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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400010009-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 20, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400010009-7
January 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
729
formula for winning the war they have that the people of North Vietnam have to loss of life and perhaps complicate the
been proved wrong. Yet, we have not built at such sacrifice in recent years. search for a settlement? Now would
only been patient with these strategists; Furthermore, President Johnson with seem the time to escalate the peace off en-
we have permitted them to launch new imagination and vision has sent his top sive and escalate the killing. As Sena-
and larger ventures. Many Members of diplomats around the world and around tor JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, one of the
the Congress, even those with deep ap- this city to the various embassies, urg- wisest Members of the Senate and in our
prehension about our growing involve- ing many other governments to use their country, put it in a thoughtful statement
ment in the Vietnam struggle, have kept good offices in persuading the Govern- recently:
silent or have restrained their dissent ment, of North Vietnam to enter discus- Negotiation, not escalation, should be the
rather than risk weakening the various sions with us looking toward a settle- dominant theme of our activity now.
strategies we have tried on the battle- ment of the war. Friendly governments Let me make my own position clear.
field. Now the time has come to exercise in eastern Europe, such as Yugoslavia i have never agreed with the foreign
the same patience and perseverance in and many other countries have at our policy assumptions that first took us into
the search for a peaceful settlement. request agreed to assist in the search for southeast Asia in an active combat role.
Just as we have tried a wide range of a peaceful settlement. These concerned Nor do I accept those assumptions now.
military efforts, and experiments of var- governments which have placed their Southeast Asia is outside the perimeter
ious kinds, we now need to try a full confidence in us have urged for months of our vital interests. Furthermore, it is
range of diplomatic and political efforts that we halt the bombing. Now they an area convulsed by nationalistic revo-
to end the war. Patience is cheaper need time-perhaps many months-to lutionary movements aimed at ineffec-
than blood, and an honorable peace is convince Hanoi that a satisfactory set- tive and sometimes corrupt local regimes.
better than the length of the daily body tlement can be achieved with the United We identify with such regimes and
count. Prime Minister Shastri's last States, and with other interested gov- against popular revolutionary move-
recorded words, spoken to his defense erninents and groups which are involved ments at our peril. We have no commit-
minister, were: "We must fight for peace in the struggle. If we were to resume ment or interest in southeast Asia that
bravely as we fought in war." That bombings now or in the near future, I justifies the sacrifice of American troops
is an appropriate admonition to all tremble to think of the staggering blow on the scale necessary to win a military
nations. this would be to our presently favorable decision.
So let us not be too quick to launch position with the many governments In 1954 when the French were on the
the bombing attacks again. I think it is whose help we have asked in the search verge of military disaster in Vietnam,
clear that we have nothing to gain and for peace. there were those who urged that Ameri-
much to lose by resuming the bombing I sometimes think that one of the can troops be sent in an effort to turn
of North Vietnam. First of all, these great, unrecognized costs of this crisis the tide. That move was blocked in con-
attacks have been largely ineffective is that we have neglected our relation- siderable part because of the sound ad-
militarily. They were designed to stop ships with other major countries that vice of our then Army Chief of Staff,
the flow of North Vietnamese soldiers are important to the long-range security Gen. Matthew Ridgway, whose warnings
into South Vietnam, but as Secretary of our country and peace of the world. made sense to another experienced gen-
McNamara observed recently, after re- A front-page story in today's New York eral, President Dwight Eisenhower. In
turning from a trip to Vietnam, there Times reports: his book, "Soldier: The Memoirs of Mat-
aand nd thew B. Ridgway," published in 1956,
are now several times as many North The Governments Britain,
United France
Vietnamese in the south as when we Japan, all allies the General Ridgway wrote:
the Communist governments of Europe as when the day comes for me to face my
started the bombing last February. well as the governments of a number of non-
Furthermore, we have suffered a heavy alined nations are said to be pleading for Maker and account actions, the thing
humbly my proud roud of was the
-
loss of skilled pilots and costly airplanes I would b be most most for
several more weeks or even months of re- fact that I fought against, and perhaps con-
in the bombing effort. Sometimes they straint. More time is needed for diplomatic tributed to preventing the carrying out of
look at the losses on the other side, but maneuver, they maintain, and for a better some harebrained tactical schemes which
they do not consider the losses on our assessment of North Vietnam's interest in would have cost the lives of thousands of
side. Our losses have been excessive tempering if not settling the conflict. men. To that list of tragic accidents that
in terms of the limited damage to the Mr. President, these countries are being fortunately never happened I would add the
enemy's military capability. In one in- bitterly chided by Red China who is tell- Indochina intervention.
stance reported to me, we lost three ing them that the bombing pause is just In hearings before the Armed Services
highly trained pilots and three expensive a lull before we hit even harder. Let us Committee and the Committee on For-
bombers trying unsuccessfully to knock not play into the hands of the Chinese eign Relations of the U.S. Senate in May
out a little bridge of secondary military Communists and undercut our friends by 1951, the late Gen. Douglas MacArthur-
importance. As a former bomber pilot resuming the bombing as China insists a man of vast military experience in Asia,
who has asked many questions of some we are about to do. confirmed an earlier statement he had
of our thoughtful military tacticians, I It would seem to me that we should made on NBC when he asserted: "Any-
see little or no military advantage in re- also exercise caution in the conduct of body who commits the land power of the
suming the bombing of North Vietnam. the war in the south. I frankly was United States on the continent of Asia
Quite the contrary, the record indicates puzzled by our recent offensive in the ought to have his head examined."
that North Vietnam responds to the delta involving 8,000 American sodilers. At the same hearing, one of our wisest
bombings by sending more forces south- Why is it necessary to engage in such and ablest generals of World War II,
ward. In other words the bombing mis- large offensive operations during this in- Gen. Omar Bradley, said:
sions in the north may result in the tensive search for a peaceful settlement? I would hate very much to see us involved
death of more American soldiers in the I hope there will be no more such engage- in a land war in Asia. I think we would be
South. ments undertaken by us unless the other fighting a wrong war at the wrong place and
Nor is there any compelling diploma- side forces the issue. We are advised by against a wrong enemy.
tic or political reason for resuming the the President and by others that it has I agree with General Ridgway, General
bombings. They have not put Hanoi in been several weeks since any North Viet- MacArthur, General Bradley-and, more
a more favorable mood to negotiate. namese forces have engaged our troops recently, with General James Gavin-
The lessons of recent history are that _ in battle and that Vietcong initiated in- and others that the United States should
bombing attacks infuriate and unite a cidents have been reduced during the never commit our manpower to a major
people behind their government in rigid bombing pause. Why, then should we war on the Asian mainland except in the
resistance to the attackers. To produce needlessly risk the death of our own sol- event of a direct attack on the United
a climate favorable for discussion, which diers in major offensive campaigns when States such as occurred at Pearl Harbor
is now the announced top priority of our our diplomats are trying to reach an end some 25 years ago.
Government, both sides need time for to the war? Would it not bennore real- Anyone who believes that it is easy for
the clash of battle, the hatreds, and ten- istic and sensible to defend our present a Western power to win a war against
sions to cool down. That process can- position and hold the line while the peace Asia's limitless manpower, its dense jun-
not be enhanced by resuming the bomb- efforts are underway rather than to ' gles, and its vast terrain should read the
ing raids on the bridges and buildings launch new operations that can only lead testimony of our generals in full when
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 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400010009-7
730 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 20, 1.966
they were being interrogated for the rec- report, after all the sacrifice, that the that they urge on the President into a
cord. If those warnings do not suffice, military lines are about the same at the political gain for themselves and poli-
let those who advocate a bigger war, and end of 1965 as they were at the end of tical destruction for the President and
who are. in a hurry to resume the bomb- 1.964. his administration.
dig and step up the war, ponder the We, have gone, almost without realizing That is what they did when the Korean
careful language of Senator MAN Si? TELD what was happening, from a seemingly involvement turned sour 15 years ago,
and his colleagues: harmless offer of economic assistance and that is what they would try to do
11' present trends continue, there is ro as- some 12 years ago, offers by President with Vietnam.
surance as to what ultimate increase in Eisenhower, to the point where we now
American military commitment will be re- have almost one-fourth of a million In June of 1950, President Truman
rea
quired before the conflict is terminated. For ordered American troops to Koorea to
to
the fact, is that under present terms of ref- American men on land and immediately turn back the Communist invaders from
crease and as the wax has evolved, the ques- offshore on naval units enraged in com- North Korea. That mission had. a lfm-
Gion is not one of applying increased U.S. .bat roles. iced purpose-to repel the atd?;ressors and
pressure to a defined military situation, but We have been bombing South Vietnam,
ather of pressing against a military situa- North Vietnam, Laos, and now, folly of reestablish the legitimacy of the t a
o e
(ion which is, in effect, open ended. follioi, there are those who are urging moderate parallel. In loss a few life, troops d, with
Mr. President, that we ought to bomb Cambodia and , our i;rove
those are sober words. the invader back k to his side o off that de-
They are not overly emotional. I be- the cities of North Vietnam and perhaps marcation line. But the momentum of
ieve that the "open ended" situation to even China. the war took charge and the administra-
which the Mansfield report refers is the But each extension of the war has tion nerviously approved sending our
pathway to Armageddon and the loss of only resulted in more troops from the troops far into North Korea to try for a
our national strength in a war without other side. So let those who talk of easy total victory over the enemy. Then
,end. solutions through more soldiers and more came the great tragedy of the Korean
So I oppose any further extension of bombs and more guns recognize that war. As our troops approached the
this higloly dangerous war. their past advice has only taken more Chinese border, Peiping ordered its forces
h'urthermore, I believe the President is of our soldiers to their deaths. In one into the war a million strong-in spite of
right in making certain modifications in breath these strategists deplore that General MacArthur's intelligence reports
our previous diplomatic position so that American boys are coming home in that this would not happen. The Ko-
we can better clear the path to a confer- wooden boxes. But in the next breath rean war then took on a bloody dinien-
enee with the other side. I said recently they offer a so-called victory formula sion that eventually cost us 50,000 Amer-
in in NBC televised interview that it will that might send 100,000 young Amerf- ican casualties and billions of dollars.
be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate cans home in boxes. They say to the In the end, after months of bloodshed,
an end to this war without recognizing President, let us not talk of ending this we finally settled on a cease fire at the
the primary interest of the South Viet- war until we have destroyed the enemy, 38th parallel, which we could have had
iiamese rebel leaders in both the nego- until we have won a victory. at a fraction of the cost in lives and
tiationi and the postwar provisional gov- Do they know what that means? Have treasure many long months earlier had
ernment. This, I think, has been a major they counted the cost? Do they know we not seen fit to escalate the war.
barrier to negotiations. If one studies that may involve sending a million Amer-
the two proposed negotiating positions of lean boys to the jungles of fain to pursue So I hope and pray that the President
Hanoi and Washington, it becomes clear an elusive rebel force that is everywhere will continue the bombing pause in North
1;hat one sticking point centers on the and yet nowhere-a rebel force that de- Vietnam indefinitely, aon in South lie
VVietnam nam so
question of whether or not the National feated the cream of the French Army, a that action ctpos ier
force of half a million men? Do they that we lose the least possible number
Liberation Front of the Vietcong shall of those brave American men I visited in
play a role in the negotiations and in. the know that we are confronted by dedi-
cated guerrilla fighters so intermingled Vietnam last month that he will go all
postwar settlement. At a time when this out not for a so-called d victory which onl
group its in control of two-thirds of the with the civilian populace that to kill y
the guerrillas would involve slaughtering means that the jungles of Asia will be
terrain and from one-third to one-half drenched with American blood-but
of the people of Vietnam, it is unrealistic men, women, and children by the tens
of thousands whose support. we need? rather that he will continue to expand
to think that they can be left out of the and diversify and strengthen the quest
negotiating efforts or the post-war settle- A veteran reporter of the New York
anent. Such an approach would :have Times, Jack Languth, after spending for a peaceful settlement.
been paralleled in our early histm:/ have more than a Year traveling with our On July 27 of last year, I took the Sen-
beng George III had expressed a willing- forces in South Vietnam and viewing the ate floor to describe what I believed to be
l xess to negotiate with our French ally opera ions at first hand, came to the con- the realities then facing us in Vietnam.
while itznoring George Washington and culsion that we might be able to win a Because I believe that analysis is equally
h.is rebel Americans. military victory of sorts. However, he valid today, I quote a few of my earlier
As to what specific part the Vietcong said that to do it we would have to kill at remarks as follows:
rebels should play in the postwar pro- least two or three innocent men, women, we are talking here, however, of a major
side for war involving thousands of American casual-
visional government of South Vietnam, eand'very children Vietcong who are guerrilla on we iyu:r were able
ties, the expenditure of billions of dollars,
fiat is a matter to be decided at the con- vast bloodshed and destruction for the Viet-
terence table and eventually to be de- to destroy. namese people, and an uncertain outcome,
cided by free elections on the part of Mr. President, I suggest that that is a There are other possible side results of such
bile people of Vietnam. I am encouraged price that is not worthy of the interest a war that may be even more serious in the
by recent reports that our Government involved. long run than the war itself, including:
las indicated a new willingness to recog- A year ago when some of us took the (1) the worsening of relations between the
iize these political realities. Senate floor to warn against the deepen- Union Unon two major nuclear powers, the soviet
We need to pursue the search for peace irlg United States involvement in that and the United States;
most-
iii Vied a.m in a variety of ways until the self-defeating wax and to urge that our leadership erent (2) the strengthening the o
of the m beniswar is ended. If we can afford to experi- country express its willingness to ne- world and tweakening of the moderate
.,lent for long years with costly tech- gotiate an honorable settlement, we were forces;
piques of destruction, we ought to have accused on this floor of running up a (3) the growing conviction in Asia,
the self discipline to devote at least the white flag and deserting our President. whether justified or not, that the United
balance of this year to the search for But as I said then, those gentlemen who States is a militaristic power with a ;ow re-
pa eace before we consider any extension of talk of the total victory will not be the gars for the lives of Asiatics and an excess-
he war. Each time our strategists have ones who give their lives in that so-called sive concern over other people's ideologies
,nistakeoly predicted that the war would victory. It will be our sons and the sons and political struggles; and
be won i f we just tried one more technique of other nations. Nor will those gentle- pea(4) the ce and the derailment
oftowardlife in worldthe
in expansion, we have simply redoubled men who call for total victory necessarily developing countries, to say nothing of its
1 tie military prescription. And now stand with the President. Some of them impact on our own hopes, for a better
iena,tor MANSFIELD and his colleagues will try to turn this dangerous venture society.
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1
January 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
The questions now before us, I said on
July 27, are:
(1) Do we continue to accelerate the strug-
gle toward a major war? (2) Do we call it
off and withdraw our forces? or (3) Do we
consolidate our present position, keep our
casualties at a minimum, and hold out in-
definitely for a negotiated settlement?
I strongly recommend the third course. I
urge that we stop the bombing, attacks in
both North and South Vietnam. Bombing
is largely ineffective in a guerrilla war and
more often than not kills the wrong people.
We should also stop the jungle land skirm-
ishes which subject our soldiers to ambush.
Instead, let us consolidate our troops in a
holding action in the cities and well-de-
fended enclaves along the coast. We can
hold the cities and the coastal enclaves with
few casualties and with little likelihood that
the Vietcong will attack frontally. Such a
plan would provide a haven for anti-Commu-
nist, pro-Government citizens including the
religious groups, and would demonstrate that
we are not going to be pushed out.
Furthermore, it is based on the realities of
the present political and military map of
Vietnam. While we are in control of the
cities and the coast, the guerillas control
most of the rural and village areas. To dis-
lodge them would be to destroy in the proc-
ess thousands of the innocent civilians we
are trying to save.
And I might add, whose support will
decide in the long run the outcome of
this struggle.
A policy of restricting our militlary efforts
in Vietnam to a holding action in the cities
and the coastal enclaves will avoid this
kind of self-defeating jungle warfare. We
can supply, feed, and defend, the urban and
coastal areas with a modest effort and mini-
mum loss of life. This is a strategy that
calls primarily for restraint and patience
until such time as the Vietcong get it
through their heads that we will not be
pushed out. I have been critical of our uni-
lateral Vietnam involvement, and I think the
original commitment and its acceleration was
a mistake. But we made the commitment,
and I would be prepared to support the kind
of holding action outlined above until we
can reach an acceptable settlement of the
struggle.
That ends the remarks that I made on
the Senate floor last July.
Mr. President, that approach to our
present involvement in Vietnam has re-
cently been recommended in convincing
terms by former Gen. James M. Gavin,
in a communication for the current issue
of Harper's magazine. I hope all of our
policymakers will read that thoughtful
communication by one of our most able
former generals.
Since I made the foregoing remarks
last July, our pilots have flown thousands
of bombing sorties. Let me say here
parenthetically that we have never sent
any better men into combat than those
pilots and our other men now fighting
in Vietnam. We have sent another
125,000 troops into combat-a thousand
of them giving their lives and another
5,000 being maimed or wounded since
last summer. The Vietnamese people,
caught in the crossfire between the two
sides, have been ground to death by the
thousands in recent months.
These developments have only served
to strengthen my conviction of months
ago that we must find a way to end this
war. I believe that involves continuing
the bombing pause. I believe it involves
consolidating the line militarily, while
pushing in every possible way for a
peaceful settlement. I know that is go-
ing to be difficult, painful, and perhaps
not an entirely happy outcome. But
the alternative, as the Mansfield report
makes perfectly clear, is $, larger and
bloodier war, which I think is sheer mad-
ness.
During my tour of Vietnam I visited,
among other installations, a large Ameri-
can airbase. At one point the driver
made a mistaken turn, and we found our
car blocked by a large flatbed truck. As
I remember, there were several other
trucks waiting to pull into the road be-
hind it. As we sat there, I noticed that
the truck carried a long row of slient
coffins, each one bearing the address in
the United States of a fallen soldier: a
sergeant from Oklahoma, a captain from
Minnesota, a Marine corporal from Ten-
nessee, a major from Connecticut, with
all those different names that make up
the United States-Scandanavian, Irish,
German, Czech.
I sat there momentarily looking at
those coffins glistening silently in the
sun, and I thought what a tragic waste
of young life and laughter and love. The
day before I visited a hopelessly over-
crowded civilian hospital in' Da Nang
with all its torn victims of the war-
children with their legs and arms torn
from their bodies by the bombing at-
tacks, old men, mothers and infants,
blasted and burned by napalm jelly,
some mutilated almost beyond recogni-
tion-all of them watching us silently,
without a murmur and without a sound,
as we moved around from bed to bed
in that overcrowded hospital.
I wondered then, as I did while we
waited before that truck carrying the
bodies of Ameridan soldiers, have I done
my part as a Senator to prevent this
from happening? Have I spoken out
honestly and courageously enough?
What more can I do as a citizen and as
a Senator to help move mankind toward
a better solution of our differences than
this?
The last time I was so deeply moved
by the tragedy of senseless violence was
when I stood in Arlington Cemetery in
November of 1963 and saw a gallant
young President laid to rest. Recall his
words :
So let us begin anew-remembering on
both sides that civility is not a sign of weak-
ness, and sincerity is always subject to proof.
Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let
us never fear to negotiate.
In what I personally regard as his
greatest speech, the American University
speech of June 10, 1963, which opened
the way for the nuclear test ban treaty,
he cited that ancient Biblical promise,
"When a man's ways please the Lord, he
maketh even his enemies to be at peace
with him." I believe we share his reso-
lution that "We shall do our part to
build a world of peace where the weak
are safe and the strong are just. We
are not helpless before that task or hope-
less of its success. Confident and un-
afraid," he said, "we labor on-not to-
ward a strategy of annihilation but to-
ward a strategy of peace."
That, I believe, is the deepest desire
of our great President, Lyndon Johnson,
of Vice President Humphrey whose every
instinct reaches out for peace, and of
Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNa-
mara, with whom I happen to disagree
on some of their recommendations, but
who have for years sacrificed every
ounce of their energy of mind and body
to their country for what they believed
was the national interest. That is the
desire, too, of Ambassador Goldberg and
Averell Harriman and our other leaders.
The cause of peace is the most urgent
heartthrob of every American mother
and father. It is the wistful hope of
our young men-of their wives and girl
friends. I believe it is the most pro-
found longing of a war-weary world.
Our President said in his superb state
of the Union address a few days ago:
"I will try to end this battle and return
our sons to their desires."
I have the faith to believe that how-
ever difficult the task, President John-
son has the will and the capacity to
achieve this high purpose, and achieving
it, to win that high place in history-
that blessing of immortality reserved for
those who make peace among men and
nations.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the
Senator from South Dakota yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HAR-
als in the chair). Does the Senator
from South Dakota yield to the Senator
from Pennsylvania?
Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.
Mr. CLARK. I congratulate the Sen-
ator from South Dakota on a brilliant,
carefully logical, and, to my way of
thinking, irrefutable approach to the
difficult problem which confronts us in
Vietnam.
This is a speech which is not only
beautifully organized from a logical and
persuasive point of view, but It is also an
eloquent speech, with a clear under-
standing of the human values involved
in the useless and largely unnecessary
slaughter which is presently going on in
Vietnam.
I congratulate the Senator. I wish I
had the ability to write a similar analysis
of our problems today and to suggest an
equally cogent and reasonable solution.
Let me say to the Senator that he need
have no fear that he has not done his
part as a Senator to keep these tragic
events from continuing to happen. He
certainly has spoken out, honestly and
courageously. I would hope that every
one of his 99 colleagues would read his
speech and ask themselves the same
question I asked myself as the Senator
was speaking: Have I done my part as a
Senator to keep this slaughter from con-
tinuing? Have I spoke out honestly and
courageously enough? Do I believe in
this war to total victory in the jungles
of southeast Asia, and, if so, why?
I certainly feel, as does the Senator,
that it would be a tragic mistake to start
the bombing of North Vietnam again,
until such time as it is clear beyond per-
adventure that there is no reasonable
hope we can end this useless, tragic
slaughter either by moving the war from
the battlefield to the negotiating table,
or, in the alternative, to a mutual but
unilateral de-escalation as a result of
which the shooting will slowly but surely
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January ? 20, 1 666
;top, as it did in Malaya some years ago, his statement here in the RECORD rein- The map to which I referred gives
the Senator will recall. forcing what I have tried to say makes graphic evidence that the question in-
If the Senator will permit me, I should one all the more confident of my posi- volved is how many Americans we are
like to make a few comments and then tion. I am very grateful to him. prepared to have killed in order to im-
ask him to observe whether he would With regard to the points he has made prove the military situation. I for one
agree with them or not. respecting the military situation that do not want a single American killed to
I have seen in the newspapers that of faces us in Vietnam, I do not feel in a reclaim useless jungle land in South
some 2.600 villages in South Vietnam, position to comment with any great tech- Vietnam.
the South Vietnamese Government, and meal knowledge about that, but I do Although I expressed it more explo-
ourselves control a mere '700. I have agree with the Senator that it is u. very sively than did the Senator from South
seen iciaps-as .f am sure the Senator discouragiw, prospect. I do not think Dakota, I wonder if he would com,nent
has, too--which show the minimal our own military people in South Viet- on my statement.
amount of real estate which is still, 24 nam are under any illusions about. what Mr. McGOVERN. I think the Se-
hours a day, under the control of the they are up against. We have highly tor's poi: it is well taken. If we had some
South Vietnamese Army or of the Amer- competent military officers in Vic tnam. assurance that after prodigious military
jean Army. 'they have made clear, from General effort on our part we would have created
I have seen three little enclaves which Westmoreland on dowrn, a military conditions that would permit democracy
are held by our side in the middle of the victory would require an enormous in- to flourish in South Vietnam, perhaps,
country, in the northern part of South crease in American forces. some argument could be made that the
Vietnam, enclaves which to my untutored The French military effort ended with effort would be worthwhile. We have no
gaze--although I served in World War 11 a disastrous defeat at Dien Bie n. Phu such assurance. What we do have is
for 4 years-are potential Dicnbienphus. some 12 years ago in spite of tI e fact some indication that the more we try to
f do not believe that we control all of that they had committed, a land force attack the Vietcong forces by military
the coastline. I believe the maps snow of something over 400,000 men. 'c'hat is means, the more we terrorize and destroy
that we control only the major portion. twice the number we have now co;nmit- the civilian population with which they
1. was told by two members of the Mans- tcd to this conflict. are intermingled.
field committee the other day--and I am So I do not blame our military people One of the reporters who has been
sure Were is nothing secret about this-- for asking for reinforcements. I think over there for some time and who has
that when the senatorial airplane took they realize, as the Senator from Penn- been watching our efforts to destroy the
off from the Saigon airport to leave the sylvania does, that they are up aghast a Vietcong forces in the villages and. jun--
country, the Vietcong had to be chased dangerous situation. files has suggested that the attacks we
off the runway with napalm bombs. i I do question the policy assun^ptions are making would make more sense if
have been told that the Vietcong are that have led us into this ritual ion in we were fighting an enemy rather than
within 3 miles of the perimeter of Saigon, Vietnam and the military mission we an ally. What he meant was that when
that most of the food that the people of have asked our forces to undertaie. we bomb a village or area controlled by
Saigon eat has already had a tax levied Mr. CLARK.. I share the Senator's the Vietcong guerrillas, or when we shell
upon it by the Vietcong, that the high- concern. I would hope the Commander those areas or spray them with machine-
ways could be cut and interdicted at any in Chief of our Armed Forces, the Presi- gun bullets, or destroy their crops we
time, and that 80 pe.-cent of the mem- dent of the United States, would redefine are destroying and alienating the civil-
b.?rs :serving in the Vietcong army were for us our diplomatic and military poi- ian population, whose aid we will need if
born and brought up in South Vietnam, icies in Vietnam, and just what our mill- we are to attain our objective.
although they may have temporarily tart' and diplomatic objectives ar4,. Mr. CLARK. And to continue these
.,,one to the north and then come back. I am as concerned as is the :aerator tactics makes the result almost inevi-
11-.ave been told that access to the from south Dakota at the escalation of table that we will lose any election which
city of Saigon from the sea by water is we may prearrange.
the war and having our American boys Mr. McGOVERN. That is my own
a ch35 ships only one ship wide, that there hunting through elephant grass to look
inc r35 awaiting to be unloaded in for *,he elusive Vietcong. As Walter judgment. I have tried to read the his-
t,hat harbor, that only are strip can get ippmann said some time ago, what er tort' of what happened when the French
in. at a time, that in darkness the water- were involved against the Vietcong from
are doing there is very much like trying 1945 to about 1954. A number of people
slak could bo cut, in all t cross s it an ny y to punch water. As soon as one pulls out who have written about that struggle
tiningone tcong two j wish unks tO ac do ro so, that his arm, the water comes back, and often
tune the Viet have said that one of the most frequently
pills over him. used tactics of the Vietcong--which
the huge o supplies neth for - The polio which the Senator from
use of our Asir rbt?ce and the e So south Vieett- Y were then called the Vietminh-was t;o
namese Air r'orce are in constant jeop- South Dakota has advocated is to fight put up a flag in a village friendly t:o
ardy from Sabotage and attack, being a defensive war at our strongp+rints-I the French Government, or to take a pot
located, as they are, in the area of Sai- would hope with our backs to the sea- shot at a French airplane. The French
gon, and that the only reason the Viet- while we proceed in an honorable way would then bomb that village or area--
cong do not render Saigon untenable is to try to persuade the Communists and thereby losing the support of the people,
that we have not bombed Hanoi, that others in South Vietnam who are not and another area would go to the Com-
actually one capital city stands as COYnmLUnist,5--and there are many of munist side. It seems to me there is a
hostage for the other. those--that we are not going to leave danger of Ou:r falling into the same trap.
I wonder whether the Senator from until there is an honorable peace that Mr. CLARK. One factor which no
ijouttr Dakota has similar information, will include free elections by th people amount of acceleration of the war or in-
and what comments lie may cure to make of South Vietnam to select these they crease in American aid is going to change
on what I have just said. want to govern them. is that it is impossible to tell foe from
MI-% MCG )VERN. Before I comment What concerns me is what apaears to friend. They all look exactly alike. A
on the Senator's questions. which are be a tug of war between variou.-. highly friend of mine, a Pennsylvanian, a great
certainly pertinent and go to the heart located persons in the executive and ad- statesman, an eminent politician, said
of some of the realities we face, I thank ministrative ,arms of our Government. that it was like things were during the
Trim for the hind words he just spoke For example, I read this in the newspa- troubles over the Irish Republic. One
about my remarks on the Senate floor pers. I did not acquire this information Irishman looked exactly like another.
this afternoon. As he knows, we have through access to any classified docu- During the day they would say, "Three
been in agreement on thus issue, for the ment. It was stated that General West- cheers for Great Britain," and as soon
anos,. part, :for many months. I have felt moreland and Ambassador Lodge are as dark fell, they would go out and shoot
that the Senator from Pennsylvania has really opposed to negotiating at this the British troops It is difficult to o d s-
.spoken out as clearly, as forcefully, and point because they believe the military tinguish friend from as courageously on this issue, and, per- situation is too unfortunate from our clothes and the climate and the location
baps more important, as accurately, as point of view to enable us to get a satis- are different, there is an analogy to any
any Member of the Senate. So to have factory settlement. guerrilla warfare where forces try to do
 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400010009-7
January -20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 733
things that the people do not want them freedom for other people. This is a settlement. I don't see how either the other
to do. struggle they have to win for themselves. side or our side can score a decisive military
victory. We have a truly superb group of
I will ask the Senator to comment on I believe that it is disastrous from the military men fighting in Vietnam. I don't
two more points. standpoint of our own interests and the think this country has ever assembled a more
First. I was under the view until re- interests of the people of South Vietnam capable, better trained, more dedicated or
cently that this was not our war, but that for us to try to impose a military and more ably led group of fighting forces than
it was a war which involved the people political solution in that part of the the men that we have in Vietnam, but they're
of South Vietnam; but that it had been world from the outside. up against enormous and, I think, over-
our policy to send them technical assist- I agree with the Senator from Penn- whelming odds, because of the terrain of that
country, because most of natural advantages
ante and support. My recollection is sylvania in his hope that one day elec- are with the Vietcong; they're so elusive,
that at the end of 1963 we had 10,000 tions can be held, hopefully under inter- they're so intermingled with the civilian
men there. The next year it increased national supervision. I do not believe population, which supposedly we're trying to
to 34,000, and we now have same 200,000 that it necessarily follows that the elec- win over to our side, that if we were to
there. The President has sent to us an tions would go against our interests. destroy the Vietcong, we'd have to destroy a
appropriation request to enable him to I do not know what the outcome would large part of the civilian population in the
increase the number of our military be. But if arrangements could be made process.
forces by more than 100,000, with the for honest elections under international So it seems to me that the most practical
supervision, we ought to abide by the re- goal that we can hope for is to hold the line,
implication that some of these additional and then press very hard, which I think we're
forces will also go to Vietnam. sult, even though we do not like the gov- now doing, for some kind of a peaceful settle-
I wonder whether the Senator from ernment that might emerge. ment.
South Dakota agrees with my view that We found in Eastern and Central Eu- Mr. VANOCUR. Well, Senator, as a former
there should be a full debate in some rope, that when a country like Yugoslavia distinguished bomber pilot in World War II,
depth on the floor of the Senate before took on a Communist government, the one of your objectives was to talk to the
we agree to the requested appropriation. world did not come to an end. bomber pilots in Vietnam. Did you get any
Certainly we should not be parties to a If we did not have problems with other impression that the bombings had done
unanimous consent which would enable countries any more serious than the what they were supposed to do when they
Problems we have with Yugoslavia, we were started last winter?
the request be rushed through in 5 Senator McGovERN. Well, I'm not sure
hours, as the e request for $700 million could celebrate with joy. It is not fatal that I know what all the objectives of the
was rushed through last year. to American security when an election bombing policy have been. If those attacks
I would hope that the Armed Services does not come out as I would like to see were designed to stop the flow of manpower
Committee and the Appropriations Com- it come out. We can continue to exert from North Vietnam into South Vietnam,
mittee would ask searching questions of influence in various ways as we have in they've failed, because we have many more
Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Eastern Europe and even in our relations men from the North fighting on behalf of
with the Soviet Union. the Vietcong in the South today than we
of as to plan point o dofst Staff o ey what they Mr. CLARK. I congratulate my friend did when the bombing attacks started last
tted to o do with escalate the money. Are they from South Dakota for the fine address February. If the bombing was designed to
I do not coate the war not? made. I associate myself with his encourage North Vietnam to come to the
do nwish to put the Senator from rom negotiating table, I'm not sure that that has
South Dakota in an invidious position, recommendations. been achieved; it may be that it had just
nor do I desire to indicate that I shall I hope that our beloved friend, the the opposite effect, that it tended to pro-
vote against the request. chairman of the Armed Services Com- duce a more rigid situation than what might
Does the Senator believe that the time mittee, and the President, who I under- otherwise have been the case.
has come for debate with respect to the stand announced this afternoon that But what disturbs me most of all is that
Vietnamese policy? bombing would resume at the end of the no matter how careful our pilots are about
Mr. McGOVERN. McGOVERN. I welcome the op- new year holiday, will take a hard look the bombing attacks-and these are truly
superb pilots-in a situation like this, you're
portunity to comment on that question. at the recommendations of Omar Brad- bound to kill many innocent civilians. I'm
The Senator is not putting me on the ley, Ridgway, MacArthur, and Gavin talking now, not about the bombing in the
spot. and have second thoughts as to the de- north, but in the south, where supposedly
I believe that one of the unfortunate sirability of accelerating this war, the people or at least a large percentage of
aspects of our South Vietnam involve- I thank the Senator. them are on our side. I was told that we
ment is that there has been so little Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Sena- exercise great caution in bombing villages
for from Pennsylvania. and hamlets, but nevertheless, while I was
searching and thoughtful debate either Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent there, in visiting the civilian hospitals in
in committee or on the floor of the that the text of my NBC interview with South Vietnam, I found them crowded with
Senate. of January 5, 1966; a bombing victims, with little children with
As I indicated in my remarks earlier, Sander Vanocur their legs, arms blown off; men, women and
we did not make any commitment orig- press release of that date; and a New children with their faces and their bodies
inally to fight a war on behalf of South York Times article, written by E. W. Ken- horribly burned and scarred with napalm
Vietnam or anyone else' What Presi- worthy, published on January 6, 1966, be bombs; those things, it seems to me, are
printed in the RECORD at this point. inevitable in bombing attacks of this kind.
dent Eisenhower said in October 1954, There being no objection, the material Mr. VANOCUR. But Senator, how can you
when he made the first American offer was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, possibly come to negotiations now, given the
of assistance to South Vietnam, was present attitude of the north and the Na-
that we would make available a modest as follows: tional Liberation Front?
amount of economic aid, provided the SENATOR GEORGE MCGOVERN Senator MCGOVERN. Well, I think it's
government in Saigon would carry out Mr. MERRILL MUELLER. Congress reassem- going to be difficult to get the other side to
some desperately needed political and bles next week, and it's expected that some- the conference table, but I don't think the
social reforms. Those reforms were time in the next 2 months there will be a differences that have been spelled out, either
debate on our future course in Vietnam, by them or by our leaders, are insurmount-
never carried out. We were absolved at Since Congress adjourned last fall, many able. Now, as I understand it, both sides
that point, with respect to the offers of legislators went to Vietnam for a firsthand have given some rather strong indications
economic assistance. look at the war, its causes and its effects. that the terms of the original Geneva set-
We maintained for the next 10 years, Their voices will be heard when the debate tlement, going back to 1954, are for the most
that this was not our war; that this was takes place. part acceptable. We may have some differ-
basically a struggle to be resolved by the One Senator who has been over there, ence of opinion as to how those Geneva
people of South Vietnam. GEORGE MCGOVERN, Democrat, of South Da- terms should be interpreted. My under-
President Kennedy said in a press con- kota, is in our Washington studio this morn- standing is that the other side is saying
ing with "Today Show" Correspondent that there must not only be an eventual
ference in September 1963, a few months Sander Vanocur. Sandy? troop withdrawal, which we have accepted
before he was killed, that in the final Mr. SANDER VANOCUR. Thank you, Merrill. on principle; there also must be a coalition
analysis this was their war; that they Senator MCGOVERN, what is the future for the government formed in South Vietnam on a
were the ones who must win or lose it. United States in Vietnam, after you've been provisional basis until elections can be held,
He said that we can send men there as there and taken a look for yourself2 and that the Vietcong, or the National Lib-
advisers and offer a certain amount of Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN. Well, Sandy, I eration Front, would have to be a part of
equipment, but we cannot win a war for think the best we can hope for is a negotiated any such coalition government.
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 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400010009-7
`73) 4 CONGRESSIONAL R1i ORD --- SENATE
1 !hulk th?tse, are negotiable terms. We
don't have to accept everything that has
scen proposed by the other side, but at least
think we conid go into the conference room
willing to diecuss a settlement:, pretty much
.,long Lite lines of the original Geneva accord.
MM t VANocsrR- But sir, the four points of
t'hari Van Doug, of April 8, the North Vie:t-
rrnrse premier said. on the third point that
they had to o'cept the program of the Na-
txiual Libera.'ion Front. Now. are you sug-
that we have to accept the National
9,ibcration Front's program, or a coalition
uvernment t
: natos' li ,'C,,vlatw. Well, its Secretary
} sk has sand, their position is somewhat
t'nhiguous rt's not entirely clear just; what
II,c.y mean by the program of the National
Liberation Front, and of course, that's the
purpose of negotiations, to clear up the
.mbiguities and the uncertainties in the
i:ositlons Offered by the two sides. For my
awn part, I don't see how we can hope,
realistically, to exclude the National Lib-
,ration Front, entirely from the postw_ir
.settlement. After all, whether we like it or
11oc-:Lnd of course we don't like it-they
"ieitrol probably two-thirds of the terrain
is South Vietnam, and they control some-
where between it. third and perhaps as much
is, it half of the people, and so a force of
that kind Is going to have to be given con-
sideration, both in the negotiations and in
the eventual settlement.
Mr. VANOCUR. Well, what are you going
to do about people like Premier Ky in South
Vietnam, who now seem to want to fight on
the end?
cuuwr Me(1ovzsN. Well, I think that's
one of the principal flaws, perhaps the basic
flaw in our current negotiating effort and
in previous efforts, is that those efforts have
.a Nang, and in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai,
south of the Marine area. In two Provinces
north of Da. Nang, also, the situation is de-
teriorating.
Or take the Fourth Corps area, at the
other end of the country. It covers the
mouths of the Mekong River that flows out
of Cambodia into Vietnam and on to the sea.
To the last few months, the Communists
have been forced by U.S. airpower, which
is extremely effective in the flatland areas
where there is little or no cover, to withdraw
to their strongholds.
Yet the Reds have stepped up their ter-
rorist assassination of village leaders and
c=nvernment officials, and have put on a
;treat new display of propaganda.
Reaction to air power: Use of American
:-irpower to combat the growing size of
the Communist forces has been-to villag-
ers-- the most important military fact of life
For the past year. The Communists have
taken a tremendous beating from the air.
At the same time, these bombings have
Forced thousands of people to flee their
homes and become refugees. At this point,
no one is sure now many refugees there are,
but certainly in the hundreds of thousands.
In many areas, a villager gets a bitter
choice: be forced into labor battalions by
the Commu gists, face assassination if he
doesn't cooperate with the Reds, have his
sons recruited for the guerrillas, and be
bombed by 'United States and Government
planes-or move into Government areas as
a destitute person, dependent on the whim
of largely inefficient and sometimes corrupt
officials for refugee relief.
Massive use of American airpower in the
countryside is equated, in the minds of
many villagers, with Red terrorism.
A village story: If you want to see how
things are going at the village level, travel
to Tu Thanh, only 6 miles from the Provin-
cial capital in Quang Ngal Province.
Last May, a battalion of Communist troops
swept into the village. They had with them
Pharr Kinh, a 52-year-old Communist. In
1954, Pharr Kinh had withdrawn with 183
other Reds to the north when the Commu-
nists turned this area over to the Saigon
Government.
Now Pharr Kinh was back in his old area
as political commissar for the Communist
battalion.
The first thing that Plasm Kinh did in
the village was to arrest seven of the village
leaders. Six were shot, and the sev nth was
buried alive. That was to make certain the
villagers knew who was running the show.
Most of the villagers fled into Govern-
ment-:held areas, where they were fed and
protected. It took the Government three
attempts to liberate the area from he Reds.
In the process, 40 percent; of the houses in
the village were destroyed by United States
and South Vietnamese planes attacking
Communist positions.
When the Communists withdrew, hey took
40 village youths who had re nairic I behind
when most villagers fled. The youths will be
indoctrinated as guerrilla troops.
Now the village is being rebuilt. Yet, if
one of the chief aims of the government and
the United States is to prove that (,hey can
do a better job than the Red, then they are
failing.
Like the rest of South Vietnam, the area
around 1'u Thanh is agricultural and needs
help with farming. But the U.S. aid mission
in Saigon has only 25 staff member:; dealing
with agriculture throughout the nation.
When pigs go hungry.: A pig-and-,?orn pro-
gram that began in 1962 with lots of U.S.
fanfare does not even function ii,, Quang
Ngai Province. There is a good reaon: You
can't import corn to feed pigs when there is
barely enough transport to feed the refugees.
In this province, 1 of every 10 eople is
homeless.
Only recently did the province get public-
health nurse from U.S. headquarters to help
reorganize the local medical corps.
There are only 900 native physicians in the
entire country, and most are in the military.
In one neihboring province, with 300,000
people, there are only 4 physicians, all in
the service and meeting civilians:' health
needs on a part-time basis.
If it were not for millions of U.S.-admin-
istered. inoculations against smallpox, chol-
era, plague, and typhoid, the country would
be at the edge of a medical disaster.
Life in the cities, for those not on the
"gravy train" of profiteering, is grins. Infla-
tion is making it that way. Since the start
of 19615, money in circulation in South Viet-
nam has gone from 27 :million piasters to 47
billion.
Inflation is fed not only by the east U.S.
construction program, but by private spend-
ing of 190,000 American soldiers. That
spending alone runs between $45 and $60 a
montla per man.
The whole society seems turned upside
down. A Saigon bar girl can make 80,000
piasters a month-about $650-i-osnpared
with Government salaries of $120 for middle-
echelon civilian officials or $100 for a major
in the South Vietnamese Army.
A Vietnamese college professor tells about
meeting his former housemaid while he was
on his motor scooter in downtown Saigon.
The former housemaid, now the girl friend
of an American soldier, drove by in a shiny
automobile.
There is talk of bringing in thousands of
skilled workers from the outside--the Philip-
pines and South Korea, for example-to take
some of the pressure off the labor market and
supply the technical help to unclog the ports.
You get some idea of what has happened
to the labor market from the fact that a
stevedore in Da Nang used to get about
30 cents for a day's work. Now, ricksha boys
demand 7o cents from U. marines for a
10-minute carriage ride.
All this economic chaos has spurred the
large-scale corruption that already existed.
Government workers find that their fixed
salaries buy only a fraction of what they
once did. Shortages of goods snake it easy
for the seller to ask higher sums than those
fixed by law. It is now commonplace to
bribe one's way aboard local civilian. trans-
port-air or ground.
It is only in the past few weeks and
months that the American Embassy and the
U.S. military have decided to try to come
to grips with some of these nonmilitary
problems, in the cities and in the country-
side.
A new U.S. program: On January 12, in
Washington, U.S. aid officials announced a
long-range program for winning the war in
the countryside.
The reaction in South Vietnam among
many was cynical: "On paper, one more U.S.
plan to save the country."
Most veterans who know the situation are
convinced that it would take between 6 and
10 years to win the war in Vietna:m-and
"win the peace."
Yet the intensity of the U.S. peace offensive
indicates to most South Vietnamese that the
United States is not about to undertake
a commitment of 6 to 10 years.
In a country that has seen hundreds of
promises by French and Vietnamese officials
broken over the past 25 years, there would be
great reservations about such a U.S. commit-
ment in any case.
The fact is: The U.S. peace offensive has
further shaken Vietnamese confidence. First
came U.S. troops, and spirits went up. Now
comes talk that sounds to Vietnamese like
"peace at any price"-and spirits are down.
The U.S. attempt to negotiate is seen here as
a sign of irresolution, not determination to
stay and fight for a decade.
All this is having a profound effect oil
the "forgotten war" in the thousands of
villages where the fate of the country is
likely to be decided.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not,
morning business is closed.
AMENDMENT OF DISTRICT OF CO-
LUMBIA MINIMUM WAGE LAW
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the Chair lays before the Sen-
ate the unfinished business, which is
H.R. 8126.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (H.R. 8126) to amend the Dis-
trict of Columbia minimum wage law to
provide broader coverage, improved
standards of minimum wage and over-
time compensation protection, and im-
proved means of enforcement.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400010009-7
rynuary 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
MT. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentle-
man from Alabama. I would like to say
that many of us are involved in a great
many worthwhile projects in Vietnam.
In my own district which includes Fort
Benning, the home of the 1st Air Caval-
ry Division, we have Vietnam Mail Call
and other wonderful projects.
But in my experience I have never seen
anyone quite so enthusiastic about any-
thing as these students are. I met a
few weeks ago with about 20 of them at
the home of a friend and we talked until
midnight about their projects. These
students are calling on people throughout
the State every day. A project like this
does not just happen. The enthusiasm
of the students makes the project pos-
sible.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. CALLAWAY. I am happy to yield
to my colleague, the gentleman from
Missouri.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I too would
like to add my words of commendation to
the students of Georgia and to the gen-
tleman in the well of the House for what
.he has so vividly brought to our atten-
tion about this program for the benefit of
the people in this Chamber.
I hope his remarks will be read and
that this program will be emulated by
many people throughout the country and
that it will bring you relief and encour-
agement in the fact that it has been
started spontaneously, and may I say
simultaneously, in other colleges.
On October 30, I had the privilege with
one of my colleagues of this House to
visit the Evangel College in my home-
town of Springfield, Mo., where a "Back
the Boys in Vietnam" program was
started. Evangel College is generally a
liberal arts college in my hometown
which was originally church oriented to
the Assemblies of God and who have
their international headquarters there.
This seems to be similar to the program
that you have related about the students
in Georgia and the "Back Our Boys"
movement. And the student body has
adopted a resolution which has been for-
.warded to the President of the United
States as well as to General Westmore-
land, the commanding general of the
theater in South Vietnam. They also
distribute bumper strips that encourage
"Back Our Boys." It is an enlightened
effort.
As a member of the Committee on
Armed Services, it has been of vital in-
terest to me-as well as to many others-
to try to make an assessment of what
the rabblerousing, poorly informed,
draft-card burners represent and portray
of themselves to the troops in South
Vietnam. It is an almost infinitesimal
small percentage, less than one-hun-
dredth of 1 percent. Of course, it is in-
teresting though that the noisemaking,
publicity-seeking, television-camera-
crowding reaction of these extremists
and ultrapoorly informed people sug-
gests those who before World War I
formed the "I Won't Work" organiza-
tion, and the "Peace-at-any-pricers"
before World War II. We seem always
to have these few with us. They are our
cross to bear. But they amount to very
little as far as the body politic and the
informed opinion of our public is con-
cerned. Thank goodness for the USO
shows and the Bob Hope entourage at
Christmastime which more truly reflects
the attitude of the citizens, U.S.A.
I thank the gentleman for what he has
done today.
Mr. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentle-
man from Missouri for his contribution.
I feel sure that the gentleman agrees with
me that the best thing that might happen
in respect to the events in Georgia is fur-
ther emulation of what is being done
in other States. The gentleman is, of
course, aware that even though the peo-
ple who will protest our policies in Viet-
nam may be a small portion of our people,
the national attention they get is much
more than that.
I have been told that Ho Chi Minh once
said that he did not win the war against
France at Dienblenphu; instead, he won
when the people of Paris no longer sup-
ported that war. I have been told also
that he now sees the same sentiment in
the United States that he saw in Paris.
I believe it is totally different. I think
the people of the United States do sup-
port our commitment to Vietnam, but it
is important that those of us who do sup-
port that commitment be heard. It is
tough to be heard when the press quite
naturally wishes to hear dissenting opin-
ions and not people who agree. That is
why the enthusiasm of these young peo-
ple is so important. They are enthusias-
tic. They must be heard. They will be
heard. Ho Chi Minh will hear about Af-
firmation Vietnam. When he does, per-
haps he will realize that his policy of con-
tinuing the war waiting for the collapse
of U.S. support will not work.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Speaker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. CALLAWAY. I am happy to yield
to the gentleman from Alabama.
Mr. BUCHANAN. I wish to join in
congratulating my colleague from Geor-
gia for his remarks today, for his con-
tinued leadership in this field, and for the
fact that he, for one, has certainly been
vocal. He has demonstrated his interest
in going to Vietnam and his repeated
work in the House. I wish to congratu-
late also, and join my colleagues in con-
gratulating, these young people in Geor-
gia who have certainly set a fine example
for the whole Nation. I think there is
very little question that the American
citizens stand behind our men in Viet-
nam.
As the gentleman has indicated, the
tiny minority who take this opposite
stand have received entirely too much
press. I would say that in my own city
we, too, have sought to demonstrate our
support and make it concrete and real
through the adoption of the 1st Infan-
try Division.
Various groups and clubs within my
city of Birmingham have adopted vari-
ous units of the division. Last Christ-
mas they were flooded with mail, with
gifts, and with other remembrances from
the people of my city as an indication of
our full support of what they are doing
there.
I wish to congratulate your young peo-
ple for an outstanding example of leader-
817
ship in making concrete the support we
all feel for the cause in Vietnam.
Mr. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentle-
man from Alabama. I commend the
people of Birmingham for adopting the
1st Infantry Division, one of the fine
units that is fighting in Vietnam today.
In closing I should like to say that
these young people, in their enthusiasm,
have not made the mistake of going off
halfcocked. When I talked to them
about it and explained to them how dif-
ficult it was to get publicity for those
who supported our position as contrast-
ed with those who do not support our
position, they told me that they had an
international press conference in New
York with representatives of the interna-
tional press, international editions of
New York papers, and international mag-
azines. At that time I asked them, "Why
did you go to New York to do this?"
realizing that Atlanta is the headquar-
ters of this movement. They said, "Why,
don't you know that New York is the
headquarters for the international
press?"
They had already been to people who
were knowledgeable, who told them to
get maximum international press cover-
age, they must go to the headquarters
of the international press. They are
working enthusiastically and hard and in
a very meaningful way.
It is a real privilege for me at this time
to present this information about en-
thusiastic Georgia students to the Mem-
bers of this Congress. ~ 91
WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Florida [Mr. SixES] is recog-
nized for 30 minutes.
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, the things
which I say today are based on studies
made in the war theater in December.
Recommendations were made at that.
time to the Department of Defense as a
result of these observations. They re-
flect the advice and opinion of senior
U.S. military and civilian leaders there.
The past year has seen a rapid esca-
lation of the effort of the United States
in the war in Vietnam. This escalation
has been marked by additional appro-
priations for defense, foreign aid, and
State Department activities. It has re-
sulted in increased military operations,
bombing of a portion of North Vietnam,
and increased airstrikes, including B-52
missions, in support of allied military
operations in South Vietnam. Similar-
ly, nonmilitary activities, including the
programs of AID and USIA have been
increased. These escalated programs
have served to hold in check the efforts
of the Vietcong and the North Vietna-
mese Government for a takeover in
South Vietnam. However, they have
not succeeded in bringing about a nego-
tiated peace settlement, nor have they
strengthened the military posture of
South Vietnam to the extent that Gov-
ernment forces, U.S. and allied troops
supporting their position, have been able
to seize and hold the initiative.
Increased allied effort in this area has
been matched by the increased involve-
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818 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
ment of troops from North Vietnam over
the Ho Chi Minh trail. This is not in
reality a trail but is a well-developed,
thousand-mile road system over which
men and equipment flow steadily from
North Vietnam, around the demilitarized
zone into Laos, and southward in South
Vietnam. Despite repeated bombings
of military targets in North Vietnam and
recently of the Ho Chi Minh trail, in-
filtration of weapons, supplies, and
North Vietnamese regular army troops
into South Vietnam is increasing. The
monthly rate of these troops is esti-
mated to be approximately 4,500.
These forces are well supplied with
modern weapons and equipment of Com-
munist manufacture which come through
the port of Haiphong or over the two
railroads from China. Other supplies
move up the Mekong River and its tribu-
taries or along the coast. The Com-
munist forces are equally well supplied
with food, most of which is obtained from
the huge South Vietnam rice crop.
The present situation has been brought
about by a variety of things, but in part
by repeatedly underestimating the future
actions of the Vietcong and the North
Vietnamese. To some extent, our re-
sponse to the requirements for the prose-
cution of the war have been based on
estimates of what we thought the enemy
would do rather than on their capabili-
ties. Repeatedly these estimates have
proven erroneous.
At the best, the prosecution of the war
promises to be a lengthy affair. Under
present ground rules, it can continue for
many years. However, the war can be
won and won speedily, if a determined
effort is made which properly utilizes
the power and capabilities of American
fighting men and American resources,
plus whatever help is available from our
allies, and which reinforces the deter-
mination of the Vietnamese to win their
own war.
Obviously, then, there is a necessity for
the establishment of an atmosphere
favorable to a stable government for
freedom-loving people of a nation willing
to stand up against Communist oppres-
sion. It can be created, but such atask
will not be easy. We have given tre-
mendous help in every category to South
Vietnam. Nevertheless the efforts of this
country to assist the Government of
South Vietnam must be increased
further.
This simply means that measures must
be taken and taken at once to strengthen
our position and that of the Government
of South Vietnam for the prosecution of
the war. This will require a number of
actions. The cost will be high, but it is
a cost which must be paid if we are to
be successful. I will discuss primarily
the military side of the picture.
Additional men and materiel must
be supplied at once. We have about half
enough of each in Vietnam to do the job.
The South Vietnamese and their allies
are already hard pressed for manpower
sufficient to carry the war to the Com-
munists. Many United States and South
Vietnamese troops are required to pin
down allied holdings and to perform
other security duties. Last year's big
buildup of forces seems at best to have
resulted only in containing the Commu-
nists. Open invasion of South Vietnam
by North Vietnamese regulars has
changed the picture drastically. We
cannot attain a healthy atmosphere until
sufficient troops are available to search
out, fight, and destroy Communist
forces. We must be able to retake and
hold South Vietnamese territory which is
now largely in Communist hands. Big-
ger and bloodier battles are in siore and
it is essential that the forces and supplies
necessary to win those battles be pro-
vided with a minimum of delay.
In other words, steps must be taken to
increase our operational troop strength
so that we cannot only contain the
buildup of the North Vietnamese forces
and those of the Vietcong, but be able to
seize and hold the initiative. This is
essential to victory. We cannot continue
to operate at our present level and hope
for more than a standoff. Failure to in-
crease our forces and our effort will not
only lead to a lack of success in the mili-
tary field, but will place in jeopardy the
lives of American military men now serv-
ing in Vietnam. Certainly no effort
should be spared to give these troops,
who are responding gallantly to their
mission, the protection and support
which they deserve.
If the present peace offensive fails, we
can no longer afford to make a, sanctuary
out of the northeast industrial area of
North Vietnam. This policy must be
changed to permit essential military tar-
gets in the area to be neutralized by
bombing or other effective measures.
This means power, POL, airfield and port
facilities, including those at Haiphong
which serves as a major source of supply
for the war economy of North Vietnam.
Failure to do this can only assist the Gov-
ernment of North Vietnam in its escala-
tion of the conflict and result in the
deaths of more Americans. If the
Government of Cambodia allows its
ports and facilities to be used to supply
the enemy, effective quarantine of these
ports should be established. The pure
and simple fact is that delivery of per-
sonnel, equipment, supplies and the
weapons of war being made available in
support of the Vietcong operations can
best be stopped in North Vietnam or at
least before it reaches South Vietnam.
Within South Vietnam itself, a large
portion of the huge rice crop produced
in this nation. has, in recent years, gone
to the Vietcong. In a limited way, in-
roads were made into the quantities of
rice which Communists secured in 1965;
however, far too much still went into
their hands. This must be stopped. To
do so will require larger militar, opera-
tion to protect tllose gathering the rice
crops and to seize the rice bearing areas
now in the hands of the Vietcon?;. For
areas where this cannot be done, it is
better to destroy the crop than to permit
it to fatten Communists to kit' Amer-
icans.
If food and supplies are denied to the
enemy, I believe the war can be won in
1 to 2 years, despite ready Communist
access to ample manpower. Failure to
take strong steps can result only in the
loss of lives of additional American,
South Vietnamese, and allied servicemen
January 20, 106
without resulting in successful military
operations or the attainment of the just
peace which we seek.
In major part, this is a war of logistics.
Logistics and construction play an es-
sential part and a limiting part in our
operations in southeast Asia. Aug-
mented U.S. forces-roughly twice as
many as are now on duty there-must
be sent into southeast Asia before suc-
cess can be anticipated. We must be
prepared to support them with food,
weapons, equipment, bases, airfields, and
ports. At this moment, it is barely pos-
sible to support forces already on duty
there. Unless the required ports, air-
fields, and military camps can be con-
structed rapidly, our forces, and their
supplies must be crowded somehow into
existing facilities and effective military
operations will necessarily be hampered,
confused, and delayed. In other words
we need additional troops and additional
aircraft immediately. Yet there are
limits on the numbers which can be sent
to Vietnam simply because we cannot
supply their needs. This is a situation
which cannot effectively be overcome
within months or even years at the pres-
ent rate and method of procedures. Work
has barely started or not started at all
on some essential projects. Logistics is
the limiting factor in the conduct of
the war.
Let me reiterate, the construction ef-
fort in Vietnam, particularly the provi-
sion for part facilities and operational
bases is vital to military operations.
However, to this date there has been a
marked lack of central authority and co-
ordination in the construction efforts.
Steps have been taken, in some instances
effectively, to bring about a coordination
between the construction and opera-
tional programs. But at best, it has been
piecemeal. The proposal to establish a
general officer position on the staff of the
military advisory command to effectuate
this coordination should be promptly ira-
plemented. This officer should report
directly to the commanding general, and
be responsible for the coordination of
the construction effort and making it re-
sponsive to operational requirements.
An essential portion of the construc-
tion problem is the lack of a sufficiently
skilled labor force in South Vietnam to
meet the military construction effort
which is required. Present contractor
effort is requiring all of the available
local labor force plus generating a re-
quirement for the use of foreign. labor.
The latter proposal is not meeting with
enthusiastic response from the South
Vietnamese Government and will prob-
ably never be a fruitful source of labor
for our construction effort. Still less de-
sirable would be the importation of high-
priced workmen from the United States
because of price problems which their
presence would generate. The construc-
tion battalions of the Navy and the Army
are doing heroic work in their activities
there. If the escalated construction
program is to be successfully imple-
mented, there is a need for more troop
construction battalions from both the
Navy and the Army. The requirement
for these troops will be accentuated as
additional facilities become operational
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,)-nary 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
T
and it is necessary to maintain them with
troop labor. In order to meet the over-
all requirement for the construction and
maintenance of facilities, steps should be
taken as promptly as possible to drasti-
cally increase the troop construction
units in South Vietnam including the
activation of Air Force battalions to bol-
ster the troop effort in this area.
The Reserve Forces of the Army and of
the Navy also contain a large number of
troop construction units. These are
manned by skilled personnel who in most
cases have been training for years to meet
emergency situations. Certainly such a
situation exists in southeast Asia today.
There is a backlog of construction work
in Vietnam today which could well be
performed by troop labor. This require-
ment will be magnified by construction
which will be necessary in support of the
items in the January supplemental ap-
propriation request. There will be ques-
tions on whether or not the transfer of
all Navy Seabee construction battalions
and Army Engineers construction bat-
talions now deployed in other theaters
of operation should be undertaken.
Considerations must be given to whether
we would seriously impair our military
efficiency in the areas in which these
troops are now operating. Regardless of
this, there are available selected Reserve
units capable of contributing to the con-
struction effort in southeast Asia, either
by their own presence there or by re-
placing Regular units who could then be
transferred to this area without impair-
ing our military requirements. Failure
to utilize the services of all available
units-Regular or Reserve-is handicap-
ping and holding back the war effort at
a time of great urgency.
Fourteen are now on duty in the thea-
ter. Their number can be increased
fivefold by utilizing Regular and Reserve
forces. They can make a tremendous
contribution. It is inexcusable not to
utilize their service. Whether to use
them is one of the most important unre-
solved questions.: We are fighting only
one war and that is the place they are
really needed.
Aside from troop labor considerations,
your subcommittee finds that construc-
tion programs are based on the expecta-
tions that the contractor's labor supply
can be increased threefold to fourfold.
Contractor personnel at the time of the
subcommittee's visit was 22,000. It is
anticipated this number will have to be
increased to 60,000 or possibly even 80,-
000. Completion of essential projects-
ports, airfields, troop cantonments,
and so forth-within the prescribed time
is predicated upon securing additional
contractor personnel. Witnesses in the
theater stated that the supply of skilled
labor is now virtually exhausted. I am
convinced that very material contribu-
tions can be made through a more realis-
tic vocational training program, but this
will take time. It is planned to obtain
approximately 10,000 third country na-
tionals to alleviate the labor shortage.
This still is a far cry from the 60,000 to
80,000 required. When it is taken into
consideration that this number is needed
to complete projects, programed for the
troop structure already authorized, and
that the percentage of completion on
these projects is now quite small, the
enormity of the task, ahead to provide
facilities and accommodations for a troop
level of 400,000 can be seen. We can pro-
vide the uniformed personnel much
faster than we can provide facilities
for their use.
The tremendous distances which must
be overcome in providing more equip-
ment and supplies for the Vietnamese
war are seldom comprehended in the
United States. South Vietnam is half
way around the world from Washington.
The great stretches of the Pacific mean
that the bulk of logistic, support must
move by sea transportation. It is a long,
long trip from the U.S. west coast to the
docks of South Vietnam. Most of the
ships which make the 20- to 25-day trip
must wait for a period longer than their
travel time across the ocean before space
for unloading is available at dockside.
In late November 120 ships were in Viet-
namese waters and the waiting time be-
fore discharging cargoes was 28 to 30
days each. There the crews receive the
higher pay authorized for those in dan-
ger areas and this further multiplies the
cost.
The lack of port facilities in Vietnam
is both geographical and historical. Sai-
gon is the only major effective deepwater
port. Additional deepwater facilities of
a limited nature have been made avail-
able at Da Nang. These are being im-
proved and expanded under existing
construction programs. A completely
new logistics base including deepwater
facilities is now under construction at
Cam Ranh Bay. Every effort must be
made to expedite the construction of
these facilities and additional facilities
in the Saigon area or where needed.
Proper advance planning must be ac-
complished to see that port battalions
and other personnel required for the
operation of facilities of this type will be
available as soon as any of them can be
effectively utilized. In the meantime and
probably for an indefinite period, greater
reliance must be placed on over-the-
beach landing and shallow port opera-
tions which would lessen the strain on
existing port facilities and permit an
expedited flow of supplies more quickly
than will be available through the com-
pletion of ports now under construction.
Even with the completion of planned
port facilities, any escalation in the mili-
tary effort will require more effective
logistics operations.
It is fallacious reasoning to think that
the completion of deepwater port facil-
ities will meet all logistics requirements
for port facilities. The escalation in
numbers of troops and military opera-
tions which must take place if we are to
be successful in attaining our objectives
in South Vietnam will place increasing
workloads on all port facilities.
Shallow water ports do exist in South
Vietnam and are available for shallow
draft vessels. This will mean moving ad-
ditional landing craft type vessels into
the area as well as others of the type
capable .of utilizing such port facilities.
It is essential that greater use be made
of LST type vessels, and that greater
reliance be placed on seagoing tugs and
819
barges and on lighterage equipment.
Steps should be taken to activate all re-
quired additional vessels of this type in
the reserve fleet, including those avail-
able to the Military Sea Transport Serv-
ice. Consideration should be given to
transferring those vessels now serving in
other parts of the world to the southeast
Asia area wherever practicable in keep-
ing with other military requirements and
the obtaining of this equipment from
stocks of other nations.
Steps should be taken at once to im-
plement realistic plans for utilization of
the type of equipment described above.
Many of the ships servicing the forces
in Vietnam are chartered from private
shipping firms. This is .a necessary but
costly requirement. The cost is com-
pounded by the problem of the long wait
to discharge their cargo. Certainly, con-
sideration should be given to placing high
priority cargo in these ships and to un-
loading them quickly so that costly de-
lays are not incurred.
One basic requirement in the logis-
tics-construction field is for additional
funds to be made available for the con-
struction of adequate facilities and for
the logistical support essential to our
troops in Vietnam.
Consideration should be given to mak-
ing a large portion of these funds avail-
able directly to the. Military Advisory
Command in Vietnam-MACV-rather
than to the individual military services.
This is particularly true with reference
to the construction portion of the logis-
tics effort. Construction should be ac-
complished wherever possible without fis-
cal and programing restrictions and with
complete flexibility. This has not been
the case in the past but must be done now
if our troops in this area are to be prop-
erly supported.
It is very difficult for the logistics ef-
fort.to respond to the changing opera-
tion's program under present limitations
and regulations. The military command
in Vietnam should be provided with
greater flexibility in the use of funds.
Wartime conditions which are existent in
Vietnam today, simply do not permit a
continuation of peacetime operating con-
ditions within the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. To allow existing conditions
in this area to continue will increase the
number of costly delays which have taken
place to the detriment of the overall mili-
tary operations.
In addition to providing increased
funds for specific construction line items,
a reserve of funds should be established
and made available to the command in
Vietnam for changes in scope of projects
and increased cost of construction as re-
quirements change.
Additional preprograming functions
are necessary in the construction pro-
gram in order to formulate the coordi-
nated construction-logistics effort which
is necessary to support the operational
requirements.
The lack of total funding now pre-
cludes adequate advance procurement of
materials and restricts contractor mobi-
lization. Both are essential if the con-
struction program is to be responsive to
operational requirements. These actions
require long lead times of a minimum of
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820 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE January 1,10, 1,x?3
4 months. Advance funds should be Since it is necessary to supply many be given to strengthening the 7th Fleet,
made available for the immediate re- of our bases in South Vietnam by air- so that additional naval gunfire might be
quirement. They should continue to be lift, we must accept the fact that escala- made available. This might require the
made available in the future because this tion of our efforts in this area will in- activation of ships from the reserve fleet,
requirement is a continuing one and will crease the requirements for airlift sup- including some which are equipped with
increase as the construction program port of our troops. Consideration will heavier guns than those presently avail-
escalates. have to be given to the utilization of able.
However, money is not everything. C-123 and C-130 aircraft in much great- I should comment on the intelligence
Money already is available which cannot er numbers than those now available in picture. It is generally agreed that the
be expended. There is still too much southeast Asia until highway and road intelligence system in Vietnam requires
paperwork on programing, on requisi- transportation can be opened. This is a more personnel who have better training
Lions for construction material, and on part of the story of the need for suffi- for the job to be done. There is a definite
other needed supplies. Requisitions cient U.S. and allied assistance to en- need for better coordination and more
sometimes takes weeks or even months able the A.R.V.N. to sieze and hold the skillful interpretation of information to
for approval. The lack of preprogram- initiative in land warfare. permit a quicker response at policy levels.
ing to assess actual requirements for The B-52 bombing activities in south- For instance, there frequently is a lack
construction and the ability to meet these east Asia are required in support of our of followthrough on bombing missions
requirements is stressed. This is par- ground operations. As our military to assess results and to permit fullest ad-
tially attributable to peacetime prose- planners become more aware of their vantage to be taken of enemy losses.
dures which necessitate too much paper- potentialities and more experienced in informed witnesses feel that intelligence-
work. their use in a war of this type, their ef- gathering is neither broad enough nor
In another area too much equipment, fectiveness will be even greater than at detailed' enough and that stronger efforts
especially construction equipment has present. The aircraft presently used are are needed, both in military and in civil-
been deadlined throughout the area for based at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam. ian application. As an illustration, our
lack of spare parts. The situation is im-. The flight to southeast Asia is long and forces have no accurate information on
proving and will continue to improve as requires refueling for a round trip mis- Vietcong supply forces. Civilians and
additional port facilities are made avail-- sion. Steps should be taken to secure coolies seen on the streets may, in fact,
able. There is now a shortage of spares, an additional site for these aircraft be Vietcong pipeline forces. Undoubt-
worldwide, and this must be faced up to. closer to the target area so that the pres- edly, some U.S.-employed Vietnamese are
There is a need, however, for greater em.. ent costly refueling and long and wear- also working for the Vietcong. Often, de-
phasis, not, only on making additional ing flights on personnel and aircraft can tailed information at the village level re-
spare parts available, but also in chang- be avoided. There are several locations garding Communist sympathizers and
ing the length of the time for replace- available if proper authority can be ob- local Communist organizations is non-
ment of equipment to one which is more tained from other nations. In the case existent.
in keeping with the conditions in Viet- of utilization of one of these sites- Apparently there is a strong Commu-
nam. For example, the construction Okinawa-no such additional authority nist underground which on occasion is
contractor plans for the amortization of would be required. But it would be nec- able to report important events to Hanoi,
his equipment on the basis of 18 months essary to move some tanker-type air- where they are broadcast before they are
usage. If this is realistic, and appar- craft to other locations. known generally to United States and
ently it is from experiences to date, Naval aviation is playing an effective allied government forces. These are
equipment; of the troop construction role in the conduct of the war Due to parts of the intelligence problem to be
units should also be programed on this the limitation on the number of carriers coped with.
basis rather than the 2- to 3-year cycles presently available to the 7th Fleet, it is Now to turn to the field of psychologi-
now anticipated. rot possible to provide sufficient naval cal warfare, I am convinced there is a
I am disturbed by the fact that equip- aviation support on station at all times definite need for improved program di-
ment and material requirements for the to meet the operational needs. The rection which can best be provided
war in Asia do not command top prior- escalation of our military operations and through having a director who is respon-
ity in the American marketplace. Mili-? the presence of additional troops will sible solely for this program. Good work
Lary witnesses state that other govern- cause an added burden on the units pro- is being done in this area, but its poten-
mental programs, such as NASA, Polaris, viding air support. The construction of tial is far from being realized. It should
and the missile program, all have aprior -- land facilities for Air Force and Marine be kept in mind that the Vietcong is
ity higher than the war effort. The moon aircraft even at an accelerated rate will highly vulnerable to psychological war-
will wait. The other programs are well still probably lag behind the operational fare operations. There is much capital
along toward completion. It appears requirements. Consideration should, to be made of the fact that refugees flee
unrealistic not to give the highest prior- therefore, be given to the assignment of only to the South Vietnamese. The
ity to a program which is taking the additional carriers to the 7th Fleet so Vietcong tax and conscript, and seize the
lives of American youths. that this required air support can be rice crop, and offer nothing in return.
The supply situation is further aggro- made available to our operational troops. The Saigon government offers a much
vated by the fact that most of the roads The A-6A is a Navy aircraft newly as- greater hope to the villagers for the fu-
and railroads in Vietnam can be utilized signed to the 7th Fleet. It is the only ture. These things should be empha-
only to a limited extent if at all by aircraft in any of our forces with a night sized over and over again. They are
United States and South Vietnam forces. reconnaissance and bombing capability. only token. examples among many.
The Communists control most of the Although it may have minor deficiencies, Recreation facilities for American per-
countryside and can cut many important this single factor dictates that its use sonnel, particularly for enlisted men, re-
highways almost at will. Only limited and number in Vietnam be expanded. mains one of the serious problems
stretches of the country's one railroad Consideration should also be given to throughout southeast Asia. Granted
can be used. That places the burden adapting the night reconnaissance equip- that there is not much time for recrea-
largely on air transportation and creates meat of this aircraft to existing aircraft tion, the fact remains there are leave
inordinate demands on our ability to available to the Navy, Marine, and Air periods when our personnel can get away
provide and maintain a sufficient nuns- Force. Research and development from their exacting duties for short pe-
ber of aircraft to supply U.S. forces who should be implemented at once which riods. For these periods, there is in most
are located away from port areas. Thus would lead to the provision of adequate areas a dearth of wholesome recreational
far, the job has been done with remark- night reconnaissance and bombing capa- facilities. The alternative is the nearest
able ability. I found no instances where bility for aircraft employed or to be em- local counterpart of honky tonks and
key operations have been prevented for ployed in this area. other places of questionable value. Ad -
lack of essential supplies. Nevertheless, Naval gunfire has played a role in sup- ditional emphasis on adequate recrea-
the problem is a critical one and the porting the operations in Vietnam. The tional activities and facilities remains
situation will be greatly improved if suffi- nature of the terrain and long shoreline very important.
cient forces can be made available to of this country makes naval gunfire often There is a need to train additional
open and maintain essential highways effective when used in support of mili- skilled labor throughout South Vietnam.
and railroads. tart' operations. Consideration should This is not only true from the standpoint
11CTA_-1b
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January 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL
4f
of our present military construction and
logistics requirement, but : from the
standpoint of the future economy of the
country. This should involve vocational
training on a much larger .scale than is
taking place now or is contemplated
through present programs. A realistic
vocational training program would re-
move much of the necessity to seek addi-
tional skilled labor from foreign nations
to meet anticipated needs in the con-
struction field.
In addition steps should be taken to
establish vocational and agricultural
type training for skills of the type needed
in the villages in order that more people
can become self-supporting.
The increasing activities of the South
Vietnamese and allied military opera-
tions have led to thousands of refugees
leaving their homes to escape Vietcong
oppression or because of the displace-
ments which are a problem of any war.
It is a problem which is helped in South
Vietnam by the nature of the people who
have a longstanding tradition of caring
for their own and assisting those who are
homeless. Yet it is a problem which can-
not be resolved through reliance upon
these means alone. The numbers are far
too great even now. Escalation of mili-
tary operations will increase these num-
bers and with it the problem. These
refugees are basically anti-Communist
because they have felt the heel of Com-
munist oppression. As such, they can
be effectively utilized to tell their story
to others who may be wavering in their
support of the Government or who do not
know what oppression of this type can
mean. These people cannot be used to
get their story across nor are they likely
to remain anti-Communist if they are
caused to suffer unnecessary hardships
and privations in their new homes. As
they are a source for good today, they
can become, as history has proven in
other areas, a source of instability if their
basic needs are not met.
It is obvious that a coordinated long-
range program to meet the refugee prob-
lem is not available today. There seems
to be too much of an attitude that the
problem can be overcome by passing out
limited material aid and allowing the
local populaces to attempt to assimilate
the refugees.. This is impractical. It
cannot be accomplished. The South
Vietnamese will assimilate every refugee
humanly possible. It is their nature, but
the numbers are far too great. There is
immediate need for a large program for
the resettlement of these refugees in
areas where they can support themselves
in new homes or at least until the time
when they can return safely to their
home villages. A little has been done
but such areas must be established in
a greater quantity than has been done to
date. This resettlement should be
coupled with increased vocational train-
ing, with primary emphasis on agricul-
ture and in locally needed skills. Failure
to accomplish this will add to the insta-
bility of the Government, but if accom-
plished it will allow these proud and in-
dustrious people to contribute, not only
to their own support, but to that of the
countryside about them.
Any report on the war in Vietnam
should include an especial commenda-
tion for medical and hospital units whose
responsibility it is to heal the wounded
and sick and to contribute to the main-
tenance of health of U.S. personnel. Al-
though faced with serious problems-
some of them almost insurmountable due
to large numbers of sick and wounded for
whom. no theater hospital facilities had
not been made available-they impro-
vised and met every requirement in ad-
mirable fashion. Unanticipated prob-
lems with new and virulent strain of
malaria, which frequently exceeded bat-
tle casualties in number, added to the
difficulties. However, your subcommit-
tee found no instances of inability to
meet the pressing demands placed upon
medical personnel nor cases of shortage
of essential medical supplies. In part
the problems were met by air evacuating
sick and wounded to the Philippines and
thence to convalescent hospitals in other
areas. There are cases where battle
wounded were receiving treatment at
Clark Field, Philippines, within 6 hours
from the time the injury was received.
This policy of air evacuating sick and
wounded is not the most desirable proce-
dure, but it served to insure prompt and
adequate treatment. Additional hospital
facilities are under construction which
should soon permit in-theater treatment
for all emergency and short-term cases.
We were briefed many times during
the course of my work in southeast Asia.
It is the belief of this committee that
briefing procedures can be modified ma-
terially to the benefit of staff personnel
without taking away from the value of
the briefings. It was noted that in most
instances, briefing teams comprised es-
sentially all of the top staff members of
the respective groups. Although 20, 25,
or even more staffers might be present,
the briefing was conducted essentially
by 2 or 3 individuals. Most of the
others took no part. Although appre-
ciative of the efforts of the U.S. units to
provide a detailed picture it is respect-
fully suggested that three or four well-in-
formed staff members could do the job,
freeing others for pressing work which
always awaits them. It is suggested also
that film clips showing areas and actions
could well be substituted for much of the
detailed information on organization and
mission. In other words, a great deal of
time for the briefing teams can be saved
without taking. away from the effective-
ness of the briefings.
It would have been impossible for me
and other Members of Congress to ac-
complish our mission in Vietnam with-
out the outstanding cooperation and
helpfulness extended by both the mili-
tary and civilian personnel in the areas
visited. Every effort was made to pro-
vide all possible assistance. The work pf
the staff of the Committee on Appropria-
tions and of the legislative liaison officers
involved in the planning and execution of
the trip was outstanding. The whole-
hearted support of all those who par-
ticipated in this endeavor is deeply ap-
preciated.
No report would be complete without
a high tribute to the morale and valor of
821
America's fighting men in southeast Asia.
Their contributions have been and are
magnificent. Their will to win, their
morale and their esprit de corps is of the
highest. Their valor and ability in
battle, their friendly relations with the
local populace and their untiring efforts
to assist these people in the problems
which they face in their everyday lives
are in the highest tradition of the Ameri-
can military service. They know why
they are fighting in Vietnam. They are
satisfied that their missions and objec-
tives are proper ones and they are dedi-
cated to the achievement of those objec-
tives with every means at their disposal,
including their lives. No lesser contri-
bution is being made by, the many civil-
ians in our military and many of our non-
military programs who are living and
working side by side with many of our
military personnel. Even a brief asso-
ciation with these people and a short
glimpse into their lives in Vietnam makes
one proud to be an American. in every
area, they have the will to win. They
deserve and they need the full and un-
limited support of the American people
and of their Government.
SUMMARY
This will be no easy war. Many unre-
solved problems confront us. The
ground rules under which U.S. forces
fight will have to be changed. It is neces-
sary that the North Vietnamese port,
power and industrial complex which sup-
ply Communist forces be neutralized or
the war' will go on indefinitely. Con-
tinuation of the sanctuary now provided
those facilities in North Vietnam will
mean continued escalation of conflict and
more American deaths. Cambodian
ports should be quarantined if that coun-
try insists on supplying the enemy. The
bulk of South Vietnam's huge rice crop
now goes to the Communists. This, too,
will have to be stopped. If food and
supplies are denied to the enemy, I believe
the war can be won in 2 years despite
ready Communist access to ample
manpower.
Additional U.S. forces, supplies, bases,
and port facilities must be provided at
once. We appear to have underestimated
Vietcong and North Vietnamese capabili-
ties in number and supplies. The build-
up of opposing forces has not permitted
us to seize and hold the initiative. This
is essential to victory. The lives of
American servicemen are at stake in this
operation and no effort should be spared
to give them the protection and support
they deserve.
Logistics and construction play an
essential part in successful U.S. opera-
tions in southeast Asia. Unless ports,
airfields and military camps can be con-
structed more rapidly, our forces and
supplies must be crowded onto existing
facilities and effective operations are de-
layed. The available labor force of South
Vietnam is being utilized effectively but
the number of skilled manpower is lim-
ited. Greater dependence should be
placed in Seabees and Army engineer
construction battalions through the
transfer of additional units and call-up
of reserves. Air Force aviation main-
tenance battalions should be activated
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE January 20, ,1 966
to bolster construction forces in the corn- in nonmilitary activities there is a That the Castro regime is the willing
bat area. Much broader vocational requirement for more positive direction tool and promoter of international com-
training programs should be instituted and emphasis, especially in our efforts in munism's desire to intensify subversion
for South Vietnam and Thailand person- psychological warfare. In this connee- and terrorism throughout the continent
net without delay. There is a need for tion., tribute is paid to American teams, and the world becomes more evident
additional skilled labor throughout the including AID, Peace Corps, and Armed daily.
area which can be provided from local Forces medical teams, who through di- Mr. Speaker, I believe there is a direct
sources. This is true not only from the recf contact with villagers have presented correlation between our struggle in Viet-
standpoint of the future economy of the a new and needed picture of the U.S. nam and the Communist meeting in
nations involved but also because of the intentions and helpfulness to the Viet- Havana last we States were ever to be
requirement for skilled workers in milii- nanaese. If the Lary construction and logistics problems. The refugee program in Soul h Vietnam driven out of Asia, such a defeat wou)d
We recommend that steps be taken to also remains a problem. There is a need give the green light for Communist sub-
develop another B-52 site closer to south- for a better coordinated refugee program version all over the world.
east Asia.. Guam, the present site, is far with stress being placed on, the resettle- Last week's meeting of Communist
removed from the target area and the meant of refugees in areas where they can leaders in Havana clearly spelled out the
long flights represent unnecessary wear contribute, primarily through agricul- blueprint for waging subversion and ter-
mod nd tear on men and equipment and re- ture, toward their own support and that ror aiist the nrws on.e of coordinated Com-
a
quire costly refueling operations. A of the countryside.
number of such alternate sites are avail- We wish to pay highest tribute to the In the last days of the tricontinental
able morale and valor of America's fighting conference it was decided that the ex-
More effective use can be made of men in southeast Asia. Their contribu- ecutive secretariat and liberation conl-
naval aviation if additional carriers are Lions are magnificent. They have the mittee-with four representatives from
provided. This will permit naval air- will to win and they deserve the full and Latin America, four from Africa, and
craft to be on station for a greater length unlimited support of the American ff our fro] a Asia their each commit dquarterstee-in
of time than is presently possible. people. -
Strengthening of the surface craft in the Havana,
avowed d purpose of the liberation
7th Fleet will also permit heavier gun- THE TRICONTINENTAL CONFER- The co avo is to channel ath and ration
fire to be made available to our land ENCE IN CUBA: A 'THREAT TO rials for insurrection throughout Latin
forces in operation near the coast. WORLD FREEDOM America. This is the first time that
Greater reliance on over-the-beach
landing operations would lessen the The SPEAKER pro ternp+;re. Under Moscow and Havana have formally set
strain on existing port facilities and per- previous order of the House, the gentle- up an office for international commu-
mit an expedited flow of supplies more man from Illinois lMr. Pucrasxri is rec- nism in Havana.
quickly than will be available through ognized for 60 minutes. Because of the Havana conference's
the completion of ports now under con- Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, be- importance, the American people should
;truction. This will mean making great- tween January 3 and 15, some eleven know, and this Chamber should
cr use of LST's and similar landing craft hundred miles from Washington, but thoroughly investigate, the significance
wherever available and placing greater only 90 miles from Key West, Fla., a of the pronouncements made during its
reliance on seagoing tugs and barges. most significant event took place in the sessions, the role of Communist Cuba as
'T'hrough the use of such equipment, capital of Cuba. host nation, and the final results and fu-
many ships which now wait for days in Last July 26 in my speech on Cuba, I ture consequences of the gathering.
he rivers and harbors of Vietnam to dis- warned that a tricontinental meeting of Too often preoccupied with events in
charge cargo can be offloaded onto Communist representatives would be Vietnam, we unfortunately fail to attach
equipment which utilizes shallow ports held this January in Cuba. 'T'hat meet- proper importance to portentous events
or beach landing operations. ing did in fact occur and its delibera- in our own backyard.
There is a need in the logistics con- tions should be of monumental concern of this conference greatly
affect security, this the safeugr ly
siruation field for additional money to be to all who value freedom. The aims
Last Saturday, after 13 days of de-
com avdii in Vn Vietnam tnamlu under the mregulaattioryons liberation, this conference of the Asian, which is our prime duty. President Mon-
which othat responsibility
which provide greater flexibility. War- African, and Latin. American Commu- roe roe when in h1 declared outlined tli that the responsibility
Staie
extra
Lime conditions simply do not permit nists came to a close in Havana. Spon- when r any aUnited
extend an
peacetime operating practices to be fol- sored by the Communist powers, orga- would consider er any attempt
system
any portion of this hsystem
]owed without costly delays. Some funds nized by known Communists, and at- hemispheric
already provided through supplemental tended by pro-Communist delegates and serous to the peace this hemisphere, sphe d the
appropriations are not yet available. In observers from 82 countries, including United States.
other construction cases appropriation official delegations from the Soviet Union The celebration of the tricontinental
processes need to be speeded up in the and Communist China, the triconti- Tconference in Havana was agreed upon
field. A reserve of funds should be rnade nental conference represents a direct
available for changes in scope and cost and major threat to the stability of in Cairo last May, when the so-called
of construction as requirements change Latin America and, consequently, a dan- African-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Orga-
in the theater. Work has barely started ger to the whole of the Western Hemi- nization, on the initiative of the Soviet
ti activities
sphere. Union, decided to expand its
tial projects jests in the theater. altoo many essen- As a cofounder of the Cuban Freedom and include Latin America in its ranks.
Additional preprograming is needed Committee which operates Radio Free Although Communist Cuba is going
and it is probable that this can be expe- Cuba. I have followed the progress of this through a serious economic and financial
crisis, lavish preparations were carried
tilted if additional planning personnel meeting with great concern. vana for the conference, and
are made available. However, it is ap- Our staff, which maintains close con- out out in best Haavanities woffered t about
parent that high enough priorities are tact with activities in Cuba, has com- the be
e delegates and were e observers, all o about
not being given construction require- piled a comprehensive record of the
Havana
r gi e th`hee Havana
rnents in the war theater. 'l'op priority is conspiratorial meeting and I should like guests of the Castro
not being given to some of the equipment today to present briefly some of the high- Hilton Hotel-now the tte of the meetings and
and material needs in Vietnam. Lights of this meeting which most di- was declared off timits for the public.
Too much equipment has been dead- rectly affect us as free Americans.
lined throughout the area for lack of I believe that- the conclusions and ob- According to the official Cuban an-
spare parts. The situation is improving jectives agreed upon at this meeting nouncement, the principal point,,, on the
but there is a-need for greater emphasis clearly show that this conference repre- conference's agenda were as follows:
on making spare parts available. Much sents the beginning of the most impor- 1. The struggle against imperialism, co-
equipment is in short supply and when tant Communist effort to penetrate Latin lonialism, and neocolonialism.
.S. iin-
equipment cannot be used for lack of Cuba in since the Castro takeover in ~2.aSsp ortressl Vietandnam against l aeration
spare parts, the loss is doubly costly. for the