FOREIGN AID HONORS OUR COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300190022-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: May 17, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

May 17, 196 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 10249
Mr. ASRLEY, Yes, There may be will not permit them to s
th
y
h
l
f
o
e
s
ou
d
undamental law of the land, thus plac-
more than that, as a matter of fact. In have sea transportation. I, for one, ing the Norwegian Constitution among
the testimony received by the committee would hate to decide an assembly of the the oldest in the world.
it was indicated. that there might be as World Convention of Churches of Christ The Norwegian Constitution of 1814
many as between 350 and 500 Americans had some special right that some other drew heavily both on Norwegian legal
who would be either unwilling or unable equally worthy group might not enjoy. traditions and on the 18th century lib-
to fly to Puerto Rico. A good many peo- Yet it is going to be a very embarrassing eralism which produced the American
ple who are anxious to attend this con- position for the committee to be in if we Declaration of Independence and Con-
vention or convocation feel strongly are required to deal with this type of stitution, the French Revolution, and the
about flying. legislation on any frequent basis. It may expansion of democracy in Britain.
Mr. GROSS. What are the desig- be that out of this could come some good. Much of the language of the Constitution
nated points of departure from this They have pointed up the fact that we followed that of the old Norwegian laws.
country? have no service available and in what Thus, Parliament, for example, was
Mr. ASHLEY. I am pleased the gentle- ought to be, I should think, a very fine named the Storting after a quasi-demo-
man asked that. The bill has been domestic trade that might support U.S. cratic body which in the 9th and 10th
amended to limit the use of the vessel or passenger vessels designed for this pur- centuries had been an important instru-
vessels making this trip, if the legislation pose. Perhaps if other groups are inter- ment of royal power.
passes, to a direct voyage from the United std iiti
it
it
een
,
might stimulate the invest-
States to Puerto Rico and then back to ment of American capital in providing
the United States. such a service to the profit of everyone.
Mr. GROSS. From designated points i hope that that might be the case,
to and from; is that correct? although the facts presented to the com-
Mr. ASHLEY. Yes. mittee do not give me too much basis for
Mr. GROSS. I am a little surprised being optimistic in that regard.
that there are no charter vessels of the Mr. ASHLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the
United States which can be used. gentleman yield?
to the members of the committee, also, I
might say to my friend from Iowa. The
record shows very clearly that the group
in question made every effort to find
available passage and was unable to do
so.
Mr. GROSS. Have there been any
other organizations granted this type of
exception, to the knowledge of the
gentleman?
Mr. ASHLEY. No.
On the previous point, I might say that
the commercial shipping interests as well
as maritime labor attended the hearings
and participated in them. They also
were most interested in the question of
whether there actually were available
American vessels for this purpose. They
Mr. MAILLIARD. I yield to the gentle-
man.
Mr. ASHLEY. I think the gentleman
from California has very thoughtfully
pointed up the fact that the committee
considered this legislation very definitely
and specifically as an exception and
really a one-time exception. It is only
because of the peculiarities of the cir-
cumstances that it has acted as it has.
By no stretch of the imagination should
this legislation be interpreted or con-
strued as an invitation or an encourage-
ment to other groups to seek the same
remedy.
Mr. MAILLIARD. I am happy to have
the gentleman make that statement, be-
cause I have some misgivings that it
might be otherwise construed.
The SPEAKER
The question is
n
.
.o
not the case, the motion of the gentleman from Ohio
Mr. GROSS. This does in fact set a that the House suspend the rules and
precedent, then? pass the bill H.R. 6164 with an amend-
Mr. ASHLEY. Yes. The circumstances ment.
are quite unusual in that respect. The question was taken; and (two-
Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman, thirds having voted in favor there
f)
o
Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Speaker, I the rules were suspended, and the bill Mr. Speaker, Norwegians are justifiably
must confess that I view this bill with was passed. Proud of the democratic system of gov-
some misgivings. I suppose that no mat- The title was amended so as to read: ernment they have built on the Consti-
ter how many times we might say this is "A bill to authorize the Secretary of the tution of 1814. Today Norway is one of
not intended to create a precedent, the Treasury to permit vessels other than the most prosperous countries of the
fact that we pass the measure will create vessels of the United States entitled to world, a stable and thriving democracy
a precedent whether we like it or not. engage in the coastwise trade to trans- offering equal opportunity to all its cit-
The bill as originally introduced both port passengers between the United izens. On this important anniversary
by the gentlewoman from Oregon [Mrs. States and the Commonwealth of Puerto we in the U.S. Congress join with all
GREEN] " and the gentleman from Mis- Rico to attend the Seventh Assembly of Norwegians and Norwegian-Americans in
souri [Mr. BOLLING] I would have felt the World Convention of Churches of celebrating the important step taken by
bound to oppose vigorously. However, Christ." Norway on May 17,1814.
with the new text which we wrote in A motion to reconsider was laid on the
committee, the restrictions are quite table. DYNAMIC NEW AFRICAN
severe. We #uarantee tha.t. a.nv chin
The structure of the government pro-
vided for in the 1814 Constitution, on the
other hand, found its pattern in 18th
century European liberalism, in the
theory of the separation of powers de-
veloped by Montesquieu in France and
also adopted as the basis of our own
American system of government. The
Constitution provided that power would
be divided among the executive-the
King in council-the legislative-Parlia-
ment-and the courts. In addition to
this separation of powers, other basic
principles of the Constitution were na-
tional independence, popular sover-
eignty, and the inviolable rights of the
individual versus the state.
These basic principles have now been
Norway's fundamental law of the land
for more than 150 years. The fact that
Norway's democratic institutions have
continued to develop and the role of the
people in government has continued to
expand attest to the flexibility of the
document and to the foresight of its
framers. Without any change in the
Constitution, parliamentarianism was
introduced in Norway in 1884 when the
King agreed to appoint a council which
had the confidence of the Storting.
Among the most important amendments
to the Constitution has been the exten-
sion of universal suffrage, first to men in
this particular voyage will comply with iv'nwr,u.uN CONSTITUTION DAY (Mr. O'HARA of Illinois asked and
basic safety requirements and that the (Mr. ROONEY of New York asked and was given permission to extend his re-
passengers will be bona fide members of was given permission to address the marks at this point in the RECORD and to
,this group and their families, and this House for 1 minute.) include extraneous matter.)
will not be opened up to commercial Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker,
groups of passengers, so I am not con- Speaker, today marks the 151st anniver- I was pleased to read in the Washington
strained to object. sary of the signature of the Norwegian Post of May 14, 1965, a dispatch by Roscoe
I do hope that we are not going to be Constitution at Eidsvoll, near Oslo. Al- Drummond from Nairobi, Kenya, stating
put in the position of having other though the Constitution has since been that the African image of Uncle Sam has
worthy groups come along with a similar amended and some of its articles sub- greatly improved. This statement by
proposal where some of their members stantially altered, the basic principles of such an experienced observer and con-
either do not like to fly or their health the Constitution of 1814 remain the scientious reporter as Mr. Drummond
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10250 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 17, 1965
verifies the reports that have been The massive majority by which President right then the question is what will happen
Johnson won. to the other 100 little countries who want
reaching me as chairman of the African Mr. Johnson's incandescent speech before to preserve that right.
Subcommittee of the Committee on For-
eign Affairs. Congress introducing the new Federal voting The outcome in Vietnam is still un-
For some months following the Novem- rights bill. The speed with which the voting rights bill certain. But our foreign aid program in
ber election there was speculation that is going forward in congress. South Vietnam is still keeping the em-
the administration of the Honorable U.S. Ambassador William Attwood sent, bers of hope afire. It is still making
Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary with a personal note, a text of the Johnson sheer survival possible.
of State for Africa was near a close. i voting rights speech to every member of the Our foreign aid program in Vietnam is
never took the slightest stock in the many Kenya cabinet. I am sure other U.S. Am- providing the advisers and the hardware
bassadors acted similarly. It made a tre- needed in the continuing struggle
ciand The loud fact was whisperings that that were Mennen mendous impact here. It cleared away much
circulated. rcula of the miasmic feeling toward what was hap- against the Vietcong.
Williams had done a terrific job in pening in the United States on racial dis- Our economic assistance program in
Africa and was immensely popular with crimination. President Jomo Kenyatta wrote Vietnam has two broad objectives:
Africans of all ranks and all stations. President Johnson a personal letter of ap- First. To strike at the root causes of
When the President asked Secretary preciation. insurgency; and second, to help keep
Williams to remain on, thus ending a on the war in Vietnam-until President Vietnam's economy afloat and avoid dis-
long period of groundless rumors, the Johnson's offer to negotiate a peaceful settle- astrous inflation.
anent on the war in Vietnam "with any gov- The first objective, the attack on the
favorable reaction in Africa was Un- ernment, anywhere, any time," most African root causes of insurgency, involves the
mistakable. This was greatly height- leaders felt it was the United states that pre-
ened by the news that President Johnson, ferred fighting to talking. But the refusal of heaviest concentration of AID-financed
clearly showing a deep personal interest the Communists to respond and their flat contract and direct-hire American tech-
in Africa and concern for the future wel- rejection of any peace talks changed feeling nicians in any country today: more than
fare of the African countries, instructed in Africa a great deal. 800 advisers and helpers-doctors, health
Secretary William to head a high-level Now Peiping has changed it more by workers, educators, administrators, en-
task force, exploring the possibilities of branding the appeal of the nonalined na- gineers, agriculturists, police experts,
tions for a Vietnam peace conference as mak-
and planning the foundations of a ing them "tools of the imperialists." The and the like, working side by side with
dynamic new African program. Kenya foreign office, for example, described the Vietnamese in every one of the coun-
I can only say, Mr. Speaker, that the this article in the Peiping People's Daily as try's 45 Provinces.
members of the African subcommittee "an incredibly vicious attack on Kenya and General economic support accounts
were thrilled by Secretary Williams' the other nonalined nations." The hope for about two-thirds of the estimated
sketching of the undertaking of this task was expressed that "such groundless insults, $210 million in AID funds budgeted for
which are completely inadmissible, would not Vietnam during the current fiscal year.
force and the possibilities promised by it be repeated." Economic support includes the financing
of a new era of brilliant African develop- On the Congo-Premier Tshombe is win-
raent such essential imports as oil, steel,
and, of deepened African-American ning wider respect among his African col- of sucmedicine, and machinery, and managing
partnership in friendship and in joint leagues. He has impressed them with his
ventures. ability and force as they have become per- the flow of U.S. surplus farm products
The article in the Washington Post by sonally acquainted with him. If Tshombe that make up for Vietnam's shortage of
Mr. Drummond follows: can free himself from the onus of using certain foods and fibers.
white mercenaries, he will enhance his stand- Because the immediate issue in Viet-
UNTrED STATES AND AFRICA--Oun IMAGE ing and be enabled to become a source of nam is survival, AID technical and capi-
IMPROVES
(By Roscoe Drummond)
NAIROBI, KENYA.-At three critical points
the image of the United States in much of
.Africa is greatly improved over what it was
it, few months ago.
Because political equality for the Ameri-
can Negro is moving visibly forward.
Because of -President Johnson's offer of
"'unconditional discussions" to bring the war
:in Vietnam to the peace table.
Because United States and Belgian forces
did not remain in the Congo after the rescue
of the rebel-held white hostages and because
Premier Moise Tshombe is gaining prestige
This does not mean that the newly inde-
dent African governments are going to aline
themselves with the United States. It does
not mean that African leaders like the dis-
patch of American Marines to the Dominican
Republic. They don't. It does mean that
U.S. actions are beginning to make more
sense to more Africans and that there will
be less temptation to be drawn into the Com-
munist camp, either Chinese or Soviet.
Here is the trend of African opinion on
strength to the cause of African unity. And tal assistance concentrates on activities
U.S. support of Tshombe will no longer be an
embarrassment to Washington. an immediate impact on a lot of
.
For all of these reasons, the United States people. But a portion of current assist-
is winning somewhat more understanding ance _ will have long-term results. In
MITMENT IN VIETNAM
(Mr. MATSUNAGA asked and was giv-
en permission to extend his remarks at
this point in the RECORD.)
Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker,
whether we like it or not, we have a com-
mitment in Vietnam.
It is a commitment first made by Pres-
ident Eisenhower, and reaffirmed by
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.
It is a commitment to help the mil-
lions of people in this embattled land
to resist military aggression from the
north.
But more than that, it is a commit-
ment to the free world---a promise that
we will do all we can to preserve the
dom-the many years of painful discrimina- freedom of choice for all of southeast
tion which the American Negro has suffered Asia. For-let us make no mistake about
have long sullied the U.S. Image in Africa. it-if South Vietnam falls, the great are
While Americans have seen the slow but now
accelerated progress toward racial justice, of free world defense between Korea and
Africans have been more aware of the strug- Pakistan will be in grave danger.
gle than of the progress. When Alabama In reaffirming our intention to con-
or Mississippi denies Negroes the right to tinue to honor our commitment in Viet-
vote, to Africans this means the American nom, President Johnson recently put it
Government is using its power against Ne- this way:
groes. Most Africans were dismayed and
frightened by Senator Goldwater. Last fall The real goal of all of us in southeast
Malcolm X toured Africa predicting a Gold- Asia must be the peaceful progress of the
water victory. People of that area. They have the right to
Three events have helped to repair these live side by side in peace and independence.
views: And if this little country does not have that
gency program, AID-supplied materials
have been used to repair 594 highway
bridges sabotaged between December
1961 and December 1964; another 44 re-
inforced concrete bridges and culverts
have been completed on major routes.
With AID assistance, more than 700
medium and small factories have been
established in Vietnam for the manufac-
ture of cement, pharmaceuticals, rubber,
jute, ceramics, paint, paper, and plastics.
Negotiations are now underway to bring
in an oil refinery financed by private
capital under an AID investment guar-
antee. AID-financed teams from Michi-
gan State University helped to develop
one of the key institutions in Vietnam to-
day, the National Institute of Admin-
istration in Saigon. It has become Viet-
nam's major source of professionally
trained Government officials for both the
central and the provincial governments.
These are just some of the things we
have been doing to honor our commit-
ment in Vietnam.
The AID program in Vietnam in fiscal
year 1966 will continue to place great
emphasis on relief and development in
the rural areas where the brunt of the
war is borne. It will also give increased
attention to improving the numbers,
training and effectiveness of the na-
tional police, to the needs of Vietnam's
urban population, to the encouragement
of domestic private industry, to assisting
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 May 17, 1965 'CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
in the training of more crucially needed The major proposal before BYRD's subcom-
government officials, to financing com- mittee is to beef up protection in crime-
mercial iniports; essential to sustain the ridden neighborhoods by allowing policemen
economy; and to providing technical ad- to work extra days.
visers and training to help the local gov- anted such by court decisions moves," BYRDecisions said, that favor tethe the crim ri-
-
ernment'further develop its self-reliance anal.
and ability to govern effectively. "It seems to me that the real culprit ?
Mr. Speaker, I urge full support of the
President's foreign aid program so that
we can continue to honor our commit-
ment for freedom and progress in Viet-
nam.
After commenting that nothing ever seems
to be done about the vicious crimes com-
mitted in the Capital, BYRD asked Police
Chief John B. Layton:
"When was the last execution?"
"Not for a number of years," Layton re-
PRESS BECOMES AWARE OF CRIME
SITUATION IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
(Mr. McMILLAN asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
?minute, to revise and extend his remarks,
and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. McMILLAN. Mr. Speaker, I am
sure that Members of the House have
noticed that all of the newspapers in
Washington have suddenly seen fit to
run a series of articles or special reports
on the crime situation in the -city of
Washington. These press stories have
restated many of the facts which have
long been known to Members of the
House but ,which are seemingly for the
first time being given acknowledgment
by the press.
The House -District Committee held
hearings for approximately 2 years in an
effort to find out why, crime continued
to increase in the Nation's Capital. We
did this without the support of the press
or news media In the Nation's Capital
and were successful in having the Mem-
bers of the House of Representatives
support the omnibus crime bill on 2
occasions during the past 2 years by a
vote of approximately 250 for to 130
against. These bills have been pending
before the other body; however, after
hearing crime experts from all over the
Nation, chiefs of police from all of the
larger cities, as well as our own Chief of
police, and also the senior Federal judge
in Washington and the present and past
District Attorneys, we feel that if the
proposed legislation were enacted into
law, it would not be necessary to employ
additional policemen. I personally can
see no reason to add to the present police
force, as long as the police are hand-
cuffed and cannot question a criminal or
arrest a suspect without being insulted.
I was delighted to read in the Wash-
ington Star on Sunday, May 16, where
Senator ROBERT BYRD had spoken out on
this, subject. I am certain Senator 13YRD
is well aware of the conditions existing
in the District of Columbia, and I hope
everyone will take time to read his re-
marks, as I am having them inserted in
the RECORD at this point:
BYRD CHARGES "SOFT" RULINGS AID
'CRIMINALS
(By Sam Eastman)
A series of "soft hearted"_ court rulings
have given the lawbreaker a powerful
weapon` in the crime war, Senator ROBERT
C. BYRD, Democrat, of West Virginia, charged
yesterday.
BYRD. chairman Of A Senate Annrnnriatinnc
10251
has devoted continuing study to the crime
problem and in each of the last three
Congresses has approved by heavy ma-
jorities anticrime legislation designed
to deal with the crime problem.
The failure of the press to make full
and objective reports becomes obvious
when people in the District of Columbia,
aroused by such articles as "Crisis in
Crime" call members of the House Com-
mittee on the District of Columbia or the
committee wanting to know what the
House of Representatives is doing about
crime in Washington. The failure to re-
port in such press stories the facts re-
garding the efforts of the House Commit-
tee on the District of Columbia and the
House of Representatives leaves the im-
pression in the mind of the public that
the House of Representatives has been
derelict in its obligations to the people of
Washington and to the people of the
States who visit the Nation's Capital.
At the very least, the local press might
have advised the public that the House
of Representatives has been reasonably
diligent in meeting its obligations in this
respect.
Whether the local press feels that the
House of Representatives is entitled to
any credit for its efforts, the press might
at least state in its crime reporting that
the House of Representatives has ac-
knowledged the serious crime problem
and has taken action toward dealing with
it.
A TRIBUTE TO THE STARS OF THE
ENTERTAINMENT WORLD
.(Mr. ANNUNZIO asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, for the
past 5 years it has been my good fortune
and privilege to act in the role of gen-
eral chairman for the Villa Scalabrini
Development Fund-Italian Old Peoples
Home. The chief purpose of my com-
mittee has been to raise the necessary
funds in order to expand the present
home which houses 100 "golden agers."
The Villa Scalabrini Italian Old Peo-
ples Home is located in the beautiful
town of North Lake, Ill., adjacent to
Chicago.
Just last December ground was broken
for phase two of the home which will in-
clude a much needed infirmary and will
increase the capacity of the villa to ac-
commodate 200 "golden" alters. Our
committee raised $1 million for this
worthwhile project and we borrowed an-
other $1 million from the Chicago arch-
diocese. The interest alone on the
money is close to $50,000 a year.
In order for our committee to pay out
this loan and the interest, we prevailed
upon our dear friend, the beloved Jimmy
Durante, who has appeared on two pre-
vious occasions at fund-raising dinners
in behalf of the villa, to help us obtain
the services of other top stars in the en-
tertainment world. With the aid of
Jimmy Durante, as honorary chairman,
fighting proposals for Washington: - w - Mr. Speaker, one significant omission man, we have organized a very ambitious
"The courts have absolutely. handcuffed in these press reports is any reference to program for Saturday, June 5, in Chi-
the Police Department-there's just too much the fact that the House of Representa- cago's 5,000-seat Arie Crown Theater at
of this." tives during the past three Congresses. McCormick Place.
plied.
(The last electrocution in the District took
place in April 1967, when a man died for
the slaying of a Washington policeman.)
The District Commissioners are asking
Congress for nearly $1.9 million for the
emergency crime-fighting measures.
Under the key proposal, policemen would
volunteer to work extra days for straight-
time pay. The move would, in effect, add
235 men to street patrol duty.
The volunteers would work in five areas
plagued with high crime rates. Layton said
this saturation technique would be tried for
a 9-month period, beginning July 1.
If the trial worked well, he said the city
would ask Congress for funds for more police-
men to continue this attack.
Layton noted in his testimony that the
Department's authorized strength now is
3,000, and that the House-passed appropria-
tions bill for the District includes money to
add 100 men. The Department, however,
actually has 2,878 men at last count-122
below the authorized level.
BYRD said he was concerned over the added
strain and danger involved in the 6-day
workweek proposal.
The real answer, he said, is for the city to
solve its recruitment problems.
The Police Chief said that the recruitment
procedures had been streamlined a few
months ago. The changes, he said, have
produced good results so far.
"Not good enough," the Senator com-
mented.
BYRD's position that the Department
should make every effort to fill the jobs al-
ready approved by Congress is in line with
th"t taken by Representative WILLIAM
NATCHER, Democrat, of Kentucky, chairman
of the House Appropriations Subcommittee
for the District.
Last March, NATCHER and BYRD approved a
Police Department request to allow volun-
teers to work a sixth day, but only until the
end of June.
This has produced the equivalent of 113
additional policemen, and the Department
hopes to raise this figure to 313 next month.
The extra police strength then would drop
to the 235 figure for the 9-month experi-
mental period.
Layton assured BYRD that the Department
expects to reach the authorized 3,000-man
level by July 1. The money requested for
the additional 100 policemen covers only the
last half of the fiscal year. This would give
the Department 6 months to recruit the 100
men, Layton explained.
Layton reported that he will ask the Com-
missioners to lift the maximum age for
police recruits from 29 to 30.
In his comments, Layton noted that the
city's police requests were "encouraged" by
President Johnson. BYRD said he is "happy"
that the city and the President finally have
become aroused over the problem. The
city's crime rate, the Senator pointed out,
has risen for 35 straight months over the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 17, 1965
Our deeds, however, do not fully cor-
respond with this policy. From daily
press reports it appears that U.S. mili-
tary forces have been working with the
military junta. Whether or not this one-,
sided cooperation Is inadvertent or even
Inevitable under the circumstances, our
impartiality and good faith are brought
'Into question. This apparent lack of im-
partiality is given further credence by
some of our actions in the U.N., the
OAS, and in the character of negotia-
tions with the rebel group. Moreover,
the mere passage of time tends to shift'
the relative balance of power between
the two sides. This inevitably intensifies
the anti-American feeling which is devel-
oping rapidly on that island.
Of the utmost importance, therefore, is
the posture of the United States in
reaching a 'political settlement. When
the United States intervened, two forces
were struggling for control of the Domin-
ican Republic. Lives were being lost.
Intervention could be justified on the
grounds that the citizens of that nation
should not be forced to accept a govern-
ment which could muster the greater
military power rather than the allegiance
of the larger number of citizens.
We have sought a political settlement
through the formation of a coalition
government. Whether or not a coalition
is being blocked by extremists on either
side is uncertain, but delay in finding
other political solutions will lead to fur-
ther aggravation of this conflict. More-
over, even if a coalition government were
formed, that such an uneasy coalition
could successfully sponsor fair elections
In the near future is open to serious
question.
Therefore, it seems to me, Mr. Speaker,
that the United States should announce
its support of a plan to permit the peo-
ple of the Dominican Republic to choose
one of the contending factions to serve
as an interim government until regular
elections can be held later. This refer-
endum should be conducted-not just
supervised-by the OAS or the U.N. The
mode of carrying out such a referendum
should be determined by the OAS or the
U.N. in consultation with all sides, but
should be carried out whether or not
agreement is obtained from all sides. If
necessary, mass media facilities should
be imported and operated under inter-
national control to assure equal access
by all sides. The United States should
announce its support in advance for the
victor at such a referendum.
We need to recognize that such a refer-
endum might bring to power persons with
whom we are in disagreement. It may
bring to power persons who fail to recog-
nize the antidemocratic character of the
Communist movement or who choose to
temporize with that movement. It may
also bring to power persons who have
shown little devotion to democratic pro-
cedures. It may be appropriate for the
OAS or the U.N. to require that any fac-
tion represented on the referendum bal-
lot make a commitment to sponsor free
elections within a stated time.
Mr. Speaker, the course I recommend
carries risks, but the risks are less than
those we incur with other courses of
action.
We have a bearcat by the tail. The
OAS nations appear reluctant to come
to our aid in solving the problems of the
Dominican Republic. If we could an-
nounce our intentions now-and make
them explicit-OAS nations should not
hesitate to intervene more actively in
support of these goals, but when our in-
tentions are obscured as they largely are
when we seek to manipulate the junta
"government to make it more attractive,
lack of enthusiasm on the part of many
OAS members is understandable.
Mr. Speaker, the U.S. national interest
will become increasingly jeopardized as
we are drawn more deeply into the In-
ternal dispute in the Dominican Repub-
lic. We urgently need to proclaim now
that our intervention continues for but
one purpose: to give effect to the prin-
ciple of national self-determination. Ac-
tion needs to follow this proclamation.
With this action we would stand proudly
before the world community of nations
as the defender of the right of people
everywhere to choose their own govern-
ment.
I should like to pay tribute to the out-
standing personalities of the entertain-
ment world who will appear on this
night and who are paying their own ex-
penses, paying for their own transporta-
tion, their room and board, and are con-
tributing their talents In order for our
home to net from the show on this night
over $200,000 which will be used to pay
out the principal and the interest on the
loan. These great entertainers, in the
best of American traditions, are helping
to create a private home for the aged
solely by their own efforts and without
depending on public funds. They are to
be hailed and congratulated, not only by
all the Members of Congress, but by the
people of America, for their generosity
and public-spirited interest in helping
to build an institution that will eventu-
ally have over 350 golden agers spending
the last days of their lives in the tran-
quility of this house of God.
Thank you, Jimmy Durante, Enzo
Stuarti, Dean Martin, Connie Francis,
Louis Prima with Sam Butera and The
Witnesses, Vic Damone, Rocky Marcino,
Ford and Mercer, Anna Marie, Jimmy
Roma, The Salvinos, Jimmy Faro, and
'Lou Breese. My heart is full of joy-
full of profound gratitude-to each and
every one of these performers for their
gracious contribution to Villa Scalabrini.
Too often we have heard that movie
stars and entertainers show no interest
in their communities and in the affairs
of those less fortunate. Yet, this is a
concrete example of the generous contri-
butions that these great stars of radio,
television, and the movies are making,
day in and day out, to the American way
of life. Throughout America, stars of
all races, colors and creeds are contribu-
ting daily of their time and talents to
benefit institutions which are. trying to
raise "private funds to alleviate the suf-
fering and the miseries of the poor.
They are doing a tremendous job in
helping to raise funds to combat juvenile
delinquency, to aid the mentally re-
tarded, to aid in the fight against cancer,
to aid in the fight against heart disease,
and countless other worthwhile causes.
How, can we. ever forget the contribu-
tions they made during World War I and
World War II and the Korean war?
How can we forget the programs they
provided, for our soldiers and the job
they are still doing today entertaining
our soldiers both at home and abroad?
We in America can be proud of the
patriotism and the good will that these
stars are showing toward their fellow
man and their fellow Americans.
P.A REFERENDUM IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
(Mr. FRASER asked and was given
permission "to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr.. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, the
United States is keeping marines in the
Dominican Republic for the announced
purpose of maintaining law and order
while a political settlement is worked out
through the Organization of American
States.
HON. BASIL L. WHITENER, DOCTOR
OF LAWS
(Mr. KORNEGAY asked and was
given permission to address the House for
1 minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KORNEGAY. Mr. Speaker, our
distinguished colleague, the gentleman
from North Carolina, Hon. BASIL L.
WHITENER, is at Pfeiffer College, Mis-
enheimer, N.C., today taking part in the
commencement exercises of that out-
standing institution. I am happy to say
that the trustees of Pfeiffer College, rec-
ognizing the great contributions that our
colleague has made to his State and Na-
tion, are conferring upon him the degree
of honorary doctor of laws.
I know of no one who more richly de-
serves to be honored today at Pfeiffer
College than BASIL WHITENER. I am
pleased that the college has recognized
his outstanding record of public service
and is conferring upon him the degree of
honorary doctor of laws.
Mr. Speaker, Pfeiffer College is a splen-
did senior institution of higher learning
located in the south central Piedmont
section of North Carolina. Under the
dynamic leadership of Dr. Lemuel Stokes
the college has witnessed rapid growth
In recent years. Pfeiffer College has an
outstanding faculty, and the school is
fulfilling a vital role in the field of high-
er education In North Carolina.
Our distinguished colleague who is be-
ing honored today at Pfeiffer College has
always been interested in education. At
an early date he developed an apprecia-
tion of the role that higher education
has in the life of our Nation. BASIL
WHITENER has always supported public
and private efforts in behalf of educa-
tion.
He was educated in the public schools
of Gaston County, N.C.; Rutherford Col-
lege; the University of South Carolina:
and Duke University. BASIL has a sister
who is a schoolteacher, and he, him-
self, was an instructor in commercial law
in Belmont Abbey College, Belmont, N.C.,
in 1939, 1940, and 1941.
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May 17, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL .RECORD - HOUSE
Belmont abbey College is a fine Bene-
dictine senior college, and BASIL WHIT-
ENER has always been interestW In the
welfare of the school. In 1960 Belmont
Abbey College bestowed, the degree of
honorary doctor of laws on BASIL WHIT-
ENER in recognition of the work he had
done in promoting the expansion of the
college and for his continued interest in
the welfare of its. students,
Mr. Speaker, I have known BASIL
WHITENER for many years, and I have
worked with him in junior chamber of
nommerce activities, Young Democratic
Club programs, and as a fellow prosecut-
ing attorney in North Carolina, I have
observed his devotion to duty, great con-
cern for others,, and profound interest
in education.
BASIL WHITENER was an outstanding
prosecuting attorney in North Carolina,
and he was instrumental in improving
the administration of justice in our
State. He was a member of the Com-
mission To Study the Improvement of the
Administration of Justice in North Caro-
lina from 1947 to 1949.
BASIL has also had a fine record of
service to his country as a member of its
Armed Forces, In 1941 he was a mem-
ber of the General Assembly of North
Carolina ' and was renominated in 1942.
He resigned, however, to enter the U.S.
Navy and to serve with distinction until
November 1945.
All of us have had occasion to observe
BASIL's outstanding record of service in
the Congress. He has represented the
people of North Carolina with a high
sense of devotion to duty. He is an out-
standing Member of this House.
Whenever one of our colleagues is
honored for civic achievement it reflects
great credit upon the House of Repre-
sentatives and the State which our col-
league represents. It has always been
gratifying to me to observe one of our
-colleagues being honored by an institu
tion of higher learning. I feel that this
is the highest and most distinguished
type of recognition that one can receive.
Mr. Speaker, in receiving an honorary
doctor of laws degree today from Pfeiffer
College, BASIL WHITENER is bringing
honer and distinction to the people he
represents and to this great House. We
are indeed pleased, therefore, to join
With his .constituents in extending our
best wishes to him on the outstanding
recognition he Is receiving today.
AIR FORCE ACADEMY HONOR
VIOLATION
(Mr. H IBERT asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks,)
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Speaker, I wish to
supplement my remarks of February 1
on the Air Force Academy honor viola-
tion as a result of the report to the Sec-
retary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
by the Special Advisory Committee on
the U.S. Air.Force Academy Academy.
If we are to assume that . Secretary
Zuckert's public statement, stating "we
owe a debt of gratitude to the com-
mittee," is in effect an endorsement of the
10253
report, then now Is the proper time for opened the section on the specific role
me to reorient my thinking about the of football by stating:
service academies. Perhaps, I, too, owe a It is distressing to note that football play-
debt of gratitude to this committee, but ers were a prominent group in the' honor
for a far different reason. Incident.
It is not my purpose to challenge in de- It further found as a cadet no signific-
tail the conclusions drawn by the com- ant relationship to exist either in favor
mittee other than to state that I am of the football player or against him,
astounded at the lack of emphasis given but later states the officer effectiveness
to major contributing conditions which reports of football players are slightly
are greatly in need of overhaul at the Air higher than those of the nonfootball
Academy. player classmates. So the football play-
It disturbs me as a friend of the er is a bland cadet, but upon graduation
academies when I recall that during the is more effective than the nonplayer.
past 15 years there has been three major Since the press failed to comprehend
cheating scandals involving hundreds of anything favorable to the football player,
cadets and the most we get out of this the question is asked what is the mission
report is a reaffirmation that all is well of the Air Academy-to make superca-
with the system. dets or good officers?
Why, I wonder, did West Point go from The matter of special privileges given
the years 1900 to 1950, a half century, to the football player is confusingly sug-
with no cheating problems and then in gested. It appears as a major prob-
the fifties have a deplorable breakdown lem, but the report indicates that football
of the system? Certainly it had bigtime players eating together is the only special
football as far back as the twenties, privilege accorded the squad. Certain-
Why, for example, should the Air Force ly such a trite privilege, if it were inde-
Academy's honor system patterned pre- fensible, could have been rectified by the
cisely after that of West Point turn up several generals in command.
such a sorry scandal in a little more than For many years it has been my sincere
10 years of existence? belief, perhaps erroneous, if we accept
When are we to expect another break- the conclusions of the report, that strong
down of a system which has cracked so football teams have been good for the
badly in the last 15 years? service academies. Further, that any
While good families suffer the conse- statement of a tendency to go "bigtime"
quences and fine young Americans run at these institutions in the light of their
afoul of the system the report barely rigid admission and academic require-
challenges the causes. But it did as usual ments fails to understand the high stand-
get out the old perennial culprit football and which all cadets, including football
and from press accounts we are led to be- players, live by.
It is distressing to note that football play- emies. For example; why did West Point
ers were a prominent group in the honor authority abrogate a written contract
incident * * * that pressures for a nationally with one football coach and at the same
at the Academy must be brought into line
with its fundamental goals as an educa-
tional and military institution * * * that
pressures, if acceded to, may well affect ad-
versely the environment and distort the true
mission of the Academy * * * the present
football schedule and programs are not en-
tirely consistent with the purpose of the
Academy.
For 25 years, ever since coming to Con-
gress, I have been a stanch friend and ad-
vocate of the service academies. This
has included guiding needed legislation,
serving on Boards of Visitors and being
ever watchful and sympathetic to their
athletic programs. From time to time
I have been assured that their extensive
recruiting efforts both in and out of Con-
gress had the blessing of Academy au-
thority their respective Chief f St FP
o
time seek a replacement whom they
knew was required to break his contract
with a university? It was pressure-
pressure for a Navy victory that forced
such questionable ethical action-action
hardly consonant with the spirit of the
cadet honor code.
Perhaps it is well then that the aca-
demies downgrade football to the play-
ing of schools, as the report ambiguously
states, "having athletic standards that
are roughly equivalent to those of the
Academy."
Obviously the solution to this problem
is quite simple. If. the report becomes
the official bible of the Air Academy,
then as a Member of Congress I shall no
longer be a party to any recruiting effort
which might distort the true mission of
the Academy.
a Nor will I, for one, encourage any
and Secretary. hypocritical approach that would en-
Now I am disturbed over the section of dorse the report and at the same time
this report on football. There Is no evi- open a rear door for the recruited ath-
dence to support that any one or more lete.
football players were directly respon- The Air Academy as well as all service
sible for the breakdown in the honor Sys- academies should forthrightly accept the
tem. By inference, however, the football recruitment of athletes as proper and
player is indicted and the impression desirable. There is nothing wrong with
given to the American public is that "big- this practice. It is both honorable and
time" football plagues the Air Academy. proper and I do not apologize for my
At one moment the report states It support of such activities.
would be grotesque to assume that foot- A cause which they are not willing
ball players, as such, are less moral than openly to support does not have my en-
members of any other group, but it dorsement. I am not. so naive as to
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10254 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 17, 1965
believe that a restricted recruiting pro- "I have looked forward to this meeting and prepared to be steadfast in the pursuit of our
gram would be followed. Further, I am I hate to miss it. When I accepted your in- Purposes- ize the entire sincerity of the great
not about to turn over the selection of my vitation, I did so with a warning that I might "I recogn
be unable to attend because Of other duties. majority of those who now disagree with our
candidates to the academies who may It gives me no pleasure that this warning policy in Vietnam. I think many of these
have the misguided belief that they can has come true. critics have been wrong in earlier moments
select better than Congressmen. "I regret my absence the more because I of stress and danger and I think many of
Therefore, until the superintendents wholly disagree with those who have argued them misunderstand the hard realities of this
make defensible their policy on varsity that it is inappropriate for a Government dangerous world. But their good faith and
official to take part in a discussion of this good intent are not in question, and on other
p o g all, I want p part of any torts athletic kind issues at other times their efforts have been
program which purporte distorts in "It may be true, although [ have no first- of great service to the country.
any way the mission of and ly any service aced- hand knowledge, that some of your meetings "Having said this much, perhaps I can ask
enly on Vietnam have failed to meet the standards you in return that these critics should recog-
I am tired of the football program and appropriate to university and. college discus- nize that the administration, which now
the qualified athlete being made the sions. It may also be true, and I have bears responsibiliy for the conduct of our hat a Its
use An of hose who feel strongly about tthe situa- oown ake, or brinkman hip of any sort for The
"whipping boy" on every allowed occasion.
individual should be llmeansd of use mils- tion in Vietnam have been more interested purpose of its foreign policy in Vietnam as
hie imself and brawn and awn serving his means of country educating as an n In pressure upon the administration than in elsewhere is that diplomacy and power and
h fair discussion with its representatives. progress and hope shall be held together in
individual with excess brains and long "But the preliminary arrangements for the service of the freedom of us all.
hair. this particular meeting, so far as I have "So I trust that the discussion this after-
I want the well-rounded typical Amer- knowledge of them, have been fair to a fault. noon will not turn upon charge and counter-
iean boy to become our military leader of I'm. confident the discussion this afternoon charge against the motives of those with
tomorrow and I do not want any special will be a model of its kind. whom we disagree.
consideration or privileges given to any "SHARE DEEP INTEREST "Let it turn, instead, upon analysis of the
one group of qualified candidates. "Members of the academic community and situation as it is, and of choices for the future
I do not deprecate brains and genius. members of the administration share a deep which can serve the Purposes we share.
We need every talent we can get and interest in the encouragement of such fair "I repeat my apologies for my forced ab-
utilize in this space age of sophisticated and open discussion. It has been argued sence; and I take comfort in the thought that
weapons. We need equally as much the that debate of this kind should be avoided I shall miss the meeting more than you will
extraordinary physical reflexes and because it can give encouragement to the miss me."
adversaries of our country. There is some GOVERN ERN PROCEEDINGS
leadership quality which results from ground for this argument, since it is true RULES NAGEL. In vie To wGo PROCEEDIN from Mr.
contact and competitive sports. that Communists have little understanding Bundy some changes will haven r made I belong to that school which has sub- of the meaning of debate in a free society. in the program for this afternoon and I will end, and scribed the Duke of Wellington's ob- The perhaps in Chinese will continue o believe, thaetAmerican mention that presently.
servaon that the Battle of Waterloo o policy is weaker because 700 faculty members My role as moderator imposes upon me
was won on the playing fields of Eton and have made a protest against our policy in the obligation to say only what is essential
Gen. Douglas MacArthur's endorsement Vietnam. and to say it briefly. I will therefore limit
with the opinion that World War II was "The American people, whatever their the introductory remarks to stating what I
won on the plains of West Point. opinions, know better. They know that believe objective of this that
There is a place in the sun for boys of those who are protesting are only a minority, and nd to o mthese oning the s proceedings.
all types, ability, and inclination in the indeed a small minority, of American teach- govern
defense of our country, and to tear one ers and students. They know also that even This meeting has come into being because
gro down at the expense of the other within that minority the great majority ac= of widespread doubt in many academic
a sservice to our country. cept and respect the rights and duty of the communities as well as elsewhere concern-
is American administration to meet its consti- ing the wisdom of current U.S. policy in
I w 1 have no part of it. tutional responsibilities for the conduct of Vietnam. It needs to be emphasized, how-
has been sponsored
tin
g
our foreign affairs. ever, that the mee
"The American people know that the real by university teachers throughout the coun-
ill come when we are afraid try and organized by the interuniversity
NAL TEACH-IN
day of danger w
.i NATIO
(Mr. RYAN asked and was given per- of any unpopular minority or unwilling to committee for a public hearing on Vietnam
understand what on the basis of two assumptions:
The
i
y
ces.
mission to address the House for 1 min- reply to its vo
Communists cannot understand at all: That The first is that whether or not those
-ate and to revise and extend his re- open discussion between our citizens and doubts are well-founded, there has been in-
marks.) their Government is the central nervous sys- sufficient responsible debate in public of the
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, on Satur- tem of our free society. We cannot let the great issues raised by our actions in south-
day, the Nation witnessed a great exer- propaganda of totalitarians divert us from east Asia.
cise in democracy. The National Teach-- our necessary arguments with one another, The second assumption is that since a
In in which faculty members and Stu- any more than we should let them be misled thorough airing of these issues by competent
dents participated was stimulating, in- by such debates if we can help it. students is a condition for an enlightened
structive, and in the highest tradition of "I will not take your time in this brief public opinion on them, in a liberal democ-
message for a rehearsal of the policy of this racy such as ours in which governmental
free inquiry. For the benefit of those administration on Vietnam. Let me take policies require the assent of its citizens, stu-
who did not have the opportunity to par- only a word to speak of our purpose here- dents who possess knowledge pertinent to
ticipate or observe the teach-in, I ask our purpose there. That purpose is peace for those issues have a special duty to discuss
unanimous consent to insert at this point the peopleof Vietnam, the people of south- them openly and critically.
in the RECORD the New York Times sum- east Asia and the people of the United States. Aim is stated
mary of the proceedings which was pub-- "We evidently differ on the choice of ways sthe primary aim of this meet-
The today, May 17. and.means to peace, in what we all must In
ing-an short, h aim that surely im merits the strong
The SPEAKER. Without objection, it recognize to be a complex, ugly and demand- ing situation. Those differences may go endorsement of all who are committed to the
is so Ordered. deep to the nature of the politics of Asia, to ideals of liberal democracy--is to contribute
There was no objection. the legitimacy of the force in the face of to the public enlightenment through respon-
ExCERPTS FROM NATIONAL TEACH-IN ON VIET- armed attack and to the true prospects and sible discussion of a serious problem con-
NAM POLICY AND TEST of BVNDY STATE- purposes of the people of Vietnam them- fronting all of us.
MENT selves. It is possible that a precedent is being
ERNEST of "NO EASY GOALS set for the development in the academic
Moderator lumbi NA U nine phi- community of a generally recognized but
gentled m en at I Columbi have a a very very in rmequeeLadies and "But my es us is less own than assessment what unites is that what None di- vigorous and informed opposition to those
gentle,t to read. I've been requested an- to wants us the war to be enlarged. d. . All of o us entrusted with political power, in the best
read Ce men
read to you a text of a statement by Mr. Me- want a decent settlement. None of us wants sense se of of opposition democracy. in the great traditions of
George Bundy, Special Assistant to President other men to be forced under a totalitarian political
Johnsoli.: political authority. An of us seek a solution Letme explain the format of the discus-
"I greatly regret that it is impossible for In which American troops can be honorably Sion this afternoon. There are two principal : Dr.
andrDr.
Kahin, no to take part in i the discussion this after- hese are easy goals. All of us, Ilitrue t are political scien e, Cornell Universt y,fesso
noun of our policy y in Vietnam.
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May 17, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Robert . Scalapino, professor of political same time essential information has been
science, University of California at Berkeley. withheld from the American public and cru-
Dr., Scalapino has graciously agreed at the cial policy decisions concerning southeast
last meeting to replace the speech that Mr. Asia have been made before the public has
Bundy had promised to give. even been aware that a problem exists. And_
Associated with each of the principal once taken, these decisions have set in mo-
speakers, there's a `supporting panel. Be- tion events which severely circumscribed any
cause of the. lateness of the word received moderating Influence which an informed
from the White House about the unavail- public opinion might bring to bear.
ability of Mr. Bundy, Mr. Kahin's supporting Moreover, in recent months the tendency
panel consists of four members; while Mr. has increased to dismiss even thoughtful
Scalapino's only three, since he was origi- criticism of Government policy as irresponsi-
nally one of that group. ble meddling.
Dr. Kahin is associated with Hans J. Mor- Illusory hope seen
genthau, professor of political science and In Vietnam, American policy has been
modern history at the University of Chi- wrong from the outset. In the decade fol-
cago; Dr. Mary Wright, professor of history, lowing World War II, because of our illusory
Yale University; Dr. Stanley Millet, profes- hope that we could induce France to become
sor of history and political science in Briar- the keystone in an American-designed Eu-
cliffe College; Dr. William A. Williams, pro- ropean military organization, we temporized
fessor of history, University of Wisconsin. with our commitment to national self-deter-
With Dr. Scalapino is associated a group mination and backed France in her efforts
consisting of Dr. Zbygriew Brzezinski, pro- to reestablish control over Vietnam.
fessor of government, Columbia University; By supporting her attempt to establish a
Dr. Wesley Fishel, professor of political Vietnamese regime which lacked nationalist
science, Michigan State University, and Dr. support, we helped insure that Vietnamese
Michael Lindsay, professor of government, patriots would have no real alternative but
American University. to rally to the banner of Ho Chi Minh.
The principal speakers will have a half- France's humiliating defeat at Dienbienphu
hour each to present their views; and then in 1954 was a military defeat but it was
share an additional 5 to 10 minutes to dis- made inevitable by the political failure that
cuss what, has been said by them. This ex- preceded it.
change will be followed by comments or Then came the Geneva agreements clear-
questions from the panelists, each with 6 ly specifying that Vietnam was one country.
minutes at his or her disposal, and begin- They stipulated that the 17th parallel was
ning with Dr. Morgenthau in an order al- a temporary demarcation line, not in any
ternating between the supporting groups. way to be interpreted-and here I'm using
Three minutes will be available to the the text of the agreement-not in any way
principal speakers to respond to questions to be interpreted as constituting a political
put to them by panelists; or if the speaker or territorial boundary.
prefers to delegate the response, to some The United States in its own unilateral
member of his supporting panel. declaration at Geneva spoke only of one
The final portion of these proceedings, Vietnam, not of a South, and not of a North,
which we hope will begin not later than and with respect to the conference's provi-
4:30, because of commitments to various sion for national elections, the United States
broadcasting systems, will be a general dis- also stated-again in its own unilateral
cussion of issues in which principal speak- declaration-that it would continue to seek
ers and panelists will participate. to achieve unity through free elections su-
The meeting will conclude with summa- pervised by the United Nations.
ations by Drs. Kahin and Scalapino. Nevertheless the United States soon there-
The first principal speaker this afternoon after set out to build up a separate state In
is Dr. Kahin. the south. And again we made the mistake
CRAVE ERRORS IN POLICY FOUND of thinking we could establish a viable gov-
Mr. KAIIIN. Mr. Nagel, ladies and gentle- ernment on an inadequate nationalist base.
men, I am indeed very sorry to learn that The United States supported Ngo Dinh Diem
Mr. Bundy finds it impossible to be with us giving him, as you know, massive amounts
this afternoon. I see no reason, therefore, for of-economic initially and later-military
altering In any significant way the remarks assistance.
I'd planned to make. I will perhaps have a But American aid was no substitute for
few additional things to say in closing con- nationalist support, something Diem's re-
cerning his absence. gime never really acquired, despite what our
Since the end of the last war, American officials told Congress and the American
officials have made such grave errors in policy people.
toward southeast Asia that we have every Diem himself had said in 1953-repeatedly,
right to be skeptical about their ability to I might add-that Ho Chi Minh-and I'm
respond intelligently to the present situa- quoting him-"gained in popularity as a
tion in Vietnam. Their most consistent fail- leader of the resistance, not as a Commu-
ure has been an inability both to appreciate nist," and that the vast majority of his fol
the importance of Asian nationalism and to lowers were nationalists and in no way pro_
work with rather than against this powerful Communist.
force. This is a major reason why Burma, What the United States failed to recognize
Cambodia, Indonesia have become so dis- was that in these conditions Ho Chi Minh,
trustful of the United States, and why they who for at least 9 years had been the
have either broken or come close to breaking acknowledged head of the Vietnamese na-
their relations with us. tionalist movement, could not be replaced
Moreover the obsession of American policy- as the leader of the Vietnamese people by a
makers with what they still see as mono- man supported from the outside, a man little
lithic communism has blinded them to the known and who had spent the critical
fact that communism in Asia has adapted years-nearly all of them-of the independ-
Y
itself to nationalism. And they have con- ence ueailure, of course, to build up an
itself the broad but nationally differentiated America's struggle abroad.
force and potential of communism with the effective government under Diem is now well
threat of specifically Chinese power. known, but this was not immediately ap-
Despite the immense information-gather- parent, for after Geneva his regime en-
ing facilities of the Government, serious joyed several years of grace during which
policy mistakes have been made because de- Ho Chi Minh's followers left it pretty much
cisions have been taken on the basis of in- alone.
appropriate criteria, wrong analyses, and a Essentially this was due to the fact that
disregard for the relevant facts. At the the Geneva agreements had promised na-
No. 88-6
10255
tionwide elections for 1956 and it was pri-
marily because of this provision and be-
cause the agreements also stipulated that
France would be responsible for carrying out
the accords-carrying out the accords south
of the 17th parallel-and that France would
remain there until the elections were held-
primarily because of those reasons that the
Vietminh withdrew its armies from the
south and for a considerable period sus-
pended revolutionary activity there.
But with American encouragement Diem
refused to permit the elections in 1956 and
France washed her hands of the responsibili-
ties which she had assumed at Geneva.
Reneging is charged
Regardless of what sophistry has been em-
ployed to demonstrate otherwise, by encour-
aging Diem to defy this central provision of
the Geneva agreements, the United States
reneged on the position it had taken there in
its own unilateral declaration.
Civil war in Vietnam became inevitable,
for when a military struggle for power ends
on the agreed condition that the competi-
tion will be transferred to the political level,
can the side which violates the agreed con-
ditions legitimately expect that the military
struggle will not be resumed?
Despite the initial period of insulation
from Vietminh militancy and despite un-
stinted American economic and political
backing, Diem failed to develop a real base
of popular support. Programs urged by the
United States for social and economic re-
form, and for winning the allegiance of the
non-Vietnamese hill-dwelling people, were
never effectively carried out.
The Saigon regime remained all too iso-
lated from the Vietnamese peasantry. As a
result, it was unable to compete with the
Vietcong guerrillas when, from 1958 on, these
guerrillas adopted increasingly militant
policies.
And in the 19 months.since the assassina-
tion of Diem, the situation has continued to
deteriorate and the shifting combinations
of army officers and bureaucrats controlling
the Government have remained just as iso-
lated from the villagers of Vietnam.
Faced with this decline in political co-
hesion, and the evident inability of the
South Vietnamese military to stave off the
Vietcong, the present administration has en-
larged the war in Vietnam by bombing the
North and increasing American military ac-
tivity in the South.
Power called the reply
It has endeavored to compensate for the
continuing erosion of Saigon's political and
military base by introducing more American
troops, more American airpower.
It has justified this in terms of our pledge
to support Vietnam, a commitment which,
as you know, the administration regards as
a test case.
And here I think it might be appropriate
to recall the caveat of Secretary Acheson in
1950 when he stated that America could not
by itself create politically stable states in
Asia.
KENNEDY REMARK OF 1963 QUOTED
President Kennedy also recognized these
limitations when, in September of 1963, he
said of the South Vietnamese, "In the final
analysis it's their war-there the ones who
have to win it or lose it. We can help them,
give them equipment. We can send our men
out there as advisers, but they have to win it."
In the context of these cautions, does an
.unconditional American military pledge to a
weak and factious regime which lacks popu-
lar backing-does that make commonsense?
Is our pledge of support completely unqual-
ified? Does it not demand a minimum degree
of performance and cooperation from Sai-
gon-political as well as military? Is our
pledge automatically to any military or civil-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 17, 1965
fan group which happens to control Saigon?
What happens if our current policy of brink-
manship induces Hanoi to send its 300,000-
man army into South Vietnam?
Because this it may very well do if the dam-
age inflicted by the United States becomes so
great that the north has little to lose by un-
dertaking a retaliatory attack and little to
save through compromise and negotiation.
The well-known military analyst, Hanson
Baldwin, has estimated that to cope effec-
tively with such a force the United States
might have to use as many as a million men.
The United States, of course, does not have
these forces immediately available and even
to send in a small proportion would use up
our entire strategic reserve.
This same trend toward a rapprochement
with Russia started by President Eisenhower,
continued by President Kennedy, that trend
has already been seriously affected by our
policy in Vietnam and it will be further un-
dermined if we continue on our present
course.
Among Communist parties throughout
Asia as well as among the nonalined states
generally, China's scornful derision. of Rus-
sia's policy of peaceful coexistence has been
gaining ever wider approval.
The possibility of cooperation between the
United States and Russia to contain China's
power-China's power and influence in south-
east Asia-is becoming ever more remote.
Our major aim in Asia is to contain China
and thus to provide the opportunityfor the
states of south and southeast Asia to develop
free from Peiping's dominating influence.
And it is this consideration which should
govern American policy toward Vietnam. No
matter how much military power we pour
into Vietnam, the present American policy of
trying to sustain a separate state in the south
may very well fail because the local political
factors necessary to insure success are sim-
ply not there.
If we are going to salvage anything in Viet-
nam, we will achieve more through a cease-
fire and a negotiated political settlement
than through the futile infusion of more and
more American military power.
The United States must recognize that the
historic Vietnam fear of-fear of and antag-
onism toward-China continues--continues
despite the common adherence to Commu-
nist ideology. And Inasmuch as the char-
acter of Vietnamese communism is insepara-
ble from Vietnamese nationalism, Vietnam-
ese power, will not necessarily be exerted in
concert with Chinese power.
Defining interest
This - is likely to depend upon whether
such actions conform with Vietnamese na-
tional interest as the Vietnamese people de-
fine that interest.
Those who still are impressed by the sim-
plistic domino theory must realize that non-
Communist governments of southeast Asia
will not automatically collapse if the Com-
munists should come to control all of Viet-
nam. So long as southeast Asian govern-
ments are in harmony with their nation's
nationalism, so long as they are wise enough
to meet the most pressing economic and so-
cial demands of their people, they are not
likely to succumb to communism.
Nationalism and the demand for social
and economic progress are the dominant
forces in southeast Asia today. if we can
work with these forces, if we can work with
them we will make a major contribution to
maintaining the territorial integrity of the
states of southeast Asia and provide them
with a better opportunity to develop along
non-Communist lines.
The first step in that direction must be to
negotiate a settlement in Vietnam.
What has our position been thus far? I
think you know it well. The administration
tells us that it is prepared to negotiate un-
conditionally but in effect on condition that
the Vietcong cease all operations immedi-
ately and on condition that the state of
South Vietnam-and this is the most Im-
portant condition, I would say-on condi-
tion that the state of South Vietnam con-
tinue its separate existence in permanent
violation of the Geneva Agreements.
Furthermore, we have made clear that the
Vietcong and its political arm, the National
Liberation Front, cannot be party to such
negotiations. Not only is that one more
condition, but it flies squarely in the face of
reality-political reality.
It is, I think, widely acknowledged that
at least half of the south is today under the
control of the Vietcong. Is it not utopian
to assume that Hanoi is in a position to in-
sist upon the Vietcong's yielding up the posi-
tion it has won there?
In 1954, the Vietminh could induce its
numerous supporters in the south to accept
Vietnam's partition and to abandon their
gains south of the 17th parallel, because
partition was regarded as a temporary meas-
ure to last only until elections.
But we cannot assume that once again
the Insurgents in the south will give up what
they have won through long and difficult
campaigns.
Over the last 5 years, the doctrine of un-
compromising struggle and a real expecta-
tion of victory have been assiduously nur-
tured among the Vietcong. While there is
undoubtedly a considerable congruence of
interest between Hanoi and the Vietcong,
under these circumstances we cannot assume
that Hanoi can abruptly call off the south-
erners' resistance.
And whatever influence Hanoi can exert
over the Vietcong, we cannot expect it to
exert this so long as we continue bombing the
North.
The morale of the North Vietnamese is, of
course, no more likely to be broken by bombs
than was that of the British or the Russians
in the last war. Indeed their will is likely to
be stiffened. President Johnson said after
our Embassy in Saigon had been bombed
that outrages like this will only reinforce the
determination of the American people and
Government. What is true for Americans is
true for the Vietnamese.
Halting our bombardment of the North
would be our first genuine indications of an
interest in negotiations. Our quite cavalier
dismissal of the United Nations Secretary
General's efforts hardly constituted a serious
American interest in negotiations. I submit
that we should give him an unequivocal
mandate to pursue negotiations and that we
should make clear that we want not just dis-
cussions but serious negotiations.
Support of others urged
And I would suggest that concurrently we
should give much more encouragement than
we have to those nonalined Asian and
African States which wish to help promote
a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.
And finally, for those many Americans who
still regard full public discussion of vitally
important national issues as essential to our
brand of democracy, there is a particularly
disquieting domestic aspect of this situation:
Realizing as they do that an informed
public discussion requires access to the rele-
vant facts, these Americans can only be
deeply disturbed when a spokesman for the
newspaper editors of this country feels com-
pelled to state as he did last month that the
American press in Vietnam faces stronger
restrictions than it ever has in wartime and
that we are getting contradictions, double-
talk and half-truths from the Government
concerning the situation in Vietnam.
And surely Americans have grounds for
concern when the New York Times can
editorialize, as it did shortly after this, less
than 3 weeks ago, that high-ranking repre-
sentatives of Government in Washington and
in Saigon have so obscured, confused, or dis-
torted news from Vietnam or have made such
fatuously erroneous evaluations about the
course of the war that the credibility of the
U.S. Government has been sacrificed.
When the American public faces the pros-
pect of war it has the right to full and honest
answers.
I had indeed hoped that Mr. Bundy's ap-
pearance would be an indication of a change
in the administration's attitude as to the
value of informed public discussion. I can
only hope that his indispensability in meet-
ing some major crisis of policymaking
Is really of greater importance than the con-
tribution he might have made this after-
noon toward our better understanding of the
administration's aims and to that kind of
enlightened public discussion which is so
essential to the wisest conduct of foreign
policy.
IS VIETCONG AN INDIGENOUS FORCE?
Mr. NAGEL. The second principal speaker
is Professor Scalapino.
Professor ScALAPINO. Mr. Moderator, ladies
and gentlemen of the panel, ladies and
gentlemen of the audience, both here and
unseen:
First, it should be perfectly clear that I
am not here as a spokesman for the Govern-
ment. I did not know-I do not know-what
Mr. Bundy would have said. As the moder-
ator has made clear, we knew about this
on both sides of this panel only about 12:30
and consequently my remarks will be strictly
those of myself as prepared rather hastily
after that time.
Now it seems to me that in beginning I
would not start my remarks with a histori-
cal background as did Professor Kahin. I
would rather prefer to work those into some
of the critical questions to which I would
like to address myself.
The first of these questions, which is, I
think, critical, is as follows:
Is the Vietcong a truly indigenous force
in South Vietnam and has it achieved its
strength for its support such as it is through
promoting socioeconomic reform?
To me, the answer to this question, while
complicated, is, on balance, "No."
Let me cite, to begin, an editorial from
the Peiping Daily Worker of April 15 of this
year and reproduced in the Peiping Review
on April 23. Said Peiping: The Vietnamese
people's anti-U.S. struggle for national sal-
vation is a just, revolutionary struggle
against aggression. It is certain to win, be-
cause there is the wise leadership of the
Marxist-Leninist Worker Party of Vietnam,
because there is the unity of the 30 million
Vietnamese people, and because there is
sympathy and support from people the world
over.
I call to your attention the first phrase in
that statement: Because there is the wise
leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Workers
Party of Vietnam. I think that there is little
question that the Vietcong is a carbon copy
of the Vietminh which preceded it. This is
certainly not to say that it does not have
indigenous support and leadership in nomi-
nal terms at least. Clearly most of the lead-
ers of the National Liberation Front origi-
nated from the south as the front is now
structured. And whatever the bewildering
differences in figures, I am prepared to say
that a significant segment of the National
Liberation Front is still southern in origin.
Critical factors
But what are the truly critical factors?
These factors, it seems to me, are as follows:
First, who does know the leadership of the
National Liberation Front? Individuals like
Nguyen Wuc Ngo. How many either in or
out of Vietnam really subscribe to their lead-
ership? The real leaders of the Vietcong are,
and have always been, those in small hard-
core elements that are also members of the
Communist Party-and that party has Hanoi
as its headquarters now as in the past.
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y , CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE., 10257
The South Vietnamese Revolutionary Par- out, and some kind of international force I have seen nothing to indicate that the
ty numbers no more than 500 or so. It could come in.
not possibly be expected to dominate the Now, secondly: What about the Cao Dal fuformula l in theddemocraticocon text can eemean-
500,000-man party of the north. Not only and the Hoa Hao.
is the leadership of this movement shadowy trtrue, ue t a Communist context, And if that hen was indeed, but take a look at its basic principles degree e the are al lllegian e that of command of Viet- ways a fraudulent the e? reThen, w s it clearly
I urge you to read them carefully, because namese. The Cao Dal alone has some two fraudulent from the beginning to assume
I suggest that though there may have been million in its reported membership. Have that you could have free elections in a so-
differences in tactics between the South these leaders joined the Vietcong? Have ciety dominated by men who regard class
National Liberation Front and the North they supported this so-called national libera- enemies as susceptible to control through
Workers Party, or Laodong group, there have tion movement?
whatever means possible?
been no differences up to date on the ques- There have been s
ome exceptions.
tion of basic policies or of fundamental pro- always able to pick up in united-f
grams.
This Is not an unusual movement. The
Vietminh also had innumerable non-Com-
munist elements. The Vietminh also until
it came to power claimed to be a multiciass,
multifront organization dedicated to na-
tional liberation of Vietnam. But it ended
up as you well know under the domination
of the Communist Party and opponents were
either liquidated, silenced, or reformed.
Thus it seems to me what is critical here
is that we do indeed face a complicated
situation in which borrowing heavily from
Chinese revolutionary tactics of the past a
five-stage development toward revolution is
involved.
The first stage is always to build a tightly
disciplined, carefully controlled Communist
Party that is not susceptible to penetration
Buddhists. But en masse, the- leadership morning by Professor terms
ch a inge wWe are
that represents the central strength of the confronted, at least theoretically, with three
really important functional elements of broad alternatives: Withdrawal, negotiation,
South Vietnam are not, and have never or escalation.
been, a part of this Communist-dominated it seems to me clear that the arguments
National Liberation Front. against withdrawal are so
have not b so
It is not to say that they support the they powerful and
present Government necessariy. strong that at least as yet they have not been
But say th what I stresses,the t avails reduce American credibility withdrawal
her allies
the uncertainties of months and years of and neutrals around the world, but it is also
civil war, they did not join the Communist that it would be a green light to the new
movement, national liberation movements which are
And I think it is also significant, quite even now getting underway. I do not need
frankly, to point out that the successes of to remind you that Peiping has broadcast
the Vietcong are neither attributable alone repeatedly its intent to support the Thai na-
to the appeals which they have been able to tional liberation movement and has already
make on social, economic or nationalist launched the first propaganda ith
w
th
grounds
is mat-
The second stage is to develop a united . ter in hand.
p I would not depreciate those appeals, or If socioeconomic interests are the critical
front movement, and in this stage of course their success in some quarters. But what I question, we would have some curious new
one solicits the support if one can obtain it would emphasize and re-emphasize is the kinds of analyses to make. We cannot ignore
of the peasantry, of the intelligentsia, of the fact that Communist strength in South Viet- the ingredient of power. And central to
petit bourgeois, using such socioeconomic nam, as in many other areas, is also heavily this, it seem to me, is the fact that for more
issues and nationalist issues as can be used. attributable to organizational skill. than 5 years, Peiping and Moscow have been
The third stage is that when the united
front is built one moves into guerrilla war- A powerful weapon arguing vigorously about the way in which
fare. If one takes hold of a movement politically to
handle American imperialism. That es-
gument, -
The fourth stage that if guerrilla warfare and can organize it, mobilize it, and utilize ent month, hich has gone down to this follows,
is basically successful and the cities can be all of the organizational technique, then one and mois roughly speaking as follows,
surrounded one moves into positional war- has, indeed, a powerful weapon-particularly and r think you know it well:
fare, when one works in a truly diverse, lister- American imperialism, argues Peiping, Is
attack-it And thence to victory, and the establish- ogenous, nonorganized society. a paper tiger. Push and taken as a nul ear
ment of a people's democracy in which the THREE BROAD ALTERNATIVES SEEN track It it not to be tpo as a nu
real opponents of the regime are at that blackmail threat. The problem with have
point out. It does not necessarily mean, however, that Russians, argues Peiping, is that they have
For I know of no si niflcant because one has organizational control, one been too sensitive to American power, too
g opposition in has public support. I think anyone familiar willing to compromise, too unwilling to push
North Vietnam today that survived this five- with American big city politics must know the revolutionary movement forward.
stage development and could remain in true that. to me opposition to the leaders of the Laodong It seems w w uldt, above att,withdraws
Party. The fact is that organization is critical to al-withdrawal would prove that Peiping was
I think it is important to understand this Communist success in Asia, and elsewhere, right and make it virtually impossible for
development, because it is neither unique this and very frequently coercion as much as moderation to prevail inside the world Com-
Vnor for that Is nm of either r igct, to persuasion is involved. How many village of- munist movement. For if the strategy of
Vietnam, ietn whence it came tart at? nor, in act, t ficials, ood, bad and ndifferent, have been pushing American power and forcing it into
respects, to North Korea. killed by the Vietcong in recent years? a unilateral retreat works-if it works in
It is a phenomenon that involves atom- Some estimates are 6,000. I have no doubt Vietnam, it will work elsewhere and be tried
biIt is of civil war and i involves a that some of them were bad, many of them everywhere.
and assistance. And unless noeh Ingredients indifferent, some of them good, but the only
` Do th Domingo view altered
are iven their a question that was really asked was
s
t
. ey
_om lex- support the Government or don't they?"
I think one misunders
ands a he
ity of the problem, and the difficult of the And if they do, then they're finished. For
solution. y to root out the willful bases of power that
Let me raise another question: Does the critical in the development of a moment like
Vietcong really cnmman the su this, and it has little to do quite frankly
the appeal of issues, socioeconomic, or
allegiance of the people of South Vietnam? others.
others.
Answer must be "no" Now I make these points because I think
I think again, though the answer is com- that if the true allegiance of the people
plicated, the answer on balance must be no. Of South Vietnam could really be tested, it is
What is a true phenomenon is that though very doubtful that they would vote for the
the Diem Government made many mistakes, Vietcong. And this question of elections, in
and I am not here in any sense to defend it, Geneva, or after the Geneva agreements or
although the Diem Government made many elsewhere, troubles me greatly.
mistakes, one of the interesting things is For I do not know, frankly, of any state
that very few, if any, significant anti-Diem _ that has been controlled by the Communists
leaders in the South joined the Vietcong. which could afford to allow free elections.
One of the significant things is that today And, quite frankly, in recent announcements
still, the great popular elements of South coming out of Hanoi, I have seen nothing
Vietnam are not a part of the Vietcong, nor to indicate that Hanoi Is interested in else-
have they ever been
ti
i
.
ons_
n the north.
I refer to the Buddhists. And the Budd- Mass media system
hist solution for this
robl
p
em, neutralist
as it is, does not involve the movement of
the Vietcong into power. The latest Bud-
dhist proposal that I've seen urges that all
Vietcong elements go; North Americans go
I do not subscribe to the domino theory
precisely, i think it should be more appli-
cable to checkers theory. For, Peiping will
jump over-not only states which she can
neutralize, but perhaps even continents. She
will jump to those areas where she can build
the ingredients for this kind of formula.
And, Indeed, as long as she has the combina-
tion of privileged sanctuaries within her own
territory and that of her allies; as long as
she had the ingredients, her mobilizing man-
power and equipment for their support and
training; as long as she had these ingredients,
then, I think, she had a strategy that was
well-nigh foolproof.
Let me then move to this question of ne-
gotiation: I suspect the overwhelming ma-
jority of people in this room, and listening
to us, favor negotiation. And I suspect that
the critical issues, therefore, to come is: who
is willing to negotiate and on what terms.
Up to date, and we can certainly hone
would really relinquish the mass media com
te,
- very little - They have refused u ilTha t'ssproposegdtvisit
munications system for purposes of a true to Peiping, a visit which, incidentally, had
dialog, that they would allow the estab- our support. They have also declined to
lishment of class-enemy parties. accept the overtures.of the English and the
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10258 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
French, either privately or publicly, to move
toward any kind of negotiation.
Their comments upon the recent proposal
of the Indians can be summed up in One
word: "ridiculous," they said concerning an
Afro-Asian international force.
Their sabotage, or attempted sabotage, of
the Cambodian conference is well known to
everyone. In short, it seems to me that on
the record whatever they have been, the
qualms of the United States toward coming
to the conference table, we have explored and
we have allowed our allies to explore every
combination of public and private opportu-
nity that seemed promising.
And we are still hoping that at least Hanoi
will come forward and break its tie, now more
than 2 years old, with Peiping and move into
a new orbit of independence.
The whole history of Vietnam Indicates
that while there has always been a stout
resistance to China on the one hand there
has always been a strong element willing to
cooperate and collaborate with China on the
other. And this brings to me-I think-the
focus, of this problem; namely, the question
of the containment of China.
May I say that I agree very much with
Professor Kahin when he talks about the im-
portance of aligning ourselves openly with
Asian nationalists. I think this Is critical.
May I suggest also that I think that there
may be some slight discrepancy in his thesis
that on the one hand the nationalist move-
ment and the Communist movement are an-
tithetical, which I think he suggested at
me point, and on the other that they can
be united.
In my opinion both are possible. They can
be united sometimes, for purposes that are
perhaps limited in time and space, but they
can also be antithetical.
` But what I would urge you to look at here
is to see how clearly was communism in Asia
truly the product of nationalism and the na-
tonallst capture.
In part It was, but only in part. North
Korean communism was implanted as a re-
sult of Soviet power. And I suggest that the
pressures which Communist China is putting
upon the small neutralist countries today-
unlna they are counteracted by some bal-
ance of power in this region-will be anti-
nationalist and increasingly satellite in char-
after.
These are small states, the survival of
which depends upon some balance of power-
a balance of power, I say, that must be a com-
bination of both Western and Asian power,
that must represent a fusion, for today it is
critical that we come Into line with such
major societies in Asia as Japan and India,
and I would hope some day, Indonesia. For
these are societies with whom we can work
in forwarding the social, economic, and na-
tionalist revolutions that the last 2 or 3 years
are indications that Communist power un-
checked will ultimately impose its own ver-
sion of socioeconomic revolution and will
ultimately impose its own sense of national
Interest.
I say that this policy, in conclusion, can run
along these lines:
First, our broad objective should be a neu-
tral, nonalined Asia that is truly neutral
and nonalined, not the Communist version
of the Vietcong.
Secondly, we should, of course, negotiate.
But we should make it clear that we are not
negotiating just with labels, that we are nego-
tiating with men representing forces. We
should negotiate with the Communists in
South Vietnam as Communists, and we
should negotiate with the other elements in
terms of whatever representation they truly
represent. It must be remembered that the
Buddhists are the largest functional group
in South Vietnam and they certainly dwarf
the Vietcong in numbers and supporters.
And lastly, I would say this, that I think
that as long as we maintain two open chan-
nels not only for the neutrals but for the
Communists, one in which we urge social,
economic, cultural exchange, one in which
We urge peaceful coexistence, one in which
we desire the exchange of scholars, journal-
ists and economic development-yes, with
China, as with others. And the other chan-
nel in which we say we will not surrender
unconditionally, we will not be driven out by
a philosophy that regards compromise as
evil as long as it takes that stand, as long as
we keep these channels open and operative
in an imaginative-sense, I do not see how we
can fail In the long run to reach a solution
to our problems.
STUDY OF HANOI ELECTION RECORD
Professor KAHIN. With regard to the atti-
tude of Hanoi Government to elections, if
you-I'm sure you have studied the election
records there--but for years after Geneva
that Government did remind the South of
its desire for elections, it did remind the co-
chairman of the Geneva conference for sev-
eral years repeatedly thereafter even after
the date of in 1966 had gone by that it still
wanted the elections, and if Hanoi says today
It wants to go back to the Geneva agreements
in their entirety, I submit that it wants to
go back to elections conducted under inter-
national auspices as well.
I've been looking at the record, as I sup-
pose you have, of Hanoi broadcasts during
the last month and I haven't seen any Indi-
cation to suggest that it does not want elec-
tions. I would ask Professor Scalaptno why
it is, because I think thatthis is germane,
that the United States continues to press for
elections uniting Germany and Korea that
has in no cane I know of in recent years in-
dicated any willingness to do so in Vietnam
and where It did before attach conditions.
I hope you won't mind my saying, Bob,
but your analysis of the internal political
balance in Hanoi was given with more self
assurance than I've ever heard anyone give
before, and I think that insofar that one can
scrutinize this, he is impressed with con-
sistent zags and zags of policy as between
Russia and Communist China.
Statement at seminar
With regard to the matter of nationalism,
may I go back to 1953 when I quoted Diem
before he was at a seminar we had at Cornell
and he made these same statements after-
ward. His most poignant concern at that
time was that the vast majority of real na-
tionalists as he put it had either made their
political usefulness much the less by having
been attentive-in other words opportunistic
politically as he saw It during the previous
years-or had in fact already gone over to
the Vietminh. A major proportion of'them,
as he said at that time, had gone over to
the Vietminh and he added the words the
most courageous of them.
I'd also suggest that when a nationalist
movement is frustrated In its efforts to win
Independence that it can very easily spill
over into Communist-controlled channels,
particularly in a country like Vietnam, where
there was a very particular history.
The French were very hard on Nationalists
and well before the war the Vietnamese Com-
munist party had gone underground and
had developed a capacity - to operate effec-
tively underground that no other national-
ist party had.
And during the Japanese occupation, as
you recall, there was an arrangement be-
tween the Japanese and the Vichy French-
the Vichy French worked with the Japanese
-and both of them made it very difficult for
the Communists to operate anywhere else
except underground and this was true for
nationalists in general.
Nationalists elsewhere in southeast Asia
May 17, 1965
were often given some opportunity to orga-
nize and develop by the Japanese occupation
authorities. Not so in Indochina. They had
to work. Non-Communist nationalists had
to work underground and in working under-
ground they naturally gravitated toward the
only well-organized underground that was in
existence.
Professor ScALAPINo. First, let me talk to
the question of Hanoi's allegiances. I want
to admit that this is a very complicated mat-
ter and one still, I think, in very great dispute
within the Laodong Party of North Vietnam.
However, having followed rather closely both
Hoktob and Nandan for the last 3 years in
translation, I have come to the conclusion,
and I think most other scholars on North
Vietnam have come to the conclusion, that
there is a very obvious, and decided, and total
swing in that period.
Now it may, as I say, be swinging back,
because I think that our bombing In the
North had a political impact upon that party,
and a very decisive one. But let me quote
you, just so that I won't be saying something
that you have to take on my faith, let me
quote you two items, the first one from Sep-
tember 25, 1963, "Peace or Violence," the
name of the article, September 1963, Hoktob,
which talks about the modern revisionists
and rightists; "Opportunists are doing their
utmost to peddle pacificism and misrepresent
the Marxist-Leninist theory on the role of
violence in history.,'
Let me quote you an article from one of
the leading North Vietnamese generals, Pham
No Mal, which appeared in the March 11
People's Army newspaper in Hanoi of this
year: "All over the world the struggle move-
ment for peace, independence, democracy and
socialism is developing and is winning real
victories. The flag of Marxism-Leninism is
being waved more and more in all the five
continents. Modern revisionism is being de-
feated, but it has not yet been completely
eliminated, and the struggle between the two
paths is continuing."
Question of nationalism
Now with respect to this question of na-
tionalism, let me reiterate, and this is all I
can do, George, one of the points that I tried
to make in my unprepared remarks; namely,
that it seems to me that the issue of how
communism treats nationalism both in ideo-
logical terms and in policy terms is entirely
derivative from certain other considerations,
that is, I have the strongest feeling that most
of the leaders of the Vietcong in the south
are--owe their primary allegiance to Hanoi
and its policy formation, and that how the
Hanoi party goes will determine the future of
the South and that, in turn, the general sit-
uation in Asia will determine whether Asian
nationalism for small states is viable. But it
seems to me we have seen increasingly that
unless we can establish some balance of
power in Asia, nationalism is going to go
under in societies like Cambodia, it's going to
go under in societies like Burma.
Th inexorable pressure of the big states
that are just emerging now, of which China
is one but not the only one, is going to sub-
merge indigenous Asian nationalism in its
own concept of its own ideological interest
and its own self-interest from a national
standpoint. And I think the evidence is
already piling up on this score. If a Prince
Sihanouk has to call off the Cambodian Con-
ference, If the Burmese have to worry about
whether the Communists are going to come
into their Government or not because of pres-
sures, if on all aides one has to ask, What
does Peiping think and say? then it seems
to me nationalism is under assault.
And it is up to us, and I think we are the
largest power in the world that truly does
not have serious economic and political in.
terests that lie in this form of neocolonial-
ism in Asia. I think we are the power that
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May 17, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUS,E
can aline ourselves with the, true nationalist policies we want to employ and the risky is the issue today in southeast Asia: The na-
movemelits of this area and, I repeat, that it which we want to take. ture of change, of social reform, whether it
seems`to me that the evidence thus-far shows And I submit again, as I have done this will be by evolution or by more rapid, coer-
that most of the true South Vietnamese anti- morning, and have done before in lectures cive, indeed violent means, and whether the
Communist or non-Communist leaders do not many times, that if you really want to United States will be associated with it.
regard the Vietcong as a nationalist move- achieve in Asia what the spokesmen for our
The main-the key Buddhists have not must be ready to go to war with China, 'with There are those who argue the revolution
joined it; the key Catholics have not joined all that that implies. in South Vietnam is purely indigenous and
it; the key Boa Hoa and Cao Dai groups have I would also say a word 2'm getting nationalistic. Now I'm not an expert on
not joined it. There are some exceptions. nervous-about negotiations. Much has southeast Asia. I'm interested in interna-
But by and large, that's a shadowy move- been made of our willingness to negotiate. tional politics. I can only judge on the basis
ment without the kind of leadership that There is, of course, no doubt, and Mr. Mc- of what I read. And I'd like to read to you
really speaks to the issue of nationalism. George Bundy didn't need to emphasize it, two passages written by men who are not
And in closing, I would like to have Profes- that our Government wants a peaceful solu- known as apologists for the administration
sor I'shin speak to really two themes. I t ion. No decent government which isn't out and both associated with a newspaper which
would like to have him discuss whether or of its mind would want anything else. has been highly critical of the administra-
not he believes that the Vietcong is similar But this is not the point. The point is not tion, particularly editorially.
or identical to the Cletminh and that, in all what you intend, but the point is what you The first comment is by Robert Kleiman in
probability, it is or is not Communist con- do regardless of your intentions, The his. the New York Times, an editorial writer. He
trolled-what its other components. tory of the world is full of instances where states that after years--b years-the so-
I would lice to have him pursue this, then, well-meaning, high-principled people have called war of national liberation in South
by suggesting what he thinks would happen brought unspeakable misery upon their own Vietnam still retains its original charm-
If we Withdrew from South Vietnam nation in spite of their good intentions, be- teristics as an armed conspiracy. The e Viet-
unilaterally. cause it used the wrong policies. tong has scored military successes and en-
Second, I would like to ask him what he Let me turn to the problem of negotia- trenched itself politically in many rural
proposes to do if the Chinese and through tions. Of course we want a negotiated areas. But there has never been any sign
them, other elements of the Communist settlement, and I'm sure there are people of a mass uprising. And then he goes on to
movement, continue to remain adamant on in our Government who pray for a negoti- discuss the relative absence of popular sup-
the question of negotiations--something that ated settlement, if only the other side would port for the Vietcong.
we hope, very much, will not happen. make a move. _ Peter Grose, writing in the Times magazine,
But suppose they continue to denounce the But those people cannot see that the im- states clearly and explicitly that the South
17 nonalined nation approach, the Indian plicit conditions which we have made-the Vietnamese Vietcong operation is controlled
approach, all other approaches to negotia- unspoken conditions-make a negotiated from the North, directed from the North,
tions as ridiculous, a plot to show China up. settlement at the moment impossible. supported from the North and, indeed, even
Then what is our next move? For, first of all, we refuse to negotiate with cites North Vietnamese admission to that
SOME OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS t- ? Vietcong. effect.
Mr. NACEL. I regret I cannot, give Mr. Kahin Second, we make it an implicit condi- HOPE POR EVOLUTION TO EPTECT CHANGE
the opportunity to reply at this.point. But tion that we remain-at least for the time Now I cite that because the basic issue here
there will, be, hopefully, the chance to do so being-in South Vietnam-that is to say, as seems to me to lie in the fact that we are
in the fine, part of the proceedings, long as no stable government is established not trying to overthrow the North Viet-
We now come to observations and ues there, while will take a very long time.
q Now the other side is fully Government. We are not trying
bons by the various commentators. I y aware of the change an n existing political situation. And,
d,
would like to remttld both them and'you that blind alley in which we find ourselves in as in Europe, we hope to rely on the passage
each will have not more than 6 minutes, to South Vietnam. We don't have the courage of time and evolution to effect change, a
be followed by any response that the prin- to retreat and we don't dare to advance too condition which I hasten to add the Soviet
cipal speaker may wish to make. fa'- leadership accepted after Cuba when it de-
I will-because of the distribution of Peiping, Anso obviously from the point of view of slated from the use of force to change the
mikes, I think It'll best if each Into of ththe com- e mike which hasn't lost a Single man in situation in Europe and itself is banking on
mentators' remains and t that conflict and has only lost, fax as we evolutionary change, on the
in front of him, - And since not everybody can tell, one gun, which Mr. McNamara peaceful tion to socialism to attain its objectives.
is visible from every fixed point, I think, per- showed the other day in a press conference. Now w that condition Is ned In
haps, the best way of telling you when Of course from the point of view of Peiping, N yet to be attained in
your Asia.
time is nearly up if I rise 1 minute before and nothing better could happen than the United
so ix dicate. States waging a war in Vietnam which it is There are those who say that it can never
that. Professor Scalapino's analysis of the stances recommend negotiations? we should not have taken the course we did?
So was Germany in Europe in 1940. So was
facts -a southeast hypothetical is Correct in every Negotiations are possible only under the the Soviet Union in Europe in 1946-46. Yet
particular -a assumption conditions such as when one recognizes the this did not justify the conclusions that one
on my part. inevitable facts of life in Asia which, as I should therefore disengage aihd in a self-
What would the consequences for Ameri- have said before, can only be changed by fulfilling prophecy make right the assertion-
can policy be? , war. make right the assertion that China Is the
Professor Scalapino speaks very softly Mr. BRZEZINSxI. Mr. Chairman, ladies and predominant power and prove it by disengag-
about the establishment of a balance of gentlemen. It seems to me that the basic ing.
power. I speak very crudely about war issue that we are facing here today involves We may or may not have been remiss in the
against China. the fact that we're living in an age of very past, but the fact is that in a number of so-
For I .see here one of the basic rimer con- rapid change with many countries and rev- cieties we have shown that we can relate
tradictions speakers of have our official policy w-this hich
morning makes, eral continents undergoing many revolutions ourselves positively to their development.
as rolled into one. Out of that condition arises And today and this afternoon, those problems so terri- two basic questions: What will be the nature the issue of Vietnamying to negotiate over
bly complicated. of the change which these societies are going
It is because we set ourselves goals in Asia to experience and are experiencing, and what We have made a number of proposals.
and we have done so, I should say in parting, role can the United States play in these These proposals have been accomo by
for half a century, which cannot be achieved changes? proposals from the 17 nations, from Id ndia,
with the means we are willing to employ. from U Thant, and the United Nations, and
And as it is in philosophy and in pure It seems to me that in Asia we have dem- none of these proposals have been accepted
login if as
pose a wrong question and you find onstrated not perfection but a positive com- because at the present time the other side
It extremely complex to give a simple and mitment to social change-in Japan, where makes a demand which involves a qualita-
it extr melt' , we have helped the reconstruction of a coun- tive change in the political status quo. That
try ravaged by war and social reform. We demand, it seems to me, is ahistorical and
Something basicali1, wrong are doing the same in India, in Pakistan, in dangerous in the nuclear age.
And the uneasiness in the country of Thailand, in Taiwan. We have maintained It is imperative that both sides, both sides,
which this assembly is an impressive mans- our economic presense and assistance be- all major powers, learn that in the nuclear
festal ol}, I think stems from this instinctive cause we have. been--able to maintain our
recognition that there's something basically political presence. age the existing political status quo cannot
changed by force. And I repeat-it is not
wrong in the modes of thought and action And our political presence will be denied be be who are trying to overthrow the North
of our Government, that there is an essential if the United States and those associated Vietnamese Government. It Is the South
contradiction or -a number of contradictions with it permit themselves to be expelled Vietnamese Government which is being
between what we profess to want and the militarily And oat that in
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE May 17, 1965
Professor SCALAPINO. If I may risk a sim-
plification of Professor Morgenthau's thesis:
It seems to me that he is coming pretty
close to saying that either war or withdrawal
from Asia is inevitable for the United
States-that we must either get out or we
must go to war with China.
I may be misinterpreting him, but that's
the way I read his remarks and he'll have a
chance to rebut this if I'm wrong.
Now, I would just like to reiterate what's-
been said by other people here. I don't be-
lieve in historical inevitability. But if I
did, I would put this in precisely the oppo-
site framework. I would say that withdrawal
at this point will mean war. Because I-think
it will inevitably settle, at least for the time
being, the issue of how to meet American
imperialism, as the Communists put It.
I think it will inevitably cause the launch-
ing not of a thousand ships, but a thousand
revolts not just in Asia, but wherever this
movement can get underway. And I think
that that means war. Under what condi-
tions, I cannot predict, nor can you.
The critical issue
MARY WRiozIT. My differences with Profes- governments of Asia really want us out of
sor Salapino and his analysis of the situa- Asia as she suggests? They do not. They do
tion are very deep and very profound and we not.
are talking about avery serious matter here. Professor WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, ladies
It's a good deal more serious than I expected and gentlemen, I would like to suggest that
it to be when we came onto this platform our difficulty arises not so much from a
today. particular complexity but from a general
I agree with him, with his very curious misconception. I would like to say in addi-
and earnest statement, that I, too, will fight tion in the context of the news of the last
for American soil. But when he makes that few days and Mr. Bundy's absence that given
plea for Asia-We will liot be moved out of enough attention to their critics and enough
tional collaboration from their opponents,
I
am ra
Asia. We will not give up unilaterally.
absolutely dumfounded, because he-. links our leaders may end the Vietnam war short
it to a policy of getting into alinement with of d
But isaster.
salvage operations are
nations like India and Japan. sophisticated
He surely is as well aware as I am and all not enough. Our rivals being human beings
of you are of what our policy and the kind may some day become Irrational under such
of policy he poses, the kind of tensions that stress. And our own imagination is being
this has placed on our sound relation with contained and stunted within the limits of
Japan and India. the past.
We are risking our relations with Japan subtle Our
dnddifmore ficulty, it seems pervasive toff me, even the
and India.
It's a very serious thing. resort to complexity we all acknowledge. We
I am in favor of attempting to provide have not recognized and adapted to the
multiple outlets for nationalism for the new triumph of an outlook and a policy formu-
nations, but only when we are wanted. lated 70 years ago. The success of that pol-
Professor Scalapino would like Asia a cer- icy as has been pointed out changed the
twin way. I agree with Professor Morgenthau reality upon which it was based. The suc-
that to have the Asia that he has outlined Is cess of that policy having changed the reality
not only impossible within the means which needs to be reconsidered, and I suggest that
we are willing to use, it is impossible within we need a new outlook and a new policy
the means at our command. appropriate to the changed conditions, in-
Because we sit here with an Asia projected stead of struggles to operate successfully
of how we would want it. We are trying to within the old framework.
disavow the Communist revolution in China. "OPENNESS TO" PROBLEMS FAVORED
We pretend it doesn't exist there. We talk Professor ScALAPINO. It's question of how
against the advice - of our best friends of you integrate a meaningful social, economic,
Europe, against our best allies as far as Asia political, and military program from the
goes. We upset the nonalined countries. standpoint of maximizing the fundamental
We bring in far more military aid than the interests which you and the non-Communist
opposition is bringing in as far as that goes. world hold in common. I don't think it's an
We've got some lessons of history here to either-or basis.
learn and Mr. Brzezinski's parallels are those I think that the Communists themselves
very dangerous intellectual exercises-faulty have shown us that it isn't, because their ap-
parallels-to the position of Hitler's Ger- proach is not an either-or basis, and never
many or Imperial Japan. Because this is not has been. And this is the kind of problem--
the first time that a great power has gone how do you develop the socioeconomic, po-
to war to try to save-use military force to litical military integration that provides a cominm try to save Asia from
profound ism. base for political support, for economic de-
I find myself in very profouopposition velopment, and for some openness?
to my friends and colleagues on the panel And I maintain that that's the most crit-
and on the other side. ical problem that we face, because It seems
Now it seems to me that that's the critical
issue.
We are engaged-we are engaged in the
hard, difficult, complex task of trying again
to build a containment policy. if you will,
but one that is more broadly gaged than
the past. And I would simply end myan-
swBP toicfr.Morgenthau's comment by sug-
gesting that if you take the last 10 years,
I think that the United States itself a late-
developing society In terms of world leader-
ship, has learned a great deal; has moved
a great distance.
'Ten years ago we were still saying--some
of us, not I. but some-that neutralism was
immoral. Today, we are prepared-and I
think this is true of both of our major
parties--to work with and underwrite when
we can, neutral and nonalined states.
We have people-and this point ought to
be underlined and reemphasized-who are
not reactionary; who are not committed to
the past, and who have found that between
its and the Communists they'd rather take
their chances on socioeconomic reform and
development with us.
And I maintain that in some of the areas
where the American commitment has been
heaviest In Asia, the standard of living is
going up most rapidly.
This is important, not because I want to
whitewash American policy, I think we've
made many mistakes in the past, we're still
;making some I've been a frequent critic of
American policy myself-but I think the time
has come, both to face up to alternatives
and at the same time to point out again and
again that, if we can't do something to pre-
serve a certain openness in these societies,
then, It' seems to me, the balance of power
will be abruptly changed and global war will
shortly ensue.
u2n7ED STATES SAID TO CREATE SITUATION
Professor SABIN. Well, there are just two like to respond to that now. be developed and maintained and economic
points that I'd like to make. One, I was I think it's better for me to respond now and social growth developed.
I
pleased at his reliance upon the New York than after another speaker. Though
cer- But I don't think ours is an adamant posi-
Times. I would hope that his reading is a tainly respect the judgment of the Chair on
said I
could rely think we've upon force eveer alone. said or
thought I don't
little wider and that he reads some of the these matters: tion.
other views in the Times. One healthy thing Firstly, we do indeed differ, Professor yoal.
about the Times is, it seems to me, the Wright and I, both in Interpretation and don't think that that's the position that any
variety of viewpoints-and there are others in fact. Because I regard about 60 percent thinking American today, however he may
expressed. of what she said as nonfact and it would differ on the question of precisely of what
we should do in Vietnam now.
' The otheY point that he made that I would take me a long time to go over this.
like to take Issue with is this: that In Viet- Sometimes, nonfact comes in nonspoken Professor LINDSAY. I think this is a very
nam we are not trying to change an existing statements, Incidentally. For example, the valuable kind of meeting, and I think that a
situation. And I say this is true in a basic question of our relations with Japan and great many of the failures in both British and
Sense. And the reason is because the situa- India and the other non-Communist coun- American policy have come from the Gov-
tion that exists Is one which we created, be- tries. I do not want for a moment to ob- ernment failing to realize that a democratic
ginning in 1950, and which we are simply -scure the fact that there is opposition to our country can only pursue an effective policy
trying to maintain. No, we're not trying to policy in Asia, as there is opposition to our on the basis of an Informed public opinion.
change It basically. The trouble is its an policy here in the United States. And I think a great many mistakes have
artificial situation and it's one that can't be But I want to ask this question: Does the arisen from failure to produce one.
shored up militarily. It lacks basic political Government of India, does the Government Then I think on that what it does seem to
ingredients of Japan, do most of the non-Communist me that a lot of this trouble has come from
areas. Japan is a marvelous example of
revolution has been won in China; as Mr.
Brzezinski says, a great deal has happened where the application of American and Japa-
in the last 20 years. The one place it's not nese aid interrelated was successful.
happened is in Chinese-American relations. There are areas where political stability
We've either got to accept the fact of the h interacted with socioeconomic gains.
existence of Communist China and agree- And I think that these areas must be pre-
and if you ask some Japanese and Indians, served and expanded in company with our
who, of course, will tell you at once that allies and. our potential allies.
Communist China is the preponderant power When the President of India, for example,
in Asia-and try to come to deal with it as says that an Afro-Asian force might make
best we can, extricate ourselves where we are some sense in the area of Vietnam and we
clearly not wanted militarily with what dig- say we're interested, and Peiping says it's ri-
nity we can muster, not because it's easy diculous, it seems to me this is a kind of
for a great power to retreat, but because its openness with which we should approach
almost the last moment to retreat In Viet- more and more of our problems.
nom and salvage something. I favor bringing the Asian and the Afri-
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failure to discuss the issues involved very :1 And beyond that-on that particular of 14(b) permits States to enact right-to-
much sooner. That if I look, I think, at most point-l cannot comment more, except to say
of the remarks 99 the speakers on the other that as I tried to make work laws. These laws, which actually
clear at the outset,
side, it seems to me they all depend on a I think this is an enormously complicated restrict the employees' right to vote to
complete refusal to face what is a basically problem. There has been terrorism on both negotiate for a union shop are improp-
fairly new problem-how does one deal with sides. There have been many unjustices, erly named. They restrict rather than
the Leninist technique of spreading totals- many killings on both sides. enlarge the employee's rights, and do not
tarian control? I mean you had it In some To try to establish where the balance of guarantee any right to work. The name
extent actually with German infiltration in terror lies, would, I think, be exceedingly is deceptive and misleading. It has been
the Balkans in the 1930's. difficult, but It seems to me clear that every held illegal in at least one State-Idaho
But I think you do have to say what you observer of the Vietcong region has referred State Federation of Labor, in Re (Robert
do with the problem when you have a small to a variety to techniques that range from
determined minority who are perfectly pre- persuasion to coercion. He has referred to E. Smylie), 26 LC Par 68, 541, 75 Ida. 367,
pared to use force and terrorism to get them- the taking of young men for military service 272 P. 2d 707.
selves in power. And it does seem to me with or without their leave, and the govern- The proponents of the so-called right-
that the, American political scientists have ment has done the same thing. to-work laws use the time worn tech-
far too much, thought in terms of the kind This is not a situation in which you can nique of using two deflnitions-One for
of society In which things work through demark the good guys from the bad guys in attack and one for defense. In ads and
elections where it's one man, one vote, and these absloutist terms. And I think it's
haven't nearly enough thought about the fairly clear that when I talked about Viet- pamphlets they attempt to define the
problem of how, you deal with a kind of nam elections what the question I really right to work as a fundamental right
society where your great majority are coin- raised was this: How can you have meaning- equal to the freedom of speech, freedom
paratively uninterested in politics and where ful free elections unless opponents have full of religion, and other basic civil rights.
a determination, where a small determined access to mass media or at least sufficient ac- They paint in somber hues the dire con-
and forceful minority has a power completely cess to get their position expressed? sequences of limiting this fundamental
out of proportion to their numbers. Professor FxsrsEL. Mr. Chairman, col- American right to earn a livelihood.
Now the other point 1. think they've leagues, Professor Kahin and Professor Scala- When it is pointed out that right-to-
refused to face. This actually was put by one pino began this discussion on a high and re-
of the Austrian Social Democrats a long sponsible level with able and solidly grounded work laws do not create any right to
time ago when he said "if you're playing analyses. I see my role as a panelist as the work, or even guarantee a chance to
chess all right you keep to the rules as long only member of this panel who has lived and work, they recoil in horror that anyone
as your opponent does, but If you know per- worked extensively in Vietnam, to try to set would suspect them of advocating such
fectly well that once your opponent starts to forth a few facts with respect to the country alien ideas. This kind of right to work,
lose he will just knock over the table, then whose continuing agony is our reason for they say, is found only in socialist coun-
you have to think out new rules." assembling here today. tries. The only right they want to pro-
So it does seem to me that you have to I think we should keep in mind that there tact is, "the right of an Individual to
begin by thinking of how do you deal with are very few blacks or whites in the Viet-
this kind. of problem, and I might just cite, namese situation. There are many shades of work at his job without being compelled
I think, a very clear case is the ease of gray. We, as scholars, should strive for ac- to belong or not to belong to a labor
Malaya. Here again you had a determined curacy and wherever it is possible, for pre- Union." It is interesting to Substitute
minority and I think if you go back and look cision. I don't think we should succumb to this definition In some of the more fiam-
at the ,papers as of about 1950 you will find the very natural inclination to over-simplify boyant propaganda sent out by right-to-
people saying very much the same as this is and thereby reduce to the absurd what is a work groups and the mass mail which
right just now, now here is a popular move- very difficult and complex problem area. ------
think it was perfectly clear after the event It is obvious that in states which do
this power depended on terrorism. once you REPEAL OF 14 (b) OF TAFT-HARTLEY not prohibit union security contracts
had the organization which broke that ter- ACT that the right to work without joining
rorism, Malaya has become in fact one of a union exists. The overwhelming ma-
the more successful Asian countries with a (Mr. THOMPSON of New J
ersey asked jority ofilt
nonagrcuural employees are
government which does in .fact have a fair and was given permission to address the not union members. In the most
amount of support. House for 1 minute and to revise and strongly unionized State, Illinois, almost
And so I feel perhaps the basic failure in extend his remarks.) American policy has been failure to develop two-thirds of the employees do not be-
the ideas of the Declaration of Independence, Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr. long to a union. Their "right to work"
of governments owing their just powers to Speaker, the issue involved in the pas- Without joining a union exists without
the consent of the governed. And to go on sage of H.R. 77 is simple. The repeal restricting the right to vote of those who
to say that a government which relies to of provision 14 (b) of the Taft Hartley Act do want a union shop. The following
its power on terrorism, on keep- will restore the right to vote to workers table shows the lls
in --on Percentage union
g prevention of discussion, on keep- throughout the country. They will re- members in each State. . Notice the
the
lug its people from any access to informa- gain the freedom to determine whether number who have the right to work with-
tion, thereby proves that it does not repro-
sent the people. Or not their interests would best be out joining a union:
served by a union security clause in their
-TRUTH FOR v1BTNAMESE PEOPLS AFL-CIO membership ent, b percentage
1962
ontract. present their right vote agricultural employment, by 1962
Professor MILLET, This a serious moment. on this issue is restricted by the so-
And we're here in search of truth. And much called right-to-work laws in 19 States.
has been said about many truths-one has Employees AFL-CIO
been left out of account. I should like to There has been an extended test of in non- AFI,-CIO members
say a little about that. this provision of the Taft-Hartley Act agricultural member- as percent
Behind all these high issues of interna- in the years since its original passage. eSments ship of meat y
tional politics and hegemony of great States There is no evidence of harm to the pub-
and international balance of power, there lies lie interest in those States which do not Thousands Thousands Percent
the Vietnamese truth. The truth for Viet- infringe the rights of the employees to AlaskunA_______._ 758.9 185
23.4
nam; which for the Vienamese people is a negotiate for a union shop. Why should Arizona-- 364.8 364 8 76 20. 8
very bitter truth Indeed. we continue to restrict employees free- Arkansas--------- 306.8 72 18.1
Scalapino has said Communists do not ask California------__ 5,218.4 1, 400 18.1
for elections. Let tale not forget it was the dam in 19 States? Color ado-________ 949. b Ion 9:0 t 550. Vietminh who expected elections in 1956. Despite the simplicity of the issue there DC ut______ 155.4 116 10.3
And I wish merely to read from the program are a number of deceptive arguments Florida___-_______ 1,387.8 150 10.6
of the National Liberation Front of 1960, sec- on behalf of 14(b) and the right-to-work Hawaaii a -__-_____-- 1,19b.1 120.0 10.9
ono article: laws which have accumulated in the last Idaho____ 184.6 (')14.0
"Abolish the present Constitution set up 18 years. Because they are overlapping Illinois --_----------- 3,551.8 1,250.0 36:2
by the servile dictatorial Vietminh adminis- it would be difficult to deal with all the Iowan-a__-_-__-__ 1,461.3 30500.0 24:0
a new tration, carry national out assembly." suffrage to elect variations in one brief speech. Since Kansas ----------- 572.1 85.0 14.9
." That was the they will be exhumed in the current de- Kentucky -----
__ 774.4 136.0 20.0
NLF position in 196 0. It,lles.not changed. Louisiana -------- 794.9 130.0 17.4
Professor M SQALAPIf7o.I'm surprised that bate over H.R. 77 I will mention some of Maine ------------ 279.0 58 20.8
sofneone 'would say here that terror on our the more common ones and their more Maryland-Die
side accounts for all that happens obvious flaws. Cost of
In Viet- Columbia______ 1,517.0 271 18.1
nom. Fi
t
rs
is the claim tht thit
ae exsence Footnotes at end of table,
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 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000300190022-5
10262 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 17, 1965
AFL-CIO membership as percentage of non- second place, they result in undesirable and preceding table presents a more accurate
agricultural employment, by States, 1982- unnecessary limitations upon the freedom of picture of the strength of unionism in
Continued working men and women and their employ- right-to-Work states.
are to bargain collectively and agree upon men this acknowledgement of union
Employees AFL-CIO conditions of work. I oppose such laws Cate- growth must be considered as grudging
members go. y."
agricultural as percent Rev. William J. Kelley O.M.I., L.L.D.: "The tribute to the value of the union move-
in non- 1-gh
establish- of employ- right to work bills don't guarantee the indi- ment if unionism can advance under the
merits ment vidual any right at all. They provide him most adverse circumstances. In many
with an opportunity to work alone, to work cases the benefits accounting for the
Ma growth of unions in States which restrict
Thousands Percent at less than union wages."
Michigan ettshigan-------- _ - 12,,968.835.0 5 28.32.18 Mr. Speaker, a related argument by union security agreements could be
Minnesota-f_____ 924.2 30.5 those who support right-to-work laws achieved more effectively within such
Missi. ---- ----- 426.7 10.8
Missououri__________ 1,327.5 10.a is that they are necessary to protect contracts. Who is in better position
mine the need for such a contract
Montana- 171.7 171.7 17.5 fundamental individual freedoms. it is deter
-_-3934 12.7
Ne
be bene-
union security contract would feel
Nevada -____--__ 228.8 10 14.2 to protect the employee from of himself by than
)ra
Nos Hampsh _w Mexico __i___ro___ 204 242. 0 60.0 14.4
New restricting his freedom-his right to vote facial let them have the right to vote to
New aerses _ _ ____ 2, 086.3 6 50 . o 24.0
New 8 , 266.2 2,000 . 0.0 31.9 to determine whether or not he wishes to decide. Let us end the deceptive pro-
New York -_-_0 14.4
North ak make a union- security agreement a goal tection which limits their right to choose.
North DCarolina__-_ 1, 258.5 80.0 6.4
ota__ 129.5 16.0 11.8 ent
is t Oh io___________ 3,099.2 1,000:0 10. .8 2 doxical lIn those States which do not membershipgclause is a haperversionoof
10
Oklahoma_._____ 601.6 65.0
Pennsl_____----- 628.0 140.0 33-~
is the infringes ocompulsory
d____ _ 3, 298.3 1,250.0 .1 have a right--work law a union shop, either a rgghhtsra democracy which
Rhode Island hode----- 298.3 60.0 2 20.1 may work in
South Carolina ___ 151.8 40.0 1.2
South Dakota ____ 961.8 17.0 15.2 member or as an employee who tenders membership accurate? No, it is not.
Tennesaee________ 988.4 160.0 15.5 dues and fees for services rendered but The worker is free to work elsewhere.
Texas ------------ 2,624.8 350.0 13.3 is not an active member. He may also Remember, in the 31 States which allow-a
Utah_____________ 287.3 45.0 16.7 or he may work union shop the great majority of em-
Virginia _________ 109.3 9.5 8.7 Work in an open shop,
Virginia---------- 1,081.8 100.0 9.2 where there is no union. In a right-to- ployees are not union members. The
westVn gton______ 447.5 250.0 21.2 work State an employee, even if he wants individual is obviously not compelled to
ac sl-- 1? 2Aa _____ 077 . 9 95.0 21 . 2
Wisconnsin .9 264.0 +21.9 to, cannot have the protection of a union join a union. Second, the rights of te
Wyoming-- ------ 95.5 17.0 17.9 shop. He must be in a compulsory open minority in a democratic system are re-
shop. Which one has the greater free- tamed and are guaranteed by law. The
Not available. dom of choice? government of the union is conducted by
Source: U.S. De aatmeni of Labor (Manpower, re- The repeal of 1.46 does not create a democratic means and the minority re-
port of the President, March 1965 and Directory of talus the right to protest and to vote
National and International Labor Unions in the United compulsory union shop. It merely puts against the leadership. There have been
states, 1963). the power of decision where it should be, violations of democratic procedure with-
The deception in the use of the term with the employee. Remember that in violations
unions, but these not due to
to
":right to work" has been pointed out by every State a minority of employees are ins some union ns, The existence t due
democratic existence is no
many eminent Americans. Here are only union members. Why should the right the ui ion shop.
is no
a few statements: to vote on this issue be denied to this rviolat eason to argue acratic the democratic
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: "I am opposed to minority? To hold that restoring the recess.
this legislation because it does not guaran- right to vote to the minority endangers process.
is ob-
only to work awto this is the thesis that s protect the public f omlthe
tee the right to work, but gives the employer v ouslyhfals. Thef rethe peal ofmajority
the right to to exploit labor. While it is true
that a great deal of labor is not unionized, restores to this minority the freedom of abuses of unions which have grown too
much of It benefits from unionized labor's choice which has been denied to them in powerful. This overlooks the many
unionize a If were tthed to work laws' weakened passed, that19 States. This restoration of freedom other legal protections in the Taft-Hart-
in-
gains be for so any wof its its mem- of contract is desirable. ley and other labor acts. In those in-
it could make make would
bars are not members." A third common argument is that the stances in which abuses occur they are
bars or s or for those se
the uhe. Methodist Church Board of Social and union shop is unnecessary. This has caused It by is human possible to nature, point not t tunion
i on
Economic Relations: "Such laws are MIS- two parts. First, it is held that the
could 'right to work laws' since they do not union will survive if its services are of abuses in other sections of the economy.
oblige anyone to give any individual a job. value for members will retain their mem- Price fixing in certain major industries
Their the pose menace , bilityiof however, the qualal ty bership and new employees will be glad is an illustration. I would not recom-
of individual freedom." to join. This overlooks the fact that mend abolishing the corporation to cure
Rabbinical Council of America: "Recog- both can get something for nothing by these. Decapitation is not the proper
remedy for a headache.
sizes the right to work legislation as a nits- staying out of the union; namely, the
Homer and beholds such legislation as a cam- benefits that the members win for them. A sixth major argument is that the
ouflage and a gimmick to weaken and un- Unfortunately there are still corpora- union member in a union shop is a cap-
dermine responsible, democratic unionism." tiaras whose management is antilabor, Live rider. This is an attempt to refute
Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam (late president, and which engage in union busting the fact that in an open shop the non-of of : Ameril n Bishops in thehright t Chuworkactivities. In these the employees need union member is a free rider who does
the parasite, , the and such to wor worthy . the protection of a union shop. Alsor in not pay for the services rendered by the
They resent believe
terms as `peace,' 'democracy,' and 'justice,' many cases the union shop works to the union. It is a strange thing to hear so
so too, clever crafty, and highly-paid public benefit of both labor and management many who fear the effects of "something
relations experts have designed these efforts by increasing the effectiveness of the for nothing" in government arguing the
to weaken labor as 'right to work' laws. work force, and by stimulating harmony merits of something for nothing in labor
"Actually, a sanctimonious subterfuge is and understanding in labor-management management relations. In a shop which
being foisted upon the public. The most relations. has a union a nonunion worker is em-
trial cant progress has been made in indus-
trial relations where the workers belong to Second, it is argued that right-to-work ployed, by law, on precisely the same
the union and the union, through its repre- laws have not stopped the growth of terms as is the union member. His re-
sentatives, meets the management, through voluntary unionism. Those in favor of fusal to join a union does not prevent
its representatives, and together they think retention of 14b normally use a base him from getting all the union benefits
out the problems that should not be fought period which has a small number of gained by collective bargaining and arbi-
out." (Address to Baltimore Conference of union members. Thus even a small tration. He takes these benefits without
or James s Mitchell : numerical increase appears as a large paying for them.
the Former Methodist Church, June
Former e right-to-work of laws, that increase. This way they can The unions properly feel that the
call these really aly are. . In the but that
is not ot what they the first place, talk about the rapid percentage growth worker should pay for the services ren-
they do not create any jobs at all. In the of unions in right-to-work States. The dered by the union in collective bargain-
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