THE NEED FOR A THOROUGH INQUIRY INTO OUR FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES BY VIRTUE OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 16, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

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nary Y , 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
nder the proposal I offer today, $50 Yet, though a thorough knowledge of
.ilion would be appropriated for title present and future economic trends is
X. This increase is necessary both to vital to intelligent policymaking, there
finance the expected projects fortheom- has been a surprisingly small amount of
ing from the expansion of the act to in- public concern and no widespread debate
clude racial imbalance plans, and also to thus far in this area. A few economists
finance more adequately the existing au- and some business leaders have come
thority to assist de jure desegregation forward with varying economic analyses
programs. The Office of Education esti- and widely differing proposals, but their
mates that this amount is the absolute efforts have received scant attention.
realistic minimum required if a satis- Mr. President, the Constitution of the
factory Federal effort is to be made. United States places the final responsi-
Mr. President, I want to stress that my bility for the conduct of our foreign re-
proposal contains no coercive features lations in the hands of the President.
whatsoever. It does not require any So, while debate in Congress over the
school board to take any action. It is conflict in Vietnam may prove healthy,
simply designed to help those school may help clarify the issues at stake, and
boards who have determined that a pro- may even develop workable alterna-
gram to correct racial imbalance is nec- tives-still, in the final analysis-we
essary and who can make good use of the cannot displace that ultimate responsi-
Federal funds which my proposal would bility of the Chief Executive-that final
provide. decision which is always his.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- However, the same Constitution vests
sent that the bill lie on the desk for 10 in Congress the primary responsibility
days for the purpose of permitting addi- for the American economy. It is we
tional Senators to join as cosponsors. who must enact the laws levying taxes,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill imposing duties, appropriating moneys,
will be received and appropriately re- and regulating commerce. And, if we
ferred; and, without objection, the bill are to legislate in a manner that will per-
will lie on the desk, as requested by the mit us to meet our international obliga-
Senator from Massachusetts. tions while maintaining a growing, ex-
The bill (S. 2928) to amend title IV panding domestic economy, Congress
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order must assemble all the facts and informa-
to authorize the Commissioner of Edu- tion necessary to the task.
cation to provide technical assistance We must probe beneath surface ap-
and grants to school boards in support of pearances and examine in detail rank-
programs designed to overcome any ra- ling questions that have yet to be resolved
cial imbalance in the public schools, in- to everyone's satisfaction.
troduced by Mr. KENNEDY of Massachu-
and referred to the Committee on Labor that the unn;ea aLates is roiiowing the
and Public Welfare. only just and honorable course of policy
open to us in Vietnam.
THE NEED FOR A THOROUGH IN- derelict in our duty if we did not ascer-
QUIRY INTO OUR FISCAL AND tain whether we can truly afford "guns
MONETARY POLICIES $Y VIRTUE and butter" without endangering our
in-
OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT economic health; whether a sudden in-
crease in military expenditures combined
Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, to- with growing domestic programs will
day the brooding specter of the war in generate unbearable inflationary pres-
Vietnam looms large over Washington. sures; whether future tax increases may
Government officials, members of the be required to keep growth steady and
communications media, and the Ameri- stable; and, whether our balance-of-pay-
can public in general, all realize that the ments deficits can be further reduced.
single most important issue currently These are just some of the matters we
facing this Nation is the conduct of our need to look into in order to discharge our
policy in a small, beleagured country responsibilities.
thousands of miles from our own shores. Mr. President, such an investigation is
In fact, whether they uphold, or would not just desirable and timely, it is urgent
have us renounce our commitment to and necessary.
the people of South Vietnam, Senators, For that reason, I am today submitting
columnists, businessmen, students and a resolution on behalf of the distin-
all men of good will affirm that the pur- guished senior Senator from Indiana
suit of peace in southeast Asia is of over- [Mr. HARTKE], the able junior Senator
riding importance to the United States from Montana [Mr. METCALi'], and my-
and every one of our partners in the free self
whi
h
ld
,
c
wou
authorize the Senate
world. Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, at its
Committee on Finance to make a full
But, concerned as we are over events and complete study of all matters relat- next printing, I ask unanimous consent
in South Vietnam itself, we cannot lose ing to the fiscal and monetary position that my name be added as a cosponsor of
sight of the problems related to the eco- of the Government, and their effect on of
he (S. 2911) to bill Tariff Act of amend roduce 3bb y
nomic strength which undergirds Amer- the state of the economy. The resolu- th the noAct of 1eo introduced L-
icas' ability to meet her responsibilities the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TA
there-as well as in other friendly na- tion would require the committee to re- 1v1ADGE].
tions and at home. We cannot and must port its findings-and make such recom- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
not allow the political and military ques- mendations as it deems advisable to the objection, it is so ordered.
tions about the Vietnamese struggle to Senate not later than 90 days after the Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I ask
obscure the implications for our economy day on which the resolution is agreed to. unanimous consent that my name may.
of the increased spending required to I sincerely trust that this resolution be added as a cosponsor to S. 2797 at its
sustain that struggle. will be speedily adopted. next printing.
No. 26-2
2901
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The res-
olution will be received and appropriately
referred.
The resolution (S. Res. 221) was re-
ferred to the Committee on Finance, as
follows:
S. Ras. 221
Resolved, That the Committee on Finance,
or any duly authorized subcommittee there-
of, is authorized under sections 134(a) and
136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, as amended, and in accordance with its
jurisdiction specified by rule XXV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, to make a full
and complete study and investigation with
respect to all matters relating to the fiscal
and monetary position of the Government
of the United States in view of our increas-
ing commitments in Vietnam, including, but
not limited to the adequacy of the revenues
of the Government, the need for increasing
the statutory limit on the public debt, meth-
ods for further improving the United States
balance-of-payments position, the problem
of interest rates and other matters related
to the Nation's economic welfare.
SEC. 2. The committee shall report its
findings upon the study and investigation
authorized by this resolution, together with
such recommendations as it deems advisable,
to the Senate not later than the 90th day
after the day on which this resolution is
agreed to.
EXTENSION OF TIME FOR ADDI-
TIONAL COSPONSORS TO S. 2888
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, a week
ago I asked unanimous consent that S.
2888 remain at the desk for the conven-
ience of those Senators who desire to co-
sponsor it.
I now ask unanimous consent that S.
2888 remain at the desk for an additional
week for the convenience of those Sena-
tors who are not present today, until
February 23. This bill would give prior-
ity to school lunch programs.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS
Mr, BOGGS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that at the next
printing of S. 2882, a bill to amend title
XVIII of the Social Security Act so as
to extend to June 30, 196', the period for
initial enrollment in the program of sup-
plementary medical insurance benefits
for the aged provided under part B of
such title, the names of Senator JAVrTS,
of New York, Senator ALLOTT, of Colo-
rado, Senator FONG, of Hawaii, and Sen-
ator ScoTT, of Pennsylvania be added as
cosponsors.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE February 16, 1966
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
TYDINGS in the chair). Without objec-
tion, it is so ordered.
NOTICE OF HEARING ON S. 2704. A
13ILL TO PROVIDE FOR THE REG-
ULATION OF BANK COLLECTIVE
INVESTMENT FUNDS
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS 1Vlr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I
AND JOINT RESOLUTION should like to announce that the Sub-
Under authority of the orders of the committee on Financial Institutions of
Senate, as indicated below, the follow- the Committee on Bankin?; and Currency
ing names have been added as additional will hold a hearing on S. 2703, a bill to
a^osponsors for the following bills and provide for the regulation of bank collec-
joint resolution:: tive investment funds.
The hearing will begin on Tuesc a.y,
Authority of February 1, 1966:
2855. A bill to amend chapter 207, title March 8, 1966, at 10 a.m.,, in room 5302,
S.
18, United States Code, to prescribe procedure New Senate Office Building.
for the return of persons who have fled, in Any persons who wish to appear and
violation of the conditions of ball given in testify in connection with this bill are
any State or judicial district of the United requested to notify Matthew Hale, chief
States, to another state or judicial district, of staff, Senate Committee on Banking
and for other purposes: Mr. BAYH, Mr. ERVIN, and Currency, room 5301), New Senate
Mr. FONG, Mr. HART, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. JAVITS,
:i,nd Mr. SMATHERS Office Building, Washington, D.C., tele-
.
S.J. Res. 133. Joint resolution designating phone [phone].
tebruary of each year as American History
Month: Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BENNETT, MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
Mr. BIBLE, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. BYRD of West Vir-
alnia, Mr. CASE, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. A message from the House of Ret)re-
DoMINICK, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. FAN- sentatives? by Mr. Hackney, one o1 its
NIN, Mr. FONG, :Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HARRIS, reading clerks, communicated to the Seri-
Mr. HART, Mr. IIARTKE, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. ate the intelligence of the death of lion,
I
Mr. KENNNEDNEDY of of Massachusetts, JORDAN Mr. of KEIdaho,NNEDY Of Of f AI BERT THOMAS, late a Representative
KENNEDY
York, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. from the State of Texas, and transmitted
MAGNUSON, Mr. MCCARTHY, Mr. MCGEE, Mr. the resolutions of the House thereon.
METCALF, Mr. MONDALE, Mr. MORTON, Mr. The message announced that the
Muni-Hy, Mr. PEARSON, Mr. PELL, Mr. PROUTY, House had disagreed to the amendment
Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. SCOTT, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3314) to
I'HURMOND, Mr. 'rowER, and Mr. YOUNG of require premarital examinations in the
North Dakota. District of Columbia, and for other Fur-
.A 3,196:
S. 2871.tA bill CtoFamend Public law 660, poses; asked a conference with the hen-
116th Congress, to establish a National Traffic ate on the disagreeing votes of the two
Safety Agency to provide national leader- Houses thereon, and that Mr. WHITENER,
ship to reduce traffic accident losses by means Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. HORTON, and Mr.
of intensive research and vigorous applica- ROUDEBUSH were appointed managers
Hon of findings, and for other purposes: Mr. oil the part of the House at the
ALLOTT, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BIBLE, conference.
Mr. CLARK, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. GRUENING, Mr.
I The message also announced that the
NOUYE, Mr. MCGEE, Mr. METCALF, Mr. MoN-
RONEY, Mr. MONTOYA, Mr. MOSS, and Mr. PELL. House had disagreed to the amendments
S. 2874. A bill to provide for the strength- of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 647 to
ening of American educational resources for amend the act of March 3, 1901, to per-
international studies and research: Mr. nut the appointment of new trustees in
CLARK, Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. deeds of trust in the District of Columbia
TNOUYE. Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. by agreement of the parties; asked a
LONG of Missouri. Mrs. NEUDERGER, Mr. PELL, conference with the Senate on the dis-
Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. RIBICoFF, Mr. WILLIAMS
agreeing votes of the two Houses
Of New Jersey, a Mr. YABROROUGH. thereon, and that Mr. MULTER, Mr.
Authority of f February 4 4, , 1966 196ti:
S. 2877..A bill to amend the Older Ameri- A.BERNETIIY, Mr. SMITH of Virginia, Mr.
cans Act of 1965 in order to provide for a SPRINGER, and Mr. NELSEN were ap-
National Community Senior Service Corps: pointed managers on the part of the
Mr" CLARK, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. HART, Mr. House at the conference.
tIARTKE, Mrs. NEIIBEEGER, and Mr. RIDICOFF. The message further announced that
the House had disagreed to the amamd-
ON ELEC- ments of the Senate to the bill i H.R.
NOTICE, OF HEARINGS
10304) to provide for the mandatory re-
TORAL COLLEGE REFORM porting by physicians and institutions
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, as chair- in the District of Columbia of certain
man of the Senate Judiciary Subcommit- physical abuse of children; asked a con-
tee on Constitutional Amendments, I ference with the Senate on the disa:ree-
wish to announce forthcoming hear- ing votes of the two Houses thereon, and
rots on electoral college reform. The that Mr. MULTER, Mr. .ABERNETHY, Mr.
hearings are scheduled to begin at 10 a.m. SMITH of Virginia, Mr.. SPRINGER, and
on February 28, March 1, 2, 3, and 4, Mr. NELSEN were appointed managers
and March 7 through 10. They will be on the part of the House at the
conducted in the auditorium, 0-308 of conference.
the New Senate Office Building. The message also announced that the
Any persons or organizations inter- House had disagreed to the amendments
ested in presenting their views to the of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 9985) to
subcommittee should contact the sub- provide for the mandatory reporting by
committee staff in room 419, Senate Of- physicians and hospitals or similar in-
fice Building, phone extension 3018. stitutions in the District of Columbia of
injuries caused by firearms or other
dangerous weapons; asked a conference
with the Senate on the disagreeing votes
of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr.
ABERNETHY, Mr. MULTER, and Mr.
HARSHA were appointed managers on the
part of the House at the conference.
ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESO-
LUTION SIGNED
The message further announced that
the Speaker had affixed his signature to
the following enrolled bills and joint res-
olution:
S. 9. An act to provide readjustment as-
sistance to veterans who serve in the Armed
Forces during the induction period;
S. 1407. An act for the relief of Frank E.
Lipp; and
H.J. Res. 403. Joint resolution authorizing
an appropriation to enable the United States
to extend an invitation to the World Health
Organization to hold the 22d World Health
Assembly in Boston, Mass., in 1969.
FOOD FOR PEACE PROGRAM
Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I have
been a friend and supporter of the food-
for peace program ever since those days
of serious agricultural surpluses back: in
1954, when we enacted the original Pub-
lic Law 480 legislation.
Last week the President submitted to
Congress a comprehensive and expanded
food for peace program. The President
called it food for freedom. Personally,
I regret the change in name as the name
food for peace was established in our
own Nation and the world. The pro-
gram, as we have known it through these
11 years of operation, has been useful to
us and to our foreign friends. It has re-
duced our surpluses. It has opened new
outlets for our fields and our farmers. It
has brought increased jobs and income
to our city people. It has fed millions of
hungry people overseas. It has stabi-
lized food prices where otherwise there
would have been severe inflation. It has
stimulated economic development and
laid the basis for expanded private trade.
It has won friends for us. It has
strengthened free world relationships
and has advanced the peaceful aims for
which we stand.
The program has done all that we
originally hoped for it, and more. The
fact that we propose now to change that
program Is In the spirit of progress rather
than dissatisfaction.
Food for peace has been not only a
useful tool in feeding people and expand-
ing trade, but also has been a highly in-
structive teacher. The lessons we have
learned are the basis for the changes now
proposed.
We have come to have second thoughts,
for example, about use of the word "sur-
plus" in a world where millions are
hungry or underfed. The same can be
said for the "disposal."
The farmers of Kansas are producing
wheat on about 9 million acres of their
farmland, and a substantial amount of
this wheat has been moving to foreign
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February I, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 2911
years of broadcasting, made the decision all almost no doubt that he'll return to making of the Government. The wavelengths
New& himself to resign as president of CBS documentaries and there's even less doubt that a network will hire him. to all the people of the country.
by
.
This is a are occurrence at broadcasting Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the cIn my view, Congress should give very
areful consideration to an allocation networks. Usually, if a man is fired, the of
event is referred to as a "resignation." The Senator from Alaska yield at that point? ` a certain amount of time of certain wave-
toughest term ever permitted is that a de- Mr. GRUENING. I am glad to yield lengths, for presentation, for discussion,
parted employe's services were "terminated to the Senator from Tennessee, for examination of public issues, not
by mutual consent." Mr. GORE. I commend the Senator alone by the Congress, but surely partly
But Fred W. Friendly, a volatile, emotional from Alaska for his statement. As a by the Congress.
man, quit after a disagreement with his new member of the Committee on Foreign
boss, John A. Schneider. Schneider was pro- Mr. GRUENING. I could not agree
moted last Wednesday from president of the Relations, I wish to express appreciation more with the wise and penetrating state-
CBS television network to group vice presi- for the coverage which television pro- ment of the distinguished Senator from
dent, broadcasting. vided for the committee hearings. I be- Tennessee. It is very much the business
In the elaborate organization of CBS, Inc., lieve that the action of the Columbia of the American people. The southeast
Schneider had been Friendly's equal. On Broadcasting System and the success of Asian involvement is one of the most
Wednesday, Schneider moved up, second only the hearings in re
hl +h , ,_
ac
and to Board Chairman William Paley.
The Wednesday date is important, for on
Thursday came a debate between Friendly
and Schneider. Friendly wanted live TV cov-
erage of George F. Kennan's testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Schneider decided to go with the regular
schedule but added that live coverage might
come this week.
The official announcement, made yesterday
by Dr. Stanton, said: "Friendly feels he is
unable to continue in his post as a result
of a decision made by * * * Schneider not
to schedule live coverage of the testimony
Stanton added: "Fred Friendly has been an
outstanding leader of broadcast journalism.
His contributions to the public, to his pro-
fession and to CBS have been great indeed.
My associates, his colleagues and I will miss
him."
Fred's emotions were shown plainly in his
letter of resignation. He called it "a matter
of conscience." After the decision not to
broadcast Kennan's testimony, Friendly
watched the four TV monitors that are in
his office. While NBC telecast the hearing,
Friendly said, CBS was showing "a fifth re-
run of 'I Love Lucy' and an eighth rerun
of 'The Real McCoys,'
"I wanted to order up an announcement
that said: 'Due to circumstances beyond our
control the broadcast originally intended for
this time will not be seen,' " Friendly wrote.
His letter of resignation also said: "I am
resigning because the decision not to carry
the hearings makes a mockery of the Paley-
Stanton CND (Columbia News Division)
crusade of many years that demands broad-
cast access to congressional debate."
Friendly, TV's most honored producer of
news documentary programs, moved to the
presidency of CBS News, March 2, 1964. His
success continued after he introduced the
national TV "test" programs and as the
Walter Cronkite news program gained ground
and sometimes won higher ratings than the
NBC team of Chet Huntley and David Brink-
ley.
One good source in New York said yester-
day: "Of course, CBS hates to lose Fred. But
he stood on principle and made his fight at
the wrong time. The network has no choice
in such a fight but to uphold its top execu-
tive."
Speculation began immediately about
Friendly's successor. The names that
cropped up immediately were those of
Gordon Manning and Bill Leonard. Man-
ning was executive editor of Newsweek for
3 years before Friendly selected him to be-
come CBS News vice president and director
of television news in December 1964.
At the same time, veteran broadcaster
Leonard was promoted to vice president and,
director of news programing. The promotion
came after Leonard had pioneered new tech-
niques for covering elections.
Privately, Friendly has complained, rather
mildly, that the presidency of CBS News
brought him smaller earnings than he had
made as a documentary producer. There's
People raises an interesting question.
Many thoughtful Americans express ap-
prehension as to the imbalance of power
between the executive and legislative
branches of Government. The Presi-
dent has frequently resorted-and prop-
erly so-to every means of com-
munication.
The state of the Union message is not
a message to Congress any more, but,
over the heads of Congress, to the Amer-
ican people. I do not speak critically of.
this situation, because we have a people's
government.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HARTKE in the chair). The time of the
Senator has expired.
Mr. GORE. I ask unanimous consent
that 3 additional minutes be allowed to
the Senator from Alaska.
The PRESIDING OFFTC
in which Congress has had no real voice.
Mr. GORE. And the Government has
been very profligate in allowing the
wavelengths to be monopolized by com-
mercial organizations. The very idea of
a vast television network using the wave-
lengths that belong to the whole people
to advertise soap, when we should be
having a critical examination of the
issue of war and peace, makes it appar-
ent that there should be a reexamina-
tion of the whole question of licensing
television.
Mr. GRUENING. I hope Congress
will not only examine this case, but the
whole subject, which affects the right to
know of the American people.
objection, it is so ordered. Without OUR COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM
.
Mr. GORE. If the legislative branch Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
is without the facility to communicate dent, with my responsibilities of being
with the American people, how is this chairman of a committee as well as the
imbalance to be corrected, I ask the assistant majority leader, I was not able
Senator? to be present at the hearings of the For-
Mr. GRUENING. I believe that the eign Relations Committee, but I want to
remarks of the senior Senator from Ten- say that these advocates of retreat, de-
nessee are extremely pertinent. I know feat, surrender, and national dishonor
of no more important function in a de- have not been doing the country any
mocracy, in a government of free people, good when they went before a television
than that the people shall have full ac- network suggesting that this Nation was
cess to all the actions of their govern- not committed to fighting aggression in
ment. Very frequently that has not this area. The Senate voted for the res-
been forthcoming. olution last year, and Senators voted that
I believe that broadcasting by the na- this country would help that country re-
tional networks by TV, the hearings of sist aggression, and specifically author-
the Committee on Foreign Relations, was ized the President to take whatever steps
one of the most important public serv- he felt necessary to resist further aggres-
Ices for the benefit of our democratic sion. We are committed. We have
system that has been rendered in our more than 200,000 men there. We have
time. at stake our national honor. We are
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the hear- committed to resisting Communist ag-
Ings deal with the most important issue gression. That is what this is all about.
before the Nation and the world today. It has been going on for some time.
I doubt that a more important commit- The Senator from Alaska voted against
tee hearing has been held in the last 20 the resolution, and he was privileged to
years. Fortunately, the message is do it, but once the Congress adopted that
reaching the American people. Millions resolution, it had taken a firm position.
of people have been able to see and hear Once Congress authorized the President
the issue questioned. It has not been a to do that which he felt necessary, the
side show. I believe the Senator will President was authorized to do it. it
agree that it has been a thorough ex- was authorized in the resolution and dis-
amination of the commitments, the is- cussed specifically during the debate on
sues, and possible consequences. the floor of the Senate. He was au-
If the American people are not en- thorized to send troops wherever neces-
titled to the fullest information on such sary to resist aggression in the area.
an issue as this, the issue of war and It is not helping our
t
coun
ry when
peace, then for what purpose should the Senators go before the Nation and ex-
Government permit the use of the other press their fears on this issue that the
waves? Red Chinese might come in, and the fact
Let us never forget that every single that we are losing some American boys.
television station operates at the license We are inflicting at least 10 to 1 damage
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2912 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE e ruary 16, 1 X966
on the North Vietnam invaders com- We let those people know that we would Those whom we have sent are whip-
pared to the losses suffered by our forces. help them resist aggression. We said ping the Communists. They are going to
if this great nation is to be humili- we would put ships and advisers in there beat the aggressors unless the best fight-
ated, Is to be defeated and run out and at that time to help those people defend Ing men in the world-the American
le downgraded to a second-class power themselves against subversion and ag- soldiers-are pulled out of there. They
by that little nation, then I wish Red gression. might be defeated, but they are not go-
China would come in. It would be a Then, the Communists came and they ing to get whipped in Vietnam. If they
great humiliation for this Nation to be attacked our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. are beaten, it will be in Washington.
defeated by a small nation of 16 million That was an act of war. We shot back. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
people. If we must be defeated, it would Not only did we shoot back, but we the Senator yield?
be better to lose to a large nation of bombed the bases from which those tor- Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
`100 million people. pedo boats came to attack our ships. dent, I yield.
This Nation was founded because we So that there will not be any mis;m- Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President. I
bad courageous men. We became a d.erstandings, at the time I was in charge wish to say in connection with the criti-
great nation because the people had of debating the equalization tax here on cism of the Senator of those who have
courage. They did not give up because the Senate floor, the President asked expressed publicly their dissent from an
they had to fight Indians. If the men Senators on the Republican side of the undeclared war and an unconstitu-
who came on the Mayflower were fright- aisle and Senators on the Democratic tional-
ened to helplessness the first time they side of the aisle to come to the White Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
had to fight Indians, they would have House and talk with him. While Sena- dent, will the Senator yield?
gone back to England on the Mayflower. tors were debating on the floor, the en-
But they fought the Indians and won, tire matter was discussed. The Presi- Mr. GRUENING. I will finish my sen-
meanwhile losing some fine Americans, dent asked for that resolution for au- tence, if I may.
until this Nation became great. We are thority broad enough to authorize put- Abraham Lincoln, who was not too
upholding our commitments in the ting troops in there and we understood greatly admired in the State of the Sen-
proud tradition of our fathers, grand- that, if need be, the resolution said that ator from Louisiana, opposed the entry
fathers, great-grandfathers, and may he was authorized to take any steps nec- of the United States in the Mexican War,
other courageous Americans who fell on essary to resist aggression in that area. spoke against it in the Congress and else-
the field of battle. It was explained on the floor of the where and today no one vilifies the mem-
I only wish that back during the Civil Senate by the chairman of the commit- ory of Abraham Lincoln or castigates him
War there had been a humorous element tee.. The resolution was broad enough for that courageous and proper attitude.
in the Congress that would have ap- to put Army men. on the land mass of Those of us who oppose and continue to
peared daily before a nationwide televi- Asia. oppose our entry in an undeclared war
lion network and have said, "We fought Then, North Vietnam regular army and the sending of our boys to slaughter
and lost a Yankee today. We lost a boy units proceeded to march on South Viet- where there was no act of aggression
today let us quit." If they had spread nam, we put our troops there to resist against us, and where those people whom
that propaganda, it might have spread aggression. They are the aggressors. we are supporting are not willing to fi?ht
fear. Maybe the war would have gone We went in after that date. We are effectively for themselves, have no regrets
the other way. 'then we would have fighting there pursuant to that,resolu- or apologies to offer.
won the principles of States' rights. We tio:n. Our national honor is committed We will find that more and more Amer-
would prove that we were the strong to it. ican people will come to our point of view
people. Having achieved victory we I do not believe it serves the purposes that we have no business down there.
could have offered to rejoin the Union of this country to have two Senators who We were not attacked, and we have no
with considerable pride that our theory voted against the purpose of this Nation right or obligation to involve ourselves all
of States' rights had been sustained. making a speech every week and some- over the world as policemen and sending
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will times every day against our determined our boys to their slaughter, whenever
the Senator yield? national purpose to uphold our national someone scents a Communist threat. An
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The honor and to keep our word and our com- examination of the record will show that
time of the Senator has expired. rnitment. there was aggression on both sides and
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I ask unani- :[ do not believe it is helpful to go on that we too were guilty of aggression and
mous consent that we may have 5 addi- national television and suggest that we violation of commitments far more sol-
tional minutes. are the International criminal when we emn and binding than those that are al-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- are, in truth, the international good leged to justify our military adventures
out objection, it is so ordered. guys. We did not start this fight. They in southeast Asia.
Mr. GRUENING. If the hearings con- did. We are ready to talk peace at any Mr. GORE. Mr President, I am glad
tinue to be televised, the American pee- time. They are not. that the hearings of the Committee on
ple may learn of the mistaken concept Our children will call us blessed and Foreign Relations have not been char-
stated by our distinguished majority courageous if we stand fast and defeat acterized by intemperate and flamboyant
whip, that we have a solemn commit- Communist aggression. language and arm waving.
iiient. solem They will learn there was no such The PRESIDING OFFICER. The I invite the distinguished junior Sen-
olemn commitment; that we were never time of the Senator has expired. ator from Louisiana to attend the hear-
so committed; that our commitment was Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- ings and present the views he has here
a tentative one, dealing only with eco- dent, I ask unanimous consent that I presented. I would like to suggest to
nomic aid and further conditioned on may proceed for 1 additional minute. him that the issue before the committee
re by ment i which the were South Vietnam Govern e The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- is not defeat, retreat, and surrender, to
went whi any commitment never made. T Therhei r out objection, it is so ordered. use his words.
was never ammitment to send our Mr. LONG of Louisiana. They will This issue is rather whether this war is troops public into cese fand , athey must inform be the cell us courageous because we have the to be held within bounds which we can
brought t these facts, a American to stand up and resist aggres- reasonably anticipate to be manageable,
re- sion in the tradition of our fathers, our whether the goal be limited and the
bMr. LONG Mr. Lhome to Louisiana. American not t people.
MI do not
grandfathers, and great grandfathers. commitments be limited, or whether this
this Nation a as being an interne-
tional criminal, as the Senator from I am proud of my forebears who helped be an open end commitment for total vic-
Oregon has said, and I do not regard this to give us this great Nation. tory militarily against whatever forces
Nation as being an international ag- I have just come from Louisiana. I may appear in opposition in southeast
gressor, as the Senator from Alaska has had an occasion to visit with these fine Asia.
said. I regard the Communists as the young men who are preparing to fight in The issue is rather whether this war is
aggressors. We helped organize the Vietnam. There Is not a coward in the a global war. Such an issue deserves the
peaceful nation of South Vietnam. We crowd. They are courageous young men. deliberate consideration which the com-
are members of the SEATO agreement. They have high morale and high spirit. mittee is giving it.
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It is far too important to be considered
with catch phrases and loosely selected
slogans.
I hope the committee hearings for the
next 2 days will be observed by countless
millions of Americans. It is for their
country, and it is their sons who will die
if this degenerates into a war between
the United States and China, and from
that who can tell what holocaust may
develop.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President-
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I yield.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Tennessee has the floor.
Mr. GORE. I yield, but I have only
a minute left.
Mr. McGOVERN. It has been sug-
gested here that those who share the
Senator's concern about a major war in
Asia are somehow lacking in patriotism
and willingness to defend our country's
interest.
I have not been in the Senate very
long. The Senator from Tennessee has.
Does the Senator from Tennessee recall
the warning of General MacArthur
some years ago that anyone who-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McGOVERN. Does the Senator
recall General MacArthur's warning
some years ago that anyone who com-
mitted the United States to a major war
on the Asian mainland "ought to have
his head examined"?
Mr. GORE. I recall that and that
General MacArthur gave this country the
warning that if we went to the Yalu in
Korea, China would not come into the
war. Unfortunately he was in error.
They did come in and we lost many thou-
sands of men in a few days.
Mr. McGOVERN. Does the Senator
remember during the discussion of
whether we should send forces into
southeast Asia in 1954 that General
Ridgway, who was then the Army Chief
of Staff, vigorously opposed it and said
that he regarded it as a harebrained
idea?
Mr. GORE. And we also heard from
General Gavin last week.
Mr. McGOVERN. It seems to me that
no one would be foolish enough to sug-
gest that General MacArthur and Gen-
eral Ridgway and General Gavin are
lacking in patriotism or in knowledge of
the problems we are up against if we
get into a major war in Asia. It is easy
for gentlemen to talk about our chil-
dren calling us blessed if we get involved
in war with China. But if, that happens,
there may not be any children left to
call us blessed.
Mr. GORE. Chauvinism is not the is-
sue here. The issue is the wisest course
for this country involving war and peace.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I rather resent the suggestion that
this Nation is waging illegal war. One
hundred and twenty-five times in our his-
tory the President has sent American
troops into action, either to defend our
position or to help our friends without
a declaration of war or any prior au-
thorization whatever.
Most of our declarations of war-in
fact, I suspect that perhaps all but about
one-actually occurred after the fighting
had begun, sometimes after it had been
going on for a long time. Our boys at
Pearl Harbor did not wait for Congress
to declare war before shooting back at
the Japanese who were attacking. Gen-
eral MacArthur did not wait for Con-
gress to declare war before he took ac-
tion in the Philippines to attack the
Japanese forces with our Air Force.
The President has the authority-
and I have said this both under a Re-
publican President and under Demo-
cratic Presidents-to send American
servicemen into action to defend the
position that this Nation decides to take,
and he has the power to make such a
decision.
I might add that when we fought the
war in Korea, there was no declaration
of war. But hardly anyone challenged
the legality of what we were doing in
Korea. There was no serious challenge
of that action. We thought we were
acting in pursuance of a United Nations
treaty commitment.
In this instance, an act of aggression
was committed against us. We were
attacked, and we fought back. We
attacked those who attacked us. Then
Congress considered the matter and
voted for a resolution that gave the Presi-
dent the specific power to take whatever
action he thought would-be necessary to
resist in that area. Look at article 51
of the United Nations Charter. It specif-
ically authorizes the right of individual
and collective self-defense.
Then what happened? The Commu-
nists proceeded to march organized units
from North Vietnam into South Viet-
nam. When they did that, we proceeded
to send units of the U.S. Army and
Marine Corps into South Vietnam to
hold the land that the Communists were
trying to take by outright aggression,
and our forces are doing a magnificent
job.
When I speak of my love for my great
country, I am not embarrassed because
now and then I become a little enthusi-
astic. I swell with pride when I see Old
Glory flying from the Capitol. I swell
with pride when I see Old Glory flying
around the Washington Monument. I
swell with pride when I see it flying from
the. Senate Office Building. I am proud
of this country. I pray that no other flag
will ever fly over it.
While sometimes I may be dismayed
to see that flag flying at half mast, as it
is today in honor of a patriotic, coura-
geous American, who'did his best to serve
his country, as God gave him the light
to serve it during his time here, my
prayer is that there may never be a white
flag of surrender up there.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.
Mr. McGOVERN. I do not believe
that anyone is questioning the glory of
the American flag. The question is,
What is in our national interest?
Does not the Senator from Louisiana
believe that Members of the Senate have
the right to raise questions about our
policy in southeast Asia, when we con-
sider that the backers of that policy
have been consistently wrong about what
they have told us?
The Secretary of Defense, not many
months ago, gave it as his assessment
that the American military combat role
in Vietnam would be largely over by the
end of 1965 and that our boys would be
on their way home. We have come to
the end of 1965 and have entered 1966.
Instead of bringing the American forces
home, we hear from those same sources
that we shall have a force of 400,000,
500,000, or 600,000 in Vietnam before the
end of 1966. That is only one of the
more notable predictions that have been
wrong. Each time we have had a dis-
appointment in our effort in southeast
Asia, our policymakers have merely
asked us to redouble the prescription.
In view of that record, does not the
Senator from Louisiana believe that
Senators have some right to raise ques-
tions about our policy there and about
the course we are on, without being re-
minded that the glory of the flag is in-
volved?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Senators
have the right to ask questions, but when
the Nation is committed and our men
are fighting in the field, we have a re-
sponsibility not to do things that will
divide and confuse the people and pro-
long the war. The information I am
getting-and it is coming from very high
sources in the Government-is that one
of the greatest difficulties in bringing the
war to an end is that every time a Sena-
tor suggests that we retreat and accept
defeat or surrender, that word goes right
back to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, and the
powers at Peiping, who say, "If we will
just keep after those Americans, even
though they are killing 10 of our men to
every 1 of theirs that is being killed
that great nation will lose courage and
quit."
So every time a Senator makes an-
other speech in fear that Red China
might come in, he helps the Communist
cause.
If the United States had been so timid
and afraid of Red China during the Ko-
rean war, South Korea would be a Com-
munist country today. Instead of try-
ing to liberate only a part of Korea, we
tried to liberate the whole country, but
we did it in the interest of freedom. I
am not ashamed that our troops went
there. They achieved our national pur-
pose, even though the Red Chinese did
come in. Some of us felt that we should
have fought the Red Chinese with more
determination than we did.
But our Nation is committed in Viet-
nam. My own judgment is that we will
see this action through. We will come
out of it with honor worthy of all Ameri-
cans who have gone before us.
To those forces of doubt and defeat
who advocate, "Oh, my goodness; get
out; Red China might come in," I say
that if Red China thought that this Na-
tion was so much afraid of Red China,
Red China would be in the war. But
Red China knows that we are a great, big,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 16,'1.966
strong country, a first class fighting
power. They know they can do us much
injury, but they also know that we can
do a lot more damage to them. It works
both ways.
Mr. McGOVERN. Did I correctly un-
derstand the implication of the Senator's
earlier statement to be a recommenda?-
L en to extend our action to a war with
China?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I did not say
1,1 fat at all, and the RECORD will not show
that I did. I merely said that if Red
China thought that if by sending some
of her troops in the United States would
turn tail and ruic, as some Senators have
advocated, Red China would be in the
war tomorrow. But I am of the unpres-
;ion that Red China believes that if she
came into the war, she would have a first-
Class modern fighting power to contend
with, and she will be right.
I maintain that speeches on the floor
of the Senate and on television, advocat-
i rig that our boys not fight for their coun-
try, and that the people back off from the
effort to help their country, handcuff our
lighting men and to hold our country
(town when the going gets tough, do
clothing but encourage the Communists
to continue the war.
Mr. GRUENI:NG. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.
M1?. GRUENING. I take issue with
the Senator's statement that our boys
are fighting for their country. We are
lighting in another country where we
gave taken sides in a civil war. The fact
is that the new "white-haired boy" whom
we have built up, Mr. Ky, made a state-
enent in answer to a press request, "Who
are your heroes?" His reply was, "I have
only one, Adolph Hitler. We need four
or five more Hitters in Vietnam." That is
the man whom we are now supporting.
Ife is the man we are entrusting with do-
mestic reforms. Actually his is the kind
Of corrupt government we have been
supporting, of which there have been
nine different specimens since Diem was
"humped off." That is the kind of
:,o-called freedom we are fighting for, not
the real freedom of the people.
ti-Ii,. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I have never seen it fail, at any
Lime when this Nation chooses to sup-
port a government that is resisting com-
munism, that the Communists always
put forth the argument that the head of
that anti--Communist government is a
"bad guy"; that he is corrupt and v',-
nious; and pick out a statement the man
may have made--l)erhapis an ill-advised
misunderstood statement-to show that
perhaps he is not the kind of fellow that
we should support, and that he is not
our kind of guy.
Alter all, Mr. President, this man is
not chopping off the heads of innocent
people. That is what cannot be said for
the opposition, however.
,'?rir. President, for the life of me I can-
flot understand when people stand and
7i?11hi; for our i'riends and keep fighting
:side by side with us, in resisting; com-
munism, why some persons will find so
;ouch fault with our friends and can-
not even find one fault with the murder-
ous assassins who want to kill us, as soon
as they have disposed of our friends.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I be-
lieve that one statement made in the
course of the very interesting, discussion
which we have just heard should per-
haps be corrected to some degree in this
Lincoln's birthday period.
I believe I am the only Member of
Congress whose father was a Confeder-
ate soldier. Many Members of Congress
had. two grandfathers who were Con-
federate soldiers. In my case I knew
for years all three of the men whore I
have mentioned, my father and my two
grandfathers. 1 never :heard any of
those three men speak with anything
save respect, and sometimes they spoke
almost with veneration, of Abraham
Lincoln. They felt, as do most of the
people in the part of the country ft om
which I come, that perhaps the greatest
national tragedy in connection with that
war which split our country asunder
was the assassination of Abraham Lin-
coln.
'I want the RECORD to show that most
of us in the southland venerate the
memory of Abraham Lincoln and believe
that if he had lived we would not have
had the troubles that came after the
conclusion of that war.
V,
DISCLOSURE OF TROOP MO dE-
MENTS IN ON-THE-SPOT REPORT-
'ING IN VIETNAM
:hMr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I re-
cently received a letter from a retired
chief warrant officer of the Army which
I believe reflects the deep feeling and
concern that parents throughout the Na-
tion have for their sons who are cur-
rently on the battlefront in Vietnam.
The concern centers around the fact
that the movement of our forces is "tele-
raphed" to the enemy through on-.rie-
spot reporting of the news media.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed at this point in the
RECORD an article written by Raymond
L. Hughes, chief warrant officer, U.S.
Army retired, of Plant City, Fla., which
appeared as a letter to the editor in the
Tampa Tribune of Sunday, February 6,
1966.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
.MUST :HELD TROOP MOVES IN VIETN., II
PANT Cary.-We note with alarm and, on-
siderable apprehension the almost total lack
of security afforded our troops in South Viet-
nara by every news medium; and the fact
that newspapers, radio, and. television ,eem
to be vying with each other to disclose in-
formation 'which, by all standards of sec:a cy
and commonsense, should not be disci-,ed.
t'reedoin of the press is one thing but when
one can pick up the morning paper, listea to
the radio, or look at television and see and
ho r disclosed the most minute detai';; of
troop movements and deployments :ht
down to platoon and squad locations and
even to pinpoint where private Joe Blot': has
his pup tent--and what road to take to find
it, the whole aspect of freedom of the T. ress
begins co be asinine and literally explosive.
If I were Private Etlow-or his security off-
cer--I would hiow my top, clear to the
Pc: ntagon..
A recent news release from recurity 1-trn-
eic%s in Washington counseled all news media
to use self-censorship and discretion in dis-
closing troop movements in Vietnam b.ct if
this had any effect at all it has not become
evident.
Commanders in the area of this vicious
and nasty conflict to which so many of our
men have been committed, and to which
many more thousands will be committed,
complain that they are extremely hamnerca
by the lack of intelligence concerning loca-
tion and movement of the Vietcong.
You may be sure that the Vietcong, Hanoi,
and Red China (if any of their people can
read English at all), have no trouble at all in
tracing the movement and minutest opera-
tion of our troops and that of our allies. 'I'o
them we must indeed be stupid to bare for
all to read (who have the price of a news-
paper) information which should reach wily
the Pentagon and then only in a top secret
communication.
If this were only a game of marbles and
the teams were not playing for keeps, in-
stead of a deadly war where your boy, or
mine, could be killed next week, I would s:Iy
tell where the boy's tent is pitched, or where
his foxhole is-and how to reach it from
Saigon; but with my 18-year-old boy likely
to arrive there at any time, I would prefer to
let him tell me where his squad is billeted or
bivouacked rather than to read it in the
paper or see it an TV.
As a combat infantryman and communi-
cations officer in a war where we knew who
the enemy was (and how to recognize him)
I shudder for our boys every time I pick up
a paper and read about an enemy who sur-
rounds him and creeps out of holes in the
night and who is unrecognizable; and yet
who is furnished the minutest detail about
where to locate our GIs-even In the dark.
The papers have a right to detest censor-
ship but they also have a duty to make cen-
sorship unnecessary Instead of aiding and
abetting our enemies. This will be a long,
bitter, and bloody war. Let us not show all
of our cards to the enemy.
RAYMOND L. HUGHES,
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, so that
Senators may realize the travail which
parents are now experiencing because of
news reporting of many of our troop
movements too soon and in too much
detail I wish to read the covering letter
Mr. Hughes addressed to me dated Feb-
ruary 9, 1966, and reads as follows:
PLANT CITY, FLA.
February 9, 1966.
Hon. SPESSARD L. HOLLAND,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR: Note attached clipping
from last Sunday's Tampa Tribune.
Is there nothing that can be done about
the flagrant disclosure of our every troop
movement in Vietnam?
This week every move of an attempted
entrapment Of three battalions of Vietcong
in a valley they had held for 10 years was
announced in advance, by every news media.
To no one's surprise they were gone when
our troops enveloped the area.
For God's salve (and our boys' sake) read
this in the Senate. And put the attached
clipping in the Senate RECORD.
My 18-year-old son is to be in Vietnam
June 1.
It is nothing short of murder what the
news media, is doing to our troops.
Sincerely,
RAYMOND L. HUGHES,
C7aief Warrant Ofeer,
U.S. Army, Retired.
Mr. President, not being a member of
the Armed Services Committee or the
Foreign Relations Committee, I am not
in possession of all the facts relative to
our situation and the restrictions im-
posed on the news media in Vietnam, and
it is not my intent, here on the floor of
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February 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 29151
the Senate to suggest any unreasonable
limitation on the freedom of the press
as provided in our constitution. How-
ever, if, as seems to be the case, on-the-
spot reporting-by newsmen accom-
panying our troops-enables the enemy
to establish a pattern of our operations
or actions in advance, then I believe the
news media should certainly impose their
own censorship of information, which I
am sure will be their desire if they are
advised that such reporting has com-
forted and aided and abetted the enemy.
If such voluntary reporting is not effec-
tive, then steps should be taken by the
military to censor news from the battle-
front.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS CON-
CERNING COMMUNITY ANTENNA
TELEVISION SYSTEMS
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, for
the past 2 weeks many -Senators have
been asking me about the legislative de-
velopments regarding the community
antenna television systems. Many of
the senatorial offices have been deluged
with literally thousands of letters from
people who have been informed that
their television service via the cable sys-
tems will be curtailed because of the
pending proposals by the FCC.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on
Communications of the Senate Com-
merce Committee, I have dealt with this
problem at great length and, therefore,
should set forth, as clearly and precisely
,as I can, some of the history of the pres-
ent situation as it involves CATV
systems.
First, the Subcommittee on Communi-
cations, anticipating the problems that
the growth of CATV systems were facing,
conducted long and extensive hearings
in 1958 and 1959. These hearings were
held in Washington, D.C., the States of
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and
Wyoming. Numerous witnesses repre-
senting Government agencies affected,
representatives of various organizations
including television stations, CATV
owners, association officials as well as the
general public, submitted their views.
It was apparent that the FCC was re-
luctant and slow to take any constructive
action in this field. In July 1959, in open
hearing, I told the Chairman of the
FCC:
You have CATV people coming in and set-
ting up their systems contrary to all stand-
ards and no one seems to be policing it,
There is no supervision on the part of any-
one. We have to have rules and regulations.
We have to have standards.
I urged him to move-to take action.
As a token effort, the Commission,
finally, at the urging of our committee,
sent a man out into the field to investi-
gate the situation.
Again, in 1960, I stated that the FCC
was rather lukewarm with regard to
whether they should assume responsibil-
ity. It was obvious from the testimony
developed by the committee that some
action was necessary. If Congress did not
act, a hodgepodge growth of CATV
would take place with possible serious
consequences to an orderly development
of TV, particularly with reference to lo-
cal live TV service. As a consequence,
the committee drafted original legisla-
tion setting forth appropriate guidelines
that, in my judgment, would have per-
mitted an orderly growth of both CATV
and broadcasting under the umbrella of
the FCC. The bill was reported favor-
ably by the committee to the Senate and
after many discussions and refinement of
language, the representatives of the Na-
tional Association of Community An-
tenna Systems agreed to accept the leg-
islation. However, certain CATV inter-
ests at the last minute decided to vigor-
ously oppose the bill and after 2 days of
full debate on the floor of the Senate,
the bill was recommitted by one vote.
There is no question in my mind, and
this will be agreed to by most of the
CATV operators today, that if the legis-
lation that the committee reported in
the 86th Congress had been enacted,
many of the questions that are now being
raised, as well as the proliferation of the
State and municipal regulations in the
CATV field, may have been eliminated
and CATV allowed to grow in an orderly
fashion.
In 1961, the FCC's concern with the
matter of CATV and its impact on the
development of local as well as nation-
wide television service began to increase
so that in May 1961 it asserted juris-
diction over a common carrier micro-
wave serving a CATV system in Wyo-
ming. The CATV representatives op-
posed this action of the FCC and ap-
pealed the decision to the Federal courts,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may be per-
mitted to continue for 2 additional
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, in a
landmark decision-Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp. (32 FCC 459) -the
Commission assertion of jurisdiction was
sustained by the court-321 F. 2d 359
(C.A.D.C.) cert. den. 375 U.S. 951. The
language of the court is quite interesting
and very specific with reference to the
FCC's responsibility.
Following the Carter Mountain deci-
sion, the Commission instituted further
intensive studies and began accumulat-
ing additional data on the overall CATV
situation. In April 1965 the Commission
adopted rules governing the grant of
microwave authorizations being used to
relay television signals to CATV sys-
tems-first report and order, docket Nos.
14895 and 15233. In general, these rules
require that any microwave-served CATV
system, upon request, carry the signals
of local stations and refrain from dupli-
cating their programs from 15 days be-
fore and after the local broadcast.
On the same date in April 1965, the
Commission also instituted a further
CATV rulemaking proceeding, divided
into two parts, which is presently in
progress-notice of inquiry and notice of
proposed rulemaking, docket No. 15971.
Part I of this proceeding proposed to
finalize the Commission's initial conclu-
sion that it had and should also exercise
jurisdiction over the CATV systems not
served by microwaves and, pursuant
thereto, to extend to them the same re-
quirements now governing the micro-
wave-served systems. In part II of the
proceeding, the Commission initiated an
inquiry looking toward possible rulemak-
ing on broader questions posed by the
trend of CATV development. These in-
cluded the effects on independent UHF
stations in major markets of CATV entry
into those markets; possible limitations
on the long-distance `extension of sta-
tions' signals by CATV and on CATV pro-
gram origination, together with several
other matters related to CATV impact on
our broadcast system. Part II also in-
cluded a notice of proposed'rulemaking
under which rules or other measures,
interim or final, might be taken to deal
effectively with some of the more press-
ing problem areas.
Interested parties have, of course, been
provided an opportunity to submit coun-
terproposals, comments, and replies on
the matters raised by the Commission's
proposals and inquiry. All such filings
have not been completed.
Final action was taken by the Com-
mission on Tuesday, February 15, 1966-
which was yesterday-in which they an-
nounced plans for the regulation of all
CATV systems. A copy of the Commis-
sion's report has been made available to
me, and I ask unanimous consent that
it be printed in full at this point in my
remarks.
There being no objection, the report
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FCC ANNOUNCES PLAN FOR REGULATION OF
ALL CATV SYSTEMS
Following meetings held February 10, 11,
and 14, the Commission has reached agree-
ment on a broad plan for the regulation of
community antenna television systems, in-
cluding a legislative program. To insure the
effective integration of CATV with a fully
developed television service, the new regula-
tions will apply equally to all CATV systems,
including those which require microwave li-
censes, and those which receive their signal
off the air. Excluded from these rules will
be those CATV systems which serve less than
50 customers, or which serve only as an
apartment house master antenna. The
CATV rules concurrently in effect for micro-
wave-fed systems will be revised to reflect
the new rules adopted for all systems.
Coupled with the new CATV rules, to be
incorporated in a Report and Order shortly
to be issued, the Commission will send ree-
ommended legislation to Congress to codify
and supplement its regulatory program in
this important area.
The Commission's new CATV program in-
cludes eight major points:
1. Carriage of local stations: A CATV sys-
tem will be required to carry without ma-
terial degradation the signals of all local
television stations within whose Grade B
contours the CATV system is located. The
carriage requirements thus made applicable
to all CATV systems will be substantially the
same as those applied to microwave-served
systems by the Commission's first report and
order in dockets Nos. 14895 and 15233,
adopted in April, 1965.
2. Same day nonduplication: A CATV sys-
tem will be required to avoid duplication of
the programs of local television stations
during the same day that such programs are
broadcast by the local stations. This non-
duplication protection, as under the exist-
ing rules, will apply to "prime-time" net-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 16; 1966
work programs only if such programs are
presented by the local station entirely within
what is locally considered to be "prime-
-,one." It will also give the CATV sub-
scribers access to network programs on the
;;irue day that they are presented on the net-
:vork. Nonduplication protection will not be
iiforded to programs which are carried In
black and white by the local station and
ore available in color from a more distant
station on the CATV system.
The new nonduplication rules thus embody
two substantial changes from those adopted
in the first report and order. First, the time
period during which nonduplication protec-
Lbou must be afforded has been reduced from
15 days before and after local broadcast to
the single day of local broadcast. Second,
a?? now exemption from the nonduplication
requirement has been added as to color pro-
f;e.crrus not carried in color by local stations.
3. Private agreements and ad hoc pro-
c;,dures: The Commission will continue to
give full effect to private agreements between
CATV operators and local television stations
which provide for a different type or degree
rif protection for the local station than do
the Commission's rules. Moreover, the Com-
arission will give ad hoc consideration to
petitions from local television stations seek-
ing a greater degree of protection than pro-
vided by the rules, or from CATV operators
seeking it waiver of the rules.
IT. Distant city signals-New CATV systems
in the top 100 television markets: Parties who
obtain State or focal franchises to operate
CATV systems in the 100 highest ranked
television markets (according to American
Research Bureau (ARB) net weekly circula-
tion figures), which propose to extend the
signals of television broadcast stations be-
yond their grade B contours, will be required
to obtain FCC approval before CATV service
to subscribers may be commenced. This
aspect of the Commissions decision is effec-
tive Immediately, and will be applicable to
all CATV operation commenced after Feb-
ruary 15, 1966.
An evidentiary hearing will be held as to
all such requests for FCC approval, subject,
of course, to the general waiver provisions of
the Commission's rules. These hearings will
be concerned primarily with (a) the poten-
tial effects of the proposed CATV operation
on the full development of off-the-air tele-
vision outlets (particularly UHF) for that
market, and (b) the relationship, if any, of
proposed CATV operations and the develop-
ment of pay television in that market. The
hearing requirement will apply to all CATV
operations proposed to communities lying
within the predicted grade A service contour
of all existing television stations in that
s-n irket.
7-iervice presently being rendered to CATV
subscribers will be unaffected. However,
the Commission will entertain petitions ob-
jecting to the geographical extension to new
areas of CATV systems already in operation
in the top 100 television markets.
3. Distant city signals--New CATV systems
in smaller television markets: 'lire commis-
,,ion's prior ohproval after an evidentiary
hearing will not be required by rule for pro-
t>osed CA'iV systems or operations in mar-
kets below 10(; nn the AItB rankings. How-
ever, the Commission will entertain, on an
ad hoc basis, petitions from interested par-
ties concerning the carriage of distrust sig-
rals by CATV ry:aems located In such smaller
rnarkc ts.
G. i:nfonnaiiun to be filed by CATV owners:
1'rirsuant to its authority under Section 403
of the Cornr:.urrie:.tians Act, the Commis-
.;lun will, within an appropriate time be
prescribed, require all CATV operations to
submit, theiollowing data with respect to
each of their CATV systems: (a) The names,
addresses, and business interests of all officers,
directors, acid persons having substantial
ownership Interests in each system; (b) the
number of subscribers to each system; (c)
the television stations carried on each sys-
tem; and (d) the extent of any existing or
proposed program origination by each CATV
system.
7. Assertion of jurisdiction To the extent
necessary to carry out the regulatory pro-
gram set forth above, the Commission asserts
its present jurisdiction over all CATV sys-
tems, whether or not served by microwave
relay.
8. Legislation to be recommended to Ccan-
greys: The Commission will recommend, with
specific proposals where appropriate, that
Congress consider and enact legislation de-
signed to express basic national policy in
the CATV field. Such legislation would in-
clude those matters over which the Comruis-
sion has exercised its jurisdiction, as well as
those matters which are still under con-
sideration.
Included in these recommendations will be
the following:
(a) Clarification and confirmation of FCC
jurisdiction over CATV systems generally,
along with. such specific provisions as are
deemed appropriate.
(b) Prohibition of the origination of pro-
gram or other material by a CATV system
with such limitations or exceptions, if any,
as are deemed appropriate.
(c) Consideration of whether, to whet ex-
tent, and under what circumstances C"ATV
systems should be required to obtain the
consent of the originating broadcast st-!lion
for the retransmission of the signal by the
CATV system.
(d) Consideration of whether CATV sys-
tems should or should not be deemed public
utilities. In this connection, Congress, will
be asked to consider the appropriate reh tion-
ship of Federal to State-local jurisdiction
in the CATV field, with particular reference
to initial franchising, rate regulation, and
extension of service.
The Commission, of course, stands re dy to
discuss all of the above matters with the
appropriate congressional committees at any
time.
STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ROBERT T.
BARTLEY'
I cannot agree that the Communications
Act confers jurisdiction over CATV; however,
I endorse legislation which would prohibit a
CATV system from originating program
matter.
SEPARATE STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER
KENNETH A. Cox
I concur fully in those portions of the
Commission's action in which it (1) asserts
Jurisdiction over all CATV operations, (2)
requires carriage of Ideal stations on CATV
systems, (3) provides for expedited ad hoc
procedures for the consideration of special
relief requested either by broadcavters or
CATV operators, (4) requires disclosure of
information as to ownership of CA'T'V sys-
tems and certain other matters, and (5) calls
on Congress to give prompt consideration
to the problem of integrating CATV opera-
tions into our overall television system, with
particular attention to the questions of pro-
gram origination by CATV systems, possible
extension of the principle of rebroadcast
consent, and overlapping jurisdiction with
the States.
As to the balance of the action ,,)ken, I
agree with what is done but believe it falls
far short of protecting the public interest
in an expanding television service. I agree
that local stations should not have Vieir pro-
grams duplicated, but believe that t:he pro-
tection afforded them is totally inadequate.
As to network programs, they should be ac-
corded exclusivity-that Is, should not be
duplicated-as to all programs which they
propose to present in a comparable time
period within 15 clays? This Commission
found in the first report that, for cogent
reasons, deladye nonduplication served the
public interest. (See pars. IOI-127, 38 FCC
at 721-.731.) But the majority now cuts
back on such delayed nonduplication to a
single day. This 1-day protection is patently
inadequate as to network programing (see
first report, par. 125, 38 FCC at 730, where
it is pointed out that only 10.2 percent of
local stations' delayed broadcasts are de-
layed less than 1 day, with roughly 79 per-
cent being delayed between I and 15 day:;).
As to nonnotwork programs, the majoril:v
previously pointed out that such material
was not distributed on a simultaneous na-
tionwide basis and that, therefore, a 15-day
protection was "clearly a minimal measure
of protection against the duplication of syn-
dicated or feature film programs, consider-
ing the extended periods-up to and exceed-
ing 5 years---for which stations now bargain
and obtain exclusivity in relation to such
programs."
As to feature film, syndicated series, and
other filmed or taped programing for which
they have acquired local exhibition rights,
they should be assured the right of first run---
which is only one of the rights normally
bargained for, but. certainly the most impor-
tant one. I realize that this is more pro-
tection than was proposed in this proceeding,
but since I feel this would be necessary to
assure the station of the most important
of the program rights It has acquired as
against prior exhibition by an entity which
has acquired no rights at all, I certainly can-
not agree with the majority's refusal to
recognize any rights as to such programing.
Some nonsimultaneous nonduplication is
necessary to afford local stations sufficient
flexibility to provide the best possible service
to those viewers who do not subscribe to the
cable service.
Similarly, I agree that some measures are
needed to curb the Indiscriminate extension
of television signals by CATV systems. Sec-
tion 303(h) of the Communications Act gives
us clear authority to establish zones or areas
of service for broadcast stations. In televi-
sion, I think we have undertaken to do this
by establishing a carefully designed channel
allocation and by fixing maximum limits on
heights and powers. While there are many
situations in which deficiencies of service
can and should be corrected by supplemental
means such as CATV, satellites and trans-
lators, I do not believe that any of these
auxiliary services should be permitted to dis-
rupt the basic television system that Con-
gress, the Commission and the broad casters
have worked so hard to establish.
The majority contents itself with saying
that it will carefully examine proposals to
provide CATV service in the top 100 televi-
sion markets, I would greatly prefer an ap-
proach which would bar new systems--for a
specified period-from extending a station's
signal beyond its Grade B contour, except
upon authorization by the Commission in
certain carefully defined situations. I be-
lieve this is necessary to stem the current
proliferation of CATV systems in areas
already receiving substantial televlsion serv-
ice. Without such action, I am afraid that
CATV-a supplemental and derivative serv-
ice-will stunt the future growth of our free
television system, and perhaps even Impair
the viability of some of the service which
the public is now receiving.
It is all very well to study the problems
posed by CATV's threatened invasion of the
major markets. It is true that the moat
immediate hopes for expanded UHF service
are centered there, and that the risk of CATV
operators' building a pay television system
1 I agree that as to network color programs
the local station should not be protected
unless it will present them in color.
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2964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 1b, 1
tunity for normal debate. But when we The next day the President resumed the For one, I think it showed to the libel
are living through the hours that Amer- bombing of North Vietnam and took his plea that the President means to follow th,
leans historically will be living through for peace to the United Nations. line, by espousing the social revolution ii
as this historic record is made I am not The fighting goes on as before. The talk South Vietnam-the aspirations of the peo-
about peace goes on, but no peace negotia- pre for better health, better housing, bet-
going to agree to have any limitation on tions seem to be in prospect. And in the ter land tenure and all the things they
debate whatsoever. Therefore, I an- meantime the President has held a dra- fought for for so many years.
nounce now that if I am on the floor I matic conference in Honolulu with the It is interesting to me that notwithstand-
shall object to any limitation of time on leaders of the Saigon Government. ing the fact that this should appeal to the
debate. I inform my leadership that i How much of all this represents forward liberals, and that the liberals should be for
to any limitation of debate, movement, either toward peace or prosecu- the limited struggle in Vietnam, because it
am opposed the Lion of the war, and how much is just motion is a struggle for freedom, the Honolulu con-
and if I not have assurance from is rather hard to tell. fcrence showed up even more sharply the
leadership that there will not be any It anything anywhere has changed, it is divisions within the President's own party
limitation of time, I shall see that some the intensity of the domestic debate over and, interestingly enough, the real consensus
Senator is present on the floor to make Vietnam. on the Republican side, which is giving him
objection in my behalf. As broadcast viewers and listeners, as let- all kinds of backing.
terwriters, as demonstrators and counter- Just one other point which seems to me
demonstrators, the American people are en- to be clear from Honolulu.
"VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE: CON- tering this argument more and more. The central thing now stands out to be
GRESS AFTER HONOLULU"-A Let us try again today to put this coin- what are you going to do with the Viet-
plex and troubling combination war and cong if there is ever going to be a peace
TELEVISION PROGRAM BY CBS peace effort into some focus. conference, and I do not think there is
TRULY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST Five more-Senators of differing persuasions any question about the fact that they have
are with us this afternoon. Let me intro- to be a party, whether they are an inde-
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last ? duce them in alphabetical order. pendent party or a group or whatever you
, in Foreign elations Committee which has been she sooner thaty have to be a party, And
Sunday Columbia February 13, 1966-
the Columbia Broadcasting oatie state that unequivocally,
series holding public hearings this week. I think, the more chance there will be to
continuation of its praiseworthy seworthy System, in g
about ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska, of the Gov- get to the negotiating table.
of the inissues forming the involved in the American undeclared pu blic out ernment Operations Committee, who has Finally, I think it is mature consensus on
been opposed to this war from its begin- the part of the people, which was contributed
in Vietnam-a series ably directed by ning. to by the Senate hearings, that there is a
Eric Sevareid and Fred Friendly-pres- JACOn JAVrTS, of New York, recently back way of limiting the South Vietnam conflict,
ented an hour-long discussion of those from South Vietnam, for the Government and that is in the effort to consolidate and
issues. Operations Committee. pacify the coastal areas and the Mekong
I was honored to be invited to pahtici- STUART SYMINGTON, of Missouri, member Delta and area around Saigon where there
of the Foreign Relations and the Armed Serv- are 70 to 80 percent of the people all with-
pate, along with my able and disting- ices Committees, and former Air Force Sec- in ready reach of air and naval power. And
guished colleagues, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. retary. that I think is the ultimate thrust of the
JAVITS, Mr. SYMINGTON, and Mr. TOWER. JouN TOWER, of Texas, member of the Gavin idea and the way In which a consensus
The discussion on the program-which Armed Services Committee, also just re- can be developed on that.
was broadcast live-was spirited and, in turned from Vietnam. Mr. SAVAREIO. We may get back to the
the short time available, sought to bring Gentlemen, I think we might try first to Gavin idea in just a moment.
forth all possible points of view. deal for a little while with this Honolulu I think Senator SYMINGTON wanted to talk
conference just over. I would like to know about this conference.
The distinguished senior Senator from. how you read its results and what you make Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. As Commander
Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] summed up the of It. Senator CHURCH. In Chief of this country, inasmuch as
basic problem confronting this Nation are pros and Hcons. Only the future will tell.' CINCPAC it se seemed quitruns gicthe al for mill-
when when he said:
I am for getting a good policy that will On the debit side, the President has laid Commander in Chief, with the Chairman of
deal more effectively with the phenonema of hands, so to speak, upon Air Marshal Ky and the Joint Chiefs, to go out and talk with Ad-
revolution. We are going to live in a genera- thus has invested him with the great pres- miral Sharp and General Waters and Gen-
tion of revolution throughout all of Latin tige of the American presidency. This could oral Harris, and then at the same time to
America, Africa, Asia, for a long time to prove a problem in the future if a need have General Westmoreland, who wears two
should develop for broadening the popular hats, one toward Hawaii and the other to
come. base of the Saigon regime. the Joint Chiefs here, to be in the discus-
I ask unanimous consent that the On the credit side, I am glad of the em- Sion-and also to have Ambassador Lodge
transcript of that television broadcast Phasis that was given to the need for social there to give his position with respect to it.
be printed in full at the conclusion of and economic, political, reform in this sit- In addition to that, I think it was prob-
uation in South Vietnam. ably wise that he brought the head of the
my remarks. But I recall that-I think even in the first Government out there, Ky, because General
There being no objection, the broad- letter that President Eisenhower sent out Ky-because I was in Saigon last month and
cast was ordered to be printed in the that committed us to the initial assistance my impression was that if we were going to
RECORD, as follows: in 1954, there was mention of the need for recognize the Vietcong separately, within a
VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE: CONGRESS AFTER reform, at that time relating to the Diem few hours that automatically meant the fall
HONOLULU regime. And if I am not mistaken, Lyndon of the Government. Therefore, If General
(A broadcast over the CBS Television Net- Johnson, when Vice President, went out Ky felt that way, he was probably reassured
work and the CBS Radio Network, Sunday, there in 1961, again on a mission which gave by the attention that was given him.
February 13, 1966) emphasis to the need for reform and secur- Finally, I would like to join my colleague,
ing a broader popular base. And now Vice Senator CIIURCII, in saying that I was very
Guests: Senators FRANK CHURCH, Demo- President HusrsmnrY is there for that same glad to note the emphasis that was paid in
crat. of Idaho; EaNEsT GnuENINO, Democrat, purpose. And obviously, this is a problem, Hawaii to the economic and social develop-
of Alaska; JACOB K. JAVITS, Republican, of a continuing problem, that we recognize, meets that are at least as important as any
New York; STUART SYMINGTON, Democrat, of but a problem easier to define than to solve. other in this overall picture.
Missouri; JOHN G. TowER, Republican, of Finally, one caveat. Mr. SAVAREs. Most of you so far seem to
Texas. I think at Honolulu the statements of Air think there was not just a waste of effort.
Moderator:. Eric Sevareid. Marshal Ky and of our own Government Senator Towrn, do you have different ideas?
Producer: William J. small. indicate a definite split on the question of Senator TOWER. No. I agree that this was
Director: Robert Camilord. negotiation and on the question of the dos- not a wasted effort. I think it is altogether
ANNOUNCER. As part of its continuing Bible Inclusion of the Vietcong. mote and proper that the President should
coverage of the Vietnam conflict, CBS News If this split is as serious as it seems, that go there and that he should meet with the
presents "Vietnam Perspective: Congress a warning for the future. Vietnamese heads of state. I think it is
After Honolulu," think good that we should add a little prestige and
Here to lead the discussion this afternoon Mw warning flag a Any of the rest . of you stature to that Government, because appar-
is CBS News Correspondent Eric Sevareid it is serious? A ently it is the most stable Government we
Mr. SEVAREID. Good afternoon. Two weeks Senator JAVITS. Well, a word on that Hono- have had there since the Diem regime.
ago today five Members of the U.S. Congress lulu Conference. I think, too, that it is good that we have
sat at this table and debated the Vietnam It seemed to me that a number of things placed emphasis on the civic action programs
war, its promises, its legality, its conduct, and developed and a number of things did not that we have already been engaged in over
its possible outcome. develop. there.
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Feb r ary 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Actually the idea of assisting these people Senator SYMINGTON. There is a side to that Mr. SEVAREID. Is there any man at this
agriculturally, healthwise, assisting them also-and that is that the Premier Ky comes table who believes these hearings are harm-
with political and social reforms is not new. from the north country and there has been ful to the national interest?
We have been doing this in Vietnam. Our increasing irritation in the south, includ- ErSe nato IJAvI tell you think they are very good,
servicemen, as well as fighting, have been on ing Saigon, about the dominance of peo-
the constructive side, working with our ple in the north, which to some extent must PresWhat ident you really ton have for tan
USAM officials over there, in conducting these have affected his control. coming to ress
civic action programs, which I think are turn- For example, I was told out there that updating of the resolution of August 1964,
ing out to be a great success. there might be another coup-although Am- the dog-eared one he carries in his pocket gives him
They are teaching these people the rudi- bassador Lodge said-well, he was only sup- and constantly he reArmedfers which the United
ments of sanitation, they are showing them posed to last 6 weeks and he has now lasted Spower to use t Forces of
tates, etc. That is completely outdated.
how to get pure water supply, helping them over 6 months.
combat disease, infection, showing them how On the other hand, I think it is unfair And anything that leads to getting the Presi-
to get the maximum utilization out of their to compare him to Hitler. We have had our dent to do that-and I think these hearings
land. And, more important, teaching them own President and our own Foreign Rela- are definitely a step in that direction-is
the art of self-government. The French tions Committee-recently there was some good.
It is high time the whole country were
failed to develop any native leadership over talk about Hitler-
there. We are currently doing that now.. Senator GRUENING. No one has compared crystallized behind what is the new policy, to get the Mr. SEVAREID. Senator GRUENING has been him to Hitler. Ky said the one man he ad- and the the way to so. that is
personally I And
listening. Would you like to speak, sir? mired most was Hitler. backing Senator GRUENING. This Honolulu Con- Senator SYMINGTON. Because if you take think that is a very serious mistake the
ference was a big buildup for the Premier, something out of context about the man- President is making, in not coming back to
Nguyen Ky, who is the ninth head of gov- the truth is that he has come much further the Congress for a new resolution.
ernment since our first white-haired boy, in his emphasis on the importance of land Mr. SEVAREID. In other words, you think
Diem, was disposed of 21/2 years ago. How reform and on the importance of a new deal the hearings are going to help him in the
useful he will be in bringing freedom to than anybody else who has been in charge end, not damage his position.
his people and having these reforms may be of that Government so far. And I would Senator JAvITs. They will help the people's
judged by his statement when he was inter- rather take somebody who has been there a cause by crystallizing the Congress and the
viewed by the London Mirror last July 4, long time, like Cabot Lodge, or like the other American people behind a policy which will
when he said: people-I would rather take their word for be enough like his policy so that he ought
aask for . I know that kind ofasupp rt.
"People ask me who my heros are. I have the possibilities under him than I would to come ~and
new reso-
only one-Adolf Hitler. We need four or people who would take a long-distance ap- Mr. you
five Hitlers in Vietnam." proach and have never discussed the matter lutlon torcGRUEllize it.
That is the man we have built up, he is with him, which I have done myself. Senator GRUENING. I think these hearings
the man whom we depend upon to bring Senator JAVITS. Well, Senator, I do not
about these reforms. I have no confidence think it is necessary for us to say we are all are long overdue; they have taken
these reforms will take place any more than out for Ky. This statement that he made place years ago, when we engaged what Is
they have taken place in the last 12 years about Hitler is pretty rugged, very hard for called ed ta here Comm, itmeent was although I am at ommn-
when we said the same thing. Eisenhower anybody in the world to take. ne such
tried to do the same thing. It is not going I think the answer is that this is the Gov- ment-but if the administration thinks so,
to happen-not with that man. ernment for the time being, and we have got then that kind of commitment required a back,
when Mr. SEVAREID. That may be a question , er to work with
indpendnt attitude otoward the we made or alleged we we Anmd that kind
a a course o pretty hard to answer, except cept over hibit our of a commitment, the President then or his
cof time, I would think. development of the country in economic and
But let me ask you gentlemen this. social terms, successor should have gone to the Senate for
Do any of you find the same objection to I think for one that Honolulu was essen- the treatymaking power.
that Conference that our ex-diplomat George tial, because at the United Nations we said What right have we got to commit our-
Kennan had this week in testifying before we want peace at almost any price. That is selves to defend the frontiers of another
the Foreign Relations Committee? He great. Now, if the other side won't negotiate country and send our troops down there
thought it wrong to have this public tieup for peace, Honolulu had to answer what do without the consent of the Senate formally
with the Saigon government at the same we do. Well, we are going to launch a new sought and obtained? We have none.
time that we had taken this issue to the campaign on the social revolution front, with Mr. SEVAREID. You are saying in effect the
United Nations. HUMPHREY as its coordinator. We need it hearings have come about because of the
Does that bother anyone? sadly-a basic coordinator. And secondly, manner we got into this war, that there
Senator CHURcH? we are developing and putting forward a would have to be such hearings at some
Senator TOWER. Well, I would disagree that strategy which is viable for us until there are point.
the timing was bad. I think that the timing not just one, to wit, ourselves, but two to overdue, r GRUENING. Yes-that they are
was very good, because I'm afraid that with talk peace.
our long peace offensive, with the long mora- And so I think Honolulu was very needed Senator CHURCH. Eric, at that point let me
torium on bombing, that perhaps some peo- and very constructive. say-I would like to emphasize the fact that
ple in Asia had gotten the impression that Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I don't want to the Foreign Relations Committee has a con-
we had no real will or determination to go too far with the Honolulu Conference. stitutional responsibility to advise and con-
prevail in southeast Asia, that we were trying Our time is running on, and there are sent in the matter of foreign policy. And for
to find some face-saving device to enable us some other things probably of more impor- years the committee has been tending to con-
to withdraw. And therefore I think that tance. duct its business more and more behind
this Conference was very timely, to show our Now, one thing is this Foreign Relations closed doors.
determination to stay in South Vietnam Committee hearing this past week. They Now, when we came back to Congress this
until we have achieved what the President have dealt with the issues. But these hear- year, the gravity of the situation had become
said is our minimum objective, and that is ings themselves have become something of such in southeast Asia that we felt we had
the guarantee of the independence of South an issue-whether they are injuring the to come out from behind closed doors, and
Vietnam. morale of troops, or our negotiating position,, in the public, examine the premises that
Senator CHUacH. Since you first turned or our fighting position. have led us into this situation, and take
that question to me, may I say a word ar two How do you feel about this? How about stock of the situation, and try to determine
about it. you, Senator SYMINGTON? You have sat what is portended for the future. And this
I think that what was unfortunate was on them. business is the business of the American
the statement that Air Marshal Ky him- Senator SYMINGTON. I think these hear- people, and they should be included, and
self made-I agree with Senator GRUENING. ings are all right. The witnesses so far have they have been through those hearings.
I think there are grounds to wonder wheth- been pretty critical of our current adminis- Mr. SEVAREID. Well, now, gentlemen, the
er this man really represents the wave of trative program, just as you have illustrated, president said 2 days ago, as I recollect, that
in southeast Asia. And I think Eric, with respect to Mr. Kennan's thinking he had followed these hearings, or the testi-
the that future when he said in Honolulu that he in about the Commander in Chief going to mony from them, and that he could not see
effect was not much interested in negotia- Hawaii. that any concrete, clear alternative policies
tions, and that In any case there would be But, on the other hand, let's ventilate the had been proposed at the hearings by people
no negotiating with the Vietcong, that this subject, as Mr. DIRxsEN would say-and it like General Gavin or Mr. George Kennan;
did render our position more difficult for is being done. the tone of their testimony appeared to be
us at the United Nations. And I should I would hope that people postpone their in opposition to what we are doing.
think it renders the President's position more final opinions about it until they hear ben- Did you discover, those of you who sat
difficult. I thought that was one of the- eral Taylor on next Thursday and Secretary there, any concrete alternative that struck
one of the unfortunate consequences. Rusk on Friday. you as worth following?
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2966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February -16-,; 1966
:senator SYMINGTON. Well, General Gavin's tion between ourselves and the Communist "if that would save 100,000 men, additional
testimony was rather difficult to follow, be- Chinese push In Asia. Americans, being needed and drafted out of
cause in the covering letter It said that he As I see it, that is in effect what they their homes into South Vietnam."
wanted-did not want to resume bombing recommended, and it seems to Inc that gave And he said "Well, that is a serious ques-
in North Vietnam, and that he did want to the lines of a perfectly viable position for tion. I would have to study it."
withdraw to coastal enclaves. But then in the United States. Now, I think his testimony was fuzzy. I
direct testimony he denied that he felt that Mr. SEVAREID. It seems rather unusual for think-that, to me, is a fuzzy answer, And
way about it. And also he denied that he me that Senators would sit and l.ry to thrash I would hope that at some time we would
was against the policies as advertised in an out alternative military stratel ies for this get a witness up there who would be clear
advertisement in the paper which said that country, which is in a war. as to just why it is we don't go after the rnili-
he was against the President's policies. Senator CHUncH. I don't thin 1:, Eric, that tary targets, and military only like power
?o I think it is fair to say, and perhaps the purpose of this hearing is to come up and petroleum, at the same time we know
a little charitable to say, that his testimony with any miracle cures in Vietnam. I think that they are coming down in such heavy
was fuzzy as to just exactly what he stood for. it is generally recognized that what has been quantities down the Ho Chi Minh trail and
in the case of Mr. Kerman, I think that his done there cannot be suddenly undone. being used against the troops of the United
position was more clear. He, in effect, as, I There are some Omelets that are not di- States and the South Vietnamese in South
gathered his testimony, wanted to strictly gestible, but I don't know of any that can Vietnam.
stick to a land war, if any war, in South be unscrambled. And the Pre, ident's op- Senator CHURCII. Can I just say in that re-
Vietnam. tions are narrowing, spect that I don't regard Ambassador Ken-
Mr. SEVAREm. To a land war. Now, lie is striving to find the rudiments nan as an authority when it comes to lbomb-
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. for a satisfactory political settlement. He is Ing, and certainly some of the questions you
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, gentlemen, as I tried to striving to locate that diplomatic door which posed to him we would have no argument
follow those hearings, it seemed to me that will lead to the negotiating table and he is about. But I do regard him as an authority
both General Gavin and Mr. Kerman were striving to keep the war confined within with respect to the overall strategy of deal-
talking about far more than just how the war manageable limits. And in all ,f these en- ing with the Communist world.
should be conducted now-what the acres deavors he certainly has my ull-hearted He was the architect of the successful con-
should be in Vietnam. They were looking at support. tainment policy in Europe, and his opinions
it in terms. as I gathered, of our whole world I think what the committee L. looking to are entitled to a lot of respect, and I think
position. We have troops in Korea, in West is to something both behind end beyond this was where on the diplomatic front, the
Europe, and many places where things could Vietnam. What kind of role arc we assum- strategic front, that he really made a very
happen. And that this was what one of them ing on the mainland of Asia and in the un- fine contribution, and what lie said, in effect,
I think called possibly a baited trap. I SUP- derdeveloped world that led us into Vietnam was, let's not let the tail wag the dog, and
pose meaning that China might come In or in the first place, and don't we have to take invest so much resource in manpower, in
that we would get overcommitted there in another careful look at these premises? Do treasure, in southeast Asia that we find our-
relation to our other commitments. we have the kind of policy that is well- selves at serious disadvantage elsewhere.
Do any of you have a feeling that Vietnam designed to cope with the problem of guer- And the President has just said that he is
Is sucking us into a position where we will be rilla warfare, of wars of so-ca1Lcd national in agreement with that, that he does not-
way off balance? liberation in the ex-colonial pert of the that he does not propose the kind of an ,,c-
c enator GRUENING. Well, I think that there world? And is the best means the massive celerated war that might engage us in a
was no effort on the part of Mr. Kerman. intervention of American troops imported massive confrontation in Asia,
whose testimony was most useful, to come tip from the opposite side of the world? Senator SYMINGTON. But he brought it up,
with a solution. He was relating it to the These are the things, I think, the long, FRANK. I didn't bring it up. He said no
whole situation. He was not asked for a searching questions, that we have got to more strategic bombing, so I asked him to
particular solution. And I think that some grope with if we are going to fashion a policy define it.
of us have ideas on the subject-but I think in Asia that will work for the United States. Senator CHURCH. Well, he is a diplomat.
that would emerge from the findings of the Mr. SEVAREID. While the Senate and others He is not an airman and not a bomber, and
committee. argue about overinvesting or not overinvest- I think it is in that phase of his testimony
r think at the end of the hearings they lag resources, men, and money in that tip of that he made a, real contribution.
will probably come up with some recoil]- Asia, the investment goes on, cuucisions by Mr. SEVAISEID. Does Senator GltueNING wish
mendations. I hope so. others. to come in'?
Senator JAVrrs. Well, I would say, Eric, that Is this fruitful at all- Senator .YMINGTON? Senator GRUENING. I think that. the ques-
I think the testimony of both Kennan and Senator SYMINGTON. Well, first, if I may, tions that the former Secretary of the Air
Gavin was extremely useful In crystallizing Eric, I would like to go back to tae question Force asked Mr. Kerman had to do with mili-
a position the administration has left very of "fuzzy". I don't think the ;;dministra- tary details which were not in Mr. Kennan's
fuzzy. tion's position is fuzzy today. I think it is field.
P or one, it Is it fact that we do not want clear. I don't agree with all et it, but I What he hoped to bring out was that this
general mobilization for Vietnam, but we think it is clear. was a great error In view of our worldwide
are willing to devote to it-and I think this I explained why I thought that General commitments, and I am hoping that this fin-
is a national consensus-such resources as Gavin's testimony was fuzzy. vestigation before we get through with it
can be devoted without general mobilization. Now let's take Ambassador Kennan's testi- will point out how completely false the
And that seems to be in the general order mony. premises are which our
of magnitude of up to 400,000 troops, and justify going in there.
Don't misunderstand me. I want to get I can demonstrate-there won't be time on
all the other things we are doing there. into the big, broad problems than have just this program-conclusively from the very
Now, what Gavin and Kennon said in ef- been. discussed by my good colh'ague from documents which are used by the adminis-
feet--and you cannot hold them word for Idaho. tration to prove why we are in Vietnam--
word-is there is a strategy of consolidating But we have a problem. We a;ue killing a this one (holding up the State Department's
our hold on the coastal regions, the Mekong great many American boys every week. brochure entitled "Why Vietnam.?")-.that
Delta, the Saigon area, engaging in a pacifi- Ambassador Kennan-former Ambassador there was no commitment. President Eisen-
cation program there, and in a sense mak- Kennan-said "I am opposed to strategic bower made no commitment to send in
Ing that our stand--just as when we with- bombing." troops. He offered economic aid on a very
drew from the Yalu into South Korea that I said "Well, will you defin< strategic tentative basis and we were not, as alletred,
became our stand. bombing." asked in there b a friendl
Now, it seems to be a accepted Y y cvKennedy
generally He said, any bombing that hcsn't got a We asked ourselves in. And Jackk Kennedy
proposition that even If the Communist; direct relationship with troops. never did anything more than send in
Chinese come in-and you cannot tell when Well, I said "For example, woulc you con- advisers.
they will come in-that is In their control-- sider strategic bombing bombing a bus that It is only under this administration that
even if they do come In, the long logistical was going down the Ho Chi Minh Trail full we sent troops into combat, and those are
lines which represent our stand on the coast; of ammunition and soldiers and guns?" questions which I hope the Committee on
around Saigon and in the Mekong Delta. He said yes, it would be; therefore he Foreign Relations will bring out. I think: the
makes our position viable. would be opposed to it unless you were sure American
y public, which has been misled so
Therefore, what Gavin and Kennan, as l: it was going to be used against our troops. long, is entitled to know these facts. And I
:see it, were laying before the country in. Now, there have been a great many figures hope in the subsequent hearings these facts
effect, was here is the way in which you can. used in executive sessions of the Armed Serv- will be thoroughly aired. It is about time
take a limited position, devoting to it the Ices Committee about the number of addi- the American people were let in on what has
resources which you have available and rea- tional troops that would be required--from been going on without their knowledge.
sonable without jeopardizing your situation 600,000, I believe, John, to 500,000 and then Senator TOWER. The fact remains that
in the rest of the world and without general 100,000 to 300,000. North Vietnam has intensified its effort in
mobilizations and without a declaration of And I asked him this question. "Would South Vietnam during the course of this
war, which I am against, and at the same you agree to bomb military target; in North administration, necessitating some reaction
time maintain a position in the confronta- Vietnam," military targets, let me emphasize, on our part. Had we not literally sent the
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cry 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
.airy to the rescue last summer, the Viet-
oong and the North Vietnamese would have
cut through the central highlands, cut their
country in two. It would have probably
overrun it by now.
Now, certainly it is true that Vietnam,
South Vietnam, taken alone has no great
geographic and strategic importance. But
southeast Asia does. And this is where the
front is. This is where Communist aggres-
sion is manifest. If we don't combat it here,
aren't we going to encourage the precipita-
tion of so-called wars of national liberation
in other spots?
Senator JAvrTs. Well, the whole idea is that
you are encouraging the technique of wars
of national liberation because you show an
inability to deal with them, and you've got
upsets right now in northern Thailand. You
had it in northern India.
Senator TowER. The point I was making.
Senator JAVrrs. Exactly right, and you are
going to face the situation in south and
southeast Asia when you are facing it here,
and you are getting prepared for.
I did want to say a word, Eric, about this
bombardment thing, which I think is very-
to my mind, has been a big obsession with
lots of people.
The fact is that once you determine the
size and character of your commitment in
South Vietnam, and let's assume that the
American people are getting to some con-
sensus on that, then everything falls into
place. If you are trying to do just so
much and you have just so many people
involved, then what bombardment you have
to undertake, and I am not against the
bombardment of the supply lines at all, re-
lates to the size and character of your mili-
tary decision as to exactly what you are going
to commit.
But I do believe that what you are going
to try to do, the purpose you are going to
try to accomplish, and the means you
are going to try to commit to It, this is a
very Important element of congressional as
well as Presidential decision, and I feel very
strongly that we should have our say in
that, and I believe that it will come down
to pretty much this pholisophy of pacifica-
tion of the areas which are within reach,
30 to 50 miles of the coast, Mekong Delta,
the Saigon area, where there is 70 to 80
percent of the population, the necessary
men to do that, and then everything that
follows to protect that position en suite,
including the extent of bombardment which
is required for it, and we have to be pre-
pared to face that as a total strategy, a
total political decision with the military
consequences which ensue.
Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I hate to inter-
rupt at this point even for the 5 seconds
necessary, but let us pause now for station
identification.
Mr. SEVAREIO. Gentlemen, some very funda-
mental questions have been raised in the
debate in the Senate and in the press re-
cently and In some of the remarks of the
President. In Honolulu he said something
to the effect that subjugation by an armed
minority in Asia is not different from the
same phenomenon in Europe, that we have
expended a lot of treasure and blood to
reverse such things.
But from our position in the world, are
these two things equal? Is Germany or
France, for example, equal to this little
country in southeast Asia? Senator Church?
SENATOR CHURCH. No, Eric. We have got
to make better distinctions, I think, than
that.
In the first place, we went back to Europe
after the Second World War because we rec-
ognized that if all of Europe fell to the
Russians and the Red Army In occupation of
Eastern Europe was moving the Iron Curtain
inexorably westward, that then the balance
of power would shift from our favor to theirs,
and I think we must not confuse the situa-
tion in Europe with the problem that faces
us in Asia.
In Europe, after all, we went back and
were welcomed among people with whom we
had a common civilization, common culture.
The great majority of these people found
communism as repugnant as we found It
and willingly joined in a real system of col-
lective defense against it, and that was the
NATO line. But the NATO line just stopped
the Iron Curtain from moving further west.
It didn't exterminate communism behind the
Iron Curtain.
And today in Europe we are not faced
with the problem of guerrilla wars of na-
tional liberation simply because these coun-
tries with strong democratic traditions have
cohesion and internal support.
But the situation is quite different in Asia,
and I think our basic mistake has been to
assume that policies which worked in Eu-
rope could be superimposed in Asia and
would work there.
I think the facts betray that those pol-
icies designed for Europe are not suitable
for Asia.
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, you seem to be taking
issue with really the most profound argu-
ment and premise behind the whole war as
often expressed by Secretary Rusk. We are
told again and again that if we do not stop
this aggression in South Vietnam, we are
going to have to meet it somewhere else In
southeast Asia.
Senator GRUENING, is that necessarily true
in your opinion?
Senator GRUENING. I want to dissent com-
pletely from the basic premise of our action
down there, that we are repelling aggression.
The facts are that we are just as much, if
not more, the aggressors. We came in to help
the French with a military mission. We did
not engage in combat because Congress
would not stand for it. President Eisenhower
could not get the support of other powers.
But we were there with a military mission.
We gave them a lot of supplies and a lot of
training and we stayed on there, and then we
continued to escalate.
We are in a foreign country. The Viet-
namese are all Vietnamese, North and South.
We are much more the aggressors than the
others and their aggression, their infiltra-
tion, did not start until long after we had
escalated our participation in violation of
agreements which we approved unilaterally
although we did not actually sign them.
I think this is the important issue and we
will not have a suitable meeting at the peace
table until we confess a certain amount of
error on our part, and that is the basic issue.
Of course, we have got to negotiate with
the people who are doing the fighting. This
is a civil war.
President Kennedy said so. Just recently
our colleague, Senator YOUNG of Odnio came
back from there convinced that this is a civil
war, that the overwhelming majority of the
Vietcong are South Vietnamese fighting the
tyrannical governments which we have sup-
ported down there. This is the basic issue,
and we are not going to have a solution at
the peace table unless we meet that question
and confess a certain amount-
Mr. SEVAREm. Are you suggesting, Senator,
that we go to a peace conference trying to
settle this now rather big war and say that
we should never have been in It in the first
place? How can a great country do that?
Senator GRUENING. When individuals do
it, confess errors, they are praised. Nations
find it more difficult to do that, but we
should do it.
De Gaulle did it in an analogous situation
in Algeria. When he first came in he was
never going to leave Algeria. Algeria was
French. The French had been there for 130
years. But after a time he realized that it
was wiser for him to get out. He lost no
prestige. He lost no face. He is stronger
than ever.
We are losing face there every day. We
would have far more face and we would save
a great many American lives if we stopped
right now and made a far greater effort to
be made by admitting our errors and admit-
ting that we are as much aggressors as the
others.
Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to com-
ment on what Senator CHURCH said about
Europe. I do not think today the way that
the telescoping in time and space, that there
is a big difference between Europe and Asia
that so many people consider that are inter-
ested in this subject.
For example, today every country in effect
is in the same county. I illustrate it in my
State by presenting the fact that by time,
militarily, by air, Red China is closer to
St. Louis, Mo., than Kansas City is to St.
Louis, Mo., by the fastest commercial jets,
and therefore I completely agree with Dean
Rusk when he says this is simply a question
of whether we want to resist communism the
world: over.
We cannot pick, as I see it, the places that
we want to resist.
As far as-incidentally, someone mentioned
that I used to be the Air Force Secretary. It
was a long time ago. I have been in the
Senate 14 years. But I was mighty proud
of it. My only point is that Socrates said
"note se ata," know your terms. What is it
we are talking about? And it begins to look
to me as if some of the people who are so
Interested in what we are doing out there
want to force us into a ground war only
in Asia and not the utilization of our air
power which I do not think we could ever
win.
Now, finally, I have a little pin here which
was given me at the political action team-
my good friend from New York knows a great
deal about-and which is the finest thing I
saw in South Vietnam. The three T letters
stands for victory, love, and sincerity, and I
would hope that those who think that there
is a predominance of Vietcong thinking in
South Vietnam would go there. It is easy to
talk long distance, and see and talk in the
villages. There are 700,000 South Vietnam-
ese fighting today on our side in South Viet-
nam and only 5 percent of them are con-
scripts, and in my opinion the very fact
that thousands of these young men are being
trained in this program prove that the South
Vietnamese, if they were given a chance with-
out terrorism and without a war that is
dominated by the North Vietnamese in South
Vietnam, that they would elect a South Viet-
namese government.
Senator JAvrrs. There is one sure thing
and that is when you-you have got to be
convinced that the North Vietnamese are in
this is an organized way, without question,
throughout their units, et cetera, and I think
that the question, with all respect to Sen-
ator GRUENING, is begged by what he says
and that the main question is the one you
stated, the one Senator CHURCH and Senator
SYMINGTON have addressed themselves to,
what is the importance of Asia to American
and free world security?
And I think one thing we had better never
forget, World War II, as far as we were con-
cerned, was started from Asia by Japan,
That is an Asian country and a mighty big
one, and very important one, and World War
II, through Japan, was the only time that
we have ever been threatened in modern
times in our own Nation, on our shores.
California was in a state of alert at that time.
Now, what is threatened in Asia, as far as
we are concerned, with its enormous pre-
ponderance of population, represents the
overwhelming security problem of the free
world for the very reason that the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the
most important alliance.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE February if,
Why? Because that is the backing which
the free world gives to the ideas for
which we are fighting in South Vietnam.
'l.'he support, the backing, the structure of the
great industrial nations of the Atlantic basin
is what makes the struggle for freedom in
the world likely to succeed, but that struggle
is now being fought at its central core
which is Asia, the preponderant population
crass in the whole world, the change of which
over to Communist aggression would make
the whole difference between security and
freedom for the world and a condition of
such jeopardy as to make our country almost
immediately a garrison state.
Mr. SEVAazIm. Senator, if there is a kind of
relentless general tide of advancing coma-
munism or the threat of it in Asia, what do
we make of such things as the complete turn-
back of the Communists in Indonesia, which
is the biggest country in that part of Asia?
Must be assume that this is an irrevocable,
remorseless, general advance?
Senator JAVITS. If I may answer that, Eric.
it is an excellent question, but the very
change in Indonesia is attributable to the
fact that Indonesia for a long enough time
was shielded from the tidelike power which
flows from Communist China, and that is
precisely, it is exactly that kind of a break-
water that we are trying to erect in all of
south and southeast Asia by strengthening;
in South Vietnam, in Thailand, in India, in
Pakistan, and in Malaysia and in the Philip-
pines and in Japan, what is the spirit which
will hold on or hold back that onrushing
tide.
Mind you, someday we will find a way to
got along with the Communist Chinese. ;f
am not for atomic war and I don't think it is
inevitable at all, but at some point in the
process you have to show steel. That is the
only thing that will-that is an answer
at this moment. That doesn't mean that
it is a permanent answer, and I am not for
it as a permanent answer.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CHURCH.
Senator CHURCH. Well, Eric, I think that
this kind of discussion begs the point a great
deal. Your original question had to do with
the comparison of Europe with Asia.
Now, my good friends "STU" SYMINGTON
says the world is much smaller. Of course
it is. My good friend "JACK" JAvrrs says
that Asia is very important. Of course it is.
The problem that we face is whether the
spread of communism which we would like to
discourage in Asia represents the same kind
of problem, and therefore can be dealt with
with the same kind of policies that we used
in Europe.
Now, in Europe communism was spread by
the Ilussiaca sword. In Asia communism is
being spread not by the same method but
by revolution.
Now, unless we are prepared to say there
Is no distinction between revolution and the
kind of westward movement of the Red Army
in Europe, then we have got to recognize that
this is a problem for which we must devise
new policies.
I simply disagree completely with the
proposition that by sending a tremendous
western army into Vietnam that this some-
how xs going to bring an end to the problem.
of guerrilla wars. Why, we are there now
with 200,000 troops. We have spent $15 or
$20 billion. We will spend more before this
war is-this year is over. Yet already we
are being told that the war is spreading into
'L hailand right next to Vietnam.
That is not because we have pulled out.
And your ilustration was a very good one,
The most effective work that is being done
against the Communists is being done by the
Indonesians themselves, not with our help:
but. without it.
And talk about the tide moving inexorably
southward from China, why, Burma dealt
with a guerrilla war without any great west-
ern intervention, and that war was dealt
with by a country that has over 1.500 miles
of common frontier with China.
Revolution must be dealt with differently
and we need a policy that is better adapted
to deal with it. And that is all that I am
pleading for.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator TowER.
Senator TowER. I think it should be
pointed out that there was an internal sit-
uation in Indonesia in, which Sukarno played
off the military against the Communist poli-
ticians. Utlimately, the Communists were a
little bit precipitive in trying to hurry the
process of takeover and the military reacted
swiftly and have now gone about systemat-
ically exterminating Communistas, And we
have been treated to the spectacle of Suban-
drfo having a soul-searching experience in an
agonizing reappraisal. As far as--
Senator CHURCH. I am merely printing out
that they are doing this on their own and
U Thant said that had we come in with a
massive western force at the time Burma
was dealing with her problem, we might
very well have--
Senator Towim. Well, Indonesia and Viet-
nam are not the same.
Senator CHURCH. Invested that govern-
ment with the kind of front of puppetry
that would have lost the support of its own
people.
Senator Tows. Indonesia and Vietnam are
not the same.
Mr'. SEVAREm. That is not a good----
Senator ToWER. The fact of the matter is
that North Vietnam is actively engaged in
armed aggression against South Vietnam.
There are North Vietnamese troops concen-
trated in regimental strength in South Viet-
nam today.
Senator CHURCH. Nobody is arguing that.
Senator TowER. Well, all right. When the
aggressor nation moves in militarily against
a non-Communist country, you cannot say,
well, the way to solve this is not by the in-
trusion of troops. Let us go over there with
specific action programs, Well, civic action
programs are great, they are fine, if that is
correct, but when the aggressor uses mili-
tary power, then we must combat that mili-
tary power. I remember a statement made
by a great commentator who said, goodness
without power is impotent and power itself
is impotent without the willingness to use
it, if necessary.
Senator CHURCH. Well, now, of course,
JOHN, but you are pushing an open door
here. No one is suggesting that we should
use--that no power should be used against
power. All that I am suggesting is-----
Senator SYMINGTON. You compared--
Senator CHURCH. All that I am suggesting,
"STU," if I may Just finish--
Senator SYMINGTON. But let me Just finish.
Senator CHURCH. All I am suggesting is
this.
Senator SYMINGTON. I am taking up for
his side because you interrupted him. Now
let Ire interrupt you.
I think that you felt that every thing was
the same in Asia and differently in Europe
and used what had been done in Indonesia
and Burma to show what could be done in
North and South Vietnam.
What JOHN was doing, as I understood it,
was to explain why he felt that Indonesia
was totallly different from anything in
North and South Vietnam, and I think there
is great merit.
Senator JAVITS. May we add one further
fact, gentlemen. Every one of us who has
been there knows that if we had not moved
in as we did beginning in February of 1965,
South Vietnam was finished-
Senator TowER. Gone. Gone.
Senator JAvrrs. Through, folded up and
out of business.
Senator TowER. Absolutely.
Senator JAVrrs. That was not true in
Burma.
Senator CHURCH. That is not true. I have
been there and that is not the argumei...
all. The argument is from the experienc,
in Vietnarn and looking around at other
guerrilla wars, let us try and determine what
will be best adapted to discouraging the
spread of Communism and recognize that
revolutionary situations are different basic-
ally than the situations that faced---
Senator GRUENING. Indeed. Indeed.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator GRUENING has the
floor.
Senator GRUENING. I would. disagree wita
all my colleagues to the effect that Asia is
so important that it justifies the kind cf
military and financial all-out action we have
taken.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator, you live very close
to Asia.
Senator GRUENING. It has some impor-
tance, but if we kept out, I am convinced
we would have had in Vietnam a. reunited
Vietnam which would have been independ-
ent of Peiping, an analogy to which is the
situation in Yugoslavia where the United
States invested $2 billion in support cf
Communist Tito because he was :independ-
ent of the lz-remlin. That could be demon-
strated if there were time. Ho Chi Minh had
no use for the Chinese; the Vietnamese hate
the Chinese. If we had just left the situa-
tion alone. But we were observed with our
fears, with our mistaken beliefs that all
communism. was of the same kind.
Senator JAVrrs. Well, the defect in that
argument is that South Vietnamese people
do not agree with Senator GRUENING. They
did not want it-
Senator TowER. That is right.
Senator JAVITS. And they fought against
it.
Senator TowER. That is right.
Senator JAVITS. And they are fighting
against it to the tune of 700,000 right now,
and that invalidates the thesis completely.
Senator TowER. And too often the critics
of administration policy say, well, we are not
supporting a popularly based government in
South Vietnam. How on earth can you de-
termine what a popularly based government
is?
Senator GRUENING. Well, why then did we
have to take over a whole war?
Senator TowER. Could you have a mean-
ingful election in South Vietnam today?
Senator GRUENING. Why did we have to
take over the whole war ourselves--
Senator TOWER. Of course you could not.
Senator GRUENING. If this was such a pop-
ular cause in South Vietnam?
Senator SYMINGTON. Because of the North
Vietnam forces. The North sent in support.
Senator GRUENING. They only came in
after we sent in American aid.
Senator SYMINGTON. I wish you would g)
out there. I told you that. You would
change a lot of your thoughts. I changed
a lot of mime.
Mr. SEVAREID. I gather the thrust of a goo,i
bit of your talk a few minutes ago was to
the effect that what we are really trying 0
do in a groping way is to get some kind of
a balance of power in Asia comparable to
the balance that was achieved and which has
protected Europe these last 20 years.
Is this always going to have to require
American armed presence? Should we have
not taken a different policy with Japa.r.,
then? Should not Japan be armed if this is
a problem? Japan at one end and India at
the other?
Senator JAVrrs. Well, isn't this really- w3
may ask a question of ourselves and of the
people-a transitional phase in Asia?
Now, Europe is pretty well equipped to
deal with its problems, whatever may be its
unwillingness to venture outside of Europe.
The fact is that the NATO alliance has held
Europe together and now it is getting to be
much more Integrated, et cetera.
This is a nascent stage, a growing stage
in Asia. India is getting a greater sense of
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Fi2nxary 16, 1 966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
nationhood. The accord between Pakistan standpoint of maintaining our own security
and India at Tashkent, indeed, the fact that to maintain our defense perimeter as far
Russia is emerging as a power itself, able from our own shores as possible, and as close
to bring two parties together I think is a to the enemy's as possible.
very significant aspect of world affairs. And Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CHURCH, did you
I think that the United States is fitting into wish to come in?
what is somewhat of a vacuum. Senator CHURCH. I just want to say I think
For a time and in this terribly tortured we do ourselves an injustice by using terms
world where you are seeking to hold off an that are really not accurate. We talk about
atomic war, a real big holocaust, it seems the free world and the Communist world as
to me that that kind of interim action is though these were two great monolithic
free world which is in the best position to
do that, and one must admit it, has the will
to do it, and indeed I am grateful that our
country does have the will and still the pio-
neering spirit in which to see that far down
the road so that it will itself assume a
burden which must be assumed if no one else
will.
Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to an-
swer your point about India and Japan, if I
may, to some extent.
India today is heavily armed by the Soviet
Communists. They have the biggest air force
by far in their part of the world.
So far as Japan is concerned, where re-
cently I spent quite a lot of time, you have
a treaty, and in that treaty the Japanese do
not guarantee to protect us, but we guaran-
tee to protect them. And they are very peace-
ful minded.
Of course, they don't like to see any fight-
ing out there. Unfortunately they had a sad
and tragic ending to World War II, but, on
the other hand, if it wasn't for the guarantee
that the United States has given them, that
goes through 1970 or to 1970, I am sure that
they would have a totally different approach
to their own defenses.
I only mention this again because I think
Europe, where incidentally we have heard
talk of NATO-I don't think there is any
greater enemy fundamentally to our future
than France, which is perhaps the core of
NATO, gepgraphically, anyway. I think each
and every one of these cases is different
and what my apprehension is, listening to
these witnesses before the Foreign Relations
Committee, is-that they are too prone to con-
tinue a phase which perhaps could be best
summed up in the words "spheres of in-
fluence."
I believe spheres of influence, the way the
world is today, when you go around it in 90
minutes, is getting to be a rather obsolete
term.
Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, we haven't
talked much about the prospects and possi-
bilities of peace. There has been no hard
signals from Hanoi so far as anyone knows
in the direction of peace negotiations.
Is there any of you at this table who think
there is any chance that Hanoi is going to
talk peace before there is some military
change in the battlefield that makes her
realize she can't win this war and will take
very great losses?
Senator TowER. I think that the only way
Hanoi can be brought to the conference
table with a reasonable attitude is for us to
make the war so costly that they do not
choose to pursue it any further. I think to
reduce their will to wage an aggressive war
against South Vietnam we must reduce their
capacity to do it. We have tried It. We
have tried desperately to bring them to the
conference table. We have sent our peace
mission all over the world and they have
rebuffed us. So apparently force is the only
thing that they understand, because they
have not yet I think been convinced of the
determination of the United States to stay
and defend non-Communist governments
against Communist encroachment.
I think one thing that we in the United
States had better resign ourselves to and
understand; that is, because we are the most
powerful nation in the free world, we are
necessarily the free world's first line of de-
fense, and it is incumbent on us from the
blocs. Neither are and most of the coun-
tries in the so-called free world aren't free
and never have been free, and this is the
reason in so much of Asia, in so much of
Africa, where the people retch in poverty and
suffer the yoke of ancient wrongs that revo-
lutions are going to occur, and we have got
to recognize that the Communists are going
to try to take these revolutions over, and
this is a different situation than faced us in
Europe.
I was -reading in the official statement of
administration policy about the kind of mil-
itary alliance system we have established
in Europe, NATO, and then SEATO and
CENTRO, around the rest of the Communist
world, and the discussion of this alliance
system Is a great barrier to Communist pene-
tration.
Well, Eric, if this is a barrier, then a sieve
is a barrier to water and a plate glass window
is a barrier to sunlight.
These alliances are not stopping the pene-
tration of communism. We stand in Viet-
nam today practically alone and the only
allies that we can honestly claim as military
allies are South Korea, Taiwan, and Thai-
land, and all together they constitute less
than 8 percent of the people of Asia.
Senator Gaumsiwo. Who are on our payroll.
Senator CHURCH. Now, I must say we are
deluding ourselves if we think this is the
bulwark of a policy. It is evidenced that
we lack a policy. I am for getting a good
policy that will deal more effectively with
the phenomena of revolution. We are going
to live in a generation of revolution through-
out all of Latin America, Africa, Asia, for
a long time to come and we have yet to
devise a policy that will deal effectively with
the-
Senator JAVITS. Well, the basic ingredi-
ents-
Senator GRUENING. I could not disagree
more with Senator TOWER. We tried bomb-
ing for 1 year and we have been totally
ineffective. It has merely hardened resist-
ance of the people, and one reason Hanoi is
not interested is because our approaches, our
alleged unconditional terms are very condi-
tional. We have got to negotiate with the
people who are doing the fighting. That is
the first thing we have got to do. We are
not doing it. If we were willing to negotiate
with the National Liberation Front, the
Vietcong; we would be realistic about it.
Hanoi is not the villain in this thing.
Hanoi came. in late to infiltrate when the
revolution, the civil war had already gone on
for some time, and this is a reality that we
have refused in our administration circles
to face.
Senator TowER. The Vietcong cannot wage
war without Hanoi.
Mr. SEVAREID. We have about a minute
and a half or so.
Senator GRUENING. They did.
Mr. SEVAREm. I wonder if any of you had
time to form any opinions about Senator
RIBIcoFF's ideas published today, that we
have a conference right away now in Geneva,
invite the Vietcong representatives and offer
a partial withdrawal of our troops if Hanoi
will do the same. Is there merit in this?
Senator JAVITS. Well, I will tell you, the
weakness of it is the very weakness of the
things that Senator CHURCH and Senator
GRUENING have been discussing. It is a uni-
lateral effort to bring peace. We are going to
sit down in Geneva and invite people to come
who then will not come which will set the
effort back a lot further than it is now.
Senator TOWER. Further negotiation from
weakness.
Senator JAvrrs. I do not believe that esca-
lation necessarily will do it. I think the
maintenance of our position with integrity
and viability on a unilateral basis, that is
what we are doing in order to defend, pacify,
reconstruct a viable area of South Vietnam is
our best position. Let us remember that the
South Vietnamese, Vietcong, could flow back
to the villages just like they left them and
the North Vietnamese could go home, and
you would not need a peace conference at all,
and that is very likely to be the result.
Senator SYMINGTON. If you sit down with
the Vietcong alone, then automatically you
lose all the Government of South Vietnam.
Senator GRUENING. That would be no loss.
Senator SYMINGTON. Why do you want to
turn over to the Vietcong South Vietnam
which you would be doing if you sat down
with the Vietcong.
Mr. SEVAREID. Gentleman, I want to thank
all of you for coming on this rainy Sunday
afternoon. Our time has about run out. I
wish we could talk for another hour, and
perhaps in the future we will have occasion
to have all of you back again. It looks like
a long war to come.
I suppose there is some danger in public
debate about the validity in the conduct of
a war in which thousands of Americans are
already risking their lives. There is some
danger of encouraging the enemy to hang on,
perhaps, when he hears all this, danger I
would think to the political careers of those
who speak out before, this is all over, people
on either side of this argument, but there
are many precedents in our history for ques-
tioning an American war even after it is un-
derway. And this Lincoln's Birthday week-
end is a good time perhaps to remember that.
On January 12 of 1848 a young Congress-
man, Abraham Lincoln, stood up in the House
and he denounced the Mexican War as un-
necessarily and unconstitutionally com-
menced by President Polk, and that speech
was described by many people and many
papers in this country as unpatriotic, a great
disservice to the fighting man. He had a
thousand of them from his own district in
that war. And he never got reelected to Con-
gress. Well, if there are dangers over this-
he became President-this present national
debate on this war, I think maybe we have
to remember that life in the free society is
not supposed to be safe. It is supposed to
be free, in the belief that only in this free
conflict of ideas do you ultimately find the
way to the final safety.
This is Eric Sevareid in Washington. Good
afternoon.
ANNOUNCER. This has been "Vietnam Per-
spective-Congress After Honolulu," part of
CBS' News continuing coverage of the Viet-
nam conflict.
TONY SCHWAMM
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, Tony
Schwamm, postmaster of Anchorage,
who only a few weeks ago was 1 of 14
postmasters in the United States visiting
Washington to be given citations by
Postmaster General Lawrence F. O'Brien
for the able way in which they had car-
ried out the President's natural beauty
program by improving the appearance of
their respective post offices and their
surrounding grounds, died suddenly of a
heart attack. His passing is a great loss
not merely to the city of Anchorage but
to all Alaska, throughout which he was
widely known and loved.
Only weeks ago, on January 18, after
his award, I placed an item in the Coil-
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9 ;,6
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE February 16, .L
GIIESSIONAL RECORD about him, and I ask
unanimous consent that it be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the extract
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
AN ALASKA POSTMASTER IS HONORED-CITA-
TION OF MEsrr Is CONFERRED ox "TONY"
SCI-IWAMM OF ANCHORAGE
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I am happy
to record that of the 14 postmasters in the
Nation who are being honored this week with
a citation of merit by Postmaster General
O'Brien, one is from Alaska. He is George S.
'.. Cony" Schwamm, the competent postmaster
of Alaska's largest city, Anchorage.
The citation of merit is awarded because of
the able way in which Postmaster Schwamm
has carried out the President's natural beauty
program by improving the appearance of the
various post offices in his jurisdiction and
their surrounding grounds.
Postmaster Schwamm is an outstanding
Alaskan, a former World War II pilot who
thereafter served with great ability as the
head of the territory's department of aero-
nautics. In that capacity he started a most
effective airport construction program and
built airfields which are still in use and have
stood up under the wear and tear of service.
He then became the manager of the Inter-
national Airport at Anchorage, which, under
his direction, became the air crossways of
the Northern Hemisphere. It links the three
great continents of that hemisphere. "Tony"
Schwamm's dynamic leadership contributed
substantially to this airport development.
Today, the passengers from Europe and Asia
have the opportunity to stop off at Anchor-
age and enjoy the outstanding scenic beau-
ties of the last: frontier.
It is a pleasure to salute "Tony" Schwamm
for his outstanding performance in every
position that he has occupied and to con-
gratulate Postmaster General Larry O'Brien
for making this award.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, what
was so essentially true of Tony Schwamm
was that he was a live, kindly, alert, dy-
namic individual, who performed every
task that he undertook with great zest
and competence.
In addition to his various personal
undertakings, he was unofficially an
Anchorage greeter, an assignment de-
rived not merely from his innate out-
giving nature but from the fact that for
many years before his postmastership he
was the manager of the International
Airport at Anchorage, to which an ever-
increasing number of visitors from
abroad came. Tony had seen the begin-
nings of their influx. He took a personal
interest in them. It was his delight to
welcome the arrivals from the Scandi-
navian countries, from France, Japan,
Germany and other countries, and to
transmit to them the spirit of friendli-
ness and warm hospitality which is
characteristic of Alaskans, and which.
Tony embodied to a superlative degree,
A World War II aviator who was re-
tired because of damage from lead poi-
soning received while in the service, it
might truly be said of him that he was
outstanding and dedicated both in war
and in peace.
In his relatively short term of service
as postmaster, he did a superlative job
in distributing the vast volume of mail to
a rapidly growing community.
He will be sorely missed, but the mem?-
ory of his sterling character and his out-
standing contributions will be remcm--
bered and treasured as long as those who
knew and loved him remain alive.
MILWAUKEE MOTHER AND TEACH-
ER TELLS HOWS CHILDREN NEED
SCHOOL MILK
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
rise again to protest the administration's
unrealistic and totally unacceptable cut-
back in the special school milk program.
I have spoken out daily on this sub-
ject. Today I want to put into the REc-
ORD the words of one who should know
better than anyone else what this calam-
itous proposal means. This person, Mrs.
Meyer Bloom Of Milwaukee, is the mother
of three children and a teacher of many
more.
She says, in part:
I frequently have observed a marked
change in attitude and responsiveness in a
child after he or she has had the morning
milk.
Are we going to permit the adminis-
tration to eliminate this? I say we can-
not afford it. Nothing is more vital than
the health and education of our children,
our most precious asset.
I ask unanimous consent to have Mrs.
Bloom's letter printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
DEAR SENATOR PaoxMIRE: As a teacher and
a mother of three growing (fast) children
I have very little time to write notes to
anyone-even the milkman-but I did want
to write to support your actions regarding
the special milk program. for our school-
children.
Your February 1966 report states prob-
ably the greatest truth regarding the situa-
tion-"You can't teach a hungry child."
I have been teaching in one of Milwaukee's
so-called core schools and frequently have
observed a marked change in attitude and
responsiveness in a child after he or she has
had the morning milk. So very many of
these children come to school without break-
fast (among other things, Including ade-
quate sleep, etc.). I have always urged the
parents I have come in contact with to send
the 2 cents per half pint of milk for their
child. Frequently this is the oily milk
children have each day.
Our school is now on a hot lunch program
and the morning milk has been eliminated.
It worries me to know that of the many
children not purchasing the hot lunch, that
is, those that bring sandwiches, a sizable
proportion of them do not purchase milk.
Is there same way we can work out this
situation in the classroom or with the par-
ents? Do you have any suggestions? I could
provide you with statistics of our school's
program alone if that would be of any help.
Most sincere best wishes in your efforts.
Mrs. MEYER BLOOM.
TIMBER ALLOWABLE CUTS--II
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on Jan-
uary 17 I discussed the subject of allow-
able cuts of timber in the national forests
in Oregon and the effort some people
were making to use a 5-year-old working
paper to exploit the national forests.
The man who assisted in preparing
this 5-year-old document was a Dr. Wil-
liam A. Duerr of Syracuse, N.Y. I sent
my remarks to Dr. Duerr and received a
letter from him dated January 26, 1966.
I ask unanimous consent that this letter
be printed in the RECORD at this point
in my remarks.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
SYRACUSE, N.Y.,.
January 2G, 1986.
Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It was kind of you
to write me on January 18 and to enclose
a copy of your remarks on the floor of the
Senate concerning the allowable cut of tim-
ber. And I appreciate the invitation you
gave me to comment in confidence.
I am much relieved to have the record
set straight, for over the years it had gotten
pretty muddled. As you observed, I was
being badly used. And yet I believed it best
not to enter the squabble personally, lest I
embarrass my associates. How fortunate for
all of us that you came to our rescue.
As you know, the allowable-cut issue con-
tinues lively. My friends in the Bureau of
Land Management tell me that Director
Stoddard is determined to fight the recent
insistent demands for an immediate upping
of the cut in western Oregon. He proposes
to make a basic study during 1966 of the
whole policy and procedure for setting the
cut, meanwhile sticking with the formula
used in recent years. Such studies are essen-
tial to the public Interest. The problem is
technically difficult and cannot be resolved
quickly. It would be a blow to Federal for-
estry if the Bureau were forced by local pres-.
sures to move prematurely.
Again, thanks to you, and kindest regards.
Most sincerely,
WILLIAM A. DuFRR.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it !became
quite obvious, after a careful reading of
an October 27, 1965, letter sent to Dr.
Duerr by a State senator from Oregon
and Dr. Duerr's November 2, 1965, reply
to the State senator, that those who were
seeking to use Dr. Duerr in exploiting the
allowable cut issue were not going to get
any help in their efforts. Now Dr. Duerr
himself observes that he was "being bad-
ly used."
In view of these developments I am
pleased to insert in the RECORD Dr.
Duerr's letter of January 26, 1966, ad-
dressed to me so that all interested in-
dividuals may have the benefit of his
comments.
It is my desire to have this allowable
timber cut issue placed out in the open
where true conservationists'-which in-
clude many in the timber industry-can
see it in full focus.
As one who has labored as an edu-
cator, I should point out that another
great principle is at stake here. It goes
beyond the forest issue. It involves the
right and the obligation of an educator
to examine into a subject freely and fuilly
and the right of a researcher to look at
all possible alternatives and not be used
because he dares to think. It includes
the precious right to think new
thoughts-the obligation to test new
ideas-the responsibility to challenge
the accepted policy. Above all, we must
never abandon the right to bring the dis-
ciplines and knowledge of science, eco-
nomics, and sociology to bear upon the
problems that confront us-free from
political ha:rrassment.
For decisions on resource manage-
ment to be sound, they must be based
on facts. For decisions to be support-
able, they must rest on logic. Any con-
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I've had comes from junior officers and en-
listed men. I have always made it a practice,
therefore, to listen to anyone, no matter what
his rank or rate.
A President I admire greatly was Teddy
Roosevelt. He was a physical-fitness advo-
cate. He was a man who understood the art
of leadership. And he got things done. It
may have been Teddy Roosevelt who coined
that bit of philosophy I've long quoted: "If
you need a helping hand, there it is-right
on the end of your arm."
Young men sometimes ask me: "Is it still
possible to achieve a full and satisfying
career in the U.S. Navy?"
My answer goes something like this:
Contrary to the prophets of doom, there
will always be a U.S. Navy-and opportu-
nities abound for those who take advantage
of them. In spite of substitute methods of
transportation, we will for many years use
the surface of the sea to carry the bulk of our
trade and to defend our shores.
Fleets of the future may bear little resem-
blance to present-day ships. But I am con-
vinced that there will be naval aviation in
some form, aircraft carriers, submarines, and
small, fast ships for escort duty. These are
all battle-tested types and least vulnerable to
nuclear bombs-if such weapons of mass
destruction are used in the future.
To fulfill its mission; the Navy must have
the finest, most dedicated officers and men
it can attract. Being a part of the Navy is
honorable; soul satisfying, and sufficiently
remunerative to reward any active young
man who loves his country and is willing to
accept his responsibilities.
Last November 7, I remarked to my Ma-
rine Corps driver, "Today is a very special day
for me because it was just 63 years ago that
I entered the Naval Academy."
"Well, Admiral, do you think you'll make
a career of it?" he quipped.
Yes, I think I shall. I'm still learning
every day. I'm still trying to do my best (by
Navy regulation a five-star admiral never re-
tires). And I refuse to worry about things
over which I have no control. If I had a
chance to relive my life, I'd still follow
Grandfather Nimitz' philosophy-even if
it led to another court-martial for running
the U.S.S. Decatur aground.
(Enrros's NOTE: Reprinted through cour-
tesy of Boy's Life magazine published by the
Boy Scouts of America.) In speaking of the
Boy Scouts, Admiral Nin itz stated:
"My boyhood occurred before Scouting
came to the United States, but I have long
been interested in its growth, development,
and principles. If I were to sum up the
qualities required of a good naval officer, I
would be hard put to add anything to the
qualities required of a good Scout.
Of the 2,500,000 men under my command
at the height of the war in the Pacific, fewer
than half were former Scouts. Yet this 40
percent won 60 percent out of all the medals
MAINE LEGISLATURE SUPPORTS
U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, on be-
half of my colleague from Maine [Mr.
MUSKIEI and myself I ask unanimous
consent to have printed in the RECORD
a joint resolution adopted by the Legisla-
ture of the State of Maine in support of
U.S. policy in Vietnam.
There being no objection, the joint
resolution was ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
JOINT RESOLUTION OF THE STATE OF MAINE IN
SUPPORT OF THE U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM
We, your memorialists, the House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate of the State of Maine
No. 26-11
in special session of the 102d legislative ses-
sion assembled, most respectfully present
and petition your honorable body as follows:
Whereas the United States of America
stands committed to a policy of resisting the
forces of Communist aggression which im-
peril the freedom and liberty Of the people
and nations of the free world; and
Whereas it is of vital importance that the
forces of totalitarianism recognize that the
United States of America, as a nation, will
utilize every means at its disposa# to honor
such commitments; and
Whereas the present use of American
military forces in Vietnam manifests the
determination of the United States of
America to implement this policy whenever
and wherever the freedom of the nations
of the free world are threatened; and
Whereas our military forces, in this great
struggle, are proving a decisive factor in im-
plementing American policy, not only in the
defense of. Vietnam against Communist ag-
gression, but as a developing arsenal of
strength which will provide the means of
securing a final peace: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That we, your memorialists, urge
that the Congress of the United States of
America, in recognition of the sacrifices and
heroism of our fighting men in Vietnam,
extend the profound thanks of the Congress
and the people of the United States to the
military forces of this country in Vietnam
for their valiant efforts; and be it further
Resolved, That a copy of this resolution,
duly authenticated by the secretary of state,
be transmitted by the secretary of state to
the Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson, President
of the United States, and to the Senate and
House of Representatives in Congress and to
the Members of the Senate and House of-
Representatives from this State.
In senate chamber, read and adopted,
sent down for concurrence, February 1, 1966.
EDWIN H. PERT,
Secretary.
House of representatives, read and adopted,
in concurrence, February 1, 1966.
JEROME G. PLANTE,
Clerk.
CURTAILMENT OF REA LOAN PRO-
GRAM WILL CAUSE FURTHER
DEPRESSION OF RURAL AREAS
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, in his
budget message last month the President
proposed sharp curtailment in rural
electrification loan funds. This cutback,
if agreed to by Congress, will have a
sharp effect in Montana.
Right now there Is a large backlog of
loan applications at the Rural Electrifi-
cation Administration. This backlog,
plus applications which will normally
come in this year, amount to about
three-quarters of a billion dollars.
Congress authorized the loan of about
$400 million to meet part of this demand.
However, the budget message proposed
that about one-third of the amount Con-
gress appropriated be impounded, its use
withheld until next year. The adminis-
tration proposes an REA loan program
of about a quarter of a billion dollars
next year, which is several hundred mil-
lion dollars short of the need.
The 24 cooperatives in Montana will
need about $8 million during the next
year and a half. If the budget cutbacks
are accepted,' several million dollars
needed for expansion of rural electric
service In Montana will have to be raised
elsewhere, at a cost considerably above
2973
the 2-percent rate on REA loans. This
will mean higher rates for consumers on
farms and in small towns.
I think that it is time for the Govern-
ment to take a hard look at the ways it
helps finance essential electric service.
The Government grants special powers
and privileges to all suppliers of elec-
tricity, because electricity is essential
and because it is most economically dis-
tributed on a monopoly basis.
A number of investor-owned utilities
have received 2-percent REA loans on
exactly the same terms granted the co-
operatives. Any supplier who obtains
one of those low-interest loans has to
agree to serve the entire area, not just
the lucrative, high-density areas.
Many power companies found they
could make more money by serving se-
lected, populous areas with conventional
financing, than by serving an entire
area with construction financed at only
2 percent. The investor-owned utilities
take in about 15 times as much revenue
per mile of line as the rural co-ops do.
If the privately owned, consumer-man-
aged rural cooperatives had that kind
of density and revenue they could cer-
tainly finance their growth without any
2-percent loans.
Another point-there has been a big
shift in financing of the major segment
of the power industry-the investor-
owned utilities-within recent years.
A substantial proportion of the cost of
their expansion has been shifted from
the stockholders to the customers.
About half of the 10 U's-the investor-
owned utilities-won't have to go to the
marketplace for new money at all dur-
ing the sixties.
In other words, these companies will
pay zero percent interest on new con-
struction capital.
The companies have already collected
a lot of that capital, month after month,
from the customers.
But the customers of the Investor-
owned utilities did not get any stock,
or dividends. And they would not get
their money back.
If the REA program Is curtailed,
either through increase in rates or in-
adequacy of service, needed employment
opportunities cannot be developed in
rural areas. It will be more difficult
for us in 'Montana to keep our young
people in these areas.
That is why I have told the President-
and a number of other Senators, of both
parties, have joined in the request-
that the REA loan program must be
restored.
Beyond its enormous value in the areas
it serves it has a beneficial effect in cities
served by investor-owned companies, be-
cause of the yardstick effect of competi-
tion. The program is especially useful
in: this regard in Montana, which is the
only one of the States-except for Ha-
waii-without a single city-owned power
system.
I believe the Congress will give the
President better advice on REA matters
than he received from his Budget
Bureau.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE February 16, 1966
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF AD-
VISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-,
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the Ad-
visory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations has submitted its seventh an-,
nual report to the President of the
United States, the Vice President, and
the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives. Members will recall that this
Commission was established by Congress
in 1959, for the following basic purposes:
First. To bring together representa-
tives of the Federal, State, and local gov-
ernments, for consideration of common
problems.
Second. To provide a forum for dis-
cussion of the administration of Federal
grant programs.
Third. To give critical attention to the
conditions and controls involved in the
'administration of Federal grant pro-
grams.
Fourth. To make available technical
assistance to the executive and legisla-
tive branches of the Federal Govern-
ment, in the review of proposed legisla-
tion, to determine its overall effect on the
Federal system.
Fifth. To encourage discussion and
study at an early stage of emerging pub-
lic problems that are likely to require in?-
tergovernmental cooperation.
Sixth. To recommend, within the
framework of the Constitution, the most
desirable allocation of governmental
functions, responsibilities, and revenues
among the several levels of government.
Seventh. To recommend methods of
coordinating and simplifying tax laws
and. administrative practices, to achieve
a more orderly and less competitive fiscal
relationship between the levels of gov-
ernment and to reduce the burden of
compliance for taxpayers.
The Advisory Commission is composed
of representatives of the public and of
each level of government. The senior
Senator from North Carolina [Mr.
ExviN7, the senior Senator from South
Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], and I have served
on the Commission since its establish-
ment. On the House side, Representa-
tive FouremIN, of North Carolina, chair-
man of the Intergovernmental Relations
Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations, and the
original sponsor of the bill creating the
Commission, and Representative DWYER,
of New Jersey, are also charter members..
The other House Member is Representa-
tive KEOGH, of New York.
In addition to the six Members from.
Congress, the Commission has three
from the executive branch: the Secre-?
tary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Agriculture, and the Secretary of Hous-?
ing and Urban Development. Other
members include four Governors, four
mayors, three State legislative leaders,
and three elected county officials. The
public is represented by three members,
one of whom is the Commission's Chair-
man.
A year has elapsed since the submis-
sion of the Commission's sixth annual
report, and it is appropriate that the
Senate be apprised of the Commission's
activities during the past 12 months.
Mr. Frank Bane, of Virginia. Chair-
man of the Commission, continues to
skillfully guide the Commission, while
Mr. William G. Colman, its executive di-
rector, provides able leadership in over-
seeing the activities of the 23-member
professional and clerical staff.
During 1965, general meetings of the
Commission were held in January, May,
and October; and this year, in January.
The following major reports requiring
implementation were adopted during the
course of the sessions:
First. "Relocation: Unequal Treatment
of People arid Businesses Displaced by
Governments." This study explores the
need to achieve consistency and equity
in the treatment of those persons and
businesses forced to relocate because of
Federal and federally aided public im-
provement programs.
The Subcommittee on Intergovern-
mental Relations acted swiftly to imple-
ment the Commission's findings. On
April 1, 1965, I introduced S. 1681. Com-
panion measures to S. 1681 were intro-
duced in the House of Representatives
by Congressmen FouNTAiN-H.R. 7821,
and 1DWYER--HR. 7970. H.R. 10212, in-
troduced by Congressman SIcnr.Es, in-
eludes provisions similar to S. 1681.
Hearings were held by the subcommittee
on June 30, July 1, 13, and 14, 1965.
Final action by the Senate is expected in
the near future.
Second. "Federal-State Coordination
of Personal Income Taxes." If our States
are to remain viable partners in our Fed-
eral system, their fiscal position. must be
strengthened. This report looks at this
problem and develops a number of useful
recommendations, including a proposed
Federal tax credit for State income tax
payments.
Third. "Metropolitan Social and Eco-
nomic Disparities: Implications for In-
tergovernmental Relations in Central
Cities and Suburbs." This report inves-
tigates :
Who lives in the central cities and corre-
sponding suburban rings of each metropol-
itan area? What are the fiscal resources in
our central cities and suburbs? How do gov-
ernmental expenditures differ among these
jurisdictions? What changes, if any, should
be made in Federal, State, and local policies
regarding such social and economic dispar-
ities, and what specific legislative and admin-
istrative actions should be taken to imple-
ment these changes?
Current work projects on the Commis-
sion's agenda include:
First. State taxation of interstate
commerce. This report considers policy
issues raised in H.R. 11798--WILLIS,
Democrat, of Louisiana, pertaining to
State taxation of interstate commerce.
Second. Intergovernmental responsi-
bility for building codes and regulations.
The variety of building regulations and
how greater uniformity can be achieved
were considered at the January meeting
of the Commission.
Third. Effect of tax and expenditure
practices on location of industry and
economic development. State laws de-
signed to attract industry pose serious
intergovernmental problems. This ques-
tion is now being scrutinized by the
Commission.
Fourth. Intergovernmental relations in
the poverty program. The war against
poverty is running into serious obstacles
and is being attacked in some quarters.
The Commission is exploring ways in
which more effective cooperation among
levels of government can be achieved in
the administration of this program.
Fifth. The Advisory Commission has
contracted with the Department of City
Planning at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology to reassess Commission
recommendations relating to urban areas
and to measure their effectiveness as de-
vices for relieving pressing metropolitan
problems.
Sixth. In October, the Commission
sponsored and chaired a meeting to con-
sider the need for a fullfledged confer-
ence to discuss the question of urban
research. The staff of the subcommit-
tee participated in the conference.
Of more general concern to those in-
terested in intergovernmental relations
is the tracing by the Commission of sig-
nificant intergovernmental events in
1965. Brief descriptions of the Voting
Rights Act, the Elementary and Second-
ary Education Act, a grant program for
the improvement of State and local 'law
enforcement are included. Two major
fiscal problems, State taxation of inter-
state commerce and the treatment of
income derived from securities of State
and local governments, are also dis-
cussed.
The brief survey of State legislative
reapportionment in 1965 will be of spe-
cial interest to all Senators.
The Commission's report also high-
lights a number of significant develop-
ments at the State level, including:
increased State interest in urban prob-
lems, improvements In intergovern-
mental fiscal relations, new and higher
State and local taxes, and greater con--
cern with revising State constitutions.
A number of recent examples of, greater
areawide cooperation in urban areas
were cited.
The Commission's report takes note
of other significant intergovernmental
relations developments that took place
at the Federal level in 1965. The crea.
tion of the Department of Urban Affairs
brings into better focus Federal activi-
ties as they affect our cities. The pas-
sage by the Senate of S. 561, the ;Proposed
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of
1965, also marks a real milestone in
intergovernmental relations. S. 561 will
help to better coordinate Federal efforts
as they influence State and local affairs.
The continuing debate on the so-
called Heller proposal suggests that the
topic of intergovernmental finances will
occupy much of our attention in the
months to come.
The report takes special note of joint
hearings held by the House and Senate
Subcommittees on Intergovernmental
Relations last May on the 5-year record
of the Advisory Commission.
In transmitting the subcommittee's
findings to the Senate Committee on
Government Operations, I pointed out:
The hearings revealed that the Commis-
sion, in its 1i years of operation, hws achieved
a high level of competence and productivity
in its continuing study of problems which
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ebruary
V1V 4AJ
ESES
a growing stream of reference by finan-
cial columnists and economic writers
to inflationary factors in our economy.
This is understandable inasmuch as
prices have moved up somewhat more
rapidly in 1965 than in the preceding
years. After increasing at an average
annual rate of 1.3 percent between 1960
and 1964, the gross national product
deflator, which is the best general mea-
sure of inflationary pressures in our
economy, rose by 1.8 percent in 1965.
Significantly, the President's Council
of Economic Advisers which testified be-
fore the Joint Economic Committee last
Tuesday, predicts no greater rate of
price increase in 1966 than in 1965.
Nevertheless, with the submission of
the 1966 budget there has been renewed
concern about inflationary pressures. In
particular, repeated references are made
to the Vietnam war as a major factor
in rising demand and inflationary pres-
sures. Many analysts and commenta-
tors have drawn a parallel between the
Korean war experience which did in-
volve substantial price inflation and the
emerging situation in Vietnam.
A closer analysis shows that the com-
parison may be spurious. In the course
of the current hearings, it has been
brought out that military expenditures
are a lower percentage of the gross na- product. Obviously, even with the ex-
tional product than they were in the pansion in 1967 th
Vi
t
e
e
,-
nam conflict ac
1950's. For the current fiscal year, total counts for only a tiny fraction of total
outlays for the military functions of the demands on the economy, and it is highly
Department of Defense amount to $56.5 misleading to attribute any serious in-
billion, which is approximately 7.7 per- flationary pressures to these outlays. It
cent of the gross national product. For is true that expanding military expendi-
1967, the percentage is 7.9 percent, which -tures have a multiplier effect and tend to
includes $10.3 billion for the Vietnam trigger off other investments and ex-
conflict. A44
In the 4-year period 1956 through
1959, when our role in Vietnam was pure-
ly an advisory one and, therefore, far
more limited than the present, the rela-
tionship between defense and total gross
national product averaged 8.85 percent-
higher than the projection for the year
ahead. The following table shows the
percentage relationship between Depart-
ment of Defense military functions and
total gross national product for each
fiscal year from 1939 through 1967. Nat-
urally, the fiscal years 1966 and 1967 are
estimated.
I ask unanimous consent that the table
may be printed in the RECORD at this
point.
There being no objection, the table was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
Defense spending as percentage of gross
national product, fiscal years 1939-67
Percent
of GNP
1939-------------------------------- 1.2
1940-------------------------------- 1.6
1941-------------------------------- 5.4
1942-------------------------------- 16.8
1943-------------------------------- 35.1
1944-------------------------------- 37.4
1945-------------------------------- 36.7
1946-------------------------------- 20.7
1947-------------------------------- 6.2
pen ures, but obviously it is unreason-
able to exaggerate the effect of current
outlays for Vietnam or to draw close
economic parallels with the Korean war
period.
The base of military expenditures was
and is much greater now than in the
Korean war period. To illustrate: Total
national defense outlays in 1949 were
$13.3 billion and, in 1950, $14.1 billion.
From that very limited base, they jumped
to $33.6 billion in 1951, $45.9 billion in
1952, $48.7 billion in 1953, and $41.3 bil-
lion in 1954. Thus, in the fiscal year 1951,
military expenditures were doubled and,
a year later, tripled as compared with
the pre-Korean war level.
By contrast, our military expenditures
have been running at a $50-billion level
ever since 1961. The Vietnam additions
come to about 20 percent of base, as con-
trasted with the aforementioned dou-
bling and tripling in the Korean war
period. As a result, there should be none
of the inflationary thrust that was
caused by rapid acceleration in the early
1950's.
For the same reason, it is absurd to
contend as our leftwing critics often do,
that this Nation is dependent on military
outlays to keep its vast economy going.
There would be no serious problem at all
in diverting any portion of military ex-
Defense spending as percentage of gross
national product, fiscal years 1939-67-Con.
Percent
1948 of
=-----------
1949 - - - - -
1950
1951 -
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957------------
1958 -------------
-------------------
1969 ----------------------
1960-------------'
1961 1962
1963
1964
1965
19661 -------------------------------
19671
Estimates.
percentage relationship ranged, from a
low of 1.2 percent in 1939 to a maximum
of 37.4 at the height of World War II,
and a postwar high of 12.1 percent in
1953 reflecting the Korean war.
Turning now to the expenditures for
the Vietnam conflict, the sum of $10.5
billion is identifiable in the 1967 budget
as required for this purpose. This comes
to 11/2 percent of gross national product.
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966,
the $4.3 billion in cost of our Vietnam
military struggle comes to about seven-
GNP
4.4
4.4
4. 5
6.4
11.5
12. 1
11.1
9.4
8. 8
8. 9
8. 9
8.8
8.3
8.5
8. 7
8. 5
8.2
7. 1
7. 7
7.8
16, 1966
penditures to the needs of an expanding
civilian society. The President has indi-
cated, both in his state of the Union mes-
sage and his annual Economic Report,
that Great Society programs have been
held back in order to meet our military
requirements and, at the same time,
avoid undue pressures on our economic
output.
Mr. President, it is clear from the testi-
mony taken by the Joint Economic Com-
mittee that the dynamic factors in our
current expansion are consumer expen-
ditures and domestic investment. Gross
national product is estimated at $722
billion for 1966-$46.5 billion over the
196,5 figure. Rising consumer expendi-
tures are expected to make up 60 percent
of this increase. In the case of business
investment, the annual rate of spending
by business for plant and equipment in
the first half of 1966 will exceed the full
year 1965 level by $6 billion, and this rise
is expected to continue in the second
half of the year. The total of fixed in-
vestment, exclusive of residential
Is ex-
,
pected to reach 101/2 percent of gross
national product.
In truth, we are maintaining a very
rapid rate of expansion on all fronts and
it is natural that some price pressures
will be generated. At the same time, it
is most important that we see these pres-
sures in proper perspective.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD at
this point an article entitled "The 2-Per-
cent War" written by J. A. Livingston.
There -being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE 2-PERCENT WAR
(By J. A. Livingston)
Question. What makes a war economy or
why is Vietnam different?
Answer. Quantity.
World Was II never left any doubt. Na-
tional defense purchases took two-fifths of
the. economic pie. The homefront served
the war maw. Bacon, sugar, meat, coffee
were rationed. Copper, steel, aluminum, and
rubber were distributed by priority.
An entire system of controls-who gets
what, when-was centralized in the War Pro-
duction Board in Washington. Even man-
power was allocated. Behind guns, butter
was an also-ran.
The Korean war gave a less decisive an-
swer. The economy had grown 16 percent
bigger. So the Nation's manpower and
equipment could handle a quantitatively
greater war effort with less strain. And
Korea was far smaller than World War H.
A month after it began, President Truman
said: "This is not the time for business as
usual * * * or for complete economic mo-
bilization."
At the peak, national defense took a 15-
percent wedge out of the pie.
And Vietnam is even smaller. Quantita-
tively, it is dwarfed by World War II. And
it differs from Korea in both size and im-
pact.
Korea caught Americans-you, me, and
General Motors-with our military plants
down. Promptly after the surrender of Ja-
pan, this Nation demobilized. National de-
fense was scanted in the lunge toward peace:
"Bring the boys back home."
After President Truman ordered General
MacArthur to the defense of South Korea,
industry had to retool and the Military
Establishment, then a mere skeleton, had to
be beefed up. Prices rose, shortages de-
veloped,
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Fe 95
ebruary .16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
is now being copied in a dozen States. And grapple with gut issues, the state can serve comes. The money could be used only for
from the assembly came a scheme to harness as a qualified example to its 49 sisters,. health, education, and welfare projects.
the intellectual horsepower of California's There are signs that the States--frightened JAVITS, however, is a Republican;; his party
"think factories." Last spring the State by the specter of further Federal encroach- is in the minority. It is unlikely that the
hired four aerospace firms to find solutions rnent and mounting fiscal crisis and shaken plan will win congressional approval this soo ov-
is boner or later tit Federal sGon-
to problems of crime and transportation that l in g Some r: States, ,e gain- year. "But
g with. regional solutions io the Washington economist. "Similar schemes
Calif sito will face in the year 2000. g vitality. A visitor to Sacramento is struck by legisla- ]perimentin
tors like Jerry Waldie, the trim, dark-haired, urban problems that often spill across arbi- have already been tried successfully in Aus-
40-year-old Democratic majority leader in teary boundary lines. Indiana and Illinois tralia and Canada." The economist pauses,
the assembly. An intense man who cares signed a compact on air pollution last year, then grins. "If you like this idea," he says,
deeply about the problems of mental retarda- and New York has joined with Pennsylvania, "you better start calling it the Johnson
tion, he directed a year-long probe of the Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan. to reverse the p
State's mental institutions, then pushed tide of pollution in Lake Erie. The 19?5 Gov- In an effort to disentangle themselves
through sweeping reforms. Or consider ernors' conference adopted an inti rstate from a web of outmoded restrictions, at
Senator Tom Rees, a lanky, informal man compact on education and set up a commis- least 25 States have established constitu-
who is perhaps the only lawmaker in the Na- Sion to make recommendations to the titates. tional-revision commissions. Almost all.
Lion with the intestinal courage needed to "We are coming to realize," says former North these commissions are recommending that
pour a jigger of gin into a glass of scotch Carolina Governor Terry Sanford, "that edu- many previously that a ective positions e'lmade
whisky and then swallow the mixture with- cation is too large and too important it sub- appointive; gove be
out grimacing. 1"Es, recently elevated to ject to be left to the haphazard chance of terms and greater powers; that archaic bor--
the U.S. Congress in a special election, is unconnected State and local efforts It is rowing and taxing provisions be thrown on
concerned about urban sprawl. "One third also too complex to be left to a single guid- the unkpil . "Not the si Unionnce after. Southern
War," reentered
of all our downtown areas are made up of tag national hand." States
says Alfred Willoughby, executive dil
ugly parking lots," he says, and he grins as To solve their pressing fiscal problems. the Wd
been. such a National Municipal exL ecutive
exa eaue-
mina-
he tells a visitor about an informal group he States have lately been exerting tremendous a r rhos of there the
who organized "to give awards to the people efforts. Indiana, for example, faced a money
who do the most to screw up our natural crisis 2 years ago. The State desperately Lion of Se constitutions. And this is only
environment." needed $200 million. Its level of : ervices beginning."'
As a further outgrowth of these revisions,
The name of this group is Los Angeles was abysmal. Its citizens were screaming also being
Gruesome (LAG) ; he hopes it will spread to about inadequate schools, high property the tteer legislative The structure number is is States hold-
the Bay Area around San Francisco (BAG) taxes, and the inability of the legislature st annual sessions, for example, has risen
and eventually to Sacramento itself (SAG). to rise above petty partisanship. Then the sIng par 1 in the ]loot decade. In Pennsylvania,
Men like Waldie and Rees can wrestle with legislature bravely enacted a compromise sh rpy I enas and other ennsyl law-
complex problems primarily because they tax plan. Republicans accepted a 2-percent Makers' salaries are being increStad. "You
have provided themselves with adequate income tax; Democrats a 2-percent sates tax. wget better legislators crease by pay-
tools. A legislator's basic salary is just It was stipulated. that poor families who paid won't
more money," says one lifm elong by pan-
$6,000, but the State provides fringe benefits sales taxes on such essentials as food could g government, "but you won't get
(among them: an automobile, oil- and tele- apply for refunds on the State's income tax. of
better State tegigovern unless you do."
phone-company credit cards) which, in ef- All of this was highly unorthodox For a Gradually most legislatures are beginning
fect, double that amount. Furthermore, while license plates blossomed with the un- the Importance ce of sresearch.
each legislator has a private office and at least official legend. "Land of Taxes," and several realize
ome are the ortan o sound a d resatrc legi one assistant----not only in Sacramento but legislators who voted for the plan were de- S S men e taking advantage by the tive-
also in his home district. feated in the. 1964 electrons. But Vic plan exist-
staffs.oundation; And many others are legislatures strengthening enen are even
professional more significant is the amount of has worked. Over the past 24 months the Foundation;
professional help lawmakers receive. Each. State of Indiana has not only veered away gin ateAdn egu buare even
the Assembly':; 23 committees, for example, from bankruptcy; it has also impr~?Ved its paying attention t interest and those old b gabs lobbying -
of control of .
has a staff director and a secretary; some services substantially. York, for example, strengthened its code
committees hove a dozen employees. in ad- In 31 States last year legislators mustered New ethics last session. And in Nebraska,
dition, there is It "floating" central staff of sufficient courage to increase existing taxes. where lobbying esioi. were likened ka
men and women who can be loaned out as Additional increases a.re expected this spring. tartly "a semaphore operation on the
the need arises. To answer general questions, 'T'here is, however, a practical and political to lawmakers :re opra a measure
assemblymen call on a six-man reference bu- ceiling on the amount of money thy.' States etly oad, that approved
can be fined one
reau. To drat bills and get legal opinions, can collect by themselves. Realizing this, prilror into jail for 6 sts can if fined arid
they rely on a legislative council of 20 at- most Governors and legislators have been th own ntempt of the legislature.
torneys. And when they want to examine pinning their hopes on Federal ac+'eptance
mendable. Ym improvements, any of ob corveurse, are e com-
such matters as the Governor's budget re- of a modified Heller plan. Such
corn-onde quests, they turn to a separate staff of 16 Before Dr. Walter Heller resigned a., Chair- Yet too few en ers wo and
lisc:il analysts, man of the President's Council on Economic whether tthey're not
corning. The trend of the times
"We have had to develop these tools," says Advisers, he proposed a plan whereby the too late be omin g he ethe Stales. times
Assembly Speaker Jesse M. Unruh, "so we Federal Government would return a fixed seems bagainst increasingly the States.
State boundaries aeotion Nation becomes
will become even less mobile,
wouldn't be conned all the time either by portion of income-tax funds to the States. the
the executive branch or by the special-inter- 'The States could use this money in almost S Federal will programs proliferate,
groups." Unruh himself has played a any way they saw fit. As Heller envisioned Sta e State programs wshrivel. As they expect
major role in that development. Once, asked it, the plan would not only reduce a worri- less and less from will i State government, s they expect
why California had such a progressive legis- some Federal surplus; it would also prompt even lass it. r-Citi lature, he replied, "Me." It was hardly an the States to become more active partners leans zee lo will leshow ss yalties will ocus in instead terd on Washing-
overstatemen C. in the federal system. ten, o D.C. aAnd if the States are deprived o-
IsasicallyUnruh is a pragmatist. Over and Organized labor howled. So did tyre liberal these loyalties, they will cease to function as
over again, in a somber, bullfrog voice, he wing or the Democratic Party. If the States nireiterates his favorite theme: A legislature are handed gift packages from Washington, meaningful States units today," of government.
e Pennsylvania
eRoy Irvis, ",are under Pennsylvania
cannot be the expressive arm of government their argument ran, the States would simply "The S
until it is independent. And it cannot be lower taxes and forget about improving serv- Representative that a the
are sort of evolutionary they don't pressure shape up,
independent until it is adequately paid, ices. In addition, they claimed, the Heller same sort
housed, and staffed. He suggests further that plan would deflate the current pressure on eaten up," government could profit greatly by the States to modernize their own archaic they'll get p'
emulating the `result' orientation of prl- tax structures. President Johnson seemed Can the States, somehow, shape up? Can
vote enterprise." And he envisions a corn- impressed with such reasoning. And he they recapture the loyalty of their constit-
ing crag of "it new politics that, is riot re- seemed piqued, too, by what he considered uents, retain their role as active partners in
stricted by conventional wisdom or ideologi- to be a premature disclosure of the plan in the Federal system and stem the tide of
cal rigidity. if we cannot generate thinking the New York 'Times. So nothing was done sweeping centralization?
in. State government," he adds, "then we about It. The only way in which the States can
cannot survive." Last October, New York's Senat,+r JACOB erect a barrier against the extension of en-
Calilornia is not the sole repository of JAV[TS introduced a modified version of the tional power, a distinguished American once
political virtue in the United States, nor is plan in Congress. JAVrrs' proposal would wrote, is for the States to strength'.sn their
its virtue uniform. Like other State govern- establish a trust fund of about $2.0 billion. governments. * * ? "As this cannot be done
ments, California's is ever threatened by Eighty percent of this money would be dis- by any change in the Federal Constitar-
human fallibility and often thwarted as it tributed on the basis of population: the re- tion * * ? it must be done by the States
gropes toward a future of awesome complex- mainhrg 20 percent would be divided among themselves."
ity. Yet in Its demonstrated willingness to the States with the lowest per capita in- The author was Thomas Jefferson.
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 Fefrr ry 16, 194pproved As ??IMXT6 &~bRDg~ 6R000400020001-5 2987
Reluctantly, President Truman resorted to
allocations of some materials and to price
and wage controls. But he never exacted a
no-strike pledge from labor. He couldn't re-
press inflation.
The psychological acceptance of war was
never all pervasive. Business continued
partially as usual. The United States had
plenty of butter while producing guns and
sending men overseas.
Nevertheless, Korea changed the American
stance. It underlined that the "ramparts
we watch" are worldwide and demand in-
stant and permanent readiness. Thus the
Vietnam effort has been pretty much in-
gested by a national defense establishment
in being. At the same time the economic
pie-the capacity to meet war demands-
has grown.
Today, military purchases amount to less
than 10 percent of the gross national prod-
uct and the Vietnam share of that is about
one-fifth. Thus, in relation to the total
economy-the aggregate production of goods
and services-Vietnam absorbs about 2 per-
cent.
Yet this 2 percent is an add-on. It re-
inforces prosperity, creates jobs, drains off
manpower into the armed services and, in
general, crowds an economy not too rich in
leeway.
Will it generate inflation?
Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler
thinks not. "Vast quantities of new indus-
trial capacity will be coming on stream," he
says enlarging the capability of the country
to cope with expanding demand.
That is why President Johnson puts off
asking Congress for a major tax boost which
would cut down purchasing power. He'd
prefer self-imposed restraint by labor and
management on wages and prices to curb
inflation.
Why permit a very small war-a 2-percent
war-to reshape the Great Society? Should
a sore tail wag a huge dog?
RENT SUPPLEMENTS
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, since
Congress adjourned last fall, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development
has studied carefully all aspects of the
rent supplement program and has devel-
oped plans for its administration.
This program marks an entirely new
step in providing decent housing for poor
people-at rents they can afford to pay.
It is designed to enlist the support and
energies of private enterprise-and, I
might add, the program has been given
enthusiastic support by builders, realtors,
lenders, private nonprofit organizations,
and other private groups.
Public housing and other housing pro-
grams have accomplished much to im-
prove housing conditions in the United
States. But there are still far too many
poor families and elderly persons with
low incomes who are living in substand-
ard housing. This is the group the rent
supplement program will serve.
Recently the Department of Hotysing
and Urban Development released income
limits for a number of cities which will
govern eligibility for rent supplements.
The Department has leaned over back-
ward to comply with the wishes ex-
pressed-by the Congress at the last ses-
sion.
The income ceilings are the same as
public housing admission ceilings in
those communities having public hous-
ing authorities. In New York City, the
rent supplement ceilings are lower than
public housing admission limits for f am-
ilies having five or more persons. In
localities where there is no public hous-
ing, rent supplement income limits will
be established at the same level which
would have existed if there were a pub-
lic housing program, based on available
rental information and the income limits
for public housing in a nearby commu-
nity having comparable cost levels.
Similarly, rules have been formulated
to limit assets, so that persons or fam-
ilies with savings or other assets of more
than $2,000 will be not be eligible for
for rent supplements, except in the case
of the elderly, where $5,000 will be
permitted.
Mortgage limits and maximum rent
limits will assure that rent supplement
housing will be of modest design without
luxury features. The objective will be
to provide sound and sanitary housing
suitable to the needs of low-income
people.
I understand that many organizations
and other potential sponsors have ex-
pressed interest to FHA in the form of
letters and other data.
These represent a total of 424 projects
and 69,750 dwelling units. Private lim-
ited dividend sponsors account for 53
percent of the proposed dwelling units,
which underlines my earlier statement
that the rent supplement program is en-
listing private enterprise to help solve
the housing problems of the poor.
These projects are widely scattered in
practically every state, and I am sure as
the program gets underway, every state
will have its share of projects.
President Johnson described the rent
supplement program as "the most cru-
cial new instrument in our effort to im-
prove the American city."
The widespread interest which has
been expressed since the program was
enacted into law last August, even
though no funds have yet been appro-
priated, underlines the accuracy and
significance of the President's statement.
THE DEATH OF DR. J. ELLIOTT
SCARBOROUGH, JR.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, at
Emory University Hospital in Atlanta,
Ga., late last month, there died one of the
great men of the medical profession, a
man whose death will leave a void of
massive proportions in the bridge of
knowledge which will eventually lead to
the conquest of cancer. Ironically, can-
cer is what killed R. J. Elliott Scarbor-
ough, Jr., who, at 59, was acknowledged
as one of the Nation's outstanding spe-
cialists in that disease.
Mrs. Simpson and I have had a long
and enduring friendship with Elliott
Scarborough. Like hundreds of others
throughout the Nation, we were shocked
that he could be taken at so young an age
by the disease that he had given his crea-
tive energy to conquer.
As the Atlanta Constitution expressed
it so eloquently in an editorial February
1:
He was the one who gave back life to so
many who were dying, or who walked gently
as a father with those he could not save and,
out of his unbounded strength, gave them
composure.
No man's passing, in the medical profes-
sion of this State and region, will be more
deeply mourned.
Mr. President, the death of Dr. Scar-
borough deprives the Nation of a great
mind, a great conscience, and a great hu-
manitarian. He was truly a national fig-
ure whose passing is felt in and out of the
medical profession. I ask, Mr. President,
that various obituaries and editorials
pertaining to Dr. Scarborough be printed
in the RECORD with my remarks.
There being no objection, the ma-
terial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[From the Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 1, 19661
DR. J. If. SCARBOROUGH, DIES; LED FIGHT
AGAINST CANCER
Dr. J. Elliott Scarborough, Jr., 59, one of
the Nation's outstanding cancer specialists,
died Monday afternoon in Emory University
Hospital. He succumbed to the disease he
spent a medical lifetime fighting.
Since coming here in 1937 to direct the
Robert Winship Memorial Clinic, Dr. Scar-
borough had been a leader in developing
Emory's Medical Center and in expanding
Emory University Clinic, of which he became
director in 1957.
He held a Rockefeller Clinic Fellowship at
Memorial Hospital in New York where he
was invited here to head up the tumor clinic
being established in the Robert Winship
Memorial Clinic, one of the first for diagnosis
and treatment of cancer in this area. Under
Dr. Scarborough's guidance it became nation-
ally known.
He believed an expanding teaching program
should be an integral part of the treatment
of private patients at the clinic, and that
the clinic could grow in service by acting as a
training center for physicians. Scores of as-
sociates who once, worked under Dr. Scar-
borough's direction are now practicing in
many other areas.
His continuing interest and influence in
the clinical handling of patients referred by
other doctors helped in expanding his con-
cept and philosophy to other areas of
medicine.
In addition to his original assignment as
director of the Robert Winship Clinic, Dr.
Scarborough held teaching positions in the
Emory Medical School, beginning as instruc-
tor in surgery in 1937 and rising to professor
of surgery in 1957. In the same year he be-
came director of Emory University Clinic and
director of professional services in Emory
University Hospital.
Dr. Scarborough did much to enable the
general public to understand cancer, for he
had the gift to speak in terms understand-
able to laymen.
In 1949 he was appointed to the National
Advisory Cancer Council, the Government's
top policymaking scientific group in cancer
research. In 1955 he was named to the na-
tional board of directors of the American
Cancer Society and reelected in 1959. He
also served as a member of the cancer com-
mittee of the American College of Surgeons.
In 1956 Dr. Scarborough was chosen presi-
dent of the James Ewing Society, composed of
doctors prominent in treatment and research
of cancer and other neoplastic diseases. In
the same year he received the American
Cancer Society's Award for Distinguished
Service in Cancer Control. He had served as
chairman of the executive committee of the
Georgia Division since 1952.
In 1960 he was appointed a member of the
Cancer Research Training Committee of the
National Cancer Institute and served until
1964.
Dr. Scarborough was a diplomats of the
American College of Surgeons, and the Amer-
ican Board of Surgery. In addition, he was
a member of the American Medical Associa-
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February j-(;,
rS' G~i
Lion, the Medical Association of Georgia, and
the Fulton County Medical Society.
Born July 26, 1906, in Mount Willing, Ala.,
he received his A.B. degree at the University
of Alabama in 1926 and his M.D. degree at
I3arvard Medical School in 1932. He served
a surgical internship at Roosevelt Hospital in
New York, then continued his training at
Memorial Hospital before coming here.
Ile was an elder in the First Presbyterian
Church. He served as a director of the Great
Southern Real Estate Trust.
lle was a member of the Piedmont Driving
Club, Capital City Club, and Kappa Alpha
fraternity. Emory students recently chose
him as an honorary member of ODK leader-
ship fraternity,
1)r. and Mrs. Scarborough, the former Isa-
belle Wisell, of Middlebury, Vt., were married
in 1935. I'hey lived at 100 Westminster Drive
NE. Their two daughters are Mrs. Nancy
Cottraux, of Atlanta, and Mrs. Joseph H.
Long, of Dallas, Tex. Their son, Elliott III,
is a college student and another son, Evans
II., attends Darlington in Rome. He is a:so
survived by his mother, Mrs. Mattie Hinson
Scarborough, and six grandchildren.
The family request that in lieu of flowers
donations be made to the Robert Winship
Memorial Clinic Patient Care Fund of Emory
[niversity.
l From ?he Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 1.
1966]
i?LSOTT SCARBOROUGH, M.D.
It does not seem quite possible that Dr.
Fliott Scarborough is gone.
Ile was the one who gave back life to so
many who were dying, or who walked gently
a ; a father with those he could not save and,
out of his unbounded strength, gave them
composure.
No man :s passing, in the medical profes-
Si,an of this State and region, will be mere
deeply mourned.
itor his field was cancer, and all who came
to him asked him for miracles. He headed
the Emory University Cancer Clinic and its
distinguished reputation in American medi-
cine brought to him the highest professional
esteem. Yet to the patient who entered his
dcx,r-anti h:s door was ever open--he was a
warm friend, steadying counselor, calming
voice, and knowing hand. No suffering hu-
man being was too humble, no frigthened
person ever too weak, to be outside his un-
derstandirrg, his concern, and his ready help.
To those who studied under him, the
hippocratic oath took deeper meaning from
Ins example-"I will impart this art by
precept, by lecture,, and by every mode of
Leaching." And so did the oath take un-
forgettable meaning for those patients the
Li :ca,te,d-"Whatsoever house I enter, there
will I go for the benefit of the sick."
be entered innumerable houses, where se
will not be forgotten.
For Elrott Scarborough was more than a
brilliant doctor who advanced the art of
medicine.
rte was a gaol man.
IFrom list Atlanta Journal, Feb. 1. H,661
K)r,. SCARBOROUGH
In the death by cancer of Dr. J. Elic.tt
Scarborough. Jr., Atlanta lost one of her first
citizens. The world lost a man long in the
forefront of the battle against cancer.
Iir. Scarborough was a national leader in
cancer research and education. He was a
pioneer in the field of diagnosis and treat-
nient, and for many years was with Emory
University Hospital and Medical School.
Ills work brought cures and comfort to
many, but, it was his fate to die of that
watch he fought.
its contributed greatly to the search Into
the causes of cancer and its cures, and this
THE COLD WAR GI BILL
:Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, the passage of the cold war GI
bill of rights is a major public service to
the Nation. The benefits to our service-
men, to our universities, to the Nation
as a whole will. be felt for marry years.
For this achievement the primary
credit must go to the senior Senator
from Texas. The Senator from Texas
has carried the burden of this fight for
7 years. Throughout that time he has
sought to educate the Congress, the exec-
utive branch and the public on the need
for this bill and the benefit;, to be ex-
pected from it. His wide knowledge of
education, his perseverance, above all his
dedication to Justice for thos,~ who have
guarded freedom's gate around the
world-these things have been indispen-
sable to the passage of this bill.
It has been a pleasure and a privilege
to have worked with him on it during my
short time in the Senate: it is an honor
to vote with him for its passa'e..
THE BOXCAR SHORTAGE
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, the
boxcar shortage, originally just a sea-
sonal matter, has become a yearlong
problem of serious proportions. In re-
cent weeks there have been an increas-
ing number of alarming ref:: its about
this shortage.
On January 27 I joined wi? h 17 other
Senators in urging the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to take strong steps
and to utilize to the fullest its existing
authority to alleviate this shortage.
I would like to call our letter, and
Chairman Bush's reply, to the attention
of the Senate. I respectfully ask unani-
mous consent that the text of these let-
ters be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
U.S. SENA'.' OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY 1.i:ADE:R,
1174shington, D.C., Janita.y 27, 1966.
JOHN W. BusH,
Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission,
Washington, D.C.
r USSR MR. CHAIRMAN: In recent weeks, there
has been an increased number of ;.)arming re-
ports about the shortage of boxes s. In years
past, this situation has been limited gener-
ally to the harvest season. However, it has
now become apparent that this is a year-
round problem. Reports indictl:e that de-
mands for boxcars are being met only 50 per-
cent of the time. Several of the major rail-
roads have only 60 to 65 percent f their own
boxcars operating on their lines
There are two distinct problems in this
situation which call for immediate attention.
First of all, the railroads are nit replacing
boxcars in kind as they are taken out of
service. Also, there is too much delay in the
expeditious return of boxcars ti, their own
lines. In this latter instance, orders from
INTERSTATE COMMERCE CONMMI :-r()N,
Washington, D.C., Fcbraro;ii 4, loci
Hon. LEE METCALF,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR METCALF: I want to give y)ll
an in-depth reply to your recent letter re-
flecting your deep concern over the boxcar
shortage, rather than a perfunctory "were
doing the best we can" type of reply. I have
therefore had our director, Mr. I'fahler. acrd
his staff combine the information they have
available with a considerable amount of addi-
tional information the Association of Am; r-
ican Railroads very helpfully assembled for
us. This report to you is submitted in the
form of two enclosures.
Sincerely,
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is a search which some day will be success-
ful.
The day of discovery will come. It win
be a day of thanksgiving for the human race.
It will be a day of thanks to Dr. Scarborough
and those like him,. who labored so long in
humanity's behalf, and whose p,itient labors
finally bore fruit.
the Federal Government have been of little
value because they are immediately tested in
the courts, thus involving time-consuming
delay.
In addition to these two difficulties, an-
other situation has arisen which will corn-
plicate matters even more. The Commodity
Credit Corporation has now ordered the re-
location of some 85 million bushels of wheat
and corn. This movement of grains from the
farms to the elevators and to seaports will
place heavy burdens on the railroads in the
Middle West and West. This country's ef-
forts to expand overseas shipment of agricul-
ture commodities will continue to aggravate
the situation.
We knew that car service is but it small
part of the activities under the jurisdiction
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, but
we want to stress the importance of this
work and ask that each member of the Com-
mission give the problem every considera-
tion. Therefore, we suggest that a greater
effort be made to facilitate utilization of
existing boxcars. More car-service person-
nel are needed to work at railroad terminals
in an effort to keep the cars moving. Re-
ports reaching us indicate that these person-
nel are decreasing in number and that their
efforts are being diverted into other areas
at is time when their services are needed at
the terminals.
We ask that the Commission initiate con-
tacts with the individual railroads discussing
the need for purchasing additional boxcars
and other equipment for the hauling of
grain. We recognize that the railroads :ire
making many improvements in their equip-
ment, but there does not appear to be a suffi-
cient stress on the need for replacing and
increasing the number of the common, or-
dinary variety of boxcar.
The boxcar shortage, originally a seasonal
matter, now a 12-month problem can easily
develop into a traffic situation of morn-
mental proportions. Movement of products
by surface transportation to point:; of export
is continually expanding. If we are to avoid
the congestion now indicated, we will line
to act now. In addition to S. 1098 c,nd S.
2816, now being actively considered by the
Congress, we feel the Commission must take
some initiative and utilize to the fullest
existing authority. This is of grave concern
to our constituents and to us as their repre-
sentatives. We demand prompt action, now.
With best wishes, we are,
Sincerely,
MIKE MANSFIELD, WARREN G. I1TAGNu SCAN,
MAURINE NEUBERGER, GALE W. MCCi mu.
QUENTIN BURDICK, MILTON R. YOUNG,
LEN B. JORDAN, WALTER F. MONDA:.E,
GEORGE MURPHY, LEE METCALF', HENRY
M. JACKSON, GEORGE MCGOVEI.N,
THOMAS H. KUCHEL, MILWARD L. SINiP-
SON, KARL E. MUNDT, WAYNE MOR'se,
FRANK CHURCH, EUGENE J. MCCAR'TF:Y.
JOHN W. Ih'ssI,
Cbttirrn.un.
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February 16, Y CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 2999
standards to be established by the
Secretary."
No section of this act received more
exhaustive attention by the Committee
on Public Works. After 4 days of hear-
ings on the bill and 3 days in executive
session, the committee reported an
amended bill which required that the
unzoned areas would be determined "in
accordance with provisions established
by the legislatures of the several States,
which shall be consistent with the pur-
poses of this section."
The last proviso of the amendment
was accepted in committee on my mo-
tion, and I believe then, as -I believe now,
that it would have given the Secretary
of Commerce quite adequate authority
to implement the act.
As the committee report stated:
The committee has given long and deliber-
ate consideration to this subsection. * *
The basic postulate of this provision is that
outdoor advertising is an integral part of the
business and marketing function and an
established segment of the national econ-
omy; as a legitimate business, it should
therefore be allowed to operate where other
industrial and commercial activities are
conducted.
The report continued with the obser-
vation:
The committee notes the qualifying clause
quoted above "which shall be consistent with
the purpose of this section." The purpose
of this act is to preserve and develop the
recreational and esthetic values of the inter-
state and primary highway systems * * *.
The committee is of the opinion that subsec-
tions (b) and (c) provide the Secretary with
adequate authority to enforce compliance
with the purpose of the act.
However, the argument was later ad-
vanced by officials of the administration,
shortly before S. 2084 was brought to the
Senate floor, that in the process of clos-
ing off many areas -heretofore occupied
by outdoor advertising, the act would
tend to enhance the value of the remain-
ing sites in industrial and commercial
areas. Therefore, in order to prevent
consequent clutter in these areas, the
administration requested an amendment
which would authorize limited controls
in commercial and industrial areas,
whether zoned or unzoned.
On September 15, 1965, the floor man-
ager of the bill in the Senate [Mr.
RANDOLPH] proposed the first of the ad-
ministration amendments addressed to
this issue. As a substitute for the com-
mittee language, the amendment read
as follows:
(e) Notwithstanding any provision of this
section, signs, displays, and devices conform-
ing to criteria determined by the States sub-
ject to concurrence by the Secretary concern-
ing the lighting, size, number of signs, and
such other requirements as may be appro-
priate, may be erected and maintained
within six hundred and sixty feet of the
nearest edge of the right-of-way within
areas adjacent to the interstate and primary
systems which are zoned industrial or com-
mercial under authority of State law, or
which are not zoned under authority of
State law but are used for industrial or
commercial activities, which unzoned areas
are determined by the several States subject
to the approval of the Secretary.
After rather lengthy debate and con-
siderable opposition, the senior Senator
from West Virgina requested unanimous
consent temporarily to withdraw the nation of unzoned areas to be "deter-
amendment, which act was later made a mined by agreement between the several
permanent withdrawal. States and the Secretary."
the Senate floor manager received a copy
of a letter from Secretary of Commerce,
John T. Connor, to Representative JOHN
C. KLuczyNSKI, chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Public Roads, explain-
ing the purpose of the proposed amend-
ment. The Secretary stated, in part:
In order to prevent an unchecked prolif-
eration which not only results in a public
eyesore but undoubtedly impedes the effec-
tiveness of billboard advertising, reasonable
standards pertaining to size, spacing, and
number of billboards would be devel-
oped. * * *
It is the intention of the administration
that the regulations, insofar as they are
consistent with the purposes of this act,
shall be helpful to the advertising industry
and that, for instance, standards of size
which may be adopted would be insofar as
possible consistent with standard size bill-
boards in customary use.
Viewed in the context of the events at
that time, Mr. President it is quite evi-
dent that the Senate had no intention
of giving authority to the Secretary of
Commerce to outlaw outdoor advertising
in industrial and commercial areas,
whether zoned or unzoned. In his letter
to Representative KLUCZYNSKI, Secretary
Connor made it equally evident that he
desired no such authority and that the
proposed amendment would not be so
interpreted by him. With this under-
standing in mind, the manager of the bill
in the Senate, the Senator from West
Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] introduced on
September 16 a modified version of the
amendment which he had withdrawn on
the preceding day. The substitute
amendment, which was passed by the
Senate with a vote of 44 to 40, read as
follows:
(e) In order to promote the reasonable,
orderly and effective display of outdoor ad-
vertising while remaining consistent with the
purposes of this section, signs, displays and
devices whose size, lighting and spacing is to
be determined by agreement between the sev-
eral States and the Secretary, may be erected
and maintained within six hundred and sixty
feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way
within areas adjacent to the interstate and
primary systems which are zoned industrial
or commercial under authority of State law,
or in unzoned commercial or industrial areas
as may be determined by agreement between
the several States and the Secretary: Pro-
vided, That nothing in this subsection shall
apply to signs as defined in section 101(c) (2).
Mr. President, there are three signifi-
cant differences between the amendment
finally adopted by the Senate and the
earlier one which was withdrawn. And
each of these changes is important in
terms of the congressional intent of the
Highway Beautification Act of 1965 with
respect to the recently announced
"guidelines." First, the declaration of
purpose in the amendment acknowledged
the legitimacy of outdoor advertising as
a business enterprise in industrial and
commercial areas. Second, it deleted the
catchall phrase, "and such other require-
ments as may be appropriate," and
limited control criteria to "size, lighting,
and spacing." And, third, it required
both the control criteria and the desig-
I would add that this subsection was
further amended by the House of Repre-
sentatives, in which action the Senate
concurred, to provide that the criteria of
size, lighting, and spacing would be con-
sistent with customary use. In present-
ing the House bill to the Senate for final
action, the senior Senator from West
Virginia stated:
Any regulations or criteria with respect to
size, spacing, and lighting of outdoor adver-
tising signs should, insofar as possible, be
consistent with customary use in the indus-
try. Therefore, I cannot perceive any valid
objection to this particular language in the
House-approved bill.
Thus, Mr. President, it is apparent
from this brief summary of the genesis
of subsection (d) of title I of Public Law
89-285, that both bodies of the Congress
were quite deliberate in their aim to
acknowledge the right of outdoor adver-
tising to operate in commercial or indus-
trial areas. That is not to imply that
the industry should operate free of any
controls. But, as the Secretary of Com-
merce indicated, and as the Congress
affirmed, the purpose of controls would
be primarily to prevent undue prolifera-
tion of signs in commercial and indus-
trial areas and to provide for any orderly
development of the industry. This is a
purpose supported by a majority of the
Senate, including the Senator from West
Virginia and myself.
I shall not comment on the specifics
of the proposed guidelines for outdoor
advertising. The senior Senator from
West Virginia made sufficient observa-
tions on this point in his comments on
February 4. However, it does seem to me
that the proposals of the Department of
Commerce are at variance with the leg-
islative intent that I have summarized.
For these reasons, the Secretary may
wish to consider the advisability of is-
suing a clarifying statement before in-
stituting the hearings in the several
States. ~44 l
A DISPATCH FROM VIETNAM PUB-
LISHED IN THE HONOLULU AD-
VERTISER
Mr. INOUYE. The Honolulu Adver-
tiser is perhaps the only metropolitan
newspaper in the 50,000 to 100,000 cir-
culation class with 2 full-time staff
reporters covering the battlefronts in
Vietnam-Bob Jones, chief of the Adver-
tiser's Vietnam bureau, and Bob Krause.
Both of these men are frontline com-
bat correspondents in the best Ernie Pyle
tradition. On February 9, the U.S. mili-
tary headquarters in Saigon reported
that Bob Jones was wounded by mortar
fragments during an operation against
Vietcong forces. The 30-year-old re-
porter suffered wounds in one leg, his
back, and both hands. S. Sgt. Robert S.
Andrade, 33, of Waimanalo, Hawaii, the
patrol leader, was killed in the same ac-
tion, as were several other members of
the patrol. Despite his wounds, Bob
Jones was able to get off a final story
to his newspaper. I respectfully request
that his account be printed in the RECORD.
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There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
I WAS BLEEDING, HE WAS DEAD
(By Bob Jones)
Cu CHI, V wrNAM.-The story wasn't sup-
POSe to end that way.
It was going to be a story of 2d Brigade
men who lived while others were dying, or
being shipped off to the hospital with the
wounded.
The patrol was almost over, and I was
writing the story in my mind. It was going
to be in the form of a letter to Sgt. Boyd
Andrade, of the Honolulu Police Department,
and Lt. Sonny Andrade, of the Kailua Fire
Department, and to Mrs. Robert S. Andrade,
of Waim.analo, and her five kids.
"Army S. Sgt. Robert S. Andrade," the story
was going in my mind, "looks to me like the
kind of GI who has a sixth sense amid the
confusion of battle to keep himself and his
men alive."
Andrade, a former lolani school football
player, was a squad leader with C Company
of the 1st Battalion, Wolfhounds. Between
C and A Companies, there had been more
than 50 casualties in 3 days of trying to flush
the Vietcong out of a jungle enclave they call
Taro Village.
I teamed up with Andrade's squad to do
a profile piece on him.
He had the reputation of being one of the
best in the business over here.
A few days earlier, three of his men had
been hit by a grenade, but he rallied his
squad and took the sniper bunker. Another
of his men froze on the ground in fear, and
Andrade had dragged the Ivan 100 yards
using an ammo sling wrapped around the
man's arm.
"Sure, I get scared," he told me out there
in the jungle, "but mostly when we are
pinned down by snipers and can't see who's
-.shooting at us."
I had taken about 1.5 pictures of him that
(lay (Thursday) and he had pulled out his
wallet and showed me pictures of his wife,
and two of his kids under a Christmas tree
in his two-story Walmanalo home.
Well, that's the way the story should have
gone. As I said, the patrol was almost over.
It was 2 p.m.
We were sitting waiting for the order to
make the final push.
Andrade had just given me a can of fruit
cocktail from his C-rations, and I was making
notes on how his squad had been better than.
00 percent of the units I have been with.
Then there was a dull but overpowering;
explosion. E'or a few seconds I lost my sight
and hearing. But there was the familiar
smell of powder choking out the rest of the
air.
I was on the ground, and bleeding from
the hand, back, and leg.
I crawled over to a young Army movie
photographer from Fort Shatter, Hawaii. Ilse
was dead. His camera lay in the settling dirt.
Andrade, who had been sitting there with
his knee touching mine, was on his back,
and although I know nothing about medi--
cin.e, I had the feeling there was nothing I
could do for him.
If you have never heard the moans and
the "Oh Gads" that come from the lips of
the men who are dying, consider yourself
lucky. You would never erase it from your
mind.
'].'here was a youngster who had both his
legs blown. off. Another lay with his body
ripped open and moaned, "Oh, my God, I'.mm
dying, I'm dying."
'bhere weren't enough medics or bandages
to go around.
A lieutenant who was the mortar forward
observer came up and said it apparently was
a short round from our own 2d Brigade that
hit us. (The 25th Division public informa-
tion office at Schofield yesterday said that
the lieutenant was wrong and that Sergeant
Andrade wag killed "by hostile small-arms
fire." The PIO said that the round of mortar
fire may have been American made, but that
it definitely was fired by the Vietcong.)
They covered up four bodies with rubber
ponchoes there in the jungle. Those still
alive crawled, or were dragged to a clearing.
A medical evacuation helicopter and ar-
mored personnel carriers came in to get us
out.
The doctors In Saigon said I took seven
pieces of shrapnel in the back and legs, and
one fragment had fractured a finger.
I consider myself the luckiest guy on earth.
Just before I went into the operating room,
they told me Sergeant Andrade had died on
his way to the hospital.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FOOD-FOR-
FREEDOM PROGRAM
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Preside nt, I be-
lieve that President Johnson's recent call
for a 5-year war on world hunger can be-
come the most important single initia-
tive of his administration.
The President has previously chal-
lenged us to eradicate poverty in our
own society. Now he calls upon Amer-
icans to join with the people of other
countries to eradicate the most serious
enemy of mankind--human hunger.
An excellent summary of the Presi-
dent's challenge was carried by the
Farmers Union Grain Terminal Associa-
tion radio broadcast on Friday, February
11. M. W. Thatcher, general manager of
GTA, has long been in the forefront of
efforts to make greater use abroad of our
agricultural abundance and know-how.
Mr. Thatcher believes that the adminis-
tration has "come up with the one thing
that can lead the world along the short-
est road to peace-food to feed the
hungry."
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the text of the GTA broadcast
referred to be printed at this point in
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
There being no objection, the text of
the broadcast was ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
GTA DAILY RADIO RouNnns
As you know by now, President Johnson
has asked Congress to approve an American
5-year world war on hunger. Congress may
give the President all that he ask_,--or more
-or less.
This is clear: The United State;. of Amer-
ica will offer its open hand bearing bread
to help the young nations and the troubled
nations of the world conquer hunger. Long
years of effort by dedicated national leaders
In this country are bearing fruit. This is
what Senator McGovERN has sought and
Vice President HUMPIiREY and Senator
MONDALE, just to name some of the origin-
ators and strongest advocates of food for
peace. On the farm front your own M. W.
Thatcher, general manager of GTA, is one
of the great leaders of the policy of abun-
dance for peace from. the good earth. Food
for freedom, a program begun by Mr. That-
cher in the fall of 1942, was the first of
its kind.
Arid today Mr. Thatcher said: "This is a
great program, a truly magnificent contri-
bution to peace and prosperity. I know our
farmers will answer the challenge to produce
more food. I know that the President and
Mr. HUMPHREY and our other top officials in
Washington are troubled by many immense
problems in the world today, but here they
have come up with the one thing that can
lead the world along the shortest road to
peace-food to feed the hungry."
Now, just what does the President's war
on hunger program include?
First, he called for more food production
by U.S. farmers-not all-out production,
but a regulated increase. Already programs
for 1966 have been adjusted to get more
wheat, soybeans, rice, and malting barley.
Second, it looks like the Nation will final-
ly get a stabilized food reserve.
Third, food aid will not be limited to
merely surplus products. Commodity Credit
Corporation would be authorized to buy
what is needled in the open market.
Fourth, the nations that receive food aid
would also be helped to increase their own
food production. They will be aided and
urged to help themselves.
Fifth, voluntary relief agencies, churches,
and charities will continue to receive farm
products for their programs.
The President said that he wants this
Nation to return to production as many re-
serve acres as may be needed in the critical
race between food and people, "but not to
produce unwanted surpluses and not to sup-
plant the efforts of other nations to develop
their own agricultural economies."
Well, that's a short and fast summary of
a big program, but it is the essence of what
President Johnson recommended to Con-
gress.
At the same time that President Johnson
made his announcement, USDA made its
move to get more soybean production.
Farmers will. be able this year to plant all
of their feed. grain base to soybeans if they
so desire, but must maintain their conserv-
ing base and minimum diversion of 20 per-
cent. For example, the corn farmer who
signs up and elects to substitute soybeans
for corn will still get the loan plus pay-
ment (30 cents a bushel) on projected corr,
yield on one-half of his base, even though.
he grows beans instead of corn.
These changes are coming almost too fast:
to keep up with, so once again sharpen your
pencils, figure the best program for your
farm, and be sure you check out with your
county ASCS office.
UPI REPORT SHOWS U.S. AID FAILS
TO REACH MOST PEASANTS
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President last
Thursday I spoke at length on the floo,'
of the Senate in support of a stepped-up
program of school and farm aid and land
reform for South Vietnam.
I contended that the facts show elo-
quently that we are talking a good fight
in this regard but that we are doing
pathetically little. I also contended that
if we are to win our way to peaceful ne-
gotiations that will permit an independ-
ent decision by the people of South Viet-
nam that we must do more--far more.
Recently Michael Malloy, writing from
Saigon for the United Press Interna-
tional, documented the point I made last
Thursday in an excellent article that ap-
peared in the Milwaukee Journal. I as'i
unanimous consent that this article be
printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
U.S. AID FAILS To REACH MOST PEASANTS IN
VIETNAM
(By Michael T. Malloy)
SAIGON, VIETNAM.-The American aid pre-
gram to South Vietnam is the biggest and
most expensive in the world. But there .s
little evidence to show that this has done
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February.. 16, 1P6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
much to win the peasantry away from the
Vietcong.
There is much to be proud of in the Amer-
ican efforts. And politicians from both
America and South Vietnam have insisted
for years that the war for the hearts and
minds of the people is just as important as
the war to kill Vietcong.
This was reaffirmed again in the Declara-
tion of Honolulu, just adopted by President
Johnson and the military rulers of South
Vietnam.
But compared to the mountain of re-
sources applied to killing the Vietcong, only
a molehill of men and money goes into the
silent war for the hearts and minds of the
peasants.
THREE MILLION PIGS GROWING
And the resources of doctors, schoolrooms,
and fatter pigs are barely enough to keep
the Vietnamese standard of living from go-
ing backward under the pressures of an ex-
panding war.
Carl Van Haeften, of Santa Cruz, Calif., is
proud of the fact that about 3 million York-
shire pigs are growing fat on Vietnamese
farms, thanks to the aid mission's agricul-
ture division, which he heads.
But the fat, new pigs cannot get to mar-
ket over the mined roads and blasted
bridges, so South Vietnam is importing ship-
loads of pigs for the first time in many years.
There is a sad repetition of these para-
doxes in other fields.
Carl Winer, of Albion, N.Y., is proud of the
schools he builds and the teachers he trains
as the head of the aid mission's education
division. But sometimes the war destroys
as Winer builds.
The worst example was the year of 1963,
when the aid mission built 1,320 classrooms
and trained 1,260 teachers. The education
ministry checked the next year and found it
had fewer schools and teachers than it did
in 1963.
The United States and its allies have sent
teams of skilled surgeons into provinces
where most of the peasants have never seen
a doctor before. But surgeons like Dr.
George Love, of Ogden, Utah, reports that up
to 90 percent of their patients are victims of
land mines, hand grenades, mortars, and
bombs.
Dr. Lowe's experience is a miniature of the
problem which faces the whole aid program.
Most of its efforts must go to repairing the
ravages of war, rather than improving the
life of the people.
To begin with, the 627 American aid offi-
cials are overwhelmed by the presence of
197,000 American fighting men. The sol-
diers of the shooting war outnumber them
by 300 to 1. Their artillery, bombs, and
napalm join with Vietcong terrorists to make
life miserable and dangerous in much of the
countryside.
The military machine gobbles up so much
money and manpower that most of the aid
program is simply an attempt to catch up
with inflation and food shortages brought on
by the war effort.
BULK FOR IMPORTS
Out of $326.6 million spent on economic
aid in the last fiscal year, for instance, only
$103.8 million actually went to development
programs like health and agriculture. The
bulk of the money was used to import grain
and goods to make up for war- caused infla-
tion and food shortages.
Military expenditures and demand for la-
bor have created boom conditions in the
cities. Prices have shot up more than 50
percent but wages have not kept pace.
Urban unemployment has been wiped out
and the imported goods make the city folk
more prosperous than ever before. America
sends cheap rice to keep food prices stable,
But three-quarters or South Vietnam's
people are peasants, and only a fraction of
these peasants actually get any benefit out
of the American aid program. All they see
of their Government is its mailed fist: Bombs,
artillery, napalm, and "search and destroy"
campaigns.
The contrast between the suffering farm-
ers and the booming cities is partly inten-
tional. Although officials do not like to talk
about it publicly, American strategy is pres-
ently intended to force the peasants to take
sides or suffer the consequences.
"They can come to the Government or they
can go join the Vietcong, but they can't re-
main neutral and indifferent," a high rank-
ing American spokesman explained.
The Province of Long An, for instance,
has 585 hamlets. American aid goes only
to the 76 hamlets which are considered paci-
fied and the rest of the countryside is
written off as enemy territory. Police con-
fiscate rice, salt, sugar, and medicine bound
for these villages.
This kind of economic warfare is intended
to keep food and supplies away from the
Vietcong. But it also means that life is
going from bad to worse for at least half
of the population of South Vietnam.
The benefits of American aid go first to
the city people, who have always been pro-
government, and second to the secure vil-
lages, which have never been pro-Vietcong.
The peasants in the insecure areas are un-
touched by the battle for their hearts and
minds.
LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD ROUTINE
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I wish
to reemphasize my strong support for
the Teacher Corps and urge speedy pas-
sage of the appropriation bill to finance
it.
The local school boards of this Nation
are now finishing up plans for the 1966-
67 school year. They will complete their
budgets-that is, allocate money for sup-
plies, equipment, personnel-by early
spring. By late spring the school boards
will be taking the 1966-67 plans to their
local citizens.
Unless the school districts know-on
a district-by-district, person-by-person
basic-just what the National Teacher
Corps is all about, its purpose, its plans,
its potentialities, and in fact where on
earth to write for more information-
there's little chance that local school dis-
tricts will be asking for the teachers they
so desperately need for the 1966-67
school opening.
Prompt action on this appropriation,
therefore, is urgent.
INDUSTRIAL AIR POLLUTION
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, an out-
standing example of the increasing at-
tention which is being given to the prob-
lem of industrial air pollution control
and abatement appeared in the October
1965 issue of Factory magazine. In a
very thoughtful and most comprehensive
article entitled "Industrial Air Pollu-
tion," Factory has examined four facets
of the air pollution problem:
First. What is being done about it in
terms of Federal, State, and local legis-
lation and in terms of private initiative?
Second. What constitutes an indus-
trial air pollutant, where it comes from,
and what its harmful effects are?
Third. The various methods, processes,
and equipment which different indus-
tries have used to clean the air.
Fourth. How industry may choose the
right air pollution control system and
what it will cost.
In this study Factory reaches some in-
teresting conclusions which seem well
worth pondering. It recommends re-
search to improve control equipment
with an eye to lowering costs, to dispos-
ing of collected solids, and to developing
useful byproducts. Factory also sug-
gests tougher penalties for _ persistent
violators of pollution codes, increased fi-
nancial assistance for small plants, and
practical local codes for small communi-
ties as well as for big cities.
Mr. President, I would like to com-
mend the staff of Factory magazine for
its constructive approach to educating
industry about the problems of and so-
lutions to industrial air pollution. I ask
unanimous consent that the editorial
which accompanies this fine article be
inserted in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CAN INDUSTRY AFFORD NOT To BE A
PUBLIC NUISANCE?
Smoke. Smell. Slop. Dust. Noise. Eye-
sores. This is the face that 6 out of 10 man-
ufacturing plants show to the public. And
the public is slowly building up to a big burn
about it. Rightly so, we think. In this age
of engineering advance, irritating or un-
sightly plant effluent seems technically in-
excusable. Only an economic argument de-
serves the public ear. But industry in gen-
eral hasn't been talking very persuasively.
All too often industry evades the issue.
Typically, it has replied to public criticism
with such banal and arrogant comments as:
"That's a million-dollar smell," or "when
that smoke clears up, you'll have a depres-
sion," or "if you don't like it, we'll take our
payroll elsewhere." Official denials to the
contrary, a plant knows when it is becoming
a public nuisance. But it also knows that
the cost of curtailment is, more often than
not, downright prohibitive. And, regardless
of what the plant might like to do, it simply
can't afford to reform if others don't.
The high cost of nuisance abatement, like
any other cost, is ultimately paid by the
consumer. This is one fact that industry
must hammer home. But in the meantime,
such costs are siphoned off from a company's
current profits. To expect a plant in one
community to add significantly to its cost
while other similar plants elsewhere do not,
would create economic anarchy. On the
other hand, widespread or impulsive legis-
lation would knock many marginal com-
panies out of the market entirely. The rich
and wise companies would persevere. The
poor and struggling plants would fail. This
is another fact the public must be made
aware of.
The ultimate solution to nuisance abate-
ment, we believe, lies in four related meas-
ures:
1. Education of the public as to the price
it must pay-directly or indirectly-for elim-
ination of these industrial nuisances.
2. A national planning program jointly
supported by industry and by Federal and
State Governments.
3. Federal legislation based upon this plan-
ning and characterized by progressive in-
tensification of restrictions.
4. Vigorous development by industry of
less costly and more effective equipment for
preventing or containing these nuisances.
L. R. BrrrsE,
Editor in Chief.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---SENATE February 16, 1966
PAINTINGS IN THE WHITE HOUSE
Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina, Mr.
President, recently the Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., Inc., in cooperation
with the White House, produced a color
film entitled "Paintings in the White
House." This program which has been
shown on some television stations
throughout the country describes our
Nation's history through the art now
exhibited in the Executive Mansion. It
is a movie which has receive highly
favorable comments for its artistic merit
and is devoid of commercialism.
A copy of the film is being loaned to
,he Senate and I have made arrange-
merits for two screenings, one at 12
noon and one at 1 p.m. on Friday,
February 18, 1966, in the auditorium of
the new Senate Office Building.
in behalf of the Committee on Rules
and Administration, an invitation is ex-
tended to all Senators and their stalls
and other Senate employees whose
schedule permits to attend one of the
scheduled showings of this beautiful
film.
19i;:fi(ll NO KA 01
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, resi-
dents of the island of Maui have a say-
inig, "Maui No Ka Oi," which means
Maui. is the best, tire best of all the lovely
islands in the Hawaiian chain.
The mayor of Maui. County, which also
includes the islands of Lanai and Molo-
kai, and two unpopulated islands, is Mr.
Eddie Tam, one of Hawaii's greatest am-
bassadors of goodwill, 16 years mayor of
Maul County and 22 years in public office.
'].'his record is unmatched in the State of
Hawaii.
The Malayan Times recently pub-
lished a story about Mayor Eddie Tam,
a man who has carried Hawaii's mes-
sage of aloha and goodwill to many na-
tions. May I respectfully request that
the article be printed in the RECORD?
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
DYNAMIC EDDIE 'L'AM GOVERNS FIVE HAWAIIAN
ISLES
With his neck outstretched to see over the
:;leering wheel of his limousine, Maui Coun-
'.y's ChineseAmerican Mayor Eddie Tam
drove up to his personal covered parking
:;tall at the County Building, Walluku, Maui,
county seat of live Hawaiian islands.
Ile didn't so much as glance at the mynah
birds chirping on the lawn, or the green-clad
crags of the lowering West Maui mountains,
as he walked from his car to his carpeted,
air-conditioned office. It was Friday, and
amen was on his mind.
Two Fridays a month Mayor ram calls to
order the eigiit members of the Maui County.
Board of Supervisors. Three members are of
Japanese ancestry, one Korean. one Puerto
Rican, one Filipino, one Hawaiian-German.
and one Puerto Rican-Caucasian.
'three of the county's islands are popu-
lated: Maui, the Valley Isle, 36,487; Molokai,
the Friendly Isle, 5,825, and Lanai, the Pine-
apple Island, 3,037. Maui County occupies
1,159 square miles.
For more than 22 consecutive years
"Friendly Eddie" has been in public office,
16 of them as mayor.
"I have learned and followed somewhat of
unique philosophy," Mayor Tam said.
a
"What a man does for himself dies wi?,h him;
what a man does for his community lives
forever.
FARMER
The five-foot, five-inch, 152-pound mayor
was born in November 25, 1899, at Islakawao.
Maui, the son of Tam Hong and Jeng Kiu,
who emigrated to Maui in the late 1800's from
Sam Chau village in China. Mayor Tam's
father worked as a blacksmith, carpenter,
and farmer in Makawao. His 96-year-old
mother now lives in Kula Sanatorium, Maui.
Mayor Tam is the eldest of three children.
His brother, William K. Tam, is assistant
manager of a Honolulu branch of tiie First
National Bark of Hawaii., acid he has ;a sister.
Iie married Lily Hisae Morimoto in Wailu-
ku on December 31, 19413, shortly after being
elected to his first 2-year term as mayor.
On November 4, 1964, he was rclected to his
ninth consecutive term.
Mayor Tani received his early edua';ation at
Mak.awao and Wailuku elementary schools.
Upon graduation from St. Anthony Boys'
School, Wailuku, in 19.1.6, the fora sr Maui
tennis champion began his career with the
Baldwin Bank in Kahului, Maui. For 10
years he served in various capacities, :a5 clerk,
collector, bookkeeper, and secretary
RESTAIIRANr
Leaving the bank in 1927, Mayor l'am was
employed as office manager, bookkeeper, and
secretary to a Maui State senator. in addi-
tion, he was agent for a Honolulu brokerage
firm. From 1945 to :1948 he op:'rated a
restaurant on Maui.
In 1942 he entered the political arena for
the first time, and was elected to the board
of supervisors as a Republican. He was re-
elected as a Democrat in 1944, and continued
to serve on that body until elected mayor.
The mayor played a major role in estab-
lishing and expanding tourism as a major
industry on Maui.
Three luxury hotels and the championship
Kaanapail Golf Course, scene of the 1964
Canada Cup and International Golf matches
now attract tourists. The hotels are lib-
erally spaced to comply' w!th a rigid master
plan designed to preserve the esthetic
beauty of the area.
The mayor of Maui was among those in-
strumental in attracting the Canada Cup
matches to Maui.
HARMONY
"It is only fitting that golfers frorra all parts
of the world come to compete in friendship
on Maui, where several races work and play
together in harmony," Mayor Tam said.
Mayor Tam's enthusiasms draw . ttention
wherever he goes. Wayne Tanaka., sports
editor of the Maul News, described Mayor
Tam on the golf course, the day before the
Canada Cup tournament:
"'Friendly Eddie' Tam, who got the big-
gest applause at the 'meet the teams din-
ner,' drew as many raves as Pa,ner and
Nicklaus on the course. You couldn't miss
him in his red and yellow Outfit. His back-
lash swing and backhanded puttin;r, were as
talked about as the booming drives of the
'big boys.'"
During the summer of 1964 the mayor was
invited to represent the State of Hawaii at
the annual Kelowna Regatta in British Col-
umbia.
"We in Maui County have mo b to be
proud of," Mayor Tana said. "We have the
largest dormant volcano, the largest sugar
plantation, the most and best beaches, and
the only roadways in the, world where you
can drive from sea level to 10,000-fcx;t eleva-
tion by traversing a distance of 40 miles.
"And that's not all," Mayor Tam continued.
"We have the largest stand of eucalyptus
trees in the Nation, the first capital of the
Sandwich Islands, and the clearest astrophy-
sical 'window' in the world at Science City
atop Haleakala.
`RANCHES
"But it doesn't end there. We have one
of the finest golf courses in the world, the
largest banyan tree in the Nation, probably
the tallest hardwood tree. Haleakala Na-
tional Park, one of the largest ranches and
the principal base for the deep-sea drilling
Project Mohole which will enhance our sci-
ence industry.
"I may be prejudiced, but I think. v have
the most efficient county government in trim
United States, the most beautiful tropical
valley in the world at Iao, the most, idea
climate and variety of climate in the world,
and the friendliest and most hospitable peo-
ple in the world.
"But what we are more proud of than
anything else Is the ability of all our differ-
ent races to work and live together in har-
mony. Here in Maui County, 'aloha' is more
than just a word; it's a way of life."
RESEARCH DIRECTOR FOR U.S.
FOREST SERVICE RETIRES
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, retirement has caught up with
one of our Nation's most able and dedi-
cated public servants. After 38 years of
devoted public service, Dr. V. L. Harper
has left his position as Deputy Chief of
the Forest Service in the Department of
Agriculture.
Dr. Harper began his career with the
Forest Service in 1927 in the piney woods
of north Florida. His personal interest
and work on gum naval stores and on
the growing and producing of southern
pines is reflected in the improved econ-
omy of the southern pine country.
Dr. Harper has held a number of posi-
tions in the South, in the Northeast, and
here in Washington, each increasingly
complex and demanding. He served,
with great distinction, as director of the
Northern Forest Experiment Station at
Upper Darby, Pa., during 1945-51.-
Since 1951, Dr. Harper has been Dep-
uty Chief in Charge of Research for the
Forest Service. During his years in this
post, until his recent retirement, many of
us brushed shoulders with this fine scien-
tist and gentleman. Dr. Harper always
demonstrated rare foresight and vision in
the programs he planned and developed.
His testimony before Senate committees
was always outstanding in its depth and
clarity; his knowledge of technical de-
tails of the Nation's forestry problems,
and the Forest Service proposals to solve
these problems, was always remarkable,
in my opinion. His honesty, sincerity,
and integrity were above reproach.
The impact which this learned and
devoted main has had upon our Nation
and its natural resources has been very
great. Naturally, I am most intimately
acquainted with accomplishments of the
Forest Service research program in my
own State of West Virginia. Dr. Harper
early saw the need-and brought it to
the attention of the Congress--to find
ways to improve our Appalachian, moun-
tain timber and water resources. He
played a key role in developing a labora-
tory and assembling a team of topnotch
scientists at Princeton, W. Va., to study
these problems. He visualized the need
for utilization and marketing research
for our valuable mountain hardwoods,
and diligently sought the will of the
Congress in constructing the necessary
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;.sr- ary 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
sacrifice to responsible citizenship. It de-
clined with surprising swiftness, but was
enormously influential almost because it was
so readily secularized. Its "secularizability."
in fact, is an important clue to the move-
ment's long-term civic significance. Know-
ing this, we can share the poignant historical
observation of George W. Pierson: "Just as
with the philosophy of the Greeks, or the
laws laid down by the Romans, the moral
attitudes of New England culture persist
though the people who gave them birth have
long since passed away"
The disappearance of classic Puritanism
did not end Its influence however. The
great awakening of the 18th century kept
alive some dimensions of the Puritan Im-
pulse. The revolutionary generation reno-
vated and enlivened the old sense of the
country's mission in a way that was by no
means utterly secular (see the several de-
vices on our national seal on any dollar
bill). And the great evangelical revivals
beginning after 1790 made the entire 19th
century a time of evangelical resurgence in
which Puritan and enlightened notions of
the national purpose were blended.
Throughout this process, moreover, the idea
of civic responsibility as a Christian virtue
was a corollary of the American's confidence
in his country's political and religious destiny
and his refusal as a practical matter to sepa-
rate church and state. On this subject, too,
Francis Grund offered a valuable observa-
tion:
"It is with the solemnities of religion that
the Declaration of Independence is yet an-
nually read to the people from the pulpit or
that Americans celebrate the anniversaries of
the most important events in their history.
s * * The Americans look upon religion
as a promoter of civil and political liberty;
and have, therefore, transferred to it a large
portion of the affection which they cherish
for the institutions of their country. In
other countries, where religion has become
the instrument of oppression, it has been
the policy of the liberal party to diminish
its influence; but in America its promotion
is essential to the Constitution."
Americans are not now faultless paragons
of dutiful citizenship and responsible gov-
ernance. Sober analysts, indeed, are speak-
ing of a moral crisis. Violence and irre-
sponsibility in our public life have shocked
the world and scarred a generation of Amer-
icans. Yet the tradition as a whole has
also been a beacon-even a marvel-to the
world; and there is in it profound occasion
for gratitude. A portion of this gratitude,
moreover, is due to the Puritan's total view
of man's state under God's rules, to his ex-
plicit concern for law, duty, public spirit,
and the commonweal, and to the fact that
he framed his counsels in such a way that
their efficacy continued long after the move-
ment's flourishing time. In the grounds for
and the fruits of that concern lies the chief
political legacy of Puritanism.
NEW TREND IN AMERICAN
AGRICULTURE
M1'. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the
noted columnist, Richard Wilson, has
written a stimulating piece, entitled,
"Chance for a New Era in Farm Poli-
cies," which appeared' in the Sunday
Washington Star, February 13, 1966.
Mr. Wilson points out that the mount-
ing world food crisis and the response of
the Johnson administration to that crisis
will call for greater production by
America's farmers. He Quotes a distin-
guished constituent of mine, Mr. Robert
C. Liebenow, president of the Corn In-
dustries Research Foundation and for-
mer president of the Chicago Board of
Trade, who is calling for an increase of
acreage in 1967 to meet the growing de-
mands for U.S. food abroad. I have fre-
quently consulted with Mr. Liebenow on
farm policy and have found him to be
a forward-looking, practical-minded
thinker in this field.
I ask,unanimous consent to insert Mr.
Wilson's column at this point in the
RECORD;
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CHANCE FOR A NEW ERA IN FARM POLICIES
(By Richard Wilson)
President Johnson calls on Congress for an
act of intelligent generosity in the new food-
for-freedom program to avert in relatively
small degree the world's growing hunger.
But it is more than that. The program
unlocks the door for the release of American
food producers from the restrictions they
have hated, but accepted, for 30 years. This
can be the beginning of the end of regi-
mented agriculture.
The proof will be in how this beginning
is handled. If the farm politicians insist on
clinging to their security blankets with both
pudgy fists there will be a small relaxation
of farm controls without a truly constructive
advance. We will then have more of the
same-billions for worldwide food distribu-
tion with America's farmers still under Wash-
ington's thumb, and the whole thing costing
more than ever.
But if the minds in Washington are big
enough they will see in the world hunger
problem the golden opportunity to serve
the highest American interests while restor-
ing freedom of action and choice to a large
sector of the population. The continuance
of the heavy Federal subsidy to American
farmers, which by now runs far past the $50
billion mark, will be harder and harder to
justify.
What the President has done in essence
is this: He has proposed expanding world-
wide food distribution by about $500 million
on condition that countries receiving this
food aid work out really effective programs
of self-help. Then, foreseeing bigger de-
mands, controls have been relaxed, and will
be relaxed further on wheat production. In
addition, the President wishes to create a
permanent food reserve for emergencies and
to be used in stabilizing prices. Several m1I-
lion acres previously taken out of production
are in the process of being brought back in
production of wheat, soybeans, and rice.
What the future holds in the biggest food
commodity of all, corn, is yet to be seen.
Corn, and other feed grains, make possible
the huge meat supply which America and
now the whole world, wishes to consume.
Several critical things can be said about
this. The expansion of acreage isn't very
great yet. Most of the Nation's farm acreage
will still be subject to control. Calling sur-
pluses a reserve is to use only another name.
Money will still pour out in farm subsidies.
The cotton surplus remains a huge unsolved
problem, and there is yet too much corn.
But when all this is said it still can be
seen that agriculture is entering a new era
which should be welcomed with open arms.
some kind of light is beginning to appear at
the end of the tunnel for that great heart-
land of America so rich in the American
tradition. Small towns which have lan-
guished in the industrial age can take heart.
Rural life, already a rich reward for the re-
sourceful, can be better for all.
3005
Robert C. Liebenow, president of the Corn
Industries Research Foundation, Inc., with
the help of a team of economists, is calling
for an increase of 20 million acres of crops in
1967. He forecasts that it is entirely possible
exports within a few years will increase by
50 percent.
In the North Central area of the Nation
alone that might increase farmers cash re-
ceipts by $2 billion and send a stream of
fresh economic lifeblood through the Mid-
west which could revivify the elm-lined
streets of many a delightful small town.
In the largest sense, food for freedom as
now projected is only beginning. The world
is racing at increasing speed into a food
crisis. Half the world's population already
suffers chronically from lack of food. The
U.N. estimates that by 1975 food supplies will
have to be increased by 35 percent merely
to sustain the present level of a world half
in hunger.
The Aswan Dam in Egypt aptly illustrated
the problem. In the 10 years which will be
taken to create the dam's irrigation canals
and bring in 2 million additional acres of
cropland, Egypt's population will have so
increased to absorb more than the produc-
tion of those 2 million acres. Egypt is not
running fast enough to keep up with itself.
The plain fact, as President Johnson points
out, is that even the American cornucopia
cannot be made to overflow enough to meet
the food needs of the developing nations.
So the challenge is here and now. The
transition to the new stage from the older
era of unmanageable surpluses will have to
be managed carefully.
But it will be a welcome change from the
old days of killing little pigs, and the gentle
rain of Government checks. Congress now
has an opportunity to act promptly, and
even more imaginatively, on the President's
Initiative.
WAR ON TWO FRONTS
Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President,
President Johnson's trip to Hawaii gave
new emphasis to the administration
policy to hold the line against Commu-
nist aggression while at the same time
building up the economic and social
conditions of Vietnam.
Speaking of this policy, the Portland
Oregonian in a recent editorial said that:
The President's statement that the United
States is pledged not only to defend the
freedom of South Vietnam but "to build a
decent society" there will be carried out in
specific programs of economic aid and in
support of Premier Ky's civic action program.
The editorial adds that:
What can be done under war conditions
will be done. But, of course, the imperative
is to suppress the Vietcong by military
action. When aggression is defeated, the
main work of rehabilitation can begin.
There is much deep thought to an
issue which concerns us all at this time,
and because of its lucid analysis I ask
that the editorial be included as a part
of the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP
President Johnson's trip to Honolulu to
confer with United States and South Viet-
namese diplomats and generals from the
frontlines gives new emphasis to admin-
istration policy.
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3006 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
That policy is to defeat Communist ag-
gression in South Vietnam, to uphold the
caretaker military government in Saigon
until conditions permit popular elections, to
throw U.S. resources into rebuilding and
strengthening the economy of South Viet-
nam.
To accomplish these objectives, the deci-
sions unquestionably have been made to step
up the airstrikes against military targets
in North Vietnam and to increase American
military power in South Vietnam to at least
400,000 troops-double those now supporting
South Vietnamese troops in the mounting
attacks on Vietcong strongholds and North
Vietnamese regiments.
The limited and responsible employment
of American power is calculated to achieve
the objectives without encouraging Red
China or the Soviet Union to enter the war-
as one or both might do should the Ameri-
can methods be changed to accomplish aerial
destruction of North Vietnam's industries,
cities and Red River Delta farmlands. At
the same time, the bombing of North Viet-
nam's military targets establishes the policy
of denying a sanctuary to the Communist
aggressor, a warning to Red China, particu-
larly, not to send in its troops as it did in
Korea.
The 37-day suspension of U.S. air strikes
against North Vietnam, while the President
sought aggressively but fruitlessly for an
indication from. Hanoi of willingness to ne-
gotiate a ceasetire and peace terms, was a
setback to what public confidence there may
be in South Vietnam in its military govern-
ment. The President's conference with Chief
of State Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier
Nguyen Can Ky will enhance their prestige
by affirming American confidence in them
and unaltered intention to defend South
Vietnam.
The President's statement that the United
States is pledged not only to defend the free-
dom of South Vietnam but "to build a decent
society" there will be carried out in specific
programs of economic aid and in support of
Premier Ky's civic action program. What
can be done under war conditions will be
done. But, of course, the imperative is to
suppress the Vietcong by military action.
When aggression is defeated, the main work
of rehabilitation can begin.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business is closed.
SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY AND
PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION,
FISCAL 1966
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
Chair lay down the unfinished business
from the previous day.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The un-
finished business will be stated by title.
The LEe:ISLATTVE CLERK. A bill (S.
2791) to authorize appropriations during
the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of
aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and
tracked combat vehicles and research, de-
velopment, test, and evaluation for the
Armed Forces. and for other purposes.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that
- SENATE February 16, i
further proceedings under the quorum
call may be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. 'Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. l Ir. Pres-
ident, last August, when the President
announced a series of actions that had
been decided upon in an attempt. to help
the people of South Vietnam preserve
their privilege of self-determination, the
Congress was asked to approve a sup-
plemental appropriation of $1.7, billion.
This appropriation was unanimously
approved in the Senate, by a vote of 89
to 0. This action followed thy' earlier
approval of the appropriation of $700
million, which had been earmarked for
this same purpose.
During the hearings on the $1.7 bil-
lion appropriation, forthright testimony
clearly indicated that the amount then
sought was in the nature of a downpay-
ment for the additional military steps
then ordered and that when the total
bill could be calculated the necessary
authorizations and appropriations would
be requested.
The rest of the check requested for
this fiscal year is $12,345,719,000.
The sum of $3,417,700,000 of the addi-
tional appropriations- now requested has
never been authorized for appropria-
tion. In exercising their rulemaking
powers, both Houses of the Congress
have adopted requirements that only
appropriations authorized by law are in
order. The bill before the Senate would
make later enactment of the entire 1966
defense supplemental appropriation in
order.
Of the appropriations that this bill
would authorize, $3,417,700,000 would be
used to buy aircraft, missiles, and
tracked combat vehicles; $151,650,000
would be used for research and develop-
ment; and $1,238,400,000 is intended to
fund military construction.
I do not wish to make a dish Tenuous
argument, but I think it important that
the Senate and the Nation clearly recog-
nize this bill for what it is: an authori-
zation of defense appropriations. It
could not properly be considered as de-
termining foreign policy, as ratifying
decisions made in the past, or as endors-
ing new commitments.
That ours is a Government of three
equal and coordinate branches and that
there are checks and balances in this sys-
tem are concepts we all learn in elemen-
tary civics. Under the Constitu ion, the
President is the Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces. By approvin; or dis-
approving a bill of this type, Congress
can neither enlarge nor diminish the
President's power to command these
forces; it merely can influence how many
members of the Armed Forces the :Presi-
dent has to command, and determine the
nature of the equipment witl. which
they will be provided,, and how they will
be cared for and protected.
Of course, I would not suggest that
Congress does not have a role in the for-
mulation of foreign policy. Under the
division of legislative 'Labor that Congress
has prescribed for itself, the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations and the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs are
the instrumentalities specializint, in for-
eign relations. Accordingly, I think it is
important to emphasize that it would be
inappropriate for this authorization to
be used as a poll of congressional opinion
on whether our foreign policy is sound.
In my opinion, such action would tend to
oust the jurisdiction of the committees
charged with primary responsibility for
such consideration. Instead, I prefer to
think of this authorization as facilitating
the arming and equipping of persons in
the Armed Forces with the most effective
weapons to assure their survival when
they are carrying out the orders of their
Commander in Chief.
For those ;persons who would like to re-
scind the support the Senate gave at the
time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, I
wish to point out that the resolution
adopted then provides by its own terms
that it may be terminated by concurrent
resolution of the Congress. As we all
know, a concurrent resolution requires
action only by Congress and does not ire-
quire Presidential participation or ap-
proval. There is, then, a readily avail-
able means for securing a test of
congressional opinion, and that is to con-
sider a resolution rescinding the Gulf of
Tonkin one. I understand that a reso-
lution to do just this has been submitted
and is pending in the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Georgia permit a
question?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Am I not cor-
rect in sayiing that the Senator from
Georgia, as chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services at that time, offered
an amendment to the concurrent resolu-
tion to provide that Congress would have
an opportunity to exercise its respon-
sibility.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. To my dis-
tinguished colleague from Massachu-
setts, who is the ranking minority mem-
ber of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, I may say that, as I recall, that sug-
gestion was made at the conference we
first held with Secretary Rusk and Sec-
retary McNamara. I made the sugges-
tion, and they agreed that it should be
embraced and embodied in the resolution
that was proposed, and that was done.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator
from Georgia took that action as chair-
man of the committee, did he not?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I did, so as
to preserve the prerogatives of Congress
and to make the resolution comparable
to the one that had been adopted in 1957,
relating to the Middle East. That reso-
lution granted broad powers i:o the Pre;,i-
dent and contained a provision that
these powers could be terminated at any
time by a majority of Congress, without
participation by the President.
Mr. President, an attempt to brush
aside the misgivings and :reservations
that many Senators and members of the
public hold about events in southeast:
Asia would be futile. This is not my
purpose. I, too, am extremely unhappy
and concerned about the gravity of the
situation there and what our commit-
ment portends. But, like many of my
colleagues, I have had an opportunity
to suggest alternative courses of action,
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and I have been unable to suggest one
likely to lead to an honorable termina-
tion of the conflict there other than the
course now being followed by the
President.
In the Senate last year, the junior
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON]
recalled, in his remarks on the floor of
the Senate, that he had visited me when
he was a member of the executive branch
to inform me of President Eisenhower's
decision to begin assisting the South
Vietnamese people and my comment that
I feared this course would be costly in
blood and treasure, but that when the
President had made his decision and had
committed the flag, I had no alternative
but to support the flag.
I mention this not to engage "in self
praise as a prophet but because it still
summarizes my view.
For any Members of the Senate who
may be initially disposed to oppose this
authorization because they have reserva-
tions and misgivings about whether the
policies being applied in southeast Asia
are wise, I strongly urge them to stay
their opposition and to find some other
manner in which to register it, other
than by doing it in a way that will work
injury to our fellow Americans who are
in southeast Asia. Incidentally, there
are 300,000 there instead of the 200,000
we hear about when we include all those
who are in Thailand and in the waters
off the coast of Vietnam.
Members of the Armed Forces are in
southeast Asia under orders. From all
reports, they are giving a splendid ac-
count of themselves. I am proud of
them. Although many have volunteered
for this duty, others are there not by
choice. They nonetheless are doing their
best. An unreasonable delay in approv-
ing this bill or a close vote on it is hardly
the way to demonstrate appreciation for
their sacrifices in our behalf. If we try
to view our position on this bill through
their eyes, I hope the Senate will not let
itself be misunderstood.
Mr. President, I say that without im-
plying that I wish to deny to any Sen-
ator the right to express himself on this
measure and what is involved herein.
In recent weeks there have been many
references to the possibility of a credi-
bility gap. If the Senate shilly-shallies
with this supplemental, it will be much
harder to convince those opposing us of
our determination to see this commit-
ment through and our adversaries are
much more likely to be intransigent and
contemptuous toward our efforts to find
peace.
I must say that I think some observers
and critics have not given the President
and the Secretaries of State and Defense
the credit they deserve for the earnest-
ness, the soul searching, and the vigor
with which they have considered alter-
native courses of action, and particularly
for the efforts they have put forth in
an attempt to find a solution leading to
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will
3007
tained on the books for the fiscal year could benefit our efforts in South Viet-
ending Juhe 30, 1966, 41/2. months from nam. I will not enumerate them all.
now, so that the appropriation which
will follow will use this authorization,
together with the remaining amount on
the book, to obtain the supplies that are
needed at once by our fighting men in
southeast Asia.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sena-
tor is correct. That does not mean that
it must all be spent in 1966. It is to be
added to the appropriations for 1966
to take sure that there is no shortage of
vital supplies for the 300,000 American
boys who are in the so-called danger
zone. Those supplies include every-
thing from rations to bombs and shells.
Mr. HOLLAND. I think that that
one fact speaks like an angel's trumpet
tones for the early passage of this
measure.
I believe that more good can be accom-
plished by this bill if we pass it quickly
as something that is needed now for
funds to be shortly appropriated and
committed or spent during the re-
mainder of the fiscal year.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No appro-
priation can be made without this au-
thorization. It will be necessary for
additional legislation to follow this leg-
islation to appropriate the money.
We all know that even if the require-
ment is not spelled out in the Constitu-
tion, the position of the House makes it
necessary for appropriations to originate
there.
I understand that the committee in
the House has already held hearings on
the appropriation-all items of it-and
is only awaiting the authorization to
send the measure here.
Further, there was testimony in the
hearings before the Committee on Armed
Services that it is important that this
appropriation be passed by the latter
part of February. It will be exceedingly
difficult to do that under the very best
of conditions, because the authorization
must be obtained before the appropria-
tion can be considered.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator for yielding. I hope
that we shall all make it clear in dis-
cussing the bill that this is for an au-
thorization to be followed immediately
by an appropriation in a like amount and
that this amount would be included with
authorizations already on the book for
the purpose of providing for what is
actually needed to be spent or com-
mitted between now and the end of the
fiscal year
They include such things as better drugs
to combat an unusual type of malaria,
from which hundreds of our boys are
suffering there at this hour, better pro-
tection for our helicopters, better medi-'
cal facilities, improvements in electronic
warfare equipment, weapons and ord-
nance of the type needed in nonnuclear
warfare, and modification of aircraft to
adapt them to the kinds of missions
needed in southeast Asia.
The military construction that would
be authorized stretches all the way from
some bases in the 'United States through
intermediate staging areas to South Viet-
nam. The kinds of things that will be
built include new hospitals, storage fa-
cilities, runways, and port facilities to
facilitate the unloading of supplies.
It was really disturbing to hear some
of the. difficulties encountered in unload-
ing and landing essential supplies in
South Vietman because of the lack of
harbor facilities. That condition is be-
ing remedied now as rapidly as it is pos-
sible to do.
The committee report gives more de-
tailed information on the weapons. to be
procured, the research and development,
to be undertaken, and the construction
that would be accomplished and I shall
not repeat them here.
I should point out, however, that title
IV of the bill could serve as a basis for
provisions in the appropriations act that
would permit the funding of our support
for South Vietnam and the forces of free
countries associated with us in her
defense from appropriations available to
the Department of Defense.
In ordinary circumstances, when a na-
tion is not enduring hostilities on its
own soil, the military assistance given to
that country is authorized and appro-
priated and accounted for separately
from the appropriations for our own
Armed Forces. When combat is taking
place, the maintenance of records of
the supplies and equipment and assist-
ance furnished becomes most difficult
and relatively irrelevant. In Korea,
support for the South Korean forces
and for the forces of other nations
who participated with us there was
included in the appropriations made to
the Department of Defense and provided
from those funds.
The arrangement proposed for South
Vietnam by this legislation is similar to
that.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sen- The intent is that the military support
Mratar. RUSSELL for South Vietnamese forces and for the
Mr. President, I desire to comment forces of Allied countries there will be
added to the requirements of the U.S.
more particularly for a few moments on forces and that support will be provided
what the authorization in this bill is for. in the field as determined by our com-
In the aircraft field, it would fund more manders without separate computation
helicopters and more aircraft of the type and bookkeeping for the part furnished
used by our Armed Forces, whether or non-U.S. forces.
not we were participating in the defense As is indicated in the committee
of South Vietnam. The same can be report, the committee has modified the
said
f ?L......J
l
tl_ _ i_.._ _,__ _. _ ____
o
ssi
es and
thi
t
v~
s p ocuremen
tightening up on what could have been
the Senator yield? is intended to replace losses already in- considered a new transfer authority and
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield. curred and those that may be incurred by requiring quarterly reports of esti-
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, it is if hostilities continue. mates of the amount of support furnished
true that this authorization is to com- In research and development, the effort each nation participating with us in
plete the total authorizations now con- is concentrated on those projects that South Vietnam.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE Fe ruary 1 ,
This limited merger of support for our
associates in South Vietnam with the
requirements for our own Armed Forces
would be authorized only during the rest
of fiscal year 1966 and for fiscal year 1967.,
The limited duration of this authority
will. permit the Congress to reconsider
whether it should be continued. But
I am sure that I voice the sentiments
of every Member of this body when I
say that we all hope and pray that an
honorable termination of hostilities can
be accomplished and that there will be
no need to continue the authority.
Mr. President, in closing, I wish to
leave the thought that I think every
Member of the Senate, without regard to
his views on the policy involved in Viet-
nam, can conscientiously support this
assistance, this means of providing arms
in self-defense to U.S. citizens, without
compromising any convictions he may
have about what further action should
be taken to restore peace in South Vie' -
tiam. I urge approval of the bill and :I
:;hall be glad to try to answer questions
about it.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am
happy to yield to the distinguished Sena-
tor from Massachusetts.
Mr. SAL'I'ONSTALL. Mr. President,
as one who joined the chairman of our
Armed Services Committee in presenting
this bill to the Senate, I wholeheartedly
endorse what the chairman has stated
as to the purposes of the bill.
As we proceed with the consideration
of this legislation, I think that it is im-
perative that we all remember what this
legislation does and what it does not d.o.
Senate bill 2791 provides authorizations
for appropriations for the procurement
of aircraft, missiles, and tracked vehicles
for various Army, Navy, and Air Force
research, development, test and evalua-
tion programs, and for the construction
of military installations. These authori-
zations total $4,807,750,000-the amount
requested by the Department of Defense.
These authorizations provide the re-
quired authority for the necessary appro-
priations to support military operations
in southeast Asia.. The recommended
authorizations totaling $4.8 billion are
for the following purposes:
1. In thousands I
Procurement of aircraft, missiles,
and tracked vehicles ---------- $3,417,700
Research, development, test, and
evaluation programs ----------- 151, 700
Military construction projects__ 1, 238, 400
Shortly we will be considering the De-
partment of Defense supplemental ap-
propriation bill which will involve some
$1.2.3 billion. I ask unanimous consent
to have included at this point in the
RECORD a tabulation of the appropria-
tions requested in the proposed supple-
mental appropriation bill and the
required authorizations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
TYDINCS in the chair). Without objec-
tion, it is so ordered.
The tabulation ordered to be printed
in the RECORD is as follows:
Department of Defense supplemental, south-
east Asia, fiscal 1966
Fin millions of dollars]
Ivlalitaay per;mmel:
.
Military personnel, Array_
Military personnel, Navy..
Military personnel, Marine
Corps -
Military personnel, Air Forcc_1
Reserve personnel, Arnry_ i
Reserve personnel, Marine
Corps-----------------------
,r Force__
Reserve personnel, A,
National Guard personnel,
Array- _
National Guard personne.l,
Air Fcroe----------
supply, .
mental
reque
2,4e. 0
(601 )
219 6
(22 9)
(%.;. 3)
(671 :1;
(82:1.:1)
764. 5
60-. 5
51ti.6
(1 c. 4)
(2;, 5)
O lrration and mama n n ,_
Ar nny._-
operatSonandmainitrs c+,
Navy
Olrcratiotiand maintenan, o,
Marino Corps_
Operation and mainenaoce,
Air Force-__--
Operation aridruaincenance,
defense agoneiCS__ - ___. _ -
Operation andmains.enanee,
Array National (marl _
Opcration raid mabu],enance, j
Air National Guard___-.
Tolad, operation and
2,3h 3
Procurement.:
Procurement of e luipnent
and missiles, Army---- -__
Aircraft-------- __---- ---
Air"raft. spares and repair
parts----------------- ----
Missiles-------------
Missiles spares and repair
inns........................
`1'rocked combat; vehicles_._
Ammunition---
Other--------------------
Procurement of aircraft and
missiles, Navy----------___.
Other procurement, Navy -____
Procurement, Marine Corps-__
Tracked combat. vehicles--
Missiles --____--_?--- .-
Aircraft. procurement, Air
1,'orcc------------- ------------
Missile procurement, Air
Force ---------------
Other procureinent, AirForce_
Total, procurement. --- _ _ _ _ _
Research, development, test, and
evaluation:
R.D.1'. & ]E., Arrn.'___-_-__-_
R.T.D. & I,., Navy _____----.
l.t.D.T, & E., Air Force -----__
Total, R.D.T. & f____..._-__
Military construction:
Military construction, Army_..
Military construction, Navy--
Military construction, Air
Force. - ----------- ------ --_..
Military consi!ructlon, defense
agencies__________________
Total, military construe-
tiun --------------------
Total, regular military
programs---------
Request to reimburse 1) OD for
stocks advanced to military
assistance program during fiscal
years 1966 and 1966__.__-__.._____
6:1.7
1, 0!' 4
z>, I)
0 .6
71. 1
7-
SO Sr. 7
214. 6
1, 21N. 4
12,34i.. 7
Authori-
zation
required
American fighting men now engaged in
military operations in southeast Asia.
The distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee discussed the
intent of this legislation with the Secre-
tary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chief's of Staff during the hearing .
I think this colloquy will help to keep this
matter in the proper perspective durin 4
our consideration:
The mere fact that a Member of the Senate
might heartily disapprove of everything that.
is going on in Vietnam wouldn't necessarily
if he felt it his duty as a u.S. 5arrasor io
provide for those who may serve in the awned
services of this country.
Secretary McNamara replied. "It would
not."
General Wheeler replied, "I a;rree z.it?1
you, Mr. Chairman."
Mr. President, section 401 of the bill
provides that funds for the support of the
South Vietnamese armed forces and
other free world forces fighting in South
Vietnam shall be derived from the regul-, r
appropriations for the support of our own
military forces. In recent years funds for
this purpose have been carried in the
military assistance program. However,
during the Korean war funds :lppropi' -
ated for the support of U.S. Forces was
$96.5.4
(604.7)
764.5
----- 38.4
(10.9)
(27.6)
used to support the Korean forces and
other allied forces engaged in that con-
flict.
The reason for this change in fundin
simply stated, is to make it easier for our
military commanders in southeast Asia
to fight the war. Under the present sys-
tem of funding, South Vietnamese troops
cannot be supplied with rifles purchased
with funds appropriated for the Army
procurement program, nor can U.S.
forces use ammunition purchased with
military assistance funds. :I think we
can all agree that this is not a reasonable
restriction to place on our military com-
manders who have the responsibility of
fighting this war. During the balance of
3,417.7
:_3 ,41'-' year 1966 it is estimated that about
28.0
62.6
71.1
509.7
254. 6
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
this bill does not involve an endorsement
of our present policies in southeast Asia.
Neither is It a repudiation of those poli-
cies. This bill authorizes the appropria-
tion of funds to back up over 200,000
$200 million will be required for the sup-
port of the South Vietnamese and other
free world forces, and for fiscal year 1967
the estimate is $600 million.
I call attention to subsection (b) of
section 401, which provides that the Sec-
retary of :Defense shall render to the ap-
propriate committees of the Congress
quarterly reports on the estimated value
of support furnished to other forces from
the appropriations made for the support
of U.S. forces. That is to keep us in-
formed, during this period, of these corn-
bined funds that are used specifically for
the South Vietnamese. I want to make
it absolutely clear that section 401 does
not expand the authority available to the
Secretary of Defense to transfer funds
between appropriations. We tightened
that up in the committee, and. I believe,
now, it is clear. And, Mr. President, it
does not enlarge the powers of the De-
partment of Defense to reprogram vari-
ous appropriations that the Congress
has made.
Mr. President, this legislation should
be supported by every Member of the
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Senate and I so urge. I shall join the
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee in opposing any amendments to
the bill that are designed to. constitute
an endorsement or repudiation of our
present policies in southeast Asia. As I
have stated, that is not the purpose of
this legislation.
The purpose is, to provide the neces-
sary funds for our forces and the South
Vietnamese who are fighting in that
country at the present time. It does
not concern whether we are right or
wrong in our policies in so fighting. We
are supporting our boys, and that is the
purpose of this authorization bill which
will lead to appropriations. Mr. Presi-
dent, I support our chairman whole-
heartedly. The committee was unani-
mous in making this report to the Sen-
ate at this time.
I thank the chairman of the com-
mittee.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank
the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. President, I am now pleased to
yield to the distinguished Senator from
Missouri [Mr. SYMiNCTON], who, before
his service in the Senate and on the
Committee on Armed Services, had a
distinguished career in the executive
branch, including service as the first
Secretary of the Air Force.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank the able senior Senator from
Georgia, the chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee for many
years, and the authority in this body on
military matters, for yielding to me.
First, I commend the Senator for this
fine analysis summarizing the bill before
us this afternoon.
I also congratulate the distinguished
ac
-
senior Senator from Massachusetts, ities, no food, ammunition, no shells, and
who, during his superb career, has al- no fuel for the airplanes and helicopters
ways put his country above party, and now in that area.
who has so thoroughly endorsed the ob- I cannot conceive of the Senate's
servations and conclusions of the distin- tolerating such a condition for a moment,
guished Senator from Georgia. without regard to the views of any Sen-
Mr. President, I would nail down again ator on the wisdom of the policy which
the statements made by the chairman of put our boys in South Vietnam.
our committee by asking two questions. Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able
First, as I understand it, the Senator's Senator from Georgia for yielding to
conviction is that regardless of how one me. And I assure him of my support,
feels about this matter of Vietnam, what- without reservations of his position with
ever opinion one may have on that par- respect to the proposed legislation.
ticular subject, this bill has nothing to Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the
do with agreement or disagreement with distinguished Senator from Missouri for
respect to our foreign policy. Rather, it his comments.
is a question of whether we do or do not Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will
wish to support young Americans, men the Senator from Georgia yield?
and some women, aver there in the com- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am now
bat zones of South Vietnam, happy to yield to the Senator from
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sen- Washington [Mr. JACKSON], who has
ator from Missouri has correctly stated been on the Committee on Armed
my position and that of the entire Com- Services for many years.
mittee on Armed Services. This bill Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as
cannot possibly be construed as either should be evident by now to everyone, we
an endorsement of or as an attack upon are engaged in Vietnam in a limited con-
national policy. It involves more the flict with the limited aim to help South
throwing of a rope to a man in the water. Vietnam preserve its independence. The
We may have cause to question how he adversary can have peace as soon as he
got there, but he is there, he is a human gives up his efforts to impose his will on
being, he is our friend and a member of the south by force and terror.
our family and, therefore, if we have a I support the administration's bill, S.
rope and do not throw it to him to en- 2791, unanimously reported by our Sen-
able him to assist himself out of the ate Armed Services Committee, which
water, this would be a callous and heart- authorizes supplemental fiscal 1966
less attitude for us to take. Defense appropriations of $4.8 billion.
Our committee is not a policy com-
mittee in the field of international rela-
tions, but we do have a direct respon-
sibility to bring to the Senate legislation
to provide for those who are in the Armed
Forces of the United States wherever
they may be stationed throughout the
world as a result of policy.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sen-
ator. My second and final question is
based upon a recent trip I made in the
past month to South Vietnam. After
noticing the heavy build up which re-
sulted from the decision to move our
troops in force there during 1964 some
logistical shortages were noted-as there
always will be in peace, in Industry, and
in war; and I found at least one case in
which shortages resulted in additional
casualties, something which was frankly
recognized and every effort was made by
the Department of Defense to correct
the situation.
Would not the able chairman agree,
however, that if we do not supply the
funds he is requesting in support of this
bill, and which is supported so con-
vincingly by the senior Senator from
Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALLI, addi-
tional casualties over a period of time are
bound to occur in the fighting zones be-
cause of shortages?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Of course,
if a hopeless impasse were to result be-
tween the Commander in Chief who or-
dered these men into Vietnam, and Con-
gress, if it refused to provide for them
there, it would mean that all of them
would perish eventually, either through
sickness, or from the bullets of the Viet-
cong and the North Vietnamese. In a
short while, they would be perfectly help-
less. They would have no medical f
il
3009
This was the sum requested by the ad-
ministration to meet additional costs in
helping the people of South Vietnam
defend their freedom.
I should like to comment briefly on our
military effort in the Vietnamese conflict.
First. The main military effort in the
future, as. in the past, must be in the
south. There is much to be said for in-
creasing that effort rapidly, to confront
Hanoi quickly with a buildup in the south
they cannot match, and to give our side
the initiative in keeping the adversary
moving and off balance. The principle
involved is clear: Hanoi and Peiping are
less likely to think it worthwhile to in-
crease their efforts in relation to the war
if our side steps up its efforts rapidly,
than if we drag out the buildup, little
bit by little bit.
I am well aware that it is extremely
difficult, for logistical reasons, to increase
the American contribution quickly. Ex-
isting ports and airfields have limited
capacities. To train, properly equip, and
deploy combat-ready forces takes time.
But the evidence that we are actually
preparing as promptly as possible to
mount a substantially larger effort would
itself, I believe, have an impressive effect
on the adversary.
Second. We should persuade our allies
in the Pacific area to increase their con-
tributions to the defense of South Viet-
nam. The Republic of Korea has sent
20,000 troops. This could be doubled to
40,000. Australia has sent 1,500 combat
forces, and, at a minimum, this could in-
crease to 5,000. New Zealand has sent
small forces that could be increased.
These allied forces have performed in
first-rate fashion and have been a sub-
stantial asset. We can hope that certain
other countries-realizing that their
vital interests are also involved in the
successful defense of South Vietnam-
will follow the example of New Zealand
,
Australia, and the Republic of Korea.
Third. I believe we are not making the
most effective use of our airpower in the
Vietnamese conflict.
As I see it-based on the advice and
counsel we have received over a long pe-
riod of time in the deliberations of the
Armed Services and Appropriations
Comn,jttees, as well as directly from the
professionals on the ground out in Viet-
nam-we are unduly and unwisely tying
our hands by limiting ourselves to only
tactical targets in North Vietnam. I
agree that we should avoid, for the fore-
seeable future, targeting the cities in
North Vietnam, and we should take great
pains to avoid hitting civilians. But
there is every good political and military
reason to make a careful selection of
strategic targets-like oil refineries and
ports-which are not only of major eco-
nomic importance to the Hanoi regime
but also have a direct and important
bearing on its ability to move men and
material into South Vietnam.
The careful choice of such strategic
targets-which would be struck only
from time to time at the President's per-
sonal direction-would contribute in a
major way to raising the cost of in-
filtration from North to South Vietnam
and to slowing and reducing the move-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 1 e wry 16,
lent of supplies and forces into the Today, I received the following tele- materiel that we already have there, that
South. This new strategy would also de- gram from the majority leader: are on the way, or that are expected to
ter the replenishment of North Viet- February 15, 1966. be sent there.
namese stocks of arms and supplies via Hon. VVAYNE MORSE, This bill merely presents the question
shipping into the northern ports. If U .S. Senate, Washington, D.C.: of supporting our men. We have already
coupled with a certain reduction in Reurtel. Senate has already laid down S. put them out front in the battleline.
2791 authorizing military procurement and As the Senator from Massachusetts
bombing operations against less impor- I announced last Thursday that this bill has stated, this bill is neither affirmative
tart tactical targets, this strategy could would be pending at the return of Senate nor negative with reference to policy
lessen the costs to us in risks to Ameri- from Lincoln Day recess. In circumstances
can pilots, and in the loss of planes over I feel that I am bound by this announcement matters.
the north---which is already well over of program which the Senate was given to Mr. AIKEN. It could not be inter-
200. understand would be the situation on re- preted as indicating approval of Con-
I hope the administration will review convening. I personally have no objections gress for future involvement?
this matter again. It should be appar- to final vote coming after Wasaington's Mr. STENNIS. No. If we did not
Birthday, but date of vote is something which support the men, we would have to bring
ent that the strategy I am suggesting Senate in its collective interests and judg- would have to tuck ta.ii
would. constitute a restrained but Sig- ments must and will decide. It is my under- them and run, so home. . W We speak.
nificant contribution to the military standing that several amendments will be
pressure we must maintain on Hanoi if offered to S. 2791. Discussion of these Mr. AIKEN. I think it is important
we expect to persuade the adversary to amendments and of the bill itself will un- to have this statement so that the act of
give up its efforts to impose its will orl doubtedly take some time. I would hope Congress on this proposal may not be so
the South by force and terror. that Senate can go ahead in view of an- badly misinterpreted or misconstrued as
in closing, I wish to commend my dis- nouncement already made placing Members was the resolution of August 1964.
on notice as to the progr.:m on reconvening Mr. STENNIS. That i the constr'ruc-
tinguished colleague the Senator from and to the end that S. 2791 will receive full
Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] for his intelli-? discussion and, every consideration. At same tion our committee put on it. It is also
gent and responsible handling of this time Foreign Relations Committee might what Secretary McNamara and General
supplemental authorization which Is hear what witnesses it has scheduled and any Wheeler pointed out in the hearings. I
needed in support of the American effort others it decides upon. would say, with the Senator from
to help block Communist subjugation of With warm regards. Massachusetts, that this neither affirms
MIKE
of Vietnam. Majority MIKE Leader, , U.S S SehSenate nor denies the policy contained in the
.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank resolution of last year, because the bill
the Senator from Washington. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I yield to before us is an authorization bill for
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, may I the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. appropriation for military supplies and.
also express my appreciation to the sell- STENNIS]. equipment, some of which has already
for Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator been used.
SALTONSTALL.I for his dedicated support. for yielding. Mr. AIKEN. I thank the Senator for
Mr. GOl:E. Mr. President- I wish to underscore one of the points making it clear that our action. on this;
Mr. MORtsE. Mr. President, will the made by the Senator from Georgia with bill can have no effect on our southeast
Senator from Tennessee yield to me for reference to the figures in this bill, which Asian policies.
2 minutes in order that I may read a he expressed so plainly. This is really a Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
telegram which I sent to the majority continuation of an appropriation of last from Vermont for his remarks; $1,2011
leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. year, an item in the general appropria- million in this is for military constluc-
MANSFIELD 1, and the reply he sent to me. tion bill for these identical purposes. tion which is to be used in direct support
I believe that this courtesy to the major- In that appropriation we made the down- of our military effort already in exist-
ity leader should be given to him at this payment on the necessary military hard- ence in southeast Asia. It pertains to
time. ware. Now we must meet the second equipment for the men, includes hospit-
Mr. GORE. I am happy to yield to and third payments, in order to complete alizatian, and supply depots, all to take
the Senator from Oregon. the order. care of what we have there.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, yester-- Supplementing what; the Senator said I thank the Senator for yielding to me.
day I sent the following telegram to the on this point, in the procurement figure Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I am
Senator from Montana l Mr. MANSFIELD], in this bill of $3,004 million, which is for grateful for the statesmanlike presenta-
which was delivered to the Senator's the procurement of military hardware tion of this bill by the distinguished
office: articles I have already mentioned, this senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. Rus-
ltespectfully recommend that debate and sum is merely a continuation of the ap- SELL I. He, and also, just now, the able
vote on sui,,plexnental military procurement propriation made last year, in order to junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr.
and construction authorization bill, fiscal make the second, third, and however STENNIS], have made it perfectly clear
year 1966, now the pending business of the many more payments are required with that one can support the pending bill
E1.,cnate, be postponed until after February 22. reference to the entire purchases. The without having it interpreted, unless
I consider it important that Senate and
Nation have benefit of testimony given at due date for the debt for which we ap- someone desires to make a misinterpre-
Voreign Relations Committee hearing by propriated last year is here. I urged tation, as an approval of the policies
Taylor and Rusk, and I hope also by then that we appropriate mon funds. I that have been followed or may here-
McNamara and Wheeler, before Senate votes knew that much more would bra required. after be followed in southeast Asia.
on this war appropriation bill. I thought we should take a bigier bite on I shall support the pending bill. I
vleNamara?s testimony before Armed the necessary fund in 1965. shall do so because, whether wisely or
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the unwisely, as has been said here, our
services committee is no substitute for his
discussing overall issues of U.S. policy Senator yield? troops are committed to battle there.
in Asia at public hearings before For- Mr. STENNIS. I yield, with the in- They are there on orders, not of their
eign. Relations committee. Contrary to inn dulgence of the Senator from Tennessee. choosing, but on orders of the Com-
pression administration has tried to create mander osin in Chief.
with American people, neither McNamara nor Mr. GORE. I yield.
Wheeler would be asked at Foreign Relations Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator from American troops in an area of hostili-
Conxmittee hearings any question that wou..d Mississippi interpret the approval of this ties must be supplied the equipment and
involve security matters. If any such ques- request for supplemental appropriations the materials necessary to enable them
tion were asked, the administration knows to accomplish the mission assigned them
Lim-, all its witnesses need do is to suggest as either approving or disapproving our by their superiors with maximum effec-
and with with
uch. questions be laid aside until they policy in South Vietnam? by their
minimum danger
can such'
can be answered in executive session. Mr. STENNIS. Frankly, I think it is themselves.
I can assure you that I am far from alone neither approval nor disapproval of our
in tlxe Senate in my recommendation to you policy. We are already committed. We The Secretary of Defense and Joint
that this military authorization bill be voted have already gone in. We have already Chiefs of Staff have stated that addi-
on. after February 22. put the men on the ground. They must tional funds are required for this pur-
With best wishes for a speedy recovery. $1.2 Retards, have support; $1.2 billion of the funds Pose.
WAYNE MoasE, in the bill is for military construction in my view it is incumbent upon the
U.S. senator. items. it is to take care of the men and Congress to provide funds for their sup-
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 _ try 16, ,roved Ford, a $~J/j9R - P67 1 000400020001-5 3011
port. This I will do, but I wish to make change mission. One of them listened
it emphatically clear, however, that sup- to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
port of similar measures in the past and In the evening thereafter he made a sig-
support of the pending measure now has nificant remark to me. He said, "This
not and does not reflect approval on my could occur only in a great and free
part of the policies and decisions that society."
have led to our involvement in Vietnam Mr. President, I am pleased for the
in its current proportions. On the con- Communist world to know. I am pleased
trary, it is my view that commitment of for those behind the Iron Curtain who
U.S. combat forces to Vietnam was a se- may not be pleased with their lot to
rious mistake, and will prove to be, in my know that there is one place in the
view, a historic mistake, that has in- world where the most critical issues can
creased rather than diminished the dan- be the subject of free debate. Yes; this
ger of a major war. is necessary in our democratic society.
Support of our troops in battle is one it is in the interest of public under-
thing; approval of national policies and standing of the issues that the Senate
decisions which put them there is quite Foreign Relations Committee is now
another. Some may regard this as a holding, public hearings on the overall
narrow, legalistic distinction. I do not; questions of policy involved in Vietnam.
and I am pleased the Armed Services In my view, both these hearings and this
Committee has unanimously determined debate are in the national interest.
that it should not be so interpreted. I wish to advert to the question that
What has been done has been done. approval of the pending bill is not tanta-
I will not support an amendment to mount to approval of the policies in
repeal the resolution of 1964. We can no southeast Asia. I do so to call attention
more repeal what has been done than we to the fact that when Secretary Rusk
can turn the sun back in its course. I was last before the Committee on For-
will not support an amendment to oppose eign Relations testifying in support of
sending draftees to Vietnam. Draftees the foreign aid. authorization request, he
are already there. Such an amendment was asked, I believe by the chairman of
to prevent the sending of replacements the committee, if a vote for that bill
would, in my view, be unfair to the men could be or would be regarded as ap-
already serving there. proval of the policies in southeast Asia.
Let it be understood that I support The Secretary demurred and said he
and support strongly the pending meas- would not like to answer that question
ure. We cannot be niggardly in supply- "just now." I am not attempting to
ing the materiel that our forces need to quote him exactly, but at any rate he
accomplish their mission and to do so deferred his answer.
with minimum danger to themselves. So it is pertinent to make the point
I voice my deep concern at this time, and to make it clear. From the RECORD
not with any idea that the calendar can it is now abundantly clear that a Senator
be reversed, not for the purpose of ex- can vote for this measure, and have it
pressing criticism, but in the hope that understood that he is voting for a specific
a review of the past and a searching pub- bill and only that.
lic analysis and debate of the present From the beginning I have had seri-
may possibly be of some help In shaping ous reservations about our policy In Viet-
the momentous decisions in the days and nam. The publicly stated objective of
months ahead. The responsibility of a our policy as being designed to secure
U.S. Senator and the dictates of con- to the people of South Vietnam the right
science impel me to participate in this to determine their own destiny without
discussion and to express these views. outside interference is, of course, fully
Public discussion is essential in a free desirable, if possible and feasible, but I
society. have not and do not believe that the
Statements have been made here policies and programs followed offered or
earlier today to the effect that this de- offer a reasonable opportunity for achiev-
bate would be an aid to the enemy. I ing this objective at bearable cost and
recall that when the previous authoriza- without posing potentially disastrous
tion bill was before the Senate last Au- consequences for ourselves and for the
gust, the junior Senator from Mississippi, free world. It is easy to coin or repeat
the chairman of the Preparedness In- slogans like "victory" and "standing up
vestigating Subcommittee, and also a to the Communists."
member of the Committee on Appropri- One can enjoy wrapping the flag about
ations, invited debate. Unfortunately, himself and enjoy a chauvinistic exer-
in my view, the Senate did not respond cise, but it is much more difficult to de-
to his invitation. I fault myself in that vise and Implement programs for ap-
regard. plication to the conditions. existing in
Debate is necessary for our democratic Vietnam which offer realistic hopes of
processes. A government conducted converting such slogans into a workable
under such a system must be conducted, policy that is fully consistent with our
in the main, in public. Democracy may national interest.
have its weaknesses. I believe it was the I have repeatedly voiced my reserva-
late, great Winston Churchill who said tions about the course of events in Viet-
that democracy is the worst form of gov- nam. When President Eisenhower un-
ernment except any other kind. That dertook our initial commitment I coun-
may not be an accurate quotation. This seled against it.
is a hazard that democracies always face. The junior Senator from Mississippi
An interesting observation was made did likewise, and I joined him in debate
to me in this regard last week when the in 1954, as the RECORD will show.
delegation was here from the Mexican I strongly advised President Kennedy
Congress on an interparliamentary ex- against broadening and deepening that
commitment. I have frequently urged
President Johnson and his Cabinet mem-
bers to avoid a wider war.
Until late 1964, I confined my state-
ments to direct communication and to
sessions of the U.S. Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee in the main. I say now
that I should have been speaking out
publicly more than I did. I feel a share
of responsibility in that regard. I fol-
lowed this course In deference to the
constitutional responsibility of the Pres-
ident and to a feeling that strident pub-
lic opposition and dissent to policies al-
ready publicly proclaimed might in some
degree lessen whatever chance there was
for effectiveness of such policies. Upon
reflection, I have concluded that this
was a mistake and I am sorry I did not
speak out publicly more often and sooner
than I did.
Legislative support of what must be
done to meet national commitments
neither implies approval of unwise pol-
icies nor negates my responsibility to
voice apprehension about present policy.
An analysis of the present situation
and a consideration of the future require
a review of the past.
Our direct Involvement in Vietnam
may be said to have started with the fall
of Dienbienphu in 1954. Of course we
were involved before then, but our role
theretofore was In support of the French
to whom we gave massive economic and
materiel support. As I recall, our sup-
port of the French in their efforts in
Vietnam amounted to some $2 billion.
After 7 years of war to which they
committed hundreds of thousands of
troops, and despite our logistic support,
the French suffered a costly defeat. The
French learned, or at least were com-
pelled to admit, that massive military op-
erations conducted thousands of miles
from their shores in the jungles and rice
paddies of southeast Asia are not the
answer to a problem that was and still
is to a large degree political, ideological,
cultural, economic, religious, and racial
in nature.
Much is said about the necessity of
meeting our national commitments, up-
holding our national honor, and protect-
ing vital national interests. Of course,
we must do these things, Mr. President.
But having said so, we must define and
understand the commitments that na-
tional honor requires us to meet, from
both a legal and moral standpoint. And
in determining our vital national inter-
ests we must do so in context with our
many worldwide responsibilities; we must
avoid becoming mesmerized by slogans
and by commitments that do not exist;
and we must achieve a balanced posture
that recognizes our limitations as well as
our strength.
Mr. President, let us examine the na-
ture of our legal commitment in Viet-
nam.
Following the Geneva accords of 1954,
to which we did not subscribe but which
we agreed to recognize and support, the
Eisenhower administration made' the
crucial decision to pick up the pieces
dropped by the defeated, withdrawing
French and to shoulder the responsibility
for promoting economic and political sta-
bility and preserving order In this iso-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE F eobruary 16,
lated area of the world which was teem-
ing with turmoil.
That was our first big mistake. How
foolish we were to undertake a burden
which the French, who were far more
knowledgeable of this area than we, had,
after 7 years of war, with an army of
400,000 men, found an almost impossible
undertaking.
And so, in October 1954, in a letter
from President Eisenhower to the Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers of Viet-
nam, the Government of the United
States made what, along with the obliga-
tions we undertook under the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, consti-
tutes our formal commitment to Viet-
nam. President Eisenhower offered U.S.
aid "to assist the Government of Viet-
nam in developing and maintaining a
,strong, viable state, capable of resisting
attempted subversion through military
means."
In this letter, President Eisenhower
made it clear that such aid would be
conditional upon assurances by the Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam "as to the
standards of performance it would be
able to maintain in the event such aid
were supplied." He added, significantly:
"the Government of the United States
expects that this aid will be met by per-
formance on the part of the Government
of Vietnam in undertaking needed re-
forms."
In addition to the unilateral commit-
ment contained in President Eisen-
bower's letter, the United States incurred
certain obligations under the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Pro-
tocol which was negotiated in September
1.954, and which went into effect in Feb-
ruary 1955. Article IV of the SEATO
Treaty provides as follows:
1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by
means of aimed attack in the treaty area
against any of the Parties or against any
State or territory which the Parties by unan-
imous agreeemnt may hereafter designate,
would endanger its own peace and safety,
and agrees that it will in that event act to
nisei the common danger in accordance with
its constitutional processes. Measures taken
under this paragraph shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council of the
United Nations.
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties,
the inviolability or the integrity of the ter..
ritory or the sovereignty or political inde-
pendence o1 any Party in the treaty area
or of any other State or territory to which
the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article
from time to time apply is threatened in any
way other than by armed attack or is affected
or threatened by any fact or situation which
raignt endanger the peace of the area, the
Parties shall. consult immediately In order
loo :vgree on the measures which should be
taken for the common defense.
3. It is understood that no action on the
territory of any State designated by unani-
mous agreement under paragraph 1 of this
Article or on any territory so designated
shall be taken except at the invitation or
with the consent of the government con-
cerned.
If is to be noted that the parties to the
treaty pledge action in accordance with.
their respective constitutional procedures
to meet "egression by means of armed.
attack" against any of the parties or cer-
tain other States in the treaty area-in-
cluding South Vietnam. The Parties
agree--to do what?-to consult immedi- that because of his own feeling about
ately to determine such measures as the problems of the Commander in Chief
should. be taken to meet any threat other and the administration, it was the better
than by armed attack. part of discretion not to speak out until
Pursuant to the Presidential letter of near the end of 1964. I think that re-
1954, the United States proceeded to ex- fleets the course of action that many
tend aid to South Vietnam. This aid Members of the Senate have been taking.
consisted of economic aid and military The fact that other Senators have not
supplies and equipment together with yet spoken out on this issue is no rea-
funds to support the Vietnamese mili- son to conclude that they do not have
tary establishment. U.S. military per- deep apprehensions and misgivings about.
sonne], were limited to small numbers the course that the United States is fol-
whose mission was to assist in training lowing.
the Vietnamese army and directing ad- Before the Senator leaves that part
ministration of the aid program. of his speech-
This arrangement continued for sev- Mr. GORE. If I may Interrupt, I
eral years. From time to time, optimis- should like to comment on that point
tic statements were issued about the briefly.
solid progress being made in development Although I hold myself culpable for
of the economy and development of the reluctance to speak out, I do not wish
Vietnam army. For example, in May to criticize other Senators in that regard,
1957, a joint statement issued from the In extenuation, however, I should like
White House on the occasion of visit by to suggest---
President Diem noted that: Mr. McGOVERN. I do not want to
In less than 3 years a choatic situation imply any criticism either.
resulting from years of war hid been Mr. GORE. I suggest that it is the
changed into one of progress and stability. imminent threat of a third world war,
Concerned was expressed over the buildup of as I interpret events, which has dis-
military forces in North Vietnam and it was turbed me; and, I dare say, it is the im-
agreed that agression or subversion threat-
ening the political independence of the Re- minence of this threat which is causing
public of Vietnam would be cone tiered as more and more Senators to express their
endangering peace and stability. views publicly.
Unless the threat of such a catastrophe
That is as fax as this joint s ..;cement bestirs men to action, and unless men*.,;
went. souls are aroused by these events, what
During this period which, by compari- on earth could arouse them to action
son, now appears to have been one of and impel them to take a position which
relative calm, however, it appeared nec- for the morrient may be unpopular with a
essary to continue to provide more and great many people?
more in the -way of aid to maintain the Mr. McGOVERN. I thoroughly agree
Diem regime. Statements about prog- with the Senator's observation. Ile has
ress proved to be illusory. And by 1959 been speaking about the critical period
it was obvious that the situation was get- after 1954, when the French effort in this
ting worse instead of better. same area ended in failure.
In .April 1959, in an address at Gettys- The Senator will recall that in 'the
burg College, President Eisenhower re- spring of 1954, when the French collapse
viewed the then current situation and appeared imminent, the late Secretary of
concluded that South Vietnam was in- State, Mr. Dulles, felt that perhaps we
capable of meeting unaided the threat ought to send American forces into that
of aggression and subversion. He re- area to see if we could turn back Ho Chi
iterated the domino theory and Justified Minh`s forces and resolve the military
the extension of military as well as eco- decision on the side of the French
nomic assistance as in our own national against the Communist forces.
interests. Aid was continued and in- President Eisenhower believed that
creased. should not be done unless we could ob-
But despite increased aid, the Gov- tain the cooperation of the British, who
ernment of South Vietnam became less were then headed by Prime Minister
stable, its economy weaker. Subversion Churchill.
became more widespread, with the Viet- Frequently we hear people argue that
cong holding and openly contro'ling sub- we are in southeast Asia lest we repeat
stantial segments of the country. Thus the errors that were made at Munich
was the situation upon the change in when the Western Powers failed to stand
administrations in January 1961. up to Hitler. The voice that sounded
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will most clearly in 1938, at the time of the
the Senator from "Tennessee yield? Munich crisis, in a call for firm actior.
Mr. GORE. I yield to the Senator from against Hitler waq the voice of Winston
South Dakota. Churchill. Yet, it was Prime Minister
Mn McGOVERN. First, may I ask the Churchill who counseled against Ames-
Senator whether he would prefer not to ican intervention in French I1ldocL.i1.aL
be interrupted? If so, I shall wait until in 1954.
he has concluded his speech. Anthony Eden writes of this period
Mr. GORE. I have no preference: I that Winston Churchill firmly believed
am happy to accommodate the Senator that the British would be doing the
from South Dakota. Americans a great injustice if they gave
Mr. McGOVERN. I have had the op- any encouragement whatever to the
portunity to read quickly most of the sending of American troops into that
Senator's address. I believe he ismak- part of the world.
Ing an extremely important statement Does the Senator not think it signifi-
today, one which reflects the sentiment cant that the one man who stands out
of many other Members of the Senate. in our mind as having been right at
Among other things, he has pointed out the time of the Munich crisis in 1938 did
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,,,,,,,may 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
not see any parallel between that situa- economic aid inherited from the Eisen-
tion and the sending of American troops hower administration. Secretary Rusk
into French Indochina in 1954? announced increased military assistance
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, Mr. on May 4, 1961. On the next day then
Churchill was very knowledgeable of Vice President Johnson went to Vietnam
conditions in both Europe and southeast and on May 13 a joint statement issued
Asia. Those conditions are in contrast, in Saigon announced additional meas-
in many respects-political conditions, ures "to extend and build upon existing
governmental structures, social organi-
zation, terrain, divergence in economics,
in industrialization, and political sophis-
tication. Indeed, there has never been
a nation of Vietnam. I shall not get
into a description of Vietnam in reply
to the Senator.
Mr. Churchill was showing his usual
perspicacity when he drew a distinction
rather than a parallel.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, it
seems to me that one of the things that
may have led us astray in southeast
Asia is that we have drawn the wrong
lessons and interpretations from pre-
vious historical situations. It is argued
by some who most ardently defend our
present position in southeast Asia that
we are trying to contain the threat of
Chinese communism in that part of the
world in the same way that we were con-
taining Russian Communist belligerents
in Western Europe after World War II.
I believe the two situations are vastly
different.
Mr. GORE. Some have become so ob-
sessed and pleased with the success of
the Marshall plan in the containment
of communism in Western Europe that
they seek to apply that remedy world-
wide, when European conditions do not
prevail in southeast Asia.
Mr. McGOVERN. Is it not correct
that, if we were to follow in southeast
Asia the same course that we pursued in
checking the spread of Soviet Russian
power in Western Europe 20 years ago,
it would involve the active support of the
countries of Western Europe, Britain,
France, West Germany, Italy, the Scan-
dinavian countries, plus the principal
countries of Asia, India, Japan, Paki-
stan, and others? This would parallel
the collective security arrangements to
check the possible threat of Chinese
Communist power in that area in the
same manner -in which we had an air-
tight collective security arrangement
thrown around the Soviet Union in
1945?
Is it not true that we have moved into
southeast Asia largely on a unilateral
basis, and that we are following a policy
that has very little support, either in Asia
or in Western Europe, and, in fact, has
the active opposition or, at least, the
grave doubt of other great countries in
Asia and in Western Europe?
Mr. GORE. I agree with the Senator.
As I said on the floor of the Senate a few
days ago, a basic and grievous error in
our policy is that, in a unilateral man-
ner, we violate the collective security
principle which we endorsed in the
United Nations Charter.
Mr. President, I return now to a brief
history of our commitments to South
Vietnam.
The Kennedy administration embraced
and expanded the policy of military and
Upon his return, Vice President Johnson
appeared before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee and explained that no
commitment had been made to send U.S.
combat forces to South Vietnam.
Now, upon the return of Vice Presi-
dent HUMPHREY, I shall suggest to the
committee that he be invited to appear
before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. We should know what com-
mitments he has made-what public
commitments have been made, what pri-
vate commitments, if any, have been
made, and the authority by which he
made them.
I do not speak critically in this sense.
I assume that whatever commitments he
has made have been upon authorization
of President Johnson. But in line with
my deeply held feeling that the Ameri-
can people are entitled to know the facts
regarding this all-important question of
war or peace, Vice President HUMPHREY
should appear promptly upon his return.
In October 1961, a visit by Gen. Max-
well Taylor resulted in a decision to
bolster still further the military strength
of Vietnam. In December 1961, in an
exchange of letters with President Diem,
President Kennedy pledged to "promptly
increase our assistance to your defense
efforts."
Please note, Mr. President, that this
was an increase of our assistance to the
defense efforts of the Vietnamese them-
selves.
Increased military and economic aid
failed to halt the slippage. A "strategic
hamlet" program for local pacification
was very costly but ineffective. When I
was in Vietnam, I visited some of these
strategic villages. I came back and re-
ported to my Government my assess-
ment that this was a costly program that
was doomed to failure. It failed misera-
bly; but it cost heavily.
It became obvious that the Diem gov-
ernment did not enjoy the confidence of
the Vietnamese people and that only the
U.S. presence and support kept It in of-
fice at all. Religious controversy and
riots brought crisis nearer and nearer.
The conditions contained in President
Eisenhower's letter of 1954 had clearly
not been met. Reforms had not been
accomplished.
President Kennedy was moved to com-
ment on this aspect of the situation on a
television interview of September 2, 1963.
He stated:
I don't think that unless a greater effort
is made by the Government to win popular
support that the war can be won out there.
In the final analysis, it is their war. They
are the ones.who have to win it or lose it.
We can help them, we can give them equip-
ment, we can send our men out there as ad-
visers, but they have to win it-the people
of Vietnam-against the Communists. We
are prepared to continue to assist them, but
I don't think that the war can be won un-
3013
less the people support the effort, and, in
my opinion, in the last 2 months the Gov-
ernment has gotton out of touch with the
people.
It should be noted that in this and a
subsequent TV interview filmed on Sep-
tember 9, 1963, President Kennedy en-
dorsed the so-called domino theory and
made clear his view that we could not
afford to withdraw from Vietnam, but he
also made it clear that stability and
order by the Vietnamese themselves were
a prerequisite to victory.
Now, Mr. President, I should like to
address a few remarks to the "domino
theory."
I recall that when the Communist
apparatus was being fastened upon
Cuba, many statements were made on
the floor of the Senate, on television and
radio, in the press, and on the public
platforms, to the effect that if Cuba fell
under communism, one after another,
the countries of Latin America might
have the Iron Curtain folded about
them. I entertained such concern my-
self, though I never made such state-
ments. I wondered if it might follow.
Many of us felt uncertain about it.
But what do. we find now? The mis-
ery, the suffering and the want, the
suppression which communism has
brought to Cuba is building resistance to
communism in other Latin American
countries. The domino theory did not
work.
The subsequent overthrow and assas-
sination of Diem did not produce either
reform or stability.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. GORE. I yield.
Mr. McGEE. I should like to pursue
a little further the Senator's analogy of
the domino theory in Cuba, as he would
draw an analogy to the domino theory
in southeast Asia.
Mr. GORE. I am not sure that I was
attempting to draw an analogy.
Mr. McGEE. The parallel; would
that be better?
Mr. GORE. I am not sure that I
even intended that. I had previously
referred to the fact that former Presi-
dent Eisenhower had seemed to endorse
the domino theory, and then I had re-
fered to it again, and it came to my
mind that there were instances in
which the domino theory had not worked.
Cuba came immediately to mind. I
am not sure that it is an analogy, but I
am willing to discuss it in that context.
Mr. McGEE. To begin with, the
dominoes would become a little wet.
Starting with Cuba, we were able,
with naval patrol and firmer economic
policies on our own part, and the firming
up of the backbones of some of our
friends in the OAS, I think, to make it
considerably more difficult for Mr.
Castro to spread - his doctrine. It - was
not a matter of merely abandoning the -
situation, leaving it alone, or letting the
rest of the people do it themselves.
The reason I raise the point with the
Senator from Tennessee is that there
is a good bit of the same element present
in Vietnam. if there is someone there
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.3014 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE Februar'u 1 , s;
who is In the position to take the lead,
we shall find the same firming up of
the willingness and the disposition not
to knuckle under, not to surrender, not
to roll over and play dead, under the
pressures that may be coming in from
the north.
1hrrther, I think Cuba would be a better
illustration of the importance of not let-
ting this sort of disease, this falling of
the first domino, knock over the rest of
the elements on the board.
!Ur. GORE. First, let it be understood,
I believe it would be regrettable for the
first domino to fall. I do not believe that
communism in South Vietnam would
be a disaster for the United States, but
it would be most undesirable. So I join
the Senator in opposition to the Com-
munist apparatus fixing its grip on South
Vietnam. But there again, as the Seri--
ator has said of the domino in Cuba, it
might get a little wet tumbling to Indo-
nesia or to the Philippines.
It seems to me that we become a little
mesmerized with these terms, and that
they may not always be applicable. That
is perhaps one reason why I was reluctant
to say I was drawing an analogy.
Mr. McGEE. I appreciate the Sena-
tor's point. If I may return to south-
east Asia, however, and the domino
theory, perhaps we need to think up it
new name for it. "Domino theory" has
become a dirty word, or an expression
open to criticism. But whatever we may
call it, small countries being forced to
accommodate their positions and policies
to an overwhelming giant near their
borders, because their neighbors collapse,
is what is about to happen in southeast
Asia. If we want to call it the domino
theory, let us deal with it as the domino
theory, and then we can discuss the
domino theory as applying to southeast
Asia.
Mr. GORE. It might be equally,
though perhaps inaccurately, described
by another term with which so many
people have become fascinated, namely
"sphere of influence."
Mr. McGEE. I do not happen to bun
the sphere of influence theory either,
but I believe that there is much concern
over abandoning this area because of
the disproportionate capabilities in sheer
power between the small independent
countries in southeast Asia on the one
hand and China alone on the other. It is
quite unlike Cuba, in the Caribbean,
where an overwhelming force still
remains, that of the United States. The
issue there is a comparable force which
would not permit Russia, through Cuba,
or China, through Cuba, to move very
far on whatever theory we may wish to
consider it.
liut, in southeast Asia, there is no force
commensurate with the great land mass
potential of China. For that reason, I
believe that we have to weigh the
prospect that faces Cambodia, Thailand,
Burma-acrd Indonesia. Indonesia be-
comes an interesting case in point, be-
cause it was a case of the Chinese Com-
munists really overreaching many of
their own dimensions too fast and too
soon. We should go slow in dismissing;
the concept that the fall of one nation
only delays momentarily the fall of the
next, the next, and then the next in this
part of the world. This has historically
been the pattern of power politics in this
area of southeast Asia.
Mr. GORE. I wonder whether the
Senator from Wyoming would mind if I
addressed some remarks to the
Indonesian situation to which he made
reference?
Mr. McGEE. No. I believe it would
contribute to this dialog.
Mr. GORE. More or less pu?antheti-
cally, I believe it is important to keep in
mind that. as the Senator indicated, the
upheaval in. Indonesia may have been in
consequence of the Communists over-
reaching themselves. That in my
view, partly correct..
But, there was another factor. The
United States continued aid to Indonesia
under the most difficult and trying cir-
cumstances.. One of the most difficult
speeches I have been called upon to make
was on the floor of the Senate in sup-
port. of continuation of aid to Indonesia
after Mr. Sukarno had publicly told the
United States to take its aid and go to
hell.. But., I was advised, as other mem-
bers of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations were advised, that iri the view
of our Government, a confrontation be-
tween the local Communists in Indo-
nesia-called. I believe, the PKI-and
the military was inevitable, that al-
though the military leaders were not
particularly aligned with the United
States, they were anti-Communist and,
therefore. it was in our national interest
to maintain liaison through aid and
otherwise.
Congress, fortunately, supported the
administration in that policy. When the
confrontation came, it came in an awk-
ward way. The Senator has aptly de-
scribed it as an overreaching; by the
Corrimunists.
The Communists intended to assassi-
nate all the military leaders. They did
succeed in assassinating several, but they
missed some. Out of this upheaval has
come the emergence of the military lead-
ers, many of whom :received th. it educa-
tion in the United States, They are not
aligned with the United States. They
are, however, asserting an Indonesian in-
dependence and the kind of government
suited to their own people and i heir pur-
poses. But they are anti-Communist.
What more can we ask? 'We ask no
more. When I am asked, as I am fre-
quently and critically, why I support and
have supported foreign aid programs for
Indonesia, I am pleased to cit, this ex-
ample, in which I believe our aid has
been. fully justified.
I hope the Senator will pardon me for
this parenthetical reference to a matter
to which he had alluded.
Mr. McGEE. Not at all. Tire fact is
that I, too, stanchly supported all of
our programs in Indonesia. We cannot
afford to change our foreign policy be-
cause we are angry at some individual
who is the head of a country. And our
foreign policy must therefore be prem-
ised on that basis. He will not always
be there. But the people will be. I be-
lieve there was some static raised on the
floor of the Senate in respect to helping
a country headed. by someone like
Sukarno, but I believe we see now that
there is substantial evidence of making
one policy and continuing that policy,
and recognizing that heads of state are
mortals, and will eventually pass on, but
the people as a whole will still be there.
I believe that Indonesia becomes another
case in point in terms of our support for
the kind of stance which will make it
possible for the independence of In-
donesia, of Vietnam, of Cambodia, of
Malaysia, to take firm root.
Much as I am unhappy with the fact
that there is a heavy military complexion
in some of these countries, we cannot
but wish to give them the opportunity to
win their independence and develop
along paths of their own chosing. That
is what is at stake now. That is the rea-
son why 1: cannot understand the :mis-
givings which are being expressed on the
floor of the Senate from time to time
concerning America's position in Viet-
nam. Any casual glance at the vast sub-
continent of Asia, it seems to me, tells its
own story in history and is a contem-
porary fact of our time. We do not need
to argue that some of the critics else-
where and. in the Senate do not read the
history books. They need only to read
the newspapers to see what has happened
in our time.
Here we have a great land mass donii.-
nated overwhelmingly by one major
power. I believe that the Senator from
Tennessee shares this position because
my first baptism in that part of the
world was with him, and I sat at his feet,
he was my professor in 1959 when we
first visited India, Thailand, and. Vietnam
when Diem was still alive--but many of
us have been hoping for many years that
India would be the great "makewait" for
China. Nehru, as he made it clear the
day we visited him, was not of that mind,
but a "squeegee" effect was beginning.
We thought that Japan might have
checked China, or that Japan might have
been a balancing force for China. But
we have not trusted Japan. What are
we confronted with now in the wake of
these great, vast, deeply moving changes
in the wake of World War 11 in the small
countries such as Burma, Thailand,
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and those
which stretch on out into the South
Pacific? They really are at the mercy
of an unbalanced, predominantly main-
land Chinese continent. India is in no
position, however, to move south, to try
to maintain the balance, even though
Nehru in his last years was beginning to
talk in terms of India being like the
United States in its earlier history, except
as relates to aggression. Whether he
should have reconstructed his thoughts
in terms of some kind of balance of
power in Asia, I do not follow the critics
who say we have no business there, that
we must get out of there, that we must
have some kind of orderly withdrawal
plan. What will happen to the little
countries there? Does the Senator
argue that they do not wish to be inde-
pendent? Does the Senator argue that
they would rather be under the wing of
mainland China?
What is the case that can be :made for
pulling out of that part of the world.,
after we, as the victors in World War
II-really the victors, Mr- President?
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were the only ones left, by the circum-
stances of a devastating war, with suffi-
cient policing power, to try to put the
pieces back together again?
France and England pulled out. The
Dutch pulled out. Even the old forces
that had existed there and had con-
tributed to the stabilization of some of
the elements out there, were gone. Only
we were in a position to do something.
We tried to carry on with a stabiliza-
tion of that line. We gave India our
backing when she was put to a show-
down in the crisis with China. The
Chinese pulled back.
What is the article on which one can
base the argument that if we were to
pull out everything will settle down, when
in the face of all the evidence there has
been a concerted move outward, to dis-
turb the balance of Asia, if we may use
that unfortunate expression?
Mr. GORE. The distinguished Sena-
tor has given a very able treatise on geo-
politics in a vast portion of the world.
He has referred to numerous situations
in his eloquent statement.
He will recall the evening when he and
I, in the company of our wives, were with
Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi. I
wonder if he recalls that during the
course of that evening, the able and great
Prime Minister on three occasions made
the remark: "When China is strong,
China is aggressive." Does the Senator
recall that statement by the Prime
Minister?
Mr. McGEE. Yes; I recall it.
Mr. GORE. The emergence of China
as a world power is one of the significant
events of all time. The threat of China
to world peace, to world stability, is felt
in all quarters of the world. Indeed, I
know of no nation more aware of it or
which, in my opinion, is more apprehen-
sive about it, than the Soviet Union her-
self. The acquisition of nuclear wea-
pons by China is another event of
monumental proportions. The degree to
which the Communist apparatus is able
to regiment the people is a factor in this
equation. The degree to which they are
able to engender hate of America in this
surging mass of one-fourth of the world's
humanity is something to which all
thoughtful men must give apprehensive
concern.
It seems to me that we must consider
our obligations, our commitments, our
performance, our actions, wherever the
situs may be, in the context of our to-
tal global obligations, our responsibility
as a world leader, and first, foremost and
last, in the context of our own national
security.
These must be interpreted in the light
of our capacity, as well as the dangers,
in the light of first priority, and de-
grees of priority.
I consider communism in Cuba most
detestable and undesirable. But it has
not been disastrous to the United States.
I detest communism in its every concept.
It is oppressive. It is stultifying. I op-
pose it wherever it shows itself, south-
east Asia Included.
But we must not permit our anti-
communism to so blind us that we fol-
low a policy that may bring eventual
disaster for our country. It is easy to
beat one's breast and say, "I am stand-
ing up to communism." This will bring
applause. But how do we stand up to
communism?
We found a successful procedure in
collective security, NATO, the United
Nations. Here we have in Vietnam an
area of secondary importance. Please
note, I did not say an area that is not im-
portant. All peoples are important. All
countries are important, even Vietnam
and Cuba. But certainly one could .not,
in my view, say that either Cuba or
Vietnam's being out from behind the
Iron Curtain, or behind it, effects a major
shift in the balance of power.
During World War II, I was closely
associated with one of the wisest men
I have ever known, the late Bernard M.
Baruch. I was author, as a young Mem-
ber of Congress, of a bill to bring about
wage and price controls early in that
war. The late President Roosevelt was
not ready to accept it. He was well
aware that what I was advocating and
what Mr. Baruch was advocating was
paving the way for what was bound to
come.
Anyway, near the end of the war, as
the attacks upon Japan were reaching
a crescendo, and victory, though months
away, was already in sight, Mr. Baruch
and I were having dinner together. He
said to me, in a paternal sort of way,
"Young man, after this war, which has
been such a world of convulsion, there
will be many upheavals in many parts
of the world, in Asia, Latin America, and
Africa. But keep your eye on Western
Europe, because here, with her indus-
trialization, with her traditions, her po-
litical influence and structure, lies the
balance of power between the Commu-
nists and the free world."
I have remembered that admonition,
and I relate it only to illustrate that as
between Western Europe and Vietnam,
there is a vast difference in priority of
commitment, in essentiality and vitality,
a difference in American interests.
I agree with Mr. Kennan, who said
that Vietnam was a matter of national
interest to us, but not a matter of vital
national interest.
That is one part of my answer.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, would
the Senator prefer to complete his state-
ment?
Mr. GORE. Let me complete it.
Mr. McGEE. Very well.
Mr. GORE. I would treat Vietnam as
a matter of importance, but of secondary
importance, not as a matter of first pri-
ority.
The difficulty with our policy is that we
have become mesmerized with it. We
are tending to put all our eggs in this
frail basket, thus endangering our com-
mitments on a broader scale to other
areas where our national interest is more
vitally concerned.
An answer to all the questions which
the Senator has posed would require a
full afternoon of discussion. I would
like to go a bit further, however, and
then I shall yield again.
I have been deeply convinced -from
the beginning-and the records of the
executive sessions of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, if the Senator will read
them, will so disclose-that the most
important thing involved in southeast
Asia was not Vietnam, north or south, or
north and south, but rather it has been
and is the equation between the three
world powers, the United States, Russia,
and China.
Shall we follow a course that is cal-
culated to heal the breach which we have
been developing between China and Rus-
sia, thus splitting the monolithic unity
of the Communist world? That is a pos-
sible consequence of a war between the
United States and China.
The able junior Senator from Missis-
sippi has expressed the view that a war
between the United States and China
might involve nuclear weapons. I join
him in that estimate because I doubt
that public opinion in this country would
permit her sons to be pitted man for
man against the masses of China with-
out giving to them every weapon in our
arsenal. Once the nuclear weapon is
used, the holocaust may have begun.
If the United States uses it first, for
the second time the white man will have
used nuclear weapons against the yel-
low race. This has portents for the fu-
ture which none of us can foresee and
the end of which no one could predict.
It is not certain that Russia would
come to the aid of China in a war with
a capitalist state. True, she has a firm
treaty commitment to do so, but I do
not know that we could rush to the con-
clusion that she would keep that treaty
commitment. She might act otherwise
should the United States become bogged
down in an Asiatic war in this Asiatic
morass.
The Soviets might rub their hands and
look about themselves and start working
their machinations in Latin America and
in Africa. They might raise trouble in
Berlin again, or move into Manchuria.
What would we do then committed to a
war with one-fourth of the human race,
halfway around the world, under circum-
stances most disadvantageous to our-
selves logistically, politically, and mili-
tarily?
Hitler learned, or should have learned,
that it was unwise to have a war on
both his fronts.
I believe Russia has been looking over
her left shoulder. Her apprehension of
China may well increase her desire for
rapprochement with the West. Indeed,
the more China has emerged as a world
power the more inclination Russia has
shown to improve her relations with the
West. Berlin has not been flaming with
action for many months, but once we
are bogged down it may be inflamed
quickly.
So I conclude a partial answer to the
question which the Senator has raised by
saying that in my view these factors must
be weighed. Vietnam must be viewed in
perspective and considered in perspec-
tive not as the end and the center of the
earth. It is neither. It is an area in
which we have demonstrated already in
a costly way our deep concern for peo-
ple who wish to resist communism.
I do not believe that in order to dem-
onstrate our sincerity in this regard we
are required to leap over the precipice
into an abyss that threatens a third
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world war and a possible nuclear holo-
caust.
am sorry to have taken so long. I
could have taken longer.
V1r. McGEE. The Senator need not
apologize to the Senator from Wyoming
for taking so long, because the Senator
always approaches these questions on
which we differ at such a high level that
it contributes to the dialog and the better
understanding of these questions.
1 wish to attempt to respond in those
areas where we have a basic difference
on the remarks the Senator has just
shared with us.
Mr. GORE. I welcome the exchange
with the able Senator. I consider him to
be one of the brightest lights that has
come to the Senate for a long time. We
are personal friends. I enjoy his con.-
tributions and welcome them.
Mr. McGEE. I thank my colleague
from Tennessee for his very generous
observations.
f should like to go back to two or three
of the real essentials and discuss those
hypotheses or fundamentals with him.
Mr. GORE. First, let me ask the Sen-
ator from. Wyoming whether the type of
discussion in which the Senate is en-
gaged today is an aid to the enemy, or
whether it serves the cause of democracy?
Mr. McGEE. I believe the honest art-
swer is yes.
Mr. GORE. Which?
Mr. McGEE. Both. I believe that
under our system of government and the
kind of society we are trying to perpetu-
ate, this is one of the calculated risks
that we must take. We do not want to
have a society of closed ideas, a society of
one truth. That is one of the risks we
must take. In that respect, it gives aid
and comfort; to the enemy.
Mr. GORE. We cannot abort our own
democratic processes In order to keep
certain information from our enemies.
Mr. M.cGEE. If we must give up a
free society in order to be doing some-
thing else, what is the purpose of doing
the something else?
Mr. GORE. Then we are agreed.
Let us now turn to something else.
Mr. McGEE. I should like to proceed
to something else. There are some es-
sential issues which the Senator has
raised, and it is those issues to which I
should like to turn. They have to do
with priorities.
The senator reminds us that we
should keep these things in perspective.
I believe that if we put these things in
historic perspective, the priorities be-
come obvious.
It is as though someone had said In
1941, "Let us see what our priority :is.
Is it Hitler or is it Japan?" We would
have had a debate then. We cannot do
both, obviously. Many people were say-
ing that.
Mr. President, we are living in a dif-
ferent world, in the wake of a war from
which we emerged as one of two powers
capable of shaping the form of new
balances In the world in the wake of
World War II.
Mr. GORE. Now there are three such
powers.
Mr. McGEE. We are now discussing
another fundamental hypothesis. We
can no longer replan the world In
Western Europe alone. There is an
emerging concern from Eastern Asia,
that would compete with Western Eu-
rope as an essential basic area of national
interest and of the concern of the re-
mainder of the world. What would be
the use of :rebalancing Western Europe,
which the Senator from Tena;cssee and
I agree we have done, notably and largely
because of our presence there at the
end of the war, and then lo:r,ing it all
through Eastern Asia? The world is
round, and World War 11 did more to
shrink the globe than anything else in
our time. With the great scientific
breakthroughs, and the like, we can no
longer talk about Western Eur< pe, about
Versailles, or about; the Congress of Vi-
enna, and then believe we are pulling
back into some kind of tenuous balance
of the powers of the world, because we
discovered in 1941 that what roes on in
Asia as genuinely can jeopardize the se-
curiity of the people of America, and,
indeed, of the world, as wh: t goes on
along the Rhine River in Western
Europe.
So it is no longer possible t > pick and
choose. It is no longer possible to say,
"This is our first priority, this is our sec-
ond priority." Unless and until the
whole globe is brought back into some
semblence of balance, we have no reason
to hope for a constructive opportunity to
contribute to a different world, to help to
contribute to a world that would be a
little better than the world thr t preceded
World War II.
So I take issue with the Senator from
Tennessee in terms of priorities. We
have to take the world as it comes. We
did it successfully in Europe: we did it
successfully in Iran in 1946; in Turkey
and Greece in 1947; in Italy in. 1949; and
there has been a difference.
We met the test in Korea; we are meet-
ing the test now in Vietnam. I submit
to the Senator that these tests are all cut
from the same cloth. It is a many-
colored cloth, but it has been put togeth-
er in strange new ways, because the repe-
titions of history are not precise and
accurate. Because it, happened one way
in Western Europe and happened in an-
other in the East does not mean there is
no reason why we cannot learn from the
one and apply to the other. Likewise it
is fundamental that in terms of monopoly
of power in one place, what inhibits the
right of independence of smaller neigh-
bors is as Irrevocable in Asia as it is in
Europe.
The lessons we should have learned
from Mr. Hitler are just as strong as the
lessons we can now put into practice be-
fore the time becomes later.
The Senator from Tennessee talks
about the prospect of a great nuclear war,
an atomic war on the mainland of Asia.
I do not know whether that will happen.
God help us if it does. But I submit that
if we follow the Senator's policy with
respect to Vietnam, the necessity of re-
sorting to some extreme of that sort may
become more horrendous and probably
more likely in the long run.
We said exactly thesame things about
the Soviet Union. The people who op-
posed our going into Berlin, the people
who opposed our taking the great chance.
who were afraid of what would happen
if there were a blockade of Berlin, said
that it would lead to a big war with
Russia. Who knows? Only Moscow
could answer that question. But some-
body had to put the issue face up, be-
cause what happened in Berlin made a
difference.. As the great Winston
Churchill once said, because of the A:me --
ican willingness to take a chance, even
the chance of a big war related to Berlin,
Russia is not on the Atlantic coast >f
Europe today.
I disagree with the Senator from 'Ten-
nessee about Cuba. Cuba, with only
Castro and whatever his little party has
there, is no great make-wait on the bal-
ance of power in the world. But with
Russia and her missiles in Cuba, the bal-
ance of power in the world was read-
justed, and that was where we risked a
showdown in 1962: We risked war with
Russia. Who can say that we did .rot
risk nuclear war with Russia? That de-
pends on the decisions that were made in
Moscow. But somewhere it was neces-
sary to draw the line.
I submit that drawing the line fails
upon our shoulders more than it does on
the shoulders of anyone else, because we
emerged from World War II with the
capabilities of doing something about it.
Let me turn now to the priority of
Vietnam, if I may-
Mr. GORE. Let me reply to the four
points the Senator from Wyoming has
made. Then we can come to, the next
one. If I do not reply now, I shall forget
what the able Senator has said, I did
not take clown his remarks in shorthand.
Mr. McGEE. I have some basic: dif-
ferences with the Senator's very learned
remarks. Following our interesting ex-
change, I had hoped I might go to his
second priority.
Mr. GORE. Will the Senator contain
himself for a moment until we deal with
the first one?
Mr. McGEE. The Senator from Ten-
nessee has the floor; he has done me
the courtesy of yielding.
Mr. GORE. I am delighted to do so,
but the colloquy might be more mean-
ingful to those who may read it, and I
shall be better able, I think, to engage in
It, if I deal with the points as they are
made.
The able Senator has said a good many
things. For one, he said that we must
draw the line somewhere. He said we
must determine where that is. But then,
it seemed to me, he met himself coin-
ing back when he said it is no longer
possible for us to pick and choose where
to stand.
Mr. McGEE. As between Europe and
Asia.
Mr. GORE. The Senator did not say
that.
Mr. McGEE. Let me interpolate that
now. That was obvious from the con-
text.
Mr. GORE. To quote the Senator
further, he said, "we must take them
where they come." There, indeed., Is a
fundamental difference in our points of
view. I believe we must pick and choose.
We must put things in perspective.
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a-
The Senator from Wyoming says that
there are no degrees of priority; that "we
must take them where they come."
Mr. McGEE. If the Senator from
Tennessee will yield, the Senator from
Wyoming did not say any such thing as
that. He said as between Western
Europe, which was the area about which
the Senator was speaking, and the Soviet
Union, and the Far East, where we are
talking about Vietnam. The Senator
from Wyoming said we cannot pick and
choose; they are cut from the same cloth.
I was not talking about the whale globe.
I am talking about the centers of power,
where the real clash of power emerges,
where the confrontation needs to be met.
That is far different from saying there
are no priorities.
Mr. GORE. What did the Senator
from Wyoming mean when he said, "It
is no longer possible to pick,and choose;
we must take them where they come"?
Mr. McGEE. That we cannot settle
our differences in Western Europe. We
must recognize that the world is round,
and that the great forces of potential
power that both the Senator from Ten-
nessee and I have been discussing are no
longer concentrated along the Rhine or
at the Congress of Vienna; they happen
to have moved into Eastern Asia, as well.
It is no longer Moscow and the United
States. Peiping has come into the pic-
ture. Many of us had hoped that India
would have checked Peiping. We had
hoped that Japan might do so, too, but
Japan appears not to be willing. We
cannot separate the restoration of the
remainder of Asia from the rest of
Western Europe. It is no longer "either,
or," as it was not even-in 1941.
Mr. GORE. I am glad to have the
Senator's explanation. That was not
exactly what I understood him to say.
Mr. McGEE. The Senator has to know
what I mean rather than what I say;
I am not so articulate as he is.
Mr. GORE. I am always glad to know
what the Senator from Wyoming means,
because he means well. The difference
between us emerges rather clearly. Not
only Vietnam, but all areas in which we
are interested, as well, must be viewed in
their relationship to our own vital na-
tional interest. They must be viewed in
relationship to our global responsibilities.
If, indeed, we have lost the capacity to
pick and choose; if, indeed, we are
stripped of the power of discretion, of
the option to put things in perspective,
and if we consider every area as all-im-
portant to our national interest, then,
indeed, we are the victim of events; we
are no longer the masters of our fate.
If this be true, we have become prison-
ers of an anti-Communist dogma and
the initiative rests in the hands of our
enemy who can bring us to a battlefield
not of our choosing, but of his choosing.
Indeed, in this context, if we are in this
sad plight, it might well be that some of
our military men are correct in their
analysis that Vietnam is a baited trap.
I have not been so convinced. I had
thought it had a degree of "happen-
stance' about it. But, if indeed the
situation is as bad as the Senator de-
scribes it, I shall have to think about it
again.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I did not
allude to it as a baited trap.
Mr. GORE. The Senator draws an
analogy between our enemies in World
War II, Germany and Japan, and our
adversaries in this Vietnam war. There
is a vast difference.
The United States was attacked at
Pearl Harbor. This attack was described
by the late President Roosevelt as a day
of infamy. To a man, to a woman, to a
child, with one voice, with one accord,
we arose. We had a cause for which
practically all men were ready and will-
ing to fight. That is not true in this
situation.
The United States is involved, and it
has become involved step by step. We
have inched into this Asiatic morass
through three administrations. Three
Presidents have assured the American
people that combat forces would not be
sent to Vietnam. Upon many occasions
it was said that the steps being taken
were not to be followed by subsequent
events which some of us foresaw.
The war did not begin with an attack
upon the United States which would have
given the American people 'a clear cause
for which to fight and for which they
would be willing to send their sons over-
seas. Even the enemy is not clearly iden-
tifiable. Although we speak of bringing
Hanoi to the peace table and we identify
North Vietnam as the adversary-and I
believe that they are the directing genius
of the guerrilla war-yet a majority of
the forces that have been plotting terror
and brutality, with which forces we are
presently fighting in South Vietnam, are
South Vietnamese.
I am not prepared to dismiss this as a
civil war, as an indigenous revolution. I
think those elements are present. Un-
questionably there is religious strife.
There is ancient racial animosity between
the Montagnards and the Vietnamese.
The Senator and I visited together Mon-
tagnard villages. We sipped some bitter
liquid through straws from a deep wine
keg in a native village.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, let the
RECORD show that it was liquid rice.
Mr. GORE. Religious animosities ex-
ist there. France never permitted the
country to become a nation. It pitted
prince against prince, duke against duke,
and divided in order to exploit. There is
little doubt as to just who the enemy
really is.
We heard it said on the floor of the
Senate today that the real enemy is the
Chinese. Is it the Chinese, the North
Vietnamese, or the Vietcong? Perhaps it
is all three.
In any event, the situation is fraught
with confusion. It is military, but it is
equally political, economic, social, reli-
gious, racial, and anticolonialism.
We have the legacy of 100 years of
French exploitation with which we must
cope. I do not believe that the analogy
between Germany and Japan as the
enemy in World War II and the confu-
sion which exists in Vietnam is an ac-
curate one. It is contrast rather than
comparison.
The Senator draws another analogy
with which I disagree. He draws an
analogy between South Vietnam on the
one hand and Russian missiles in Cuba
and the Communist conquest of Berlin
on the other. I completely disagree with
that.
In Berlin and in the 1962 Cuban crisis,
priorities were clear. Yet the Senator
says we cannot draw priorities, that we
must take them as they come, that no
longer can we pick and choose.
Mr. President, in Cuba the Russians
were attempting atomic blackmail. They
were attempting to seize and reverse the
balance of power.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, if they
had succeeded in Cuba, would they have
upset the balance of power?
Mr. GORE. The Senator is correct.
Had they succeeded in placing numerous
missiles with atomic warheads in Cuba,
they would have achieved a great victory.
They would have altered the military
situation in the world.
I am not prepared to say that that
would have shifted the balance of power,
but we would have been under the gun.
Mr. McGEE. Then the Senator agrees
with me. That is what I just got
through saying.
Mr. GORE. We would have been un-
der the gun, the trigger cocked, with a
pistol at our temple, so to speak. This
would surely have seriously altered the
situation. Indeed, although I am not
prepared to assert this, it was stated to
the Committee on Foreign Relations in
executive session that if the Russians
should succeed in Cuba, it would shift
the balance of power.
Now, with respect to Berlin, Germany
is the strongest industrial and military
force in Western Europe. The seizure
of Berlin by the Communists would have
seriously altered the military situation
and the balance of forces, political, eco-
nomic, and military, in Europe. It
would have extinguished the ambition of
all Germans, East or West, for ultimate
reunification of their country.
It would have placed the largest city
in central Europe under Communist
domination.
Mr. President, much as I regret to dis-
agree with the able Senator, to consider
Vietnam, on one hand, as having the
same priority and importance to the
United States as Russian atomic mis-
siles in Cuba or Russian seizure of
Berlin, is totally in error.
Now, to come to the fourth and last
point-and then I shall yield again-the
Senator treats Vietnam as one of
the-
Mr. McGEE. Critical areas of the
world.
Mr. GORE. Critical areas, where the
Communists attempt to make a gain; is
that correct?
Mr. McGEE. Correct.
Mr. GORE. But he says we must treat
them all alike; they all have the same
priority.
I think the point is important. I wish
to resist this conclusion. I think a Ho
Chi Minh government of South Vietnam
would be most undesirable; but I do not
think that possible eventuality should be
considered as a matter of top priority
concern to the vital interests of the
United States. I simply do not think it
holds that relative importance to us.
Now I yield. -
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Mr. McGEE. I thank my fellow Sen-
ator for yielding again.
I address myself, first of all, to the rela-
tive roles of Japan, the Pacific, and West.-
ern Europe in our stake in Asia and Eu-
rope simultaneously, rather than to the
convenience of selecting priorities as be-
tween the two.
Of course, the attack of Japan on Pearl
Harbor galvanized us all. Of course, we
were united. Because we had not been
willing to learn in Manchuria in 1931 the
lesson I trust we learned then, we paid
with a gigantic war in the Pacific.
That is the reason why we would like
to avoid that kind of exigency, that kind
of confrontation again. That is the
whole point. The Senator could not
have more eloquently made the point I
wish to get across: that we cannot afford
to wait another time, because of nuclear
capabilities, for war tension to get as far
along as it had when the Japanese struck
Pearl Harbor, or when Germany at-
tacked Poland.
I trust we have learned our lessons.
For the language that is universal, both
in Berlin and in Tokyo, both in London
and in Washington, in Saigon, in Ja-
karta, in Canberra, is the lesson that we
should have learned by now about when
to stop an aggressor.
if we had only learned that lesson, or
been willing to act upon it, in 1931 in
Manchuria, in 1935 In the Rhineland,
in 1936 in Ethiopia, who knows what the
prospects might have been for a differ-
ent kind of confrontation of the aggres-
sors? It would have been in different
dimensional form than we have known
since in history. We cannot say with
certainty, because we do not have that
kind of omniscience, but we do know
what the price was for doing it the way
we did it before, trying to appease a
dictator, whetting his appetite by giv-
ing him somebody else's real estate. It
does not work.
So I would answer the Senator, who
says that there is no necessary priority
connection between the Pacific and
Western Europe, in response to my as-
sertion that there is, that there is in-
deed; they are cut from the same cloth,
they are swept by the same threat, and
they are put out of balance by the Same
disproportionate forces that character-
ized the imbalance of Europe at the end
of World War II.
What has happened in Asia is as much
our doing or undoing as it is the next
fellow's. We fought a war in Asia, simul-
taneously with the war it was said we
could not fight in Western Europe.
Many sober voices warned us against a
two-front war. But in spite of the un-
fortunate experience of Mr. Hitler on
that score, both with Russia and West-
ern Europe, we did rather well. We dis-
covered what we had to do, and with the
great resources God has blessed us with,
and the leadership we were able to com-
mand, we succeeded.
But I say to my friend from Tennessee
that we are going to have to do it over
the old way if we do not watch out, and
that the time to stop aggression is at
the beginning. I call to his mind a bit
of warning and finger-wagging Lord
Palmerston did 100 years ago in the
British Parliament. He was speaking of
the Russians-they were not Commu-
nists then, but they had great power.
He said that anyone can predict the
policy of an expansionist state if he
reads a history book. He said that what
they seek to do is press outward along
their periphery; and wherever they are
not stopped, they will break through
and take another piece of geography, but
whenever they are stopped, they go else-
where to seek softness.
The parallel Palmerston referred to
100 years ago obtains at the present
time, whether one applies it to Moscow
of Peiping. The willingness to risk the
use of force, or in certain instances to
actually command that force, makes
the difference.
Those on the other side have gambled
all along that we were inhibited about
using force-that somehow the Ameri-
cans, because we had a different stand-
ard, and because one human life makes
a difference to us-would be very reluc-
tant to resort to the use of force.
Hitler knew our minds better than did
some of the American people themselves,
and he gambled. He was net a great
power, as we know them today. Eng-
land, France, the United States and Rus-
sia were all more powerful titan Hitler
on paper. But Hitler was willing to risk
his power, and he capitalized on the
inhibitions of the "have" nations not to
risk what they had. That is how he
got by with literal murder for as long
as he did, until it took the h' locaust of
a gigantic World War II to bring him
down.
That is exactly the reason for the
petition I would submit to tae Senate
today. I say that we have a lesson to
learn, and that lesson, which was writ-
ten in Europe, is equally applicable in
Asia.
Look at the prize at stake in Asia.
Look at the prize, I say to my friend from
Tennessee. Southeast Asia: 300 million
people, and more. Most of the rice of
the world. Oil, tin, bauxite and rubber.
These would be sparkling diamonds in
the resources of great powers, and par-
ticularly of a power that is only now
beginning to expand its quest for new
industrial capabilities.
This is an area that historically has
been a .great power factor. It was one
of the prizes on the scales of the old-
fashioned balances of the 19t.h century.
This is one of the strategic waterways of
the earth. The trade from East to West
primarily goes this way, acro,,s south-
east Asia.
Likewise, the area itself `tanks the
mainland. Here India is ou:.clanked to
the East. It thrusts, almost a; a dagger,
directly toward the Philippines, Austra-
lia, and New Zealand. This is indeed a
prize to covet.
If we tend to think otherwise. I believe
it would serve us well to go back and
read our history again. Japan did not
attack Pearl Harbor, in order to get
Hawaii. Japan started World War II in
order to obtain a great empire. in south-
east Asia. The Japanese had read the
history books. They were cognizant of
the sources of great power. And I say
that it behooves us, in our national self-
interest, to see that we do not permit,
through our own folly or indifference,
this area to fall into the hands of a
great power that can use it in a hostile
way. That would only raise the cost of
redressing the balance.
Finally, let me say to my friend that
there is another great issue at stake
here that was in truth at stake :in Berlin.
If I may draw the parallel--
Mr. GORE. Let me respond to some
of the Senator's points before he makes
others.
Mr. McGEE. If I am speaking to sev-
eral points, only because I am attempting
to answer the many points the Senator
from Tennessee raised.
Mr. GORE. Very well; I yield further.
Mr. McGEE. Each time I respond to
half of the Senator's points, lie injects
another dozen, and I am having difficulty
keeping up. So I would appreciate it if
I could finish the context of his sugges-
tions just made.
The question of the uncertainties of
the people in southeast Asia, it seems to
me, is a very large question. In Western
Europe, at the time of the Berlin crisis,
we were friends of the English, the
French, and many others. They knew
what we stood for. But they were not
sure that the great power that we were
left with at the end of the war would be
used to try to protect a balance in Eu-
rope. They, too, read a history book.
At the end of the first great war, we
went home, and Europe was taken over
by the dictators. It was forfeited. The
English, the French, the Dutch, the Bel-
gians, and the rest of them had to have
the answer to that big question: Would
the Americans, this time, stay as they
had promised when they went to war?
They did not know for sure. Would they
accommodate with the Russians? Or
could they afford to remain outside of
this orbit, and remain free?
It took :Berlin to answer that, inciden-
tally, to resolve that question in the
mind, well as they knew us. What it
represented was more the breaking of the
blockade. It represented the American
will to risk a war in behalf of freedom
and an opportunity for a better kind of
peace, if that were to be our lot in our
time. That is the great questiomnark
which hangs today over some of the small
nations in southeast Asia. Of course
they are different from us. They are
different because their institutions are
sometimes in opposition to our own. But
the one thing that they have, that we
have, the one thing they can. talk about
that we can talk about in the same
language is the dignity of independence;
namely their national identity. It is
that identity which makes the difference.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I must in-
terrupt the Senator there. Despite the
statement of the able Senator from
Wyoming, the Vietnamese people do not
have, never have had, and never have
known the dignity of individualism, the
freedom, the sense of independence
which the American people have. They
have never even been a nation. They
have never been independent. I do not
know how the Senator arrives at that
conclusion.
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Mr. McGEE. May I respond to that?
Mr. GORE. Certainly.
Mr. McGEE. One of the great prizes
we won in Asia for the American role
there during the war was the prize of
winning the complete disintegration of
the old colonial empires. They had been
there too long.
Mr. GORE. But they had been there
100 years.
Mr. McGEE. After the colonial em-
pires pulled out, those people were
sparked by the new and often underesti-
mated drive for national independence,
for their own identity as areas, even
though those areas sometimes resulted in
awkward geographic configurations im-
posed by colonial powers, and even
though it did not always represent a basic
ethnic nationalism.
The point remains, typical of most of
Asia, as well as Africa and Latin Amer-
ica: The explosion of the nearly inde-
pendent countries in a drive to further
their own independence again. This is
true of southeast Asia. It is that spirit
of historic craving for independence to
which I am referring when I draw that
analogy. All I am saying is that these
countries need to know where we stand.
Are they going to have to live beneath
the shadow of the great giant to the
north, not knowing from one day to the
next what the future of their own in-
dependence may be? Are they going to
have to accommodate themselves in some
way, economically and politically-as we
have seen through the National Libera-
tion Front movement-to the regimes in
the north? They do not know. It makes
a difference to them, because they would
like very much to survive some way.
They need to know whether it will be
a shield or a wall behind which, as was
the case in Western Europe, they would
have a reasonable opportunity to strug-
gle, in some tortuous way, up the scale
of economic, social and political growth.
God knows, they have a long way to go.
That is another reason, it seems to me,
why this question mark hangs over us, the
same kind of question mark that poses
the same fundamental question which
was posed in a far more mature way, and
in a far more elevated scale of living, in
the politics of Western Europe, but it is,
nonetheless, the kind of spirit that causes
their hearts to beat a little faster. I am
sure that they are as proud of their na-
tionalism as we are of ours. That is why
we are there. That is why we have to
take over and be there. That is why we
have to follow through this responsibility
as well.
Let me say in conclusion to my friend
the Senator from Tennessee, in response
to the particular issue which has been
raised-
Mr. GORE. I must interrupt the
Senator. I do not believe that is the
reason we are there at all. We are not
in Vietnam because of the nationalism of
the Vietnamese people.
Mr. McGEE. There the Senator goes
again, lifting my words out of context.
Mr. GORE. The Senator just stat-
ed-
Mr. McGEE. I have been speaking
for a great many minutes with the Sen-
ator. I have stressed the balance of
power in southeast Asia. I have stressed
the lessons learned in fighting aggres-
sion. I have stressed the element of the
nationalistic ambitions of the people.
Therefore, if the Senator would be will-
ing to keep what I hava said in its total
context when he refers to my explana-
tion of independence and our presence in
South Vietnam, it would be appreciated.
Mr. GORE. I shall be happy to deal
with the total context of the able Sen-
ator's very eloquent interjection. It is
true that there are lessons to learn from
history. It is true that we can draw
some wisdom from the events of the past;
but I, as a limited historian, have not
noticed history repeating itself very
often. It is much less likely to do so in
the nuclear age. Never before have we
had the balance of power, the means of
communication, and the power of almost
total destruction in the hands of a few
powers as it exists today.
Mr. McGEE. Did the Senator say
"never before"?
Mr. GORE. Will the Senator kindly
let me proceed, please?
Mr. McGEE. Of course.
Mr. GORE. The Senator very ably
cites many incidents of the past and
many tragic historic occurrences. Then
he makes what I believe is a grievous
error in drawing an analogy between
every one of those occurrences and
Vietnam.
They are simply not analogies. True,
we have made errors. True, we have
succeeded in containing communism in
the Mediterranean basin to some ex-
tent, although we have not exterminated
it. The largest political party in Italy Is
still the Communist Party.
Once again, I suggest, that is a situa-
tion which is not analogous. But, to
hasten on to my address, and to make
summary comment, the Senator has
again referred to Berlin and to Russian
nuclear missiles on Cuba.
As one Senator, I was fully prepared
to accept the risk of a third world war-
a nuclear war-when the Russians at-
tempted to put their atomic missiles in
Cuba. This was a risk which I thought
we should take. It happened that I was
a delegate to the United Nations at the
time. There, I saw the secret communi-
cation between President Kennedy and
Mr. Khrushchev. Never in all my life
have I been so proud of an American
President as I was during that dramatic
episode. I shall not undertake to quote
the communication except to say in es-
sence that the President told Mr. Khru-
shchev that the missiles must be re-
moved from Cuba and quickly, that if he
did not take them off, we would.
This was a risk which we had to take
because the stakes were high. The vital
interests of America were at stake. I am
not sure that the balance of power in the
world was not also at stake.
At least, our freedom of action would
clearly have been compromise had we
allowed Russian missiles to remain in
Cuba.
I was prepared, in my own mind, to
support the risk of war over Berlin, be-
cause there, too, I thought the balance
of power was at stake. But I am. not
willing to go over the brink of the abyss
toward a third world war over Viet-
nam.
Let me repeat, it is important, but it
does not, in my opinion, involve our
vital interests. Communism there would
be disagreeable and undesirable, but
surely no more disastrous to the
United States in Vietnam than it is in
Cuba.
Mr. McGEE. The Senator does not
really believe that, does he?
Mr. GORE. Indeed I do. I do not
know why the Senator asked the ques-
tion in that way.
Mr. McGEE. Will the Senator
yield-
Mr. GORE. Not for the moment. In-
deed, I believe it. I have been trying
for the last hour to convince the Sen-
ator of the error of his way when he un-
dertakes to draw an analogy, to estab-
lish a comparable priority, between Viet-
nam and Western Europe, between any-
thing and everything in the world. He
says, we can no longer pick and choose;
we have to take them where they are.
Mr. McGEE. Between Western Eu-
rope and Asia. The Senator is running
a little loose on this analogy. It is be-
tween Western Europe and Asia.
Mr. GORE. If I am running a little
loose it is only because I am quoting the
Senator.
Mr. McGEE. The Senator withdrew a
statement earlier. I assume he wants to
withdraw this.
Mr. GORE. No, I do not withdraw
it. The Senator has made a second ex-
planation, but he has arrived at the same
conclusion he previously stated.
If I may, I would like to get back to
the historical development of our esca-
lation-
Mr. McGEE. Is the Senator terminat-
ing the colloquy? I asked him to yield
a moment ago.
Mr. GORE. If the Senator wishes me
to yield, I do so.
Mr. McGEE. I understood the Sena-
tor was responding to my comments that
I have been making for an hour or so.
Mr. GORE. I am happy to yield fur-
ther, as much as the Senator desires.
Mr. McGEE. May I say that my friend
and I disagree over-
Mr. GORE. We have disagreed. Let
us go to another point.
Mr. McGEE. My friend and I disa-
gree. The central point is whether Viet-
nam by right is of such importance as
for us to assume whatever risk may be
involved in our presence there. These
are risks we cannot foresee. We have to
make educated guesses. I said this risk
is of a high priority, in the national inter-
est and that of the world, because I feel
that what we do or fail to do in south-
east Asia can well write the real future
of eastern Asia in terms of the various
potentials of power that are loose in that
area. Therefore, our fundamental dis-
agreement rests, if I understand the Sen-
ator correctly, upon the issue that Viet-
nam is only another small country, in
which there may or may not be com-
munism. If we leave the word "com-
munism" out of the debate, we can see
the issue a little more clearly. I think it
is a matter of aggression. It is a matter
of power that jeopardizes the balance in
this critical area, where the power cal-
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culations, by offsetting the balances,
bring about stability.
it is awful to talk about "balance of
power." I know that. But balance of
power is still the only substitute which
man, in all his foolishness, has been able
to find for war. That is a sorry com-
mentary on the human race.
Mr. GORE. And does the Senator say
that Communist control of Vietnam
would bring about a shift of that bal-
ance of power?
Mr. MCGEE. I suggest that, in the
same hour to which the Senator has al-
luded, I have been trying to make that
point.
Mr. GORE. The Senator thinks that
is so?
Mr-. MCGEE. I do. I believe the bal-
ance of power in Asia depends on our
presence there.
Mr, GORE. The Senator mentioned
the numerous minerals In that area.
Can the Senator nam" one strategic
product in South Vietnam?
Mr. MCGEE. I think rice itself would
be a considerable inducement-
Mr.. GORE. That is the first time :l
have heard rice described as a strategic
material. I thought it was a bit starchy.
Mr. McGEE. People have happened to
become a basic indispensable resource in
the modern sinews of power. Rice hap-
pens to be a part of what is necessary for
those people to survive.
Mr. GORE. Will the Senator name me
a strategic mineral exported from South
Vietnam?
Mr. McGEE. I think that is irrelE:--
vant. The Senator, with his skillful do-?
bating, is .getting by the point.
Mr. GORE. No; I am trying to get the
Senator on the point.
Mr. McGEE. Vietnam lies astride a
vast area---
Mr. GORE. The Senator is talking
about strategic materials. That is a,
geographic point.
Mr. McGEE. It is astride a vast area
of 300 million people, and rice is neces-
sary to them. There are bauxite, tier,
rubber, oil--
Mr. GOlE. The point I am trying to
make is that, with respect to Vietnam,
there is nothing but confusion.
Mr. McGEE. Vietnam is a symbol.
Mr. GORE. Now the Senator talks
about a symbol.
Mr. McGEE. It is a symbol of the
whole area, and that is at stake just as
much as Manchuria, even with its re-
moteness, was deemed to be unrelated to
the rise of Japan.
Mr. GORE. The Senator is drawing
an analogy-
Mr. MCGEE. Whenever the Senator
finds an uncomfortable analogy, he
downgrades the analogy. We can learn
from the pages of the history books.
Let us not, do it this time. The only
way not to do it is on the side of not
ignoring aggression in the hope that
no more will take place.
Mr. GORE. I do not find the anal.--
o:;; uncomfortable. I find it abstruse.
Mr. McGEE. The pattern worldwide,
it seems to me, is whether we should
seek to confront aggression, which had
something to do with the beginning of
World War II, and has something to
do with the aftermath following that
same conflict; that we would be mis-
taken In trying to confine our analysis
to a single incident; and that the tactics
and strategy are the same. Even
though the strategy may remain the
same, the tactics may differ. The fact
is that the tactics of Russia in Iran were
not the same tactics she took in Greece,
in Turkey, or in Berlin or Korea.
Mr. GORE. The Senator is now gen-
er aliizing,
Mr. MCGEE. I am trying to put it in
perspective, as the Senator has . uggested.
Mr. GORE. The Senator ha; said that
Vietnam would affect the balance of
power. He has talked about the rich
strategic minerals and products and the
people of Vietnam. I have asked him to
name one of those strategic materials.
He has named rice.
Mr. MCGEE. I wish the Senator
would not---
Mr. GORE. Does the Senator from
Arkansas I:Mr. FULBRIGxTI fee] the need
of more rice?
Mr. MCGEE. The Senator r'duces the
power concept to a ridiculous concept.
He knows what the sinews of power are.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. GORE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In Arkansas we
are great producers of rice. A 10-per-
cent increase in acreage has just been
announced. Vietnam ought to be pro-
ducing its own rice. Formerly it did.
Will the Senator yield to ire for a
question?
Mr. GORE. I yield.
Mr. FULBBRIGHT. Unfortunately, I
did not hear the analogies which the
Senator from Wyoming mentioned.
Who is the aggressor? Did the Senator
indicate who he thought was tl ie aggres-
sor in South Vietnam?
Mr. GORE. I would rather yield to
the Senator from Wyoming on that point.
Mr. LAUSCHE. What is the question?
Mr. McGEE. As I understand, the
question is whether we had attempted to
name the aggressor.
Mr. GORE. Whether the Senator
from Wyoming had named the
aggressor?
Mr. McGEE. I believe the record is
rather replete with evidence that the ag-
gressor that we are concerned about at
this particular point is the aggression
across the 17th parallel from the north,
through the National Liberation Front,
and through regular units which have
come down.
Mr. GORE. Is that a sufficient answer
for the Senator from Arkansas?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought that
paw t of the discussion indicated that it
was China which was the ag??.ressor. I
was not clear who the Senator thought
was the aggressor.
Mr. MCGEE. We were discussing
China as being a major source of power.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Does the Senator
from Arkansas claim that the United
States is the aggressor?
Mr. GORE. I yielded to the Senator
from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not hear the
beginning of the colloquy with the Sen-
ator from Wyoming. He was drawing art
analogy of various other places.
Can the Senator remember when the
United States ever before stepped into
the shoes of a former colonial power, as
we have done in South Vietnam, in which
we support a colonial power in trying to
retain its power, as we did in the case c f
France?
Is it not true that in nearly every case
that I can think of our sympathies and
support have been on the side of the
colony seeking freedom from the colonial
master?
Mr. GORE. The statement of the
Senator is certainly true, and this is con-
sistent with our national origin.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
correct.
Mr. GORE. We came into being
through a revolution, through insur-
gency. This country has sympathetically
responded to moves of independence and
I do not now recall any other in-
stance-
Mr. President, may I ask for order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate will be in order.
Mr. GORE. I do not recall any other
instance in history when the United
States has gone to the aid of a country
to retain its colonial empire.
Mr. FUL.BRIGHT. It is the only one
that I know of.
Mr. GORE. And we went heavily. I
believe the cost was about $2 billion.
The Vietnamese people did not wish
France to continue her exploitation.
They resisted. They fought victoriously
at Dienbi'.enphu. They fought vi-
ciously and won. We made the very great
and grave mistake of undertaking this
burden after the French, after fighting
7 years with an army of up to 400.000
men, with our almost unlimited aid, had
failed.
I cite that as an answer to the Sen-
ator.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is what I
thought. This situation is not cornpa-
rable, it seems to me, to Berlin or hardly
any other case that has been mentioned
in the course of the colloquy in the re-
cent exchange. There are many differ-
ences in this case from many of the
other analogies referred to.
Most important is that Vietnam was
seeking to recover her independence,
which was taken from her by force in
1784 or 1785. Normally, in our tradi-
tional way, we would have favored that.
Instead of that, in this case, for rea-
sons unrelated to Vietnam, we took the
side of the French and did our best to
retain their colonial control. This has
led to many unfortunate results. I
though that should be clear for the
RECORD.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield at that point?
Mr. GORE. No; I do not now yield.
I wish first to respond to the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relation.;.
I know of no valid analogy that can be
drawn between the predicament in Viet-
nam and any other instance in which
we have been engaged. It is quite
unique.
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T bruary 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I feel that way.
There are no similar analogies any-
where in the world.
Mr. GORE. The question on which
the distinguished Senator from Wyoming
and I have been engaged in extended de-
bate turns on this point.
The able Senator equates Vietnam
with World War II, with Munich, with
missiles in Cuba, with Berlin, and with
just about every instance that he has
thus far recalled in history. I do not
believe they are on all fours.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not believe
they are relevant.
Mr. GORE. There may be a certain
relevancy, but in my view they are cer-
tainly not analogous.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the
Senator if I understood him to say that
Vietnam, per se-and leaving for later
discussion the influence of China-is not
vital to the security of the United States.
Mr. GORE. Does the Senator agree
with me that Vietnam does not consti-
tute sti-
tute the balance of power between the
major powers of the world?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. - I do agree with the
Senator. It is a weak and poor country,
with no industrialization to speak of. It
formerly had almost a large surplus of
rice. It is now importing rice due to the
destruction as a result of this war. For
the foreseeable future it is a very poor
country that will need a great deal of
assistance for its problems.
Will the Senator not agree that appar-
ently behind the concern about Vietnam
is really a concern about China in the
minds of those who exaggerate, in my
view, or emphasize the significance of
Vietnam?
Mr. GORE. I believe in all fairness
and candor that I should say that this
is behind my concern also, but from a
different point of view.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is from mine,
too.
This is a matter one must consider;
and we in the Senate should try to un-
derstand what is the significance of
China, what role she has played in the
past, and what she may be playing in the
present.
I do not believe that it is at all clear
at the moment.
Mr. GORE. I agree.
I wish now to take the opportunity to
express my appreciation to the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations
for having taken the initiative to
promote a better examination of the
issues herein involved.
I was in my home State over the week-
end, and I heard many expressions of
appreciation for the committee hearings.
People considered them enlightening and
educational. "For the first time," they
said, "we begin to understand the issues
involved."
Mr. President, this is a democracy.
We can follow the course of wisdom only
to the extent that our people are en-
lightened and informed. It is only from
information and enlightenment that a
wise decision can be reached.
I thank the chairman.
Expressions have been made here to
the effect that we are aiding com-
munism by holding these hearings, or by
engaging in the kind of debate that has
been held on the floor of the Senate
today.
I reject that argument. I believe that
our democratic processes must operate.
We lose the most precious element we
have if we forego that.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. GORE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I wish to
express my appreciation for what the
Senator has said about the hearings. I
understand that earlier today, before we
had completed our hearings on the Asia
Bank, there were some rather harsh
words said about the hearings. I ap-
preciate the Senator's comments. He
has played a very important role in the
hearings. -
Speaking for myself, I agree that the
hearings are most essential. I apologize
to the Senate, and I regret that I did not
initiate them and that the committee did
not initiate them long ago. I can only
say that I did not realize earlier how se-
rious this commitment in southeast Asia
was.
At the time of the 1964 resolution I
really had no realization of what we were
about to get into, or how it was about to
escalate, or certainly I would have held
hearings then. I- regret that we did not
do this earlier. However, it is better to
have the hearings now than not at all.
If the Senator and his committee col-
leagues are agreeable, I hope we shall be
able to continue to have some hearings
for the education and enlightenment of
the people of this country and of the
Senate.
Mr. McGEE. I am sure the Senator
from Tennessee recalls my earlier com-
ments on that point.
Mr. GORE. I am pleased to say that
the senior Senator from Wyoming said
that although the Communists are our
enemies, and might draw some encour-
agement and some glee from the debate,
nevertheless, on balance, in his view, the
debate is an essential part of the work-
ing of our democratic process. The able
Senator from Wyoming and I have had
some difficulty agreeing on numerous
points, but we agreed on that one.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to hear
that.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, following
a very knowledgeable, although I fear
too lengthy colloquy with my colleagues,
I shall return to the history of our in-
volvement in Vietnam. I shall resume
with the assassination of President
Diem. I had said that the subsequent
overthrow and assassination of Diem did
not produce either reform or stability.
Since 1963, a succession of govern-
ments, some military and some civilian,
have operated one step removed from
utter chaos. The pace of deterioration
became more rapid. As our aid was
further increased and our military ad-
visers became more numerous, the
Vietcong increased its control over the
3021
countryside both in terms of geography
and people. But we continued to main-
tain the fiction that our role was that of
providing assistance to the sovereign
Government of South Vietnam in its
struggle for freedom. On June 2, 1964,
President Johnson, referring to the Oc-
tober 1954 letter from President Eisen-
hower, stated:
We will keep this commitment. In the
case of Vietnam, our commitment today is
just the same as the commitment made by
President Eisenhower to President Diem in
1954-a commitment to help these people
help themselves.
Events took a significant turn on Au-
gust 2 and 4 of 1964, when North Viet-
namese gunboats attacked U.S. Navy
ships in international waters in the Gulf
of Tonkin. President Johnson ordered
immediate retaliatory action against
gunboat bases in North Vietnam. His
action was strongly supported by the
overwhelmingly majority of Congress
and the American people. This in-
cluded the senior Senator from Tennes-
see. As I recall, the President described
the retaliatory action as a limited re-
sponse to the attack on our ships on the
high seas. Shortly thereafter, as the
President's request, the Congress over-
whelmingly passed a resolution support-
ing the determination of the President
to take "all necessary measures to repel
any armed attack against the forces of
the United States and to prevent fur-'
ther aggression." The resolution has
been interpreted by some as giving the
President carte blanche authority to
wage undeclared war.
I shall not enter into a discussion of
this issue except to say that I did not so
regard it. But raising legalistic ques-
tions will not solve our current problems.
We must deal with the situation as it
exists, whatever may be the theoretical
legal arguments about how it was
created. It has been suggested that Con-
gress can rescind that action. But of
what benefit would that be? What has
been done cannot be repealed. We must
start from where we are.
Since August of 1964 we have witnessed
steady escalation of the scope of
U.S. participation in the conflict. Our
military forces on the scene have been
drastically increased in numbers and
are now committed to combat. Begin-
ning a year ago, planes have carried the
war to North Vietnam with bombing
raids almost on an around-the-clock
basis. We have engaged in saturation
bombing of the jungles with our B-52
bombers. All of this has been done with-
out visible measurable progress in bring-
ing the situation under control.
The flow of supplies and recruits from
the North has continued, but the
strength and manpower of the Vietcong
is still predominantly indigenous to
South Vietnam.
If I correctly understand the situa-
tion, the brutalities, the atrocities, and
the horrible bestiality that are practiced
upon the people in the villages of Viet-
nam are committed by the South Viet-
namese Vietcong adherents.
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Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Tennessee yield for a
statement: on that point?
Mr. GORE. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I reject vigorously
and vehemently the statement that the
South Vietnamese are the perpetrators
of torture and bestiality. The truth is
that the Communists and the North Viet.-
naanese are the ones that are perpetrat-
inr: it.
rle. GOIh . Mr. President--
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator from 'Tennessee permit m e
to comment on that statement?
Mr. GORE. In just a moment. I am
willing to have the Senator from Ohio
make his statement, but I do not believe
that the facts support his statement.
The overwhelming preponderance of the
forces of the Vietcong and the Corl?-
lnunist forces that have been in South
Vietnam are indigenous to South Viet-
nam. It is true that many of them have
been trained in North Vietnam; that
they are supplied by the North Viet-
namese; and that to a large extent they
are directed by the Communist Party
and. officio Is in Hanoi. B:.'t the fact is
that perhaps as much as 80 percent of
the forces that we face there as
enemies are South Vietnamese Com.--
munists or Vietcong forces that
are augmented, supplied, directed, or
abetted by the North Vietnamese. I be--
licve that the testimony before our corn--
mittee clearly supports this statement.
if the Senator from Ohio draws a dis--
tinetion between the South Vietnamese,
on the one hand, and Communists on
the other, there might be a basis for his
statement. But, as I understand, the
North Vietnamese and the Vietcong fight;
side by side and perpetrate horrible
crimes together. But it has been my im.--
prrssion that the Vietcong constituted
the vast majority of those forces and
therefore perpetrated the greater ma--
jor?ity of the wrongs.
i/tr. 1.,ALISCHE. With that modifica--
hon, there is some good reason for the
Senator from Tennessee to make his
statement.
Mr. GO'ZE. In other words, we per-
haps misunderstood each other.
N4,% LAUSCHE. The implication con-
tamed in the original statement was that
the Communists are free from guilt of
torture and atrocities, and that all the
blame lies with the anti-Communists.
Mr_. GORE. I am sorry that the Son-?
a .tor from Ohio so interpreted my state-
ment; I surely did not so mean it.
Mr. ILAUSCHE. The records are re-,
plete with statements that the Commu-.
nists have practiced the most violent;
atrocities imaginable.
Mr. GORE. I agree.
r,3r. LAUSCHE. The lives of the chiefs,
the mayor.;, and the other friends of the
West have a duration of about 4 months..
Wi.hin 4 months, their heads are re-
5 eavcd from their bodies and are placed.
l,i pikes for the observation of the in-?
n e ent South Vietnamese citizens.
(t)I:Ls:. Mr. President, I agree
with the hhenator. Many of the victims
have been the innocent teachers of little
children. If the inference first drawn by
the Senator from Ohio could be read
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 16, 1966
from my statement, I wish it made ex-
plicit that I did not so intend.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. GORE. I yield.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I
point out that very obviously there have
been atrocities on both sides This is
the kind of war that produces atrocities.
I am fully aware of the consistent
atrocities practiced by the Vietcong. As
the Senator points out, there have been
executions--murders-of villa;ze leaders,
teachers, and others. There have been
atrocities by both parties in the civil
war. These people are not fighting under
the kind of Marquis de Queensbury rules
which we should like to see app lied. One
atrocity breeds another.
While the atrocity of planting bombs
in buses and restaurants is horrible, I
think there is not a vast distinction to
be drawn between dropping bombs from
the air, supposedly on strategic targets-
which bombs kill many innocent peo-
ple--and any other kind of bombing.
It is a matter of record that in the
bombing of South Vietnam, with :napalm
and other high explosives, our bombs
have killed many innocent peasants. It
is a part of the whole atrocit v of that
war itself.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, f. know of
no war in history that better illustrates
the accuracy of the old statement that
war is hell than this war in Vietnam.
The atrocities committed by the Com-
munists in this war are really unbeliev-
able in their viciousness.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. Presi. bent, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. GORE. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. Presid. rnt, I do
not believe that we can justifiably and in
fairness to our country place the atroci-
ties admittedly proved to be committed
by the Communists on an eeual basis
with our action and say that our country
is following a similar course. We are
not doing that.
Mr. GORE. The Senator di, l not un-
derstand me to say that;.
Mr. LAIJSCHE. The Sonata r did not
say that. However, the fact is that we
have been most charitable. We have
been enduring the brutality of the Com-
munists. It is not true that when the
people of the United States are told that,
with our entire ethnical ba.ckgrrnrnd, our
acts parallel the acts of the Communists.
Mr. GORE. I know of no on,. who has
said that. And if anyone doer, say it, I
shall. join the Senator in denour cing him.
Mr. President, last summer, with fur-
ther rapid deterioration in South Viet-
nam, President Johnson and his advisers
undertook a full-scale review of our mili-
tary commitments and our military op-
erations. There was much pubic specu-
lation about; a major escalation of the
war. It was widely reported that the
military leaders had reconimei,ded that
some 400,000 troops be committed to
Vietnam.
When the President announced his de-
cision after much public si eculation
about what that decision would be-in
a July 28, 1965 statement, however, it
appeared that he had resisted the mas-
sive escalation that :has been urged upon
him. It was announced that 50,000 ad-
ditional troops would be sent to Vietnam.
In commenting on the President's state-
ment, I said on the floor of the Senate:
I took some heart and found some encour-
agement in President Johnson's statement
today for the following reasons:
First, the President has apparently resisted
the far greater degree of escalation that has
been urged upon him.
Second, the President stopped short of ac-
cepting, or treating this as an American war.
He showed an awareness of the fact that; our
policy has been, and, I think should be, to
assist the Vietnamese to win their own war.
I believe the President showed a keen aware-
ness of the danger of permitting the struggle
to become an American war, a wl;ite man's
war against Asia.
According to the distinguished chair-
man of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices in a statement earlier today, our
troop strength in that area is now in
the neighborhood of 300,000--and our
"highest military authorities" are talk-
ing of 600,000 men being sent there.
I was heartened by references in the
July 28, 1965, pronouncement to the
possibility that the good offices of the
United Nations might be utilized in. an
effort to find a solution. I read from
my July 28, 1965, remarks in the Senate:
Third, by his increased emphasis upon
the United Nations through his letter de-
livered today by Ambassador. Goldberg to
Mr. U Thant, the President demonstrated,
it seemed to me, an awareness of the danger
of isolating the United States in a land war
in Asia and the danger of unifying the Com-
munist world into monolithic unity by the
landing of a major American expeditionary
force in Asia.
Should this happen it might well be that
we would not be permitted the luxury of
concentrating most of our forces in Vietnam.
I had earlier applauded the President's
Johns Hopkins University speech in
which he announced clearly our willing-
ness to negotiate with interested nation:;
without preconditions. More recently,
the pause in the bombing of North Viet-
nam and the widely publicized peace
offensive conducted by President John-
son have served to improve our posture
in the eyes of world opinion. The
President is to be commended fee having
made this effort, and again I commend
him.
But the fact remains that this effort
did not succeed in bringing the contro-
versy to the bargaining table. More-
over, the further effort to utilize the.
United Nations which was begun when
bombing of North Vietnam was resumed
has thus far not been particularly fruit-
ful.
And so, Mr. President, all our orior ac-
tions having failed to resolve the contra--
versy, or even to have brought a solution
nearer, another major escalation ha:;
been under consideration.
There are important differences, _f
think, between our situation now and
what it was last summer. Another esca-
lation must be considered in the light ei'
the fact that our military effort has al-
ready been substantially escalated over
what it was last summer. Each time our
policy has been reviewed over the years,
the result has been that our involvement
has been deepened and the level of our
military effort has been escalated. Al;
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February 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
each step we have become more heavily
committed, the problem has become
more complex, solutions have become
more elusive, and the potential conse-
quences of any course of action have be-
come more serious.
Thus has our commitment evolved,
step by step until what many now regard
as our obligation in Vietnam bears no
resemblance to the obligation we ac-
tually incurred under the Eisenhower
letter of 1954 and the SEATO Treaty.
The pattern of step-by-step escalation
of our commitment, accompanied with
repeated assurances that we seek no
wider war, concerns me greatly and I am
apprehensive that this pattern may be
continued. And that Is the purpose of
this speech.
We have been told repeatedly that we
are in Vietnam only to help the Viet-
namese help themselves. This was not
to become an American war. But we
have gone by successive stages from the
extension of economic aid, to military
aid, to military "advisers" and techni-
cians, to troops to protect vital Ameri-
can installations, and finally to full-scale
offensive commitment of U.S. ground
forces and the bombing of North Viet-
nam. It has become an American war.
If we had insisted upon the terms and
conditions contained in President Eisen-
hower's 1954 letter, we would have long
since had to terminate any assistance at
all in Vietnam. But we did not insist.
From a review of the record it seems
clear to me that we have no binding
legal commitment that requires us to
expend the effort we have undertaken in
Vietnam. What commitment we have,
we have managed to create for ourselves.
It is as if, by saying over and over pub-
licly that we are committed to restore
order and tranquillity in South Vietnam,
we have somehow convinced ourselves
that we are legally bound to do so, what-
ever the cost.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. GORE. I yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I have be-
fore me the SEATO Treaty. Article 4 of
that treaty reads:
ARTICLE IV
1. Each Party recognizes that aggression
by means of armed attack in the treaty area
against any of the Parties or against any
State or territory which the Parties by unani-
mous agreement may hereafter designate,
would endanger its own peace and safety,
and agrees that it will In that event act
to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes. Measures
taken under this paragraph shall be im-
mediately reported to the Security Council
of the United Nations.
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties,
the inviolability or the integrity of the ter-
ritory or the sovereignty or political inde-
pendence of any Party in the treaty area or
of any other State or territory to which the
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article
from time to time apply is threatened in any
way other than by armed attack or is af-
fected or threatened by any fact or situation
which might endanger the peace of the area,
the Parties shall consult Immediately in
order to agree on the measures which should
be taken for the common defense.
3. It is understood that.no action on the
territory of any State designated by unani-
mous agreement under paragraph 1 of this
Article or on any territory so designated
shall be taken except at the invitation or
with the consent of the government
concerned.
This is the protocol, which provides:
The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty unanimously designate
for tl}e purposes of Article IV of the Treaty
the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free
territory under the jurisdiction of the State
of Vietnam.
Mr. President, I interpret that as a
commitment to help these people defend
and hold their territorial sovereignty
and integrity, and that that is a binding
agreement that we made.
If, in our judgment, this agreement
for the benefit of a third party means we
are going to help them maintain the "in-
violability and integrity of their terri-
tory or the sovereignty or political inde-
pendence of any party in the treaty
area" when threatened by any means,
whether by armed attack or by means
other than armed attack, it seems to me
that we have a treaty which compels us
to act to help these people maintain
their own territorial integrity and sover-
eignty against Communist enslavement.
Mr. GORE. I appreciate the Sena-
tor's reference to the SEATO treaty.
For his information, I have previously
dealt with that and have given reasons
why I think this treaty does not amount
to a binding commitment to do what we
are doing or what is contemplated in
Vietnam. I should be glad to discuss it
again, but I have already done so.
Does the Senator from South Dakota
wish me to yield?
Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I wish to make
a brief observation. I know the Senator
has been on his feet for a long time, but
I was particularly grateful for the point
he has made, that we must beware of the
danger of making this an American velar.
I think the Senator is absolutely correct;
this Is a struggle which, in the last anal-
ysis, must be decided primarily by the
people of 'Vietnam themselves.
Frequently, people draw the wrong
parallels with other situations.
We are in South Vietnam with over
200,000 American forces and billions of
dollars in American aid. The govern-
ment there has not been able to put to-
gether an indigenous army capable of
providing the kind of resistance and suc-
cessful effort that we saw, for instance,
in Greece at the end of World War II.
Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator very
much. As I see it, the Communists have
us committed to war in an area where
we-face the greatest possible disadvan-
tages. Second, they have us committed
there all alone. Third, If what some
of my colleagues have said today be
true, we must treat this commitment
with the same degree of priority that
we should treat an attempt to enslave
Western Europe, or to put Russian
nuclear missiles on Cuba.
I do not believe the situation is quite
that bad, but I appreciate the relevancy
of the Senator's remarks.
I recognize that, in addition to what-
ever formal legal commitment we have
In Vietnam, there is also what Is called
our moral commitment to assist a people
In quest of freedom. I do not subscribe
to the view that the Vietcong movement
is simply, a popular indigenous uprising
against the remnants of despotic colo-
nialism. Evidence of Vietcong terror-
ism, of direction and support from Hanoi
is clear. The Vietcong, if they could do
so, would in my opinion doubtless estab-
lish a repressive Communist regime.
But, Mr. President, there are many
other communist regimes, including the
one in Cuba. Our moral commitment to
liberate Cuba should be at least equally
strong. Even so, it does not necessarily
follow that we should launch a major
military effort to overthrow Castro.
These indefinite "moral commitments"
have their limitations. They must be
measured by our national interest.
In reality, our present commitment
in Vietnam has evolved from the fact
of our presence. Each time we have in-
creased our presence we have enlarged
our commitment. Each time we have
escalated our presence and effort our
dilemma has become magnified.
The distinguished former Ambassa-
dor, Mr. George F. Kennan, in his recent
forceful testimony before the Foreign
Relations Committee, stated as follows:
The first point I would like to make is that
If we were not already involved as we are
today in Vietnam, I would know of no rea-
son why we should wish to become so in-
volved, and I can think of several reasons
why we should wish not to.
In this statement I concur completely.
In the final analysis we should be
guided by our own vital national inter-
ests. It is my view that our national
interests are not served by a major mili-
tary operation in southeast Asia.
First, even if we accept the inevita-
bility of military solutions to cold war
problems-which I do not necessarily
do-it is difficult to Imagine more disad-
vantageous conditions under which to
wage war than those which prevail in
South Vietnam.
Second, we stand virtually alone in
the struggle. We have received only
token support from a few of our allies.
Other free world nations do not even
agree with what we are doing in this un-
happy area. They find It difficult to
understand why we are there. It is not
that our Government has failed to ex-
plain our position. It is simply that they
do not believe that either their interests
or ours are served by the conflict. On
the contrary, they think the free world's
position is endangered. In going it
alone we violate the principle of collec-
tive security to which we committed our-
selves when we subscribed to the United
Nations Charter. We cannot, standing
alone, remake the world, and it does not
serve our national interests to try on
the scale and under the conditions which
prevail in Vietnam.
Third, we must, as I stated earlier, be
guided by our position and our posture
on a global basis, with recognition of the
fact that our strength, though greater
than that ever enjoyed by any nation, is
not limitless. We have responsibilities
around the world. We must meet our
commitments in NATO. We still have
two divisions in Korea. We have prob-
lems and responsibilities within our own
hemisphere. Our military and eco-
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2 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE T'ebntauif 16, 1 ri Distribution, USDA Chicago.
CIIICAGO, ILL.
CARL HOLT,
Director, School Lunch Section,
State Department of Education,
St. Paul, Minn.:
In accordance with instructions from the
Bureau of Budget to hold expenditures under
the special milk program to $1 billion in-
elusive of administrative costs for this fiscal
year you are hereby advised that the current
deduction of 5 percent will be increased to
10 percent beginning with claims for the
month of February. Schools and child care
institutions should. be notified as promptly
as possible. As provided in section 215.7(E)
of the special milk regulations no deductions
will be made in reimbursements to needy
schools.
DENNIS M. DOYLE,
Director, Midwest Area,
U.S. Department of Agriculture.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
CONSUMER AND MARKETING SERVICE,
Chicago, Ill., December 28, 1965.
Mr. C. E. HOLY,
Director, School Lunch Section, State De-
partment of Education, St. Paul, Minn.
DEAR MR. HOLT: This will supplement my
wire of December 23 on the special milk pro-
gram fund situation for the remainder of the
fiscal year.
As you know, Congress appropriated $103
million for the special milk program this
year. Based on preliminary estimates of
expenditures for the year, however, we would
need at least $102 million obligating au-
thority in fiscal year 1966 If the present 5
percent reduction is continued through the
full year. In order to hold expenditures to
$100 million as instructed by the Bureau or
the Budget, it has become necessary to re-
duce obligations for the last half of the year
by $2 million.
Because the school year generally hegira
In September, about 40 percent of program
obligations occur from February 1 to the end
of the fiscal year. Thus, in order to reduce
obligations by $2 million during the remain-
Ing 40 percent of the year, an additional S
percent reduction in claims is necessary be-
ginning with claims for the month of
February..
No restoration of funds which may be
saved by the percentage reduction method
will be made after the end of the fiscal year.
Although the wording of section 215.7(el
of the special milk program regulations, ef-
fective December 1, 1965, is not spelled out
as thoroughly as it was in the former section
215.8(e) of the prior regulations, the intent
is the same. No percentage reduction of re-
imbursement shall be applied to any part of
claims submitted by needy schools approved
for special assistance under the special milk
program.
We hope the overall impact of this action
will not adversely affect program operations.
Sincerely yours,
DENNIS M. DOYLE,
Director, Midwest Apea.
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ae xry 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
"'awm
They were primarily social, economic, and
political decisions. They come at a malle-
able and, perhaps, decisive turn in the war-
His column of February 14 said.
Drummond reported that the Hono-
lulu decisions centered on "how to help
Saigon show the Vietnamese peasant
that it is his own government, not the
Communists', which can and will pro-
tect him, help him, and secure him bet-
ter against the worst hardships of the
fighting."
The problem-and the opportunity-
is to get people who are now either will-
ingly or unwillingly living in Vietcong-
controlled-areas to seek the shelter of the
Government.
The end of the war, Drummond be-
lieves, "will come when the Vietnamese
peasants make this choice."
This column spells out the challenge
before us and our allies in Vietnam, and
in the belief that others may find the
column illuminating, I offer it to ? the
RECORD for publication:
(From the New York Herald Tribune,
Feb. 14, 1966]
DECISIVE TURN IN VIET? WINNING A PEOPLE'S
WAR-VITAL STEPS AT HONOLULU
(By Roscoe Drummond)
WAsuxwoTow.-General Giap, the supreme
commander of the Communist forces in
North Vietnam, has labeled it a "people's
war." He's right.
This is why the decisions taken at Hono-
lulu by President Johnson and Premier Ky
go to the heart of winning. They were pri-
marily social, economic, and political de-
cisions. They come at a malleable and, per-
haps, decisive turn in 'the war.
For a long time the larger part of the 16
million South Vietnamese people, mostly
peasant farmers, has tried hard to stay neu-
tral in the seesaw conflict between the Viet-
cong and the government troops.
They did so not because they wanted to
be ruled by the Communists; there is ample
proof they don't. But for one main reason:
neither side could give them security. Neu-
trality seemed the only way to survive.
The situation is now being radically
altered. The mounting South Vietnamese
and U.S. forces, the steady B-52 raids against
VC strongholds keeping the Communists ever
on the move with fewer places to hide, the
now ability to take the battle to where the
enemy Is and not let him rest-these are
the new factors which are changing the face
of the conflict.
They are making it impossible for the
peasant farmers to avoid much longer hav-
ing to choose sides and either help the gov-
ernment to-win or to cast their lot and lives
with the Communists.
Before the escalation of fighting and the
search-and-destroy strategy of the expanded
Vietnamese and U.S. forces, It was under-
standable that the peasant should feel he
could best avoid trouble by not choosing
sides.
Now the moment of-decision is at hand
when the farmers and villagers will have to
decide whether:
To stay on their farms or in their ham-
lets and take risks of noncombatants in
war.
To move to areas under government con-
trol where the Vietcong is not drawing the
fire of defending forces.
To put their fate and future Into the
hands of the Vietcong.
The Honolulu decisions centered on this
very matter: How to help Saigon show the
Vietnamese peasant that it is his own gov-
ernment, not the Communists', which can
and will protect him, help him and secure
him better against the worst hardships of
the fighting.
Saigon has given the peasant food when
the Vietcong have taken it away from him.
It has given him medicine, helped him repair
the village schools and employed him to re-
pair roads, whereas the Vietcong have forced
the peasants to dig their trenches.
But after a decade of fighting, the Saigon
government cannot alone meet this problem
which will soon become more acute. More
Is needed and the United States proposes to
provide it.
One of the wisest young generals in the
Pentagon, Brig. Gen. Edwin F. Black, who
has just returned from a special mission in
Vietnam, puts the problem-and the oppor-
tunity-in these words:
"This new combination, of relentless pres-
sure on the ground and ceaseless attack from
the air, Is making the Vietcong and their
supporters steadily more miserable * *
sooner or later these pressures will probably
Cause many more of the people, who are now
either willingly or unwillingly living in Viet-
cong controlled areas, to seek the shelter
of the government."
The end of what General Giap calls the
"people's war" will come when the Vietna-
mese peasants make this choice. It .is a
WTOP EDITORIAL COMMENT ON
THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIETNAM
POLICY EXPOUNDS SOME MUCH
NEEDED COMMONSENSE ON- A
COMPLEX ISSUE
(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks at this point in the REcoRD and to
include extraneous material.)
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, those
of us who have followed the progress of
the fighting in Vietnam, and of the de-
velopments of our policy in connection
with that conflict, as we have been
privileged to follow them in the Commit-
tee on Armed Services, are well aware
that the facts and issues in the Vietnam
conflict are highly complex. Because of
this complexity it is not always possible':
to make a contribution to a thorough'
understanding of what is involved in
Vietnam simply by resort to easy slogans.
or passing headlines or hastily con-
ceived proposals.
For all these reasons, Mr. Speaker, it.is
especially encouraging to run across.
now and then a comment on the matter
of our Nation's policy in Vietnam that
has been carefully thought out, that
demonstrates a full awareness of the
complexity of the issues involved, and
that is marked with a high measure of
sound commonsense.
Two such comments I am happy to say,
have recently appeared on WTOP radio
and television in editorials prepared and
presented by Jack Jurey of WTOP. Be-
cause of their soundness and common-
sense I commend these two editorials to
my colleagues and to the American
people.
The editorials follows:
VIETNAM-I
(This editorial was broadcast on February 14
and 15, 1966, over WTOP Radio and Tele-
vision.)
This Is a WTOP editorial.
The hardest work that men ever do is to
think; to define their terms; to sit down and,
putting aside preconceptions as much as pos-
3071
sable, try to arrive at a rational definition
of a problem and a rational approach to its
solution.
In the case of Vietnam, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has now heard from
two men with exceptional credentials: Gen.
James Gavin and former Ambassador George
Kennan. In prolonged testimony, they ap-
peared to say much the same thing. Both
men, and Professor Kennan in particular,
criticize the policy decisions of the last
dozen years which led to the present warfare,
both are extremely apprehensive of the perils
of continued escalation; both consider our
Vietnam commitment to be a distortion of
American foreign policy objectives; both
warn that the United States cannot be all
things to all men throughout the world.
But when it comes to the situation as it
Is, Professor Kennan and General Gavin agree
that continued resistance is necessary. Ken-
nan made this statement: "I think it should
be our Government's aim to liquidate this
involvement just as soon as this can be done
without inordinate damage to our own pres-
tige or to the stability of conditions in that
area." The involvement, he said, "is today
a fact * * * a precipitate and disorderly
withdrawal could represent in present cir-
by saying that he can see little difference be-
tween what Kennan and Gavin recommend
and what the Government is doing. Neither
can we. If all the people who are concerned
about Vietnam will stick to the relevant
issues-which is how the present problem
can be dealt with-a good part of the fog
ought to lift. It is vital to debate strategy
not in retrospect but in terms of the im-
mediate crisis. Provided this Is done, it
could very well turn out that there Is not
nearly so much disagreement about Vietnam
as appears in the headlines.
This was a WTOP editorial, Jack Jurey
speaking for WTOP.
VIETNAM-II
(This editorial was broadcast on February 15
and 16, 1966, over WTOP Radio and Televi-
sion)
This Is a WTOP editorial, the second In a
series on Vietnam,.
At the root of much of the discord and
dissent about Vietnam is the fear of con-
tinuing escalation the fear that if American
military power is applied in ever-greater
measure we will drift into conflict with Com-
munist China and, perhaps, the Soviet
Union.
This is not an unreasonable anxiety. But
if we are trying to deal with the Vietnam
problem rationally-which seems to be the
principal need of the moment-escalation
can be controlled and kept within rational
limits.
Military power is not an end in itself, it is
an instrument of policy; which means that
the escalation of such power can be severely
limited to the achievement of policy objec-
tives,
These include, first and foremost, persuad-
ing the other side to come to the conference
table to negotiate what would be-for us and
them-an acceptable formula for ending the
fighting. -
We do not seek to harm Red China, al-
though one of our purposes is to contain an
extension of Chinese power In southeast
Asia. We do not seek to destroy North Viet-
nam. And we probably are prepared to con-
cede the existence of the National Liberation
Front-the Vietcong-and deal with it as a
political entity in one way or another.
These limited objectives imply a limit to
escalation. They argue against the bomb-
ing of Hanoi. They argue against a vastly
greater commitment of American troops.
Our aim is to establish an unshakable Amer-
ican military presence in South Vietnam, but
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Februaiy 11~,
not to undertake an unending build-up of The full story began a long time ago,
men and material. but a convenient beginning point for
In other words, in terms of escalation, we my narrative is October 25, 1963, when
east control the situation-not let the sit- the FDA released a progress report on
nation controi us. Here again we suggest the ,
,'resident and his critics are closer to agree- its v a.mpaign Against Nutritional
anent than the headlines indicate. Because Quackery" in connection with the See-
we can see iwLhing significant in the record and National Congress on Medical
to indicate that Mr. Johnson is not fully Quackery held in Washington, D.C., un-
aware of the need for restraint and caution der joint sponsorship of the FDA and
in. South Vietnam.
This was a WTOP .editorial,
.-,peaking for W'1'O11.
DECEPTION BY VARIOUS FEDERAL
AGENCIES
(Mr. KING of Utah asked and was
given permission to address the House
for 1 minute and to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. KING of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I
am alarmed at the lack of cooperation.
and the secretiveness, even the willful.
deception that is currently practiced by
various Federal agencies.
It is conceded, I believe, that one of
the most cirective bulwarks of freedom
in the United States has been our his?-
toric resistance to government in secret.
Yet there is evidence, today, that secre-
tiveness has become in some instances
an Instrument of departmental policy.
No one questions that our national.
security requires certain critical infor-
mation to remain classified. There are
official documents whose general circu.-?
lation is not in the national interest.
There are important decisions, we all
agree, which must be made behind closed
doors.
In order to preserve the freedom of our
intellectual marketplace, however, the
number of kerns designated to be with-
held should be kept at an absolute niini-
murn. The tendency is for departments
of government to classify everything
which might prove to be embarrassing
to anyone within that department. Loy-
alty to the establishment rather than
the dissemination of truth, becomes the
Important factor in determining wheth-
er governmental information should be
released to the public, or kept under lock
and key. Secrecy is to be deplored, and
should be justified only in situations
where national security is clearly at
stake.
Now that the Government is spending
billions of dollars in basic research-
which amount represents over 60 per-
cent of all basic research conducted in
this country-it is mandatory that this
information be made freely available to
the pub4c. People are entitled to this
dearly paid for information, not as a
matter of grace, but as a matter of rig tit,
subject only to the considerations of na-
tional security.
Errors In judging, Incompetence, ne-
glect, and maladministration should be
exposed. The concealment of truth,, or,
worse yet, the dissemination of error,
should be repudiated as an instrument
of governmental policy.
Over the past 8 months I have had
a most frustrating experience with the
Food and Drug Administration. Per-
sonnel in that agency have followed a
policy of official deafness and calculated
obtuseness that defies credibility.
the American Medical Association.
Among other things, this report
warned against what the FDA still calls
the soil depletion myth. One state-
ment in the report seemed to me and to
many of my well-informed friends to be
difficult to defend:
The facts are that research has demon-
strated that the nutritional value's of our
crops are not significantly affected by the
soil or the kind of fertiliser used. Only the
yield is affected. Lack of iodine in soil or
water, of course, has been shown to cause
goiter, but this is the only disease definitely
associated with soil deficiency.
May I say, in passing, that any proven
relationship between soil composition
and the nutritional value of food be-
comes a matter of great significance.
The food industry, considered collec-
tively, is the largest single industry in
the United States. Grass annual food
sales are approximately $65 billion. That
industry has done an excellent job of
making America the best-fed Nation in
the world, but the question has been
seriously asked, by experts, whether this
industry may not have spent a dispro-
portionate amount of time and effort in
improving eye-appeal, convenience, stor-
ability, and packaging, at the expense of
effort which might have been spent in
improving the nutritional quality of
food. We are not splitting hairs, or
magnifying molehills. We arc raising a
question which might determine the di-
rection in which the largest industry in
this Nation will travel for generations to
come. The FDA, by use of the above
and other similar language, has indi-
cated one clear course for the food in-
dustry to follow. The facts which I am
about to discuss raise the serious ques-
tiori whether the FDA, in so doing, has
acted with complete candor.
I willingly concede that there is a
sharp divergence of opinion among the
experts on the question whether depleted
or contaminated soils may produce food
deficient in nutritional value. In my
discussion, I do not take sides in that
controversy. I assert, only that the para-
mount importance of the aubject re-
quires that all persons concerned act
with complete candor. The public in-
terest requires nothing less.
In an attempt to resolve this conflict,
I sought a conference with the FDA per-
sonnel when I returned to C< ngress last
year to discuss the aforesaid statement.
On May 5, 1965, Dr. Phillip L. Harris,
Director of the Division of Nutrition of
the Food and Drug Administration, along
with Dr. Homer Hopkins of the division
staff, joined the members of my staff,
and me, in a conference. Dr. Harris and
Dr. Hopkins, both of whom are distin-
guished men In the field of nutrition,
listened respectfully and sympathetically
to my objections to the categorical nature
of the aforesaid FDA statement. With-
out making any commitment, they agreed
to review the problem to see if the FDA
might reconsider its official view of the
matter.
I was later told, unofficially, that on
or about June 11, 1965, D1'. Hopkins, at
the request of Dr. Harris, had prepared
an interoffice scientific memorandum,
which held that the FDA position could
not be defended. I was also told that
an official report would be sent to me
within a few days.
A few days became a few weeks; and
on July 9, I wrote to Dr. Harris asking
for informtaion about the progress of
their review of the interrelationship be-
tween soil quality and nutritive value of
food.
Another month of silence elapsed.
Finally on August 12, I wrote and
asked when I might expect a reply to my
letter of July 9. When I still received
no acknowledgment, I instructed one of
my staff to call the Assistant C'ommis-
sioner's office on the telephone.
The Assistant Commissioner said that
a reply by Dr. Harris to my July 9 letter
had been sent on July 28. I had never
received that letter in my office, so I.
asked for another copy. When it ar-
rived, I was disappointed to find it devoic
of substance. In it, Dr. Harris said
We in the Division of Nutrition are retivel:,
reviewing and evaluating literature, much of
it very recent, on this subject. We hope to
complete the rview shortly and will be glad
to lot you hear further from its at, that
time.
I confess that I was taken aback bg
the fact that over 3 months had elapsed
since my conference with Dr. Harris and
Dr. Hopkins, and over 2 months since
Dr. Hopkins had drafted an interoffice
memo covering the subject in question.
When one of my staff questioned the
delay by phone on August 18, the Assist-
ant Commissioner assured him that a
definite decision on the subject could be
expected within about 10 days after then,
that is, by August 28. When I had re-
ceived no word from anyone by Septem-
ber 8, I wrote again, this time to the
Assistant Commissioner. A copy of my
letter follows:
S~EPTEM71tl:a 8. 1.[lt3
Mr. WINTON B. RANKIN,
Assistant Commissioner for Planking,
Food and Drug Administration,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mn. RANKIN: As I understand it, 'Jr.
Homer Hopkins, staff assistant to Dr. Phillip
Harris, Director of the Division of Nutrition
of the Food and Drug Administration, pre-
pared a report on or about June 1 relating
to the subject of the influence of soil upon
the nutritional quality of food.
As I further understand it, this report pur-
ported to conflict with a previous statement
of the Food and Drug Administn,iton to the
effect that the quality of soil affected the
quantity but not the quality of food grown
thereon.
As a result of this apparent conflict, the
Food and Drug Administration decided to
review Its statement of policy, in the Lght
of the aforesaid report of Dr. Hopkins..
On August 18, you were kind enough to
discuss this matter with my administrative
assistant, Mr. Frank Mensel, at which lime
you indicated to him that a report would be
forthcoming within 10 days.
It Is possible that the report has already
issued, without my being aware of it. This
letter is to indicate to you my great interest
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NATIONAL SENIOR SERVICE CORPS
(Mr. SICKLES (at the request of Mr.
REES) was granted permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECORD
and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Speaker, in 1900,.
life expectancy in the United States at
time of birth was 47 years. Today it is
a little over 70 years. In 1900 there
were approximately 3 million Americans
over 65 years of age. Today there are
over 16 million in that age group, and by
1970 there will be about 20 million.
In earlier times, the pattern of life
was that people worked until they died,
but today retirement comes at 70, 65, 62,
or 60, and there are several years remain-
ing before death.
The transition from active life to re-
tired status is satisfactorily met by some,
but for many it is a traumatic experience
that is most difficult to overcome. To
be suddenly faced with enforced idle-
ness, to have to break with past associ-
ations involving the isolation from
friends of long standing without new
friends to fill the vacuum, especially to
be overtaken by a feeling of uselessness-
these are conditions which we must do
everything possible to avoid.
It is one thing for the pace of activity
to be slowed down; it is quite another
thing for activity to come to a sudden
halt. Many elderly persons desire to be
of service to their community, but there
are too few means by which their serv-
ices can be rendered.
By the Older Americans Act of 1965, a
fine beginning was made toward the ob-
jective of a better life for our senior citi-
zens, and I am particularly happy that
the State of Maryland Commission on the
Aging has been successful in obtaining
one of the first grants under title III of
the act for the purpose of helping to
maintain the Metropolitan Senior Center
in Baltimore City. I have recently re-
ceived a letter from the Maryland Com-
mission on the Aging which indicates
how important the Older Americans Act
is to the State of Maryland, and I ask
unanimous consent to have this letter
printed in the RECORD at this point.
STATE OF MARYLAND,
COMMISSION ON THE AGING,
Baltimore, Md., January 26, 1966.
Hon. CARLTON R. SICKLES,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR CARLTON: I am delighted to inform
you that on January 20, the State Commis-
sion of the Aging acted favorably on the
first project under the Older Americans Act
in Maryland. Indeed, if not the first, among
the first in the Nation.
Under this project a grant of $10,000 for
the first year will go to the Metropolitan
Senior Center in Baltimore City. This cen-
ter has become increasingly effective in the
city and has previously depended largely
on private financing plus some additional
appropriation from the city itself. There
was a possibility that without this grant,
their activities for the coming year would
have been much restricted or even aban-
doned at the very time when it was be-
coming most useful to the older citizens of
the city.
This project represents the first "bite"
into the $67,000 Maryland may use during
this fiscal year for grants on a matching
basis of 75 percent Federal, 25 percent lo-
cal money, under title III of the act.
I know you will share our own sense of
accomplishment that we were able so speed-
ily to assist such a meaningful operation
on behalf of the enrichment of the lives
of so many older citizens.
Sincerely,
MARGARET C. SCHWEINHAUT,
Chairman.
Such centers as the senior center in
Baltimore City are of great importance
in providing informational, counseling,
referral, and similar services. I believe
we must go further, however, by the
establishment of a National Senior Serv-
ice Corps to enable senior citizens to
work in their own communities up to
20 hours per week for compensation not
to exceed $125 per month. Such a Senior
Service Corps should be administered on
a cooperative Federal-State basis. The
details regarding the proposed Senior
Service Corps are contained in a bill I
introduce today to amend the Older
Americans Act of 1965. I wish to em-
phasize that the bill provides that mem-
bers of the Senior Service Corps would be
used in programs that would contribute
to an undertaking or service in the pub-
lic interest that would not otherwise be
provided, and that such programs will
not result in the displacement of em-
ployed workers or impair existing con-
tracts for services.
I hope this bill will receive favorable
consideration by the Congress, Mr.
Speaker. It will help to bring the
elderly back into the community in the
twilight of their years, allow the com-
munity to profit from the time and talent
and wisdom. of our senior citizens, and
enable all of us to see that the retired
life is one that is well worth living.
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
(Mr. SICKLES (at the request of Mr.
REES) was granted permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECORD
and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Speaker, I would
like to call my colleague's attention to a
statement on the subject of legislative
reapportionment which was adopted by
the national board of the League of
Women Voters of the United States, and
which has been approved by the League
of Women Voters of Frederick County,
Md. The statement was as follows:
STATEMENT OF POSITION ON APPORTIONMENT
OF STATE LEGISLATURES As ANNOUNCED BY
THE NATIONAL BOARD OF THE LEAGUE OF
WOMEN VOTERS OF TIIE UNITED STATES, JAN-
VARY 12, 1966
The members of the League of Women
Voters of the United States believe that both
houses of State legislatures should be ap-
portioned substantially on population. The
league is convinced that this standard, estab-
lished by recent apportionment decisions of
the Supreme Court, should be maintained
and that the U.S. Constitution should not
be amended to allow for consideration of fac-
tors other than population in apportioning
either or both houses of State legislatures.
Of overriding importance to the league in
coming to this decision is the conviction that
a population standard is the fairest and most
equitable way of assuring that each man's
vote is of equal value in a democratic and
representative system of government. Other
considerations influencing league decisions
are that the U.S. Constitution should not be
amended hastily or without due considera-
tion because of an unpopular Court decision,
and that individual rights now protected by
the Constitution should not be weakened
or abridged.
Against the background of its longstand-
ing interest in State government, the league
also hopes that by maintaining a population
standard State government may be strength-
ened by insuring that State legislatures are
more representative of people wherever they
live. Finally, the league feels certain that
the term "substantially" used in Supreme
Court decisions allows adequate leeway for
districting to provide for any necessary local
diversities.
DECLINE IN UNEMPLOYMENT
(Mr. FALLON (at the request of Mr.
REES) was granted permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECORD
and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. FALLON. Mr. Speaker, the de-
cline in the Nation's unemployment rate
has been hailed editorially by the Balti-
more Sun-and other newspapers-as
"an economic milestone."
Referring to the report from the Labor
Department that the Nation's unemploy-
ment rate declined to just under 4 per-
cent in January, the newspaper recalled
that this was "a goal set by President
Kennedy in 1962 and reaffirmed by
President Johnson."
Stating that this does not mean that a
condition of literal full employment has
been reached, because many unskilled
workers do not have jobs, "it does mean
that the country is close to a condition
of statistical full employment," the paper
states.
I offer this editorial, on a subject of
general interest to us all, for the RECORD
with the request that it be reprinted
there.
[From the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 1966]
FOUR PERCENT
The report from the Labor Department in
Washington that the Nation's unemploy-
ment rate declined to just under 4 percent
in January is an economic milestone. It
was a goal set by President Kennedy in 1962
and reaffirmed by President Johnson. It
obviously does not mean that a condition of
literal full employment has been reached,
because we know that many unskilled work-
ers do not have jobs, but it does mean that
the country is close to a condition of statisti-
cal full employment.
We can understand this when we note
that, while there still is unemployment
among the unskilled, there are labor short-
ages in many of the skilled categories. Labor
Secretary Wirtz predicted that the unem-
ployment figure will go down to 3.5 percent
or lower this year. The figure for December
was 4.1 percent. As we have said before, the
declining unemployment total, together with
the scarcity of qualified jobseekers in many
fields, points up the importance of training
programs to develop skills for the jobs avail-
able. Declining unemployment also points
up the importance of restraints on wages
and prices to check the inflationary effect of
nearly full employment.
(Mr. FALLON (at the request of Mr.
REES) was granted permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECORD
and to include extraneous matter.)
[Mr. FALLON'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the Appendix.]
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N-GROM 9 RC1 67 8 0004000 ry 16, 1966
W&W
THE BOEING 727 SHOULD BE
GROUNDED
(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of
Mr. REES) was granted permission to ex-
Lend his remarks at this point in the REC-
ORD and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the
Boeing 727 jet should be ordered ground-
ed pending it full investigation into its
airworthiness and crashworthiness.
Last week on the floor of this House I
spoke on the subject of aerial garbage
and aviation safety. That speech mainly
concerned near-collisions. Today I want
to talk. about real collisions.
There have been four crashes of Boeing
727 jet airliners in the past 6 months A
United Air Lines 727 crashed in Chicago
on August 16, 1965, killing 35 persons.
An American Air Lines 727 crashed in
Cincinnati on November 8, 1965, killing
59 persons. Another United Air Lines
727 crashed 3 days later in Salt Lake
City, killing 42 persons. And most re-
cently, a Japanese 727 crashed into
Tokyo Bay killing 133 persons. A total
of 264 persons were killed in these 4
crashes.
These facts alone, in my opinion should
have moved the Federal Government to
order all 727's grounded pending a com-
plete investigation. The additional fact
that each of the four fatal crashes oc-
curred under similar circumstances, as
the planes were preparing to land, makes
it even more imperative that the Govern-
ment act immediately before additional
lives have been lost.
Problems of construction have already
been found in the Boeing 727. A study
recently completed by the FAA disclosed
it number of deficiencies in the materials
presently being installed in the interiors
of the planes. Further, the CAB has
pointed out that the manner in which
the fuel line is installed could have had
something to do with the Salt Lake City
crash.
Each of the four crashes are cur-
rently under investigation by the CAB.
A CAB team has even been dispatched to
Japan to act as technical adviser to the
Japanese Government in its investiga-
tion of the Tokyo crash. But these in-
vestigations consume a great deal of
time. Ordinarily, CAB investigations of
major accidents take as much as a year,
sometimes longer.
Meanwhile, more than 220 727's are in
service with 17 airlines in 7 nations and.
whether 1 of them is getting ready to
crash the next time it prepares to land.
because of some structural defect or
other deficiency is something we may not,
know for many months.
Mr. Speaker, this is really an intoler-
able situation. The Government is on
notice that something may be wrong with
the way the 727's are put together.
There have been 4 crashes in the past 6
months in which 264 persons met hor-
rible and undeserved deaths. Each crash
occurred under similar circumstances.
Yet they continue to fly. There is no
excuse for this. Surely, the great com?-
mercial air lines would be willing to en-
dure the temporary inconvenience of
utilizing the planes that were in service
before the 727's for a few months while
the CAB completed its investigations. I
fail to see why the Government has not
yet acted.
An editorial at the New Republic.
February 19, 1966, discusses this problem.
I invite my colleagues' attention to this
article? With unanimous consent I am
inserting it at this point in the RECORD.
SAFETY IN THE AIR
The crash early this month in Tokyo Bay
of yet another Boeing 727 jet-the fourth in
6 months-has still not moved the Civil Aero-
nautics Board to recommend grounding the
planes. All four crashes occurred as the
planes were preparing to land, but the CAB
has seen no pattern in the accidents to sug-
gest that the 727 is unsafe. The CAB has yet
to complete any investigation of the domes-
tic 727 crashes; it has yet to hold a hearing
on any of them.
It takes a distressingly long time for the
Board to investigate accidents-often as long
as a year-and once it has made a finding
more time may elapse before corrective ac-
tion is taken. The limited recommendations
the CAB has already made to improve the
crashworthiness of the Boeing plane will take
time to implement. Meanwhile nearly 200
727's are flying.
Last November 11, 43 persons died in the
crash landing of a United Air Lines Boeing
727 in Salt Lake City (hearings on that crash
open this week). According to a preliminary
report by the CAB, the interior furnishings
of the plane helped spread the fire that broke
out on impact and gave off a heavy black
smoke which "contributed to the fatalities."
The Federal Aviation Agency has just com-
pleted a study, says the CAB, which "dis-
closed a number of deficiencies in the ma-
terials presently being installed in aircraft
interiors. Materials are available," the re-
port continued, "which would be far superior
to those being used today." But no planes
have been grounded as a result of that find-
ing, and so far the FAA has not ordered the
airlines or manufacturer to refit plane in-
teriors. Until the FAA completes its flamma-
bility studies and hands down new stand-
ards, a repeat of the Salt Lake City disaster
is possible at any time. (FAA spokesmen
don't know yet whether new standards will
apply just to planes coming off the assembly
line or to planes now in service as well.) Of-
ficials mysteriously distinguish between "air-
worthiness" and "crashworthiness"; they see
no reason to ground a plane simply because
it doesn't crash well (43 persons died in Salt
Lake because the plane was not crash-
worthy) .
The CAB has identified other problems
with the Boeing 727. Its fuel line passes
through the fuselage of the plane and runs
close to generator wires which can spark a
fire in a belly landing. In the Salt Lake
crash the "ignition of spilled fuel could have
been caused by sparks from runway contact
or by a broken and shorted generator lead or
both."' It would help, the CAB noted, to
move the wires away from the fuel line and
strengthen insulating and tubing materials
to withstand the shock of a crash landing.
This,Boeing plans to do-in 4 months.
THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE
(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of
Mr. :REES) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the
San Antonio Light, February 11, carried
an editorial. on the much-discussed
Honolulu Conference. In this editorial
the Light quotes from the statement of
the South Vietnam leaders that to win
the military war "we shall strive as we
fight to bring about a true social. revo-
lution."
In order to share this editorial with
my colleagues, I include it in the RECORD :
DECISION AT HAWAII
In the "Declaration of Honolulu" the
United States and South Vietnamese Gov-
ernments have effectively dispelled any
doubts that may have been entertained about
allied resolve in pursuing the Vietnam war
to victory.
Victory in Vietnam means, of course, suc-
cess in both the political and military spheres
and it was on this double aspect of the con-
flict that the declaration placed its greatest
emphasis.
The mission of Vice President HuMrsneEv
to Saigon, moreover, is added evidence of
this emphasis.
As the leaders of South Vietnam stated,
the struggle is "a military war, a war for
the hearts of the people. We cannot win
one without the other. But the war for the
hearts of the people is more than a military
tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we
shall strive as we fight to bring about a true
social revolution."
President Johnson could not have demon-
strated his awareness of this better than by
his inclusion in the U.S. conference delega-
tion of his Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare and his Secretary of Agriculture.
In other words, the conference placed an
appropriately equal emphasis on the future
as it did on the present.
A "DECLARATION OF FREEDOM"
ADOPTED BY 1,500 CUBAN EXILES
(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr.
REES) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, on Janu-
ary 23, 1966, 1,500 Cubans, living in exile,
adopted a "declaration of freedom" at a
rally held in Key West, Fla.
This established another date to be
placed in the history and in the hearts
of all freedom-loving Cubans.
It is altogether fitting that this was
done at the San Carlos Club from the
same balcony where in 1898 the great
Cuban patriot, Jose Marti, turned the
course of history by proclaming the
ideological basic of a free Cuba from
Spanish colonialism.
Mr. Speaker, this "declaration of free-
dom" is submitted for the attention of
my colleagues and should be read by all
freedom-loving people throughout the
world :
DECLARATION OF FREEDOM
In the city of Key West, Monroe County,
State of Florida, United States of America,
we, the Cuban exiles in the United States,
in the name of God Almighty, and speak-
ing both for ourselves and the oppressed peo-
ple in Cuba, the martyr island, do say:
That on January 1, 1959, the slavery yoke
that came from Europe and was extinguished
in Cuba at the end of the 19th century, was
resumed.
That those responsible for this high trea-
son to our fatherland and to our people are
just a score of traitors who, usurpating the
government of the country have been acting
as mercenary agents for the Sino-Soviet im-
perialism, and have surrendered to that im-
perialism our freedom and our dignity, al:;o
betraying the American hemisphere.
That as a consequence of this high treason,
those who are usurpating the power in Cuba
(as they were never elected by the people) .
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soon became the center of Polish emigra-
tion. -
The Polish insurgents invited General
Kosciuszko to head the rebellion against
Russia and offered him command of the
Polish national armies. With the news
of the insurrection and Russian de-
termination to crush it, he hastened to
Cracow, where he summoned his people
to arm and proclaimed new decrees in
favor of the peasants.
The Polish patriots led by Kosciuszko
defeated the Russians at Raclawice and
ably defended Warsaw but were at last
overcome by the superior numbers of the
enemy. On October 10, 1794, the gal-
lant Polish force of 7,000 was almost
annihilated by a Russian force over twice
as large. General Kosciuszko's valor and
heroism in this battle were unsurpassed.
Three horses were killed under him as he
rode again and again into the thickest
of the battle. Finally, seriously wounded
and insensible, the heroic general was
taken prisoner. As the poet, Campbell,
has written, "Freedom shrieked when
Kosciuszko fell."
Freed by the Russians 2 years later, the
Polish patriot traveled to the United
States for a brief period and then re-
turned to Europe where until his death
in 1817 he continued his unceasing efforts
for the liberation of Poland.
Mr. Speaker, Americans and Poles
alike revere the memory of General
Kosciuszko for his service to the inde-
pendence of our countries. His name is
synonymous with one of the noblest
causes of all-freedom. His heroism
transcends dimensions of time and man-
made national boundaries. He is the
universal patriot, and to him we pay
tribute and from him we gain Inspira-
tion-and strength for our own hard fight
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
of
HON. MARTHA W. GRIFFITHS
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Speaker, U.S.
Ambassador Goldberg stated the case
succinctly when he said:
The United States is not responsible for
resuming the bombing. President Ho Chi
Minh of North Vietnam is responsible.
Commenting on this, the Detroit News
said :
Ambassador Goldberg laid the blame where
it should lie. His temperate and reasoned
justification for the indictment won't satisfy
the scattered spectrum -of vociferous critics,
particularly at home, because hard facts will
never satisfy them.
In his efforts for peace, the editorial
points out President Johnson "halted the
bombing >unconditionally, sent 6 special
envoys to 34 capitals, contacted more
than 115 governments, even directly ap-
proached the aggressor, North Viet-
nam."
It adds:
The Reds were asked to show only an
inkling of willingness for a negotiated settle-
ment so that the guns could be silenced at
least temporarily in Asia.
For anyone who wishes the facts, he
may read this editorial and get them.
Because?I thought it a lucid examination
A761
what is discussed there can be on commu-
nism's terms alone.
It appears that if the United Nations is to
be blackballed and the conference table
denied us and our allies, we shall now have
to answer aggression in the only language it
permits.
of this matter which so vitally concerns The U.S. Tax System and International
us all, I offer it to the RECORD for publi-
cation.
GOLDBERG TAKES U.S. CASE TO U.N., BUT
HANOI SPURNS PEACE BID
"The United States is not responsible for
resuming the bombing. President Ho Chi
Minh of North Vietnam is responsible."
Thus succinctly U.S. Ambassador Arthur
H. Goldberg, appearing before the U.N. Se-
curity Council, laid the blame where it should
lie. His temperate and reasoned justifica-
tion for the indictment won't satisfy the
scattered spectrum of vociferous critics, par-
ticularly at home, because hard facts will
never satisfy them.
In their dream world they bleat or whine
about the United States being an "interna-
tional outlaw with blood on its hands"-to
quote Senator WAYNE MORSE of Oregon-and
they protest it is wicked to pursue peace and
at the same time, in the event that the pur-
suit fails, to use military power to protect
those willing to resist aggression.
These oddly assorted critics were given
their chance by President Johnson. He tried
it their way. He halted the bombing uncon-
ditionally, sent 6 special envoys to 34 capi-
tals, contacted more than 115 governments,
even directly approached the aggressor, North
Vietnam.
Here was communism's opportunity to
prove Mr. Johnson's critics were on sound
ground. The Reds were asked to show only
an inkling of willingness for a negotiated
settlement so that the guns could be silenced
at least temporarily in Asia. But what was
the outcome?
As Goldberg said: "No letup in war activi-
ties on the Communist side. No reduction
in infiltration into South Vietnam. No re-
duction in terror. No reduction in the sup-
ply of men or arms during the bombing
pause. No willingness to negotiate or even
to talk quietly through diplomatic channels
with a view to negotiations * * *,absolutely
nothing."
Goldberg explained how even before the
bomb pause was 1 week old, this Nation di-
rectly informed Hanoi of the suspension and
advised that if Hanoi reciprocated by making
a serious contribution toward peace it would
have a favorable effect on further extension
of the pause.
For 30 days after that we waited, to no
avail. So, back to the bomb racks we had
to go.
It was not, however, the end of our pursuit
for peace, as Goldberg explained, Recourse
to the United Nations opened up "a new di-
mension" in that drive, with an offer to both
North and South Vietnam to come before the
world's only established peacemaking forum
and plead their differing causes.
But that hope apparently has died, too,
Hanoi rejecting as invalid any Security Coun-
cil action to settle the war. More, it wouldn't
even agree the United Nations should dis-
cuss the matter. And on this stand it was
backed in the Security Council by the Soviet
Relationships
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. AL ULLMAN
OF OREGON
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, I think it
is a matter of utmost importance that
the United States diligently pursue the
possibilities of resolving the many prob-
lems of international relationships in the
area of taxation.
Significant progress has been made in
recent years in the number of agreements
effected with other nations and in our tax
regulations treating income of U.S. for-
eign investments and the investments of
foreign nationals in this country.
Former Secretary of Treasury Douglas
Dillon deserves great credit for initiating
many important steps, as does his suc
cessor, Henry Fowler, and Assistant Sec-
retary Stanley S. Surrey. Mr. Surrey
made a significant contribution to better
understanding of this complicated prob-
lem in a recent symposium of the Tax In-
stitute of America. Under unanimous
consent I insert his remarks in the
RECORD:
THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS,
1965-66
(Remarks by Hon. Stanley S. Surrey, Assist-
ant Secretary- of the Treasury, at the
Tax Institute of America Symposium, the
New York Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y?
Thursday, December 2, 1985)
About a year ago in a paper presented at
Montreal before the Tax Executives Institute,
I discussed the U.S. Tax System and Interna-
tional Tax Relationships. Since then two in-
come tax protocols, with Belgium and Ger-
many, were signed and have been ratified by
the Senate; three treaties with less developed
countries, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Israel, have been signed and are pending in
the Senate; tentative agreements have been
reached with the Netherlands and India; and
negotiations are actively being pursued with
a number of countries, including the United
Kingdom, France, Portugal, Honduras, Trini-
dad, and Tobago, and Taiwan.
Since then important regulations and
rulings affecting the international alloca-
tion of income have been issued and more
are in preparation. A comprehensive bill re-
vising our statutory income tax treatment of
Union and that sour apple of the Western A consideration of these current develop-
alliance, De Gaulle's France. ments is now appropriate. I shall divide this
The short answer to all this is that North consideration into three parts-income tax
Vietnam, the Vietcong, and Red China, that treaties, both, with developed anti less de-
giant skulking in the background, don't veloped countries, the administration of
mant to talk peace because they don't want
peace. Trapped by their own fanaticism U.S. statutory or unilateral treatment of
about power in the barrel of a gun being the foreign income, and U.S. statutory or
final and only arbiter, they say that if the unilateral treatment of foreigners. Because
issue is to be discussed at all, it must be dis- of the length of this paper, I have prepared
cussed by the 1954 Geneva accord powers and a summary which precedes the paper.
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 Approved For ftt"
Q5N19 R ~YJP
_67FA9q 400020P ii 5ary 16, 190,
SUMMARY
Income tax treaties
'i'he United States is engaged in an exten.--
sive revision of its Income tax treaties with,
developed countries, prompted by the recent
changes in the corporated tax systems of the
European countries and the adoption in 1963
by the OECD of a model income tax conven.--
Lion. The protocol with Germany ratified
recently by the Senate and the tentative pro--
i.ocol with the Netherlands shortly to be
:signed illustrate much of the pattern than
this revision is taking. This pattern provides
a, widened flexibility to international trade
and investment activities between the United
totes and Europe. The scope of export ac-
LiviLies in a treaty country can now be en-
larged, for instance, by displays and ware--
houses for the storage or delivery of goods,
without subjecting the exporter to a tax in
that country.
Also, in cases where a firm maintains con-
s;iderable commercial or industrial activity in
is treaty country and therefore is taxable there
on that activity at regular corporate rates, it
can at the same time make investments In
that country, or establish licensing relation-
ships, that will remain subject to the lower
rates of tax which treaties provide for invest-
ment; and royalty income. Investors, more-
over, will generally be free from tax on capi-
tal gains arising in a treaty country. In the
important matter of withholding rates on
dividends paid to parent companies in one
treaty country by their subsidiaries in an-
other treaty country, the United States is In
favor of the low OECD model rate of 5 per-
cent, and likewise favors the 15 percent rate
on portfolio investment. It also favors the
principles that the withholding rates should
be nondiscriminatory-in that a country
should be willing to offer the same rates to
all its treaty partners-and reciprbcai-La
that a country should not claim higher treaty
rates than the rates it desires us to adopt 1.11
the treaty.
'i' tese concepts cover ground that has been
considerably explored in recent years. But
the new corporate tax systems present prob-
iems less fully mapped. Some of these sys-
tems involve integration of the corporate tax
with the individual shareholders' taxes on
distributed dividends, through credits to
these shareholders for the corporate tax.
Their structure, by limiting these credits to
domestic shareholders in domestic corpor?:
Lions, discriminates against both their domes-
tic shareholders who invest abroad and the
shareholders from abroad who invest in the'.r
domestic corporations. The OECD conver..-
Lion does not fully meet these problems, and
therefore in analytic framework for their
ssoltition is needed. Such a framework should
be rested, as far as possible, on two basic
concepts: (irsi, the concept of long-range
neutrality in a country's tax system between
those of its investors who invest at home and
those who invest abroad: and second, the
concept of nondiscrimination in a country's
tax system between its investors at home and
Investors from abroad.
'T'hese treaties, under the pressure of nego-
Linting problems and inevitable differences
:among countries and negotiators, will not
always exhibit uniformity in phrasing and
a.rrangemciat. apart from substantive differ-
ences. 'T'here is therefore clearly a need i o
clarify the disuniformity-to state through
regulations or otherwise when and to what
extent different phrases and different ap-
proaches in various treaties, or even the same
treaty, really embody differences in end re-
sult and are so intended. The United States
intends to improve its regulations in re-
i.ponse to this need.
The United States is also engaged in an
extensive program of negotiations to obtain
is network of treaties with less developed
countries. We believe that such treaties
significantly improve the trade, investments,
and cultural relationships between. the
United States and these countries. Many of
the European nations are also engaged in
similar efforts. While these new less devel-
oped country treaties in many provisions fol-
low those with developed countries, there are
quite significant differences arising from the
fact that the investment and trade flows
from the United States to these countries is
generally much larger than the reperse flows.
As a. consequence, and also in the light of the
revenue problems of these countries, the re-
ductions in withholding rates on .:vestment
income and royalties in these tree ies do not
always match those in the develop' cl country
treaties. There also is pressure ti, widen the
def,nition of permanent establis:merit and
thus contract the area if tradin; activities
free from tax in these countries In addi-
tion, since the restrictions on fixation by
the source country that do emerac in. these
treaties bear in a revenue sense m,.re heavily
on the less developed countries, ::?.ich coun-
tries seek some provisions on the t)art of the
developed countries that can be regarded as
an encouragement to investment In them.
The European nations have responded
through provisions reducing the burden of
their taxes on income flowing 'nook from
these investments, either through en exemp-
tion or adoption of tax-sparing credits. The
United States, emphasizing instc:.d the en-
couragement to the investment itself at the
time that it is being considered by the U.S.
taxpayer. is responding through extending
to :investment In less developed treaty
countries the 7-percent credit now in our
law for investment at home. This 7-percent
treaty credit extends to investments of cash
and tangible property. A complementary
provision offers encouragement to the in-
vestment of technical assistance, through
deferring tax in both countries where in-
tangible assets, such as patents. processes
or know-how, are exchanged by a U.S. in-
vestor for stock in a corporation in the less
developed country.
We believe that extension of '.lie invest-
ment credit is appropriate only where the
other country is receptive to our investment
and where its tax system, taken as a whole
rind in the light of any modificr,Lions made
in the treaty, does not involve measures that
can be regarded as significantly working at
cross-purposes with this investment. This
negotiating approach on our part, has met
with an affirmative response by the less de-
veloped countries.
The Subcommittee of the Sena'.e Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations has performed a
useful public service in holding foil hearings
on. one of these new treaties, the Thailand
Treaty. The published hearing:- contain a
complete technical explanation o[ the treaty
and a description of factors affecting nego-
tiations with less developed countries.
Necessarily, as experience is gained, the
present pattern that has so far evolved in
our negotiations with less developed coun-
tries can be improved. The progress of these
negotiations is encouraging, for it indicates
that the United States and these countries
can reach a, treaty arrangement that each
regards as fair and conducive t-u improved
investment, trade, and cultural relation-
chips. This attitude and the promise it
holds for a growing network of i;ax treaties
represent a major step in our political and
economic relationships with these countries.
Administration of U.S. statutory taxation of
foreign income-Allocation of income and
section 487
The Importance of developing a sound
administration of the U.S. statutory taxation
of foreign income is matched by t,tie formida-
ble nature of the task: The field is relatively
new as tax matters go, and the needed ex-
perience, analysis of detail, and ;ynthesis of
concepts are still In a formative stage; the
international business activities to which the
rules relate are rapidly expanding in Impor-
tance and number, and thus the variety of
transactions and business relationships in-
volved steadily increases; the tax rules more-
over are constantly being buffeted by the
shifting exigencies of balance-of-payment;
problems. But all of this merely under-
scores the challenge of the task, and th
Treasury is seeking to respond in a fitting
manner.
The Treasury regards as the matter pres-
ently having major priority the establish-
ment of a satisfactory framework for thu
administration of the rules governing trans-
actions between the domestic and foreign
units of our business companies.
.In our tax parlance, this centers on the
application of section 482 of our code, au-
thorising the Commissioner to allocate in-
come, deductions, and credits between re-
lated units of an enterprise so as to prevent
evasion or clearly reflect the income of the
various units. The variety and number of
transactions in the foreign area that lie
within the reach of the section have over-
strained the level of technical development
that had been achieved in the earlier domes-
tic application of the section. The situation
thus calls for a many-faceted implementa-
tion of the section so that it may carry the
new burden placed on it.
Several steps have already been token.
The first, in revenue procedure 6.1- 54,
achieved an orderly treatment of controver-
sies that had arisen for years prior to 19133
by permitting taxpayers to offset--against
any increase in U.S. taxes occasioned by an
adjustment under this section allocating
additional income to the U.S. unit of the
enterprise--the foreign taxes paid on the in-
come involved and thus to avoid double
taxation. In addition, the revenue proce-
dure stated that the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice would not pursue for those years adjust-
ments based on applications of section 482
not clearly required by its previous technical
development. Through Its achievement of
an orderly treatment of the pre-1963 ears
and the consequent very marked reduction in
number and dollar amount of deficiencies
under the section for those years, this rev-
enue procedure has permitted the ncecieci
technical development of the section to pro-
ceed in an atmosphere free of acrimonious
disputes that would otherwise have existed.
The second step, in revenue procedure 6:1-
17, provides rules governing the transfer of
income between foreign subsidiary and U.4.
parent intended to reflect an adjustment
correcting an understatement of the parent's
income, as where it charged too low a price
for goods sold to the subsidiary or rendered
services to it for an inadequate fee. The
principal impact of these rules is to permit
broad flexibility in fitting the section 4112
adjustment into a proper position within
the flow of funds from the foreign subsidiary
and its dividend pattern. This removes inn-
pediments to the orderly repatriation of
funds from. the subsidary and makes it possi-
ble for the taxpayer to accept the adjustment
without increasing the transfer of income
from subsidiary to parent more than it con-
siders desirable.
These procedural steps set the stage for
the development of appropriate guidelines
for the substantive application of section
482. To this end the Treasury has already
issued detailed proposed regulations covering
transactions where assets or services of a
U.S. parent are made available to its foreign
subsidiary--where money Is lent, where man-
agement or other services are rendered, where
machinery and other tangible assets are made
available. Essentially the approach is to
offer taxpayers a safe conduct pass through
section 482 through guidelines, based on the
costs incurred by the parent and an alloca-
tion of those costs to the subsidiary in a
manner that follows accepted accounting
precedents outside the tax field. The second
set of proposed regulations, now in prepa-
ration and far more difficult to develop, will
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 78 Approved F? (0 599 2*ZEV_6A H0 0 k ebr2WrJ 16, 1966
The effectiveness of this treaty led to the years. But they have been fast disappearing Vietnam Discussion
development of a similar agreement with as Burkburnett, spurred by its women citi-
Mexico, concluded in 1936. zens, presses on with the library and other EXTENSION OF REMARKS
projects.
The population is rising. In the past de- or
cade, Burkburnett has doubled its ppula- HON. LESTER L. WOLFF enrollm
ent. Your Town May Just Need Stirring Up tion tripled g, and business from Sh pp d OF NEW YORK
Air Force Base give stability to the economy. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EXTENSION OF REMARKS It was spring in January the day I landed
of at the Wichita Falls Airport. On the 15-mile Wednesday, February 16, 1966
drive to Burkburnett, I heard about some of Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, during this
HON. GRAHAM PURCELL its accomplishments.
OF TEXAS There was a cleanup week (November 8- period of discussion on the whole range
15) with Joe Salter, chairman of the civic of problems associated with the Vietnam
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES improvement committee and vice president conflict some very excellent appraisals of
Wednesday, February 16, 1966 of the Community Service Council, in charge. the situation have been made. I respect-
On November 11, schoolchildren were given fully include in the RECORD the following
Mr. PURCELL. Mr. Speaker, every a half holiday and furnished litter bags with editorial from the Long Island Press
person who has the opportunity to visit which they cleared the streets. High school about the views of former Ambassador
Burkburnett, Tex., is impressed by the students worked by classes on assigned George Kennan, and commend it to the
aggressiveness and activity in that areas; the seniors won the student council attention of this distinguished body:
community. award for the best job.
Burkburnett offers ample evidence of Members of the ministerial alliance man- NEITHER DOVE NOR HAWK
ned tractors to mow vacant lots. Members George Kennan, our former Ambassador to
the old rule that "communities that pull of the men's clubs cleared downtown streets Moscow and one-time chairman of State De-
together get things done." and alleys. partment policy planning, did the Nation a
Recently the Christian Science Mont- As we swung into town through an under- great service last week in his testimony at
tor told the story of Burkburnett'S proj- pass, one of my hostesses apologized for beer a Senate airing of Vietnam policy. He made
ects which are being entered in the 1964- cans and other roadside litter. Burkburnett the point, too often lost in the passion of
65 community improvement program itself is dry by local option, she said, but this debate, that we have to be neither doves,
beer is available in nearby towns. Boy Scouts hightailing it away from danger, nor hawks,
ored by of Wom omen's s Clubs the and and the eal Sears, Roebuck Federation pebuck are trying to cope with the nuisance and do swooping down on the enemy. We can be
W the clearing-up, but soon the police will step wise old owls-or better yet, reasonable,
Foundation. In, realistic human beings.
To those interested in learning what At the home of Mayor James E. Frye, some Surrender? Of course not, said Kennan.
an outstanding community can do to of the clubwomen talked of their projects 'Precipitate and disorderly withdrawal could
make itself a better place to live, I com- while Mrs. Frye, the steering-committee represent in our present circumstances a
mend the following article: chairman, served hot-mulled cranberry and disservice to our own interests and even to
[From the Christian Science Monitor, pineapple juice and sandwiches. world peace greater than any that might
LIBRARY PUSHED have been involved in our failure to engage
Jan. 26, 1968 ] ourselves in the first place: '
YOUR TOWN MAY JUST NEED STIRRING UP "The most important thing for us," said On the other hand, he doubted that even
BURKBURNETT, TEx.-When high school Mrs. Frye, "is to have a real cross section the most formidable military successes would
of our town in this, said we have. No one bring about "the complete disappearance of
of
students must travel 15 miles to the nearest group or individual is doing it." the recalcitrants with which we are faced,
library to study for exams, your town's in a Membership in the Community Service adversaries
our formmilal and the c submission by y the
realization es
bad way. Council extends to two rural home-demon- the
Facing such a dilemma, citizens of Burk- stration clubs and the nearby Clara-Fair- our present stated political aims." mlete
Burnett decided library was first among view organized rural community. Claude If we have such difficulty in tiny Vietnam,
a many town needs. The Council of Feder-
ated Study Clubs, of which Mrs. F. M. Mc- Adams, Clara-Fairview president, is chair- just think of the formidable task in impos-
Murtry is president, saw those needs, entered man of board. the Burkburnett library committee jing our will on 700 million Chinese.
To "dig in and wait" for a political solu-
last community improvement program (CIP) "I've lived here all my life," said Mrs. tion to emerge, as Mr. Kennan suggested, is
last February, and called a communitywlde
meeting at the town hall. Philip Carpenter, first and only woman on
the Burkburnett City Council, "and we've essentially what we are doing in Asia. And
we have followed
Eheop are d policy we 1945, a followed
High school students as well as their elders never had a library-always had to go 15 it Is essentially the
were on hand for the meeting. miles to Wichita Falls." successfully himself. icy
are e b by rop Mr. Kennan degree, not in himself.
"We will make enough patrons to justify The library committee did research on largely differences lshaped
the library," said the students. They were the choice of a site, funds available, and r !Mr. Kennan's inlsubs inc
articulate. They still are and they take standards. They visited other libraries and whether it be rGavin's . Ken enclaves or Lyndon
active part in Burkburnett's community consulted with the Texas State librarian in wJohnson's James
more aggressive, yet es or Lyndon
projects. The student council is among the Austin. kind of s mor limited, war. . 40 organizations represented on the Com- "Many of our first ideas had to be re- We can profit from the long experience of
munity Service Council. vised," the women told me. "Our park cold war confrontation in Europe and apply
The Community Service Council was orga- would not be an ideal site. The library some of its lessons to the hotter war in
nized by the steering committee appointed couldn't be successfully Operated by vol- Asia. The hawks and the doves were busy
at the initial meeting. Having no pattern unteers. We knew that what we got we'd in Europe, too, with one side urging us to
for the new council, Burkburnett cut its have to live with a long time. If we were destroy the other to embrace the Soviets.
own. Mrs. Marjorie Kauer wrote the consti- going to have a library we'd have to think But the Russian bear dies hard, as Hitler
tution and bylaws. big." discovered even before atom bombs; and his
Like many another community, Burk- At this point things happened. Mr. and embrace can be a fatal hug, as hundreds of
burnett's big need was for citizens to pull Mrs. Walter Bohner gave a lot opposite 4thousands in East Europe well know.
together. That they had not done so until Town Hall with a frame building, their We took-and still take-neither course.
recently might perhaps be explained in part former family home. They also gave $1,000. Instead, we built up our allies in West
by the town's history. Many other donations have since come in. Europe and drew lines beyond which we
When Burkburnett was incorporated in The old house will be removed to an ad- made it clear Russia must not tread-in
1907, there was an oil well in every back joining lot. Meanwhile, architect's plans Greece, in Iran, in Turkey, in Berlin and in
yard, and water sold for more than oil. A have been approved for an $84,000 library Cuba. We dug in and we waited and now
decade later came World War i and an oil building. The city will vote on a $42,000 each day, the prospect of war in Europe
boom. Remember the movie "Boom Town"? bond issue to be matched by State funds. grows less and less likely.
Burkburnett was that town. Its population "A bunch Of little people trying to do big A millenium? Utopia? Detente, even?
soared to 30,000 but slumped back to 5,000 things," some people said at first. But now Of course not. We will have profound differ-
when peace came and ended the boom. that they see things shaping up they've ences with Russia and will for years to come.
POPULATION CLIMBING changed their Opinions. Everybody is be- There can be, as Mr. Kennan said of Vietnam,
Old shacks and store buildings remained hind the project. "no happy way out of this conflict." What
co-
as shabby reminders of the vanished pros- "People's attitude is wonderful," said exwe have ist nee,hndthncin1945 is a s de facto nor
perity. A few of them survived over the Mr. Adams.
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 1+'ebritary 1 E;, x~g~roved F(~NG ~SI~) VAL RECORD D A PPElNDIX 00400020001-5
sifted by the Department of Agriculture
as Government-financed programs, the
$1.669 billion rises to $2.605 billion. This
will leave $3.599 billion as truly commer-
cial competitive exports of agricultural
products in the 1964-65 fiscal year in-
stead of $4.426 billion-,see table 3, page
15, of the above cited Department of Ag-
riculture Publication.
Migratory Bird Treaty Stamp." Requests
must be postmarked not later than March 16.
Migratory Bird Treaty
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 50TH An aivFR-
SARY OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY WITH
GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA
By 1910 it was apparent that the effects
of year-round hunting of migratory birds
with improved firearms for both
s
HON. JOHN D. DINGELL
OI' MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATI VhS
pur . and
This leaves a considerably less brilliant Wednesday, February 16. 1966 commerce. coupled with the vagaries of
accomplishment. No doubt we could ex- Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant uealtlher and the demands of an expanded
port well above $6 billion in agricultural to populace w were daracteriz tithe rr n-
per111ission granted I insert into the the abundance which characterized the frnn
products if we first, sold more for foreign Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD tier era.
currencies under title I, Public Law 480; a release from the 31st North American It was also evident to the leading eon-
second, moved more exports under fam- Wildlife & Natural Resources Conference servationists of the time that this was a
ine and emergency relief under title II to be held in the Hilton Hotel, Pitts- matter of national concern which would not.
of Public Law 480; third, increased for- burgh, Pa., March 14-16, 1.966, at which be met by individual actions of the several
eign donations under section 416, Agri- time an announcement will be made of States.
culture Act of 1.949 and section 302, Pub- the establishment of a Migratory Bird on August 16, 1916, the Convention Ile-
tic Law 480; and fourth, and offered more Treaty Stamp to celebrate the 50th an- tween the United States and Great Bri rain for the
;hipmerfts under barter programs-CCC niversary of the signing of the Migratory United StProtecon of ates and Canadadwas gr ed ill The the
Charter Act: section 303, Public Law 480; Bird Treaty between the United States, treaty was ratified later that year and pro-
and so so forth. Great Britain, and Canada. claimed by President Wilson on December
But if we did so we would not advance This was one of the great milesiones 8, 1916. It remains a unique action among
by one iota the competitive capacity of of American conservation and wildlife nations In dealing with wildlife protection
this country in foreign markets. This history and it is highly appropriate that and preservation, It was an extrawrdi:nary t
is a matter of production costs, and giv- treaty ne sovereign nations when i
the announcement be made at that line. Was signed ween d and remains so after 50 years.
cogu a away agricultural plonuc does not Also inserted into the RECORD is back- This treaty afforded international pro-of produ
ends reduce costs because of tn. It hight er tax ground information on the 50th anni- tection for the first time to named migra-
aise them of the Migratory Bird Treaty tory game and nongame birds common to
burden created. with Great Britain and Canada made both Canada and the United States and
Mr. Speaker, the false impression ere- available by the Wildlife Management made each nation responsible for enacting
ated by the inclusion of subsidized farm Institute, one of the outstanding wildlife its own laws to implement the treaty provi-
products in our exports and shipments and conservation organizations in the sions.
under Public Law 480, and so forth, is United States. Nine families of migratory game bird:, and
matched b
an
th
y
o
er statistical practice
that is equally pernicious in its effects. I
refer to what has been called the f.o.b.-
c.i.f. distortion. All the other leading
trading nation,,; report their imports on
the c.i.f. basis. This merely means that
they record the true cost of the goods im-
Ported by adding to the foreign price, the
cost of shipping; and insurance incident
to bringing the goods to their ports of
entry.
What is our practice? We leave off
these charges and record the value of our
imports at their foreign price, point of
export. If anyone believes this to be a
minor matter he should compare the
Price of an automobile at Its f.o.b. De-
troit level and what the cost would be if
he took delivery several thousand miles
away.
Prom calculations made on the basis
of actual import and export statistics of
this country in its trade with England
and Japan, it seems safe to say that our
imports from these countries are under-
valued from 20 to 25 percent for the rea-
sson just set forth. This represents a se-
lious distortion, and we should review all
our import statistics with this distortion
in mind.
Surely we cannot base our trade noli-
'T'he material follows: .aa iauuues 01 Insectivorous and other non-
game species are under its protection. Mi-
M1.:,RATORY BIRD TREATY STAMP To Be I:,;t;ED gratory waterfowl, and the recreation these
AT WILDLIFE. CONFERENCE birds afford have particularly benefited
A new 5-cent postage stamp comrnem, ~rat_ from the treaty.
tog the 50th anniversary of the signing of The direct and indirect effects of the treaty
the Mi t B
r
and the resulting national legislation to im-
plement it have been much broader than
those envisioned by the proponents of the
treaty. This international agreement has
affected legislation and regulations of nut
of the States.
More than 230 waterfowl refuges and over
45 general migratory bird refuges comprising
over 2 million acres have been acquired or
set aside by the U.S. Government in addi-
tion to nearly 100 'waterfowl production areas
comprising over 100,000 acres. A broad pro-
gram of migratory bird research costing over
$1,800,000 anually has developed in the De-
partment of the Interior's Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife.
An International Bird Banding Center at
Laurel, Md., is the focal point of a single
system of bird banding on the continent.
Here records are :maintained on automatic
data processing systems which support
studies of migratory birds by both grotes-
sionals and amateurs.
g
~aory ire Treaty that provides uni-
form protection for migratory birds in the
United States and Canada will be issued on
March 16 at Pittsburgh, Pa. The staamp-
is,aiance ceremony will be held in conjauic-
tiol with the 31st North American. Wildlife
and Natural Resources Conference, winch
will be held at the Pittsburgh Hilton B,.>tel,
March 14-16, under the sponsorship of the
W:lldlife Management Institute.
Described as a starkly modern artwork, the
horizontal stamp features two birds in white
outline, one flying north, the other south,
at the Canadian border. Canada Is red; the
United States blue; the Great Lakes a lighter
blue. At the top in a white panel appears
An International. Migratory Bird Commit-
tee, consisting of an Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture and an Assistant Secretary of kilt,
Interior for the United States, and the t'a-
nadian Director of Agriculture and Canad: 'a
Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and N;:-
in black capitals "Migratory Bird Treaty/
1916 United States-Canada 1966." The words
"U.S. Postage Five Cents" appear in back
in a white panel at the bottom.
The Migratory Bird Treaty was signer; in
Washington, D.C., by Sir Cecil Arthur Spring
and Secretary of State Robert Lansing on
August 16. 11916. President Woodrow WiLoia,
after receiving the advice and consent of the
Senate, proclaimed the treaty Deeembe: 8,
1916.
Tae treaty observed that "ninny sneeie': or
iutlat we have been doing. Lions traverse certain parts of the United tional Resources, was formed in 1961 to give
Dominion
m rnai._
It has been estimated that in place of a any of and these the
are of great Canada; luc that
as agement of migratory birdsontineutal
;5.2 billion surplus in our exports over a source of food or in destroying insects which Four flyway councils, consisting of Slate
imports for 1965 as reported recently by are injurious to forests and forage plants and Provincial officials, give continuing at-
the Department Of Commerce we actu- * as well as to agricultural crops * ` " tention to the welfare of migratory water -
.Llly ran a deficit of about $2 billion, when but are nevertheless in danger of exterr.ii- fowl. Cooperation among these councils, the
Life figures are corrected by the guides nation through lack of adequate protection Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, aria
I have set forth above. during the nesting season or while on their the Canadian Wildlife Service provide for the
way to and from their breeding grounds ' most comprehensive annual surveys and cor:-
I am very anxious to see this statistical Collectors desiring first day canceilati,,ns tinned studies of migratory birds in the
practice corrected as soon as possible and may send addressed envelopes, together with world.
^.nl introducing appropriate legislation to remittance to cover the cost of the stani'pa The Canadian Government carries out. re-
Ghat end. I urge all who are concerned to be affixed, to the Postmaster, Pittsburgh, search, establishes hunting regulations, aund
about a sound foreign, trade policy to Pa., 15219, Send money order or certified provides law enforcement in Its implement;,
take an interest In this matter and to check only. The envelope to the Postmaster tion of the treaty. Canada also is embark-
;support the legislation. shotld be endorsed. "First Day covers 5-edit log on a wetlands preservation program.
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 February 16, _I9~i~ved Fo2~Qg/6L2EF&-WP67~11fT0400020001-5
impossible victory, but the difficult and
painful sharing of a crowded planet with
disagreeable neighbors.
This is what we seem to be up to in Asia.
Just last Friday Peiping screamed that the
Soviets have joined the United States, India,
and Japan in forming a "ring of encircle-
ment" around Red China-not de facto co-
existence but de facto containment.
We do not, however, share Mr. Kennan's
misgivings over the Honolulu Conference.
There are many ways-none without risk-
to wage limited war. Honolulu was basically
an extension of how Lyndon Johnson
chooses to do it. Instead of just digging in,
we are trying to pressure the enemy to the
peace table. And, at the same time we are
trying, sad to say, belatedly to improve the
political and social climate so that we can
put to work the gains of the battlefield. It
is a difficult and dubious path. But this is a
difficult and dubious world that seldom offers
perfect, absolute answers.
School Milk Program
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr.
Speaker, I wish to serve notice that I am
very much opposed to the administration
plans to slash funds for the school milk
program. During the last fiscal year this
program benefited more than 90,000
schools and child care institutions. The
amount appropriated for the special milk
program during the current fiscal year
was $103 million. According to the Milk
Industry Foundation, the school milk
program and the national school lunch
program accounted for the usage of
nearly 3 billion pounds of milk.
If the milk had not been used it would
probably have been acquired by the Com-
modity Credit Corporation where at pres-
ent support prices it would have cost the
taxpayers exactly the same amount of
money as was required to finance this
program which is so highly beneficial to
the nourishment and health of American
schoolchildren.
Mr. Speaker, it makes very little sense
to fund new expenditures and untried
programs which cost many millions of
dollars more and then penalize a tried
and true program like the special milk
program or the school lunch program.
I am amazed that an administration
which professes to be so interested in
fighting the war against poverty and in
doing something about school dropouts
is so shortsighted in its approach to
these problems. Furthermore, as a Rep-
resentative from an area where dairying
constitutes an important part of the
farmers' cash income, I am distressed
that the Government's false economy
will result in a curtailment of the con-
sumption of milk. There are so many
other areas in which savings could be
accomplished without sacrificing the
health and welfare of the schoolchildren
of America.
Connecticut's Highway Commissioner Ives
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WILLIAM L. ST. ONCE
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. ST. ONGE. Mr. Speaker, under
leave to extend my remarks, I wish to
insert into the RECORD the- text of an
article published in the Hartford Courant,
in the issue of February 7, 1966, about
Connecticut's highway commissioner,
Howard S. Ives. .
Commissioner Ives, who resides at
North Stonington, Conn., in my district,
has devoted a lifetime of service to the
State highway department dating back to
1917. He started as a rodman and was
appointed commissioner in 1959 by the
then Gov. Abraham A. Ribicoff. Com-
missioner Ives has been nationally
Honored for his work on highway beauti-
fication and is regarded as one of our
most safety-minded road engineers and
experts.
The article about Commissioner Ives
not only tells us about the man and his
accomplishments over the years, but also
his views and outlook on life, his char-
acter and his fine qualities. I am de-
lighted to count him among my friends.
The article reads as follows:
HOWARD S. IVES: MAN IN MIDDLE OF THE
ROADS
(By James J. Devaney)
State Highway Commissioner Howard S.
Ives is the man in the middle.
Everyone agrees the State needs roads, but
no one wants the road to go through his
house.
Ives has been nationally honored for his
work on highway beautification-and his
name arouses ire among lovers of Bushnell
and East Rock Parks.
He is noted as one of the most safety-
minded engineers ever to head the depart-
ment-and is criticized for allegedly danger-
ous crossovers on 1-91 in Hartford.
CONSCIOUS OF COMPLAINTS
Ives is acutely conscious of the complaints,
but he points out, "I'm charged with running
a department, carrying out the mandate of
the legislature-to build facilities with the
funds made available.
"We're not a bunch of firebreathers, but
we have to keep our minds on the goal-to
put these facilities where they will do the
most good for the most people, and we can't
deviate from that."
He feels many critics would remain silent
"if people would only realize the extremes
we go to to insure safe, economical and
engineeringwise sound roads.
"What people don't realize," he continues,
"is you can pick up a newspaper in Provi-
dence, or Talahassee, or just about anywhere
else and find the same complaints. But
these roads are the work of the best engi-
neering minds in the country."
But Ives has a real concern for people af-
fected by new highways. One of his aids
said "I've seen him leave meetings and take
off to some little town in a far corner of the
State to investigate some complaint per-
sonally."
Ives comments "One of the most painful
things in the department is the displace-
ment of people. It tears us apart, but we do
A779
what we have to do under the law, as fairly
and humanely as possible."
Discussing the charge that highways de-
stroy natural beauty spots Ives says "People
think of ruthless destruction as they see the
bulldozers, earthmovers, and trucks. But
this ruthlessness-these earthmovers-are
to the engineer a sign of progress.
CITES GOALS
"This ugliness is temporary. The goal is a
highway. Two roads divided by a median.
Something planned and executed very care-
fully.
"The landscape engineer is active in every
phase of construction. We try to design a
highway so it looks as if it belongs there.
"When we put a road through woodland or
countryside, conservationists complain. But
we've enabled thousands of people to enjoy
that area who never had a chance to do so
before.
"As a conservationist, I look at a tree, and
know how long it took to grow it and that
it is a beautiful thing. As a safety man, I
hate trees-those near the pavement-be-
cause people can run off the road and kill
themselves."
Much of the superhighway activity in the
State since Ives took office July 1, 1959, has
been concentrated in the Hartford area.
"We talk about the population explosion,
and it's a real thing," Ives said. 1-91 was de-
signed several years ago with the 1970 popu-
lation in mind. Now we're designing for
1990 and 2000."
Ives continues "The Hartford highway
complex isn't complete. It won't really work
until 1-291 is complete." 1-291 is the link
between 1-91 and 1-84 which will give Hart-
ford a belt highway system.
Discussing criticism of 1-91 and its link to
the city and over the bridges of the city Ives
says "There isn't anything that has been
done that can't be corrected-and will be
corrected; only minor changes are needed.
"The fact that we've made some changes
in signs and movement is not a sign of bad
design. We know that one of the worst
troubles is that people drive too darn fast.
"No one in the department will make ex-
cuses for anything we do. If we make mis-
takes, we say so, and correct them. We don't
make the same mistake twice."
LOVES BRIBGES
He sums up: "All I'm trying to do is run
the highway department. And when some-
one says 'Ives, go home,' I'll go home, but I
want to leave a heritage of highways.
"Outside of my family and my country,
this has been my life."
Born in New Haven, July 31, 1900, Ives
grew up in Norwich, where he attended lo-
cal schools and planned his future. And he
knew what he wanted to do.
"I can't remember when I didn't want to
build bridges. I read every book on bridges
I could get my hands on, starting when I
was about 10 years old.
"If there's anything I love to do it is to
build bridges. A bridge is something alive
and beautiful. If I could do what I want to
do. I'd be building bridges, not sitting
here."
Ives started his career with the highway
department as a rodman with a survey crew
in the summer of 1917. One of his cherished
possessions now is a plaque which reads
"From rodman to commissioner." "That's
the story of my life," he says.
He worked for the department until 1922,
and after various engineering positions and
his qualifications as a professional engineer
in 1925, he returned to the department in
1927, and started his rise through the ranks.
And he helped build bridges-the Middle-
town-Portland Bridge,.the Housatonic River
Bridge connecting the Merritt and Wilbur
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Cross Parkways between Milford and Strat-
lord; the Charter Oak Bridge; Gold Star
Memorial Bridge over the Thames between
New London and Groton, and the Raymond
is'. Baldwin Bridge over the Connecticut be-
tween Old Saybrook and Old Lyme.
CITES FAVORITE
His favorite was the Arrigoni Bridge in
Middletown. "It was the first big bridge on
which I was project engineer, and the first
high level bridge in Connecticut. Fortu-
nately, everything came together right, or I'd
be living in Mexico."
Ives was appointed deputy highway com-
missioner in July 1955, and concentrated on
organizing the department for the comple-
tion of the Connecticut Turnpike, and the
development of a division of research and
development within the department.
He resigned in 1956 to become general
manager of the Edward Balf Co. of Hartford,
but returned to the department when he was
appointed State highway commissioner by
Gov. ABRAHAM A. RIBICOFF in 1959.
Between the time he took office July 1,
1959 and June 30, 1965, the Department spent
more than $600 million for about 223 miles
of new highways.
In addition to his career as an engineer,
Ives managed an active military career.
He enlisted as a private in the Connecticut
Army National Guard in 1938. when he was 38
years old.
"I went for a year's active training, and it
stretched to more than 5 years," he said.
"I like it, but I didn't care too much for
the spit and polish."
Eves served as an engineer officer both in
the Pacific and In Europe during World War
It. He was recalled to active duty during
the Korean war, but to his chagrin, instead
of being sent to Korea, he wound up com-
manding the antiaircraft defenses of Balti-
more, Md.
"Tt bothers me that I had to retire a few
years ago, and I cant' get into this one," he
comments. Ives retired in 1957 as a brigadier
general.
?i::RIES OFBOATS
Tves and his wife, the former Caroline
Wallen of Norwich. live at Long Pond, North
,3 ton, in a former summerhouse they
Stoning
converted to year-round as a family project
after World War If.
Ile lists his hobbies as his eight grandchil-
dren and boating. His boat the "Kitty Hig-
,ins VI," is a cruiser rigged for sport fishing.
Ives explains "Kitty Higgins" was a nick-
name he first gave his wife--it was the name
of a comic strip character. Ives has had five
boats--"Kitty Higgins II" was his jeep in
Europe during World Wax II.
Tve:; is acutely aware that his position is
a hot spot. "People ask me 'Why do you
stick to it?' I don't know. Every 3 months
or so I say 'I'd better go home.' But I don't,
and I don't want to. I just hope I know
enough to go home when finally I should."
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, I
rise today to speak in behalf of the
Lithuanian people, who 48 years ago, at
Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, pro-
claimed their independence after over
a century of Russian rule and went for-
ward as a free nation, achieving a high
level of economic and social prosperity.
Tragically, this taste of freedom was
brief. It was only a little over two dec-
ades after the establishment of inde-
pendence that Lithuania once more be-
came the victim of her overpowering
neighbor. The totalitarian might of the
Soviet Union has since been used to ex-
terminate any sense of Lithuanian na-
tionhood. Despite oppression, the :Lith-
uania.n people continue to resist tyran-
ny and attempt to preserve their
heritage of freedom.
Today, our prayer and hope is that
this proud nation of people dedicated to
the cause of liberty throughout their his-
tory will once again join the family of
free nations. We honor these people on
this 48th anniversary of their independ-
ence and join with all Americans of
Lithuanian descent in renewing our de-
votion to the cause of freedom and jus-
tice.
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, success
in fulfilling our commitments in Viet-
nam is now within reach.
The following column by Roscoe
Drummond, which appeared in the New
York Herald Tribune of February 9, 1966,
gives a, realistic estimate of the war situ-
ation and I commend it to the attention
of our colleagues:
CONG FORCES WANINGS: A VIETNAM PEFORT-
WE'RE ON WINNING TRACK
(By Roscoe Drummond)
WASHINGTON.-What is the most reliable
and realistic estimate of how the war is go-
ing in Vietnam? Are we losing? Are we
just holding on? Are we hopelessly stale-
mated? Are we making solid headway to-
ward victory?
It is the purpose of this column to re-
port the overall trend of the fighting in
Vietnam--arid to cite the evidence. It is
based on information and judgment of peo-
ple, some only just returned from Saigon,
whom I consider trustworthy and objective.
Here are the essential elements:
1. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong
troops are being hurt-and hurt badly. The
extent to which the enemy is hurting is only
how becoming evident.
7,. Hanoi's whole timetable and Strategy
of conquest is out of gear. Vietcong "vic-
tories" during the monsoons last year were
to enable the Vietcong to take the offensive.
Captured North Vietnamese prisoners say
they were told they were being sent south
just "to wrap it up." It isn't happening that
way. Vietcong morale is deteriorating and
Hanoi radio is bracing its troops for a "long,
bard war."
3. There is absolutely no defeatism among
the highest U.S. officials (military, political,
and economic) who are on the scene in Viet-
nam. They are confident that the independ-
ence of South Vietnam can and will be se-
cured.
4. No easy or early victory is expected.
Hard fighting, perhaps harder than we have
thus feu' experienced, may lie ahead. There
is no basis for airy, blue-sky optimism. But
success is within reach.
Here are some pertinent facts.
Troop strength: During 1965, U.S. military
manpower rose from 23,000 to 181,000 and
will expand further. South Vietnamese
armed forces increased from 560,000 to 679,-
000. Enemy military strength rose from
103,000 to 230,000.
Losses in battle: Enemy troops killed in
battle in 1965 totaled 34,000, with 6,000 cap-
tured-a 100-percent increase in losses over
1964. U.S. losses were slightly more than
1,300 in 1965, South Vietnamese losses were
11,000.
Where Vietcong is hurting. In-depth
interviews with several hundred Vietcong
prisoners and defectors, carried out by ex-
perts independent of any government agency,
reveal:
That Vietcong forces are thrown badly off
balance because B-52 bombers constantly
keep them on the run, preventing them from
resting and regrouping. They complain:
"There is no longer any place to hide."
That the Vietcong is increasingly losing
the support of the villagers and peasant.,
who have hid them in the past. They are
losing it through terror and taxes. The vil-
lagers mostly blame the Vietcong for the air
attacks which their presence brings.
The Vietcong are so short of manpower
they are impressing 15-year-olds and young
women into armed service.
The Vietcong prisoners complain of heavy
losses in combat, and North Vietnamese pris-
oners admit they were misled by Hanoi,
which had assured them that U.S. soldiers
would be soft and couldn't fight against
guerrillas.
The great majority of prisoners say that
most have now come to believe the Vietcong
can't win the war.
It is clear that there is a feeling among
quite a few Americans in the United States
that we can't win. I am convinced that the
evidence is on the side that we can win, are
winning, and will win.
The confidence and stamina of our men
on the battlefront deserves to be matched
by confidence and stamina on the homefront.
Operation Trading Stamps: Community
Service
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. RICHARD L. OTTINGER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, I
would like to call our colleague's atten-
tion to the wonderful community service
which has been performed by one of my
constituents, Mr. Al Reid, of Yonkers.
N.Y.
Mr. Reid is the publisher of the Illus-
trated News, a weekly newspaper in
Yonkers and. for more than 2 years he
has collected over 400,000 trading
stamps. He has redeemed these stamps
and has distributed more than 2,000 toys,
games, and other comforting items to
hospitals, convalescent centers, chil-
dren's homes, homes for the aged and
other deserving institutions. Recently
the Peoples Savings Bank of Yonkers
contributed 10,000 trading stamps to Mr.
Reid's project. These stamps, in turn.
were translated into a dozen toys and
games which were presented to the chil-
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dren's ward at St. John's Riverside Hos-
pital
it is with great pleasure that I join
with Al Reid's friends and neighbors in
honoring his outstanding service to the
community.
Metropolitan Dade County's Pioneering
Traffic Court
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. DANTE B. FASCELL
OF FLORIDA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, since
July 1, 1959, Dade County, Fla., has had
a new and effective traffic court. This
court has done an outstanding job in
helping Greater Miami deal with the
problems caused by a steadily increasing
number of cars and trucks on our high-
ways. It has had a marked effect on
safety and, in the 61/2 years of its oper-
ation, has proved to be one of the finest
and most effective courts in the Nation.
I wish to call the attention of our col-
leagues to a most informative article.
concerning the court in this month's is-
sue of American County Government, by
the distinguished mayor of Metropolitan
Dade County, Charles Hall.
The article follows:
FEWER ACCIDENTS AIM OF A PIONEERING
TRAFFIC COURT
(By Mayor Charles Hall)
The metropolitan court of Dade County,
Fla., has been recognized as the best in its
field nationally. Winner of 10 national
awards since it was established in 1957, the
court received 5 from the American Bar
Association for establishment of a model
court and its continued progress.
Metro court jurisdiction includes all cases
arising under county ordinances adopted by
the metro commission. It may punish for
contempt; impose fines not exceeding $1,000;
commit offenders to the county jail; and
issue bench warrants. If the offense is pun-
ishable by a fine exceeding $500 or imprison-
ment of more than 60 days, the accused can
demand a jury trial.
The court, which tries all traffic offenses in
Dade County, is based on the underlying con-
cepts of traffic safety through driver educa-
tion and uniform laws and treatment.
The objectives of metro court are to in-
crease respect for traffic laws and to con-
tribute to the total community effort re-
quired to reduce traffic accidents. The main
tool in this all-out campaign is not the fear
of having to pay a heavy fine but the educa-
tion of the violator.
After bing in metro court, many motorists
say they hadn't realized the importance of
traffic laws or the dignity in which the court
conducts itself, Such statements are a pleas-
ant contrast to those charging that many
traffic courts are mere fine-collecting agencies
with no concern for justice or correction.
Before metro court was established, the
quality of justice ranged from excellent to
terrible in the 27 municipal traffic courts.
Small cities were unable to afford proper fa-
cilities or full-time judges. Twenty-seven
different sets of regulations made knowledge
of the driving laws almost impossible.
Result? A deterioration of the driving pub-
lic's attitude toward the law and law en-
forcement that was seriously reflected in the
county's soaring death, injury and accident
rate.
Metro court had to overcome many hur-
dles-mainly legal suits-before arriving.at
its present position. In one 1958 decision,
the Florida Supreme Court ruled that metro
traffic ordinance 57-12 expressly nullified and
superseded the ordinances of all Dade Coun-
ty municipalities and that traffic offenses
arising under county ordinances should be
tried only In the metro court.
After initial legal obstacles were overcome,
the board of county commissioners approved
a three-phase proposal of the American Bar
Association to render traffic court services
to Dade County, setting up the present court
system.
The court went into effect on July 1, 1959,
with seven court locations (another was
added latter). In addition to all 27 munic-
ipalities, the Dade County Sheriff's Depart-
ment and the Florida Highway Patrol also
file traffic cases in the metro court.
Except for violations of inspection regu-
lations, equipment requirements, pedestrian
and parking laws, all moving violations are
scheduled for a court hearing on first of-
fenses.
COURT APPEARANCE
Without extentuating circumstances, all
persons must appear personally before the
judge. This follows a national recommend-
ation of the Conference of State Supreme
Court Chief Justices. The arresting police-
men are assigned specific court dates-twice
a month. The courtroom for the case de-
pends on where the citation was issued.
Personal appearance of violators affords the
judges the opportunity to review the per-
son's prior driving record, to observe any
mental or physical deficiencies, and to give
enough individual attention to educate and
correct the individual violators rather than
to punish them. In his opening remarks,
the judge talks about local problems and
current accident statistics.
Tourists and nonresidents may advance
the trial date by arrangement with either the
individual police officer at the time a ticket
is issued or the clerk's office, where the of-
fender posts a nominal bond equal to the fine
for the offense. This privilege is extended
to local residents when circumstances war-
rant it.
Dade. County residents or property owners
may be released without bail upon a written
promise to appear in court, except for
hazardous moving violations which require
booking and bail. Noncounty residents may
be released on cash bail except where the
officer is required to book the person. The
officer may also release sick persons from cus-
tody if a valid driver's license is surrendered
or when he is willing to accept a written
promise to appear.
All parking, standing, and nonmoving
violations may be paid by mail upon signing
a waiver of appearance and a guilty plea.
This privilege is entended to certain moving
offenses when no court appearance is re-
quired.
traffic complaints has been incorporated into
the clerical and financial processing to elim-
inate ticket fixing. Police officers' voided,
spoiled or lost complaints are processed in
open court.
In 1964, 289,000 cases were handled. By
November, the 1965 load had surpassed the
300,000 mark. The cases are handled by 175
employees.
A traffic school originally was maintained
by the Miami Police Academy, but was as-
signed to the metro court, which updated
and expanded it in 1961 in conjunction with
the Dade County Board of Public Instruc-
tion.
The school has paid dividends. Many mo-
torists who made dangerous errors through
ignorance, inexperience or faulty judgment
are not fined but sent to the school.
In the drive for traffic safety, the court
promotes vehicle and pedestrian safety in
English and Spanish on radio, TV, news-
papers, billboards, photo and literature dis-
plays, waste cans and postmarks on metro
mail.
The court sponsors the ABA program, "Go
to Traffic Court as a Visitor, Not as a Viola-
ter," and hosts groups such as the Boy
Scouts and civic organizations.
Realizing that Dade County has a large
number of Spanish speaking people, a Latin
American safety education program was
launched in 1960. Some 1,800 Latin Ameri-
cans attended classes taught in Spanish and
learned all phases of driving regulations and
the Florida financial responsibility law.
Five years ago the metro court's student
traffic safety council, recently cited as the
most outstanding such countywide group
In 13 Southeastern States, was organized.
The council has representatives from 32
county high schools. The judges send stu-
dent defendants to the council for driving
education punishment.
Another court project is the distribution
of a printed monthly report of its activities
with complete accident analysis, including
conviction rate by type of violation.
Metro judges are chosen in accordance
with the so-called Missouri plan, approved
by Dade County voters. Candidates for the
13 judgeships are screened by a committee
consisting of attorneys, laymen, and the pre-
siding senior judge of the circuit court.
The county commission appoints one or
three selected by the committee to serve
until the next primary. At that time, the
candidate runs unopposed for the approval
of the electorate. If he wins a majority, he
receives a full term. The top seven in the
balloting serve for 6 years; the others, 4
years.
Hope Is Seen
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL
OF MARYLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, Presi-
dent Johnson's quest for peace in Viet-
nam has at last received a glimmer of en-
couragement.
This comes from the fact that the
Vietnam issue has been moved to the
corridors of the United Nations. I was
one of the Members of the House who
communicated with President Johnson
last month to request that he formally
request the United Nations to seek an
effective cease-fire and that we pledge
our support and our resources to such an
effort.
Certainly, the decision of the U.N.
Security Council to place the Vietnam
issue on its agenda marks a clear victory
for this administration. It could prove
the necessary step in moving the prob-
lem from the battlefield to the confer-
ence table.
Commenting on this, the Baltimore
Sun said the fact that the issue now is
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before the United Nations Security Coun-
cil "means that another door is being
held open while another possible route
to a Geneva conference is being ex--
amined."
The editorial suggests that "words like
hawks, doves, and aggression, for ex-?
ample, could well be dispensed with for
the time being while calm, dispassionate
efforts are made to discover the basis
for a rational peace settlement."
Here is a calm, dispassionate ap-
praisal of a subject of vital concern to
us all, and place the editorial in the
RECORD :
lI'rom the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 4, 19661
u THE UNITED NATIONS
As Arnbantador Goldberg keeps saying,
what the United States is trying to do is to
have the Vietnam war brought to the con-
ference table. Our objective, our belief, our
hope is to have it settled there rather than
on the field of battle. The fact that the
Issue now is before the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, after procedural preliminaries
which tended to obscure the modest nature
of the United States proposal, means that
another door is being held open while an-
other possible route to a Geneva Conference
is being examined.
To this extent the involvement of the
Security Council, limited as it is, may be
helpful. Communist China and North Viet-
nam, which pour vituperation on the United
States and scorn the United Nations, may
talk more candidly with some of the small
nonalined states. Diplomatic conversations
thus could be more useful than a public
debate in the Security Council over a formal
resolution, especially if a debate should end
ina Soviet veto.
Public debate is useful, of course, at the
proper time, when it promotes understand-
ing by sifting the grains of facts from the
chaff of speculation and emotion. Words
like hawks, doves and aggression, for example,
could well. be dispensed with for the time
being while calm, dispassionate efforts are
made to discover the basis for a rational
peace settlement. This applies to the Sen-
ate committee's inquiry as well as to the
United Nations.
Ad Hoc Congressional Conference on
Vietnam
i:XTENSION OF REMARKS
Or
HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL
+5 NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. ROS:E:NTHAL. Mr. Speaker, un-
der leave to extend my remarks in the
RECORD, I am inserting below the report
of an ad hoc congressional conference
on Vietnam, held in Washington on Jan-
uary 21 and 22. The conference was
sponsored by eight Members of Congress,
listed in the report.
The report represents the views of a
group of experts particularly qualified to
discuss American diplomacy. The con-
clusions were reached by that group,
rather than by the congressional spon-
sors. The sponsors believe the report
merits careful consideration by their col-
leagues, the executive branch, and the
American people.
The report. follows-
REPORT OF TIIE AD HOC CONGRESSIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON VIETNAM, HELD IN WASHING-
Tow, D.C., JANUARY 21 AND 22, 1966
CONGRESSONAL SPONSORS
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, Democrat, of New
York, chairman.
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Democrat. of Michi-
gan.
Doer EDWARDS, Democrat, of California.
LEONARD FARBSTEIN, Democrat, of New York.
DONALD M. FRASER, Democrat, of Minnesota.
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Democrat, of
Wisconsin.
HENRY S. REUSS, Democrat, of Wisconsin.
WILLIAM F. RYAN, Democrat, of New York.
Foreword
On January 21 and 22, 1966. a group of
experts and scholars met in Washington at
the invitation of eight Members of the House
of Representatives to analyze the current
situation in Vietnam and prepare realistic
proposals to help end the war and lacilitate
a negotiated settlement.
The sponsoring Congressmen have felt un-
satisfied with the recent role of Congress
in foreign affairs. They believe their office
requires a more fundamental examination
of foreign policy than that allowed by even
the most careful consideration o1 specific
legislation. The sponsors are convinced that
the level of congressional analyse can be
raised through greater intimacy be;:weer the
legislative branch and the intellectual and
university community. It was with this in
mind that they invited to Washington a
group of experts particularly qualified to dis-
cuss with them Vietnam and its implications
for American diplomacy.
Some of the participants have spent con-
siderable time in Vietnam, and have obtained
intimate association with conditions there.
Others offered the important perspectives of
experience in negotiation, study of econom-
ics, diplomacy or international law, or ex-
pert knowledge of relevant geographical
areas.
Participants were requested not to dwell
on epi.sodes or errors of the past. Instead,
they were asked to discuss present policies
and possible alternatives to them; to analyze
the problems involved in reaching and en-
forcing a settlement in Vietnam; and to pro-
ject the outlines of a creative American pol-
icy toward Asia.
Certain conclusions and recommendations
by the participants emerged in the discus-
sions and these are stated explicitly at the
beginning of the report. The subsequent
summary of the discussions also includes
some individual points which contributed to
the analysis, although they were not unan-
imously endorsed.
The sponsors regard the proposals made
by the conference as important contributions
to their own thinking about Vietnam and the
formulation of American foreign policy.
They feel the report deserves the attention
of their congressional colleagues, members
of the executive branch, and the American
people. Finally, they view the conference
as having set an important precedent for
future congressional initiatives in foreign af-
fairs.
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Arthur Larson, chairman, director,
Rule of Law Research Center, Duke Univer-
sity; former director of the U.S. Information
Agency, and Special Assistant to President
Eisenhower.
Mr. Richard Barnet, codirector, institute
for Policy Studies; former Deputy Director,
Office of Political Research, U.S. Anus Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency.
Prof. Robert Browne, professor of wonom-
ics, Fairleigh-Dickinson University: former
A.I.D. official in Vietnam.
Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, former counsellor
to the Department of State.
Prof. Richard Falk, associate professor of
international law, Princeton University; edi-
tor, American Journal of International Law.
Prof. Bernard Fall, professor of inter--
tional relations, Howard University; author
of "The Two Vietnams."
Mr. Arnold Fraleigh, lecturer in politico;
science, George Washington University;
former Foreign Service officer.
Dean Edmund Gullion, dean, Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy; former Coun-
sellor of American Legation in Saigon;
former Ambassador to the Congo.
Prof. George McT. Kahin, director, south-
east Asia program, Cornell University.
Prof. John Lewis, professor of government,
Cornell University.
Prof. John Lewis, professor of government..
Cornell University.
Mr. Robert Nathan, economic consultant.
Mr. Marcus Raskin, codirector, Institute
for Policy Studies; former member of the
special staff of the National Security Coun-
cil.
Prof. Louis Sohn, Bemis Professor of In-
ternational Law, Harvard Law School.
Mr. James Warburg, writer on foreign
policy.
Betty Goetz Lall, Rapporteur, School of
Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell Uni-
versity.
Paul T. Gorman, executive assistant.
Mr. Nathan attended that part of the
conference dealing with economic aid but
did not participate in the preparation of
the report.
Dean Gullion is not in agreement with a
majority of the findings and recommenda-
tions.
CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS
The conference reached the .recommenda-
tions and conclusions set out below. A sum-
mary of the discussions from which they
were developed follows:
Present strategies
There are diplomatic alternatives, not yet
fully explored, to continued military escala-
tion of the war in Vietnam.
Continued bombing of North Vietnam is
not in the American interest either in
shortening the war or in improving prospects
for a negotiated settlement.
There should be no further escalation of
American troop commitment. There are
serious risks of inviting greater North Viet-
namese and Chinese activity.
Unilateral withdrawal of all American
troops prior to a cease fire or peace con-
ference is not in our national interest.
New policy initiatives
The most productive course for the future
is a deescalation of military activity and
commitment.
The National Liberation Front must be
recognized as a principal belligerent in the
war, and as a necessary party to any peace
conference and settlement.
To improve the likelihood of negotiations.
the Saigon government should be broadened
to include representatives less hostile to
negotiations.
The United States must help promote
greater contact between all South Viet-
namese factions-representatives of the Na-
tional Liberation Front, the Saigon govern-
ment, and influential private citizens.
Negotiations and the convening of a
conference
The differences between the several
negotiating positions are not insurmoul:.t.-
able. The United States might agree to
Hanoi's four points, treating them as one
interpretation of the 1954 agreement and
thus an appropriate basis for negotiations.
The controversial point 3 of the Hanoi
program would then be a subject for sub-
sequent discussion rather than prior
approval.
The 1954 Geneva Conference should be
reconvened with all parties to the hostilities
represented.
A procedure for reconvening the Geneva
Conference would be to have the three na-
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 Feb,-.wary. 16; gigpgoved FQ.r tggMNQL/2-RE 8ABOMEM0400020001-5 A783
wins on the International Control Commis-
sion (Canada, India, Poland) request a con-
ference to receive new instructions on
enforcement of the 1954 agreements.
The inability of the United Nations thus
far to use its good offices to help end the
Vietnam war dramatizes the urgency of in-
cluding China as a full member of that in-
stitution. Despite the difficulties of involv-
ing the United Nations in a settlement of
the war, all parties should seek opportuni-
ties to utilize the United Nations in appro-
priate ways.
Terms of a settlement
A cease-fire must be secured. Given the
dispersed nature of the conflict, such a
cease-fire might be more easily reached at a
conference, though the possibility of a prior
cessation of hostilities should be explored
carefully.
Agreements must be reached on a provi-
sional government in South Vietnam and
procedures for the holding of elections to
form a constituent assembly. A provisional
government might be established on the
basis of geographical areas controlled, with
contested areas to be administered tempo-
rarily by the International Control Commis-
sion. Alternatively', decisions regarding
such a government could be reached by prior
negotiations between all parties in the
south.
All parties must firmly adhere to the re-
sults of free elections.
Amnesty must be granted for all parties
in the conflict.
Guarantees of the cease-fire, the provi-
sional government, free elections, troop
withdrawals, amnesty, and neutralization
must be enforced by an effective Interna-
tional Control Commission. The Interna-
tional Control Commission must therefore
be significantly strengthened. United Na-
tions participation in this process might re-
duce administrative difficulties and set
precedent for future United Nations partici-
pation in the solution of other civil conflicts
threatening world peace.
A settlement should assure the neutrali-
zation of the two zones of Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia. Arms control agreements
must be reached applying to other nations
of the area, prescribing their nonparticipa-
tion in military alliances, the freedom of
their territory for foreign military bases, and
their protection from outside arms, mate-
rial, and armed personnel infiltration,
CONFERENCE SUMMARY
1. The current situation in Vietnam
In discussing the present situation in
Vietnam, the Conference concentrated on
two major issues: the status and relations
of the several Vietnamese parties in conflict
and the political effect of. various military
tactics and strategies.
The Vietnamese Antagonists
There is little information about the Na-
tional Liberation Front and its military arm,
the Vietcong. Their top leaders are not
easily contacted; below the top leadership
few of their personnel have been adequately
identified by Americans. Many of the par-
ticipants felt this lack of knowedge itself
obstructed needed initiatives in the diplo-
matic sphere. Several participants ac-
quainted with politics in South Vietnam
reminded the Conference that the Vietcong
had grown out of the resistance movement
when all of Vietnam was struggling against
the French. The National Liberation Front
is clearly dominated by the Communists, al-
though several experts pointed out that the
Front does consist of various factions, some
of them more natidnalist than Communist.
It was felt that attempts must be made to
learn more about the structure of the Front,
constituting as it does, such a- significant
force in the south.
There were varying viewpoints regarding
the strength of the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment, and the Conference was aware of
the extreme mutability of circumstances in
Saigon. Some participants believed there
was no organic non-Communist political
structure left in South Vietnam, and that
the military government was simply an ex-
tension of the American presence. Others
argued that there was considerable structure
intact. The Conference agreed that the sta-
bility and prestige of the Government was
largely a function of the degree of American
support.
Many participants were deeply disturbed
by the Ky government's insistence that talk
of negotiations jeopardizes its life and
threatens to dissolve its army's will to fight.
All agreed that this position should not be
allowed to prevail. In fact, it was felt that
a broadening of the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment would be a prerequisite for moves
toward a negotiated settlement.
Relations Between Saigon and the National
Liberation Front
Given the above evaluation, the partici-
pants were deeply convinced that steps must
be taken to promote greater contact between
the National Liberation Front, members of
the Saigon Government, and influential
South Vietnamese citizens. American policy,
in its insistence that the war is a simple
case of external aggression, may be under-
cutting this goal. While many noted the
intransigence of Saigon on stimulating con-
tacts, several of the participants pointed
out that some South Vietnamese officials,
Buddhists, independent political figures, and
non-Communist intellectuals are undoubt-
edly acquainted with the National Liberation
Front agents and officials. The United
States, through local aid and intelligence
officials, should actively seek to promote
these relations. The participants thought
that the United States must persuade the
Ky government not to obstruct this process
and inflict punishment on citizens engaged
in promoting contact between presently hos-
tile groups. If, as all parties to the conflict
agree, a future South Vietnam must be au-
tonomous and free from foreign interfer-
ence, then attempts at reconciliation within
the country must be made.
Relations Between the National Liberation
Front and Hanoi
Many in the group believed there are dif-
ferences between the National Liberation
Front and the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment regarding the conduct of the war.
Some argued that those fighting in the south
are likely to feel less inclined to compromise
for a settlement. An example of this differ-
ence was the variation in interpretation
given by the National Liberation Front and
North Vietnam to the statement first issued
by the Front on March 17, 1965. The North
Vietnamese version, broadcast 3 days after
the National Liberation Front account, was
much toned down.
The difference in outlook between the
Front and North Vietnam was cited as an-
other reason why the United States should
encourage the Government in South Vietnam
to make contact with the National Liberation
Front. We could be committing serious er-
rors if we assumed that Hanoi had such com-
plete authority over the National Liberation
Front that it could speak for it on all issues
of stopping the war and negotiating a set-
tlement. We do not know definitely that the
National Liberation Front would accept Han-
oi's terms for a settlement. In fact, it, was
felt that one of the reasons why reunifica-
tion of North and South Vietnam is no longer
an issue of priority was the recognition by
Hanoi that even with a Vietcong victory, re-
unification would involve a complicated
process of bargaining between Hanoi and
whoever formed a South Vietnamese Govern-
ment.
The Political Effects of Military Tactics:
. Bombings in the North
The Conference participants were in agree-
ment that the bombings in the north were o)
little military value, while the diplomatic
disadvantages were very serious. It was_
agreed that the bombings had helped bolster
South Vietnamese morale; but it was believed
this factor did not outweigh harmful diplo-
matic effects. Further escalation of the
bombings, it was felt, could not be expected
to improve the situation.
The Political Effects of Military Tactics:
Operations in the South
The Conference expressed extreme anxiety
over the prospect of increased American
troop commitments in the south. Echoing
the conclusion of the recent Mansfield re-
port, the participants argued that an escala-
tion of troop commitment would likely re-
sult in stalemates on yet higher levels of
engagement. There was profound aware-
ness of the risks of provoking greater North
Vietnamese and possible Chinese ground par-
ticipation. No member of the group be-
lieved the United States should withdraw all
its forces from Vietnam prior to a settlement.
But the group agreed that the most desirable
future course would be a deescalation of
military activity and involvement. Many
held that American initiatives on staged
withdrawals would be more in the U.S. inter-
est than, a continued enlargement of our
involvemnt.
The Conference also noted that bombings
in the south and ground clear-and-hold op-
erations were creating a serious refugee prob-
lem. The number of refugees, estimated at
1 million in 1965, was growing beyond the
capacity of pacification programs to absorb
them. The problem was thought to be of
increasing importance to the stability of the
South Vietnamese Government.
Throughout the discussion there was con-
cern expressed that the more the United
States makes the war our war, the less chance
we have of building attitudes congenial to a
settlement. With respect to U.S. economic
efforts, for example, it was argued that with-
out the willingness of the South Vietnamese
Government to commit itself to improving
conditions in the countryside, large increases
of U.S. economic aid and personnel are not
likely to achieve intended political results.
11. Negotiations and a peace conference
The conference discussed in some detail
the present bargaining positions of the
parties in conflict. From here, it turned to
an examination of the problems involved in
initiating negotiations and convening a peace
conference.
Current Negotiating Positions
On the surface it appears that both sides
in the war are agreed on what should con-
stitute the basis for negotiations and a peace
conference. The United States and North
Vietnam have said that the 1954 Geneva
Agreement should form the foundation of
a settlement; the United States has pre-
sented 14 points as representing its own
position. The North Vietnamese position is
represented by the four points announced
on April 8, 1965. Of these, point three has
been the principal obstacle to agreement.
This point reads: "The internal affairs of
South Vietnam must be settled by the South
Vietnamese people themselves, in accord-
ance with the program of the NFLSV (the
South Vietnam National Liberation Front)
without any foreign interference." The
United States has indicated that all points,
4 or 14, could be dealt with in negotiation.
Yet there is still considerable controversy
regarding the true nature of Hanoi's point
three. One view was that point three.meant
that Hanoi would settle for nothing less than
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX February 16,'1966
a settlement based entirely on the program
of the front. Many, however, disputed this
interpretation, arguing that the four points
;ire but an elaboration of Hanoi's under-
standing of the 1954 agreement. Cited as
documenting this contention were the
preamble and postscript to the four points.
The preamble states that it is the intention
of the North Vietnamese Government "to
;;trictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements
on Vietnam and to correctly implement their
basic provisions as embodied in the follow-
ing four points":
A significant number of participants felt
that the negotiating positions of the parties
were not so irreconcilable. It was then pro-
posed that the United States should accept
,he four point, of Hanoi. treating them as
one interpretation of the Geneva accords,
.end thus an appropriate basis for negotia-
tinns. The controversial point three would
then become a subject for discussion at a
conference rather than prior to it. This
American diplomatic initative would give
fianoi less reason to oppose negotiations.
' 1.'lhere was some belief that Hanoi was not
disposed, to negotiate now since it felt that
the United States could be worn down
psychologically.
tf, however, the above view is not entirely
the case, and if the positions of the several
parties are not so opposed, what then is
holding tip the convening of negotiations
and a conference? There appears to be the
lack of conviction on each side that the
ether side does in fact accept the conditions
proclaimed for a settlement. There may also
lie conviction that military success Is still
possible. And clearly there is ambiguity
regardng the role of the National Liberation
ti'ront, in addition to other procedural dif-
iiculties regarding the convening of a
conference.
scaling with .he National Liberation Front
t main stumbling block to negotiations
leas been the refusal of the United States
to accept the presence of the National Lib-
eration Front as one of the necessary parties
t:o the negotiations and settlement. The
U.S. position has been, in the words of the
President: "The Vietcong would not have
difficulty being: represented and having their
views represented if for a moment Hanoi
decided she wanted to cease aggression. I
don't think that would be an insurmount-
:chle problem." This has appeared to be in.-
ecifTicient recognition to satisfy the Front
and North Vietnam. And Hanoi has some-
licnes seemed to take the extreme view that
the Front is the only group from South Viet-
tc;.m that should be dealt with.
The group felt strongly that the United
:;fates should he clearer about its willingness
to deal with the Front at the negotiating
able. While the United States should con-
,kilt folly with the South Vietnamese Gov-
c'rnment on its view, the Ky government
r.hou.id. not be permitted to exercise a veto
over U.S. policy in this respect. One ap-
proach to dealing with the Front might be an
American decision to grant the Front bel-
ligerent status.
ieconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference
The reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Con-
ference is almost; a certain prerequisite to
negotiating art end to the war. There is,
however, a procedural problem as to which
Government or body should request the re-
convening of this conference.
While there .ere considerable uncertainties
regarding future developments, the partici-
pants thought it important to discuss likely
alternative procedures for convening a con-
f erence.
The cochairmen of the 1954 conference-
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union?
are unlikely to issue a conference call be-
cause the Soviet Union might not wish to
expose itself to further denunciations by
Elections
There was unanimity that elections should
be held for the purpose of creating a gov-
ernment of South Vietnam and that the
United States and all other parties to a nego-
tiated settlement should be absolutely firm
in their willingness to accept the results of
them. The United States, among its 14
points for a settlement, includes the "sup-
port of free elections in South Vietnam to
give the South Vietnamese a government of
their own choice." Most of the group felt
that the U.S. Government would honor this
commitment.
Fnding acceptable means by which elec-
tions can be held will be a difficult task.
The International Control Commission was
commissioned at Geneva to supervise elec-
tions for the reunification of the two zones
of Vietnam, The group assumed that the
International Control Commission could also
be given the ditty of supervising elections for
the formation of a constituent assembly
among whose responsibilities would be the
formation of a government.
Amnesty
The Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided
that the representative authorities of the
northern and southern zones of Vietnam
"must not permit any individual or collec-
tive reprisals against persons who have col-
laborated in any way with one of the parties
during the war, or against members of such
persons' families." This amnesty will need
to be reinforced in a peace settlement. If
necessary, the ICC must be given special
authority to see that amnesty is being ob-
served, and to consider reports of violations
and recommend action in their event.
Unification With North Vietnam
The Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided
that elections would be held in July 1955. for
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China or complicate its good relations with
North Vietnam. So this avenue war: there-
fore considered unpromising.
Another possibility is that the United
Nations might request the reconvening of
the conference. The principal problem here
is that neither North nor South Vietnam or
China are members of the United Nations;
and North Vietnam and China may continue
to regard any United Nations action as likely
to be partisan and therefore unacceptable.
A third possibility, now unlikely, is to act
on a former (1964) Cambodian reouest to
reconvene the conference to guarantee its
neutrality and borders, which Cambodia
charged. were threatened by the Vietnam
war. This conference might then be used
by the parties to discuss a settlement of the
war in South Vietnam.
There is a fourth possibility, as vet un-
tried, which might be most acceptable to all
parties. The three countries of the Inter-
national Control Commission (India, Canada,
and Poland) could request that the Geneva
Conference be reconvened in order that they
receive further instructions on the imple-
mentation of the 1954 agreement. At this
conference, the terms of a settlement to the
present war could be considered.
In requesting such a conference, the Inter-
national Control Commission members might
propose that representation be determined
along the lines of the 1961-62 Laos Confer-
ence, which allowed each. of the warring fac-
tions to participate in discussion. One of the
major functions of that conference was to
provide a channel through which leaders of
the three groups met and eventually agreed
on the formation of a government. The
Laos accord was then intended to be a guar-
antor of the settlement,
III. Terms of a settlement
Cease-Fire
A cease-fire will have to be a precondition
for elections to form a government for
South Vietnam. Yet given the dispersed na-
ture of the conflict, there would have to be
prior negotiations.
The U.S. position is that it will accept
a cease-fire before a conference or will agree
to a cease-fire as the subject of a conference.
The group agreed that either sequence could
be tried. But given the complexities of such
matters, a cease-fire would probably have to
be worked out at preconference or confer-
ence negotiations.
The United States is accepting sonic risk in
being willing to have a cease-fire before a
conference. It is one thing to call upon
major military forces to stop fighting, and
quite another to rely on the observance of a
cease-fire by guerrilla forces. Yet, the United
States side would gain politically as it result
of a cease-fire. Participants noted that
there are many recent examples where nego-
tiations were convened while fighting con-
tinued. This was the case in Indonesia,
Cyprus, Yemen, Algeria, and, in 1954, Indo-
china. What is desirable is that the bel-
ligerents agree, at least tacitly, that they will
engage in a maximum amount of deescala-
tion so as to permit a conference to meet in
the most relaxed possible atmosphere .
Provisional Government
One of the most difficult question; for a
reconvened peace conference to settle is the
nature of any provisional government, pend-
ing the holding of elections. Some believed
that this question is so difficult for outside
parties to decide that elections to t'orm a
constituent assembly for South Vietnam
should take enlace as soon as they could be
organized. Others thought that elections
immediately following a cease-fire would
present serious problems..
Two principal ways of forming a provi-
sional government pending elections were
discussed. At the national level, anal] South
Vietnamese Government would be composed
of representatives drawn from geographical
areas. Although many details would have
to be worked out in conference, the essential
functions of government would be divided
among the major South Vietnamese groups
and the International Control Commission.
At the local level the Saigon government
would continue to exercise authority over
areas controlled by it, and the same would
be true for the National Liberation Front
as well as such largely autonomous groups
as the Cao Dal, Hoa Hao, and some of the
Montagnard groups. As to those geographi-
cal areas which are contested, the Interna-
tional Control Commission would need to ex-
ercise temporary control. (It was noted that.
there is some precedent for this in the agree-
ment which gave the United Nations tem-
porary administrative control in West Irian. i
In this connection, members of the group
again stressed the importance of promoting
closer contacts by the different groups In
South Vietnam.
A second way of forming a provisional
government is the more traditional one of
having the parties decide on a cabinets where
portfolios would be divided among them.
Within this context the I.C.C. could be given
special responsibilities. Some expressed
anxiety that this form of provisional govern-
ment has provided Communists with a means
of staging a coup d'etat. It was pointed out
by others that whether such a provisional
government can function until elections are
held depends in large measure on the political
orientation of the population. In such
countries as France and Italy, Communists
were included in the cabinet of the inimed:s-
ate post-World War II governments with
no subsequent Communist takeover. In the
Laos Agreement of 1961-62, a coalition gov-
ernment that was formed at the time sub-
sequently broke down when the Communist
faction withdrew its support and refused to
participate, leaving the centrist and right-
wing groups to run that part of the country
they controlled.
 i. i Alpproved F_&W.&.eTMl/p6 9C RDP (000400020001-5
the purpose of reunifying the northern and
southern zones of Vietnam. Among the
members of the group who have had close
contacts in Vietnam there was agreement
that North Vietnam would not demand early
reunification of the country. Since the
United States is on record as supporting any
free decision of the people of Vietnam on re-
unification, this issue no longer appears to be
among those causing great controversy. A
constituent assembly could be given respon-
sibility for achieving reunification. On this
point it was noted that in January 1957, 6
months after the failure to hold elections in
Vietnam for reunification, the Soviet Union
proposed that North and South Vietnam be
admitted to the United Nations as separate
states. The United States rejected the pro-
posal at the time.
Neutralization of North and South Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia
The Geneva Agreement of 1954, by provid-
ing that North and South Vietnam could not
accept foreign military personnel and bases
or participate in military alliances, set the
stage for a military neutralization of the
four areas comprising. Indochina. It was
recognized by the group that such neutrali-
zation does not preclude governments in
these countries headed or controlled by Com-
munists, but that insofar as military mat-
ters are concerned, Communist or non-
Communist governments could not be alined
with other countries. It was the conviction
of the group that neutralization of North and
South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would
not jeopardize the security interests of
America or the non-Communist states of
Asia.
Withdrawal of Troops
Informally and unofficially, many Commu-
nist spokesmen have stated that it would not
be necessary for the United States to with-
draw its troops in advance of a negotiated
settlement in Vietnam. There is, however,
some uncertainty whether Hanoi and the
Front are in accord on this point.
The U.S. position is that we "want no U.S.
bases in southeast Asia," and that "we do
not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-
nam after peace is assured." Assuming flexi-
bility on the part of both sides on this issue,
the group did not think that the withdrawal
of troops per se would constitute a major
issue in the negotiations. The exact staging
of the withdrawal of troops on the part of
both the United States and North Vietnam,
of course, would need to be the subject of
rather detailed discussions.
Enforcement Provisions of a Settlement
The International Control Commission,
under the terms of the 19541 Geneva Agree-
ment, is made responsible for implementing
the terms of the agreement. However, in
the 1954 agreements it was expected that the
French Army would provide the necessary
logistic support and that financial support
would be given by the French Government.
When the French withdrew from South Viet-
nam in August 1956, the Commission was left
without any means of support. The need for
a reinforced ICC, therefore, was strongly
felt by all members of the group. If the
ICC is to perform the tasks assigned to it
in 1954, plus any additional ones designated
by a new 'peace conference, there must be
agreement on a new financing formula. The
Laos Agreement of 1961-62 bolstered the
ICC in its operations in that country; this
included a financing formula whereby the
United States, the Soviet Union, China,
France, and the United Kingdom each agreed
to pay 17.6 percent of the costs. The other
parties agreed to pay lesser percentages.
Some of the group felt that the ICC by
itself did not have the kind of administrative
structure needed to perform its duties. It
was therefore suggested that the United Na-
tions could provide administrative support to
strengthen the implementation of a settle-
A785
ment. Whether the Chinese would agree to American response to Communist agita-
such administrative support was not known, tion for conflict in developing areas must
but some participants thought that a United not be to react unilaterally with military
Nations decision to support strict observance forces. U.S. aid to certain governments with
of the Geneva Agreement would be evidence anti-democratic features appears to have
to the Chinese of the United Nations impar- pressed the Soviet Union into incerasing its
tiality regarding a settlement. agitation for disorder. Yet Soviet and Chi-
IV. Related aspects of a Vietnamese nese exhortations to developing countries
settlement have met with little success. Those nations
which are in their post-colonial stage are
China anxious for periods of sustained economic
At a number of points in the conference growth which increased revolution and vio-
China was discussed. These discussions lence would only disturb. There are still
covered China's view of the Vietnamese con- some nations, nevertheless, in which revo-
flict, and the relation of its domestic affairs lution is, or may soon be ripe. This must
to foreign policy. Thought to be particu-
larly important were the problems of pro-
viding sufficient food for its expanding popu-
lation, the succession question, and the
adaptation of the army to political rather
than professional military purposes. Chi-
nese food needs cannot be met by extending
control over small states in the area. Only
in the loess region of North China can total
food production be substantially raised,
something in the order of 40 percent. As to
the question of succession, the older leader-
ship has attempted-with only only mod-
erate success-to instill revolutionary and
anti-American attitudes in those younger
men likely to replace them. American poli-
cies, however, can affect the degree of suc-
cess the older leadership has with this
indoctrination process.
It was also noted that the Maoist leader-
ship fears that the United States may at-
tack the mainland soon and that China
must be prepared to meet this attack by
various forms of defense encompassing
guerrilla-type operations. There are signs,
however, that army leaders may be seriously
resisting the role assigned them by the party
in the defense of China.
On Chinese foreign policy, the specialists
in:the group noted the gross misinterpreta-
tion given by many to the September 1965
statement of the Chinese Defense Minister,
Lin Piao. This statement, contrary to pop-
ular and some official beliefs, advocated
scaling-down of overt Chinese action and
those militant policies which increased the
risk to China Itself. The Chinese espoused
the view that revolutions and wars of libera-
tion could not be imported, and that con-
ditions within a country had to be ripe in
order for such revolutions to succeed. This
did not mean that China would not send out
agents and propaganda to foment revolu-
tion. Yet such tactics should be differenti-
ated from the likelihood of repeated large-
scale Chinese aggression and the sending of
Chinese troops and arms to local Commu-
nist groups in the developing areas of the
world. Notable too in the Lin statement
was the absence of threats to the United
States in Vietnam, even though China had
issued many such threats in the earlier
months of 1965.
Thus in Vietnam, China has exercised
caution. Yet in assessing future Chinese in-
tentions it was stressed that there undoubt-
edly was a threshold for China's active parti-
cipation in the war. At some point in a con-
tinued U.S. escalation the Chinese would
doubtless feel compelled to enter.
Many believed that since 1963 Chinese for-
eign policy had suffered a series of signifi-
cant setbacks in the developing areas pri-
marily because of the hostile reactions of
indigenous populations and leaders.
Wars of Liberation
The group considered the above evalua-
tion as having particular relevance to Com-
munist policy on wars of liberation. Given
Chinese inability or reluctance to commit
military force to support wars of liberation,
and what some felt was a growing uneasiness
on the part of the Soviet Union unilaterally
to promote these conflicts, the participants
felt it important that the United States
revise its conception of Communist aggres-
sion.
be anticipated by the United States. It was
felt that our own particular revolutionary
tradition was not appropriate to guiding
these revolutions. But our interests are
most likely to be served by a sympathetic
rather than a hostile response when these
events finally occur.
In discussion of possible responses to rev-
olutions in the developing nations, the con-
ference emphasized the need for discover-
ing new roles for international organiza-
tions. Likewise, the participants thought
the United States should seek to explore new
avenues of cooperation with the Soviet Union
within the United Nations.
In discussing the role of major powers in
local conflicts of the future, many favored
stress on developing procedure within in-
ternational law rather than emphasis on se-
curing agreement on general principles.
There was some discussion of whether
Communist-inspired violence was likely to
break out in Thailand. The topic was con-
sidered to be highly speculative, though sev-
eral experts expressed the view that a major
outbreak of hostility was unlikely. Local
tension and increased terror, on, the other
hand, were thought to be a distinct possibil-
ity. Some thought was given, therefore, to
the possibility of multilateral action to
anticipate strife and prevent a crisis
analogous to that in Vietnam.
The group also noted the need for arms
control agreements in Thailand and possibly
other areas. Such agreements might pro-
hibit the import of arms or armed personnel,
the establishment of foreign military bases,
and the joining of military alliances. These
steps could be incorporated into a general
conference on Vietnam, or as an adjunct to
a Vietnamese settlement. Our greatest in-
terest, finally, should lie in insulating these
conflicts from outside interference.
On the relationship of Vietnam to other
countries in southeast Asia, including
Thailand, it was pointed out that Vietnam
was the only case in southeast Asia where
the Communists effectively identified them-
selves with the country's nationalists. Else-
where in southeast Asia, nationalism has not
been forced into fusion with communism.
Indeed, the failure of Communist insurrec-
tions in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the
Philippines testifies to the positive contribu-
tion of Asian nationalism. In each of these
cases, the inability of Communist insurgents
to secure nationalist backing defeated their
ultimate goals.
"Not To Doubt,"tby Richard Chaput-A
Saga of Spiritual Conquest
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
of
HON. JAMES C. CLEVELAND
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, on
January, 12, I paid tribute in the CON-
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 A786
Approved For " ~ /A?L9 ! ORD 67 004468 APPENDIX February 16,- 06(;
CRESSIONAL RECORD-page A62-to Mr. has not been an independent country.
Richard R Ch
t
f
. apu
o
Nashua, N.H., who
was named 1 of 10 outstanding young
men in America by the National Junior
Chamber of Commerce.
On January 20, I paid further tribute
to Mr. Chaput and inserted a wonderful.
editorial from his hometown paper the
Nashua Telegraph-CONGRESSIONAL REC-
ORD, page A 260.
Mr. Chaput achieved his distinctions
in spite of the fact that he is nearly to-
tally paralyzed as the result of child-
hood polio. His accomplishments in-
ciude the authorship of his autobio-
graphy "Not to Doubt," which contains
at foreword by Richard Cardinal Cushing.
Since my remarks appear in the REC?-
onD, a number of my colleagues have in.?
quired about the book and I am taking
this opportunity to repeat the name of it
nd to recommend it as an honest, grip-
ping, moving story of a man's conquest
over pain, fear, depression, loss of faith,
and frustration at what apepared to be
a hopeless life.
I have sent a copy to the President;
in the belief he would find the story of
a man whom trouble could not conquer
inspiring in this time of our country's
troubles. I wish it were possible for me
to send a copy to each of my colleagues
in the Congress, who also bear great
burdens in these days of strife and un-
certainty.
Again, I am pleased to recommend
"Not to Doubt", an. Inspiring story of
spiritual conquest by a brave man.
Lithuania: A Captive Nation
IEXTENS1ON OF REMARKS
of
HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER
OF ILLINOIS
TN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, nations
like individuals, wish to be free to order
their affairs as they see fit. How tragic
it thus is when a nation is deprived of its
independence through no fault of its
own. Certain great states were deprived
of their freedom for a few years recently
because they had shown complete dis-
regard for the rights of other peoples.
But when a, nation is subjugated to the
will of a foreign power simply because it
was too small and weak to resist the
brute force of its neighbors, then we are
faced with a situation which is wrong
...nd which assaults all the instincts for
fairplay and decency which we profess.
Lithuania is one such case of a nation
held captive by a stronger, rapacious
neighbor. The Lithuanian people have
an identifiable history dating back to the
Dark Ages. They have a proud history
as one of the great nations of Eastern
Europe. They have a culture and lan-
guage which has set them apart from
their neighbors. They certainly have as
much right to an independent national
r'xistence as any people. Yet, this is not
today the case. Since 1940 Lithuania
White it is right that our Government
has not recognized the destruction of the
Lithuanian state and still has diplomatic
relations with representatives of inde-
pendent Lithuania, the unpleasant fact
is that more than 2g,2 million people
live under the yoke of Soviet Russian
domination in their own homeland.
The last two and a half decades have
been especially hard years for the people
of Lithuania. Their country was a bat-
tleground in one of the most merciless of
conflicts-the Eastern . Front of the
Second World War. After the Soviet
armies returned in 1944 the infamous
methods of Stalinist repression increased
the suffering of the people. Opposition
was quickly blotted out. Sovietization
of all forms of living was imposed. The
population declined. Russian immi-
grants appeared to fill the places left
empty by the deaths and deportation of
tens of thousands of the native populace.
But what is especially terrible about
these events is that they began by the
destruction of the independent Lithu-
anian. nation. When the Soviets reim-
posed. the rule of Russian czars, they
ended 22 years of Lithuanian freedom.
Lithuania had become independent on
February 16, 1918. In the years which
followed, a great deal of progress was
made., especially in social matters, which
indicated that Lithuania would be a
peaceful, developing nation. It is par-
ticularly sad that this renaissance was
so viciously ended and the freedom and
progress of Lithuania transformed into
the sterile slavery of a Communist sa-
trapy.. Mr. Speaker, I feel that it is thus
especially appropriate that we take note
of the 48th anniversary of the declara-
tion of independence of Lithuaria. Let
me extend to the people of captive Lith-
uania my deepest wishes that the great
hope for the future embodied in the an-
niversary of their independence iii ay soon
be fulfilled.
People to People
MOD- -
honor by the Korean Ambassador a
nd
Madam Kim. The Government of the
Republic of Korea honored Frank Per-
per on this occasion in appreciation for
his arduous support of the Korean Cul-
tural and Freedom Foundation. His of -
forts are in the highest tradition of our
country's "people-to-people" program
and we can all be proud of Frank's Con-
tributions to international understand-
ing and good will.
Mr. Speaker, under unanimous con-
sent I insert at this point in the RECORD
a letter from the Korean Ambassador at
large concerning the tour of the "Little
Angels" and the letter of appreciation to
Frank Perpe:r:
THE KOREAN CULTURAL AND
FREEDOM FOUNDATION, INC.,
Washington, D.C., January 21, 1965.
DEAR FRIENDS: The Little Angels' 1965 tour
of the United States was a cultural triumph.
Audiences responded to performances by
these 26 young ladies and 1 boy from
Korea with ovations. Critics used such
words as "charming," "magnificent," "su-
perb" to describe their skillful and enter-
taining Korean folk dances, accompanied by
ancient oriental music.
In these critical days in Asia, of course, the
Little Angels' performances do more than
bring Americans a better understanding of
the centuries-old Korean culture. They also
honor those Americans who have fought and
died to preserve the independence of the
Republic of Korea and emphasize that Free
Korea Is one of America's stanchest alLies
in the defense of freedom in Asia.
The Little Angels would like to return to
the United States this year as part of a world
tour planned[ by the Korean Cultural and
Freedom Foundation. All funds raised by
the tour will assist the greater cause and
objectives of the Foundation, which include
the education of underprivileged children in
Korea.
Whether or not the 1966 tour will be pos-
sible depends in large part upon the people
like you who have an abiding Interest in
culture and in people-to-people exchanges
as a means of increasing world understand-
ing.
With warm personal regards.
Sincerely,
YOU CHAN YANG,
Executive Vice President and Arnba.s-
sador at Large of Korea.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION,
HON. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL
OF MARYLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 19613
Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, in these
troubled times when international un-
derstanding and good will are so im-
portant, it is heartening to note the in-
dividual acts of brotherhood performed
by some dedicated citizens.
One fine example of such action is well
demonstrated by the work of my good
friend, Mr. Frank M. Perper, of Arling-
ton, Va. This businessman, who is pres-
ident of the Motel Management Corp.
of America, Inc., has made many un-
selfish contributions of his time and
energy, as well as his resources, to help
further friendship between the people of
Korea and the United States.
Therefore, I was particularly pleased
to attend a recent reception held in his
REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
Seoul, Korea, November 1, 1965.
This letter of appreciation is presented to
Mr. Frank M. Perper, the Motel Management
Corp. of America, Inc., Arlington, Va., in
recognition and gratitude of his unselfish
contributions which helped to further the
friendship between the peoples of Korea and
the United States.
As an arduous supporter of the Korean
Cultural and Freedom Foundation he has
made tangible aid available In assisting the
recent tour of the Little Angels, Korean chil-
dren's musica:[ and dancing group.
He also cooperated cordially in providing
facilities and services for official and cere-
monial occasions in Washington, D.C., area,
and has shown warm humanity by assisting
many Korean students in the United States
to become self-supporting in continuing
their education.
The generosity of Mr. Perper will long and
affectionately be remembered by the Korean
people, and Is hereby recognized and com-
mended.
HONG JONG CHUL.
Minister, Ministry of Public Informa-
tion, Republic of Korea.
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February 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A789
they have only seen the beginning. The
British have promised to invoke an even
wider range of sanctions and are expected to
announce the next round shortly.
There is no question in our minds about
the determination of the British to see this
program through. I might point out that
at the Lagos Conference of January 11-12,
the British appear to have convinced all
other Commonwealth members who attend-
ed that there were sufficient reasons to be-
lieve that these sanctions can be successful.
This led to a decision to wait until July
before the Commonwealth will reexamine
the effectiveness of this attempt to bring
down the Smith regime. We are sure that
the British will use that time to good ad-
vantage. -
Before and after the illegal rebellion, the
British position has been that they would
not use force in the Southern Rhodesia
rebellion, except to restore law and order.
Shortly after the rebellion took place, the
British gave an indication that they were
willing to send troops into neighboring Zam-
bia, although agreement could not be reached
with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda
on a mandate for such troops.
In the meantime, when the possibility that
the Smith regime would cut off Zambia's
power from the Kariba Dam became a spec-
ter on the horizon, British Prima Minister
Harold Wilson publicly stated that the Unit-
ed Kingdom could not stand idly by and
allow that to happen. Zambia's entire cop-
per-based economy depends on Kariba pow-
er. Late last week, too, a British military
mission arrived in Zambia for talks with the
Zambian Government..
The United States and the United King-
dom are united in their determination that
Zambia shall not be made to bear the brunt
of the Southern Rhodesia crisis, As a result
of their common colonial past, the economies
of Southern Rhodesia and Zambia are rather
intricately intertwined. All of Zambia's oil,
for example, has been received from the re-
finery at Umtali. Thus, the announcement
of the British oil embargo caught Zambia
with less than 2 weeks' supply of petroleum
products, although measures were already
underway tomeet Zambia's petroleum re-
quirements by alternate overland methods.
These, of course, take time to function fully.
NEIGHBORS HELP ZAMBIA
The help given to Zambia by its African
neighbors has been vital to the success of the
supply operation, Kenya and Tanzania have
cooperated magnificently in making avail-
able their port, railroad, and airport facilities
for the British segment of the airlift. Tan-
zania has greatly facilitated the overland
flow of petroleum by helping to organize
truck convoys.
The Congo has met every request of the
United States and Canadian Governments
to make a success of the airlift we have
mounted from Leopoldville. Two great
American overseas airlines, Pan American
Airways and Trans World Airlines, deserve a
hearty "well done" for their assistance with
this airlift. Together, they are carrying a
minimum of 180 tons of diesel fuel a day to
Zambia.
By the first of March, the petroleum sit-
uation within Zambia should be sufficiently
normal again for that aspect of the airlift to
be discontinued, but we are prepared to con-
tinue the airlift for other vitally needed
supplies. President Mobutu made a large
gilt of oil from his Government's own stocks
to help tide Zambia over the most critical
period of the oil shortage. The Portuguese
authorities in Mozambique and Angola and
the South African Government have shown a
correct attitude. They have respected the
British oil embargo and show every sign of
continuing to practice their neutrality in
what they see as a domestic British prob-
lem.
Let me close with a comment on 'the claim
of the Smith regime that it is a bulwark
against communism in Africa. We disagree.
We believe the regime's policies and actions
are designed to perpetuate minority rule.
If those are left unchallenged and un-
checked, they would create exactly the kind
of situation in which the Communists could
greatly extend their Influence in Southern
Rhodesia and which would encourage the
Communists to renew their efforts elsewhere
in Africa.
We have had some experience in helping
responsible African governments resist Com-
munist encroachments-far more experience,
I might add, than the Southern Rhodesian
regime. We believe the policies of govern-
ments in other African countries-policies
looking toward social advancement, respon-
sible majority rule, and political stability-
are far more effective weapons against com-
munism than any of the methods the Smith
regime might devise.
We know of no Communist threat to
Southern Rhodesia at present, but we fear
one may well develop if the colony continues
on its present course. We do not consider
our support of British efforts to return
Southern Rhodesia, to legal, constitutional
government inconsistent with our policy of
resisting the Communist threat to genuine
independence in Africa. On the contrary,
we look on our opposition to the rebel. regime
as additional evidence of our determination
to resist that threat.
[Front the South Bend (Ind.) Tribune, Jan.
29, 19661 ,
"AFRICA LAUDS PEACE STEPS" MENNEN WIL-
LIAMS TELLS OF TALKS WITII LEADERS
Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen
Williams, who carried President Johnson's
Vietnam "peace - offensive" to Africa, said
here Friday night that the African part of
the peace effort was successful,
Williams, former six-term Governor of
Michigan and now African affairs assistant
in the State Department, spoke at a dinner
meeting of the International Relations Coun-
cil of St. Joseph County in the Morris Inn.
The "peace offensive" was well received by
African leaders, said Williams, who traveled
the length of Africa, visiting 14 heads of state
in 7 days, to explain this Nation's Viet-
namese policy.
Williams said African leaders were pleased
to be consulted and praised the United
States for efforts to open Vietnam peace ne-
gotiations.
PROMISE ACTION
Many of those to whom he talked prom-
ised to approach the Communist world and
urge negotiations, Williams said.
"Even If the North Vietnamese refuse to
negotiate," Williams added, "I am positive
that we have convinced the leaders of black
Africa of the sincerity of our Intentions."
During a question period following his
speech, Williams also said communism has
lost its early impact on Africa and has set-
tled into a status more like imperialism.
"Ideologically, communism hasn't made
any headway in Africa," Williams said. "The
number of card-carrying Communists in Af-
rica is very small."
He said the only really successful effort by
Red China and Russia has been Brazzaville,
the Congo.
The main topic of Williams' speech was
the Southern Rhodesian crisis resulting from
the effort of the Ian Smith regime to obtain
independence from the British Government
and extend a white supremacy ruled.
PRAISES EFFORT
Williams praised the efforts of Britain to
bring down the Smith regime. He said the
efforts of Britain to use controls on trade
rather than armed conflict In the Southern
Rhodesian matter are proving successful,
"American reaction to the illegal seizure of
power by the Smith regime was immediate
and positive," Williams said. He praised
American businessmen for voluntary coop-
eration in helping to, make the trade controls
successful.
Williams scoffed at the claim by Smith
that the minority-rule government in South-
ern Rhodesia would be a bulwark against
communism.
On the contrary, Williams said, Smith
policies to perpetuate minority rule and hold
down the advancement of the Negro majority
creates "exactly the kind of situation in
which the Communists could greatly extend
their influence in Southern Rhodesia" and
encourages Communists efforts elsewhere in
Africa.
Communism and Crisis in Italy
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. EDNA F. KELLY
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966
Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, under
leave to extend my remarks, I wish to
place in the RECORD and to commend to
the attention of the membership of this
body, an editorial entitled "Communism
and Crisis in Italy," which appeared in
the February 14, 1966, edition of the New
York Times.
For many years I have spoken in this
House about developments in Italy, ex-
pressing my growing concern about the
influence of the Communist Party in the
governmental affairs of this country.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on
Europe, and as a great admirer of the
Italian people, their contributions to our
culture, and their positive and im-
portant role in the NATO structure, I
have viewed with dismay the progress
which the Communist Party of Italy has
made over the years In various local, ad-
ministrative; and national elections. The
current government crisis in Italy is in
part attributable to those developments.
Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that the
current situation in Italy-a situation
which may provide the opportunity for
the increase in power of the Communist
Party of that country-will be resolved in
such a manner so as to prevent, any
diminution of Italy's important role in
the affairs of the free world.
The editorial follows:
'COMMUNISM AND CRISIS IN ITALY
The failure of Aldo Moro, leader of the
Christian Democrats, to form a government
on his first try in the present Italian political
crisis is bad news for everyone but the Com-
munists. The possibilities now are a long
crisis, a caretaker government, or a general
election. The four-party coalition is dis-
playing lack of unity just at the moment
that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has
reorganized and unified its leadership.
The PCI, largest Communist Party in the
West, Is likely to continue on the relatively
moderate line set for it years ago by the late
Palmiro Togliatti. In its esoteric terminol-
ogy, polycentrism-or autonomy from Mos-
cow and Peiping-is the party's policy in
international affairs. In internal affairs, it
is democratic centralism, which calm for cen-
tralized strategy but, diversity and even lib-
eralism in tactics.
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