SENATOR CHURCH'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300190024-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: May 17, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

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lYdy 17, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE 10313
variety of ways to achieve a common solu- I believe this legislation is needed to im- [From the New York (N.Y.) Times, May 16,
tion of their common problems, prove the administration aid coordination 19651
Interlocal contracting, for example, is au- of the principal Federal programs which pro- VIETNAM DEBATE HEARD ON 100 CAMPusES-
thorized, and the use of multipurpose metro- vide assistance for the housing and the de- BUNDy Is UNABLE To APPEAR BECAUSE of
politan districts is encouraged. velopment of the Nation's urban communi- "OTHEa DuTiEs"
Further, the legislature's authority to deal ties. (By Max Frankel)
with urban area problems is full protected. I am convinced that it will help promote
These provisions, however, should be re- interstate, regional and metropolitan collab- WASHINGTON, May 15.-The great debate
garded as only beginnings, for there is a oration. lost its star performer in midcourse, today
clear need for more adequate State leader- I am certain that such a department will when Government business kept McGeorge
ship and attention with respect to your provide better technical assistance and in- Bundy at the White House and away from a
metropolitan problems. The State, after all, formation-including a clearinghouse serv- national audience watching a teach-in on
is the depository for most of the legal power ice-to these units of local and State gov- Vietnam policy.
to act in urban affairs, and it must come to ernment. Mr. Bundy, special assistant to President
accept a genuine role in the field. No one of these three national proposals Johnson for national security affairs and
I'm still enough of a Hamiltonian, how- alone will solve the urban crisis, nor will one of the principal architects of American
ever, to believe the Federal Government also State and local efforts alone suffice. But foreign policy, announced his withdrawal at
has a special role to play in helping civic when combined, they offer meaningful ways the start of the main debate of the all-day
institutions adapt to their new regional en- of implementing the concept of "creative Program.
vironment. federalism" and of giving local officials a bet- An audience of about 5,000 persons had as-
The national character of many metropoli- ter than even chance of establishing the sembled here from many parts of the country
tan questions makes this mandatory. More foundations of a vital metropolitan commu- to witness the confrontation between Mr.
than 50 Federal programs are now operating nity. Bundy and some of his best known critics in
in our urban areas, and most of them have The town was once the place where many the academic world. More than 100,000
been enacted since 1950. The future is not public decisions were made and carried out. other persons gathered- at more than 100
likely to reverse this trend. Then It was the city. Now it is the region, campuses to hear the debate by way of spe-
Authority and effort are needed in Wash- With its combination of cities and towns. cial radio hookups.
ington-as well as in the urban areas-to These developments have not been sudden- Word of the cancellation came in the 2-
assure that each of these programs con- for as Vachel Lindsay wrote of Springfield, hour lunch recess. When the meeting gath-
tributes not only to its more limited program Ill.: ered again for the major debate session, much
goal, but also to the general goals of our "Record of the audience was still unaware that Mr.
emerging metropolitan communities. Three it for the grandsons of your son- Bundy would not speak.
current case studies indicate tha'. Washing- A city is not builded in a day: The announcement was greeted by a few
ton is responding to this challenge. A little town cannot comple her soul scattered boos and hisses, mixed with desul-
Till proposed Intergovernmental Cooper- Till countless generatipn ss away." tory applause. There was also some laughter,
Cooper-
year and which 39 Senators cosponsored) is ~v rounu oI gentle applause at its conclusion.
of paramount importance to you here and to VIETNAM DEBATE: EMOCRACY AT There was no explanation from the White
all other metropolitan regions in the coun- WORK House for Mr. Bundy's absence. The spon-
try. Last month, we held a week of hear- sors of the debate withheld comment. They
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the were told informally that the reasons for his
lugs on this measure. debate over our policies in Vietnam absence would become clear in 2 or 3 days.
Title IV of bill merits your special consid- reached a crescendo on Saturday here in There were no overt signs of crisis around
eration, since it establishes a national urban Washington. For many, many hours the Government. President Johnson issued
assistance policy. Under it, each Federal some of the most vigorous critics of our a brief statement offering aid to a-coalition
executive administering urban programs is Asian government in the Dominican Republic, read
obliged to coordinate his actionss with those policies disputed with some emi- another statement on excise tax policy, and
of other Federal agencies and his plans must nent academic defenders of the admin- planned to spend the weekend at the nearby
be part of or consistent with local and area- istration course. . presidential retreat at Camp David, Md.
wide planning efforts. Perhaps the show ran a little too long. Senior officials of the administration said
Another section of this title stipulates that Some of the presentations were unin- that they had strict orders not even to hint
applications for grants and loans under cer- formed, some intemperate; but a sur- at the reason for Mr. Bundy's cancellation.
tain urban programs would be reviewed and prising number were incisive and pene- They said they were uncomfortable with the
commented upon-but not vetoed-by a re- trating. need for silence and expressed hope that de-
gional planning body composed _of elected velopments today or tomorrow would dem-
Officials from the general units of local gov- Obviously all of this causes pain to onstrate the need for the sudden cancella-
ernment. This section is designed to those who would like to see this Nation tion.
strengthen areawide planning and to assist United 1,000 percent behind the Presi- Prof. Robert Scalapino of the University
Federal agencies in their evaluation of grant dent on Vietnam. But, let us face it, of California at Berkeley, a member of the
applications. there is a serious division in America on panel that supported Mr. Bundy, took his
It will not create undue delays. But it this immensely perplexing and complex place as the main debater in defense of
will protect the integrity of regional plan- issue, as there is bound to be in a big, administration policy.
ning objectives from subversion by , a frag- thinking, working democracy. Mr. " which statement said that "other
mented and uncoordinated Federal approach duties," whiche did not specify, had forced
to urban development. Equally Important, The importance of this teach-in is him to miss a meeting that he had looked
it helps to implement one of the basic goals that the processes of democracy were forward to. He said he disagreed wholly with
of this conferenceand of your forum. constructively at work on this trouble- those who believed it inappropriate for a
A second case study of Federal responses some problem. In view of the radio and Government official to face his critics.
to urban problems is covered in the proposed educational television audience of hun- "I take comfort in the thought that I shall
Water Quality Act of 1965, which I was privi- dreds of thousands, and since millions miss the meeting more than you will miss
leged to introduce in this session. The bill of Americans must have read newspaper me," he added.
has now passed both Houses of Congress. It re But he was missed. The academic spy's
ports of this discussion, our democracy sors had said from the start that Mr. Bundy's
increases grants for the construction of mu- has been more deeply informed. submission to questioning and criticism had
nicipal sewage treatment works and provides Although McGeorge Bundy-who was "made the event."
financial assistance to municipalities and
other bodies for the separation of combined to have been the administration's No. 1 He was also missed because he had been
sewers. Of special concern to you is the pro- defender was necessarily on assignment counted upon to provide authoritative and
vision that the grants may be increased by in Santo Domingo, the administration's official interpretations of Government ac-
10 percent for projects which are part of a case was vigorously and competently ex- tions and policies that have been the target
of scholarly attack in the dozens of teach-ins
Comprehensive regional plan. This incen- pressed. In my judgment the admin- that led to the debate today.
tive approach has worked well in the "open istration position was significantly He had warned the sponsors of the teach-
space" program. It will strengthen our at- strengthened by this discussion. In that he might not be able to take part.
tempt to curb water pollution. And I am I ask unanimous consent that a report The sponsors confirmed this.
convinced that this device should be extended of the debate in Sunday's New York In Mr. Bundy's absence, the burden of
to other Federal programs. Times, together with identification of debate fell to some of the leading scholars
A third proposal would create a broad In- the principal participants be printed in and analysts of foreign affairs who had as-
Strument for dealing with the urban crisis sembled to interrogate and help him.
at both the national and the grass roots the RECORD at this point.
Their discussion was often sharp, but never
levels. I have cosponsored President John- There being no objection, the report unruly. It was accompanied by many ap-
son's bill to establish a Department of Hous- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, peals for courtesy and respect and many
lug and Urban Development. as follows: statements that the problem of Vietnam was
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 17, 1965
so complex as to permit serious differences
among thoughtful and honest men.
Prof. George McT. Kahin, who was to have
been Mr. Bundy's principal opponent, as-
serted the theme of the teach-ins-that the
American public was entitled to "full and
honest answers"-and questioned the ad-
ministration's readiness to supply those an-
swers at all times.
URGES TIE TO NATIONALISM
But Mr. Kahin's principal target was
policy. He bemoaned the U.S. "consistent
failure" and "inability both to appreciate the
importance of Asian nationalism and to work
with, rather than against, that powerful
force."
A leading American student of southeast
Asia, Professor Kahin said that Western
policies had driven nationalists throughout
Asia toward the Communist camp because
the Communists had recognized the nation-
alists' aspiration. He argued that, for this
reason, no military victory was possible in
Vietnam, no independent nation of South
Vietnam was ever likely to achieve popularity
and viability, and the American effort to con-
tain the expansion of Communist China was
misdirected against North Vietnam.
He also argued against the so-called "dom-
ino theory," which holds that the loss of all
Vietnam to communism would cause the
loss of other nations as well.
"So long as southeast Asia governments are
in harmony with their countries' national-
ism, and so long as they are wise enough to
meet the most pressing economic and social
demands of their peoples, they are not likely
to succumb to communism," he said.
He said that the administration, although
it had offered "unconditional" discussions,
was in fact demanding that the Vietcong re-
bels immediately cease all operations and
that South Vietnam continue its separate
existence "in permanent violation" of the
Geneva accord of 1954, and was also refusing
to deal with the Vietcong's political arm, the
National Liberation Front. - -
The bombing of North Vietnam is more
likely to stiffen that Government's resistance
than persuade it to undertake negotiations,
Professor Kahin said.
BACKED BY AUDIENCE
Mr. Kahin spoke deliberately and with-
out fire. Although his views plainly had
the support of most of the audience, he drew
his first applause at the very end of his pre-
pared text, when he said:
"When the American public faces the
prospect of war, it has the right to full and
honest answers."
He was applauded a second time when he
appended a statement that he had hoped
"Mr. Bundy's appearance would be an indi-
cation of a change in the administration's at-
titude as to the value of informed public
opinion."
"I can only hope thathis indispensability
in, meeting some major crisis of policy mak-
ing is really of greater importance than the
contribution he might have made this after-
noon," he said.
Following Mr. Kahin, Professor Scalapino
said that the Vietcong were unquestionably
not an indigenous force. He cited state-
ments in the Peiping press attributing the
success of the Vietcong to the Marxist-
Leninist leadership of a Marxist-Leninist
force.
DIFFER OVER TACTICS
While there have been differences between
Hanoi and the leaders of the National Liber-
ation Front in South Vietnam, these are
differences over tactics and not over basic
policy, Dr. Scalapino said.
The strength of the Vietcong is primarily
due to organizational skills that do not nec-
essarily mean it has public support, he went
on. He said he was confident that the peo-
ple of South Vietnam, if they were able to
express themselves in free elections, would
not vote for the National Liberation Front.
Peiping has steadily contended that
"U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger" that
would collapse when pushed, he said.
"If Peiping Is able to demonstrate this works
in South Vietnam, it will work elsewhere,"
Dr. Scalapino declared.
The speaker said this did not mean that
he subscribed to the so-called domino the-
ory. Rather, he said he would use the
word "checkers"-because the Communists
would "jump to those areas which they can
neutralize."
If the United States is to negotiate with
Hanoi and the Vietcong, he said, it should
regard them as Communists and should not
operate under the illusion that it is dealing
with Asian nationalism.
Mr. Bundy made a brief contribution to
the debate by sending "only a word" about
the administration's purpose in Vietnam.
"That purpose is peace," he said, "for the
people of Vietnam, the people of southeast
Asia and the people of the United States.
"We evidently differ on the choice of ways
and means to peace, in what we all must
recognize to be a complex, ugly and demand-
ing situation. Those differences may go
deep to the nature of the politics of Asia, to
the legitimacy of force in the face of armed
attack and to the true prospects and pur-
poses of the people of Vietnam themselves."
But Mr. Bundy suggested that "what di-
vides us is less than what unites us."
ALL SEEK "DECENT" ACCORD
"None of us wants the war to be enlarged,"
he said. "All of us want a decent settlement.
None of us wants other men to be forced
under a totalitarian political authority. All
of us seek a solution in which American
troops can be honorably withdrawn. None
of us-I hope-believes that these are easy
goals."
Mr. Bundy praised the arrangements for
the debate as "fair to a fault" and said the
American people knew that the real day of
danger would come when the Nation was
afraid of any unpopular minority or unwill-
ing to reply to its voices.
He said there was some ground for arguing
that such debate would encourage the Na-
tion's adversaries. The Chinese Communists
will continue to pretend, he said, that the
protest of 700 faculty members weakens
American policy. However, Americans know
that the protests come only from a "small
minority" of teachers and students, he said.
A greater tribute to the protest movement
was expressed by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., for-
mer Harvard professor and White House aid.
He had been billed as a defender of admin-
istration policy in Vietnam and did praise
what he said were President Johnson's efforts
to reach a peaceful settlement.
But he brought some discomfort to both
sides.
He said it was "moving and impressive" to
see the deep national concern that had pro-
duced the meeting today. And he deplored
"a certain selfrighteousness" that he felt had
crept into utterances on all sides of the dis-
cussion.
Mr. Schlesinger was particularly severe
with Secretary of State Dean Rusk for a com-
ment that some educators suffered from "gul-
libility." He said that, after reading the
administration's white paper on Vietnam, he
had been tempted to reflect upon the gulli-
bility of Secretaries of State.
But he also deplored the use of slogans and
bright phrases in the academic world in deal-
ing with a complicate problem.
CALLS FOR NEGOTIATION
Mr. Schlesinger argued that, although the
commitment to defend South Vietnam in
1954 was probably a mistake, policymakers
today could not withdraw from that com-
mitment without undermining other Asian
nations, abandoning loyal supporters in
South Vietnam and giving comfort to Pei-
ping in its conflict with Moscow.
Negotiation is the only answer, he said,
adding that he understood the administra-
tion was trying to force North Vietnam to
the conference table.
He did not agree, he said, with the heavy
emphasis upon military solutions, partic-
ularly the bombing of North Vietnam. He
said that Washington's commitment to
South Vietnam and its desire to demonstrate
that the Vietcong couldnot win the guer-
rilla war could be better achieved through
a limited increase in American ground forces
there and a more attractive political pro-
gram.
"If we took the marines we now have in
the Dominican Republic and sent them to
South Vietnam, we'd be a good deal better
off in both countries," he said.
Mr. Schlesinger appeared on a morning
program of speeches with Prof. Hans J. Mor-
genthau of the University of Chicago and
Isaac Deutscher, the writer on Marxism.
PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEBATE
WASHINGTON, May 15-These were the prin-
cipal participants in today's national teach-
in about United States policy in Vietnam:
MORNING SPEECHES
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., on the Government
position.
Hans J. Morgenthau, a critique of the ad-
ministration.
Isaac Deutscher on the policy and the
cold war.
Eric Wolf, moderator, on the history of
the teach-in.
AFTERNOON POLICY CONFRONTATION
Speakers
George McT. Kahin, professor of govern-
ment and director of the southeast Asia pro-
gram, Cornell University.
Interrogators
On behalf of U.S. policy:
Zbygniew Brzezinski, professor of public
law and government and director, Research
Institute for Communist Affairs, Columbia
University.
Wesley R. Fishel, professor of political sci-
ence, Michigan State University.
Robert A. Scalapino, professor of political
science, University of California, Berkeley.
Michael F. M. Lindsay, professor of Far
Eastern studies, American University.
Against U.S. policy:
Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of political
science and director, Center and Study of
American Foreign Policy, University of Chi-
cago.
Stanley Millet, professor of government,
Briarcliff College.
Mary Wright, professor of history, Yale
University.
William A. Williams, professor of history,
University of Wisconsin.
Moderator
Ernest Nagel, professor of philosophy, Co-
lumbia University.
EVENING PANEL DISCUSSIONS
The realities of North Vietnam
For U.S. policy:
P. J. Honey, British scholar on Vietnamese
affairs.
Paul Kattenberg, policy planning staff,
State Department.
Against U.S. policy:
Bernard Fall, Howard University.
The issue of Chinese expansion
For U.S. policy:
Benjamin Schwartz, Harvard.
Michael Lindsey. American University.
Lindsay Grant, Far East Division, State De-
partment.
Against U.S. policy:
Felix Greene, Palo Alto.
Mary Wright, Yale.
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May 17, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 10315
The domino theory in southeast Asia responsible debate on the policy of the China is now the central problem. It has
For V.S. policy: United States in Vietnam. a gievance, an atomic bomb, a religious ide-
Robert Scalapino, University of California, President Johnson was originally against ology and a staggering surplus of people. In
Berkeley. this erudite confrontation. He took the Asia it is the arsenal of rebellion, and the
Herbert Spivack, Examination Board, U.S. opposition on the campuses of the country problem is how to deal with this astounding
Foreign Service. to his Vietnam policy as another act of high- fact.
Against U.S. policy: brow hostility to him personally. Finally, China is using the scientific achievements
Oliver Clubb, Jr., Syracuse. he agreed to let his principal White House of the West to defy the West-as it did this
Daniel Lev, Cornell. adviser on foreign policy, W. McGeorge past week with its explosion of another
The U.S. record in South Vietnam Bundy, former dean of the Harvard faculty, atomic device. The most dangerous thing in
address the visiting professors and students; the world today is that the West has found
For U.S. policy: but, in the end, Mr. Bundy didn't show. no means to deal with this rising problem
Wesley Fishel, Michigan State. BUNDY SCRATCHED and the university professors and students
Thomas Conlon, Far East Affairs, State De- are quite right in recognizing that no gov-
partment. Nevertheless, despite Mr. Bundy's regret- ernment has come up with the answer.
Against U.S. policy: table and unexplained absence, the exchange
Nicholas Wahl, Princeton. Of ideas in the meeting was useful and may DISCUSSING REALITIES
Stanley Millet, Briarcliff. have set an important precedent for the The importance of this weekend's debate in
The civil war and aggression from the North future. Washington is that at least a means has been
This was not merely a protest by the stu- found to discuss these realities, to move from
For U.S. policy: dents and professors about what is happen- protest against the effects of world disorder
Robert Scigliano, Michigan State. ing there-though their previous protests to analysis of causes and a choice of hard
William J. Jorden, Public Affairs Division, brought it about-but an inquiry, an honest options.
State Department. search for answers to the moral, political The interuniversity committee, which was
Against U.S. policy: and military dilemmas that confront the responsible for the Washington teach-in,
Robert Browne, Farleigh Dickinson. country in southeast Asia. should be continued and supported finan-
Robert Scheer Center for Study of Demo- Most important, it was a model of what can cially. It started at the University of Mich-
cratic Institutions. . be accomplished in a vast, democratic con- igan as a protesting movement against the
U.S. military policy tinental society, when modern instruments Government's Vietnamese policy, threatening
For U.S. policy: of communication are used to discuss funda- an academic strike, and has now developed
Leo Cherne, International Rescue Commit- mental questions of public policy. into a forum of national debate which could
tee. It was not only that hundreds of students be of fundamental importance to the
John Huizingaa, policy planning council, and professors gathered here to express their Nation.
State Department. concern about the Johnson administration's Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on
Against U.S. policy: policy in Vietnam, or that representatives Monday, the New York Times carried
Seymour Melman, Columbia. of the administration explained at last what substantial excerpts from this national
Anatol Rappaport, Michigan. the Government was doing there, but that teach-in and I ask unanimous consent
Can the war be won? the whole discussion was carried by radio to
university communities in 35 States and that these excerpts be printed in the REC-
For U.S. policy: thus enabled the students to continue the ORD at this point.
Col, Amos Jordan, U.S. Military Academy, discussion in the coming days and weeks. There being no objection, the excerpts
West Point. NO RESOLUTION were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
Daniel Ellsberg, State Department.
Against U.S. policy: This is something quite new and different as follows:
Jason Finkle, University of Southern Cali- from the struggles between governments and I From the New York Times, May 17, 1965]
fornia. universities in other countries. The energy EXCERPTS FROM NATIONAL TEACH-IN ON VIET-
Walter Goldstein, Brooklyn College. and zeal of university students elsewhere are NAM POLICY AND TEXT OF BUNDY STATEMENT
Political and moral effects of U.S. policy usually directed either against the Govern- (NoTE.-Following are excerpts from the
For U.S. policy: ment, as in many Latin-American countries, transcript of the national teach-in on Viet-
Zbygniew Brzezinski, Columbia, and Joseph or as an instrument of Government prop- nasn in Washington Saturday as recorded by
aganda in many Communist and newly de-
J. Sisco, International Organization Affairs, veloped Countries, but the interuniversity the New York Times.)
State Department. meeting here in Washington this weekend (Moderator Ernest Nagel, professor of phi-
Against U.S. policy: provided an opportunity to find the truth losophy at Columbia University.)
Isaac Deutscher. between the policies of the Government and Ladies and gentlemen, I have a very im-
Staughton Lynd, Yale. the conflicting views of its critics. portant announcement to read. I've been
The making of U.S. policy Nothing was really resolved in the process, requested to read to you a text of a statement
For U.S, policy: but an important technique of serious dis- by Mr. McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to
Walt W. Rostow, chairman, Policy Planning cussion was discovered. President Johnson) :
greatly regret that it is impossible for me
Council, State Department. Presidential talks In the past have not to I take part in the discussion this afternoon
Paul Seabury, University of California, Ber- produced objective national discussion of of our policy in Vietnam.
keley. political realities. The press and radio and I have looked forward to this meeting and
Samuel Huntington, Harvard. television have merely dramatized the differ- I hate to miss it. When I accepted your in-
Against U.S. policy: ences of opinion over policy. The political vitation, I did so with a warning that I might
D. F. Fleming, California State College, debates in Congress have only encouraged be unable to attend because of other duties.
Mark Raskin, Institute for Policy Studies. partisan and subjective conclusions about It gives me no pleasure that this warning has
how to proceed. And, until this weekend, come true.
Stanley Hoffman, Harvard. the demonstrations on the American cam- I regret my absence the more because I
Hans Morgenthau. puses have provoked more heat than light. wholly disagree with those who have argued
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, Mr. BALANCED DEBATE that it Is inappropriate for a Government of-
James debate here in Washington this week- ficial to take part in a discussion of this kind.
James Reston, of the New York Times, end, however, has been more balanced and It may be true, although I have no first-
has made a characteristically thoughtful realistic. The Administration, which at first hand knowledge that some of your meetings
analysis of this debate, calling it useful was aloof, full of resentment and self-pity, on Vietnam have failed to meet the standards
and adding that it "may have set an im- finally participated in the discussion and appropriate to university and college discus-
portant precedent for the future." I ask helped itself and its critics to deal with re- sions. It may also be true, and I have
that this Reston analysis be printed in alities in the process. thought so once or twice myself that a few of
the RECORD at this point. Even so, this debate between the intellec- those who feel strongly about the situation
tual and political communities of the coun- in Vietnam have been more interested in analy There being no objection, the - try is still unsatisfactory. It is still dealing pressure upon the administration than in fair
cis was ordered to be printed in the e RE C-
discussion with its representatives.
primarily with the effects of the disorder of
ORD, as follows: _ the world and not with the causes. Viet- But the preliminary arrangements for this
[From the. New York (N.Y.) Times, nam, which was the main subject of this particular meeting, so far as I have knowledge
May 16, 1965] weekend's discussion, is not a cause but of them, have been fair to a fault. I'm con-
WASHINGTON: AN ENTERPRISING DEBATE merely one effect of the problem. fident the discussion this afternoon will be
The cause is the poverty, misery, and re- a model of its kind.
(By James Reston) sentment of most of the human race and the Share deep interest
WASHINGTON, May 15.-Something new and exploitation of these things by the cunning Members of the academic community and
enterprising has happened in the National techniques of Communist subversion. An- members of the administration share a deep
Capital this weekend. The political and other cause is the failure of the Western interest in the encouragement of such fair
Intellectual communities of the Nation have World to devise- effective means,rpf dealing and open discussion. It has been argued
come together and engaged in a serious and with theselacts. that debate of this kind should be avoided
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 17, 1965
because it can give encouragement to the
adversaries of our country. There is some
ground for this argument, since it is true
that communists have little understanding
of the meaning of debate in a free society.
The Chinese will continue to pretend, and
perhaps in part to believe, that American pol-
icy is weaker because 700 faculty members
have made a protest against our policy in
Vietnam.
The American people, whatever their opin-
ions, know better. They know that those
who are protesting are only a minority, in-
deed a small minority, of American teachers
and students. They know also that even
within that minority the great majority ac-
cept and respect the rights and duty of the
American administration to meet its con-
stitutional responsibilities for the conduct of
our foreign affairs.
The American people know that the real
day of danger will come when we are afraid
of any unpopular minority or unwilling to
reply: to its voices. They understand what
Communists cannot understand at all: That
open discussion between our citizens and
their government is the central nervous sys-
tem of our free society. We cannot let the
propaganda of totalitarians divert us from
our necessary arguments with one another,
any more than we should let them be misled
by such debates if we can help it.
I will not take your time in .his brief
message for a rehearsal of the poliby of this
administration on Vietnam. Let me take
only a word to speak of our purpose here-
our purpose there. That purpose is peace for
the people of Vietnam, the people of south-
east Asia, and the people of the United
States.
We evidently differ on the choice of ways
and means to peace, in what we all must
recognize to be a complex, ugly, and demand-
ing situation. Those differences may go deep
to the nature of the politics of Asia, to the
legitimacy of the force in the face of armed
attack and to the true prospects and pur-
poses of the people of Vietnam themselves.
No easy goals
But my own assessment is that what di-
vides us is less than what unites us. None of
us wants the war to be enlarged. All of us
want a decent settlement. None of us wants
other men to be forced under a totalitarian
political authority. All of us seek a solution
in which American troops can be honorably
withdrawn. None of us, I hope, believes that
these are easy goals. All of us, I trust, are
prepared to be steadfast in the pursuit of our
purposes.
I recognize the entire sincerity of the great
majority of those who now disagree with our
policy in Vietnam. I think many of these
critics have been wrong in earlier moments
of stress and danger and I think many of
them misunderstand the hard realities of this
dangerous world. But their good faith and
good intent are not in question, and on other
issues at other times their efforts have been
of great service to the country.
Having said this much, perhaps I can ask
you in return that these critics should recog-
nize that the administration, which now
bears responsibility for the conduct of our
foreign affairs, does not admire force for its
own sake, or brinkmanship of any sort. The
purpose of its foreign policy in Vietnam
as elsewhere is that diplomacy and power and
progress and hope shall be held together in
the! service of the freedom of us all.
So I trust that the discussion this after-
noon will not turn upon charge and counter-
charge against the motives of those with
whom we disagree.
Let it turn, instead, upon analysis of the
situation as it is, and of choices for the
future which can serve the purposes we
share.
I repeat my apologies for my forced ab-
sence; and I take comfort in the thought
that I shall miss the meeting more than you
will miss me.
RULES TO GOVERN PROCEEDINGS
Mr. NAGEL. In view of this statement from
Mr. Bundy some changes will have to be
made in the program for this afternoon and
I will mention that presently.
My role as moderator imposes upon me the
obligation to say only what is essential and
to say it briefly. I will therefore limit the
introductory remarks to stating what I be-
lieve to be the objective of this meeting and
to mentioning the simple rules that will gov-
ern these proceedings.
This meeting has come into being because
of widespread doubt in many academic com-
munities as well as elsewhere concerning the
wisdom of current United States policy in
Vietnam. It needs to be emphasized, how-
ever, that the meeting has been sponsored
by university teachers throughout the coun-
try and organized by the Inter-University
Committee for a Public Hearing on Vietnam
on the basis of two assumptions:
The first is that whether or not those
doubts are wellfounded, there has been In-
sufficient responsible debate inpublic of the
great issues raised by our actions in South-
east Asia.
The second assumption is that since a
thorough airing of these issues by compe-
tent students is a condition for an enlight-
ened public opinion on them, in a liberal
democracy such as ours in which govern-
mental policies require the assent of its citi-
zens, students who possess knowledge perti-
nent to those issues have a special duty to
discuss them openly and critically.
Aim is stated
In short, the primary aim of this meet-
ing--an aim that surely merits the strong
endorsement of all who are committed to
the ideals of liberal democracy-is to con-
tribute to the public enlightenment through
responsible discussion of a serious problem
confronting all of us.
It is possible that a precedent is being set
for the development in the academic com-
munity of a generally recognized but vigor-
ous and informed opposition to those en-
trusted with political power, in the best
sense of opposition in the great traditions of
political democracy.
Lot me explain the format of the discus-
sion this afternoon. There are two principal
speakers: Dr. George M. Kahin, professor of
political science, Cornell University, and Dr.
Robert Scalapino, professor of political
science, University of California at Berkeley.
Dr. Scalapino has graciously agreed at the
last minute to replace the speech that Mr.
Bundy had promised to give.
Associated with each of the principal
speakers, there's a supporting panel. Be-
cause of the lateness of the word received
from the White House about the unavail-
ability of Mr. Bundy, Mr. Kahin's supporting
panel consists of four members, while Mr.
Scalapino's only three, since he was originally
one of that group.
Dr. Kahin is associated with Hans J. Mor-
genthau, professor of political science and
modern history at the University of Chi-
cago; Dr. Mary Wright, professor of history,
Yale University; Dr. Stanley Millet, professor
of history and political science in Briarcliffe
College; Dr. William A. Williams, professor
of history, University of Wisconsin.
With Dr. Scalapino is associated a group
consisting of Dr. Zbygriew Brzezinski, pro-
fessor of government, Columbia University;
Dr. Wesley Fishel, professor of political
science, Michigan State University, and Dr.
Michael Lindsey, professor of government,
American University.
The principal speakers will have a half-
hour each to present their views; and then
share an additional 5 to 10 minutes to dis-
cuss what has been said by them. This ex-
change will be followed by comments or
questions from the panelist, each with 6 min-
utes at his or her disposal, and beginning
with Dr. Morgenthau in an order alternating
between the supporting groups.
Three minutes will be available to the
principal speakers to respond to questions
put to them by panelists; or if the speaker
prefers to delegate the response, to some
member of his supporting panel.
The final portion of these proceedings,
which, we hope will begin not later than
4:30, because of commitments to various
broadcasting systems, will be a general dis-
cussion of issues in which principal speak-
ers and panelists will participate.
The meeting will conclude with summa-
tions by Drs. Kahin and Scalapino.
The first principal speaker this afternoon
is Dr. Kahin.
GRAVE ERRORS IN POLICY FOUND
Mr. KAHIN. Mr. Nagel, ladies and gentle-
men, I am indeed very sorry to learn that Mr.
Bundy finds it impossible to be with us this
afternoon. I see no reason therefore for al-
tering in any significant way the remarks I'd
planned to make. I will perhaps have a few
additional things to say in closing concern-
ing his absence.
Since the end of the last war, American
officials have made such grave errors in policy
toward southeast Asia that we have. every
right to be skeptical about their ability to
respond intelligently to the present situation
in Vietnam. Their most consistent failure
has been an inability both to appreciate the
importance of Asian nationalism and to work
with rather than against this powerful force.
This is a major reason why Burma, Cambodia,
Indonesia have become so distrustful of the
United States, and why they have either
broken or come close to breaking their rela-
tions with us.
Moreover the obsession of American policy
makers with what they still see as mono-
lithic communism has blinded them to the
fact that communism in Asia has adapted
itself to nationalism. And they have con-
fused the broad but nationally differentiated
force and potential of communism with the
threat of specifically Chinese power.
Despite the immense information gather-
ing facilities of the Government, serious
policy mistakes have been made because
decisions have been taken on the basis of
inappropriate criteria, wrong analyses and a
disregard for the relevant facts. At the
same time essential information has been
withheld from the American public and
crucial policy decisions concerning southeast
Asia have been made before the public has
even been aware that a problem exists. And
once taken, these decisions have set in mo-
tion events which severely circumscribed any
moderating influence which an informed
public opinion might bring to bear.
Moreover in recent months the tendency
has increased to dismiss even thoughtful
criticism of Government policy as irrespon-
sible meddling.
Illusory hope seen
In Vietnam, American policy has been
wrong from the outset. In the decade fol-
lowing World War II, because of our illusory
hope that we could induce France to become
the keystone in an American-designed Euro-
pean military organization, we temporized
with our commitment to national self-deter-
mination and backed France in her efforts
to reestablish control over Vietnam.
By supporting her attempt to establish a
Vietnamese regime which lacked nationalist
support, we helped insure that Vietnamese
patriots would have no real alternative but
to rally to the banner of Ho Chi Minh.
France's humiliating defeat at Dienbienphu
in 1954 was a military defeat but it was made
inevitable by the political failure that pre-
ceded it.
Then came the Geneva Agreements clearly
specifying that Vietnam was one country.
They stipulated that the 17th parallel was a
temporary demarcation line, not in any way
to be interpreted-and here I'm using the
text of the agreement-not in any way to
be interpreted as constituting a political or
territorial boundary.
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The United States in its own unilateral guerrillas adopted increasingly militant
declaration at Geneva spoke only of one Viet- policies.
nam, not of a South, and not of a North, and And in the 19 months since the assassina-
with respect to the conference's provision for tion of Diem, the situation has continued to
national elections, the United States also deteriorate and the shifting combinations
stated-again in its own unilateral declara- of army officers and bureaucrats controlling
tion-that it would continue to seek to the Government have remained just as iso-
achieve unity through free elections super- lated from the villagers of Vietnam.
vised by the United Nations. Faced with this decline in
Nevertheless the United States soon there- sion, and the evident inabilit~ftthe South
after set out to build up a separate state in Vietnamese military to stave off the Viet-
the South. And again we made the mistake cong, the present administration has en-
of thinking we could establish a viable gov- larged the war in Vietnam by bombing the
ernment on an inadequate nationalist base. north and increasing American military ac-
The United States supported Ngo Dinh Diem tivity in the south.
givin
him
g
, as you know, massive amounts
of-economic initially and later-military
assistance.
But American aid was no substitute for
nationalist support, something Diem's re-
gime never really acquired, despite what our
officials told Congress and the American
people.
Diem himself had said in 1953-repeatedly,
I might add-that Ho Chi Minh-and I'm
quoting him-"gained in popularity as a
leader of the resistance, not as a Commu-
nist," and that the vast majority of his
followers were nationalist and in no way
pro-Communist.
What the United States failed to recognize
was that in these conditions Ho Chi Minh,
who for at least 9 years had been the ac-
knowledged head of the Vietnamese na-
tionalist movement, could not be replaced
as the leader.of the Vietnamese nennie by
-
+-
litt
give
hem
i
le
?
equip11 ent. We can send our men to communism.
known and who had spent the critical out there as advisers, but they have to win Nationalism and the demand for social and
years-nearly all of them-of the independ- it." economic progress are the dominant forces in
ence struggle abroad. In the context of these cautions, does an southeast Asia today. If we can work with
America's failure, of course, to build up an unconditional American military pledge to these forces, if we can work with them we will
effective government under Diem is now well a weak and factious regime which lacks pop- make a major contribution to maintaining
known, but this was not immediately ap- ular backing-does that make common- the territorial integrity of the states of south-
parent, for after Geneva his regime enjoyed sense? Is our pledge of support completely east Asia and provide them with a better op-
several years of grace during which Ho Chi unqualified? Does it not demand a mini- portunity to develop along non-Communist
Minh's followers left it pretty much alone. mum degree of performance and coopera- lines.
Essentially this was due to the fact that tion from Saigon-political as well as mili- The first step in that direction must be to
the Geneva agreements had promised nation- tary? Is our pledge automatically to any negotiate a settlement in Vietnam.
wide elections for 1956 an it was primarily military or civilian group which happens to What has our position been thus far? I
because of this provision and because the control Saigon? What happens if our cur- think you know it well. The administration
agreements also Stipulated that France rent policy of brinkmanship induces Hanoi tells us that it is prepared to negotiate un-
would be responsible for carrying out the to send its 300,000-man army into South conditionally but in effect on condition that
accords-carrying out the accords south of Vietnam?
the 17th parallel--and that France would re- Because this it may very well do if the athe ong cease all operaons
nd V nc condition that the state of ImmediatelySouth
main there until the elections were held- damage inflicted by the United States be- Vietnam-and this is the most important
primarily because of those reasons that the comes so great that the North has little to condition, I would say-on condition that the
Vietminh withdrew its armies from the lose by undertaking a retaliatory attack and state of South Vietnam continue its separate
south and for a considerable period sus- little to save through compromise
and exi
t
But with American encouragement Diem
refused to permit the elections in 1956 and
France Washed her hands of the responsibili-
ties which she had assumed at Geneva,
Reneging is charged
Regardless of what sophistry has been em-
ployed to demonstrate otherwise, by en-
couraging Diem to defy this central provision
of the Geneva agreements, the United States
reneged on the position it had taken there
in its own unilateral declaration.
Civil war in Vietnam became inevitable, for
when a military struggle for power ends on
the agreed condition that the competition
will be transferred to the political level, can
the side which violates the agreed conditions
legitimately expect that the military struggle
will not be resumed?
Despite the initial period of insulation
from Vietminh militancy and despite un-
stinted American economic and political
backing, Diem failed to develop a real base
of popular support. Programs urged by the
United States for social and economic re-
form, and for winning the allegiance of the
non-Vietnamese hill-dwelling people, were
never effectively carried out.
The Saigon regime remained all too iso-
lated from the Vietnamese peasantry. As a
iesult, it was unable to compete with the
Vietcong guerrillas when, from 1958 on, these
10317
No matter how much military power we pour
into Vietnam; the present American policy of
trying to sustain a separate state in the
south may very well fail because the local
political factors necessary to insure success
are simply not there.
If we are going to salvage anything in
Vietnam, we will achieve more through a
cease-fire and a negotiated political settle-
ment than through the futile infusion of
more and more American military power.
The United States must recognize that the
historic Vietnam fear of-fear of and antag-
onism toward-China continues-continues
despite the com
mon adherence to Commu-
Power called the reply nist ideology. And inasmuch as the char-
It has endeavored to compensate for the aoter of Vietnamese communism is insepara-
continuing erosion of Saigon's political and ble from Vietnamese nationalism, Viet-
military base by introducing more American namese power will not necessarily be exerted
troops, more American air power, in concert with Chinese power.
It has justified this in terms of our pledge DEFINING INTEREST
to support Vietnam, a commitment which, This is likely to depend
as you know, the administration regards as actions conform with Vietnamesetnational
a test case. interest as the Vietnamese people define that
And here I think it might be appropriate interest.
to recall the caveat of Secretary Acheson in Those who still are impressed by the sim-
1950 when he stated that America could not plistic domino theory must realize that non-
by itself create politically stable states in Communist governments of southeast Asia
Asia, will not automatically collapse if the Commu-
KENNEDY REMARK OF 1963 QUOTED nists should come to control all of Vietnam.
President Kennedy also recognized these So long as southeast Asian governments are
limitations when, in September of 1963, he in harmony with their nation's nationalism,
said of the South Vietnamese, "In the final so long as they are wise enough to meet the
analysis it's their war-they're the ones who most pressing economic and social demands
_.._ 1 _,__
_ _
have to win it or lose i+ w
s
ence in permanent violation of the
negotiation.
Geneva agreements.
The well-known military analyst
Hanson F
th
,
ur
ermore,we have made clear that the
Baldwin, has estimated that to cope effec- Vietcong and its political arm, the National
tively with such a force the United States Liberation Front, cannot be party to such
might have to use as many as a million men. negotiations. Not only is that one more con-
The United States, of course, does not have dition, but it flies squarely in the face of
these forces immediately available and even reality-political reality.
to send in a small proportion would use up It is, I think, widely acknowledged that at
our entire strategic reserve. least half of the South is today under the
This same trend toward a rapprochement control of the Vietcong. It is not utopian to
with Russia started by President Eisenhower, assume that Hanoi is in a position to insist
continued by President Kennedy, that trend upon the Vietcong's yielding up the position
has already been seriously affected by our it has won there?
policy in Vietnam and it will be further
undermined if we continue on our present in 1954, the Vietminh could inhuto lac nu-
course
. merous supporters in the South to accept
Among Communist Parties throughout Vietnam's partition and to abandon their
Asia as well as among the nonalined states partition gains south was of the 17th parallel, because
generally, China's scornful derision of Rus- pre last regarded e a temporary meas-
sia's policy of peaceful coexistence has been only until elections.
gaining ever-wider approval. But t we
cannot the Sou assume that once again tat
The possibility of cooperation between the they have w gh will give d what
United States and Russia to contain China's camp igns, won through long and difficult
power-China's power and influence in
Over the last 5 years, the aoreal p ta-
southeast Asia-is becoming evermore re- compromising struggle and a real
mote. Our major aim in Asia is to contain turn of on of victory had ly nu-
China and thus to provide the opportunity victory had been assiduously ours
tured
for the states of south and southeast Asia to do among the Vietcong. While there i-
develop free from Peiping's dominating terest undo betw y n a of Hanoi and congruence , in-
influence. between Hanoi and the Vietcong, un-der And it is this consideration which should that Hanoi can abruptly call off the sou h-
govern American policy toward Vietnam, erners' resistance.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD'- SENATE May 17, 1965
And whatever influence Hanoi can exert
over the Vietcong, we cannot expect it to
exert this so long as we continue bombing
the north.
The morale of the' North Vietnamese is,
of course, no more likely to be broken by
bombs than was that of the British or the
Russians in the last war. Indeed their will
is likely to be stiffened. President Johnson
said after our Embassy in Saigon had been
bombed that outrages like this will only re-
inforce the determination of the American
people and Government. What is true for
Americans is true for the Vietnamese.
Halting our bombardment of the north
would be our first genuine indication of an
Interest in negotiations. Our quite cavalier
dismissal of the United Nations Secretary
General's efforts hardly constituted a serious
American interest in negotiations. I submit
that we should give him an unequivocal
mandate to pursue negotiations and that we
should make clear that we want not just dis-
sions but serious negotiations,
Support of others urged
And I would suggest that concurrently we
should, give much more encouragement than
we have to those nonalined Asian and Afri-
can states which wish to help promote a
.peaceful settlement in Vietnam.
And finally, for those many American who
still regard full public discussion of vitally
important national issues as essential to our
brand of democracy, there is a particularly
disquieting domestic aspect of this situation :
Realizing as they do that an informed pub-
lic discussion requires access to the relevant
facts, these Americans can only be deeply
disturbed when a spokesman for the news-
paper editors of this country feels compelled
to state as he did last month that the Amer-
ican press in Vietnam faces stronger restric-
tions than it ever has in wartime and that
we are getting contradictions, doubletalk
and half-truths from the Government con-
cerning the situation in Vietnam.
And surely Americans have grounds for
concern when the New York Times can edi-
torialize, as it did shortly after this, less than
3 weeks ago, that high-ranking repre-
sentatives of government in Washington
and in Saigon have so obscured, confused, or
distorted news from Vietnam or have made
such fatuously erroneous "valuations about
the course of the war that the credibility of
the U.S. Government has been sacrificed.
When the American public faces the pros-
pect of war it has the right to full and honest
answers.
I had Indeed hoped that Mr. Bundy's ap-
pearance would be an indication of a change
in the administration's attitude as to the
value of informed public discussion. I can
only hope that his indispensability in meet-
ing some major crisis of policymaking is
really of greater importance than the contri-
bution he might have made this afternoon
toward our better understanding of the ad-
ministration's aims and to that kind of
enlightened public discussion which is so
essential to the wisest conduct of foreign
policy.
IS VIETCONG AN INDIGENOUS FORCE?
Mr. NAGEL. The second principal speaker
is Professor Scalapino.
Professor SCALAPINO. Mr. Moderator, ladies
and gentlemen of the panel, ladies and gen-
tlemen of the audience, both here and un-
seen:
First, it should be perfectly clear that I
am not here as a spokesman for the Govern-
ment. I did not know-I do not know-
what Mr. Bundy would have said. As the
moderator has made clear, we knew about
this on both sides of this panel only about
12:30 and consequently my remarks will be
strictly those of myself as prepared rather
hastily after that time.
Now it seems to me that in beginning I
would not start my remarks with an his-
torical background as did Professor Kahin. I
would rather prefer to work those into some
of the critical questions to which I would
like to address myself.
The first of these questions, which is, I
think, critical, is as follows:
Is the Vietcong a truly indigenous force in
South Vietnam and has it achieved its
strength for its support such as it is through
promoting socioeconomic reform?
To me, the answer to this question, while
complicated, is, on balance, no.
Let me site, to begin, an editorial from the
Peiping Daily Worker of April 15 of this year
and reproduced in the Peiping Review on
April 23. Said Peiping: The Vietnamese peo-
ple's anti-U.S. struggle for national salva-
tion is a just revolutionary struggle against
aggression. It is certain to win, because
there is the wise leadership of the Marxist-
Leninist Workers Party of Vietnam, because
there is the unity of the 30 million Vietna-
mese people, and because there is sympathy
and support from people the world over."
I call to your attention the first phrase
in that statement: "Because there is the wise
leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Workers
Party of Vietnam." I think that there is
little question that the Vietcong is a carbon
copy of the Vietminh which preceded it.
This is certainly not to say that it does not
have indigenous support and leadership in
nominal terms at least. Clearly most of the
leaders of the National Liberation Front orig-
inated from the south as that front is now
structured. And whatever the bewildering
differences in figures, I am prepared to say
that a significant segment of the National
Liberation Front Is still southern in origin.
CRITICAL FACTORS
But what are the truly critical factors?
These factors, it seems to me, are as fol-
lows:
First, who does know the leadership of
the National Liberation Front? Individuals
like Nguyen Wuc Ngo. How many either in
or out of Vietnam realy subscribe to'their
leadership? The real leaders of the Viet-
cong are, and have always been, those in
small hard-core elements that are also mem-
bers of the Communist Party-and that
party has Hanoi as its headquarters now as
in the past.
The South Vietnamese Revolutionary Party
numbers no more. than 500 or so. It could
not possibly be expected to dominate the
500,000-man party of the north. Not only
is the leadership of this movement shadowy
indeed, but take a look at its basic princi-
ples. I urge you to read them carefully,
because I suggest that though there may
have been differences In tactics between the
South National Liberation Front and the
North Workers Party, or Laodong group, there
have been no differences up to date on the
question of basic policies or of fundamental
programs.
This is not an unusual movement. The
Vietminh also had innumerable non-Com-
munist elements. The Vietminh also until
It came to power claimed to be a multiclass,
Inultifront organization dedicated to na-
tional liberation of Vietnam. But it ended
up as you well know under the domination
of the Community Party and opponents were
either liquidated, silenced, or reformed.
Thus it seems to me what Is critical here
is that we do indeed face a complicated
situation in which borrowing heavily from
Chinese revolutionary tactics of the past a
five-stage development toward revolution is
involved.
The first stage is always to build a tight-
ly disciplined, carefully controlled Commu-
nist Party that is not susceptible to pene-
tration from the outside.
The second stage is to develop a united-
front movement, and in this stage of course
one solicits the support if one can obtain
it of the peasantry, of the intelligentsia, of
the petit bourgeois, using such socioeco-
nomic issues and nationalist issues as can be
used.
The third stage is that when this united
front is built one moves into guerrilla war-
fare,
The fourth stage that if guerrilla warfare
is basically successful and the cities can be
surrounded one moves into positional war-
fare.
And thence to victory, and the establish-
ment of a people's democracy In which the
real opponents of the regime are at that point
out.
For I know of no significant opposition
In North Vietnam today that survived this
five-stage development and could remain in
true opposition to the leaders of the Laodong
party.
I think it is important to understand this
development, because it is neither unique to
Vietnam, nor for that matter of fact, to
China, whence it came earlier; nor, in certain
respects, to North Korea.
It is a phenomenon that involves a com-
bination of civil war and international aid
and assistance. And unless both ingredients
are give their approximate weight and role,
I think one misunderstands the complexity
of the problem, and the difficulty of the
solution.
Let me raise another question: Does the
Vietcong really command the support and
allegiance of the people of South Vietnam?
Answer must be "No"
I think again, though the answer is com-
plicated, the answer on balance must be no.
What Is a true phenomenon is that though
the Diem Government made many mistakes,
and I am not here in any sense to defend it,
although the Diem Government made many
mistakes, one of the interesting things is
that very few, if any, significant anti-Diem
leaders In the South joined the Vietcong.
One of the significant things is that today
still, the great popular elements of South
Vietnam are not a part of the Vietcong, nor
have they ever been.
I refer to the Buddhists. And the Bud-
dhist solution for this problem, neutralist
as it is, does not involve the movement of
the Vietcong into power. The latest Bud-
dhist proposal that I've seen urges that all
Vietcong elements go North, Americans go
out, and some kind of international force
come in.
Now, second: What about the Cao Dal
and the Hoa Hao.
There are groups that command in some
degree the allegiance of millions of Vietnam-
ese. The Cao Dal alone has some 2 million
in its reported membership. Have these
leaders joined the Vietcong? Have they sup-
ported this so-called national liberation
movement?
There have been some exceptions. One is
always able to pick up in united-front activi-
ties 5 Catholics, 3 Hao Hoa, 10 Buddhists.
But en masse, the leadership that repre-
sents the central strength of the really
important functional elements of South
Vietnam are not, and have never been, a part
of this Communist-dominated National Lib-
eration Front.
It is not to say that they support the
present Government necessarily.
But what I think is more important is to
say that through the stresses, the travails,
the uncertainties of months and years of civil
war, they did not join the Communist move-
ment.
And I think it is also significant, quite
frankly, to point out that the successes of
the Vietcong are neither attributable alone
to the appeals which they have been able to
make on social, economic or nationalist
grounds.
I would not depreciate thos. appeals, or
their success in some quarters. But what C
would emphasize and reemphasize is the facet
that Communist strength In South Vietnam,
as in many other areas, Is also heavily attrib
utable to organizational skill.
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May 17, 19d5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE. 10319
"A powerful weapon" more than 5 years, Peiping and Moscow one point, and on the other that they can
If one takes hold of a movement political- have been arguing vigorously about the way be united.
ly and can organize it, mobilize it, and utilize in which to handle American Imperialism. In my opinion both are possible. They can
all of the organizational technique, then one That argument, which has gone down to be united sometimes, for purposes that are
has, indeed, a powerful weapon-particularly this present month, is roughly speaking as perhaps limited in time and space, but they
when one works in, a truly diverse, heter- follows, and I think you know it well: can also be antithetical.
ogeneous, nonorganized society. American imperialism, argues Peiping, Is a But what I would urge you to look at here
THREE BROAD ALTERNATIVES BEEN 'paper tiger." Push and attack-it will re- is to see how clearly was communism in Asia
treat. It is not to be taken as a nuclear truly the product of nationalism and the na-
It does not necesarily mean, however, that blackmail threat. The problem with the tionalist capture.
because one has organizational control, one, Russians, argues Peiping, is that they have In part it was, but only in part. North
has public support. I think anyone familiar been too sensitive to American power, too Korean communism was implanted as a re-
with American bie-city nolities must know
__..,,__-
-- power na i suggest that -
that. the revolutionary movement forward. pressures which Communist China is putting
The fact is that organization is critical to It seems to me that above a11
ith
, w
- upon the small neutralist countries today-
Communist success in Asia , and elsewhere drawai-withdrawal would prove that Pei- unless they are counteracted by some balance
and very frequently coercion as much as ping was right and make it virtually im- of power in this region-will be antinational-
persuasion is involved. How many village possible for moderation to prevail inside ist and increasingly satellite in character.
officials, good, bad and indifferent, have been the world Communist movement. For if the These are small states, the survival of
killed by the Vietcong in recent years? strategy of pushing American power and which depends upon some balance of power-
Some estimates are 6,000. I have no doubt forcing it into a unilateral retreat works- a balance of power, I say, that must be a
that some of them were bad, many of them if it works in Vietnam, it will work elsewhere combination of both Western and Asian
indifferent, some of them good, but the only and be tried everywhere. power, that must represent a fusion, for to-
question that was really asked was, do they Domino view altered day it is critical that we come into line with
support the Government or don't they? such major societies in Asia as Japan and
And if they do, then they're finished. For I do not subscribe to the domino theory p
to root out the willful bases of power that precisely. I think it should be more appli- nesia. For and I these would are hope societies some with day, whom w-
critical in the development of a moment like cable to checkers theory. For, Peiping will can work we
this, and it has little to do quite frankly jump over-not only states which she can and nationalist revolutions theutions that social, economic,
the last 2
with the appeal of issues, socioeconomic or neutralize, but perhaps even continents, or and 3 naars are indications 2
o years that Communist
others. She will jump to those areas where she can power unchecked will ultimatel impose its
Now I make these points because I think build the ingredients for this kind of for- Y Po
that if the true allegiance of the people of mula. And, indeed, as long as she has the own version of socioeconomic revolution and
South Vietnam could really be tested, it is combination of privileged sanctuaries with- will ultimately impose its own sense of na-
very doubtful that they would vote for the in her own territory and that of her allies; tional interest.
Vietcong. And this question of elections, in as long as she had the ingredients, her mo- I say that this policy, in conclusion, can
Geneva or after the Geneva agreements, or bilizing manpower and equipment for their run along these lines:
elsewhere, troubles me greatly. support and training, as long as she had First, our broad objective should be a
For I do not know, frankly, of any state these ingredients, then, I think, she had a and nonalined, neutral, nonalined Asia that
st neutral
that has been controlled by the Communists strategy that was well-nigh foolproof. annot the Communist Cmismtrunist version
which could afford to allow free elections. Let me then move to this question of nego- of the Vietcong.
And quite frankly in recent announcements tiation: I suspect the overwhelming major- Secondly we should, of course, negotiate.
coming out of Hanoi, I have seen nothing to ity of people in this room, and listening to But we should make it clear that we are not
are
e
indicate that Hanoi is interested in elections us, favor negotiation. -And I suspect that negotiating just with labels, that f
in the north. the critical issues, therefore, to come is: Who We negotiating should with
is willing to negotiate and on what terms. d h negotiate men with the representing forces.
Communists in
Mass media system South Vietnam as Communists, , and we
Up to date-and we can certainly hope that
I have seen nothing to indicate that they this will change-the Chinese have indicated should negotiate with the other elements in
Would really relinquish the mass media com- very little willingness to negotiate. They terms of whatever representation they truly
munications system for purposes of a true have refused U Thant's proposed visit to represent. It must be remembered that the
dialog, that they would allow the estab- Peiping, a visit which, incidentally, had our Buddhists are the largest functional group
li_s hment of class enemy parties, in South Vietnam and they certainly dwarf
I have seen nothing to indicate support. They have also declined to accept
that the the overtures of the English and the French the Vietcong in numbers and supporters.
formula of free elections which is meaning- either privately or publicly, to move toward And lastly, I would say this, that I think
ful in the democratic context can be mean- any kind of negotiation. that as long as we maintain two open chan-Com
mun
context. And If
tha is Ingf lei then was theist Geneva agreement alt Their comments upon the recent proposal Colmmunot the but the
nists,yonoe in which we urgef social.
of the Indians can be summed up in one economic, cultural exchange, one in which
ways udulent fromthese beginning it clearly word: "Ridiculous," they said concerning an coexistence, one in which we
g g assume Afro-Asian international force. we urge peace
that you could have free elections in a so desire the exchange of scholars, journalists,
ciety dominated by men who regard class Their sabotage, or attempted sabotage, of and economic development-yes, with China,
enemies as susceptible -tibia to control through the Cambodian conference Is well known to as with others. And the other channel in
enemies
1>lesus ept ble everyone. In short, it seems to me that on which we say we will not surrender uncon-possible? ate I think that when it comes to the the record whatever they have been, the ditionally, we will not be driven out by a Now, basic issues that confront u6 today, they qualms of the United States toward coming philosophy that regards compromise as evil
Were outII ssueed in broad terms very well this to the conference table, we have explored as long as it takes that stand, as long as
morning by Professor Schlesinger. We are and we have allowed our allies to explore we keep these channels open and opera-
morni nt at lofes the Schlesing, with ehaxe every combination of public and private op- tive in an imaginative sense, I do not see
confr ted, at eorhdcally, Negotiee portunity that seemed promising, how we can fail in the long run to reach a
dons. Or escalation. And we are still hoping that at least Hanoi solution to our problems.
It seems to me clear that the arguments will come forward and break its tie, now STUDY
error OF HANOI ELECTION RECORD
against withdrawal are so powerful and so more than 2 years old, with Peiping and
at-
strong that at least as vet they have not move into a new orbit of independence. Professor KnHIIr. With regard to the at-
It is not mterirmerely that credibility wwithdrawal would that while there has always been a stout re- you-i m sure you nave studied the election
reduce A sistance to China on the one hand there has records there-but for years after Geneva
i th her allies
and neutrals round the world, but it. is also always been a strong element willing to co- that desire for government elections did , it did reminds re the mind South the of its
co-
that it would a "green light" to the new operate and collaborate with China on the chairman of the Geneva Conference for sev-
national 1iberation movements which are other. And this brings to me-I think-the eral years repeatedly thereafter even after
even now getting underway. I do not need focus of this problem; namely, the question the date of 1656 had gone by that it still
to remind ou that _ Peiping has broadcast of the containment of China. wanted the elections, and if Hanoi says to-
repeateaiy is intent to support the Thai May I say that I agree very much with day it wants to go back to the \Geneva agree-
national liberation movement and has al- Professor Kahin when. he talks about the ments in their entirety, I submit that it
ready launched the first propaganda with importance of alining ourselves openly with wants to go back to elections conducted un-
this matter in hand. Asian nationalists, I think this is critical. der international auspices as well.
If socioeconomic interests are the critical May I suggest also that I think that there I've been looking at the record, as I sup-
question, we would. have some curious new may be some slight discrepancy in his thesis pose you have, of Hanoi broadcasts during
kinds of analyses to make. We cannot fig- that on the one hand the nationalist move- the last month and I haven't seen any Indi-
aore the . ingredient of power. And central ment and the Communist movement are cation to suggest that it does not want elec-
to this, it seems, tq me, is the fact that for antithetical, which I think he suggested, at tions. I would ask Professor Scalapino why
110.86 -14
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10320 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 17, 1965
it is, because I think that this is germane, year: "All over the world the struggle move- But there will be, hopefully, the chance to
that the United States continues to press ment for peace, independence, democracy do so in the final part of the proceedings.
for elections uniting Germany and Korea and socialism is developing and is winning We now come to observations and ques-
that has in no case I know of In recent real victories. The flag of Marxism-Lenin- tions by the various commentators. I would
years indicated any willingness to do so in ism is being waved more and more in all the like to remind both them and you that each
Vietnam and where it did before attach con- five continents, Modern revisionism is being will have not more than 6 minutes, to be
ditlons. defeated, but it has not yet been completely followed by any response that the principal
I hope you won't mind my saying, Bob, eliminated, and the struggle between the two speaker may wish to make,
but your analysis of the internal political paths is continuing." I will-because of the distribution of
balance in Hanoi was given with more self- question of nationalism mikes, I think it'll be best if each of the
assurance than I've ever heard anyone give commentators remains and talks into the
Now with respect to this question of na- mike in front of him. And since not every-
before, and I think that insofas that one tionalism, let me reiterate, and this is all I body is visible from every fixed point, I think,
can scrutinize this, he Is impressed with can do, George, one of the point that I tried perhaps, the best way of telling you when
consistent zips and zags of policy as between to make in my unprepared remarks, namely, your time is nearly up if I rise 1 minute
Russia and Communist China. that it seems to me that the issue of how before and so indicate.
Statement at seminar communism treats nationalism both in ideo- The first commentator is Prof. Hans Mor-
With regard to the matter of nationalism, logical terms and in policy terms is entirely genthau.
may I go back to 1953 when I quoted Diem derivative from certain other considerations, Professor MORGENTIAN. Let me suppose
before he was at a seminar we had at Cor- that is, I have the strongest feeling that that Professor Scalapino's analysis of the
nell and he made these same statements most of the leaders of the Vietcong in the facts in southeast Asia is correct in every par-
afterward. His most poignant concern at South are-owe their primary allegiance to titular-a mere hypothetical assumption on
that time was that the vast majority of real Hanoi and its policy formation, and that how my part.
nationalists as he put it had either made the Hanoi party goes will determine the fu- What would the consequences for Ameri-
their political usefulness much the less by ture of the South and that, in turn, the gen- can policy be?
having been attentive-in other words op- eral situation in Asia will determine whether Professor Scalapino speaks very softly
portunistic politically as he saw it during Asian nationalism for small states is viable. about the establishment of a balance of
the previous years-or had in fact already But it seems to me we have seen increasing- power. I speak very crudely about war
gone over to the Vietminh. A major propor- ly that unless we can establish some balance against China.
tion of them, as he said at that time, had of power in Asia, nationalism is going to go For I see here one of the basic inner con-
gone over to the Vietminh and he added the under in societies like Cambodia, it's going tradictions of our official policy which makes,
words the most courageous of them. to go under in societies like Burma. as speakers have reminded us this morning
I'd also suggest that when a nationalist The inexorable pressure of the big states and this afternoon, those problems so terri-
movement is frustrated in its efforts to win that are just emerging now, of which China bly complicated.
independence that it can very easily spill is one but not the only one, is going to sub- It is because we set ourselves goals in
over into Communist-controlled channels, merge indigenous Asian nationalism in its Asia and we have done so, I should say in
particularly in a country like Vietnam, where Own concept of its own ideological interest parting, for half a century, which cannot be
there was a very l articular history. and its own self-interest from a national achieved with the means we are willing to
The French were very hard on nationalists standpoint. And I think the evidence is employ.
and well before the war the Vietnamese already piling up on this score. If a Prince And as it is in philosophy and in pure logic,
Communist Party had gone underground and Sihanouk has to call off the Cambodian Con- if you pose a wrong question you find it ex-
had developed a capacity to operate effec- ference, if the Burmese have to worry about tremely complex to give a simple and correct
tively underground that no other nationalist whether the Communists are going to come answer.
party had. into their Government or not because of pres- Something basically wrong
And during the Japanese occupation, as sures, if on all sides one has to ask, "What And the uneasiness in the country of
you recall, there was an arrangement between does Peiping think and say?"; then it seems which tassembly is an impressive the roy o of
the Japanese and the Vichy French-the to me nationalism is under assault. which this h I assembly stems from this instinc-
Vichy French worked with the Japanese- And it is up to us, and I think we are ffestation, ive recognition that there's stems from this instinc-
and both of them made it very difficult for the largest power in the world that truly tivelly Wong in the modes of something nd
the Communists to operate anywhere else does not have serious economic and political
interests that lie in this form of neocolonial- action of our Government, that there is an
except underground and this was true for ism in Asia. I think we are the power that essential contradiction or a number of con-
roation in general. In southeast Asia can aline ourselves with the true nationalist tradictions between what we profess to want
Natioonalnali sts elsewhere of this area and, I repeat, that and the policies we want to employ and the
were often given some opportunity to orga- risks which we want to take.
it seems to me that the evidence thus far
by pa- nize n and develop Not the Japanese occu shows that most of the true South Viet- And -I submit again, as I have done this
had to work. Noso in Indochina. They namese anti-Communist or non-Communist morning, and have done before In lectures
had to work. Non-Communist nationalists leaders do not regard the Vietcong as a na-
tionalist many times, that If you really want to
had to work underground and in working movement. achieve in Asia what the spokesman for our
underground they naturally gravitated to- The main-the key Buddhists have not Government say they want to achieve, you
ward the only well-organized underground joined it; the key Catholics have not joined must be ready to go to war with China, with
existence: it; the key Boa Boa and Cao Dal groups have all that that implies.
thProf eses o o
r Prgf ti of Hanoi's . First, let me talk to I would also say a word-I'm getting
not joined it. There are some exceptions.
the tt of s is a very nplic I want But by and large, that's a shadowy move- nervous-about negotiations. Much has
ter and admit d that one still, this I is a think, in very in very grea great dismat- mat- ment without the kind of leadership that been made of our willingness to negotiate.
te really speaks to the issue of nationalism. There is, of course, no doubt, and Mr. Mc-
putt within the Laodong Party of North George Bundy didn't need to emphasize it,
Vietnam. However, having followed rather And in closing, I would like to have Profes- that our Government wants a peaceful solu-
losely both Hoktob and Nandan for the last sou Kahin a to really two themes. I tion. No decent government which isn't out
o have him discuss whether or of its mind would want anything else.
8 years In translation, I have come to the would like t speak
not he believes that the Vietcong is similar
conclusion, and I think most other scholars or identical to the Cietminh and that, in all But this is not the point. The point is not
el North Vietnam have come to the con- probability, it is or is not Communist con- what you intend, but the point is what you
elusion, that there is a very obvious, and trolled-what are its other components. do regardless of your intentions. The his-
decided, and total swing in that period. I would like to have him pursue this, then, tory of the world is full of instances where
Now it may, as I say, be swinging back, by suggesting what he thinks would happen well-meaning, high-principled people have
'because I think that our bombing in the if we withdrew from South Vietnam brought unspeakable misery upon their own
nation in spite of their good intentions, be-
North had political impact upon that par- unilaterally.
ty, and a very decisive one. But let me quote e Second, I would like to ask him what he cause it used the wrong policies.
you, just so that I won't be saying something proposes to do if the Chinese and through Let me turn to the problem of negotiations.
that you have to take on my faith, let me them, other elements of the Communist Of course we want a negotiated settlement,
quote you two items, the first one from Sep- movement, continue to remain adamant on and I'm sure there are people in our Govern-
tember 25, 1963, "Peace or Violence," the the question of negotiations-something that ment who pray for a negotiated settlement.
name of the article, September, 1963, Hoktob, if only the other side would make a move.
which talks about the modern revisionists we hope, very much, will not happen. But those people cannot see that the im-
utmost rightists; ospe "Opportunists pacfism a are doing their the But 17- suppose 17- they nation continue to approach, the In denounce - plicit conditions which we have made-the
utmost to peddle pacifism and misrepresent dian approach, all other approaches to nego- unspoken conditions-make a negotiated
the Marxist-Leninst theory on the role of settlement at the moment impossible.
violence in history." tiations as ridiculous, a plot to show China For, first of all, we refuse to negotiate with
Let me quote you an article from one of up. Then what is our next move? the Vietcong.
the leading North Vietnamese generals. SOME OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS Second, we make it an implicit condi-
Pham No Mal, which appeared in the March Mr. NAGEL. I regret I cannot give Mr. tion that we remain-at least for the time
11 People's Army newspaper in Hanoi of this Kahin the opportunity to reply at this point. beging-in South Vietnam-that is to say,
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10321
as long as no stable government is estab- trying to overthrow the North Vietnamese Immoral. Today, we are prepared-and I
lisped _t ,ere, which Will take a very long Government. We are not trying to change think this is true of both of our major
time., an existing political situation. And, as in
Parties-to the other side is fully aware of the Europe, we hope to rely on the passage w, ne work with and i nd states. when
blind, alley in which we and. ourselves in time and evolution to eect change, acondi- We have people- and this point fought to
South Vietnam. We don't have the courage tion which I hasten to add the Soviet leader- be underlined and reemphasized-who are
to retreat and we don't dare to advance too ship accepted after Cuba when it desisted not reactionary; who are not committed to
far. from the use of force to change the situation the past, and who have found that between
And so obviously from the point of view of in Europe and itself Is banking on evolution- us and the Communists they'd rather take
Peiping, which hasn't .lost a single man in ary change, on the peaceful transition to so- their chances on socioeconomic reform and
that conflict and has only lost, as far as we cialism to attain its objectives. Now that development with us.
can tell, one gun, which Mr. McNamara condition is yet to be attained in Asia. And I maintain that in some of the areas
showed the other day in a press conference. There are those who say that it can never where the American commitment has been
Of course from the point of view of be, for China is the predominant power in heaviest in Asia, the standard of living is
Peiping, nothing better could happen than the region. Let us assume for a second that going up most rapidly
the United States .waging a war in Vietnam it is. So was Japan in 1940. Does that mean This is important, not because I want to
Which it is not able to win and which it we should not have taken the course we did? whitewash American policy, I think we've
cannot afford to, lose. So was Germany in Europe in 1940. So was made many mistakes in the past, we're still
Why should Peiping under such circum- the Soviet Union in Europe in 1945-46. Yet making some-I've been a frequent critic of
stances recommend negotiations? this did not justify the conclusion that one American policy myself-but i think the
Negotiations are. possible only under the should therefore disengage and in a self-ful- time has come, both to face up to alterna-
conditions such as when one recognizes-the filling prophesy make right the aassertion- tives and at the same time to point out
Inevitable facts of life in Asia which, as I make right the assertion that China is the again and again that, if we can't do some-
have said before, can only be changed by predominant power and prove it by disen- thing to preserve a certain openness in these
war. gaging. societies, then, it seems to me, the balance
Mr. BazszINSKI. Mr. Chairman, ladies, and We may or may not have been remiss in of power will be abruptly changed and global
gentlemen. It seems. to me that the basic the past, but the fact is that in a
wa
b
il
i
num
r w
er of
l shortly ensue.
ssue that we are facing here today involves societies have
i
i
a os
t
vely to their development. Professor KAHIN. Well, there are
rapid change with many countries and sev- And today we are trying to negotiate over just two
Oral continents undergoing many revolutions the issue of Vietnam. points that I'd like to make. One, I was
rolled into one. Out of that condition arises We have made a number of pro pleased at his reliance upon the New York
two basic questions: What will be the nature These proposals have been accompanied ab little Times. I would hope that his re me ading is a the
of the change which these societies are going proposals from the 17 nations, from India, wider in and the that s. reads some of thing
to experience and are experiencing, and what from U Thant and the United Nations, and other views Times is, it. One healthy me, he
role can the United States play in these none of these proposals have been accepted about the Tmes is, it d there to are others
changes? because at the present time the other side variety of viewpoints-and there are It seems to me that in Asia we have dem- makes a demand which involves a qualitative expressed.
onstrated not perfection but a positive com- change In the political status quo. That de- The other point that is made that I Viet-he would
mitment to social change-in Japan, where mand, it seems to me, is ahistorical and dan- like to take issue with is this: that in Viet-
we have helped the reconstruction of a coun- gerous in the nuclear age. nom we are not trying to change an existing
try ravaged by war and social reform. We . It is imperative that both sides-both sides. situation. And I say this is true in a basic
are doing the same to TnAta ; n