ACCIDENT AT BIEN HOA AIR BASE, VIET NAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300200006-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 14, 1965
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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MORNING OF JUNE 11, 1965
STA'T'EMENT BY LT. GENERAL WILLIAM K. MARTIN
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
BEFORE THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 26, 1965
L
CCIDEN BIE HOA AIR BASE,
7 VIET NAM
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Mr. Chairman - Gentlemen,
I have just returned from Bien Hoa Air Base in South Viet Nam where
I investigated the tragic and costly accident which occurred at that
base on 16 May. I have briefed the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and
the Secretary. Today I will cover the circumstances preceding the
explosion, primary areas investigated and our findings.
As soon as the Chief of Staff received word of this accident, he
directed me to form a team and depart Washington for Viet Nam, as soon
as possible. Within 5 hours, I departed with a team of maintenance and
supply, picked up a munitions expert and accident investigators enroute.
We went over there with the specific intent to determine the cause of
this accident and to identify any factors which may have contributed to
its severity.
We arrived in South Viet Nam, 28 hours after departure from Andrews,
late in the afternoon of the 17th of May where I was met by commanders
in the area. As you will see later, we were on the scene in sufficient
time to be one of the first groups in the accident area after all bombs
and ordnance had been cleared.
CHART To give you a better understanding of this base and to set the stage
1 for the accident, I will refer you to this vertical photograph.
The base at Bien Hoa is under the control of the Vietnamese Air Force.
U. S. military units are tenants.
As you can see, the main runway is oriented east and west. To give
you a few details about the facilities on the base, I will start at the
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west end of the runway. First, I call to your attention a new concrete
parking ramp being constructed from MAP funds. This ramp will, when
completed, be used by the A-ills of the Vietnamese Air Force. On the
other side of the runway, you will see a perimeter road running basically
parallel with the runway. The first large complex heading this way is
the munitions storage area. This is a Vietnamese munitions storage
facility which we use jointly with them. Continuing on around the
perimeter road you should note the perimeter fence which extends around
most of the base. As we proceed on around this end of the runway you
will notice the new USAF bomb holding area and the main taxiway which
leads to the focal point of aircraft operations. The base maintenance
facilities are located in this general area. A subsidiary taxiway
parallels this complex of buildings and leads to parking ramps where most
of the Vietnamese A-lH and U. S. A-lE aircraft are normally parked. To
the east is the main area from which Army forces operate. This is a
steel matting strip. You will note the pierced steel planking provided
for the parking of Army helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft. Army
helicopters operate from points throughout this particular area. The
main housing and messing facilities are located in this area.
I would like now to return to the main munitions storage area.
Munitions to be used on aircraft are delivered around the perimeter road,
across this end of the runway along this road. Army munitions go here
and Vietnamese and U. S. Air Force munitions flow here. As you can see
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from the photograph, holding areas for munitions have been established in
this area for U. S. A-lE aircraft and this area for the Vietnamese A-lH
aircraft, and along this side of this ramp for the B-57 aircraft. Fuze
assembly centers have been established in this location for the B-57s and
in this area for the Vietnamese aircraft. Immediately to this side of
the B-57 parking lot is the J-P1+ fuel storage area which will be shown
in more detail later. The accident occurred on the B-57 parking ramp
which is in the center of the base complex.
To give you a better appreciation of the ingredients involved in
this accident, I would like to first address myself to the high explosives.
On the U. S. aircraft alone there were a total of 85 general purpose bombs,
10 each tanks of napalm and one aircraft loaded with incendiary bombs.
The Vietnamese aircraft involved were loaded mostly with general purpose
bombs, and fragmentation bombs. At the time of the accident approximately
135 U. S. personnel and approximately 25 Vietnamese personnel were in the
immediate vicinity. 27 Air Force personnel and one Vietnamese were killed.
76 USAF and 29 U. S. Army personnel were wounded. 12 USAF aircraft
(10 B-57s, 1 FSU, 1 Al-E) and 2 UNAF Al-Hs were destroyed.
CHART The day of the accident started normally. A number of B-57s were
2 scheduled to fly bombing missions. Two flights were to strike targets in
South Viet Nam. The third flight was scheduled to strike targets outside
of South Viet Nam. The first of the flights, which were located in these
positions, took off at 8 o'clock. The second flight was scheduled for an
eight twenty (0820) takeoff.
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CHART The third flight at eight forty (08+0). I will use-this chart to give
3 you an idea of a typical mission in Viet Nam. The aircraft normally
take off from Bien Hoa, proceed along a designated route to the target
area, expend their bombs individually and return. All of these missions
involve bombs with delay fuzes as well as bombs with instantaneous fuzes.
CHART To get back to the circumstances existing immediately preceding the
2 accident, I should point out that the pilot of the aircraft located in
the A-9 position aborted from the second flight, the other aircraft
taxied to the west end of the runway in preparation for takeoff. Flight
number 3 is indicated by red and green dots. The green dots indicate
a crew at the aircraft. The red indicates the aircraft was loaded with
bombs having delay fuzes in the tail and instantaneous fuzes installed
in the nose. This fuze configuration was to permit the pilot some
selectivity in bomb detonation in event of mission change. The aircraft
in A-i position was loaded with bombs with instantaneous fuzes and tanks
of napalm. Two aircraft in number 3 flight had general purpose bombs
with delay fuzes in the bomb bay and bombs with instantaneous fuzes
installed externally under the wings. The other aircraft bad bombs
internally with delay fuzes and other bombs externally. When the number
2 flight departed, position B-9 was vacated and shortly thereafter an
F-8U of the U. S. Navy taxied into this position. This aircraft had
landed at seven fifty-eight (0758) due to an emergency caused by fuel
transfer problems, had taxied to the end of the runway where its guns
were dearmed, and had proceeded to the ramp where he parked in this position.
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Many of our personnel who had already launched their aircraft were
naturally curious and gathered around this aircraft. Very shortly there-
after at eight twenty-three (0823) on Sunday, 16 May, an explosion
occurred on this ramp.
Men fought the fire and moved out fourteen A-lHs.
CHART This is a composite from aerial photographs taken on the afternoon
following the accident. To reorient you, this is the parallel taxiway,
and this is the fuel storage area. As an indication of the magnitude of
the blast, you might be interested in knowing that a compressor, which is
the large part of a jet engine, was thrown over 900 feet and through the
roof of a building well off this chart. We know when the explosion
occurred that 85 baenbs.were loaded aboard the aircraft. An analysis of
this photograph showed that some 65 had exploded. This left a total of
20 to be dealt with. Shortly after ten o'clock on the morning of the 16th,
Captain McFeron, an explosive ordnance disposal expert, pointed out to
the commander that these unexpended weapons with delay fuzes were a
serious hazard and should be immediately removed from the area. He
reasoned that these delay fuzes, although the shortest delay should have
been 24 hours, could very well go off earlier as a result of heat and/or
explosion damage. Several of the bombs with delay fuzes were collected
and placed on trailers. Others were placed in separate piles or on bomb
hoists. At ten thirty (1030), Captain McFeron, and two airmen with him,
were killed at this location when 4 or 5 bombs prematurely detonated.
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one other airman with them was seriously injured and lost a leg. The
Commander of the 2nd Air Division, General Moore, immediately cleared
the area of all personnel and ordered no further demolition activity.
At seven twenty-one (0721) the following morning, 5 bombs located
in this area exploded. After considerable discussion among the Commanders
involved, Lt. Colonel O'Shaughnessy, a U. S. Army explosive ordnance man,
with the concurrence of General Moore, purposely detonated 3 bombs with
delay fuzes at this point. The final bomb with a delay fuze was located
and detonated at four thirty (1630) on the afternoon of the 17th about
the time we arrived at Saigon. Six weapons not having delay fuzes were
safely moved out of the area during subsequent cleanup. In summary, of
the 85 general purpose bombs in the area: 65 were exploded in the main
blast; 6 were safely recovered; and, i1 were exploded or purposely
detonated on the B-57 parking ramp.
CHART In an attempt to reconstruct this accident, over 100 witnesses were
5 interviewed the first two days. Many of these had their backs turned or
were not facing directly toward the blast. Some witnesses, however,
viewed the blast from key vantage points. A tower operator in close
proximity was facing the area and observed the first fire or explosion
as indicated. An Army Chaplain was flying in a helicopter and thought it
was the #1 or #2 aircraft. The pilot of a U-3 aircraft got the same
impression. A Ground Control Approach operator was also reasonably sure
that the explosion occurred in this area and took photographs before many
of the airplanes caught on fire. Captain Greene, the pilot of this aircraft,
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and the only surviving pilot from the third flight, homed in on the air-
craft on the northwest corner of the ramp. Other witnesses in the
southeast corner of the ramp thought it may have been the aircraft on
B-5. Some of the best witnesses were located in this area near the
A-1H parking ramp. Nevertheless a plotting of all of these witnesses'
statements tended to focus on the first and second aircraft on the ramp.
As best we can determine, with one exception, all personnel located
inside this green line were killed. The arrival of the F-8U and the
congregation of U. S. airmen around it probably saved their lives. The
lone exception, to our knowledge, of men not being killed inside the
green line, is the crew chief of this aircraft who was standing just a
little out from the nose. He had serious burns and was in serious
condition at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. We did have an
opportunity to talk to him and he was of the impression that his own
aircraft had exploded. Thus, from witness statements and his, we cannot
completely rule out this particular aircraft.
Many of the witnesses described the explosion as a whoosh, a low
rumbling sound, and some even as a popping noise, which tends to support
the idea that it may have been a low order detonation initially. These
same witnesses were of the opinion that 10 to 15 seconds later a loud
blast, which is descriptive of a full high order bomb detonation, took
place. Others were of the impression that the full detonation took place
first.
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CHART In our investigation of this accident we explored many possible
2 causes. One of the first was to make a complete rundown on the
maintenance being performed on those aircraft remaining on the ramp.
s The aircraft in the B-5 position had some electrical malfunction of the
trim control and had low tire-pressure. The spare aircraft in the A-i
position had a previous malfunction on the remote magnetic indicator,
but of more importance, required some work on the external bomb racks.
Because of this difficulty, the aircraft was configured with fewer tanks
of napalm than normal. The aircraft in the A-2 position required that
the hydraulic accumulator, which provides rudder boost, be increased in
pressure from 800 to 1,000 pounds per square inch (PSI). The aircraft
in the A-9 position had not joined the second flight since bomb fuzing
was not canplete and the pilot and his crew were on the way to the
operations building, walking between the row of B-57s, when the explosion
occurred. Aircraft 893 on the back side of the ramp had previously
suffered battle damage and was undergoing maintenance and the installation
of new electrical wiring.
After tracking dawn all of these various maintenance actions, we
concluded that the possibility of this-type of maintenance contributing
to the explosion was relatively remote.
Another possibility which was extensively explored, and is still being
investigated, is the failure of B-57 starters. This starter has given
the Air Force difficulty, although it has been improving the last several
years. We have experienced some 20 failures since 1 January 1962.
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I hope that this last presentation has not been too detailed. How-
ever, we believe that an understanding of the complexity of this fuze
is necessary to appreciate why we are so concerned about it in our
investigation.
Another area of concern-was the numbers and qualifications of the
bomb loading crews used on the B-57 aircraft. The increased operational
requirements in Southeast Asia early this year indicated the immediate
need for additional ordnance loading crews as well as other skilled
personnel. So that the other Air Force commands throughout the world
could retain a capability, and still support the increased operational
and related munitions requirements in Viet Nam, a special project was
conceived which selected the highest caliber personnel from the commands
in the Continental United States. These personnel were placed on
temporary duty in Southeast Asia. They were fully qualified on aircraft
peculiar to their respective home commands. For example, a loading crew
from Tactical Air Command might be fully qualified and experienced on the
F-100 aircraft. Nevertheless, before they could be utilized to load
munitions on B-57 aircraft, it was necessary that they be given additional
training. Many of these men were placed on 120 days temporary duty in
Southeast Asia and were to be returned to their parent commands. This
training was accomplished at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Upon
arrival there, these men were selected and formed into 4-man teams for
3 to 10 days of training and certified as crews. As an example of the
training given them, they received special briefings and practical
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demonstrations on types of munitions, aircraft armament systems, bombing
equipment, loading and fuzing, emergency procedures and safety. Before
being dispatched to South Viet Nam, they were certified as being fully
qualified by the commander of the Munitions Maintenance Squadron at
Clark. At the time of the accident, a number of 4-man crews were avail-
able for use in B-57 operations at Bien Hoa. Some of these crews were
permanently based at Bien Hoa and the others were there on temporary duty.
our analysis of the training, numbers, and skill levels of loading crews
indicated that they were adequate and reasonably well trained. However,
safety procedures were not always followed at Bien Hoa. Crew efficiency
was not as effective as it should have been due to the minimum supervision
exercised by the limited numbers of junior officers and senior non-
commissioned officers. We have recommended that the Air Force reevaluate
the program of short period temporary duty. It may well be that additional
permanent change of station personnel should and must be made available
to provide the necessary continuity and high level supervision required.
Another possibility which we investigated was the inadvertent firing
of .20 mm ammunition from the A-1Hs parked on this and other ramps. As
you will recall, the nearest of these aircraft were loaded with fragmenta-
tion bombs and had ammunition in their guns but did not have any rocket
pods installed. We assured ourselves that even had one of the machine
guns fired, bullets would have cleared the B-57 aircraft by a wide margin.
Another possibility explored was the involvement of ground support
equipment. This aircraft does not require external power to start. The
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pilots start the aircraft at a briefed time or use the starting smoke
from the leader?s aircraft as an indiation to start their own. Shortly
before the accident, a high pressure compressor was delivered to position
A2. The aircraft in the A-3 position at that time bad not taxied out.
We were concerned about the compressor since cases have been reported
of it exploding and catching on fire. In addition, we found a wheel, a
muffler and part of a high pressure hose from this compressor in the
crater at the A-2 position. We spent considerable time trying to determine
whether this compressor could have started the accident at position A2.
However, late in our investigation it was ascertained that the compressor
had been moved at approximately 7:50 (0750) to the aircraft in the B-5
position to pump up a tire. The remains of this compressor were still
in this location after the explosion although it was badly damaged. We
concluded on the basis of evidence then available that this compressor
played no part in the accident. Other ground support equipment, including
a low pressure compressor was on the flight line but we could not ascertain
whether it played a part.
Another possibility explored involved the use of oxygen and nitrogen
in these aircraft. The aircraft in the A-2 position had been serviced
with nitrogen. Nitrogen is used to purge fuel fumes from the system.
Earlier in the week some of the end fittings on the high pressure hose
for both oxygen and nitrogen high pressure hoses had been locally fabri-
cated to replace damaged fittings. Nitrogen bottles have female fittings
whereas oxygen bottles have male fittings. We were concerned that these
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fittings may have been inadvertently mixed. There was also the possibility
that oxygen had been placed in the nitrogen bottles or vice versa. Had
oxygen been in the bottle used to purge this aircraft, it would have
exploded as soon as the oxygen reached a proper concentration of JP-4
fuel. We verified that all oxygen and nitrogen bottles were accounted
for. We further confirmed, by the use of standard Air Force test equip-
ment, that all of the bottles contained the prescribed contents.
The final possibility considered by my team was sabotage. In looking
into this subject, the first step was a review of base security procedures.
As I previously stated, Bien Hoa is a Vietnamese Air Force installation
and security responsibility for the base and surrounding area rests with
them. Their forces have, however, been augmented by U. S. troops since
the mortar attack on 1 November 1964 to enhance security.
Responsibility for the B-57 area, though guarded by Air Police at
night, lies with the maintenance crews of the aircraft after they come
to work in the morning. Vietnamese personnel are not permitted in the
B-57 area unless authorized and escorted. Even to enter the base gates,
an individual may be required to subject himself to search, in addition
to examination of his pass.
We concluded that the physical security is adequate.
The possibility of sabotage was considered immediately upon receipt
of the flash report of this matter. Specific inquiries were conducted,
both on and off-base to explore the possibilities of gunfire, introduction
of explosive devices and tampering. 140 interviews had been conducted at
the time we left Bien Hoa.
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In the absence of a specific finding as to the cause of the Bien Hoa
explosion, sabotage cannot be completely eliminated: as a possibility.
On the other hand, there is no evidence of gunfire from off or on-base.
There is no evidence of unauthorized personnel having gained access to
aircraft. There is defense in depth of the perimeter to the extent that
enemy infiltration would be extremely difficult. Internal security of
the base is specifically designed to detect infiltration both at the
perimeter and at the B-57 parking area. Although security is the
responsibility of the VNAF, U. S. Forces are employed in critical areas.
To summarize our specific investigative actions, we have examined
some of the more obvious possibilities in depth and reached the follow-
ing conclusions:
1. The qualifications of individuals were found to be satisfactory.
However, supervision of munitions handling and loading did not fully
conform to Air Force standards.
2. Maintenance being performed on aircraft played no part in the
accident.
3. The B-57 starter conceivably could cause an accident under these
circumstances and is still a suspect..
4. Aerospace ground power equipment is not believed to have con-
tributed to this accident, but cannot be completely eliminated at this
time.
5. The delay fuze remains a suspect.
6. Security of the base was satisfactory but the possibility of
sabotage requires and is under continuing investigation.
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7. There was no evidence to indicate an overt attack by the Viet Cong.
A natural question which comes to everyone's mind is "Why was the
accident so catastrophic?" The explosion occurred when a large number of
aircraft were loaded with fuzed bombs in preparation for an operational
mission. These aircraft were parked much closer together than the Air
Force safety criteria specifies. Under normal stateside conditions
these aircraft would have been parked at least 175 feet apart. This
criteria had been waived in South Viet Nam because of the limited space
available. An understanding of why the area was so congested can only
be explained by some rationalization of the operation in Viet Nam and
how it developed. The requirement for aircraft sorties and ordnance
delivery in this area has increased steadily. For example, the sorties
flown almost doubled from December to April of 1965. At the same time,
the tonnage of bombs dropped increased nearly five-fold, which indicates
the increased capability of aircraft now being employed. In order to
meet this steady increase in operational requirements, increased air-
craft had been assigned to the theater and to Bien Hoa. With the rapid
build up in forces during the past six months, the construction of needed
operational facilities had not been able to keep pace, thus aircraft
operating areas became increasingly congested. Real estate for expansion
was at a premium.
After the mortar attack in November, it was obvious that temporary
revetments for aircraft would be necessary to provide protection against
a recurrence of such an attack. The use of sandbags was directed from
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the start as the best and quickest way to provide such protection. Plans
and funding action were initiated to provide for permanent type revetments
as a follow-on. Over 1 million bags were used for sandbagging in South
Viet Nam. Construction was started on some 16 sandbag revetments at
Bien Hoa with in-house labor. In addition, extensive sandbagging was
provided for personnel, communications centers, key guard posts and
bomb holding points. After work was started on these temporary revet-
ments, permanent construction was started in the same area, thus the use
of these temporary revetments was limited. The Commander of the Second
Air Division considered the requirement for additional sandbag revetments,
including the possibility of revetments on the B-57 ramp at Bien Hoa.
He concluded that such revetments would have so limited the movement of
aircraft and ground support equipment and would have so congested his
available parking areas that the required mission capability would have
been reduced to an unacceptable level. He knew that such revetments,
while providing some protection against mortar attacks, would provide
little protection against accidental detonation of our own ordnance
while loaded aircraft were parked with minimum spacing in the area. He
explained that revetments on this small ramp would further reduce the
critically short parking areas available. It was planned to tow air-
craft into the temporary revetments after the last mission of the day
and back to the cement ramp in the early morning, since mortar attacks
were extremely unlikely during daylight hours.
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He pointed out that engines could not be started in the revetments because
jet blasts would damage and burn the sandbags causing the revetments to
collapse. Further, he considered mortar attack as less likely than it
was in October due to the increased base security provided in depth by
the Vietnamese and the U. S.-Army. He pointed out that accidental
explosions of the type experienced in Bien Hoa were rare. For example,
only 8 such incidents were recorded for the whole of WW II and Korea.
He explained that, in conjunction with the operational training missions
with the Vietnamese Air Force, beginning in December 1961, and the combat
operations since the Gulf of Tonkin incident, over 66 million lbs of
munitions had been loaded and expended and that since September 1964,
which is the point in time when the Air Force began to use the delay
fuzes in Viet Nam operations, a total of 2.4 million lbs of munitions
had been expended using over 6,000 of these fuzes, without incident.
The Chief of Staff directed that I return to provide him with an interim
report on 24 May 65, and that the investigation be continued under the
direction of Major General Meyers, Deputy Commander of the 2d Air Division.
His Investigating Board, which commenced work at the same time as my
team, has been augmented with fire pattern, structures and explosive
specialists to assist him.
Now I would like to discuss actions taken by the Air Force. The
interviewing of witnesses is continuing. Every effort is being made by
General Meyers' Board, supported by the entire resources of the Air Force,
to find a clue that can lead to a positive determination of the cause of
the initial fire or explosion.
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During and immediately subsequent to my investigation, numerous
actions were initiated to preclude a recurrence of this incident.
(1) The use of delay fuzes in Southeast Asia was immediately
suspended pending extensive testing of this fuze.
(2) All delay fuzes of one type have been withdrawn from Southeast
Asia and are being held at Clark Air Base.
(3) Bien Hoa has established a single bomb holding area and the
assembly of fuzes has been consolidated in one location.
(1.) A joint maintenance team from 2d Air Division and 13th Air
Force visited this base and others to insure that maintenance organiza-
tion, particularly as it pertains to the handling of munitions, is
efficiently supervised-and operating properly.
(5) A safety survey of all jointly occupied bases is underway by
the 2d Air Division with representation from the Vietnamese Air Force,
the Vietnamese Department of Aviation, and the U. S. Marine Corps to
insure that all of these agencies identify and correct any explosive
hazards which may affect not only their own forces but the forces of
their counterparts.
(6) An assistance team, headed by a general officer from Hq Pacific
Air Forces, went to Bien Hoa to assist the base in determining if
additional equipment is required for handling explosives and to assist
in the establishment of the safest possible system for handling munitions.
(7) An Air Force Civil Engineering office has been established in
Bangkok and Saigon to review construction of badly needed facilities to
the maxim= practicable extent.
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In addition to these actions which have been taken in Southeast
Asia, Hq United States Air Force directed the establishment of a Study
Group to make a thorough analysis of the B-57 aircraft and the munitions
carried on it in Viet Nam, in an attempt to duplicate malfunctions
which may have caused the accident at Bien Hoa. This test program is
now underway at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and by a team of 8
specialists from the United States at Clark Air Base.
The Headquarters also has directed a comprehensive laboratory -
type test of the delay fuzes which were in use in Viet Nam. This test-
ing is now completed. Approximately 660 fuzes representing 26 lots with
manufacture dates from 19+5 through 1954 have been subjected to varying
degrees of inspection,. handling environment, shock treatment, chemical
analysis, and functional testing. Testing indicates that the delay
fuzes are safe for field use providing the established safety instruc-
tions and handling procedures are followed.
I want to reiterate that we have not identified the specific cause
of the accident at Bien Hoa and that the investigation is continuing.
I have an excellent color film taken shortly after the explosion
that I would like to show before answering any questions.
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