that time, we in America have
supported the principle of self -determ.ina-
tion for ourselves and for all others. It is
a central theme of our domestic policy; it is
a cornerstone of our foreign policy. It is
also a basic principle of the UN Charter to
which we and all member states of the UN
are committed. It would be wholly incon-
sistent if we should turn our back on that
principle now.
We also believe that the power of our Na-
tion must always be used for peace no less
than for fighting.
We were told by individuals and nations
of many ideologies that a pause in our bomb-
ing raids on North Vietnam for a reasonable
period of time would be essential before
Hanoi. would respond. The President or-
dered a halt and it went into effect just be-
fore Christmas, but there was no indication
that Hanoi was any the more interested in
peace.
out, conviction remains that the Vietna-
mese people-once the aggression from the
North ends-are entitled to work out their
destinies so that each man-North nnct
South-will enjoy the fruits of peace.
It would be a mistake to assume-despite
the negative response from Hanoi-that our
peace initiative has not been worthwhile.
We have made our views and peaceful intent
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