THE MESS IN VIETNAM XVII: THE STEADILY WIDENING WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300180029-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: June 9, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

June 9, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
the complex world in which we dive. But It
is far better to have ideals and targets toward
which all of us work, rather than to have no
idealism at all. We must mix idealism with
realism. Many minds must be brought to
bear on establishing the goals toward which
we work and a program through which to
attain them.
An ideology combines a way of life with a
way of governing. By truly practicing de-
mocracy as a way of life at home, we can
insure that our example will advance de-
mocracy abroad. By dedicated application
of democracy as a way of government, we can
further democracy in world affairs through
official policy. If democracy by example and
policy guides our behavior within America
and on the global stage, the promise of lib-
erty and the dignity of man will be within
the reach of us all.
WITH WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MA-
RINES FROM THE DOMINICAN
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, last Thursday President Johnson
announced that he was ordering with-
drawal of the remainder of our marines
from, the Dominican Republic. This
Nation and the world owe an everlasting
debt of gratitude to those courageous men
of the U.S. Marines who moved to evacu-
ate innocent foreign nationals, including
citizens of the,United States, from the
civil warfare that raged in Santo Do-
mingo at the time of President Johnson's
decision to send in the marines.
The marines protected many persons
who were not citizens of the Dominican
Republic, and fears that the United
States was aiming a long-range occupa-
tion of the island were wholly unjustified.
. In no way do I mean to diminish the
fine work, done by the 82d Airborne Di-
vision. These courageous soldiers still are
on duty to prevent unnecessary blood-
shed and to assure the people of the
Dominican Republic that the revolt does
not result in another Communist regime
like that in Cuba. We are merely there
to see that the people of the Dominican
Republic are guaranteed free elections
and other democratic processes.
Mr. President, at that time there was
a great hue and cry from some sources
about a return to the earlier days when
the United States did, upon some occa-
sions, use the Marines for long-term oc-
cupation of certain places in Latin
America. It is understandable that the
peoples of Latin America might fear such
a thing. They were, of course, encour-
aged in that fear by the Communist
propagandists-as they are always en-
couraged to criticize and malign the
United States.
In our own country, however, there
was no such excuse, and yet we heard
then, and we hear now, voices within
our own councils which say much the
same thing. I hope that President John-
son's action in withdrawing the marines
at the earliest possible moment will tend
to still these voices, which are essentially
the voices of dissension and division, at
a time when the President is facing so
many critical and delicate situations
throughout the world.
President Johnson is a man of reason
and restraint, dealing one after the other
No. 104--13
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with crises which are thrust upon him,
and dealing with them with tolerance,
patience, and the judicious use of the
great military power and tremendous re-
sources of this mighty Nation.
President Johnson found that this ac-
tion was necessary to save the lives of
the foreign civilians who were there-
citizens of this country, and citizens of
other countries-who were caught in
this sudden and brutal outburst of vio-
lence, which was growing rapidly more
savage and uncontrolled.
Armed gangs were running through
public rooms and corridors of the prin-
cipal hotel which housed our representa-
tives and those of other countries, firing
rifles and submachineguns through the
walls and windows. Our Ambassador,
and I think he showed great good sense
in his action under the circumstances,
took the telephone and went under-
ground. He got down under the desk in
order to continue reporting to the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State.
It is indeed surprising that, despite all
that was going on then, and all that
has gone on since, not one national of
another country lost his life. The ma-
rines went ashore instantly, established
the necessary sanctuaries, protected
them, and arranged for the orderly evac-
uation of those who wished to leave,
There was not a single life of a foreign
national or visitor lost.
One of those who criticized our actions
in sending in the marines was President
de Gaulle of France. It is worth noting,
however, that this did not prevent the
French Ambassador to the Dominican
Republic from taking advantage of our
protection for French citizens, and, in
fact, the protection zone was enlarged to
include the French Embassy after the
marines had already taken up their
positions.
I wish it were possible to say that there
were no lives lost, and no injured and
wounded, as a result of this necessary
action, Mr. President, but unhappily this
cannot be said. Eight fine marines have
died,and 29 have paid in lesser measure
for the success of this operation. We
should all pay our homage today to these
young men, and express our sympathies
with their families and friends who now
will miss them in the intimate ways that
always accompanyy such tragedies.
While our purpose in entering Santo
Domingo was to protect our own citizens
and the citizens of other countries, we
were certainly very much concerned
about the circumstances and conditions
prevailing for the people of this island.
At the time the marines landed, the
people of the island were caught between
the two forces. They were bombed and
strafed in the streets of Santo Domingo;
they were starving. Many of them were
being put up against the wall and shot.
The sanitary conditions were the cause
of serious concern for the health of the
people, and widespread epidemics were
feared.
Much of this has now changed. We
have brought in food and have assisted
in bringing about arrangements which
give hope of stabilizing the situation, at
least for the helpless noncombatants.
12527
We are providing funds for the neces-
sary governmental services and operation
of other vital institutions.
We still have troops in the Dominican
Republic, but they are there now in asso-
ciation and cooperation with the ma-
jority of the members of the Organiza-
tion of American States. We are joining_
fully in the efforts to reach some po-
litical solution of the difficult problems
which still exist. Our objective will con-
tinue to be to find this solution, and to
withdraw the remainder of our forces
from the island.
President Johnson has given concrete
evidence of the peaceful course he will
pursue by withdrawing the marines.
There is no doubt whatsoever that Presi-
dent Johnson's future actions will be folly
in keeping with his order of last Thurs-
day.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.
Mr. GR(ENING. I am happy to say
that I heartily approve of the Presi-
dent's policy in the Dominican Republic
to date. I feel he had to act as he did.
He said so from the very start. He
moved first to save American lives and,
second, to prevent what he feared might
be a Communist takeover-both wholly
worthy and commendable objectives.
Third, he moved as rapidly as possible
to make the problem a multilateral af-
fair, with the assistance and cooperation
of our sister American Republics, by call-
ing on the Organization of American
States to come in and help work out
the Dominican problem.
If out of this tragic situation in the
Dominican Republic we can get a per-
manent peacekeeping force in the Amer-
icas, in which the United States will be
merely one of a number of nations coop-
erating, I feel definitely that we shall
have brought about an event of lasting
significance and a great turning point in
the history of the Americas.
For that reason I believe the Presi-
dent's policy, both on the immediate
range and on the long range, are highly
commendable. He deserves unqualified
praise. I am happy to say this because
of the fact that I do not agree with our
policy in southeast Asia.
I thank the Senator for yielding to me.
Mr. President, I now should like to
speak on my own time for a little more
than 3 minutes.
The PR SIDING OFFICER (Mr.
COOPER in the chair). How much time
does the Senat desire?
Mr. GRUEN NG. About 10 minutes.
The PRES ING OFFICER. Without
objecti?rl, t i Senator may proceed.
THE MESS IN VIETNAM XVII: THE
STEADILY WIDENING WAR
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in its
leading editorial this morning entitled
"Ground War in Asia," the New York
Times states :
The American people were told by a minor
State Department official yesterday that, in
effect, they were in a land war on the conti-
nent of Asia. This is only one of the ex-
traordinary aspects of the first, formal? an-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 1965
nouncement that a decision has been made
to commit American ground forces to open
combat in South Vietnam: The Nation is in-
formed about it not by the President, not. by
a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-Cabinet
official, but by a public relations officer.
There is still no explanation offered for
a :move that fundamentally alters the char-
acter of the American Involvement in Viet-
nam. A program of weapons supply, train-
ing and combat advice to South Vietnamese,
initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Ken-
nedy, has now been transformed by President
Johnson into an American war against
Asians.
The editorial
question:
Is it not more likely that political ir-
responsibility in Saigon will grow, rather
than decline, as the main military responsi-
bility for defending South Vietnam is trans-
ferred increasingly to American hands?
And concludes:
The country deserves answers to this and
many other questions. It has been taken
into a ground war by Presidential decision,
when there is no emergency that would seem
to rule out congressional debate. The duty
now is for reassurance from the White House
that the Nation will be informed on where
it is being led and that Congress will be con-
sulted before another furious upward whirl
is taken on the escalation spiral.
The American people deserve and
should get straight answers from the
administration as to just where we are
going in Vietnam. It deserves more than
mislabeling as "advisers" American
Armed Forces personnel who have for
quite some time now been in the front-
line of the fighting in South Vietnam.
It deserves more than statements that
our marines are in South Vietnam only
as defensive troops to protect our bases.
I ask unanimous consent that the edi-
torial from today's New York Times en-
titled "Ground War in Asia" be printed
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. GRUENING. This changing char-
acter of the war in Vietnam has been
noted in recent days by other knowledge-
able writers.
Writing from Saigon on June 4, 1965,
Malcolm Browne, Associated Press re-
.orter, notes that the Vietnam wax is
Mr. Browne, in his news dispatch, goes were now killing four times as many men
: as we were losing."
on to say: briefing which
U.S. officials predict that American casualty was one of dozens that
toils will increase from now on as American the White House has conducted in an effort
Marine Corps, and Army paratrooper units to sell its Vietnam policy, concluded with
talks by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
move deeper into the battle.
U.S. air strikes on North and South Viet- "big daddy" himself.
Dam have increased in recent months to the From news stories of troop movements
point that they are now round-the-clock to Vietnam, it is evident that it will not
operations. take long to build up to the 300,000
In the north, strikes have been limited to fighting men in Vietnam predicted by
military installations, roads and waterways
well south of Hanoi. There seems no imme- Secretary McNamara.
diate prospect of bombing Ncrth Vietnam's Those of us who have heard the discus-
t
h
e
e Sena
cities or civilian industries. sions in the cloakrooms of t
But in the south, huge sectors of the na- are quite aware that many of our col-
tion have been declared "free bombing zones," leagues, are having second thoughts about
in which anything that moves is a legitimate the southeast Asia resolution passed
target. Tens of thousands of tons of bombs, overwhelmingly on August 7. I voted
rockets, napalm and cannon fire are poured that resolution as did the Sen-
the these vast areas each week. If only by against
the laws of chance, bloodshed is believed to ator from Oregon [Mr. MORSEI and noth-
be heavy in these raids. ing in the events of the past 10 months
In exchange, the Vietcong is exacting its since that date has caused me to doubt
pound of flesh. the wisdom of voting against the resolu-
In the past week, big Vietcong units prowl- tion placing a blank check in the hands
ing through the jungle-covered mountains of of the President to commit our Armed
central Vietnam have chewed up three gov- Forces to fighting anywhere in southeast,
will not t battalions
he able to o it fight again for that a these long time. units Asia against undeclared enemies.
will not
Government casualties in these ambushes Mr. Starnes continued in his column:
probably have exceeded 1,000 men. "Rusk had nothing new to say, but he kept
The Vietcong have clearly shifted gears saying it at such great length that finally
from what they call "guerrilla warfare" to the President, who was sitting in the front
"mobile warfare." row, started looking ostentatiously at his
The Communist concept of mobile warfare watch," my informant reports. "But Rusk
is essentially guerrilla operation on a vastly missed the cue, until at last the President
expanded scale, in which whole battalions just got up and nudgedRusk away from the
and regiments are used in mounting am- lectern."
bushes. Ambushes remain the key feature What the Senators heard then is a thing
of the war. that has caused something very near to
The Saigon government and its American cloakroom consternation. Mr. Johnson sailed
ally control the air above South Vietnam and into a defense of his escalation of the war
some of its roads and waterways. The Viet- in Vietnam, and bluntly told his audience
tong controls much of the rest of the that they had authorized it and, by Implica-
m"tion. tion, must share the responsibility for it.
Government units move mostly by truck, The President said he was frequently asker.L
plane, and helicopter. Vietcong units move what his policy in Vietnam was. Then, with
on foot through the trackless jungle. This the subtlety of a sledgehammer, he told the
means the Communists generally have the Senators that the Congress had laid down the
advantage in setting up their ambushes. policy in a resolution passed last August 7
Roads, particularly those that wind by a vote of 504 to 2. And, said the Presi-
through the mountain passes of central dent, he was doing his best to carry out that
Vietnam, are ideal places for ambushes. resolution.
Even helicopters must land in clearings, The source of this account, who knows
which in the jungle are often only tiny the Senate intimately, reported that, In spite
patches of ground. of the near unanimity of congressional sup-
The Vietcong can and often does set up port for administration Vietnam policy, Sen-
traps around these clearings, with .50-caliber ators are still "rankled" over Mr. Johnson's
machineguns trained on the places heli- bland assumption that the August 7 resolu-
copters will be forced to land. tion authorized escalation of the war in
As the fighting grows hotter it becomes The southeast Asia.
ollowed passed ap the fever attacks in-
on, more brutal. Neither side is taking many dignation The resothat f
more any more. Soldiers caught off side North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S.
nsfor " tortured to death.
txansformed into an enormous meat to saying what Presiders' Johnson says it
grinder, in which both sides are now Mr. Richard Starnes in the Washing- says-whether the Senators who voted for it
making an all-out drive to bleed each ton Daily News for June 4, 1965, also like
The resolut to admit it or the President
other to death. It is a meat grinder in comments on the steady escalation of "as Commander in Chief, to take -all neces-
which America for the first time has an the undeclared war in Vietnam. sary measures to repeal any armed attack
active part-on both the giving and re- Mr. Starnes begins his article, en- against the forces of the United States and
ceiving end." titled "The Escalating War" with the to prevent further aggression."
These are disturbing words coming statement: Note well that the resolution was not
from a wholly reliable correspondent who The American people are not alone in limited to Vietnam but specifically asserted
won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of their blissful ignorance of the coming de- that the U.S. goal was "assisting the people
of southeast Asia"
from Vietnam under the most dif- mands for men to feed the insatiable jungle " to fight off alleged aggres-
sion. That means just what it says-Cox: -
ficult circumstances and who, in an ex- war in Vietnam. A completely reliable dress "approves and supports" anything Mr.
cellent book entitled "The New Face of source who was present at a White House Johnson deems necessary to prevent further
War" has set forth his trying experiences briefing tells me this: aggression in the area, and it is now some-
in attempting to get the truth to the "1 saw U.S. Senators blanch when Robert what late for whatever second thoughts are
American people. McNamara told them that they had to pre- occurring in Capitol cloakrooms.
pare to see 300,000 Amer'een men rent to Whatever doubt may have existed as to tie
He is still trying and his words should Vietnam. intent of the August 7 resolution was dis-
be heeded, even though they are not en- "I never thought I'd live to see such spelled last month, however, when Congress
tirely unexpected to those of us who have a thing in the United States, but McNamara dutifully voted a blank check $700 million
been following the events in Vietnam told the briefing quite cheerfully that things appropriation to finance the expanding war.
closely, were looking up In Vietnzm because we This time the division was 596 to 10, still a
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dune 9, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
sufficiently lopsided vote to assure history
that the 89th Congress had supported es-
calation in the Pacific Whether It knew what
it was doing or not.
This same growing unrest in the Con-
gress and its questioning of the wisdom
of itsabdication of a voice in the conduct
of our foreign policy is noted by the New
York Times in its leading editorial on
June 7, 1965, entitled "Congress and
Vietnam" which begins:
Signs are growing of congressional interest
in ending the leave-it-to-Lyndon era in
American foreign policy.
The Founding Fathers intended the
framing of our foreign policy to be a
`partnership between the executive and
the legislative branches of the Federal
Government with each acting as co-
equals.
We are now seeing the harmful effects
of treating the formulation of foreign
policy as the exclusive prerogative of the
executive branch of the Government.
The editorial in the New Bork Times
contains the following observations:
Factors that go beyond the President's
limited experience in foreign affairs and the
extraordinary vacillations in Dominican pol-
icy have set off the present questioning at
home and abroad. The reluctance of Secre-
tary of State Rusk to employ the full re-
sources of his Department and give inde-
pendent advice, the meager use made by the
President of nonofficial task forces In the
foreign policy field, the overdependence on
military and intelligence agencies and the
divorce between the administration and the
Nation's intellectuals-all point to a need
for more vigorous congressional Interest.
Nowhere is this more vital than on Viet-
nam, where grave constitutional questions
are raised by the official acknowledgment of
an Increasing combat role for American
troops. During the 18 months of, the John-
son administration, the number of American
.troops in Vietnam has been tripled to about
46,500; a further buildup to more than
60,000 appears imminent. American planes
have entered Into combat both in South and
North Vietnam-in the latter case openly
attacking a foreign country with no declara-
tion of war. American warships have bom-
barded the North 'Vietnamese coast. And
there are indications that American ground
troops-first employed as advisers in South
Vietnam, then deployed to defend American
Installations and now directly engaged in
patrolling action-will soon take on a full
combat role as a tactical reserve aiding South
Vietnamese units in trouble.
Yet at no point has there been significant
Congressional discussion, much less direct
authorization of what amounts to a deci-
sion to wage war. That Is why 28 Demo-
cratic Congressmen, on the initiative of
Representative ROSENTHAL, of Queens, now
have wisely asked the chairman of the
House Foreign -Affairs Committee to hold
public hearings on the administration's
Vietnam policy.
American casualties in Vietnam, while
still relatively minor, already exceed those
of the Spanish-American War, The choices
open to the President are exceedingly diffi-
cult ones; they should not be his alone,
either as a matter of sound policy or of con-
stitutional obligation. If he takes it upon
himself to: make an American war out of
the Vietnamese tragedy, without seeking
congressional and national consent, he may
open the country to divisions even more
dangerous than those that developed out of
the Xoreaxi conflict.
I ask unanimous consent that the en-
tire editorial from the New York Times
for June 7, 1965, entitled "Congress and
Vietnam" be printed at the conclusion
of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER.. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. GR'[JENING. ITow singularly in-
dividualistic the war in Vietnam has
become was commented on by colum-
nist Drew Pearson in his column in the
Washington Post on June 4, 1965, under
the heading "President Johnson's Per-
sonal War." Mr. Pearson states:
The war in Vietnam has also become a
lonely war and to some extent a personal
war for one man. * ^ * It's become per-
sonal today, because the President feels It
so keenly and directs it so carefully. Every
morning at 3 he wakes up and calls the
White House security room, Three in the
morning is about the time the news is in
from Vietnam on the casualties and the
hits after each bombing raid.
Mr. Pearson concludes this portion of
his article as follows:.
The North Vietnamese have been winning.
Our bombing raids have not stopped the sup-
ply of troops and supplies from going south
or the guerrilla raids by the Vietcong.
The Russians, who normally might have
acted as intermediaries, were put on the spot
by our bombing of the north. The Chinese
have chided them with being too friendly to
the United States in the past, and with for-
saking their alleged former role as the cham-
pion of small nations. So it's difficult for
them to side with the United States now.
The Chinese are delighted at the predica-
ment of both Moscow and Washington. They
don't want the Vietnamese war to end, The
longer it lasts, the more the United States
and Russia become at swords' points, and the
more the smaller nations of southeast Asia
pull away from the United States Into the
Red Chinese camp.
In brief, the military advisers who sold
the President on the strategy of bombing
North Vietnam failed to understand oriental
politics. Though he inherited the Vietnam-
ese problem, they sold him on enlarging
it into a mess that could either lead to
world war or is almost insoluble without se-
rious loss of face,
I ask unanimous consent that the en-
tire column written by Drew Pearson in
the Washington Post for June 7, 1965, en-
titled "President Johnson's Personal
War" be printed in the RECORD at the
conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. GRUENING.. An excellent series
of articles on Vietnam recently appeared
in the New York Herald Tribune. They
were written for the New York Herald
Tribune by its special correspondent
Beverly Deepe from Saigon.
I ask unanimous consent that Beverly
Deepe's articles appearing in the New
York Herald 't'ribune on May 30, May 31,
June 1, June 2, June 3, and June 4, 1965,
be printed in the RECORD at the conclu-
sion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 4.)
Mr. GRUENING. Communism can-
not be fought with nothing.
A strong, capable, noncorrupt govern-
ment in_ Saigon., has been needed for
years to bring about the social and
economic reforms sg necessary to show
12529
the people of South Vietnam that they
can have liberty and economic and social
justice.
But BeverlyDeepe's articles show why
needed reforms were thwarted.
In her fifth article she discusses the
long delay in land reform and how the
government at Saigon was playing the
landlord's game:
"The most important question in the Viet-
namese countryside besides security is land
reform," an American technician said, "yet
virtually nothing has been done about it.
"The Vietcong are gaining a lot of points
with the peasants by simply Issuing land
titles-and it costs them nothing. They
take the land from the landowner and give
it away. Nothing we give to the peasants-
like pigs, insecticides, or fertilizer-is as im-
portant as land."
American technicians and provincial offi-
cials for the past several years have urged
the implementation of an effective land re-
form program. Two land distribution
schemes currently have been written, but
neither has been accepted. Higher officials
of the American Embassy and In the Agency
for International Development believe land
reform is not the panacea for Vietnam's
problems.
A program for the training of land-reform
cadre is under consideration. But the pro-
gram will not be instituted until the other
day-when the Vietcong Communists have
been defeated.
WARNING
However, one Vietnamese general recently
warned American generals and officials that
American-backed efforts to pacify the prov-
inces would fail unless they were linked with
land reform.
"When the Vietnamese National Army goes
back to pacify areas from the Vietcong, the
local landowner goes back with them, offer-
ing to serve as intelligence agent," the gen-
eral explained. "Obviously he wants to col-
lect his back rent. So when the army paci-
fies the area It pacifies it for the landowner
and not for the peasant.
"Of course, 35 percent of the peasants are
landless. They become 'fanatics and will
fight for the land given them by the Viet-
cong because it's as important to them as
life."
One U.S. official described as "horror
stories" the actions of some landowners
to collect back rent, once Government
forces had pacified Vietcong areas.
According to reliable sources, in other
cases, when the Vietnamese Government
Army attempts to pacify the area, the
commanders simply ignore the problems
of land reform, refusing to collect back
rents-but also refusing to confirm the
landownership rights.
In Vietcong-controlled areas, if land-
owners or their agents return to collect
back rent the matter is simple. The
peasant complains to the Vietcong, and
the agent is shot.
"The question of land reform is quite
simple," one low-ranking Vietnamese pro-
vincial official explained. "The government
represents the landowners; the ministers and
generals are either landowners or friends of
landowners. The Catholic Church owns
land. The Buddhist Church owns land. No-
body, is interested in, fighting for the poor
peasant. And the top Americans-well, they
talk to only the ministers and rich people
so they don't push it either."
Beverly Deepe in her fourth article
describes "How the United States Built
on the Quicksand of Asian Politics," She
says:
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 1965
Since November 1963, the country has been
in a state of political crisis. Sources in
Saigon now argue that it would be a mistake
to rebuild a counterideology-even if it
could be done. They say instead that the
Saigon government must reform itself and
"out-revolutionize the Communists-but do
ii; 10 times better and 50 times faster than
the Communists themselves."
The dilemma of American policymakers is
the schizophrenic nature of the Vietnamese
society itself. The governing class is gener-
ally urban-based, French-educated with an
aristocratic position based on either family
background, money or landownership. This
-elite minority attempts to govern the masses
although it knows little about them and is
concerned less.
After 10 years of administering the largest
U.S. medical aid program in the world,
American officials here still have little in-
fluence on Vietnamese medical affairs. One
American-trained Vietnamese doctor said
that a medical degree from an American
medical school still is not readily recognized
in Vietnam, on the other hand, a "parachute
degree"-a degree virtually bought with
money from a second-rate medical school in
France-is easily acceptable by "the Mafia."
The two best hospitals in Saigon are
French operated. They are also the most
expensive. There is no good American hos-
pital in Saigon for the Vietnamese popula-
tion (although there are two American-
operated hospitals in France). Requests by
the American-operated Seventh Day Ad-
ventist Missionary Hospital to expand their
30-bed clinic have repeatedly been refused.
American officials in Saigon have not ef-
fectively pressured the Saigon government
to correct "this rot within," in the words of
a Vietnamese anti-Communist. Instead,
they have superimposed upon the rot a spec-
tacular medical program in the provinces.
"The Americans think we should fight for
democracy," one young Vietnamese intellec-
tual explained. "But, in fact, the Vietcong
fight because of the lack of democracy."
But her most devastating article is
entitled: "Corruption-Hottest Saigon
Issue" and shows how corruption on high
in Saigon-winked at and ignored by
U.S. officials-was and is one of the
causes for effective support of the Gov-
ernment at the grassroots--support
which is essential.
The article states, in part:
The hottest issue in Saigon is not bombing
Hanoi, nor Vietcong terrorism, nor possible
negotiations for peace. It is corruption.
Vietnamese sources-generals, majors.
captains, ex-ministers, economists--say that
corruption has now reached scandalous, un-
precedented proportions.
Highly placed sources in Saigon-Ameri-
can, Vietnamese, and Western-urged tighter
controls on Vietnamese Government funds
and on American aid and goods.
The issue is considered a gift for the Viet-
cong Communists, who promise the workers
and peasants justice and equality. It also
has caused friction within the Vietnamese
Government and armed forces.
One high-ranking American official in the
U.S. Agency for International Development
(AID) reportedly estimated that 30'percent
of American economic aid was unreceipted
or unaccounted for last year. Alow-echelon
American provincial official says some of the
45 Vietnamese provinces had not - submitted
vouchers for expenditures during the past 3
years.
The originalpurpose of American advisers
was to train Vietnamese to use the equip-
ment-"and to keep track of the equipment,
which sometimes took some doing," one
American captain who worked on the pro-
gram for 2 years said.
"We brought in air conditioners for hos-
pitals-they ended up in the general's house.
We brought in hospital refrigerators to store
vaccines in. The vaccines spoiled and the
refrigerators wound up in the general's
house."
These are the comments and criticisms
which the highly placed sources in Saigon
made about the commercial import program
and sales of farm surplus commodities.
First, according to one Vietnamese eco-
nomist and ex-minister, economic aid doesn't
aim at an economic target, but is only in
support of a military machine. About four-
fifths of the U.S.-generated piastres in 1964
were allocated to support the Vietnamese
military budget.
CONSPICUOUS WEALTH
Second, the commercial import program
has enriched and enlarged the upper middle
class elements in Saigon and, other cities, but
it has also accentuated the extremes between
the urban and rural classes. Often you bring
in a whole lot of things for the richer mid-
dle class with conspicuous consumption, and
the Vietcong can play on this, saying it en-
riches the middle class and bourgeois, one
Western ambassador said.
Third, the rural communities, especially
earlier in the program, received a relatively
small proportion of the commercial import
aid. Between 1955 and 1960, when the Viet-
cong began organizing and recruiting in the
countryside, only 4 percent of the direct and
indirect American aid was funneled into the
rural population, which is an estimated 85
percent of the total population.
Fourth, the commercial import program
has not been geared to assist the building
of industries which funnel Vietnamese agri-
cultural products into the light industrial
sector. During the critical period of Viet-
cong formation in the countryside, from 1955
to 1960, American economic aid assisted in
the establishment of 58 companies. But
about 70 percent of these depended on im-
ported raw materials: even the papermills
needed to import woodpulp.
The Vietnamese officials have therefore de-
vised an effective system of padding their
vouchers and receipts.
"Suppose a wooden bridge costs 1,600 plas-
ters to build," an American district adviser
complained, "the contractor adds another
200 piasters and the district chief adds an-
other 200 piasters. I can practically see the
money flow into their pockets, but they give
me a receipt for 2,000 plasters. What can I
do to disprove them?"
One Vietnamese province chief under the
Ngo Dinh Diem regime admitted he ordered
a few of his loyal troops to blow up his own
bridge that was half constructed so that
they could let another construction contract.
Some Vietnamese regional and regular
units are known to possess phantom troops-
troops that never existed, or were killed or
deserted but never reported as lost. Their
paychecks slip into the hands of privileged
commanders.
"What it boils down to is whether to have
a social revolution or not and clean up this
government," a Vietnamese economists ex-
plained. If America is too scared to do it-
the Communists will, and will win the people.
The people want justice. They don't care
if they have a democracy or a dictatorship-
if the government comes in with bullets or
ballots. But they want justice-even if it
is harsh. The Vietcong are harsh, but they
are just.
The basic conclusion arrived at in this
excellent series is summed up at the be-
ginning of the second article:
U.S. policy in South Vietnam is frozen in
a negative posture that concentrates on mil-
itary victory while failing to produce the
sort of dramatic political strategy that would
make such victory possible.
This, at least, is the opinion of highly
placed sources in Saigon who have watched
the American involvement here grow stead-
ily for more than a decade.
In their view, the U.S. attitude is essen-
tially anti-Communist rather than pro-
something. The overwhelming impression
is that the American policymakers are at-
tempting to stem the tide of Communist
aggression or to teach Hanoi a lesson. But
this implies a political status quo in a coun-
try that is changing in its post-colonial de-
velopment, and is, indeed, fighting for
change.
"Nothing negative has ever prevailed over
something positive," the Western military
expert commented. One of the most fre-
quently asked questions by Vietnamese cap-
tains and majors on the battlefront is "What
are we fighting for?" as they look at the
political turmoil in their rear area at Saigon.
I ask unanimous consent that the
article by Mr. Richard Starnes and Mal-
colm W. Browne be printed at the con-
clusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibits 5 and 6.)
EXHIBIT 1
[From the New York Times, June 9, 19651
GROUND WAR IN ASIA
The American people were told by a minor
State Department official yesterday that, in
effect, they were in a land war on the con-
tinent of Asia. This is only one of the
extraordinary aspects of the first formal an-
nouncement that a decision has been made
to commit American ground forces to open
combat in South Vietnam. The Nation is
informed about it not by the President, not
by a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-
Cabinet official, but by a public relations
officer.
There is still no explanation offered for a
move that fundamentally alters the char-
acter of the- American - involvement in Viet-
nam. A program of weapons supply, train-
ing and combat advice to South Vietnamese,
initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Ken-
nedy, has now been transformed by Presi-
dent Johnson into an American war against
Asians.
It was the bombing of North Vietnam that
led, in turn, to the use of American jet air-
craft in South Vietnam and the emplace-
ment of American marines and paratroops
to defend American airbases. Now, with
American air support hampered by the mon-
soon rains, American ground troops are to be
made available as a tactical reserve to help
South Vietnamese units in trouble.
It can all be made to sound like a gradual
and inevitable outgrowth of earlier com-
mitments. Yet the whole development has
occurred in a 4-month span, just after an
election in which the administration cam-
paigned on the issue of its responsibility and
restraint in foreign military involvements.
Since March, American forces in Vietnam
have been more than doubled to 52,000, as
compared to 14,000 when President Johnson
took office. Additional troops are moving in
and a buildup to 70,000 is indicated. There
has been neither confirmation nor denial for
reports that a force exceeding 100,000 is
planned, including three full Army and Ma-
rine divisions. Nor is there any clarification
on whether the so-called combat suppori
role now authorized-combat in. support of
South Vietnamese units-is to be trans-
formed later into offensive clear and hold op-
erations of- a- kind hitherto carried out only
by South Vietnamese forces. Apart from the
obvious difficulty American troops would
have in distinguishing guerrillas from the
surrounding population, such a war ulti-
mately might absorb as many American
troops as were employed in Korea.
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June 9, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
A major factor in the original escalation gaged in patrolling action-will soon take on INSOLUBLE MESS
12531
decision-the decision to bomb North Viet a full combat role as a tactical reserve aid- When the President outlined his Baltimore
nam-was the political crisis in Saigon after ing South Vietnamese units in trouble. peace proposals they were also personal, espe-
eight changes of government in little more Yet, at no point has there been signifi- cially his plan for a giant series of dams on
than a year. The bombing was urged upon cant congressional discussion, much less di- the Mekong River to benefit all the Indochi-
President Johnson as the only way to shore rect authorization of. what amounts to a nese countries, including North Vietnam.
up morale, halt the factional feuding, and decision to wage war. That is why 28 Demo- Mr. Johnson had hoped that this, coupled
prevent a complete political collapse in South cratic Congressmen, on the initiative of Rep- with his offer of unconditional peace talks,
Vietnam. resentative ROSENTHAL, of Queens, now have plus joint United States-U.S.S.R. aid, might
Is it only a coincidence that the decision wisely asked the chairman of the House For- induce the other side to sit down at the con-
to enter the ground war has come during eign Affairs Committee to hold public hear- ference table. It didn't, for three reasons:
another political crisis in Saigon? Ther ings on the administration's Vietnam poi- The North Vietnamese have been winning.
may be a need to prop up the government 1Cy. Our bombing raids have not stopped the sup-
of Premier Phan :guy Quat against the Cath- American casualties in Vietnam, while still ply of troops and supplies from going south
olic and southern factions which. made a relatively minor, already exceed those of the or the guerrilla raids by the Vietcong.
constitutional issue out of his recent Cabi- Spanish-American War. The choices open The Russians, who normally might have
net reshuffle and still seek to. bring him to the President are exceedingly difficult acted as intermediaries, were put on the spot
down. But is it not more likely that politi- ones; they should not be his alone, either by our bombing of the north. The Chinese
cal irresponsibility in Saigon will grow, as a matter of sound policy or of constitu- have chided them with being too friendly to
rather than decline, as the main military tional obligation. If he takes it upon him- the United States in the past, and with for-
responsibility for defending South Vietnam self to make an American war out of the saking their alleged former role as the cham-
Is transferred increasingly to American Vietnamese tragedy-without seeking con- pion of small nations. So it's difficult for
hands? gressional and national consent-he may them to side with the United States now.
The country deserves answers to this and open,the country to divisions even more dan- The Chinese are delighted at the predica-
many other questions. It has been taken gerous than those that developed out of the ment of both Moscow and Washington. They
into ,a ground war by Presidential decision, Korean conflict. don't want the Vietnamese war to end. The
when there is nQ exngrgency that would seem longer it lasts, the more the United States
to rule out congressional debate. The duty EXHIBIT 3 and Russia become at swords' points, and the
now is for reassurance from the White House [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, June 4, more the smaller nations of southeast Asia
that the Nation will be informed, on. where it 1965] pull away from the United States into the
is- being led and that Congress will be con- PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PERSONAL WAR Red Chinese camp.
sulted before another furious upward whirl (By Drew Pearson) In brief, the military advisers who sold
is taken on the escalation spiral, the President on the strategy of bombing
War, no matter what the circumstances, North Vietnam failed to understand oriental
Ez~HZSiT 2 is tragic business. However, the war. in politics. Though he inherited the Vietna-
{From the New York Times, June, 7, 1966 Vietnam has also become a lonely war and mese problem, they sold him on enlarging it
1 to some extent a personal war for one man. into a mess that could either lead to world
COI4GRESS AND VIETNAM This is not because the President began
wax or is almost insoluble without serious
Signs are growing of congressional interest it. It began 18 years ago under the French, loss of face.
In ending the "leave it to Lyndon" era in was picked up 10 years ago by President BEHIND THE SCENES
American foreign policy. Eisenhower, and increased 4 years ago by The Central Intelligence A enc is usin a
There is Senator FULBRIGHT''s new President Kennedy. Y g
to giv e the OAS a major voice in proposal channeling It's become personal today because the Ica m to mysterious airline that calls itself Air Amer-
President feels it so keenly and directs it so drop weapons and supplies to our guer-
American military assistance to Latin Amer carefully. Every morning at 3 he wakes up rills fighters in Communist-held areas of
ica... There is the provision in the new foreign Laos and Vietnam. The CIA is trying to give
aid bill for a thoroughgoing congressional and calls the White House Security Room.
the Reds a taste of their own guerrilla medi-
Three in the morning is about the time the
Invest gation' and for terminating the aid news is in from Vietnam on the casualties tine Senate investigators have dis-
program in its present form in 1967. and the hits after each bombing raid. covered that the CIA not only watches sus-
There is, the-trip to Europe, at their own The President worries over these, broods picious mail, but actually opens the letters
expense, of four House Republicans to in- over them, wants to know, no matter what as part of its secret intelligence work. How-
vestigate the crisis in NATO. And there are the hour of the night, just what has ever, Senators will protect the CIA, will not
the recent criticisms of administration policy happened. reveal this in their probe of Government
in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic by One reason for this personal direction is eavesdropping.
Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY, plus his current that the President is worried over the possi-
charge that the United States is neither meet- bility of enlarging the war. He knows how EXHIBIT 4
ing its aid responsibilities to the underde- easy it is for bomber pilots to make a mis- [From the New York (N.Y.) Herald Tribune,
veloped countries nor Identifying itself with take, or how dangerous it can be to jettison May 30, 1965]
the world revolution underway in those areas. their bombs on their way home. (By Beverly Deepe)
Factors that go beyond the President's On the usual wartime bombing raid, a SAIGON.-One of the biggest puzzles of the
limited experience in foreign affairs and the mission will fly over a target, attempt to Vietnam war is what makes the Communist
extraordinary vacillations in Dominician knock it out; but if the clouds are low or an Vietcong guerrillas fight so hard.
policy have set off the present questioning enemy plane gives trouble, the bombers may "It's fantastic the way the Vietcong lay it
at home and abroad. The reluctance of Sec- drop their payload indiscriminately on the
pendent advice, the meager use made by the rv` "Young kids who fought with them explain
President of nonofficial task forces in the Not, however, , with h the war ar in Vietnam. it by saying the Vietcong create a 'new order
the Mr. Johnson has given strict orders that only and a new reality.'"
foreign policy field, the overdependence the
targets he picks out are to be hit-and
military and intelligence agencies and the According to reliable persons who have
these are bridges, ammunition dumps, rail-with ,
divorce between the administration and the the Vi icon Vmanpo prisoners and defectors
38,000
road centers and military installations.
Nation's intellectuals--all point to a need the 6,000ong hard-core fighters composed 0, 38,000
"We're knocking out concrete, we're not
for more vigorous congressional interest. hitting women and children," 46,0p harm core fighters and into to
Nowhere is this re vital than on Viet- ," he has ire- 80,000 part-time guerrillas--falls into two
n?o. quently told his aides. main categories: The older generation troops
nam, where grave constitutional questions In addition to his care to avoid civilian
are raised by the official acknowledgment of casualties he is concerned over any bombin who fought against the French 15 to 20 years
g
ago and a younger generation recruited in
an increasing combat role for American mission that might stray over the line into
troops. During the 18 months of the John- China, or give the Communist Chinese the South Vietnam.
son administration, the number of. Amer- slightest provocation to enlarge the war. Of the first category, more than 70,000
lean troops in Vietnam has been tripled to This is why the war in and over Vietnam Vietminh-as they were called during the
about 46,500; a further buildup to more has been a lonely war, a personal war di- French Indochina War-left their homes in
than 60,000 appears imminent. American rected by a man who goes to bed well after South Vietnam when the country was parti-
planes have entered into combat both in midnight, but wakes up automatically at 3 tioned in 1954 and went to North Vietnam,
South and North ?Vietnam-in the. latter a.m. to check on the military targets he has where they continued their training and
case openly attacking a foreign country with personally pinpointed. Indoctrination.
no declaration of war. American warships Under the Constitution, he tells friends, INFILTRATION
have bgmbar(.lecl the North Vietnamese coast. he is charged with the conduct of war. But From 1966 onward, they gradually infll-
And there ate indic2tions that American regardless of the Constitution, he knows trated back to their native villages. The
ground troops-first employed as .advisers in that if there are failures, or if the war most significant aspect of their return was
South Vietnam, then deployed to defend spreads, he will get the blame. So he is tak- a transfusion of political leadership into the
American installations and now directly en- ing the responsibility, south to organize and recruit younger south-
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 12532
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 1965
erners. Simultaneously, the Communists be- The Communists operate behind the mask
gan a massive campaign of assassination of of the National Liberation Front, which ex-
village government officials, virtually obliter- ploits nationalism and xenophobism. It dis-
sting the Government's local leadership. guises its Communist core philosophy by
The older troops had fought the French sloganeering about freedom and democracy.
for one reason: Independence, with its anti- One Western diplomat explained the Com-
French, anticolonial, antiwhite overtones. monist appeal in these words: "The Commu-
They fought and won with guns, but their nists have swiped the American ideals. The
most effective weapon was hate. Communists are promising the peasants a
One member of a Vietminh suicide squad New, Fair, Square Deal-land, reform, demo-
wrapped himself in gasoline-soaked cotton, erotic elections, land courts for justice."
ran into a French ammunition depot in Sai- Hence, the appeal of the Communist guer-
gon and burned himself alive to destroy the rilla movement Is not communism at all.
installation. The story of the cotton boy One American official explained that of more
swept through the countryside. than 200 Vietcong prisoners and returnees he
thin
d an
ti
"My father even wanted me to volunteer
to be a cotton boy," a Saigon businessman
recently recalled.
'Young Vietnamese students read French
history books referring to "our ancestors, the
Gauls." This example of French accultura-
tion was countered by the Vietminh argu-
ment: "Please remember, your ancestors were
not the French. You know your ancestors.
were the dragon and the fairy," a legend com-
monly accepted by the population.
According to prisoners in the older group,
once they returned to South Vietnam in the
late 1950's, they were surprised at what they
found. They had been told the south must
be liberated from its own poverty. One said
he was astonished to see the Government
troopers wearing boots. (Communist troops
often wear rubber-tire sandals.)
Another said he had been told that two-
thirds of South Vietnam had been liberated.
But when he attacked Government villages
the peasants fought his men. They had
been told they must liberate the south from
the American imperialists, but soon discov-
ered they were fighting Vietnamese.
But few of these veterans defected to the
government side. One oldtime propaganda
agent captured in the south explained that
he listened to the Voice of America and
British Broadcasting Corp. to discover the
truth. But he listened to the Hanoi radio
to find out the correct party line.
He reasoned that if the party lied, there
must be a good reason for it. The party
knew best.
The younger generation Vietcong troops
join the liberation army for different rea-
sons. Some of them are virtually kidnaped.
Others have personal grievances or are sim-
ply bored with life in the villages. The
Vietcong promise them adventure, and a
chance to see life and be educated.
There is no sharp overriding national cause
which the Vietcong are pushing throughout
g
y
one
Interviewed, not one men
about Marxism-Leninism, atheism, collective
farms.
But the Vietcong also have a strong appeal
for youth. "The Vietcong promise them
fun-that life will be gay," one source said.
"Many of those who join believe they get
this."
Even if a youth has been forced to join the
Vietcong, a highly effective indoctrination
session immediately begins to mold him into
an enthusiastic, well-disciplined fighter.
Perhaps, this can be seen in their songs.
Neil Jamieson, 29, a Vietnamese-speaking
provincial representative from Gloucester
City, N.J., translated a number of Vietcong
songs and talked with incoming Vietcong de-
fectors.
One of the songs goes:
"We are peasants in soldier's clothing, wag-
ing the struggle for a class oppressed for
thousands of years; our suffering is the suf-
fering of the people.
"Many of their songs are centered on vic-
tory," Mr. Jamieson said. "They associate the
soldiers with the peasants-fighting oppres-
sion, not only against the foreigners, but also
the upper classes within society.
"The troops accept-in fact, glorify-hard-
ship because it identifies them with the peo-
ple. It's almost like old Christianity. It's
like little kids' Sunday School hymns-the
idea of picking up the Cross for Jesus but in-
stead of a cross it's a pack."
He said most of the Vietcong songs were
"upbeat, emphasizing the positive in a Nor-
man Vincent Peale manner." Government
songs were often sad.
A SPARTAN LIFE
"The young troops lived a very Spartan
life," Mr. Jamieson continued. They were
short of medicine, and all suffered attacks
of malaria. Many suffered real hardships. It
was cold in the jungle, yet they didn't dare
light a big fire.
"I talked with many of the Vietcong about
paign. But there are grievances. their songs," he said. "After their evening
Some unmarried males join to get away meal, they would break Into teams of three
from their landowners. Some are fired from and have their self-criticism sessions. Each
their jobs and join. Many prefer serving one would go through his experiences of the
with the Vietcong rather than government day, his life in society, and in his three-man
forces because they believe they can stay combat team. If one of them was wounded
closer to their families. In combat, the two buddies would take care
Some young married men join to get away Of him.
from the in-laws; the Communists in the "After supper they would go through this
village promise to take care of the wife and ritual. They are taught to do this immedi-
children. (One Vietcong trooper returned to ately after joining the Vietcong by the older
his village, found his wife and children cadre, who told them that sins can be for-
destitute, picked up a rifle and shot up the given but to conceal anything is a blow
Vietcong village committee.) One was against the group.
talked into joining when a pretty girl prom- "If for example, the young trooper had
dis-
h
b
i
'
ecame
e
d;
d criticize
ised to marry him if he d
lost his ammunition or weapon, he
i.llusioned when he found she had promised himself. This psychological aspect is a great not solely, a military operation against
to marry six other recruits also. Vietcong strength. armed Communist guerrillas. They are Op-
Some are simply kidnaped at gunpoint. "After the self-criticism session, there erating dramatically on one front while the
One was led away with a rope around his would be announcements b the cadre and Communists are operating on six fronts-
One was kidnaped only hours after by political, economic, social, cultural, psycho-
neck. P~ y then would sit around and sing to pass their logical, and military, all integrated into one
his wedding. time in the evening. They would sit around powerful stream of warfare.
One reliable source estimated that about a small campfire, if security permitted-just "Suppose you lose your billfold in a dark
10 to 15 percent of the southern-born Viet- like the Boy Scouts used to do. These youths place," one Vietnamese provincial official ex-
cong troops were orphans. About 30 percent were uneducated, but the Communists taught plained. "But you insist on looking for it
are, farm laborers. About 80 percent came them about the sputnik and Castro and Cuba. where there is light because it is easier.
from the rural areas. They didn't understand it well, but they knew Well, you are now looking fthe Commu-
In the West, the war in Vietnam is an Cuba was a tiny country near America and W military field--
field-
ideological confrontation with communism. America was a paper tiger when Cuba stood nists in the light place looking for
In Vietnam, this is not the way it is regarded up to us and we were powerless to do any- but you never, never find them all-they are
by many of the Vietcong. thing to them, also where you refuse to look."
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"The troops were short of rice, yet each
day they put a few grains from each meal in
a bamboo tube. When there was enough
they'd take it to a tribal village and have a
party for the children.
"One youthful trooper was with the Viet-
cong for 3 years, and was a member of their
youth organization, which is the halfway
point to becoming a party member. He was
recruited at gunpoint, but he didn't hate the
Vietcong."
He told me: "If I told you what I thought
about out there in the jungle you'd think
I was crazy. The Vietcong create a new real-
ity; you feel you are in the world and not out
of it."
New York Herald
31, 1965]
OUR GrRL IN VrET-II: AMERICA'S FROZEN
POLICY-VITAL POLITICAL POWER UNUSED
(By Beverly Deepe)
SAIGON.-U.S. policy in South Vietnam is
frozen in a negative posture that concen-
trates on military victory while failing to
produce the sort of dramatic political strat-
egy that would make such victory possible.
This, at least, is the opinion of highly
placed sources in Saigon who have watched
the American involvement here grow steadily
for more than a decade.
In their view, the U.S. attitude is essen-
tially anti-Communist rather than pro-
something. The overwhelming impression
is that the American policymakers are at-
tempting to stem the tide of Communist
aggression or to teach Hanoi a lesson. But
this implies a political status quo in a coun-
try that is changing in its postcolonial
development and Is, indeed, fighting for
change.
"Nothing negative has ever prevailed over
something positive," the western military
expert commented. "One of the most fre-
quently asked questions by Vietnamese cap-
tains and majors on the battlefront is, 'What
are we fighting for?' as they look at the po-
litical turmoil in their rear area at Saigon."
HOLLOW WORDS
While some Americans in Saigon pay lip-
service to the principles of freedom and
democracy, these are, as one American Gov-
ernment employee noted, "hollow words that
mean little in Asia."
A Western diplomat argues that the West-
ern concepts of democracy and freedom have
never been simplified and codified as have
the Communist ideology. There axe no
American primers for democracy as there
are Communist primers for revolution.
"One cannot understand these American
principles unless he has reaped the benefits
of them or seen them firsthand," the diplo-
mat explained. Hence, he said, the princi-
ples in which Americans believe must be
translated, demonstrated, and visualized for
the Vietnamese by the Vietnamese Govern-
ment, and this has yet to be done.
The main political problem during the
past decade seems to have been to realize
there is a political problem and to act
positively.
The American policymakers, however,
view the battle in Vietnam as principally, if
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June 9, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD- SENATE
12533
?~ ~! and American authorities appear cool to the Several weeks ago a low-ranking Vietna-
During the past decade, $1.1 billion was idea. Economic planners are more interested mese civil servant was fired after he spat on
spent on the U.S. military assistance program in Japan's contribution to a $9 million bridge the Minister of Economics because of differ-
for weapons, tanks, and ammunition for the for the Mekong River. ing views on the issue. A Vietnamese gen-
Vietnamese armed forces. In addition, $2.1 The United States has political power in eral and an admiral have been suspended on
billion was spent in Vietnam from American Vietnam, but chooses not to use it. Yet at charges of corruption.
economic aid funds. But 75 percent of the this time the Saigon regime is too weak to act One high-ranking American official in the
economic aid was for the purpose of pa
s g with political
y
commercial import program punish," one American explained. "But we
? ca 'v Alai 13C411" "But we
These figures exclude the salaries of Amer- don't do it. We are still timorous about in-
ican servicemen, and Government officials, terfering in a nation's internal affairs."
and all their operating costs, as well as A Western ambassador agreed. "The first
gasoline, parts, and ammunition for Ameri- basic fault in the system," he said, "is you
can units, are too respectful of Vietnamese independ-
There is also the fact that the Vietnamese ence, so you do not interfere in making
national army was built to counter a con- decisions on great issues-and in my opinion
ventional invasion instead of a guerrilla war. you should-while instead you are very par-
Once the slow-motion invasion began a year ticular, you pester them on small things of
ago, the army was slow in reacting. almost no importance. This creates the
There is no grand, dramatic political strat- wrong impression and does not get the re-
egy for winning the political war in South sults. Your instructions should be more ar-
Vietnam Comparable to the dramatic mill- ticulate but fewer."
Lary actions. American generals, colonels and captains
The bombing raids on North Vietnam have admit they do not talk politics with their
not
d
an
cannot win the political war within Vietnamese military counterparts; and no
the South. But without them the war could other American agency has been given the
never have been won-or contained -because responsibility of cementing all the fighting
of the sustained influx of North Vietnamese Vietnamese political factions together.
troops, weapons, and the much more sig- This is in contrast to the Vietcong and
niiicant political leadership cadre. If the the Communist apparatus-a guerrilla is first
raids have not won the war, however, they and foremost a political cadre, and after that
have in effect won time-they have provided a soldier. The Communist political cadre-
the time to act politically. perhaps with only the rank of sergeant-de-
Sources in Saigon now hope for a dynamic tides what villages will be attacked and the
political maneuver to reverse the adverse military commander, with a rank of major,
political tide. They feel the military opera- follows his orders.
tions then would not be considered an end COMMUNISM FIRST
in themselves a i
s
,
s now the case, but the
means to an end-an honest, efficient gov-
ernment, a land reform program for the
peasants, a smashing medical-educational
program that would lift the nation econom-
ically and politically into the 20th century.
These sources argue that the elaborate and
effective military battle plans have in effect
given the nation time to formulate and im-
plement a massive blueprint for the political-
economic-social development of Vietnam.
Instead of Vietnam being simply a military
battleground, it could also become a political
The Vietcong military apparatus is of a
secondary, supporting nature to the Com-
munist political machine. Hence American
efforts to defeat the guerrillas still have not
defeated the political subversive. American
advisers in the provinces admit that even
when the Communist guerrillas are defeated
militarily, the Communist political cell sys-
tem in the village is rarely destroyed.
The appearance of new French faces on the
main street of Saigon, the arrival of increas-
ing number of proneutralist Vietnamese from
Paris, and the release of thousands of pro-
one young American Government employee from prison within the last 18 months is
said. "We are fighting against revolution. more important in the subversive field than
How can we expect to win? It's like advo- the introduction of American combat Ina-
eatin the murder ,o# mother." fines and paratroopers is in the counter-
One Western ambassador says as an exam- "With la guerri the a military fiud.
ple that it was "politically inadmissible" that mount of money you et-
200,000 refugees in the central part of the namefe spending in military field," one all the
country-victims of an autumn flood, Com- land fromaor said, "you could buy it the
munist terror and friendly bombing raids- from the landowners and give t to the
were not made a symbol of non-Communist peasants. You could pave Vietnam with
revolution by the Vietnamese gold."
government. A 155-mm. howitzer shell costs $70; a 500-
They are given charity rice and propaganda
lectures," costs $18 n
lectures," he said. "They should be put in and pound
tons general purpose bomb-
factories and apartment houses to show the of them are expended daily and
ni
htl
g
y fn Vietnam.
world the benefits of fleeing the Communist
side, Some anti-Communist refugees are not
given help by the government, and return to I From the New York Herald Tribune,
Vigtcong areas." June 1, 1965]
Another source criticized the American of- OUR GIRL IN VIET-III: CORRUPTION-
ficials for not forcing the Diem regime years HOTTEST SAIGON ISSUE
ago to establish "centers of prosperity" in (By Beverly Deepe)
which the Vietnamese people and the outside SAIGON.-The hottest issue in Saigon is
world ould,see the results. of the American not bombing Hanoi, nor Vietcong terrorism,
presence. nor possible negotiations for peace. It Is
WoilLD INT40DUCE TV corruption.
A high-ranking Western official suggests Vietnamese sources-generals, majors,
that television should have been widely in- captains, ex-ministers, economists-say that
.troduced in Vietnam to relay government corruption has now reached scandalous, un-
propaganda to the villages, to educate the precedented proportions.
children and to show adult films on better Highly placed sources in Saigon-Ameri-
carming methods, can, Vietnamese, and Western-urged tighter
More than 3 years ago, private Japanese controls on Vietnamese Government funds
companies made such,, proposals for this, and and on American aid and goods.
the Japanese Government has tentatively of- The issue is considered a gift for the Viet-
fered technical assistance and funds. A tele- cong communists, who promise the workers
vision station would Cost $500,000. and peasants justice and equality. It also
But Successive Vietnamese governments has caused friction within the Vietnamese
have postponed a decision on this project Government and armed forces.
of American economic aid was unreceipted
or unaccounted for last year. A low-echelon
American provincial official says some of the
45 Vietnamese provinces had not submitted
vouchers for expenditures during the past 3
years.
Another official said that outright corrup-
tion-American funds ending up in the
pockets of the rich-was probably limited
to 10 percent. Last year, this would have
been $233,000.
One high-ranking Western official angrily
commented: "This is a major American
scandal. The way American-generated
funds flow out of this country to Paris-or
back to America itself-well, it makes your
hair curl.
"There are millions and millions of
piasters that go to France or go to Hong
Kong-and these piasters are generated by
American aid funds. The French have a
saying in Saigon that every time America
increases its aid funds there's a new hotel
on the Champs Elysee."
FRENCH GIGGLE
The ambassador of another Western em-
bassy lamented, "The French stand by, look
at what you're doing, and giggle."
American aid falls into two broad cate-
gories-military and economic. During the
past decade $1.1 billion was given to Vietnam
through the U.S. military assistance pro-
gram. This program gives guns, ammuni-
tion, bombs, and other equipment to the
Vietnamese armed forces.
The original purpose of American advisers
was to train Vietnamese to use the equip-
ment-"and to keep track of the equipment,
which sometimes took some doing," one
American captain who worked on the pro-
gram for 2 years said.
"We brought in air conditioners for hos-
pitals-they ended up in the general's house.
We brought in hospital refrigerators to store
vaccines in. The vaccines spoiled and the
refrigerators wound up in the general's
house."
The second broad category totaling $2.1
billion during the past decade is the eco-
nomic aid program administered through the
AID.
However, of the 10-year economic aid pro-
gram, 75 percent has been channeled into
the commercial import program and sales
under the food-for-peace program. It is this
program, copied from the Marshall plan for
Europe after World War II, that highly placed
sources in Saigon believe should be reap-
praised.
SPECIAL KITTY
The commercial import program, plus
selling of American farm Surplus goods, calls
for the importing of goods from America or
U.S.-authorized. countries. The American
Government pays the exporter in dollars for
the goods. The Vietnamese importer in
Saigon pays the Vietnamese in piasters.
These American-generated piasters are
then put in a special kitty belonging to the
Vietnamese Government. This counterpart
fund primarily is used to pay the operating
expenses of the Vietnamese national armed
forces and to supplement Vietnam's other
revenues.
The total amount of piasters budgeted by
the Vietnamese Government in 1964 was 37.1
billion, but only 31.5 was actually spent
which created the impression in Saigon, even
among Vietnamese economists, that "there's
too much money in Saigon. We cannot ab-
sorb It all."
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12534 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 1965
More than 19 of the 37 billion budgeted 250,000 piasters had been allocated for the known in the jungles--so his wife can be a
was spent in the military budget. U.S: job. The government official explained the prostitute?"
generated piasters through the counterpart remaining two-thirds had to be divided with "What it boils down is whether to have
clean up
Vietnamese of economist this s
fund accounted for 10.4 billion-or about messenger boys up high-ranking civil a a social revolution not and e
o ex-
still servants.
1965 Vietnamese t, still under Sixth, the Vietnamese administrative sec- plained. "If America is too scared to do -
The 1965 Vietnamese. budget, expenditures.
The
want justice. win TThethe dpeo-
discussion, is expected to total more than tion of the commercial import program has at the Communists
45 billion piasters. At the free market rate times been corrupted. One former Viet- ple. The people
81 is worth 73 piasters. namese minister who worked with Ameri- care if they have a democracy or a dictator-
These are the comments and criticisms can foreign aid said that Vietnamese im- ship-if the government comes in with bul-
which the highly placed sources in Saigon porters pay 4 to 5 piasters per American lets or ballots. But they want justice-even
dollar for the import license. if it is harsh The Vietcong are harsh, but
made about far commercial import program Every time there's a coup or government they are just."
and sales c farm surplus Vietnamese econo- ese ashakeup, Vietnamese businessmen complain
mist First, and acc ex-mordinginiste t or, "economic one Vieconometnase aid doesn't they will have to pay off a new minister to [From the New York Herald Tribune,
June 2, 1966]
aim at an economic target, but Is only in sup- get their import licenses.
port of a military machine." About four- Vietnamese Importers are legally allowed OUR GIRL IN VIET-IV: How THE U.S. BUILT
fifths of the U.S.-generated piasters in 1964 5 percent of the import license to be depos- ON THE QUICKSAND OF ASIAN POLITICS
were allocated to support the Vietnamese ited abroad in a foreign account. However, (By Beverly Deere)
military budget. as an inducement to sell his products, the
foreign exporter regularly offers an additional SAIGON.-In 1962, when American advisers
coxssncuours WEALTH illegal 4-5 percent listed as promotion fees and helicopters began arriving in large num-
I t President No Dinh Diem
Second, the commercial import program
has enriched and enlarged the upper-mid-
dle-class elements in Saigon and other cities,
but it has also accentuated the extremes be-
tween the urban and rural classes. "Often
you bring in a whole lot of things for the
richer middle class with conspicuous con-
sumption, and the Vietcong can play on
this, saying it enriches the middle class and
bourgeois," one Western ambassador said.
Third, the rural communities, especially
earlier in the program, received a relatively
small proportion of the commercial import
aid. Between 1955 and 1960, when the Viet-
cong began organizing and recruiting in the
countryside, only 4 percent of the direct and
indirect American aid was funneled into the
rural population, which is an estimated 85
percent of the total population.
Fourth, the commercial import program
has not been geared to assist the building
of industries which funnel Vietnamese agri-
cultural products into the light industrial
sector. During the critical period of Viet-
cong formation in the countryside, from 1955
to 1960, American economic aid assisted in
the establishment of 58 companies. But
about 70 percent of these depended on im-
ported raw materials; even the paper mills
needed to import wood pulp. has prevented large-scale deficit
After 10 years in Vietnam, Americans still runaway inflation, paid the national army, his brothers' secret party, the Can tau, corre-
allow rubber as one of the most important and assisted in the establishment of more sponded to the Communist Party.
exports in the country-most of it going to than 700 local industries. But it has also When President Diem was ousted, his
France-but no substantial rubber produc- allowed the Vietnamese Government to use counterideology and countermachines were
tion factories ..have been established in their own foreign exchange for other con- washed away. Since then, no single person
Vietnam. Sumer demands-and too much of this has has been in total command of the anti-
Fifth, the Vietnamese - officials recognize been channeled into the luxury class. Communist forces long enough to build a
two kinds of corruption; there's "dirty dis- The shops along the main street of Saigon similar machine or ideology.
honest corruption"-i.e., taking Vietnamese are filled with imported cheeses, French per- Since November 1963, the country has
Government funds-but also "clean honest fume, Japanese radios, French costume Jew- been in a state of political crisis. Sources in
corruption"-getting access to American- city, and foreign-made cars. None of these Saigon now argue that it would bee an istak:e or cit- teens for funds f ende Vietgovern rmen items can be bought by the rural peasants. to rebuild a counterideology-
for money for rendering ment IN SCHOOLS, Too could be done. They say instead that the
iservices, from the taxi meters birth tegSaigon government must reform itself and
Cates to fisting of taxi meters to meet gov- v These problems have been accentuated by "outrevOlutionize the Communists-but do
ernment specifications. day-to-day corruption in the Vietnamese sys- it 10 times better and 50 times faster than
The Vietnamese officials have therefore de- tem of life. A child in a French school in the Communists themselves."
vised an effective system of padding their Saigon-where sons of ministers and gen- The last the American-backed Saigon
vouchers and receipts. erals go if they are not in France-easily government time e seized the itSai on
"Suppose a wooden bridge costs 1,600 pias- can pass an exam with a 10,000 piasters de- volved ver the strategic hamlet program.
to build," an American district adviser posit under the table, "and if you doli't think concept o srategi hamlets, with m. TThe
ic and social advantages, was officially
complained. "The contractor adds another so, just look at how many French' teachers
other esters and the district chief adds an- leave Vietnam and invest is on the launched by President Diem in April 1962.
other 200 piasters: 7? Can,pi`aetically see the French Riviera," an anti-Communist source ECONOMIC DISASTER
money flow into their pockets, but they give remarked.
me a receipt for 2,000 piasters. What can I Transfers for Vietnamese battalion com- But it was doomed. One American, fluent
do to disprove them?" manders from the remote provinces to Saigon in Vietnamese, visited a pilot project in
One Vietnamese province chief under the cost 50,000 piasters. Cuchi, 20 miles from Saigon, and was told by
Ngo Dinh Diem regime admitted he ordered For 50,000 piasters, a young man can ob- peasants that the hamlet program was an
a bridge his loyal tralf- to truc up his own tain a certificate that he's involved in under- economic disaster.
they c that was heron constructed o that cover work for the Ministry of Interior-and The peasants said the Government forced
they let anoer construction contract. is thus exempt from the army draft. The them to construct hamlets instead of farm
units Some are Vietnamese e known to oeg possess and "phantom Ministry has signed 1,300 of these certificates their cash crop of tobacco. As a result, they
troops" r desert that never existed, or were in recent weeks. could produce only 10 percent of what nor-
killed was raised.
killed or deserted but never reported as lost. Up to 5,000 piasters is siphoned off the al- y The d
o
Vietnamese
American Tile#r paychecks slip into the hands of prix- lotments
become a prostitute before theefirst the schizophren cf nature of policymakers
it Laast c week, leaflets were printed payment arrives-which takes up to 10 society itself. The governing class is gener-
age leaflets roam
age Vietcong troops to return to o thh to the govern- voveern- months," one Vietnamese observer said. ally urban based, French educated with an
ment side. Printing cost 79,000 piastres, but "Why should her husband want to die un- aristocratic position based on either family
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or discount to be deposited in hard cur- Was told b e
re a close American friend that un-
Hence, of Vietnam.
Hence, , the program has allowed the Viet- less he radically reformed his government,
namese to build up foreign accounts of hard he undoubtedly would be overthrown in a
currency. In addition, Vietnamese and coup d'etat. The American had taken a poll
Western sources complain that many profits of Diem's former supporters and found that
are being sent abroad, either physically or only 30 out of 150 were sticking with the
in paper transfers, instead of being invested chubby little
wan mandarit listen and the Ameri-
in local industries in Vietnam.
PIASTERS IN SUITCASE cans weren't interested in hearing it," the
friend lamented. "More American troops and
Some sources believe that high-ranking helicopters came; but reform did not. The
officials simply carry piasters to Hong Kong Americans built a beautiful war machine
in a suitcase (four American enlisted men and placed it on political quicksand."
were once arrested for doing this for a Chi- Despite the American military buildup, the
nese). In other cases a paper transfer is failure of President Diem to institute reforms
made in which piasters are paid in Saigon provided the political fuel on which Vietcong
and American or Hong Kong dollars or French strength grew.
francs are deposited in a foreign account. A year later, President Diem was over-
Seventh, instead of selling goods to the thrown and killed.
Vietnamese consumer at the lowest possible President Diem had built a political magl-
cost to keep the products moving, some not line for political warfare with the Com-?
businessmen-principally Chinese-corner munists. On one side was the Communist
the market, establish a monopoly, and sell at ideology, the National Liberation Front and
inflated prices, causing a rise in the cost of behind it, the Communist Party, calling it-
living. During a 10-day shortage period, the self the People's Revolutionary Party.
price of sugar or cement, for example, would President Diem had built his own counter-
double. ideology, a vague concept called personalism.
vement corre-
M
o
Eighth, the commercial Import program His National Revolutionary
a, .sod to the National Liberation Front;
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June 9, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
background, money, or land ownership. This
elite minority attempts to govern the masses
although it knows little about them and is
concerned less.
The elite's lack of concern and compas-
sion was illustrated in an incident related
by the wife of a Western embassy official.
The wives of embassy officials had voluntarily
presented furniture, clothing, and toys to a
local orphanage.
"Several days after we handed over the
goods, one of the embassy wives returned
to the orphanage," the lady explained. "We
were astonished to find the officials had even
taken the toys out of the hands of little
orphans. The toys were nowhere to be
In contrast, cadre wanting to join the
Communist Party are sent to live with the
rural masses and practice "three together-
ness"; eating, living, and working with the
peasants. Cadre are invited to join the Com-
munist Party-which has an exclusive, and
not mass membership-when they are pre-
pared to govern.
"The Americans had to play with the cards
that were dealt out and they weren't very
good cards," one Western diplomat explained.
"In Vietnam, nationalism went the Commu-
nist way, We saw a lot of Vietnamese in
the South who are. the political forces in the
country` ? * * they are the bourgeois, the
landowners, the Catholics. They believe in
the same ideas as we do; we support these
people and they support us. But these peo-
ple in an Asian country in the throes of
political-social upheaval-they are not in the
mainstream."
The diplomat continued:
"They're on the edges-we're supporting
them and the mainstream is elsewhere-in
the nationalist movement of the Commu-
nists. The mainstream elements got into the
hands of Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam and
Mao Tse-tuug in China. Chiang Kai-shek
didn't have the nationalist issue; he was
helped by the United States-and this In
turn made it more likely he'd loge."
MANDARIN SYSTEM
The lack of justice and equal opportunity
is perhaps best reflected in the medical pro-
fession in Vietnam, which one American-
educated Vietnamese doctor called "the.med-
ical mafia." Two elite groups of doctors-
the faculty of medicine at University of
Saigon and a private. organization called the
Medical Syndicate-decide which doctors will
be licensed for private practice. Virtually
all the members of these groups come from
Hanoi and favor licensing only northerners.
"These seven older-generation men'in the
faculty of medicine are capable and dedi-
cated," one American official working in
medical field said, "They just happen to be
'partisan, They represent the old mandarin
system; they choose, select-and limit the
leaders of the future. It's the tradition in
the East for more than 1,000 years that lead-
ers of the next generation are always chosen
by those In power. This gives rise to the
mandarin system and an undue amount of
nepotism."
After 10 years of administering the largest cases, when the Vietnamese Government
U.S. medical aid program in the world- Army attempts to pacify the area, the com-
American officials here still have little in- wanders simply ignore the problems of land
-
ical school still is. not readily recognized in In Vietcong-controlled areas, if landowners
Vietnam, on the other hand, a parachute de- or their agents return to collect back rent
gree-a degree virtually bought with money the matter Is simple. The peasant complains
from a second-rate medical, School in to the Vietcong, and the agent is shot.
France-16 easily acceptable by the "the RECRUITING
mafla." American officials who have talked with
The two best hospitals in Saigon are large numbers of Vietcong prisoners and
French-operated. They are also the most returnees believe the Vietcong recruits with-
expensive. There is no good American hos- In South Vietnam are almost entirely from
pital in Saigon for the Vietnamese popula- the rural population, probably indicating
No. 104-14
tion (although there are two American-op-
erated hospitals in France). Requests by
the American-operated Seventh-day Advent-
ist Missionary Hospital to expand their 30-
bed clinic have repeatedly been refused.
American officials in Saigon have not ef-
fectively pressured the Saigon government
to correct "this rot within," in the words of
a Vietnamese anti-Communist. Instead they
have superimposed upon "the rot" a spec-
tacular' medical program in the provinces.
"The Americans think we should fight for
democracy," one young Vietnamese Intel-
lectual explained. "But in fact, the Viet-
cong fight because of the lack of democracy."
[From the New York Herald-Tribune, June 3,
1965]
OUR GIRL IN VIET-V: LAND REFORM-THE
LONG DELAY
(By Beverly Deepe)
SAIGON.-"The most important question in
the Vietnamese countryside besides security
is land reform," an American technician said.
"Yet virtually nothing has been done about
it.
"The Vietcong are gaining a lot of points
with the peasants by simply issuing land
titles-and it costs them nothing. They
take the land from the landowner and give
it away. Nothing we give to the peasants-
like pigs, insecticides, or fertilizer-is as im-
portant as land."
American technicians and provincial offi-
cials for the past several years have urged
the implementation of an effective land re-
form program. Two land distrilllttion
schemes currently have been written, but
neither has been accepted. Higher officials
in the American Embassy and in the Agency
for International Development believe "land
reform Is not the panacea for Vietnam's
problems."
A program for the training of land-reform
cadre is under consideration. But the pro-
gram will not be instituted until "the other
day"-when the Vietcong Communists have
been defeated.
WARNING
However, one Vietnamese general recently
warned American generals and officials that
American-backed efforts to pacify the prov-
inces would fail unless they were linked with
land reform.
"When the Vietnamese National Army goes
back to pacify areas from the Vietcong, the
local landowner goes back with them, offer-
ing to serve as intelligence agent," the gen-
eral explained. "Obviously he wants to col-
lect his back rent. So when the army pacifies
the area it pacifies it for the landowner and
not for the peasant.
"Of course, 35 percent of the peasants are
landless. They become fanatics and will
fight for the land given them by the Vietcong
because it's as important to them as life."
One U.S. official described as "horror
stories" the actions of some landowners to
collect back rent, once government forces
had pacified Vietcong areas.
12535
not the strength of the Vietcong appeal so
much as -the accessibility to rural masses
for Communist recruiting.
Furthermore, an estimated 30 percent of
the Vietcong strength recruited in the South
are considered to belong to the "farm labor
class," the lowest in the semi-Confucianistic
rigidly stratified rural society.
The five rural classes in Vietnamese coun-
tryside area are: the landowners (who lease
out all the land they own) ; the rich peasants
(who own more land than they till, and lease
out some of It) ; the middle-class peasants
(who own all they till); the tenant farmers
(who rent all their lands), and the farm
laborers (who cannot rent land, but are
seasonally hired for planting and harvesting).
"The question of land reform is quite
simple, one low-ranking Vietnamese pro-
vincial official explained. "The government
represents the landowners; the ministers and
generals are either landowners or friends of
landowners. The Catholic Church owns
land. The Buddhist Church owns land.
Nobody is interested in fighting for the poor
peasant. And the top Americans-well, they
talk to only the ministers and rich people so
they don't push it either."
LANDOWNERS
One Vietnamese general recalled that dur-
ing the war with the Communists against the
French in the early fifties, he was ordered
by imperial decree to have landowners in his
security district in North Vietnam divide up
the land with the peasants. There were two
large landowners in the area, he recalled, one
of them ,a Roman Catholic bishop and the
second a relative of the then Finance Min-
ister.
"The Catholic bishop refused to divide the
land because he said he had to support 2,500
seminary students with the rent money, and
the big landowner also refused," the general
explained. "I warned them both if they
didn't give the land to the peasants the
Communists would take over not only the
land, but also the seminary and the land-
owner's house. But they wouldn't listen.
The big landowner told the Finance Minis-
ter what I was doing. I was quickly trans-
fered to another place-and 3 years later the
Communists took over."
The land-reform issue in Vietnam-in-
volving not only issuing of land titles, but
also law enforcement on land rents, land
security for tenants and fixed rates on the
interest of borrowing of money-is not con-
sidered as acute as in other parts of Asia.
The Japanese say, for example, that a peasant
without land is like a man without a soul.
The victory of Chinese Communists in taking
over mainland China was achieved not so
much by armed' guerrillas as by the promise
of land to the poverty-stricken, landless
peasantry.
"The land for the landless" campaign in
the Philippines virtually broke the back
of the Hukbalahap insurrection in the
fifties.
According to reliable sources, the Vietcong
guerrillas in Vietnam have a haphazard, in-
consistent land-reform program which varies
from area to area in sections of the country
they control. However, the current govern-
ment has virtually no program at all. Ore
American provincial official estimated that
the Vietcong had Issued land titles to 50
percent of the peasant families in his prov-
ince; the government: had issued none.
In some areas, the Vietcong take some of
the land from the rich peasants and give it
to the landless tenant-who still pays rent,
to the Vietcong.
So far, the Vietcong have not killed or
harassed the rich peasants as they did before
their seizure of power in North Vietnam.
In some cases, the Vietcong program in the
rural areas is considered self-defeating. They
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12536 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE June 9, 1965
have made a definite push for higher rents
as they move toward the mobile warfare
phase.
In some areas, Vietcong taxes and indirect
taxes in rice have doubled over that of last
year. In other areas, the Vietcong are known
to have redistributed the land, increased the
land tax from 100 to 900 piastres and in-
creased the rice tax from 50 to 300 piastres.
In the countryside outside Hue, which has
lately fallen under their control, the Vietcong
are attempting to collect 10-15 percent of
what the peasants had raised during the
past decade, when they lived in peace, The
peasants are said to be discontented about
that. In isolated cases, peasants have burned
their own crops rather than pay Vietcong
taxes.
In the fifties, President Ngo Dinh Diem
attempted to correct the injustices In the
countryside. But his effectiveness was lim-
ited. A U.S. Government bulletin published
in January this year explained:
"Under the ordinances approved in 1956, a
program was being carried out to regularize
tenancy agreements through written con-
tracts. The contracts established minimum
and maximum rents of 15 and 25 percent, re-
spectively, chargeable by the landlord against
the tenant's main crop. While a start has
been made in land reform, real progress has
been negligible and a review of the entire
program needs to be undertaken."
(From the New York Herald Tribune,
4, 1965]
OUR GIRL IN VIET-CONCLUSI014: THE
GRAM THE REDS CAN'T FIGHT
(By Beverly Deepe)
June
PRO-
SAIGON.-This Is the story of the three little
pigs of Vietnam.
It is one of the most visibly effective
American-sponsored programs in rural Viet-
nam against which the Communist Vietcong
guerrillas have many arguments but no real
answer.
In early 1962, American provincial repre-
sentatives of the Agency for International
Development (AID) began distributing im-
proved white pigs from the Mekong Delta
throughout the entire countryside.
The program called for a package deal in
which eight bags of cement would be given
to build a combination pig sty-compost pit,
while three improved pigs and American sur-
plus corn would be lent to the farmer.
One of the pigs would later be marketed,
which would repay the entire $50 cost of the
venture; the others would be kept for breed-
ing.
"The pigs had a fantastic impact," one
American agricultural technican explained.
"The farmers followed the old Chinese cus-
tom and washed their pigs daily. Some of
them put red ribbons around the ears of
the pigs. Almost all the pigs became pets
for the children."
BUT WHY CEMENT?
"Of course, we had a few problems. .Some
of the Vietnamese farmers had never even
seen cement before and they didn't under-
stand why they should have a cement-floored
pig sty and compost pit when for centuries
they had moved the pig waste out on the
ground.
"Some of the farmers moved their cots into
the compost pit. Some of them put the pigs
in their houses and moved their families
into the pig sty. After all, it was better
than their dirt-floored houses.
"Some of the farmers put tiled roofs on
the pig sty with curlicues like ancient
Chinese temples. They became the new
status symbols in the villages. We never
could understand why they made them so
elaborate.
them only when they need the money. They
use the piggy as a living bank."
He explained that at first the richer village
families got the pigs, or the friends of the
local Vietnamese Government agricultural
technicians. Now-3 years and 40,000 pigs
later-"the pigs have seeped into all levels
of the villages," he said.
"The neighbors buy little -pigs from the
first family to have them. In one northern
city, 2 years ago you wouldn't see one im-
proved pig a day come through the slaughter-
house. Now about one-third of a day's
production is the improved breed."
REPAYMENTS
He explained that the Vietcong political
cadre attempted to sabotage the program by
telling the farmers that it was a "giveaway
program" rather than a loan, so that the
farmers would not make repayment to the
Government. So far, the rate of repayment
has been low, but in most cases the 18-
month deadline for repayment has not been
reached.
"The pig program doesn't make the farmer
pro-Government or pro-Vietcong," the tech-
nician explained. "But it does expose him
to the Government cadre, to the Government
administration and to an American
veterinarian. Maybe this is the first time in
the farmer's life that the Government has
done something to help him. So gradually,
it creates a better feeling for the Govern-
ment.
"The Vietcong do not steal the pigs, and
we have lost very few of our pig hamlets to
the Vietcong."
In addition to the pig program, Vietnamese
agricultural technicians, assisted by Ameri-
cans, have also started programs to improve
ducks, chickens, and cattle and to promote
a wider distribution of water buffaloes, which
are used to pull the farmers' plows.
Other technicians have established experi-
mental stations for improving rice seed
(which some Vietnamese prefer to eat rather
than use for seeding).
Recently, Vietnamese agricultural agents
conducted 3-day courses on improved farm-
ing techniquesfor farmers during the slack
season. Twenty piasters (30 cents) was given
the farmers for lunches "and that really had
an impact," one American agricultural expert
explained. "It. was part of our pacification
program. But the Vietcong even welcomed
the agents into their areas to help their
farmers."
FERTILIZER ON CREDIT
In another instance, Vietnamese Govern-
ment administrators have implemented a
credit-loan system whereby farmers can buy
fertilizer before the rice planting and repay
the loan after harvest. Production has more
than doubled in some areas. In other areas
small irrigation pumps have been bought on
loan, making possible two or three crops of
rice a year instead of only one.
The Vietcong retort that the fertilizer will
destroy the soil; that in the first year of
using fertilizer, production will increase but
in future years it will drop; that the govern-
ment will double the prices when it comes
to paying the loan, or that the government
will make the farmers dependent on the
fertilizer year after year and then skyrocket
the prices.
"The poor Vietnamese farmer, who has a
lot of superstition and no knowledge of
chemicals, is in the dark," an American
technician said. "The Vietcong play on the
farmer's past lack of faith in the govern-
ment."
American-supported rural economic aid is
scattered in the secure "oil spots" in each
of Vietnam's 45 provinces, which at times
undercuts the impact that it has had nation-
wide.
"Then, of course, the most profitable time The Communist-initiated war has pro-
to sell the pig is when he's about 1 year duced an economic deterioratioh and social
old," he continued. "But the Vietnamese upheaval in the countryside. Young farmers
let the pigs get fatter and fatter and sell are drafted Instead of planting rice. Large
tracts of land are abandoned because of Viet-
cong pressure, and other large tracts, now
uncultivated, could be developed into ex-
cellent farming land.
Despite this, the standard of living has
improved during the last 10 years. Ten
years ago, a bicycle was a status symbol; now
motor scooters, bicycles, and buses are reg-
ularly seen in the countryside.
The nationwide statistics on education are
also impressive. In 1955, 329,000 pupils at-
tended elementary public schools. In 1964,
the number had increased to 1.5 million.
In 1964 alone, 900 new rural schools were
built and 1,000 elementary education teach-
ers were trained. A total of 4,000 rural
schools was built in the decade.
In 1955, there were 2,900 university stu-
dents in Vietnam. By 1964, the number had
increased to 20,000, with a new university
established in the northern provinces. More
than 2,500 Vietnamese students and techni-
cians have been sent to America through
AID programs for advanced degrees.
However, the population growth is 2.8 per-
cent yearly.
In the rural health field, Vietnamese vil-
lagers often find it difficult to understand
what has been prevented-such as cholera
epidemics or malaria. During the last 6
years, however, the American-backed $12
million malaria-eradication program, part of
a worldwide effort, has dropped known ma-
laria cases from 7.22 percent to less than i
percent.
SPRAYING OF HOMES
More than 1 million Vietnamese farm
homes are being sprayed twice a year. More
than 8 million persons have been directly
affected by the spraying. The Vietcong
propagandists told the villagers the spray
would cause their thatched roofs to crumble
or would kill their cats and chickens.
"The Vietcong say the farmers don't have
enough cats to eat all the rats," one Ameri-
can medical expert explained, "and the rats
eat rice. They use this argument when
there's a poor crop of rice and a good crop
of rats-and it's very effective with the
peasants."
The malaria rate has dropped to the ex-
tent that medical experts simply keep tab?
on it by collecting blood samples.
"The Vietcong spread the word that the
Americans were collecting Vietnamese blood
to give to the wounded Americans," the medi-
cal expert continued. "This even happened,
on the outskirts of Saigon. One American
educational lecturer started to-give a lecture
on the taking of these blood samples for
malaria control; suddenly all the mamas and.
little kids started throwing rocks at him.
"The police had to escort him out--all be-
cause of that outlandish Vietcong propa..
ganda. But Vietnamese people don't like to
give blood; they are superstitious about that
and it's very strange to them."
More than 8,000 rural health workers are
currently operating in the Vietnamese coun--
tryside. Nine gleaming white surgical suites,
costing $500,000 each, have been established
throughout the country and are staffed by
Americans, Filipinos, New Zealanders, Aus--
tralians, and Italians.
EXHIBIT 5
[From the Washington (D.C.) News,
June 4, 1965]
THE ESCALATING WAR
(By Richard Starnes)
The American people are not alone in their
blissful ignorance of the coming demands for
men to feed the insatiable jungle war in
Vietnam. A completely reliable source who
was present at a White House briefing tells
me this:
"I saw V.S. Senators blanch when Robert
McNamara told them that they had to pre-
pare to see 300,000 American men sent to
Vietnam.
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"I never thought I would dive to see such
a thing in the United States, but McNamara
told the'briefing quite cheerfully that things
were looking up in Vietnam because we were
now killing four times as many men as we
were losing "
The briefing, which was one of dozens that
the White House has conducted in an effort
to sell its, 4 Vietnam policy, concluded with
talks by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
"Sig Daddy" himself.
"Rusk had nothing new to say, but he kept
saying it at such great length that finally
the President, who was sitting in the front
row, started looking ostentatiously at his
watch," my informant reports. "But Rusk
missed the cue, until at last the President
just got up and nudged Rusk away from the
lectern."
What the Senators heard then is a thing
that has caused something very near to
cloakroom consternation. Mr. Johnson
sailed into a defense of his escalation of the
war in Vietnam, and bluntly told his audi-
ence that they had authorized it and, by im-
plication, must share the responsibility for
it.
The 'President said he was frequently asked
what his policy in Vietnam was. Then, with
the sublety of a sledgehammer, he told the
Senators that the Congress had laid down
the policy in a resolution passed last August
7 by a vote of 504 to 2. And, said the Presi-
dent, he was doing his best to carry out that
resolution.
The source of this account, who knows the
Senate intimately, reported that, in spite of
the near unanimity of congressional support
for administration Vietnam policy, Senators
are still "rankled" over Mr. Johnson's bland
assumption that the August 7 resolution au-
thorized escalation of the war in southeast
Asia.
The resolution, passed in the fever of in-
dignation that followed reported attacks by
North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S.
Fleet units in Tonkin Gulf, comes very close
to saying what President Johnson says it
Says-whether the Senators who voted for it
like to admit it or not.
The resolution authorized the President
"as Commander in Chief, to take all neces-
sary measures to repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and
to prevent further aggression."
Note well that the resolution was not lim-
ited to Vietnam but specifically asserted
that the U.S. goal was "assisting the people
of southeast Asia" to fight off alleged ag-
gression. That means just what it says-
Congress "approves and supports" anything
Mr. Johnson deems necessary "to prevent
further aggression" in the area, and it is now
somewhat late for whatever second thoughts
are occurring in Capitol cloakrooms.
Whatever doubt may have existed as to the
intent of the August 7 resolution was dis-
pelled last month, however, when Congress
dutifully voted a blank check $700 million
appropriation to finance the expanding war.
This time the division was 596 to 10, still a
sufficiently lopsided vote to assure history
that the 89th Congress had supported escala-
tion in the Pacific whether it knew what it
was doing or not.
Exnnsrr 6
[From the New York Herald Tribune, June 6,
1965]
VIETNAM WAR ALTERS CHARACTER
(By Malcolm W. Browne)..
SAIGON, VIETNAM, June 4.-The war in Viet-
nam has been transformed into an enormous
..Meat grinder, in which both sides are now
making an all-out drive to bleed each other
to death.
It is a meat grinder in which America for
the first. time has an active part-on both
the giving and, receiving end.
U.S. officials predict that American casualty
tolls will increase from now on as American
Marine Corps and Army paratrooper units
move deeper into the battle.
U.S. air strikes on North and South Viet-
nam have increased in recent months to the
point that they are now round-the-clock
operations.
In the north, strikes have been limited to
miiltary instalaltions, roads, and waterways
well south of Hanoi. There seems no imme-
diate prospect of bombing North Vietnam's
cities or civilian industries.
But in the south, huge sectors of the nation
have been declared "free bombing zones," in
which anything that moves is a legitimate
target. Tens of thousands of tons of bombs,
rockets, napalm, and cannon fire are poured
into these vast areas each week. If only by
the laws of chance, bloodshed is believed to
be heavy in these raids.
In exchange, the Vietcong is exacting its
pound of flesh.
In the past week, big Vietcong units prowl-
ing through the jungle-covered mountains of
central Vietnam have chewed up three Gov-
ernment battalions so badly that these units
will not be able to fight again for along time.
Government casualties in these ambushes
probably have exceeded 1,000 men.
The Vietcong have clearly shifted gears
from what they call guerrilla warfare to
mobile warfare.
The Communist concept of mobile warfare
is essentially guerrilla operation on a vastly
expanded scale, in which whole battalions
and regiments are used in mounting am-
bushes. Ambushes remain the key feature
of the war.
The Saigon Government and its American
ally control the air above South Vietnam and
some of its roads and waterways. The Viet-
cong controls much of the rest of the nation.
Government units move mostly by truck,
plane, and helicopter. Vietcong units move
on foot through the trackless jungle. This
means the Communists generally have the
advantage in setting up their ambushes.
Roads, particularly those' that wind
through. the mountain passes of central Viet-
nam, are ideal places for ambushes.. Even
helicopters must land in clearings, wich in
the jungle are often only tiny patches of
ground.
The Vietcong can and often does set up
traps around these clearings, with 50-caliber
machineguns trained on the places helicop-
ters will be forced to land.
As the fighting grows hotter it becomes
more brutal. Neither side' is taking many
prisoners any more. Soldiers caught off side
now are generally shot on the spot or tor-
tured to death.
CHILEAN DEMOCRACY
WORKING WELL
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in
the news-in newspapers, on television,
and radio-we hear agreat deal . more
about Vietnam and-the Dominican Re-
public, about coups and revolutions, and
about the setbacks in the world. Un-
fortunately, the quiet progress that is
being made in many countries has been
neglected because it does not make news.
For example, the, current Atlantic
Monthly carries an excellent, concise re-
port on the impressively favorable de-
velopments in Chile under the leadership
of Eduardo Frei. The excellent article
points out that under Mr. Frei there has
been great improvement in education. I
read briefly from the 'article :
It is a shocking fact that in this country
of 8.5 million people of largely European ex-
traction there were approximately 200,000
children with no school to go to. in a crash
program initiated immediately on taking
office in November, at the beginning of the
Chilean summer, Frei organized an intensive
course to train new teachers, asked existing
ones voluntarily to accept longer hours, and
undertook the construction of. thousands of
schoolrooms, as well as lodgings for teachers
in remote areas.
President Frei has also been busily en-
gaged in an excellent land reform pro-
gram which in the next few years will
provide for an additional 100,000 inde-
pendent farmers in Chile.
Everyone who has studied the Com-
munist movement knows that the great-
est bulwark against communism is the
individual farmer who has his own plot
of ground and his own farm to defend.
In addition, under Mr. Frei tax re-
forms in Chile have made progress.
There have been jail sentences for tax
evaders and that is almost unheard of
in South America. Most significant of
all is the excellent cooperation between
the Chilean Government and American
corporations-Anaconda Copper and
Kennecott Copper-both of which have
huge holdings in Chile. Chile has
worked out a system of ownership and
participation in the profits of those cor-
porations that have been agreed to by the
corporations. Chile has avoided the ex-
propriation which the Marxists have
called for. Confiscatory taxes have been
avoided. Both Anaconda and Kennecott
are proceeding profitably fram their
standpoint, and also sharing their gains
with the Chileans and with the Chilean
Government.
There is a very serious problem, as
there is in most of those countries, with
inflation. But even in that field Mr.
Frei is making progress.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that I may pro-
ceed for 3 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER.. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The remarkable
thing to me is that Mr. Frei has been
able to put into effect a system of slow-
ing down inflation which has at the same
time permitted wage earners to earn
significantly more money. It has per-
mitted farmers to obtain better prices
for their crops, while simultaneously
keeping inflation from preventing the
kind of firm and solid economic progress
which is most essential.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this fine, short article on Chile,
published in the Atlantic Monthly, be
printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE ATLANTIC REPORT-CHILE
Chileans are accustomed to earthquakes,
but the recent upheaval in their politics is so
unusual that historians peer back to 1841 to
find a parallel. Christian Democrat Eduardo
Frei is the first President since then, under
Chile's multiparty system, to be elected by an
absplttte ;majority and to have a congress to
do his bidding.
His victory by 56 percent in the presidential
elections of September 1964 was startling
enough, but it might have been considered
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 1965
the wages of fear: the Marxist left was run-
ning so strong-and did, indeed, chalk up a
hefty 39 percent-that the right and center
voted for him as a lesser evil, in spite of his
revolutionary program. In the congressional
elections 6 months later, however, the old
alinements were back in force; the right and
center, Chile's traditional governing parties,
fully expected to return a congress able to
block untoward presidential initiative. In-
stead, Frei's party all but swept them away,
while the far left slightly improved its posi-
tion.
The result is not only a green light for
Frei's Revolution With Liberty, which aims at
transforming Chile's social structure, but also
an unexpected revolution in its politics. The
era of compromise, mutual back scratching-
or sheer deadlock-is over, at least for the
time being. Indeed, it is likely that disgust
with political infighting played its part, as it
does in Gaullist France, in this sudden emer-
gence of a majority party. Like De Gaulle,
Frei, before the landslide, had asked for a
constitutional amendment permitting him to
go to the people should congress become too
obstructionist.
PEACEFUL REVOLUTION
The program which is now the approved
blueprint for Chile's future follows closely
the outlines for peaceful revolution drawn up
at the Punta del Este conference as the basis
for the Alliance for Progress. Emphasis is
placed on achieving a social impact where it
will be most immediately and dramatically
evident in Chile: among the landless farm
laborers and among the unorganized prole-
tariat that swarms in city slums.
Chilean agriculture has been for some
years a major reason for the imbalance of the
economy. Once a net exporter of agricultural
products, Chile now imports more than $140
million worth, two-thirds of which could be
produced locally. In Chile's inflationary rat
race, agricultural prices have lagged behind
industrial ones because of Government at-
tempts to control the cost of the urban "mar-
ket basket"; worse still, these controls have
been erratic, thus discouraging rational de-
velopment.
While these economic considerations are
important, it Is the social aspects which most
concern the Christian Democrats. They point
out that one-third of the population lives on
the land, 60 percent is illiterate, and the
death rate of infants in rural areas is 129 per
thousand, shocking figures for one of the
most advanced countries in Latin America.
The ,Government goal is not, thus, just an
increase in production-which they will en-
courage by allowing food prices to rise faster
this year than those of industry-but a pro-
found agrarian reform.
Frei has promised to distribute land to
100,000 new farmers (luring his 6-year term,
and to provide, through cooperatives, the
necessary technical and financial assistance
to make the venture efficient. In this respect,
his government has a valuable heritage from
his predecessor, conservative president Jorge
Alessandri, who got a well-articulated if
somewhat mild agrarian reform law through
congress in 1962. Under this law 6,000 plots
have already been distributed. The present
government plans to amend the law, to speed
up the process of expropriation, and to allow
for deferred payment of indemnities instead
of cash on the line.
THE URBAN SLUMS
The program for the urban slums, which
have been rebaptized "marginal neighbor-
hoods," goes under the name Popular Pro-
motion, a hodgepodge package aimed at
bringing them Into the mainstream of na-
tional life: Here, too, the Alessandri heritage
gives Frei a headstart, since Alessandri built
more low-cost housing than any previous
President. Frei hopes to 'build still more,
and in the existing slums to install Water
systems. pave the streets, put in electricity,
with 19)bor furnished largely by the in-
habitants themselves.
He is moat enthusiastic about the creation
of neighborhood organizations: sewing cir-
cles, teams for various sports, parent-teacher
associations, and local self-government
councils, which are to have the right to fed-
erate with similar councils throughout the
country in order to form effective pressure
groups. Frei promises that none of these
activities will be linked with politics, but
some of his critics wonder how it is humanly
possible to keep them separate.
In neighboring Peru, President Belailnde's
similar and successful Popular Cooperation
has been accused of being primarily a de-
vice for building grassroots support for his
party. In any case, only 10 percent of
Chile's working class is organized, in unions
largely Communist-controlled, at least at the
top. Organizing people "where they live as
well as where they work" is thus an interest-
ing new approach to the problem of giving
civic representation to the submerged pro-
letariat-
A third area where Frei has already
achieved dramatic social impact is education.
It is a shocking fact that in this country of
81/2 million people of largely European ex-
traction there were approximately 200,000
children with no school to go to. In a crash
program initiated immediately on taking of-
fice in November, at the beginning of the
Chilean summer, Frei organized an intensive
course to train new teachers, asked existing
ones voluntarily to accept longer hours, and
undertook the construction of thousands of
schoolrooms, as well as lodgings for teachers
in remote areas.
He mobilized the good will and enthusiasm
of various groups: villagers gave land and
their labor and sometimes local materials;
the armed forces sent their troops and
equipment; 1,500 university students spent
their holidays mixing mortar and laying
bricks. This year, for the first time, no
Chilean'child will be denied the pleasures of
the three R's.
Agrarian reform, public dousing, and edu-
cation cost money, and Chile is already
overextended in the matter of foreign credit;
it has received more dollars per capita in
Alliance for Progress aid than any other
Latin-American country. However, Frei also
inherited from Alessandri an economy which,
while certainly not brilliant, is still in rela-
tively good shape. The balance of payments
in 1984 showed a slight credit, thanks
largely to the high price of copper and re-
stricted imports. The growth rate was 4
percent, not too far below the Alliance goal
o1' 5 percent.
The budget is approximately in balance,
owing to a tax reform that is just beginning
to show its benefits-among which Chileans
count not only increased collections but a
jail sentence actually enforced for a tax
evader, an unheard-of phenomenon in Latin
America.
THE COST OF LIVING
However, on Chile's main problem, en-
demic inflation, the Alessandri government,
after an encouraging start, made no head-
way. The cost of living rose 38 percent in
1964; since 1960 it has nearly tripled. Previ-
ous attempts to stop the runaway in its
tracks having failed, Frei is proposing to
apply the brakes slowly. He aims for a rise
of only 25 percent in 1965, with lesser rises
in succeeding years until stability is reached,
hopefully by 1968. However, this year he is
proposing that the rise be fully compensated
by wage increases, with agricultural prices
and wages to be overcompensated to redress
previous injustices.
In order to maintain the overall increase
within the 25-percent limit, he is, therefore,
insisting that industrial'prices rise no more
than 19 percent. In this framework, only a
sharp rise in production can maintain previ-
ous profit levels. Stringent controls, more
effective than any yet devised, will be neces-
sary to hold the line.
Financing social programs in so tight an
economy thus requires some maneuvering
and a high level of competence, but Frei has
attracted a team of young economists from
the various universities-particularly the
Institute of Economics, organized some
years ago by Prof. Joseph Grunwald, of Co-
lumbia-and from the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA), whose headquarters are in Santiago.
Chileans like to call them the Brain Trust.
Service on the foreign debt, which would
have absorbed more than half the export re-
turns of the next few years, has been suc-
cessfully renegotiated to provide a breathing
spell. The United States has extended loans
of various types for $120 million. And
Chileans themselves have been asked to make
a sacrifice: a capital levy on personal prop-
erty of 1.5 to 3 percent annually for a period
of 5 years.
This proposal has naturally aroused the
ire of the propertied classes-and not only
because of the money involved. Frei was
careful to cite such precedents as France's
similar levy just after the war and to point
to its present glowing prosperity as the result.
What really upsets many Chileans is the
declaration of their possessions which is im-
plied in the levy. Income tax evasion would.
thereby become much more difficult. (At
present, in spite of tax reform, the salaried
class bears most of the burden; only 11,000
people have declared a taxable income of over
$5,000 a year.)
NEW DEAL IN COPPER
Redressing social injustice, however ad-
mirable, is nevertheless no sure cure for
inflation and economic stagnation. To get;
the country moving, Frei has tackled the
problem at its very center-copper. This
metal dominates the Chilean economy; it
provides more than 50 percent of foreign
exchange and $85 million annually in taxes.
But five-sixths of the copper is extracted by
two American companies, Anaconda and
Kennecott. Although these companies pay
the highest wages in the country, and the
highest mining taxes in the world, the pres-
ence of two foreign colossi at the heart of the
economy is a constant irritant to national
pride, particularly since a good deal of the
copy er is refined abroad and its marketing
is beyond the control of Chile.
The Marxist left, has been campaigning for
some time in favor of outright expropria-
tion. The American companies have hesi-
tated to invest in the face of this threat and
the concomitant one of confiscatory taxes.
Kennecott even announced a few years ago
that it was not planning any further expan-
sion in Chile and would spend its money in
developing its American properties.
Frei, for his part, proposed an inter-
mediary solution which he called the Chile--
anization of copper. Immediately after the
election, he sent a commission to the United
States to see how the new word could be
defined.
The definition has turned out to be not
only dramatic but eminently satisfactory t:>
everyone concerned---except, of (ours:;
Chile's diehard Marxists. What it amounts
to is a business association between the
Chilean Government and the mining compa-
nies, a new departure, on a scale like thi..
in the whole concept of "how to do busine-
abroad."
In two cases, that of Anaconda and thss
Cerro Corp.-new to Chile but already op-
erating in Peru-Chile has acquired a 25-
percent equity in new companies formed to
exploit new ore beds. In the most startli-ig
agreement, that with Kennecott, Chile has
bought outright 51 percent of a new conl-
pany to exploit the rich El Teniente mine.
whose production, with the aid of Kennecott?
w;?l be vastly expanded. The companies will
b3,.efit by tax reductions and guarantee,,
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.11-, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENA'T'E
12527
the complex world in which we live. _ But it with crises which are thrust upon him, We are providing funds for the neces-
is far better to have ideals and targets toward and dealing with them with tolerance, sary governmental services and operation
which all of us work, rather than to have no patience, and the judicious use of the of other vital institutions.
idealism at all. We must mix idealism with great military power and tremendous re- We still have troops in the Dominican
realism. Many minds must be brought to
.bear on establishing the goals toward which sources of this mighty Nation. Republic, but they are there now in asso-
we work and a program through which to President Johnson found that this ac- elation and cooperation with the ma-
i
th
tt
" " -
a
n
a
em, tion was necessary to save the lives of
An ideology combines a way of life with a the foreign civilians who were there-
way of governing. By truly practicing de-
mocracy as a way of life at home, we can
Insure that our example will advance de-
mocracy abroad. By dedicated application
of democracy as a way of government, we can
further democracy in world affairs through
official policy. If democracy by example and
policy guides our behavior within America
and on the global stage, the promise of lib-
erty and the dignity of man will be within
the reach of us all.
WITH WITHDRAWAL OF U.S, MA-
RINES FROM THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, last Thursday President Johnson
announced that he was ordering with-
drawal of the remainder of our marines
from the Dominican Republic. This
Nation and the world owe an everlasting
debt of gratitude to those courageous men
of the U.S. Marines who moved to evacu-
ate innocent foreign nationals, including
citizens of the United States, from the
civil warfare that raged in Santo Do-
mingo at the time of President Johnson's
decision to send in the marines.
The.marines protected many persons
who were not citizens of the Dominican
Republic, . and fears that the United
States was aiming a long-range occupa-
tion of the island were wholly uiustified.
In no way do I mean to diminish the
fine work done by the 82d Airborne Di-
vision. These courageous soldiers still are
on duty to prevent unnecessary blood-
shed and, to assure the people of the
Dominican Republic that the revolt does
not result in another Communist regime
like that in Cuba. We are merely there
to see that the people of the Dominican
Republic are guaranteed free elections
and other democratic processes.
Mr. President, at that time there was
a great hue and cry from some sources
about a return to the earlier days when
the United States did, upon some occa-
sions, use the Marines for long-term oc-
cupation of certain places in Latin
America. It is understandable that the
peoples of Latin America might fear such
a thing. They were, of course, encour-
aged in that fear by the Communist
propagandists-as they are always en-
couraged to criticize and malign the
United States.
In our own country, however, there
was no such excuse, and yet we heard
then, and we hear now, voices within
our own councils which say much the
same thing. I hope that President John-
son's action in withdrawing the marines
at the earliest possible moment will tend
to still these voices, which are essentially
the voices of dissension and division, at
a time when the President is facing so
many critical and delicate situations
throughout the world.
President Johnson is a man of reason
and restraint, dealing one after the other
No. 104--13
citizens of this country, and citizens of
other countries-who were caught in
this sudden and brutal outburst of vio-
lence, which was growing rapidly more
savage and uncontrolled.
Armed gangs were running through
public rooms and corridors of the prin-
cipal hotel which housed our representa-
tives and those of other countries, firing
rifles and submachineguns through the
walls and windows. Our Ambassador,
and_I think he showed great good sense
in his action under the circumstances,
took the telephone and went under-
ground. He got down under the desk in
order to continue reporting to the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State.
It is indeed surprising that, despite all
that was going on then, and all that
has gone on since, not one national of
another country lost his life. The ma-
rines went ashore instantly, established
the . necessary sanctuaries, protected
them, and arranged for the orderly evac-
uation of those who wished to leave.
There was not a single life of a foreign
national or visitor lost.
One of those who criticized our actions
in sending in the marines was President
de Gaulle of France. It Is worth noting,
however, that this did not prevent the
French Ambassador to the Dominican
Republic from taking advantage of our
protection for French citizens, .and, in
fact, the protection zone was enlarged to
include the French Embassy after the
marines had already taken up their
positions.
I wish it were possible to say that there
were no lives lost, and no injured and
wounded, as a result of this necessary
action, Mr. President, but unhappily this
cannot be said. Eight fine marines have
died and 29 have paid in lesser measure
for the success of this operation. We
should all pay our homage today to these
young men, and express our sympathies
with their families and friends who now
will miss them in the intimate ways that
always accompanyy such tragedies.
While our purpose in entering Santo
Domingo was to protect our own citizens.
and the citizens of other countries, we
were certainly very much concerned
about the circumstances and conditions
prevailing for the people of this island.
At the time the marines landed, the
people of the island were caught between
the two forces. They were bombed and
strafed in the streets of Santo Domingo;
they were starving. Many of them were
being put up. against the wall and shot.
fully in the efforts to reach some po-
litical solution of the difficult problems
which still exist. Our objective will con-
tinue to be to find this solution, and to
withdraw the ' remainder of our forces
from the island.
President Johnson has given concrete
evidence of the peaceful course he will
pursue by withdrawing the marines.
There is no doubt whatsoever that Presi-
dent Johnson's future actions will be fully
in keeping with his order of last Thurs-
day.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.
Mr. GRUENING. I am happy to say
that I heartily approve of the Presi-
dent's policy in the Dominican Republic
to date. I feel he had to act as he did.
He said so from the very start. He
moved first to save American lives and,
second, to prevent what he feared might
be a Communist takeover-both wholly
worthy and commendable objectives.
Third, he moved as rapidly as possible
to make the problem a multilateral af-
fair, with the assistance and cooperation
of our sister American Republics, by call-
ing on the Organization of American
States to come in and help work out
the Dominican problem.
If out of this tragic situation in the
Dominican Republic we can get a per-
manent peacekeeping force in the Amer-
icas, in which the United States will be
merely one of a number of nations coop-
erating, I feel definitely that we shall
have brought about an event of lasting
significance and a great turning point in
the history of the Americas.
For that reason I believe the Presi-
dent's policy, both on the immediate
range and on the long range, are highly
commendable. He deserves unqualified
praise. I am happy to say this because
of the fact that I do not agree with our
policy in southeast Asia.
I thank the Senator for yielding to me.
Mr. President, I now should like to
speak on my own time for a little more
than 3 minutes.
The PR-SIDING OFFICER (Mr.
CoopEa in the chair). How much time
does the Senator desire?
Mr. GRUENING. About 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING With
YY LllJ/
The sanitary conditions were the cause Mr GRU~N nt, in its
of serious concern for the health ,
of the leading editorial this morning entitled
peaple, and widespread
feared. epidemics were "Ground War in Asia," the New York Much of this has now changed. We Times states:
The American
have brought in food and have assisted people were told by a minor
in bringing about arrangements which State Department official yesterday that, in
effect, they were in a land war on the conti-
give hope of stabilizing the situation, at nent of Asia. This is only one of the ex-
least for the helpless noncombatants. traordinary aspects of the first formal an-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 19 65
noupcement that a decision has been made
to commit American ground forces to open
combat in South Vietnam: The Nation is in-
formed about it not by the President, not by
a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-Cabinet
official, but by a public relations officer.
There is still no explanation offered for
a move that fundamentally alters the char-
acter of the American involvement in Viet-
nam. A program of weapons supply, train-
ing and combat advice to South Vietnamese,
initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Ken-
nedy, has now been transformed by President
Johnson into an American war against
Asians.
The editorial
question :
Is it not more likely that political ir-
responsibility in Saigon will grow, rather
than decline, as the main military responsi-
bility for defending South Vietnam is trans-
ferred increasingly to American hands?
And concludes:
The country deserves answers to this and
many other questions. It has been taken
into a ground war by Presidential decision,
when there is no emergency that would seem
to rule out congressional debate. The duty
now Is for reassurance from the White House
that the Nation will be informed on where
it is being led and that Congress will be con-
sulted before another furious upward whirl
is taken on the escalation spiral.
Mr. Browne, in his news dispatch, goes were now killing four times as many men
on to say: as we were losing.'
U.S. officials predict that American casualty The briefing which was one 9f dozens that
tolls will increase from now on as American the White House has conducted in an effort
to sell its Vietnam policy, concluded with
Marine Corps and Army paratrooper units talks by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
move deeper into the battle. "big daddy" himself.
U.S. ai, strikes on North and South Viet-
nam have increased in recent months to the From news stories of troop movements
point that they are now round-the-clock to Vietnam, it is evident that it will not
operations. take long to build up to the 300,000
In the north, strikes have been limited to fighting men in Vietnam predicted by
military installations, roads and waterways Secretary McNamara.
well south of Hanoi. There seems no imme-
diate prospect of bombing Ncrth Vietnam's Those of us who have heard the discus-
cities or civilian industries. sions in the cloakrooms of the Senate
But in the south, huge sectors of the na- are quite aware that many of our col-
tion have been declared "free bombing zones," leagues are having second thoughts about
in which anything that moves is a legitimate the southeast Asia resolution passed
target. Tens of thousands of tons of bombs, overwhelmingly on August 7. I voted
rockets, napalm and cannon fire are poured against that resolution as did the Sen-
the these vast areas each week. If only by
the laws of chance, bloodshed is believed to ator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE? and noth.-
be heavy in these raids. ing in the events of the past 10 months
In exchange, the Vietcong is exacting its since that date has caused me to doubt
pound of flesh. the wisdom of voting against the resolu-
In the past week, big Vietcong units prowl- tion placing a blank check in the hands
ing through the jungle-covered mountains of of the President to commit our Armed
central Vietnam have chewed up three gov- of to fighting anywhere in southeast
will nt be battalions able t to o fight badly again for that a these long time. units Asia against undeclared enemies.
will not ol
Government casualties in these ambushes Mr. Starnes continued in his column:
probably have exceeded 1,000 men. "Rusk had nothing new to say, but he kept
The Vietcong have clearly shifted gears saying it at such great length that finally
from what they call "guerrilla warfare" to the President, who was sitting in the front
" row, started looking ostentatiously at his
"mobile warfare
.
The American people deserve and The Communist concept of mobile warfare watch," my informant reports. "But Rusk
should get straight answers from the is essentially guerrilla operation on a vastly missed the cue, until at last the President
administration as to just where .we are expanded scale, in which whole battalions just got up and nudged Rusk away from the
and regiments are used in mounting am- lectern."
going in Vietnam. It deserves more than bushes. Ambushes remain the key feature What the Senators heard then is a thing
mislabeling as "advisers" American of the war. that has caused something very near to
Armed Forces personnel who have for The Saigon government and its American cloakroom consternation. Mr. Johnson sailed
quite some time now been in thefront- ally control the air above South Vietnam and into a defense of his escalation of the war
line of the fighting in South Vietnam. some of its roads and waterways. The Viet- in Vietnam, and bluntly told his audience
It deserves more than statements that cong controls much of the rest of the that they had authorized it and, by Implica-
our marines are in South Vietnam only nation. tion, must share the responsibility for it.
as defensive troops to protect our bases. Government units move mostly by truck, The President said he was frequently asked
I ask unanimous consent that the edi- plane, and helicopter. Vietcong units move what his policy in Vietnam was. Then, with
on foot through the trackless jungle. This the subtlety of a sledgehammer, he told the
tonal from today's New York Times en means the Communists generally have the Senators that the Congress had laid down the
titled "Ground War in Asia" be printed advantage in setting up their ambushes. policy in a resolution passed last August 7
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my Roads, particularly those that wind by a vote of 504 to 2. And, said the Pressi-
remarks. through the mountain passes of central dent, he was doing his best to carry out that
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Vietnam, are ideal places for ambushes. resolution.
objection, it is so ordered. Even helicopters must land in clearings, The source of this account, who knows
(See exhibit 1.) which in the jungle are often only tiny the Senate intimately, reported that, in spite
patches of ground. of the near unanimity of congressional sup-
Mr. GRUENING. This changing char- The Vietcong can and often does set up port for administration Vietnam policy, Sen-
acter of the war in Vietnam has been traps around these clearings, with .50-caliber ators are still "rankled" over Mr. Johnson's
noted in recent days by other knowledge- machineguns trained on the places heli- bland assumption that the August 7 resolu-
able writers. copters will be forced to land. tion authorized escalation of the war in
southeast Asia.
Writing from Saigon on June 4, 1965, As the fighting grows hotter it becomes The resolution, passed in the fever of in-
Malcolm Browne, Associated Press re- more brutal. Neither side is taking many dignation that followed reported attacks by
porter, notes that the Vietnam War is prisoners any more. Soldiers caught off side North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S.
changing in character and is "being now are generally shot on the spot or fleet units in Tonkin Gulf, comes very close
transformed into an enormous meat tortured to death. to saying what Presiden` Johnson says it
grinder, ir} which both sides are now Mr. Richard Starnes in the Washing- says-whether the Senators who voted for it
making an all-out drive to bleed each ton Daily News for June 4, 1965, also like to admit it or not.
other to death. It is a meat grinder in comments on the steady escalation o "as resolution authorized , to taakkee all nee le ces-
as Commander in Chief, to his-
which America for the first time has an the undeclared war in Vietnam. sary measures to repeal any armed attack
active part-on both the giving and re- Mr. Starnes begins his article, en- against the forces of the United States and
ceiving end." titled "The Escalating War" with the to prevent further aggression."
These are disturbing words coming statement: Note well that the resolution was not
from a wholly reliable correspondent who The American people are not alone in limited to Vietnam but specifically asserted
tthe U.S. goal w"assisting the peopl^
won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of their blissful ignorance of the coming de- that h southeast ia l was fight off alleged aggres-
events from Vietnam under the most dif- mands for men to feed the insatiable jungle 8o That means just what it says--Con-
gress circumstances and who, in an ex- war in Vietnam. A completely reliable gross "approves and supports" anything Mr
source who was present at a White House
cellent book entitled "The New Face of s Johnson deems necessary to prevent further
War" has set forth his trying experiences briefing tells me this: aggression in the area, and it is now some-
in attempting to get the truth to the "I saw U.S. Senators blanch when Robert what late for whatever second thoughts arc
American people. McNamara told them that they had to pre- occurring in Capitol cloakrooms.
pare to see 300.000 Amrrir n m,.,n rent to Whatever doubt may have existed as to tic
He is still trying and his words should Vietnam. intent of the August 7 resolution was die-
be heeded, even though they are not en- "I never thought I'd live to see such spelled last month, however, when Congress
tirely unexpected to those of us who have a thing in the United States, but McNamara dutifully voted a blank check $700 miliion
been following the events in Vietnam told the briefing quite cheerfully that things appropriation to f.nance the expanding war.
closely. were looking up i"i Wet' rm because we This time the division was 596 to 10, still r'.
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une -9, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
sufficiently lopsided vote to assure history
that the 89th Congress had supported es-
calation in the Pacific whether it knew what
This same growing unrest in the Con-
gress and its questioning of the wisdom
of its abdication of a voice in the conduct
of our foreign policy is noted by the New
York Times in its leading editorial on
June 7, 1965, .entitled "Congress and
Vietnam" which begins:
Signs are growing of congressional interest
in ending the leave-it-to-Lyndon era in
American foreign policy.
The Founding Fathers intended the
framing of our foreign policy to be a
partnership between the executive and
the legislative branches of the Federal
Government with each acting, as co-
equals.
We are now seeing the harmful effects
of treating the formulation of foreign
policy as the exclusive prerogative of the
executive branch of the Government.
The editorial in the New York Times
contains the following observations:
Factors that go beyond the President's
limited experience in foreign affairs and the
-extraordinary vacillations in Dominican pol-
icy, have set off the present questioning at
home and abroad. The reluctance of Secre-
tary of State Rusk to employ the full re-
sources of his Department and give inde-
pendent advice, the meager use made by the
President of nonofficial task forces in the
foreign policy field, the overdependence on
military and intelligence agencies and the
divorce between the administration and the
Nation's intellectuals-all point to a need
for more vigorous congressional "interest.
Nowhere is this more vital than on Viet-
nam, where grave constitutional questions
are raised by the official acknowledgment of
an increasing combat role for American
troops. During the 18 months of the John-
son administration, the number of American
troops, in Vietnam has been tripled to about
46,500; a further buildup to more than
60,000 appears imminent.. American planes
have entered Into combat both in South and
North Vietnam-in the latter case openly
attacking a foreign country with no declara-
tion of war. American warships have bom-
barded the North Vietnamese coast. And
there are indications that American ground
troops-first employed as advisers in South
Vietnam, then deployed to defend American
installations and now directly engaged in
patrolling action-will soon take on a full
combat role as a tactical reserve aiding South
Vietnamese units in trouble.
Yet at no point has there been significant
congressional discussion, much less direct
authorization of what amounts to a deci-
sion to wage war. That is why 28 Demo-
cratIc Congressmen, on the initiative of
Representative ROSENTHAL, of Queens, now
have wisely asked the chairman of the.
House Foreign Affairs Committee to hold
public hearings on the administration's
Vietnam policy.
American casualties in Vietnam, while
,still relatively minor, already exceed those
of the Spanish-American War. The choices
open to the President are exceedingly diffl-
cult ones; they should not be his alone,
either as a matter of sound policy or of con-
atitutionall,obligation. If he takes it upon
himself to make an American war out of
the Vietnamese tragedy, without seeking
congressional and national consent, he may
open the country to divisions even more
.
'd'angerous than those that developed out of A strong, capable, noncorrupt govern-
the Korean conflict
. anent in. Saigon has been needed. for
I ask unanimous consent that the en- .years to bring about the social and
tire editorial from the New York Times economic reforms so necessary to show
12529
for June 7, 1965, entitled "Congress and the people of South Vietnam that they
Vietnam" be printed at the conclusion can have liberty and economic and social
of my remarks. Justice.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- But Beverly Deepe's articles show why
out objection, it is so ordered. needed reforms were thwarted.
(See exhibit 2.) In her fifth article she discusses.. the
Mr. GRUENING. How singularly in- long delay in land reform and how the
dividualistic the war in Vietnam has government at Saigon was playing the
become was commented on by colum- landlord's game:
nist Drew Pearson in his column in the "The most important question in the Viet-
Washington Post on June 4, 1965, under namese countryside besides security is land
the heading "President Johnson's Per- reform," an American technician said, "yet
sonal War." Mr. Pearson states: virtually nothing has been done about it.
The war in Vietnam has also become a "The Vietcong are gaining a lot of points
with
lonely war and to some extent a personal the peasants by imply issuing land
war for one man. * * * It's become per- titles-and costs theem nothing. They
sonal today, because the President feels it take the land d from the landowner and give
so keenly and directs it so carefully. Every l away. Nothing r the
or f fert tilizer-is as s im-
morning at 3 he wakes up and calls the like pigs, insecticides cticides we , give
morning House security room. Three in the portant as land."
morning is about the time the news is in American technicians and provincial offi-
cials for the past several years have urged
re-
hits after each bombing raid. the implementation of an effective land re-
form program, Two land distribution
Mr. Pearson concludes this portion of schemes currently have been written, but
his article as follows', neither has been accepted. Higher officials
of the American Embassy and in the Agency
The North Vietnamese have been winning. for International Development believe land
Our bombing raids have not stopped the sup- reform is not the panacea for Vietnam's
ply of troops and supplies from going south problems.
or the guerrilla raids by the Vietcong. A program for the training of land-reform
The Russians, who normally might have cadre is under consideration. But the pro-
acted 'as intermediaries, were put on the spot gram will not be instituted until the other
by our bombing of the north. The Chinese day-when the Vietcong Communists have
have chided them with being too friendly to been defeated.
the United States In the past, and with for- WARNING
saking their alleged former role as the char n- one Vietnamese general recently
pion of small nations. So it's difficult for warned American generals and officials that
them to side with the United States now. American-backed efforts to pacify the prov-
The Chinese are delighted at the predica- inces would fail unless they were linked with
ment of both Moscow and Washington. They land reform.
don't want the Vietnamese war to end. The "When the Vietnamese National Army goes
longer it lasts, the more the United States back to pacify areas from the Vietcong, the
and Russia become at swords' points, and the local landowner goes back with them, offer-
more the smaller nations of southeast Asia ing to serve as intelligence agent," the gen-
pull away from the United States Into the eral explained. "Obviously he wants to col-
Red Chinese camp. lect his back rent. So when the army paci-
In brief, the military advisers who sold fies the area it pacifies it for the landowner
the President on the strategy of bombing and not for the peasant.
North Vietnam failed to understand oriental "Of course, 35 percent of the peasants are
Vietnam-
politics. Though he inherited the Vietnam- landless. They become fanatics and will
ese problem, they sold him on enlarging
it into a mess that could either lead to fight for the land given them by the Viet-
world war or is almost insoluble without se- cong because it's as important to them as
rious loss of face. life."
I ask unanimous consent that the en- One U.S. official described as "horror
tire column written by Drew Pearson in stories" the actions of some landowners
the Washington Post for June 7, 1965, en- to collect back rent, once Government
titled "President Johnson's Personal forces had pacified Vietcong areas.
War" be printed in the RECORD at the According to reliable sources, in other
conclusion of my remarks. cases, when the Vietnamese Government
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Army attempts to pacify the area, the
objection, it Is so ordered. commanders simply ignore the problems
(See exhibit 3.) of land reform, refusing to collect back
Mr. GRUENING.. An excellent series rents-but also refusing to confirm the
of articles on Vietnam recently appeared landownership rights.
in the New York Herald Tribune. They In Vietcong-controlled areas, if land-
were written for the New York Herald owners or their agents return to collect
Tribune by its special correspondent back rent the matter is simple. The
Beverly Deepe from Saigon. peasant complains to the Vietcong, and
I ask unanimous consent that Beverly the agent is shot.
Deepe's articles appearing in the New "The question of Iand reform Is quite
York Herald tribune on May 30, May 31, simple," one low-ranking Vietnamese pro-
June 1, June 2, June 3, and June 4, 1965, vincial official explained. "The government
be printed in the RECORD at the conclu- represents the landowners; the ministers and
sign of my remarks. generals are either landowners or friends of
landowners. The Catholic Church owns
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without land. The Buddhist Church owns land. No-
'Objection, it is so ordered, body is interested in fighting for the poor
(See exhibit 4.) peasant., And the top Americans-well, they
Mr. GRUENING. Communism Can- talk to only the ministers and rich people
so they don't push it either."
not be fought with nothing
Beverly Deepe in her fourth article
describes "How the United States Built
on the Quicksand of Asian Politics." She
says:
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9f 1965
Since November 1963, the country has been
in a state of political crisis. Sources in
Saigon now argue that it would be a mistake
to rebuild a counterideology-even if it
could be done. They say instead that the
Saigon government must reform itself and
" but-revolutionize the Communists-but do
it 10 times better and 50 times faster than
the Communists themselves."
The dilemma of American policymakers Is
the schizophrenic nature of the Vietnamese
society itself. The governing class is gener-
ally urban-based, French-educated with an
aristocratic position based on either family
background, money or landownership. This
elite minority attempts to govern the masses
although it knows little about them and is
concerned less.
After 10 years of administering the largest
U.S. medical aid program in the world,
American officials here still have little in-
fluence on Vietnamese medical affairs. One
American-trained Vietnamese doctor' said
that a medical degree from an American
medical school still is not readily recognized
in Vietnam, on the other hand, a "parachute
degree"-a degree virtually bought with
money from a second-rate medical school in
France-is easily acceptable by "the Mafia."
The two best hospitals in Saigon are
French operated. They are also the most
expensive. There is no good American hos-
pital in Saigon for the Vietnamese popula-
tion (although there are two American-
operated hospitals In France). Requests by
the American-operated Seventh Day Ad-
ventist Missionary Hospital to expand their
30-bed clinic have repeatedly been refused.
American officials in Saigon have not ef-
fectively pressured the Saigon government
to correct "this rot within," in the words of
a Vietnamese anti-Communist. Instead,
they have superimposed upon the rot a spec-
tacular medical program in the provinces.
"The Americans think we should fight for
democracy," one young Vietnamese intellec-
tual explained. "But, in fact, the Vietcong
fight because of the lack of democracy."
But her most devastating article is
entitled: `.`Corruption--Hottest Saigon
Issue" and shows how corruption on high
in Saigon-winked at and ignored by
U.S. officials-was and is one of the
causes for effective support of the Gov-
ernment at the grassroots--support
which is essential.
The article states, in part:
The hottest issue in Saigon is not bombing
Hanoi, nor Vietcong. terrorism, nor possible
negotiations for peace. It is corruption.
Vietnamese sources-generals, majors,
captains, ex-ministers, economists-say that
corruption has now reached scandalous, un-
precedented proportions.
Highly placed sources in Saigon-Ameri-
can, Vietnamese, and Western-urged tighter
controls on Vietnamese Government funds
and on American aid and goods.
The issue is considered a gift for the Viet-
cong Communists, who promise the workers
and peasants justice and equality. It also
has caused friction within the Vietnamese
Government and armed forces.
One high-ranking American official in the
U.S. Agency for International Development
(AID) reportedly estimated that 30 percent
of American economic aid was unreceipted
or unaccounted for last year. A low-echelon
American provincial official says some of the
45 Vietnamese provinces had not submitted
vouchers for expenditures during the past 3
years.
The original purpose of American advisers
was to train Vietnamese to use the equip-
ment-"and to keep track of the equipment,
which sometimes took some doing," one
American captain who worked on the pro.
gram for 2 years said.
"We brought in air conditioners for hos-
pitals-they ended up in the general's house.
We brought In hospital refrigerators to store
vaccines in. The vaccines spoiled and the
refrigerators wound up in the general's
house."
These are the comments and criticisms
which the highly placed sources in Saigon
made about the commercial import program
and sales of farm surplus commodities.
First, according to one Vietnamese eco-
nomist and ex-minister, economic aid doesn't
aim at an economic target, but Is only in
support of a military machine. About four-
fifths of the U.S.-generated piastres In 1964
were allocated to support the Vietnamese
military budget.
CONSPICUOUS WEALTH
Second, the commercial import program
has enriched and enlarged the upper middle
class elements in Saigon and other cities, but
it has also accentuated the extremes between
the urban and rural classes. Often you bring
in a whole lot of things for the richer mid-
dle class with conspicuous consumption, and
the Vietcong can play on this, saying it en-
riches the middle class and bourgeois, one
Western ambassador said.
Third, the rural communities, especially
earlier in the program, received a relatively
small proportion of the commercial import
aid. Between 1955 and 1960, when the Viet-
cong began organizing and recruiting in the
countryside, only 4 percent of the direct and
indirect American aid was funneled into the
rural population, which is an estimated 85
percent of the total population.
Fourth, the commercial import program
has not been geared to assist the building
of industries which funnel Vietnamese agri-
cultural products into the light industrial
sector. During the critical period of Viet-
cong formation in the countryside, from 1955
to 1960, American economic aid assisted in
the establishment of 58 companies. But
about 70 percent of these depended on Im-
ported raw materials: even the papermills
needed to import woodpulp.
The Vietnamese officials have therefore de-
vised an effective system of padding their
vouchers and receipts.
"Suppose a wooden bridge costs 1,600 pias-
ters to build," an American district adviser
complained, "the contractor adds another
200 plasters and the district chief adds an-
other 200 piasters. I can practically see the
money flow Into their pockets, but they give
me a receipt for 2,000 piasters. What can I
do to disprove them?"
One Vietnamese province chief under the
Ngo Dinh Diem regime admitted he ordered
a few of his loyal troops to blow up his own
bridge that was half constructed so that
they could let another construction contract.
Some Vietnamese regional and regular
units are known to possess phantom troops-
troops that never existed, or were killed or
deserted but never reported as lost. Their
paychecks slip into the hands of privileged
commanders.
"What it boils down to Is whether to have
a social revolution or not and clean up this
government," a Vietnamese economists ex-
plained. If America is too scared to do it-
the Communists will, and will win the people.
The people want justice. They don't care
if they have a democracy or a dictatorship-
if the government comes in with bullets or
ballots. But they want justice-even if it
is harsh. The Vietcong are harsh, but they
are just.
The basic conclusion arrived at in this
excellent series is summed up at the be-
ginning of the second article:
U.S. policy in South Vietnam is frozen in
a negative posture that concentrates on mil-
itary victory while failing to produce the
sort of dramatic political strategy that would
make such victory possible.
This, at least, is the opinion of highly
placed sources in Saigon who have watched
the American involvement here grow stead-
ily for more than a decade.
In their view, the U.S. attitude is essen-
tially anti-Communist rather than pro-
something. The overwhelming impression
is that the American policymakers are at-
tempting to stem the tide of Communist
aggression or to teach Hanoi a lesson. But
this implies a political status quo in a coun-
try that is changing in its post-colonial de-
velopment, and is, indeed, fighting for
change.
"Nothing negative has ever prevailed over
something positive," the Western military
expert commented. One of the most fre-
quently asked questions by Vietnamese cap-
tains and majors on the battlefront is "What
are we fighting for?" as they look at the
political turmoil in their rear area at Saigon.
I ask unanimous consent that the
article by Mr. Richard Starnes and Mal-
colm W. Browne be printed at the con-
clusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibits 5 and 6.)
EXHIBIT 1
[From the New York Times, June 9, 19651
GROUND WAR IN ASIA
The American people were told by a minor
State Department official yesterday that, in
effect, they were in a land war on the con-
tinent of Asia. This is only one of the
extraordinary aspects of the first formal an-
nouncement that a decision has been made
to commit American ground forces to open
combat in South Vietnam. The Nation is
informed about it not by the President, not
by a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-
Cabinet official, but by a public relations
officer.
There is still no explanation offered for. a
move that fundamentally alters the char-
acter of the American Involvement in Viet-
nam. A program of weapons supply, train-
ing and combat advice to South Vietnamese,
initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Ken-
nedy, has now been transformed by Presi-
dent Johnson into an American war against
Asians.
It was the bombing of North Vietnam that
led, in turn, to the use of American jet air-
craft in South Vietnam and the emplace-
ment of American marines and paratroops
to defend American airbases. Now, with
American air support hampered by the mon-
soon rains, American ground troops are to be
made available as a tactical reserve to help
South Vietnamese units in trouble.
It can all be made to sound like a gradual
and inevitable outgrowth of earlier com-
mitments. Yet the whole development has
occurred in a 4-month span, just after an
election in which the administration cam-
paigned on the issue of its responsibility and
restraint in foreign military involvements.
Since March, American forces in Vietnam
have been more than doubled to 52,000, as
compared to 14,000 when President Johnson
took office.` Additional troops are moving in
and a buildup to 70,000 is indicated. There
has been neither confirmation nor denial for
reports that a force exceeding 100,000 is
planned, including three full Army and Ma-
rine divisions. Nor is there any clarification
on whether the so-called combat support
role now authorized-combat in support of
South Vietnamese units-is to be trans-
formed later into offensive clear and hold op-
erations of a kind hitherto, carried out only
by South Vietnamese forces. Apart from the
obvious difficulty American troops would
have in distinguishing guerrillas from the
surrounding population, such a war ulti-
mately might absorb as many American
troops as were employed in Korea.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
A major factor in the original escalation
decision-the decision to bomb North Viet-
nam-was the political crisis in Saigon after
eight changes of government in little more
than a year. The bombing was urged upon
President Johnson as the only way to shore
up morale, halt the factional feuding, and
prevent a complete political collapse in South
Vietnam.
Is it only a coincidence that the decision
to enter the ground war has come during
another;, political crisis in Saigon? There
may be a need to prop up the government
of Premier, Phan Huy Quat against the Cath-
olic and southern factions which made a
constitutional issue out of his recent Cabi-
net reshuffle and still seek to bring him
down. But, is it not more likely that politi-
cal irresponsibility in Saigon will grow,
rather than decline, as the main military
responsibility for defending South Vietnam
is transferred increasingly to American
hands.?
The country deserves answers to this and
many other questions. It has been taken
into a ground war by Presidential decision,
when there Is no emergency that would seem
to rule out congressional debate. The duty
now is for reassurance from the White House
that the Nation will be informed on where it
is being led and that Congress will be con-
sulted before another furious upward whirl
is taken on the escalation spiral.
ExriIBIT 2
.[From the New York Times, June
.Signs are growing of congressional interest
in ending the "leave it to Lyndon" era in
American foreign policy.
There is'Senator FULBRIGHT's new proposal
to give the OAS a major voice in channeling
American military` assistance to Latin Amer-
ica. There is the provision In the new foreign
aid bill for a thoroughgoing congressional
investigation and for terminating the aid
program In its present form in 1967.
There is the trip to Europe, at their own
expense, of four House Republicans to in-
vestigate the crisis in NATO. And there are
the recent criticisms of administration policy
in Vietnam and the ]Dominican Republic by
Senator ROSERT F. KENNEDY, plus his current
charge that the United States is neither meet-
ing its aid responsibilities to the underde-
veloped countries nor identifying itself with
the world revolution underway in those areas.
Factors that go beyond the President's
limited experience in foreign affairs and the
extraordinary vacillations in Dominician
policy have set off the present questioning
at home and abroad. The reluctance of Sec-
retary of State Rusk to employ the full re-
sources of his department and give inde-
pendent advice, the meager use made by the
President of nonofficial task forces in the
foreign policy field, the overdependence on
military and intelligence agencies and the
divorce between the administration and the
Nation's lptellectuals-all point to a need.
for more vigorous congressional interest.
Nowhere is this more vital than on Viet-
nam, where grave constitutional questions
are raised by the official acknowledgment of
an increasing combat role for . American
troops. During the 18 months of the John-
son administration, the number of Amer-
ican trA' s in Vietnam has been tripled to
about 5bfi; a further buildup to more
than 6G,000 appears imminent. American
planes have entered into combat both in
South and North Vietnam-in the latter
case openly attacking a foreign country with
no declaration of war. American warships
have bombarded the North Vietnamese coast.
And there are Indications that American
ground troops-first employed as advisers In
South Vietnam, then deployed to defend
American installations and now directly en-
gaged in patrolling action-will soon take on
a full combat role as a tactical reserve aid-
ing South Vietnamese units in trouble.
Yet, at no point has there been signifi-
cant congressional discussion, much less di-
rect authorization of what amounts to a
decision to wage war. That is why 28 Demo-
cratic congressmen, on the initiative of Rep-
resentative ROSENTIAL, of Queens, now have
wisely asked the chairman of the House For-
eign Affairs Committee to hold public hear-
ings on the administration's Vietnam pol-
icy.
American casualties in Vietnam, while still
relatively minor, already exceed those of the
Spanish-American War. The choices open
to the President are exceedingly difficult
ones; they should not be his alone, either
as a matter of sound policy or of constitu-
tional obligation. If he takes it upon him-
self to make an American war out of the
Vietnamese tragedy-without seeking con-
gressional and national consent-he may
open the country to divisions even more dan-
gerous than those that developed out of the
Korean conflict.
ExHIBIT 3
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, June 4,
1965]
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PERSONAL WAR
(By Drew Pearson)
War, no matter what the circumstances,
is tragic business. However, the war In
Vietnam has also become a lonely war and
to some extent a personal war for one man.
This is not because the. President began
it. It began 18 years ago under the French,
was picked up 10 years ago by President
Eisenhower, and increased 4 years ago by
President Kennedy.
It's become personal today because the
President feels it so keenly and directs it so
carefully. Every morning at 3 he wakes up
and calls the White House Security Room.
Three in the morning is about the time the
news is in from Vietnam on the casualties
and the hits after each bombing raid.
The President worries over these, broods
over them, wants to know, no matter what
the hour of the night, just what has
happened.
One reason for this personal direction is
that the President is worried over the possi-
bility of enlarging the war. He knows how
easy It is for bomber pilots to make a mis-
take, or how dangerous it can be to jettison
their bombs on their way home.
On the usual wartime bombing raid, a
mission. will fly over a target, attempt to
knock it out; but if the clouds are low or an
enemy plane gives trouble, the bombers may
drop their payload indiscriminately on the
way back, regardless of military targets.
TARGETS OF CONCRETE
Not, however, with the war in Vietnam.
Mr. Johnson has given strict orders that only
the targets he picks out are to be hit-and
these are bridges, ammunition dumps, rail-
road centers and military installations.
"We're knocking out concrete, we're not
hitting women and children," he has fre-
quently told his aides.
In addition to his care to avoid civilian
casualties he is concerned over any bombing
mission that might stray over the line into
China, or give the Communist Chinese the
slightest provocation to enlarge the war.
This is..why the war In and over Vietnam
has been a lonely war, a personal war di-
rected by a man who goes to bed well after
midnight, but wakes up automatically at 3
a.m. to check on the military targets he has
personally pinpointed.
Under the Constitution, he tells friends,
he Is charged with the conduct of war. But
regardless of the Constitution, he knows
that, if there are failures, or if the war
spreads, he will get the blame. So he is tak-
ing the responsibility.
12531
INSOLUBLE MESS
When the President outlined his Baltimore
peace proposals they were also personal, espe-
cially his plan for a giant series of dams on
the Mekong River to benefit all the Indochi-
nese countries, including North Vietnam.
Mr. Johnson had hoped that this, coupled
with his offer of unconditional peace talks,
plus joint United States-U.S.S.R. aid, might
induce the other side to sit down at the con-
ference table. It didn't, for three reasons:
The North Vietnamese have been winning.
Our bombing raids have not stopped the sup-
ply of, troops and supplies from going south
or the guerrilla raids by the Vietcong.
The Russians, who normally might have
acted as intermediaries, were put on the spot
by our bombing of the north. The Chinese
have chided them with being too friendly to
the United States in the past, and with for-
saking their alleged former role as the cham-
pion of small nations. So it's difficult for
them to side with the United States now.
The Chinese are delighted at the predica-
ment of both Moscow and Washington. They
don't want the Vietnamese war to end. The
longer it lasts, the more the United States
and Russia become at swords' points, and the
more the smaller nations of 'southeast Asia
pull away from the United States into the
Red Chinese camp.
In brief, the military advisers who sold
the President on the strategy of bombing
North Vietnam failed to understand oriental
politics. Though he inherited the Vietna-
mese problem, they sold him on enlarging it
into a mess that. could either lead to world
war or is almost insoluble without serious
loss of face.
BEHIND THE SCENES
The Central Intelligence Agency is using a
mysterious airline that calls itself Air Amer-
ica to drop weapons and supplies to our guer-
rilla fighters in Communist-held areas of
Laos and Vietnam. The CIA is trying to give
the Reds a taste of their own guerrilla medi-
cine * * * Senate investigators have dis-
covered that the CIA not only watches sus-
picious mail, but actually opens the letters
as part of its secret intelligence work. How-
ever, Senators will protect the CIA, will not
reveal this in their probe of Government
eavesdropping.
EXHIBIT 4
[From the New York (N.Y.) Herald Tribune,
May 30, 1985]
(By Beverly Deepe)
SAIGON.-One of the biggest puzzles of the
Vietnam war is what makes the Communist
Vietcong guerrillas fight so hard.
"It's fantastic the way the Vietcong lay it
on," a Vietnamese-speaking American pro-
vincial representative commented.
"Young kids who fought with them explain
it by saying the Vietcong create a 'new order
and a new reality: "
According to reliabie persons who have
talked with Vietcong prisoners and defectors,
the Vietcong manpower-composed of 38,000
to 46,000 hard-core fighters and 60,000 to
80,000 part-time guerrillas--falls into two
main categories: The older generation troops
who fought against the French 15 to 20 years
ago and a younger generation recruited in
South Vietnam.
Of the first category, more than 70,000
Vietminh-as they were called during the
French Indochina War-left their homes in
South Vietnam when the country was parti-
tioned in 1954 and went to North Vietnam,
where they continued their training and
indoctrination.
INFILTRATION
From 1956 onward, they gradually infil-
trated back to their native villages. The
most significant aspect of their return was
a transfusion of political leadership into the
south to organize and recruit younger south-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9,'1965
erners. Simultaneously, the Communists be-
gan a massive campaign of assassination of
village government officials, virtually obliter-
ating the Government's local leadership.
The older troops had fought the French
for one reason: Independence, with its anti-
French, anticolonial, antiwhite overtones.
They fought and won with guns, but their
most effective weapon was hate.
One member of a Vietminh suicide squad
wrapped himself in gasoline-soaked cotton,
ran into a French ammunition depot in Sai-
gon and burned himself alive to destroy the
installation. The story of the cotton boy
swept through the countryside.
"My .father even wanted me to volunteer
to be a cotton boy," a Saigon businessman
recently recalled.
Young Vietnamese students read French
history books referring to "our ancestors, the
Gauls" This example of French accultura-
tion was countered by the Vietminh argu-
ment: "Please remember, your ancestors were
not the French. You know your ancestors
were the dragon and the fairy," a legend com-
monly accepted by the population.
According to prisoners in the older group,
once they returned to South Vietnam in the
late 1950's, they were surprised at what they
found. They had been told the south must
be liberated from its own poverty. One said
he was astonished to see the Government
troopers wearing boots. (Communist troops
often wear rubber-tire sandals.)
Another said he had been told that two-
thirds of South Vietnam had been liberated.
But when he attacked Government villages
the peasants fought his men. They had
been told they must liberate the south from
the American imperialists, but soon discov-
ered they were fighting Vietnamese.
But few of these veterans defected to the
government side. One oldtime propaganda
agent captured in the south explained that
he listened to the Voice of America and
British Broadcasting Corp. to discover the
truth. But he listened to the Hanoi radio
to find out the correct party line.
He reasoned that if the party lied, there
must be a good reason for it. The party
knew best.
The younger generation Vietcong troops
join the liberation army for different rea-
sons. Some of them are virtually kidnaped.
Others have personal grievances or are sim-
ply bored with life in the villages. The
Vietcong promise them adventure, and a
chance to see life and be educated.
There is no sharp overriding national cause
which the Vietcong are pushing throughout
the country, such as the anti-French cam-
paign. But there are grievances.
Some unmarried males join to get away
from their landowners. Some are fired from
their jobs and join. Many prefer serving
with the Vietcong rather than government
forces because they believe they can stay
closer to their families.
Some young married men join to get away
from the in-laws; the Communists in the
village promise to take care of the wife and
children. (One Vietcong trooper returned to
his village, found his wife and children
destitute, picked Zip a rifle and shot up the
Vietcong village committee.) One was
talked into joining when a pretty girl prom-
ised to marry him if he did; he became dis-
illusioned when he found she had promised
to marry six other recruits also.
Some are simply kidnaped at gunpoint.
One was led away with a rope around his
neck. One was kidnaped only hours after
his wedding.
One reliable source estimated that about
10 to 15 percent of the southern-born Viet-
cong troops were orphans. About 30 percent
are farm laborers, About 80 percent came
In the West, the war in Vietnam is an
ideological confrontation with communism.
In Vietnam, this is not the way it is regarded
by many of the Vietcong.
The Communists operate behind the mask
of the National Liberation Front, which ex-
ploits nationalism and xenophobism. It dis-
guises its Communist core philosophy by
sloganeering about freedom and democracy.
One Western diplomat explained the Com-
munist appeal in these words: "The Commu-
nists. have swiped the American ideals. The
Communists are promising the peasants a
New, Fair, Square Deal-land, reform, demo-
cratic elections, land courts for justice."
Hence, the appeal of the communist guer-
rilla movement is not communism at all.
One Americas, official explained that of more
than 200 Vietcong prisoners and returnees he
interviewed, not one mentioned anything
about Marxism-Leninism, atheism, collective
farms.
But the Vietcong also have a strong appeal
for youth. "The Vietcong promise them
fun-that life will be gay," one source said.
"Many of those who join believe they get
this."
Even if a youth has been forced to join the
Vietcong, a highly effective indoctrination
session immediately begins to mold him into
an enthusiastic, well-disciplined fighter.
Perhaps, this can be seen in their songs.
Neil Jamieson, 29, a Vietnamese-speaking
provincial representative from Gloucester
City, N.J., translated a number of Vietcong
songs and talked with incoming Vietcong de-
fectors.
One of the songs goes:
"We are peasants in soldier's clothing, wag-
ing the struggle for a class oppressed for
thousands of years; our suffering is the suf-
fering of the people.
"Many of their songs are centered on vic-
tory," Mr. Jamieson said. "They associate the
soldiers with the peasants-fighting oppres-
sion, not only against the foreigners, but also
the upper classes within society.
"The troops accept-in fact, glorify-hard-
ship because it identifies them with the peo-
ple. It's almost like old Christianity. It's
like little kids' Sunday School hymns-the
idea of picking up the Cross for Jesus but in-
stead of a cross it's a pack."
He said most of the Vietcong songs were
"upbeat, emphasizing the positive in a Nor-
man Vincent Peale manner." Government
songs were often sad.
A SPARTAN LIFE
"The young troops lived a very spartan
life," Mr. Jamieson continued. They were
short of medicine, and all suffered attacks
of malaria. Many suffered real hardships. It
was cold in the jungle, yet they didn't dare
light a big fire.
"I talked with many of the Vietcong about
their songs," he said. "After their evening
meal, they would break into teams of three
and have their self-criticism sessions. Each
one would go through his experiences of the
day, his life in society, and in his three-man
combat team. If one of them was wounded
in combat, the two buddies would take care
of him.
"After supper they would go through this
ritual. They are taught to do this immedi-
ately after joining the Vietcong by the older
cadre, who told them that sins can be for-
given but to conceal anything is a blow
against the group.
"If for example, the young trooper had
lost his ammunition or weapon, he'd criticize
himself. Thts psychological aspect is a great
Vietcong strength.
"After the self-criticism session, there
would be announcements by the cadre and
then would sit around and sing to pass their
time in the evening. They would sit around
a small campfire, if security permitted-just
like the Boy Scouts used to do. These youths
were uneducated, but the Communists taught
them about the sputnik and Castro and Cuba.
They didn't understand it well, but they knew
Cuba was a tiny country near America and
America was a paper tiger when Cuba stood
up to us and we were powerless to do any-
thing to them.
"The troops were short of rice, yet each.
day they put a few grains from each meal in
a bamboo tube. When there was enough
they'd take it to a tribal village and have a
party for the children.
"One youthful trooper was with the Viet-
cong for 3 years, and was a member of their
youth organization, which is ., the halfway
point to becoming a party member. He was
recruited at gunpoint, but he didn't hate the
Vietcong."
He told me: "If I told you what I thought
about out there in the jungle you'd think
I was crazy. The Vietcong create a new real-
ity; you feel you are in the world and not out
of it."
[From the New York Herald Tribune, May
31, 1965]
OUR GIRL IN VIEr-II: AMERICA'S FROZEN
POLICY-VITAL POLITICAL POWER UNUSED
(By Beverly Deepe)
SAIGON.-U.S. policy in South Vietnam is
frozen in a negative posture that concen-
trates on military victory while failing to
produce the sort of dramatic political strat-
egy that would make such victory possible.
This, at least, is the opinion of highly
placed sources in Saigon who have watched
the American Involvement here grow steadily
for more than a decade.
In their view, the U.S. attitude is essen-
tially anti-Communist rather than pro-
something. The overwhelming impression
is that the American policymakers are at-
tempting to stem the tide of Communist
aggression or to teach Hanoi a lesson. But
this Implies a political status quo in a coun-
try that is changing in its postcolonial
development and is, indeed, fighting for
change.
"Nothing negative has ever prevailed over
something positive," the western military
expert commented. "One of the most fre-
quently asked questions by Vietnamese cap-
tains and majors on the battlefront is, `What
are we fighting for?' as they look at the po-
litical turmoil in their rear area at Saigon."
HOLLOW WORDS
While some Americans in Saigon pay lip-
service to the principles of freedom and
democracy, these are, as one American Gov-
ernment employee noted, "hollow words that
mean little in Asia."
A Western diplomat argues that the West-
ern concepts of democracy and freedom have
never been simplified and codified as have
the Communist Ideology. There are no
American primers for democracy as there
are Communist primers for revolution.
"One cannot understand these American
principles unless he has reaped the benefits
of them or seen them firsthand," the diplo-
mat explained. Hence, he said, the princi-
ples in which Americans believe must be
translated, demonstrated, and visualized for
the Vietnamese by the Vietnamese Govern-
ment, and this has yet to be done.
The main political problem during the
past decade seems to have been to realize
there Is a political problem and to act
positively.
The American policymakers, however,
view the battle in Vietnam as principally, if
not solely, a military operation against
armed communist guerrillas. They are op-
erating dramatically on one front while the
Communists are operating on six fronts--
political, economic, social, cultural, psycho-
logical, and military, all integrated into one
powerful stream of warfare.
"Suppose you lose your billfoldin a dark
place," one Vietnamese provincial official ex-
plained. "But you insist on looking for it
where there is light because It is easier.
Well, you are now looking for the Commu-
nists in the light place-the military field--
but you never, never find them all-they are
also where you refuse to look."
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June- 9, 19.61 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD SENATE
12533
ECON0aUc.,A?ID and American authorities appear cool to the Several weeks ago a low-ranking Vietna-
During the past decade, $1.1 billion was idea. Economic planners are more interested mese civil servant was fired after he spat on
spent on the U.S.military assistance program in Japan's contribution to a $9 million bridge the Minister of Economics because of differ-
for weapons, tanks, and ammunition for the for the Mekong River. ing views on the issue. A Vietnamese gen-
Vietnamese armed forces. In addition, $2.1 The United States has political power in eral and an admiral have been suspended on
billion was spent in Vietnam from American Vietnam, but chooses not to use it. Yet at charges of corruption.
economic, aid funds, But 75 percent of the this time the Saigon regime is too weak to act One high-ranking American official in the
economic aid was for the purpose of paying with political dynamism and effectiveness. U.S. Agency for International Development
expenses of the national army through the "We have the power to take names and to (AID) reportedly estimated that 30 percent
commercial import program. punish," one American explained. "But we of American economic aid was unreceipted
These figures exclude the salaries of Amer- don't do it. We are still timorous about in- or unaccounted for last year. A low-echelon
lean servicemen and Government officials, terfering in a nation's internal affairs." American provincial official says some of the
and all their operating costs, as well as A Western ambassador agreed. "The first 45 Vietnamese provinces had not submitted
gasoline, parts, and ammunition for Ameri- basic fault in the system," he said, "is you vouchers for expenditures during the past 3
can units. are too respectful of Vietnamese independ- years.
There is also the fact that the Vietnamese ence, so you do not interfere in making Another official said that outright corrup-
national army was built to counter a con- decisions on great issues-and in my opinion tion-American funds ending up in the
ventional invasion instead of a guerrilla war. you should-while instead you are very par- pockets of the rich-was probably limited
Once the slow-motion invasion began a year ticular, you pester them on small things of to 10 percent. Last year, this would have
ago, the army was slow in reacting. almost no importance. This creates the been $233,000.
There is no grand, dramatic political strat- wrong impression and does not get the re- One high-ranking Western official angrily
egy for winning the political war in South sults. Your instructions should be more ar- commented: "This is a major American
Vietnam comparable to the dramatic mili- ticulate but fewer." scandal. The way American-generated
tary actions. American generals, colonels and captains funds flow out of this country to Paris-or
The bombing raids on North Vietnam have admit they do not talk politics with their back to America itself-well, it makes your
not and cannot win the political war within Vietnamese military counterparts; and no hair curl.
the South. But without them the war could other American agency has been given the "There are millions and millions of
never have been won-or contained -because responsibility of cementing all the fighting piasters that go to France or go to Hong
of the sustained influx of North Vietnamese Vietnamese political factions together. Kong-and these piasters are generated by
troops, weapons, and the much more sig- This is in contrast to the Vietcong and American aid funds. The French have a
nificant political leadership cadre. If the the Communist apparatus-a guerrilla is first saying in Saigon that every time America
raids have not won the war, however, they and foremost a political cadre, and after that increases its aid funds there's a new hotel
have In effect won time-they have provided a soldier. The Communist political cadre- on the Champs Elysee."
the time to act politically. perhaps with only the rank of sergeant-de-
Sources in Saigon now hope for a dynamic tides what villages will be attacked and the FRENCH GIGGLE
political maneuver to reverse the adverse military commander, with a rank of major, The ambassador of another Western em-
political tide. They feel the military opera- follows his orders. bassy lamented, "The French Stand by, look
tions th
en would not be considered an end
in themselves, as is now the case, but the
means to an end-an honest, efficient gov-
ernment, a land reform program for the
peasants, P. smashing medical-educational
program that would lift the nation econom-
ically and politically into the 20th century.
These sources argue that the elaborate and
effective military battle plans have in effect
given the nation time to formulate and im-
*plement a massive blueprint for the political-
economic-social development of Vietnam.
Instead of .Vietnam being simply a military
battleground, it could also become a political
showplace, they maintain.
"But we lack any political imagination,"
one young American Government employee
said. "We are fighting against revolution.
How can we expect to win? It's like advo-
cating the murder of mother."
One Western ambassador says as an exam-
ple that it was "politically inadmissible" that
200,000 refugees in the central part of the
country-victims of an autumn flood, Com-
munist terror and friendly bombing raids-
were not made a symbol of non-Communist
revolution by the Vietnamese government.
"They are given charity rice and propaganda
lectures," he said. "They should be put in
factories and apartment houses to show the
world the benefits of fleeing the Communist
side. Some anti-Communist refugees are not
given help by the government, and return to
Vietcong areas."
Another source criticized the American of-
ficials for not forcing the Diem regime years
ago to establish "centers of prosperity" in
which the Vietnamese people and the outside
world could see the results of the American
presence.
A high-ranking Western official suggests
that television should have been widely in-
troduced in Vietnam to relay government
propaganda to the villages, to educate the
children and to show adult films on better
,farming methods.
More than 3 years ago, private Japanese
companies made such proposals for this, and
the Japanese Government has tentatively of-
fered technical assistance and funds. A tele-
vision station would cost $500,000.
But successive Vietnamese governments
have postponed a decision on this project
COMMUNISM FIRST
The Vietcong military apparatus is of a
secondary, supporting nature to the Com-
munist political machine. Hence American
efforts to defeat the guerrillas still have not
defeated the political subversive. American
advisers in the provinces admit that even
when the Communist guerrillas are defeated
militarily, the Communist political cell sys-
tem in the village is rarely destroyed.
The appearance of new French faces on the
main street of Saigon, the arrival of increas-
ing number of proneutralist Vietnamese from
Paris, and the release of thousands of pro-
neutralist and pro-Communist Vietnamese
from prison within the last 18 months is
more important in the subversive field than
the introduction of American combat ma-
rines and paratroopers is in the counter-
guerrilla military field.
"With the amount of money you are
spending in the military field," one Viet-
namese major said, "you could buy all the
land from the landowners and give it to the
peasants. You could pave Vietnam with
gold."
A 155-mm. howitzer shell costs $70; a 500-
pound general purpose bomb costs $180-
and tons of them are expended daily and
nightly in Vietnam,
From the New York Herald Tribune,
June 1, 1965]
GIRL IN VIET-III: - CORRUPTION-
HOTTEST SAIGON ISSUE
(By Beverly Deepe)
SAIGON.-The hottest issue in Saigon is
not bombing Hanoi, nor Vietcong terrorism,
nor possible negotiations for peace. It is
corruption.
Vietnamese sources-generals, majors,
captains, ex-ministers, economists-say that
corruption has now reached scandalous, un-
precedented proportions.
Highly placed sources in Saigon-Ameri-
can, Vietnamese, and Western-urged tighter
controls on Vietnamese Government funds
and on American aid and goods.
The issue is considered a gift for the Viet-
cong Communists, who promise the workers
and peasants justice and equality. It also
has caused friction within the Vietnamese
Government and armed forces.
gories-military and economic. During the
past decade $1.1 billion was given to Vietnam
through the U.S. military assistance pro-
gram. This program gives guns, ammuni-
tion, bombs, and other equipment to the
Vietnamese armed forces.
The original purpose of American advisers
was to train Vietnamese to use the equip-
ment-"and to keep track of the equipment,
which sometimes took some doing," one
American captain who worked on the pro-
gram for 2 years said.
"We brought in air conditioners for hos-
pitals-they ended up in the general's house.
We brought in hospital refrigerators to store
vaccines in. The vaccines spoiled and the
refrigerators wound up in the general's
house."
The second broad category totaling $2.1
billion during the past decade is the eco-
nomic aid program administered through the
AID.
However, of the 10-year economic aid pro-
gram, 75 percent has been channeled into
the commercial import program and sales
under the food-for-peace program. It is this
program, copied from the Marshall plan for
Europe after World War II, that highly placed
sources in Saigon believe should be reap-
praised.
SPECIAL KITTY
The commercial import program, plus
selling of American farm surplus goods, calls
for the importing of goods from America or
U.S.-authorized countries. The American
Government pays the exporter in dollars for
the goods. The Vietnamese importer in
Saigon pays the Vietnamese in piasters.
These American-generated piasters are
then put in a special kitty belonging to the
Vietnamese Government. This counterpart
fund primarily is used to pay the operating
expenses of the Vietnamese national armed
forces and to supplement Vietnam's other
revenues.
The total amount of piasters budgeted by
the Vietnamese Government in 1964 was 37.1
billion, but only 31.5 was actually spent
which created the impression in Saigon, even
among Vietnamese economists, that "there's
too much money in Saigon. We cannot ab-
sorb it all."
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12534 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 1965
More than 19 of the 37 billion budgeted 250,000 piasters had been allocated for the known in the jungles- o his wife can be a
was spent in the military budget. U.S.- job. The government official explained the prostitute?"
generated piasters through the counterpart remaining two-thirds had to be divided with "What it boils down to is whether to have social fund accounted for 10.4 billion-or about messenger boys up to high-ranking civil ao a nment lutionVietna or not
ese declean up t this
T
one-third--of Vietnam's expenditures. servants. g" a The 1965 985 Vietnamese budget, still under Sixth, the Vietnamese administrative sec- plained. "If America is too scared to do it-
discussion, is expected to total more than tion of the commercial import program has at the Communists will, and will win the peo-people
want
ustice. 45 billion piasters. At the free market rate ntAmes been aamese ministers who worked former Ameri- ple.are if they have a democracy or a dic ator-
ts1 is worth 7 e3 piasters. can foreign aid said that Vietnamese im- ship-if the government comes in with bul-
These are ghl comments and criticisms piasters per American lets or ballots. But they want justice-even
which the hl import in Saigon dollar for the import license. p if it is harsh. The Vietcong are harsh, but
made about the ah c commmer merciaal impprogram
and sales of farm surplus commodities. Every time there's a coup or government they are just."
First, according to one Vietnamese econo- shakeup, Vietnamese businessmen complain
mist and ex-minister, "economic aid doesn't they will have to pay off a new minister to [From the New York Herald Tribune,
their import licenses. June 2, 1965 J
alinat port of an a military eilitartaril y y matarget, e" is only f sup- get 'Vietnamese importers are legally allowed OUR GIRL IN ViET--IV: HOW THE U.S. BUILT
port chine." About four-
fifths of the U.S.-generated piasters in 1964 5 percent of the import license to be depos- ON THE QUICKSAND OF ASIAN POLITICS
were allocated to support the Vietnamese ited abroad in a foreign account. However, (By Beverly Deeps)
military budget. as an inducement to sell his products, the
foreign exporter regularly offers an additional SAIGON.--In 1.962, when American advisers
CONSPICUOUS WEALTH Illegal 4-5 percent listed as promotion fees and helicopters began arriving in large num-
President Nan Dinh Diem
m
Second, the commercial import program
has enriched and enlarged the upper-mid-
dle-class, elements in Saigon and other cities,
but it has also accentuated the extremes be-
tween the urban and rural classes. "Often
you bring in a whole lot of things for the
richer middle class with conspicuous con-
sumption, and the Vietcong can play on
this, saying it enriches the middle class and
bourgeois," one Western ambassador said.
Third, the rural communities, especially
earlier in the program, received a relatively
small proportion of the commercial import
aid. Between 1955 and 1960, when the Viet-
cong began organizing and recruiting in the
countryside, only 4 percent of the direct and
indirect American aid was funneled into the
rural population, which is an estimated 85
percent of the total population.
Fourth, the commercial import program
has not been geared to assist the building
l Vietnamese agri-
h f
hi
unne
c
of industries w
cultural products into the light industrial businessmen-principally Chinese-corner
establish a monopoly, and sell at
d of Viet- the market
i
i
l
,
per
o
ca
sector, During the crit
tong formation in the countryside, from 1955 inflated prices, causing a rise in the cost of
to 1960, American economic aid assisted in living. During a 10-day shortage period, the
the establishment of 58 companies. But price of sugar or cement, for example, would
about 70 percent of these depended on im- double.
ported raw materials; even the paper mills Eighth, the commercial import program
needed to import wood pulp., has prevented large-scale deficit spending,
After 10 years in Vietnam, Americans still runaway inflation, paid the national army,
allow rubber as one of the. most important and assisted in the establishment of more
exports in the country-most of it going to than 700 local industries. But it has also
France-but no substantial rubber produc- allowed the Vietnamese Government to use
tion factories have been established in their own foreign exchange for other con-
Vietnam. sumer demands-and too much of this has
Fifth, the Vietnamese officials recognize been channeled into the luxury class.
h "dirt dis- t f Sal on
s
t
t
munists. tin one siuc woo ~..~ ,,..u.,---_
ideology, the National Liberation Front and
behind it, the Communist Party, calling it-
self the People's Revolutionary Party.
President Diem had built his own counter-
ideology, a vague concept called personalism.
His National Revolutionary Movement corre-
sponded to the National Liberation Front;
his brothers' secret party, the Can Lao, corre -
sponded to the Communist Party.
When President Diem was ousted, his
counterideology and countermachines were
washed away. Since then, no single person
has been in total command of the anti-
Communist forces long enough to build a
similar machine or ideology.
ere
ree o g
two kinds of corruption,
y The shops along the main s
honest corruption"-l.e., 'taking Vietnamese are filled with imported cheeses, French per- Since November 1963, the country has
Government funds-but also "clean honest fume, Japanese radios, French costume Jew- been in a state of political crisis. Sources in
corruption"-getting access to American- elry, and foreign-made cars. None of these Saigon now argue that it would be a mistake
generated funds or soaking Vietnamese cit- items can be bought by the rural peasants. to rebuild a counterideology-even if it
izens for money for rendering government IN SCHOOLS, TOO could be done. They say instead that the
services, from the issuance of birth certif- Saigon government must reform itself and
States .to fixing of taxi meters to meet gov- These problems have been accentuated by "outrevolutionize the Communists-but do
ernment specifications. day-to-day corruption in the Vietnamese sys- it 10 times better and 50 times faster than
The Vietnamese officials have therefore de- tem of life. A child in a French school in the Communists themselves."
vised an effective system of padding their Saigon-where sons of ministers and gen- The last time the American-backed Saigon
vouchers and receipts. erals go if they are not in France-easily in-
the strategic seized the hamlet political progra initiative The
ters a wooden bridge casts 1,600 pias- can pass an exam with a 10,000 piasters de- government
ters to build," an American district adviser posit under the table, and if you don't think concept of fortified hamlet, with m. The
complained. "The contractor adds another so, just look at how many French teachers economic and social advantages, was officially
200 piasters and the district chief adds an- leave Vietnam and invest in hotels on the ecoem April cia.
President Diem
other 200 piasters.' I can practically see the French Riviera," an anti-Communist source launched mic and social
DISASTER
money flow into their pockets, but they give remarked.
me a receipt for 2,000 piasters. What can I Transfers for Vietnamese battalion com- But it was doomed. One American, fluent
do to disprove them?" panders from the remote provinces to Saigon in Vietnamese, visited a pilot project in
One Vietnamese province chief under the cost 50,000 piasters. Cuchi, 20 miles from Saigon, and was told by
Ngo Dinh Diem regime admitted he ordered For 50,000 piasters, a young man can ob- peasants that the hamlet program was an
a b few of hit loyal troops ntrbluon that es up his own tain a certificate that he's involved in under- economic disaster.
bridge that was her construction tcontract. cover work for the Ministry of Interior-and The peasants said the Government forced
they could let amese il and o. is thus exempt from the army draft. The them to construct hamlets instead of farm
anran poantetom Ministry has signed 1,300 of these certificates their cash crop of tobacco. As a result, they
Some Vietnamese
nor-
units are known too poss in recent weeks. could produce only 10 percent of what nor-
killed or deserted eshat never existed, or were
killed or ertbut never reported as lost. Up to 5,000 piasters is siphoned off the al- inally was raised. and to
of Am
The d
she
surviv
erican Their paychecks slip into the hands of prig- ham to become a prostitute before theefir t the schizophrenic nature of thel Vf tnamese
ileged
week, leaflets were printed to encour- payment arrives---which takes up to 10 society itself. The governing class is gener-
fait cwmmanflleet
age Vietcong troops to return to the govern- months," one Vietnamese observer said. ally urban based, French educated with an
merit side. Printing cost 79,000 piastres, but "Why should her husband want to die un- aristocratic position based on either family
s
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,
or discount to be deposited in hard cur- bars in Vena
rency outside of Vietnam. was told by a close American friend that un-
Hence, the program has allowed the Viet- less he radically reformed his government,
namese to build up foreign accounts of hard he undoubtedly would be overthrown in a
currency. In . addition, Vietnamese and coup d'etat. The American had taken a poll
Western sources complain that many profits of Diem's former supporters and found that
are being sent abroad, either physically or only 30 out of 150 were sticking with the
in paper transfers, instead of being invested chubby little mandarin.
in local industries in Vietnam. "But Diem wouldn't listen and the Ameri-
PIASTERS IN SUITCASE cans weren't interested in hearing it," the
friend lamented. "More American troops and
Some sources believe that high-ranking helicopters came, but reform did not. The
officials simply carry piasters to Hong Kong Americans built a beautiful war machine
in a suitcase (four American enlisted men and placed it on political quicksand."
were once arrested for doing this for a Chi- Despite the American military buildup, the
nese). In other cases a paper transfer is failure of President Diem to institute reforms
made in which piasters are paid in Saigon provided the political fuel on which Vietcong
and American or Hong Kong dollars or French strength grew.
francs are deposited in a foreign account. A year later, President Diem was over-
Seventh. instead of selling goods to the thrown and killed.
Vietnamese consumer at the lowest possible President Diem had built a political magi-
. Corn-
 June
`0,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
background, money, or land ownership. This
elite minority attempts to govern the masses
although it knows little about them and is
concerned less.
The elite's lack of concern and compas-
sion was illustrated in an incident related
by the wife of a western embassy official.
The wives of embassy officials had voluntarily
presented furniture, clothing, and toys to a
local orphanage.
"Several days after we handed over the
goods, one of the embassy wives returned
to the orphanage," the lady explained. "We
were astonished to find the ofiiciala had even
taken the toys out of the hands of little
orphans. The toys were nowhere to be
found."
In contrast, cadre wanting to join the
Communist Party are sent to live with the
rural masses and practice "three together-
ness"; eating, liding, and working with the
peasants. Cadre are invited to join the Com-
munist Party-which has an exclusive, and
not mass membership-when they are pre-
pared to govern.
"The Americans had to play with the cards
that were dealt out and they weren't very
good cards," one Western diplomat explained.
"In Vietnam, nationalism went the Commu-
nist way. We saw a lot of Vietnamese in
the South who are the political forces in the
country * * * they are the bourgeois, the
landowners, the Catholics. They believe in
the same ideas as we do; we support these
people and they support us. But these peo-
ple in an Asian country in the throes of
political-social upheaval-they are not in the
mainstream."
The diplomat continued:
"They're on the edges-we're supporting
them and the mainstream is elsewhere-in
the nationalist movement of the Commu-
nists. The mainstream elements got into the
hands of Ho.Chi Minh in North Vietnam and
Mao Tse-tung in China. Chiang Kai-shek
didn't have the nationalist issue; he was
helped by the United States-and this In
turn made it more likely he'd lose."
MANDARIN SYSTEM
The lack of justice and equal opportunity
Is perhaps best reflected in the medical pro-
fession in Vietnam, which one American-
educated Vietnamese doctor called "the med-
ical mafia." Two elite groups of doctors-
the faculty of medicine at University of
Saigon and a private organization called the
Medical Syndicate-decide which doctors will
the licensed for private practice. Virtually
all the members of these groups come from
Hanoi and favor licensing only northerners.
"These seven older-generation men in the
faculty of medicine are capable and dedi-
cated," one American official working in
medical field said, "They just happen to be
partisan. They represent the old mandarin
system; they choose, select-and limit the
leaders of the future. It's the tradition in
the East for more than 1,000 years that lead-
ers of the next generation are always chosen
by those in power. This gives rise to the
mandarin system and an undue amount of
nepotism."
After 10 years of administering the largest
U.S. medical aid program in the world-
American officials here still have little in-
fluence on Vietnamese medical affairs. One
American-trained Vietnamese doctor said
that a medical degree from an American med-
ical school still is not readily recognized in
tion (although there are two American-op-
erated hospitals in France). Requests by
the American-operated Seventh-day Advent-
1st Missionary Hospital to expand their 30-
bed clinic have repeatedly been refused.
American officials in Saigon have not ef-
fectively pressured the Saigon government
to correct "this rot within," in the words of
a Vietnamese anti-Communist. Instead they
have superimposed upon "the rot" a spec-
tacular medical program in the provinces.
"The Americans think we should fight for
democracy," one young Vietnamese intel-
lectual explained. "But in fact, the Viet-
cong fight because of the lack of democracy."
[From the New York Herald-Tribune, June 3,
19651
OUR GIRL IN VIET-V: LAND REFORM-THE
LONG DELAY
- (By Beverly Deeps)
SAIGON.-"The most important question in
the Vietnamese countryside besides security
is land reform," an American technician said.
"Yet virtually nothing has been done about
it.
"The Vietcong are gaining a lot of points
with the peasants by simply issuing land
titles-and it costs them nothing. They
take the land from the landowner and give
It away. Nothing we give to the peasants-
like pigs, insecticides, or fertilizer-is as im-
portant as land."
American technicians and provincial offi-
cials for the past several years have urged
the implementation of an effective land re-
form program. Two land distribution
schemes currently have been written, but
neither has been accepted. Higher officials
in the American Embassy and in the Agency
for International Development believe "land
reform is not the panacea for Vietnam's
problems."
A program for the training of land-reform
cadre is under consideration. But the pro-
gram will not be instituted until "the other
day"-when the Vietcong Communists have
been defeated.
WARNING
However, one Vietnamese general recently
warned American generals and officials that
American-backed efforts to pacify the prov-
inces would fail'unless they were linked with
land reform.
"When the Vietnamese National Army goes
back to pacify areas from the Vietcong, the
local landowner goes back with them, offer-
ing to serve as intelligence agent," the gen-
eral explained. "Obviously he wants to col-
lect his back rent. So when the army pacifies
the area it pacifies it for the landowner and
not for the peasant.
"Of course, 35 percent of the peasants are
landless. They become fanatics and will
fight for the land given them by the Vietcong
because It's as important to them as life."
One U.S. official described as "horror
stories" the actions of some landowners to
collect back rent, once government forces
had pacified Vietcong areas.
According to reliable sources, in other
cases, when the Vietnamese Government
Army attempts to pacify the area, the com-
manders simply ignore the problems of land
reform, refusing to collect back rents-but
also refusing to confirm the land ownership
rights.
Vietnam, on the other hand, a parachute de- or their agents return to collect back rent
gree-a degree virtually bought with money the matter is simple. The peasant complains
from a second-rate medical school in to the Vietcong, and the agent is shot.
France-Is easily acceptable by the "the RECRUITING
mafia. American officials who have talked with
The two best hospitals in Saigon are large numbers of Vietcong prisoners and
French-operated. They are also the most returnees believe the Vietcong recruits with-
expensive. There is no good American hos- in South Vietnam are almost entirely from
pital in Saigon for the Vietnamese popula- the rural population, probably indicating
12535
not the strength of the Vietcong appeal so
much as the accessibility to rural masses
for Communist recruiting.
Furthermore, an estimated 30 percent of
the Vietcong strength recruited in the South
are considered to belong to the "farm labor
class," the lowest in the semi-Confucianistic
rigidly stratified rural society.
The five rural classes in Vietnamese coun-
tryside area are: the landowners (who lease
out all the land they own) ; the rich peasants
(who own more land than they till, and lease
out some of It); the middle-class peasants
(who own. all they till); the tenant farmers
(who rent all their lands), and the farm
laborers (who cannot rent land, but are
seasonally\hired for planting and harvesting).
"The question of land reform is quite
simple," one low-ranking Vietnamese pro-
vincial official explained. "The government
represents the landowners; the ministers and
generals are either landowners or friends of
landowners. The Catholic Church owns
land. The Buddhist Church owns land.
Nobody Is Interested in fighting for the poor
peasant. And the top Americans-well, they
talk to only the ministers and rich people so
they don't push it either."
LANDOWNERS
One Vietnamese general recalled that dur-
ing the war with the Communists against the
French in the early fifties, he was ordered
by imperial decree to have landowners in his
security district in North Vietnam divide up
the land with the peasants. There were two
large landowners in the area, he recalled, one
of them a Roman Catholic bishop and the
second a relative of the then Finance Min-
.fater.
"The Catholic bishop refused to divide the
land because he said he had to support 2,500
seminary students with the rent money, and
the big landowner also refused," the general
explained. "I warned them both if they
didn't give the land to the peasants the
Communists would take over not only the
land, but also the seminary and the land-
owner's house. But they wouldn't listen.
The big landowner told the Finance Minis-
ter what I was doing. I was quickly trans-
fered to another place-and 3 years later the
Communists took over."
The land-reform issue in Vietnam-in-
volving not only issuing of land titles, but
also law enforcement on land rents, land
security for tenants and fixed rates on the
interest of borrowing of money-is not con-
sidered as acute as in other parts of Asia.
The Japanese say, for example, that a peasant
without land is like a man without a soul.
The victory of Chinese Communists in taking
over mainland China was achieved not so
much by armed guerrillas as by the promise
of land to the poverty-stricken, landless
peasantry.
"The land for the landless" campaign in
the Philippines virtually broke the back
of the Hukbalahap insurrection in the
fifties.
According to reliable sources, the Vietcong
guerrillas in Vietnam have a haphazard, in-
consistent land-reform program which varies
from area to area in sections of the country
they control. However, the current govern-
ment has virtually no program at all. One
American provincial official estimated that
the Vietcong had issued land titles to 50
percent of the peasant families in his prov-
ince; the government had issued none.
In some areas, the Vietcong take some of
the land from the rich peasants and give it
to the landless tenant-who still pays rent,
to the Vietcong.
So far, the Vietcong have not killed or
harassed the rich peasants as they did before
their seizure of power In North Vietnam.
In some cases, the Vietcong program In the
rural areas is considered self-defeating. They
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9-_ 1965
have made a definite push for higher rents them only when they need the money. They
as they move toward the mobile warfare use the piggy as a living bank."
phase. He explained that at first the richer village
In some areas, Vietcong taxes and indirect families got the pigs, or the friends of the
taxes in rice have doubled over'that of last local Vietnamese Government agricultural
to have redistributed the land, increased the
land tax from 100 to 900 piastres and in-
creased the rice tax from 50 to 300 piastres.
in the countryside outside Hue, which has
lately fallen under their control, the Vietcong
are attempting to collect 10-15 percent of
what the peasants had raised during the
past decade, when they lived in peace. The
peasants are said to be discontented about
that. In isolated cases, peasants have burned
their own crops rather than pay Vietcong
taxes.
In the fifties, President Ngo- Dinh Diem
attempted to correct the injustices in the
countryside. But his effectiveness was lim-
ited. A U.S. Government bulletin published
in January this year explained:
"Under the ordinances approved in 1955, a
program was being carried out to regularize
tenancy agreements through written con-
tracts. The contracts established minimum
and maximum rents of 15 and 25 percent, re-
spectively, chargeable by the landlord against
the tenant's main crop. While a start has
been made Inland reform, real progress has
been negligible and a review of the entire
program needs to be undertaken."
[From the New York Herald Tribune, June
4, 1965]
OUR GIRL IN VIEr-CONCLUSION: THE PRO-
GRAM THE REDS CAN'T FIGHT
(By Beverly Deepe)
SAIGON.-This is the story of the three little
pigs of Vietnam.
It is one of the most visibly effective
American-sponsored programs in rural Viet-
nam against which the Communist Vietcong
guerrillas have many arguments but no real
answer.
In early 1962, American provincial repre-
sentatives of the Agency for International
Development (AID) began distributing im-
proved white pigs from the Mekong Delta
throughout the entire countryside.
The program called for a package deal in
which eight bags of cement would be given
to build a combination pig sty-compost pit,
while three improved pigs and American sur-
plus corn would be lent to the farmer.
One of the pigs would later be marketed,
which would repay the entire $50 cost of the
venture; the others would be kept for breed-
ing.
"The pigs had a fantastic impact," one
American agricultural technican explained.
"The farmers followed the old Chine cus-
tom and washed their pigs daily. Some of
them put red ribbons around the ears of
the pigs. Almost all the pigs became pets
for the children."
BUT WHY CEMENT?
"Of course, we had a few problems. Some
of the Vietnamese farmers had never even
d
did
n t un
seen cement before and they
e - merit will double the prices wheal it comes
stand why they should have a cement-floored to paying the loan, or that the government
pig sty and compost pit when for centuries will make the farmers dependent on the
they had moved the pig waste out on the fertilizer year after year and then skyrocket
ground. the prices.
"Some of the farmers moved their cots into "The poor Vietnamese farmer, who has a
the compost pit. Some of them put the pigs lot of superstition and no knowledge of
in their houses and moved their families chemicals, is in the dark," an American
into the pig sty. After all, it was better technician said. "The Vietcong play on the
than their dirt-floored houses. farmer's past lack of faith in the govern-
"Some of the farmers put tiled roofs on ment."
the pig sty with curlicues like ancient American-supported rural economic aid is
Chinese temples. They became the new scattered in the secure "oil spots" in each
status symbols in the villages. We never of Vietnam's 45 provinces, which at times
could understand why they made them so undercuts the impact that it has had nation-
elaborate. wide.
"Then, of course, the most profitable time The Communist-initiated war has pro-
to sell the pig is when he's about 1 year duced an economic deterioration and social
old," he continued. "But the Vietnamese upheaval in the countryside. Young farmers
let the pigs get fatter and fatter and sell are drafted instead of planting rice. Large
tracts of land. are abandoned because of Viet-
cong pressure, and other large tracts, now
uncultivated, could be developed into ex-
cellent farming land.
Despite this, the standard of living has
improved during the last 10 years. Ten
years ago, a bicycle was a status symbol; now
motor scooters, bicycles, and buses are reg-
ularly seen in the Countryside.
The nationwide statistics on education are
also impressive. In 1955, 329,000 pupils at-
tended elementary public schools. In 1964,
the number had increased to 1.5 million.
In 1964 alone, 900 new rural schools were
built and 1,000 elementary education teach-
ers were trained. A total of 4,000 rural
schools was built in the decade.
In 1955, there were 2,900 university stu-
dents in Vietnam. By 1964, the number had
increased to 20,000, with a new university
established in the northern provinces. More
than 2,500 Vietnamese students and techni-
cians have been sent to America through
AID programs for advanced degrees.
However, the population growth is 2.8 per-
cent yearly.
In the rural health field, Vietnamese vil-
lagers often find it difficult to understand
what has been prevented-such as cholera
epidemics or malaria. During the last 6
years, however, the American-backed $12
million malaria-eradication program, part of
a worldwide effort, has dropped known ma-
laria cases from 7.22 percent to less than I
percent.
SPRAYING OF HOMES
More than 1 million Vietnamese farm
homes are being sprayed twice a year. More
than 6 million persons have been directly
affected by the spraying. The Vietcong
propagandists told the villagers the spray
would cause their thatched roofs to crumble
or would kill their cats and chickens.
"The Vietcong say the farmers don't have
enough cats to eat all the rats," one Ameri-
can medical expert explained, "and the rats
eat rice. They use this argument when
there's a poor crop of rice and a good crop
of rats-and it's very effective with the
peasants."
The malaria rate has dropped to the ex-
tent that medical experts simply keep tabs
on it by collecting blood samples.
"The Vietcong spread the word that the
Americans were collecting Vietnamese blood
to give to the wounded Americans," the medi-
cal expert continued. "This even happened
on the outskirts of Saigon. One American
educational lecturer started to give a lecture
on the taking of these blood samples for
malaria control; suddenly all the mamas and
little kids started throwing rocks at him.
"The police had to escort him out-all be-
cause of that outlandish Vietcong propa-
ganda. But Vietnamese people don't like to
give blood; they are superstitious about that
and it's very strange to them."
More than 8,000 rural health workers arc
currently operating in the Vietnamese coun-
tryside. Nine gleaming white surgical suites
costing $500,000 each, have been established
throughout the country and are staffed by
Americans, Filipinos, New Zealanders, Aus-
tralians, and Italians.
EXHIBIT 5
[From the Washington (D.C.) News,
June 4, 19651
THE ESCALATING WAR
(By Richard Starnes)
The American people are not alone in their
blissful ignorance of the coming demands for
men to feed the insatiable jungle war in
Vietnam. A completely reliable source who
was present at a White House briefing tall:;
me this:
"I saw U.S. Senators blanch when Robert
McNamara told them that they had to pre-
pare to see 300,000 American men sent, to
Vietnam.
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later='cne pigs nave eeepv s u v off ,o.~==
of the villages." he said.
"The neighbors buy little pigs from the
first family to have them. In one northern
city, 2 years ago you wouldn't see one im-
proved pig a day come through the slaughter-
house. Now about one-third of a day's
production is the improved breed."
REPAYMENTS
He explained that the Vietcong political
cadre attempted to sabotage the program by
telling the farmers that it was a "giveaway
program" rather than a loan, so that the
farmers would not make repayment to the
Government. So far, the rate of repayment
has been low, but in most cases the 18-
month deadline for repayment has not been
reached.
"The pig program doesn't make the farmer
pro-Government or pro-Vietcong," the tech-
nician explained. "But it does expose him
to the Government cadre, to the Government
administration and to an American
veterinarian. Maybe this is the first time in
the farmer's life that the Government has
done something to help him. So gradually,
it creates a better feeling for the Govern-
ment.
"The Vietcong do not steal the pigs, and
we have lost very few of our pig hamlets to
the Vietcong."
In addition to the pig program, Vietnamese
agricultural technicians, assisted by Ameri-
cans, have also started programs to improve
ducks, chickens, and cattle and to promote
a wider distribution of water buffaloes, which
are used to pull the farmers' plows.
Other technicians have established experi-
mental stations for improving rice seed
(which some Vietnamese prefer to eat rather
than use for seeding).
Recently, Vietnamese agricultural agents
conducted 3-day courses on improved farm-
ing techniques for farmers during the slack
season. Twenty piasters (30 cents) was given
the farmers for lunches "and that really had
an impact," one American agricultural expert
explained. "It was part of our pacification
program. But the Vietcong even welcomed
the agents into their areas to help their
farmers."
FERTILIZER ON CREDIT
In another instance, Vietnamese Govern-
ment administrators have implemented a
credit-loan system whereby farmers can buy
fertilizer before the net planting and repay
the loan after harvest. Production has more
than doubled in some areas. In other areas
small irrigation pumps have been bought on
loan, making possible two or three crops of
rice a year instead of only one.
The Vietcong retort that the fertilizer will
destroy the soil; that in the first year of
using fertilizer, production will increase but
 dune 16, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 12537
"I never thought I would live to see such U.S. officials predict that American casualty children with no school to go to. In a crash
a thing in the United States, but ! cHJamara tolls will increase from now on as American program initiated immediately on taking
told the briefing quite cheerfully that things Marine Corps and Army paratrooper units office in November, at the beginning of the
were looking up in Vietnam becau se we were move deeper into the battle. Chilean summer, Frei organized an intensive
now killing four times as many men as we U.S. air strikes on North and South Viet- course to.train new -teachers, asked existing
were losing." nam have increased in recent'months to the ones voluntarily to accept longer hours, and
The briefing, which was one of dozens that point that they are now round-the-clock undertook the construction of thousands of
the white House has conducted in an effort operations. schoolrooms, as well as lodgings for teachers
to sell Its Viet;ar4 policy, concluded with In the north, strikes have been limited to in remote areas.
talks by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and miiltary instalaltions, roads, and waterways
"Big Daddy" himself. well south of Hanoi. There seems no imme- President Frei has also been busily en-
Rusk had nothing new to say, but he kept diate prospect of bombing North Vietnam's gaged in an excellent land reform pro-
saying it at such great length that finally cities or civilian Industries. gram which in the next few years will
.the President, who was sitting in the front But in the south, huge sectors of the nation provide for an additional 100,000 inde-
row, started looking ostentatiously at his have been declared "free bombing zones," in pendent farmers in Chile.
watch," my informant reports. "But Rusk which anything that moves is a legitimate Everyone who has studied the Com-
missed the cue, until at last the President target. Tens of thousands of tons of bombs, munist movement knows that the great-
just got up and nudged Rusk away from the rockets, napalm, and cannon fire are 'poured
est bulwark against communism is the
lectern." Into these vast areas each week, If only by What the Senators heard then is a thing the laws of chance, bloodshed is believed to individual farmer who has his own plot
that hgs caused something very near to be heavy in these raids. of ground and his own farm to defend.
cloakroom consternation. Mr, Johnson In exchange, the Vietcong is exacting its In addition, under Mr. Frei tax re-
sailed into a defense of his escalation of the pound of flesh. forms in Chile have made progress.
war in Vietnam, and bluntly told his audi- In the past week, big Vietcong units prowl- There have been jail sentences for tax
ence that they had authorized It and, by im- ing through the jungle-covered mountains of evaders and that is almost unheard of
plication, must share the responsibility for central Vietnam have chewed up three Gov-
it. ernment battalions so badly that these units in South America. Most significant of
The President said he was frequently asked will not be able to fight again for a long time. all is the excellent cooperation between
what his. policy in Vietnam was. Then, with Government casualties in these ambushes the Chilean Government and.American
the sublaty of a sledgehammer, he told. the probably have exceeded 1,000 men. corporations-Anaconda Copper and
Senators that the Congress had laid down The Vietcong have clearly shifted gears Kennecott Copper-both of which have
the policy in a resolution passed last August from what they call guerrilla warfare to huge holdings in Chile. Chile has
7 by a vote of 504 to 2. And, said the,Presi- mobile, warfare. worked out a system of ownership and
dent, he was doing his best to carry out that The Communist concept of mobile warfare participation in the profits of those cor-
resolution. Is essentially guerrilla operation on a vastly
The source of this account, who knows the expanded scale, in which whole battalions porations that have been agreed to by the
Senate intimately, reported that, in spite of and regiments are used In mounting am- corporations. Chile has avoided the ex-
the near unanimity of congressional support bushes. Ambushes remain the key feature propriation which the Marxists have
for administration Vietnam policy, Senators of the war. called for. Confiscatory taxes have been
are still "rankled" over Mr, Johnson's bland The Saigon Government and Its American avoided. Both Anaconda and Kenneeott
assumption that the August 7 resolution au- ally control the air above South Vietnam and are proceeding profitably from their
thorized escalation of the war in southeast some of its roads and waterways. The Viet- standpoint, and also sharing their gains
Asia. tong controls much of the rest of the nation.
The resolution, passed in the fever of in- Government units move mostly by truck, with the Chileans and with the Chilean
dignation that followed reported attacks by plane, and helicopter. Vietcong units move Government.
North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S. on foot through the trackless jungle. This There is a very serious problem, as
Fleet units In Tonkin Gulf, comes very close means the Communists generally have the there is in most of those countries, with
to saying what President Johnson says it advantage in setting up their ambushes. inflation. But even in that field Mr.
says-whether the Senators who voted for it Roads, particularly those that wind Frei is making progress.
like to admit it or not. through the mountain passes of central Viet- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
The resolution authorized the President nam, are ideal places for ambushes. Even
"as Commander in Chief, to take all neces- helicopters must land in clearings, which In time of the Senator has expired.
sary measures to repel any armed attack the jungle are often only tiny patches of Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
against the forces of the United States and ground. ask unanimous consent that I may pro-
to prevent further aggression." The Vietcong can and often does set up ceed for 3 additional minutes.
Note well that the resolution was not Jim- traps around these clearings, with 50-caliber The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
ited to Vietnam but specifically asserted machineguns trained on the places helicop- out objection, it is so ordered.
that. the U.S. goal was "assisting the people ters will be forced to land. Mr. PROXMIRE. The remarkable
of southeast Asia" to fight off alleged ag- As the fighting grows hotter it becomes thing to me is that Mr. Frei has been
-gression. That means just what it says- more brutal. Neither side is taking many
Congress "approves and supports" anything prisoners any more. Soldiers caught off side able to put into effect a system of slow-
Mr. Johnson deems necessary "to prevent now are generally shot on the spot or tor- trig down inflation which has at the same
further aggression". in the area, and it is now tured to death, time permitted wage earners to earn
somewhat late for whatever second thoughts significantly more money. It has per-
are occurring in Capitol cloakrooms. mitted farmers to obtain better prices
Whatever doubt may have existed as to the CHILEAN DEMOCRACY for their crops, while simultaneously
intent of the August 7 resolution was dis- WORKING WELL keeping inflation from preventing the
pelled last month, however, when congress
dutifully voted a blank check $700 million Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in kind of firm and solid economic progress
appropriation to finance the expanding war. the news-in newspapers, on television, which is most essential.
This time the division was 596 to 10, still a and radio-we hear a great deal more Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sufficiently lopsided vote to assure history about Vietnam and the Dominican Re- sent that this fine, short article on Chile,
that the 89th Congress had supported escala- public, about coups and revolutions, and published in the Atlantic Monthly, be
tion in the Pacific whether it knew what it
was doing or not. about the setbacks in the world. Un- _printed at this point in the RECORD.
EXHIBIT 6 being made in many countries has been was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
[From the New York Herald Tribune, June d, neglected because it does not make news. as follows:
1965] For example, the current Atlantic THE ATLANTIC REPORT--CHILE
VIETii&' C WAR A~ LTERSCI;ARACTER Monthly carries an excellent, concise re- Chileans are accustomed to earthquakes,
(By Malcolm W. Browne) Port on the impressively favorable de- but the recent upheaval in their politics Is so
velopments in Chile under the leadership unusual that historians peer back to 1841 to
SAmhas, VIETNAM, June 4.-The war in Viet- of Eduardo Frei. The excellent article find a parallel. Christian Democrat Eduardo
nam has been transformed into an enormous Frei is the first President since then, under
meat grinder, In which both sides, are now points out that under Mr. Frei there has Chile's multiparty system, to be elected by an
making an all-out drive to bleed: each other been great improvement in education. I absolute majority and to have a congress to
to death. read briefly from the article: do his bidding.
It is a meat grinder in which America for It is a shocking, fact that in this country His victory by 56 percent in the presidential
the first .time has an active part-on both of 8.5 million people of largely European ex- elections of September 1964 was startling
the giving and receiving end. traction there were approximately 200,000 enough, but it might have been considered
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12538 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9s 1965
the wages of fear: the Marxist left was run- with labor furnished largely by the in- effective than any yet devised, will be neces-
ning so strong-and did, indeed, chalk up a habitants themselves. sary to hold the line.
hefty 39 percent-that the right and center He is most enthusiastic about the creation Financing social programs in so tight an.
voted for him as a lesser evil, in spite of his of neighborhood organizations: sewing cir- economy thus requires some maneuvering
revolutionary program. In the congressional cles, teams for various sports, parent'teacher and a high level of competence, but Frei has
elections 6 months later, however, the old associations, and local self-government attracted a team of young economists from
alinements were back in force; the right and councils, which are to have the right to fed- the various universities-particularly the
center, Chile's traditional governing parties, erate with similar councils throughout the Institute of Economics, organized some
ears ago by Prof. Joseph Grunwald, of Co..
y
block untoward presidential. initiative. In- groups. Frei promises that none of these
stead, Frei's party all but swept them away, activities will be linked with politics, but
while the far left slightly improved its post- some of his critics wonder how it is humanly
The result is not only a green light for
Frei's Revolution With Liberty, which aims at
transforming Chile's social structure, but also
an unexpected revolution in its politics. The
era of compromise, mutual back scratching-
or sheer deadlock-is over, at least for the
time being. Indeed, it is likely that disgust
with political infighting played its part, as it
does in Gaullist France, in this sudden emer-
gence of a majority party. Like De Gaulle,
Frei, before the landslide, had asked for a
constitutional amendment permitting him to
go to the people should congress become too
obstructionist.
PEACEFUL REVOLUTION
The program which is now the approved
blueprint for Chile's future follows closely
the outlines for peaceful revolution drawn up
at the Punta del Este conference as the basis
for the Alliance for Progress. Emphasis is
placed on achieving a social impact where it
will be most immediately and dramatically
evident in Chile: among the landless farm
laborers and among the unorganized prole-
tariat that swarms in city slums.
Chilean agriculture has been for some
years a major reason for the imbalance of the
economy. Once a net exporter of, agricultural
products, Chile now imports more than $140
million worth, .two-thirds of which could be
produced locally. In. Chile's inflationary rat
race, agricultural prices have lagged behind
industrial ones because of Government at-
tempts to control the cost of the urban "mar-
ket basket"; worse still, these controls have
been erratic, thus discouraging rational de-
similar and successful Popular Cooperation
has been accused of being primarily a de-
vice for building grassroots support for his
party. In any case, only 10 percent of
Chile's working class is organized, in unions
largely Communist-controlled, at least at the
top. Organizing people "where they live as
well as where they work" is thus an interest-
ing new approach to the problem of giving
civic representation to the submerged pro-
letariat.
A third area where Frei has already
achieved dramatic social impact is education.
It is a shocking fact that in this country of
8~/2 million people of largely European ex-
traction there were approximately 200,000
children with no school to go to. In a crash
program initiated immediately on taking of-
fice in November, at the beginning of the
Chilean summer, Frei organized an intensive
course to train new teachers, asked existing
ones voluntarily to accept longer hours, and
undertook the construction of thousands of
schoolrooms, as well as lodgings for teachers
in remote areas.
He mobilized the good will and enthusiasm
of various groups: villagers gave land and
their labor and sometimes local materials;
the armed forces sent their troops and
equipment; 1,500 university students spent
their holidays mixing mortar and laying
bricks. This year, for the first time, no
Chilean child will be denied the pleasures of
the three R's.
Agrarian reform, public housing, and edu-
cation cost money, and Chile is already
overextended in the matter of foreign credit;
important, it is the social aspects` which most Alliance for Progress aid than any other
concern the Christian Democrats. They point Latin-American country. However, Frei also
out that one-third of the population lives on inherited from Alessandri an economy which,
the land, 60 percent is illiterate, and the while certainly not brilliant, is still in rela-
death rate of infants in rural areas is 129 per tively good shape. The balance of payments
thousand, shocking figures for one of the in 1964 showed a slight credit, thanks
most advanced countries in Latin America: largely to the high price of copper and re-
lumbia-and from the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA), whose headquarters are in Santiago.
Chileans like to call them the Brain Trust.
Service on the foreign debt, which would
have absorbed more than half the export re-
turns of the next few years, has been suc-
cessfully renegotiated to provide a breathing
spell. The United States has extended loans
of various types for $120 million. And
Chileans themselves have been asked to make
a sacrifice: a capital levy on personal prop-
erty of 1.5 to 3 percent annually for a period
of 5 years.
This proposal has naturally aroused the
ire of the propertied classes-and not only
because of the money involved. Frei was
careful to cite such precedents as"France's
similar levy just after the war and to point
to its present glowing prosperity as the result.
What really upsets many Chileans is the
declaration of their possessions which is im-
plied in the levy. Income tax evasion would
thereby become much more difficult. (At
present, in spite of tax reform, the salaried
class bears most of the burden; only 11,000
people have declared a taxable income of over
$5,000 a year.)
NEW DEAL IN COPPER
Redressing social injustice, however ad-
mirable, is nevertheless no sure cure for
inflation and economic stagnation. To get
the country moving, Frei has tackled the
problem at its very center-copper. This
metal dominates the Chilean economy; it
provides more than 50 percent of foreign
exchange and $85 million annually in taxes.
But five-sixths of the copper is extracted by
two American companies, Anaconda and
Kennecott. Although these companies pay
the highest wages in the country, and the
highest mining taxes in the world, the pres-
ence of two foreign colossi at the heart of the
economy is a constant irritant to national
pride, particularly since a good deal of the
cop; er is refined abroad and its marketing
is beyond the control of Chile.
The Marxist left has been campaigning for
some time in favor of outright expropria-
tion. The American companies have hesi-
tated to invest in the face of this threat and
increase in production-which they will en- percent, not too far below the Alliance goal the concomitant one of confiscatory taxes.
courage by allowing food prices to rise faster of 5 percent. Kennecott even announced a few years ago
this year than those of industry--hut a pro- The budget is approximately in balance, that it was not planning any further expan-
found agrarian reform. owing to a tax reform that is just beginning sion in Chile and would spend its money in
Frei has promised to distribute land to to show its benefits-among which Chileans developing its American properties.
100,000 new farmers during his-6-year term, count not only increased collections but a Frei, for his part, proposed an inter-
and to provide, through cooperatives, the jail sentence actually, enforced for a tax mediary solution which he called the Chile
necessary technical and financial assistance evader, an unheard-of phenomenon in Latin anization of copper. Immediately after the
to make the venture efficient. In this respect, America. election, he sent a commission to the United
his government has a valuable heritage from THE COST OF LIVING States to see how the new word could be
his predecessor, conservative president Jorge However, on Chile's main problem, en- defined.
Alessandri, who got a well-articulated if demic inflation, the Alessandri government, The definition has turned out to be not
somewhat mild agrarian reform law through after an encouraging start, made no head- only dramatic but eminently satisfactory to
congress in 1962. Under this law 6,000 plots way. The cost of living rose 38 percent in everyone concerned-except, of course
have already been distributed. The present 1964; since 1960 it has nearly tripled. Previ- Chile's diehard Marxists. What it amounts
government plans to amend the law, to speed our attempts to stop the runaway in its to is a business association between the,
up the process of expropriation, and to allow tracks having failed, Frei is proposing to Chilean Government and the mining coml:~a-
for deferred payment of indemnities instead apply the brakes slowly. He aims for a rise Hies, a new departure, on a scale like thi ?.
i th hole cones t of "how to do businer-
w p
of cash on the line.
THE URBAN SLUMS
The program for the urban slums, which
have been rebaptized "marginal neighbor-
hoods," goes under the name Popular Pro-
motion, a hodgepodge package aimed "at
bringing them into the mainstream of na-
tional life. Here, too, the Alessandri heritage
gives Frei a headstart, since Alessandri built
more low-cost housing than any previous
Piresident. Frei hopes to build still more,
and in the existing slums to install water
systems. pave the streets, put in electricity,
of only 25 percent in 1965, with lesser rises n e
in succeeding years until stability is reached, abroad."
hopefully by 1968. However, this year he is In two cases, that of Anaconda and 1hr
proposing that the rise be fully compensated Cerro Corp.--new to Chile but already op
by wage increases, with agricultural prices erating in Peru-Chile has acquired a 25-
and wages to be overcompensated to redress percent equity in new companies formed ti
previous injustices. exploit new ore beds. In the most startling
In order to maintain the overall increase .greement, that with Kennecott, Chile has
within the 25-percent limit, he is, therefore, bought outright 51 percent of a new com-
insisting that industrial prices rise no more p any to exploit the rich El Teniente mire
than 19 percent. In this framework, only a w b.o'.e production, with the aid of Kennecott.
sharp rise in production can maintain previ- all be vastly. expanded. The companies will
ous profit levels. Stringent controls, more by tax reductions and guarantees.
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~Tui 9, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 12539
while Chile feels much more master of its If,, the amendment were adopted, States the original apportionment plan were ap-
Iate.
Similar tax benefits and other stimuli have
also been offered to the smaller companies
to encourage them to expand too All this
implies a tremendous increase in production.
Frei anno.nced that by the end of his term
in' 1970 tonnage will have doubled-to 1,-
200,000 tons a year-and that Chile will then
be the biggest copper producer in the world.
More of this copper will be refined in Chile,
and Chile, with seats on the boards of di-
rectors, will have some say on how the metal
is to be marketed.
Chile will: doulltXess contlnue , its flirta-
tion with the Communist bloc-it has even
shipped to Red China as a gesture of de-
fiance. At the same time, Frel has said,
it will "respect with all due dignity and in-
dependence the interests of our principal
consumer"ancl biggest investor."
Chile his not been able to lay much cash
on, the.line?for. these tremendous acquisi-
tlons. Its - chief contribution will be
in housing for'miners, access roads and oth-
br, construction, and the supply of power, all
elements in its development plan anyway.
The emphasis on mining may withdraw re-
sources,. from other areas, but new foreign
investment will amount to $400 million, some
of which will, of course, be disbursed with-
in Chile itself. l owever, the program will
not bear its full fruit until Fret's term is
nearly over. "I am governing for Chile,"
he says, "which was not born nor does it
die In one. presidential term.
The long-term prospects for a significant
increase in government revenues and foreign
exchange are thus excellent. The problem
is to survive until this ship comes in, and
meanwhile to encourage other exports: iron
ore, of which Chile has rich deposits, cel-
lulose products from the Andean forests,
and fish meal, where a budding enterprise
hopes to emulate the Peruvian bonanza.
Further industrialization within so small a
market is hardly viable except with the pros-
pect of an effective Latin American Common
Market. Frei is pushing hard for a summit
meeting to cut away the petty nationalist
haggling which has hampered negotiations
for years.
Chileans, the most civic minded of all
Latin Americans, are conscious of these
problems, conscious too that with the new
political alinement within their country the
price of failure in this experiment of revo-
lution with liberty may be revolution with-
o{lt liberty. "We must show Latin Amer-
ica," they constantly say, "that there Is an
alternative to Castro."
EXCELLENT STATEMENT BY SENA-
TOR CASE FAVORING ONE-MAN,
from Neey [Mr. CASE] submitted
a concise but remarkably complete state-
ment before the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Amendments of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary in opposi-
tion to the Dirksen reapportionment
amendment.
I would like to draw the Senate's at-
tention to two points made by Senator
CASE which I believe are generally over-
.,looke.4 , u, discuss ,ons of this rotten -bor-
Qugh amendment,
First, far too few of the people clam-
oring,so loudly for the adoption of the
Dirksen amendment realize the damage
it col,ld do to the Negro's drive toward
equal voting rights. As Senator CASE
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could and some might apportion, themselves
on the basis of such factors as income level,
religious belief, or-most probable-color. I
am sure this is not the Intent of the dis-
tinguished minority leader in proposing this
amendment, but recent history suggests that
it could very 11 well be the ' outcome.
I hope that Senators who actively sup-
ported the voting rights legislation re-
cently passed by the Senate will take
Senator CASE'S _comtxients to heart.
Second, the passage of the "rotten
borough" amendment would undoubted-
ly mean a continuing and increasing re-
liance on the Federal Government to do
those jobs that can and should be done
at the State level. Urban interests often
are the first to suffer from malappor-
tionment. When they are blocked by a
malapportioned State legislature from
receiving funds for sanitation facilities,
transportation lines, urban redevelop-
ment, and countless other needs, they
are forced to turn to the Federal Govern-
ment. Senator CASE puts it this way:
If we had set out to hobble the already
stumbling institution of State government,
we could not have found a better way.
Mr. President, 'I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed at this point in the
RECORD the statement by Senator CASE
before the subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the Committee on
the Judiciary.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLIFFORD P. CASE ON
REAPPORTIONMENT RESOLUTION (S.J. RES.
2) SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS OF THE SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
I appreciate this opportunity to present
my views on Senate Joint Resolution 2, the
proposed constitutional amendment on ap-
portionment of State legislatures.
Despite the great attention given to dis-
tracting tangential issues, the intent of the
amendment is clear: it is designed to re-
verse the. Supreme Courts historic one-man,
one-vote decisions of 1964. .
I am opposed to this amendment. Apart
from its basic philosophy, it contains two
specific and fatal flaws.
The first might be called the deep freeze.
In this connection, I call attention to the
provision that "the right and power to de-
termine the composition of the legislature of
a State and apportionment of the member-
ship thereof shall remain in the people of
that State,"
That sentence has been interpreted by
eminent constitutional authorities to mean
that the courts would be frozen completely
out of the picture. They could not review
any apportionment. They could not correct
imbalances which exist or which could be
expected to arise in the future.
If a State legislature were to apportion one
house on the basis of race, for Instance,
where could the deprived Negro citizens of
that State turn for help? Certainly not to
the legislature responsible for the depriva-
tion. To the courts? Not if this amend-
ment is adopted.
Proponents of the amendment reply, "But
we have provided that the, people have the
right and power to determine the reappor-
tionment plan. Doesn't this protect the
public interest?"
Unfortunately, it does not. The amend-
ment's provision for a one-shot referendum
on each State's. reapportionment plan would
proved, even the voters themselves could not
correct it, The New York Times called this
the most serious defect of the amendment,
and continued:
"It permits apportionment on a nonpopu-
lation basis in perpetuity if such a course
has once been approved by referendum.
But what if the majority in the future
changes its mind on this issue? Any amend-
ment on this subject should require the
States to reapportion every 10 years and re-
quire a referendum each time, to make cer-
tain that a majority still favors apportion-
ing one house on a basis other than popula-
tion. Otherwise, the outrageous malappor-
tionments that the Supreme Court finally
intervened to correct could grow up all over
again."
The amendment's second defect is the
blank check given to the States to use any
criteria in determining their reapportion-
ment. The phrase, "upon the basis of fac-
tors other than population," gives States a
completely free hand.
Recently I attended a dinner of legislative
correspondents in New Jersey. They pro-
posed a plan, drawn up to fit within the pro-
tection of thin amendment, which suggests
the range which the amendment would al-
low the New Jersey Legislature:
"Under the plan, counties would be cred-
ited with 200,000 residents for each board-
walk, 250,000 for each ferry mooring, 1.3 for
each chicken, and 5.34 for each hundred-
weight of milk produced. The plan gives
Somerset an extra 150,000 residents for its
population of foxhounds, as determined un-
der the last census by local hunt clubs * * *
The U.S. Supreme Court has said legislators
represent people, not acres, trees, cows, or
pastures. The Court was eloquently silent
on the specific questions of boardwalks, fer-
ries, chicken, butter, and foxhounds." ?
The plan was proposed in jest, but it illus-
trates an important point. If the amend-
ment were adopted, States could and some
might apportion themselves on the, basis. of
such factors as income level, religious belief,
or-most probable-color. I am sure this is
not the intent of the distinguished minority
leader in proposing this amendment, but re-
cent history suggests that it could very well
be the outcome. The lengths to which some
Southern States have gone to prevent the
Negro from voting indicate that they would
not be reluctant to use this amendment as
an additional weapon.
The proponents of Senate Joint Resolution
2 claim it is needed in order to "protect
minority rights." The rights of minorities as
well as majorities must be protected, but
how this should be done is another question.
The supporters of this amendment seem to
think that the only way to provide adequate
protection of the rights of any minority Is
to give that particular minority a hammer-
lock on the legislative process. They are
usually thinking of citizens in rural or less
populous areas. But if the premise is true,
is not every minority entitled to the same
kind of consideration? That is to say, why
not give every minority a hammerlock on the
legislative process? Why should one minority
be more equal than any or all other minori-
ties?
The fact is that the only reliable safe-
guards for any minority are to be found in
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and,
even more basically, in the self-restraint
and respect for others on the part of the
public in general.
I find It surprising that many individuals
and groups which traditionally have opposed
extensions in the power of the Federal Gov-
ernment are working for adoption of this
amendment. If we had set out to hobble the
already stumbling institution of State gov-
ernment, we could not have found a better
way. The, story of many of our State legis-
 12540
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, t965
latures is one of stall and stalemate, Inde-
cision and inaction in the face of urgent
issues.
If this amendment should pass, many of
the States, already stymied in their efforts to
find modern solutions to problems of growth
and urbanization, will inevitably look in-
creasingly to the Federal Government.
My colleague from Wisconsin, Senator
PaoxMIRE, has stated the issue clearly:
"This amendment is calculated to assure
the country that State government-which
has been too timid, too backward, too re-
luctant, and as a result has seen its power
and initiative go to Washington-will be
slowed down to a molasses pace indefinitely.
It would do so by striking down the greatest
opportunity in many years which the States
have had for swift progress."
If this amendment, should pass, we will
have set the wheels of progress turning back-
ward for State governments. In an age of in-
creasing urbanization and urban problems,
In a period when many citizens are lament-
ing the growth of the Federal Government,
we cannot afford to take such shortsighted
action.
CARDINAL MINDSZENTY: A HERO
OF OUR TIME
Mr. PROXMIIE. Mr. President, on
June 12 of this year Cardinal Mindszenty
of Hungary celebrates the 50th anniver-
sary of his ordination Into the priesthood
of the Roman Catholic Church. For a
man of God, whatever religion he pro-
fesses, an anniversary of this longevity
deserves the honor and tribute of all men
of good will.
Cardinal Mindszenty is by every mean-
ing of the term a hero of our time. In
this era of oversophistication in which we
live, the noble virtues of heroism are
often regarded with detached indiffer-
ence and cynical disregard of their real
worth. It is well, therefore, Mr. Presi-
dent, that on this occasion we should
call the attention of our American people
to those values of heroism that have ele-
vated Cardinal Mindszenty in the esteem
of all free men; for It is in the life and
works of such a man that our youth and
even those not so young canfind the ex-
ample of a great and noble life well lived.
What are the attributes of Cardinal
Mindszenty for which he deserves to be
called a hero of our time?
Mr. President, first of all, I would
single out the cardinal's unfailing fidelity
to his God and to his church. This great
Hungarian, this extraordinary man of
God, absolutely refused to deny his in-
terior religious commitments. And this
lie did under the most soul-shattering
conditions of Communist - imprisonment
which are familiar to us all. Cardinal
Mindszenty could not be broken. He was
a rock that could not be shattered.
Where other men may have surrendered
to the temptations wrought by a sense of
tragic futility, this great European held
firm.
Mr. President, in this volatile era of
shifting loyalties and of altering prin-
ciples, in this time where practicality,
expediency, and the pernicious adapta-
bility of one's deepest values is a guiding
norm for far too many people, it is a
glorious experience to behold a man, who
surrounded by his enemies would say, I
will not submit, I will not break.
Such a man, M. President, is, indeed,
a hero.
Such a man, Mr. President, Is Cardinal
Mindszenty.
There is still another quality that I
would point to as indicating the virtue
that is this man, and it is the cardinal's
unfailing fidelity to his country and to
the cause of freedom.
In every way Cardinal Mindszenty was
a Hungarian patriot. Yes, Mr. Presi-
dent, he was a fighter against all oppres-
sion of his country, a fighter against the
oppression of the spirit of man. He was
a freedom fighter who has never lost
faith in his country, in his people, and in
man's inner desire to seek the good life
in freedom.
What assures Cardinal Mindszenty a
place in the hall of fame of all freemen,
Mr. President, is not so much his fidelity
to his God and church and his fidelity
to his country and people-it is not so
much this reality which is a quality com-
monly held by many men, as it is the fact
that this man's values, his honor, his
spirit, his whole being as a man had been
tested by the enemy, and he did not
falter. He did not take the easy way
out. He held firmly to his most sacred
values, values embodied in his love of
God and country.
Mr. President, we do honor to our-
selves when we pay tribute to this great
Hungarian; for in honoring him we re-
assert those values that we Americans
have always cherished as part of our own
tradition.
And, Mr. President, when we honor
this Hungarian patriot, we honor, too, the
great and fearless people of Hungary;
for to them Cardinal Mindszenty has
come to symoblize the Hungarian spirit
of freedom.
On this 50th anniversary of Cardinal
Mindszenty's ordination to the priest-
hood, let us, therefore, extend our best
wishes to this truly great and holy man,
for his life has been and shall always be
an inspiration to all men who seek free-
dom for the spirit of all men.
IMPROVEMENT OF OPERATION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF ANTIDUMP-
ING ACT OF 1921
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on May
26, I Introduced S. 2045, on behalf of my-
self, the distinguished Senator from
Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], and 21 other
Senators, a bill aimed at improving the
operation and administration of the
Antidumping Act of 1921. An editorial
in the Washington Post of June 1 dis-
plays an apparent misunderstanding
about the intent and significance of this
legislation.
The bill now has 29 Senate cospon-
sors, as well as 93 in the House of Rep-
resentatives making a total of 122, and
I am confident that they are just as dis-
turbed as I am to be characterized, as
the title of the editorial states, as "pro-
tectionists at work." I should like to add
that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr.
SCOTT] joins me in placing this state-
ment before the Senate.
The editorial is devoted to criticism of
both the Orderly Marketing Act of
1965 and the newly revised Antidump-
ing Act amendment. Without attempt-
ing at this time to go into the merits
of the editorial's remarks about the
former, of which Senator MUgxIE is the;
principal sponsor and I ~am a cosponsor,
I would like--on behalf of myself, Sen-
ator SCOTT, and other cosponsors of the
antidumping legislation, including the
initial sponsor of the bill in the House
of Representatives, A. SYDNEY HERLONG,
JR.-to object to recurring Post edito-
rial attempts to cloud the issues sur-
rounding the unfair trade practice of
dumping by raising the old and conven-
ient cry of "protectionist" whenever a
piece of legislation is introduced which
would attempt to curb international
price discrimination.
Anyone who takes the time to examine
the 1921 Antidumping Act, and the
amendment which I and a number of my
colleagues are proposing, will readily dis-
cern that imports would not be denied
entry or prevented from being sold in our
markets; they merely would be placed
on a fair, competitive price basis if their
importation at a dumping price injures
American producers. The amendment
certainly is not protectionist in going
along with the Treasury practice of al-
lowing foreign producers to lower their
home market prices in order to elimi-
nate the margin of dumping on sales to
the United States, and thereby terminate
dumping cases at the Treasury level
through an appropriate price adjust-
ment. Where no such adjustment is
made, and then only if the Tariff Com-
mission finds the dumped imports to be
injurious, a special dumping duty is cal-
culated by Treasury to bring the price
back up to the price level at which the
product was sold in the country of ex-
port.
This is a far cry from the editorial's
charge that proponents of this legisla-
tion "cling stubbornly to the belief that
this country can continue to be the
world's largest exporter while closing its
gates to the products of other coun-
tries." Responsible journalism, it would
seem, might not have resorted so read-
ily to the old cliches, nor to misleading
assumptions. I shall briefly explain what
I have in mind.
Editorials in the Post along similar
lines followed the introduction in 1963 of
a predecessor bill proposed as an amend-
ment to the U.S. Antidumping Act and
prompted then Senator, now Vice Presi-
dent, HUBERT HUMPHREY, its principal
sponsor, to speak up as I am doing to-
day to set the record straight. I might
add that I was a cosponsor of the 1963
bill, and I feel that his remarks, which
appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
of May 27, 1963, are as pertinent today
as they were 2 years ago.
I am, however, disturbed by the apparent
lack of understanding displayed in these
editorials toward the objectives of the Anti-
dumping Act Itself. In the editorial of May
13, the Post asserts that "any attempt to
eliminate international competition by
means of the inflexible Antidumping Act pro-
cedures will invite retaliations that can only
work to the disadvantage of the free world."
The April 23 editorial refers to the operation
of the Antidumping Act as an example of
the "discredited, protectionist policies which
have inhibited international trade in the
past."
Certainly my vigorous advocacy of expan-
sionist trade policies is a matter of public
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C046AESSIONAL RECORD StNA`I' 519
From the San Francisco (Calif.) 'Examiner,
May 27, 1965 ]
HIGHHANDED
An amazing coobination of 'bureaucratic
arrogance and highhanded procedure has
developed in the wake of the U.S. appellate
court ruling that certain Atomic Energy
Collimission powers are 'subject to the
priority of local'ordinances. '
This was .the decision that would prevent
Construction of AEC overhead powerlines
contrary to the objections of the city of
Woodside and San Mateo County_
A joint Senate-1iouse subcommittee hear=
ing today is the instrument of AEC retalia-
tion. The measure before the subcommit-
tee would give the AEC powers superior to
those of the States and local communities
in such matters. Only the alertness-of Con-
gressman J. ARTHUR YOUNGER kept the hear-
ing from being closed to opponents. No time
for preparation of objections was allowed.
The overriding AEC powers proposed
would,extend far beyond Woodside's esthetic
oncerno, President Johnson's call for a
oncerted national campaign to protect
scenic. values would be ignored, with the
executive right hand seemingly not know-
ing what the left hand is doing.
These are' the _ rawest sort of railroad-
ing tactics, contemptuous of orderly pro-
cedures. Amendment of the Atomic Energy
Act for the purpose of elevating the AEC
to virtually dictatorial position is full of dan-
ger. If undertaken at all, it should be in
the full 'light of day, not as a deliberate
short circuiting of a court decision that
properly upheld the sovereignty of laws at
the community level.
[pram the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, June
r 4, 19651
l
POWER FLAY; WOODSIDE VERSUS THE AEC
Woodside, Calif,, has a very small popula-
tion but a. very large sense of principle.
Residents of Woodside, for instance, be-
lieve that even the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion should obey the Federal statutes re-
quiring' compliance with local ordinances.
Specifically, they insist that the Commission
should not violate; Woodside city laws by 11i-
stalling overhead powerlines to the AEC's
linear accelerator project at Stanford Uni-
versity.
The second highest Federal court in the
land agreed with Woodside. In a unanimous
decision, the U.S. circuit court of appeals
ruled that under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 the Commission does not have the power
to override local ordinances "with respect
to the generation, sale or transmission of
power."
AEC officials had protested that under-
ground installation of the powerlines as
required. by Woodside (and other surround-
ing communities) would substantially in-
ently fallen on deaf ears-or on ears more
sensitive to demands for an unnecessary ex-
pansion of AEC power.
Woodside may lose its fight, if the AEC
bills can be pushed through Congress. But
a lot of other cities, big and small, also will
have lost.
[From the Palo Alto (Calif.) Times, May 21,
1965]
SAY "UNCLE" TO WOODSIDE, UNCLE
Cheers for the U.S. district court of
appeals decision that the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission cannot ram its overhead
powerlines down the throat of unwilling
Woodside.
This victory of a rustic little community
over the awesome Federal Government
should hearten all those who believe right,
not might, must prevail in our Republic.
But more than a David beating a Goliath
is involved. The narrow issues of the case
seem to rest on the facts that Woodside had
an ordinance requiring powerlines to be
placed underground, and that the AEC's
chartering legislation forbids it to transmit
electricity in violation of Federal, State, or
local regulations.
More broadly, though, the issue is whether
Woodside as, a municipal corporation has the
right to protect its scenery, and whether
Uncle Sam, if he would come through Wood-
side with histapline to supply power to the
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, must
respect that right.
A view has measurable value in Woodside-
ask any real estate salesman. It is up to
the AEC like any good neighbor to obey local
regulations and not to mar the landscape.
As we asserted more than a year ago, the
contention that the AEC cannot afford to
pay more to bury the lies is abusive nonsense.
So is the idea that action must be stampeded
because the $114 million research tool is
almost ready to operate. Delay would be no
issue if the AEC had agreed to underground-
ing 14 months ago.
In short, there is no basic problem here
that money cannot solve. May the U.S.
Supreme Court keep these points in mind if
the AEC appeals-and may "remember Wood-
side" become a watchword reminding Wash-
ington to remain respectful of local interests.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, June
1965]
BEAUTY AND THE AEC
ordinances. ' Tlie 'J'oint Committee appears,
not unnaturally, a great deal more con-
cerned with hooking up the new high-energy
accelerator at Stanford than with protecting
the Pacific skyline.
The President cannot be expected per-
sonally to take up every intricate dispute
between beauty and the builders. But he
can devise an appeals procedure so that
single-minded Federal agencies and congres-
sional committees would no longer sit as the
final judges of their own construction
projects.
the New York (N.Y.) Times,
June 8, 1965]
HIGH POWER
Apparently word of President Johnson's
concern for conserving the natural land-
scape has not reached the Atomic Energy
Commission.
The AEC is determined to win its fight to
string high-power transmission lines any-
where it pleases. For more than a year, the
Commission has been engaged in a struggle
over this issue with the residents of Wood-
side, Calif., a town 30 miles south of San
Francisco. The agency wants to take pos-
session of a strip of land 100 feet wide and
5.3 miles long, running through picturesque
hills and heavy woods, and erect an over-
head line on poles and towers ranging from
70 to 120 feet high. The line would carry
electricity to a linear accelerator being built
at Stanford University.
The residents of Woodside, pointing out
that county zoning forbids overhead power-
lines, urged the AEC to place the lines un-
derground, rather than scar the countryside.
Instead, the AEC went to court-and lost.
On May 20, the Federal Court of Appeals
upheld Woodside, basing its decision on a
section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. Un-
daunted, the AEC turned to its friends in
Congress. On May 25-the same day that
the White House Conference on Natural
Beauty opened-Senators PASTORE and
HICKENLOOPER and Representative HOLIFIELD,
the ranking members of the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy, introduced a bill to
exempt the AEC from such local and State
zoning regulations. Hearings were sched-
uled immediately with no advance notice.
Estimates of the cost of putting the lines
underground range from $2 to $4 million, but
.either figure is small compared to the total
cost of the linear accelerator. Moreover,
Woodside, a wealthy town, has offered to
quadruple its taxes for the next year to
help pay part of the added costs for the un-
derground line.
These local considerations, however, are
less important than the principles involved.
Even in the absence of a Presidential push
for protecting the natural environment,
Federal agencies should respect local conser-
vation requirements. No committee of
Congress should attempt to rush through a
law with the imperiousness the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy is showing. The
public looks to Congress to curb rather than
to abet high-powered bureaucratic arro-
gance.
The threats to the American landscape
include, unfortunately, the Federal Govern-
ment Itself. While President Johnson is
very emphatically a defender of the conti-
nent's natural beauty, the Government over
which he presides is notoriously a house of
many mansions. Its great regulatory
powers, and its massive construction
crease the cost of the service. This is true,' budgets, are most commonly controlled by
although the estimates vary. Pacific Gas & agencies of specific and narrow interests
Electric said it would help make up some of that offer no very profound consideration to
the Qe cene e id the town $ 50;00 of Woodside the esthetics of the countryside.
voted by quadrupling When a New `Stork power company decided
its mpalopal tax rate. to build a massive generating complex at
The Atomic Energy Commission, however, Storm King Mountain on the Hudson River,
decided that instead of complying with the protesting citizens discovered that their only
law, it would change it. appeal lay with the Federal Power Commis-
Bills were quickly -introduced to amend sion. But that Commission is primarily
the current statute to allow the ARC to Ig-
nore local regulations. This week the ex
post facto legislation was heard by a Joint
?~,Iieggy_. `u"bcoxrimittee, ydhere it re-
Atan1~G
orating 'capacity. Now the- Atomic Energy
Commission wants to string a high-voltage
line, in violation of local laws, across a
expedience than equity. I effect, "thebil s are nerous, have discovered ed that their
would set the pattern fr any Federal agenc last appeal lies with the Joint Congressional
to demand . overhead werlines whatever Committee on Atomic Energy, which is pre-
the local regulations. President Johnson's, paring legislation to permit the Atomic
plea to preserve natural beauty` had appar- Energy Commission to override the. local
N9. 104-12
[From the Santa Barbara (Calif.) News-
Press, June 3, 1965]
ATOMIC POWERPLAY AT WOODSIDE
There 'is a deplorable measure of Federal
agency arrogance being displayed by the
Atomic Energy Commission in its dispute
with the tiny bay area community of Wood-
side. -
Source of the controversy is the AEC's de-
termination to send a grotesque army of
powerline structures marching across Wood-
side's foothills, through town, and on to the
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The community has battled this project
for years. It incorporated in 1956 to preserve
its hill and forest beauties; passed zoning
laws to prohibit overhead powerlines of the
size proposed; voted to quadruple its tax
rate for a specified period to raise $150,000 to-
ward putting the lines underground-and it
won an important court decision._ On May
20, the U.S. circuit court of appeals ruled
that the AEC cannot build its line overhead
in disregard of local ordinances.
The AEC promptly ran to Congress, asking
last week for legislation stating flatly that
such a matter is not subject to local regula-
tion. It got an immediate bill introduced
and a rush hearing before the legislative sub-
committee of the Joint Congressional Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy. The subcommit-
tee heard opening statements last Thursday.
Talk about nuclear power.
Central arguments of the AEC relate to
expense. It would cost $668,000 to string the
powerlines overhead, it said-$2,640,000 to
bury them. It emphasized that if the lines
are not installed soon the staff at the ac-
celerator will be standing around and doing
little but collecting salaries and running up
total costs of $1,500,000 a month.
We submit that while all of this is deplor-
able, it is not the fault of a tiny but doughty
community fighting to preserve itself and
the very natural beauties so loudly heralded
as desirable by the President of the United
States. The fault might rather lie with a
Federal agency's hard-nosed attempt to have
its way if it has to run roughshod over the
courts and have its own laws tailormade.
The wishes and ordinance of local com-
munities in which the AEC operates certainly
deserve a lot more consideration than Wood-
side is getting.
Hearings resumed this week in this attempt
to aim a Federal law directly at a community
and its ordinances.
On the basis of information to date, the
legislation should be scrapped.
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, a few
years ago, the late Senator Richard Neu-
berger, of Oregon, and I jointly sponsored
an amendment to the interstate highway
legislation, providing an incentive to the
States to regulate outdoor advertising on
portions of the new Interstate Highway
System which the Federal Government
was underwriting at a cost of 90 percent.
In a debate in the Senate, against vigor-
ous bipartisan opposition, the views of
the late Senator Neuberger and myself,
prevailed on a rollcall vote. It will be a
sad day for anybody who enjoys what the
great God above us gave us all across the
country if the Senate were to approve
this backward legislation, which, as I say,
may be before us in the next few days or
weeks.
I hope Senators may take occasion to
read the newspaper comments that I
have placed in the RECORD and will study
the situation, for I earnestly hope the
Se to may in its wisdom repudiate this
ante pt by a great Government agency
to orride local concern and our judicial
syst4m. I hope the Senate will reject the
pro osed legislation.
1(
~t
~ ESCALATION OF THE `TJFTNAM
STRUGGLE
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the State
Department announced yesterday that
(en. William C. Westmoreland, who
heads the U.S. military assistance com-
mand in South Vietnam, has been given
authority to commit U.S. troops to com-
bat in South Vietnam on request by
South Vietnamese commanders, pro-
vided only that U.S. troops are not to
engage in combat strictly on their own,
but are to fight alongside South Viet-
namese forces.
To the American people this an-
nouncement is very reminiscent of
Korea.
It is another escalation of U.S. par-
ticipation in the struggle, yet it comes as
no.surprise. Not only has this decision
been rumored for several days, but it
has been apparent for weeks now that
the United States was moving slowly to-
ward a greatly increased ground combat
role for U.S. forces in South Vietnam.
This movement has not been impercep-
tible, but it has been gradual and un-
dramatic enough to forestall any signifi-
cant public reaction. Yet the stark facts
are that there are more than 50,000 N.S.
troops now in South Vietnam as against
about 14,000 when President Johnson
took office only 18 months ago. We now
hear rumors that 100,000 or more troops
will be in South Vietnam soon. Under
present orders, our troops will still be
on extended action within a country
which wants us within its borders-
South Vietnam. But will U.S. troops
tomorrow be called on to follow on the
ground the air bombardment of North
Vietnam?
We have been moving in the direction
of a massive, bogdown land struggle in
Asia without any specific consent by
Congress or the people for that kind of
war. Although the President has the
power, for all practical purposes, to com-
mit the United States to such a struggle,
I have said on many occasions over the
last 2 months that it would be disastrous
for this country if the President were to
use that power without firstasking Con-
gress for a resolution-similar to the
joint resolution of August 10, 1964-to
authorize specifically an expansion of the
U.S. military role in the Vietnamese
struggle onto such a new and qualita-
tively different level. Without a man-
date from the Congress and the people,
a U.S. land struggle in Asia could en-
gender criticism and division in the coun-
try that will make recent protests over
our Vietnam policy look like a high
school picnic.
News reports describe this new combat
role for U.S. troops in Vietnam as a
future one. It is still not too late. Once
again, I request the President not to per-
mit this new level of U.S. participation
in the ground struggle to occur without
obtaining the kind of mandate from Con-
gress and from the people which, alone,
can make such a policy feasible without
grave divisions in the country. Once
again I say the Congress will un-
doubtedly support the President. But
just as he could not forgo the salutary
announcement of U.S. willingness to
negotiate-although he felt he had said
it many times before-so lie cannot fore-
go the salutary effect of a congressional
debate and action on this new and crucial
U.S. policy in Vietnam.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that an editorial entitled "Congress
and Vietnam," which appeared in the
New York Times of June 7, 1965, to-
gether with an article by John W. Finney
entitled "Johnson Permits U.S. Units To
Fight If Saigon Asks Aid." And an
editorial entitled "Ground War In Asia,"
both published in the New York Times
today, be printed at this point in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
and editorials ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
[From New York (N.Y.) Times, June 7, 19651
CONGRESS AND VIETNAM
Signs are growing of congressional interest
in ending the "leave it to Lyndon" era in
American foreign policy.
There is Senator Fubright's new proposal
to give the OAS a major voice in channeling
American military assistance to Latin Amer-
ica. There is the provision in the new for-
eign aid bill for a thorough-going congres-
sional investigation and for terminating the
aid program in its present form in 1957.
There is the trip to Europe, at their own
expense, of four House Republicans to inves-
tigate the crisis in NATO. And there are
the recent critcisms of administration policy
in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic by
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, plus his current
charge that the United States is neither
meeting its aid responsibilities to the under-
developed countries nor identifying itself
with the world revolution under way in those
areas.
Factors that go beyond the President's
limited experience in foreign affairs and the
extraordinary vacillations in Dominican
policy have set off the present questioning
at home and abroad. The reluctance of
Secretary of State Rusk to employ the full
resources of his department and give inde-
pendent advice, the meager use made by the
President of non-official task forces in the
foreign policy field, the overdependence on
military and intelligence agencies and the
divorce between the Administration and the
Nation's intellectuals--all point to a need for
more vigorous congressional interest.
Nowhere is this more vital than on Viet-
nam, where grave constitutional questions
are raised by the official acknowledgment of
an increasing combat role for American
troops. During the 18 months of the John-
son administration, the number of American
troops in Vietnam has been tripled to about
46,500; a Purther build-up to more than
60;000 appears imminent. American planes
have entered into combat both in South and
North Vietnam-in the latter case openly
attacking a foreign country with no declara-
tion of war. American warships have bom-
barded the North Vietnamese coast. And
there are indications that American ground
troops-first employed as advisers in South
Vietnam, then deployed to defend American
installations and now directly engaged in
patrolling action-will soon take on a full
combat role as a tactical reserve aiding South
Vietnamese units in trouble.
Yet, at no point has there been significant
congressional discussion, much less direct
authorization of what amounts to a decision
to wage war. That is why 28 Democratic
Congressmen, on the initiative of Represen-
tative ROSENTHAL of Queens, now have wisely
asked the chairman of the House Foreign.
Affairs Committee to hold public hearings
on the administration's Vietnam policy.
American casualties in Vietnam, while
still relatively minor, already exceed those
of the Spanish-American War. The choices
open to the President are exceedingly difficult
ones; they should not be his alone, either as
a matter of sound policy or of constitutional
obligation. If he takes it upon himself to
make an American war out of the Vietnamese
tragedy-without seeking congressional and,
national consent-he may open the country
to divisions even more dangerous than those
that developed out of the Korean conflict.
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June 9, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 1 997
Mom the New York (N.Y.) Times, prompted by a mounting concern over the and inevitable outgrowth of earlier commit-
June 9, 1956] current Communist offensive. Gents. Yet the whole development has oc-
JOHNSON PER.Mrrs U.S. UNrrs To FIGHT IF The offensive had been expected during the curred in a 4-month span, just after an elec-
SAIGON ASKS Au>-PRESIDENT GrvEs?.AMERI- current monsoon season, when the mobility tion in which the administration campaigned
CAN COMMANDER AUTHORITY To COMMIT of the South Vietnamese Army and American on the issue of its responsibility and res-
GI'S To BATTLE-REQUEST Is LIKELY BOON- airpower would be.restricted by rainy weath- traint in foreign military involvements.
POLICY DECISION PROMPTED BY INCREASING er. What has surprised and disturbed offi- Since March, American forces in Vietnam.
CONCERN OVER BIG VIETCONG OFFEN$IVE cials, however, is the_force, sometimes in have been more than doubled to 52,000, as
(By John W. Finney) reinforced battalion strength, that the Viet- compared with 14,000 when President John-
WASHINGTQN, June 3.-President Johnson tong have been able to throw into the offen- son took office. Additional troops are mov-
sive. g in and a to
incated.
has authorized his commanders in Vietnam It has become increasingly evident to offi- iThere has beenuneither confirmation nor de-
to commit U,S..ground forces to combat if cials, as they analyze the strength of the nial for reports that a force exceeding 100,000
their assistance is, requested by the South Vietcong forces, that the American bombing is planned including three full Army and
Vietname a Arm . raids in North Vietnam and Laos have failed divisions, The State Department said today that the in their principal military objective of cur- cation Marine on whet Nor is o-cal any clarifi
bat her authority to order American ground forces tailing the strength of the guerrilla forces support" role now the so-called "combat
into combat, t under the e In olic decision weeks, made by interdicting the flow of supplies and men support of South Vietnamese units-is to be
by President the north.
been delegated to Gen. William C. Westmore- transformed later into offensive "clear and
land, who heads the U.S. military assistance MORE U.S. TROOPS HELD NEEDED hold" operations of a kind hitherto carried
command in South Vietnam. In view of the possibility that the Vietcong out only by South Vietnamese forces, . Apart
Whether the United States implements this may force a military showdown this summer, from the obvious difficulty American troops
decision-and thus, takes another major step administration officials were driven to the would have in distinguishing guerrillas from
in its deepening involvement in the Viet- conclusion that American combat support the surrounding population, such a war ulti-
namese war-depends largely upon South was required to stiffen the South Vietnamese mately might absorb as many American
Vietnam's Government and upon the military Army and to prevent its possible psychologi- troops as were employed in Korea.
circumstances. cal collapse in the, face of the Communist A major factor in the original escalation
sHTPT PROM PROLE 'offensive. decision-the decision to bomb North Viet-
A request for PROM PASSIVE SSI Et OLEO s is ex- These officials recognize that the decision- nam-was the political crisis in Saigon after
p carries with it some risk of a corresponding eight changes of government in little more
petted in the near future from the South stepup on the Communist side. But their than a year. The bombing was urged upon
Vietna the Vietcong step up their appraisal is that the expansion of an already President Johnson as the only way to shore
In the last 3 months, U.S. round trot s existing combat role would not provoke a up morale, halt the factional feuding, and
g p s escalation of the war. prevent a complete political collapse in South
in South Vietnam have been gradually mov- Officials indicated that the expanded com- Vietnam,
log from a passive to an active combat role. bat role would necessitate the assignment of Is it only a coincidence that the decision
,Marines and army paratroops, originally additional American troops to South Viet- to enter the ground war has come during an-
sent in to provide "perimeter defense" for nam. There now are about 52,000 American other political crisis in Saigon? There may
key installations, have undertaken active troops there, but the combat forces are be a need to prop up the government of
patrolling miles from the bases they are de- limited to 12,000 marines and 3,600 para- Premier Phan Huy Quat against the Catholic
fending. In the course of this patrolling, troops of the 173d Airborne Brigade, and. southern factions which made a con-
they have frequently engaged in combat with Officials are now talking of a buildup to stitutional issue out of his recent Cabinet re-
Vietcong guerrillas. about 70,000 men in the immediate months shuffle and still seek to bring him down.
Thus far, they have acted largely on their ahead. Many of the reinforcements, how- But is it not more likely that political cr-
own, without the support of Vietnam forces. ever, will be logistical rather than combat responsibility in Saigon will grow, rather
CONFIRMATION BY M'CLOSSSY, troops. than decline, as the main military responsi-
What is contemplated now is a significant Mr. McCloskey said the authority to com- bility for defending South Vietnam is trans-
step beyond the defense of American bases, mit the American forces to combat rested ferred increasingly to American hands?
wrath American troops participating in of- upon the President's constitutional powers as The country deserves answers to this and
fensive or defensive actions by the South Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. many Vietnamese Army. Additional authority, he said, was provided into y a ground questions. ex y Presidential t denbeen taken
Official confirmation of the Johnson ad- by the congressional resolution, no r decision
h, approved when there is no emergency that would seem
ministration's decision came when Robert last August, which authorized the President to rule out congressional debate. The duty
J. McCloskey, the State Department spokes- to take all necessary steps, including the use now is for reassurance from the White House
clan, was asked by reporters what the likely of armed force to assist South Vietnam in that the Nation will be informed on where
response Would.be tq,a South Vietnamese re- defense of its freedom.
quest for combat assistance. it is being led and that Congress will be
He replied that U.S. military commanders [From the New York (N.Y.) Times, June 9, consulted before another furious upward
in Saigon had made it clear to the South 1965] whirl is taken on the escalation spiral.
Vietnamese Government that "American GROUND WAR IN ASIA Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
forces would be. available for combat support The American people were told by a minor Senator yield for a question?
together with Vietnamese forces when and State Department official yesterday that, in Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
if necessary." effect, they were in a land war on the Conti-Mr. Thus gar,, according to the State Depart- nent of Asia. This is only one of the extra- that at AI Tess Does the Senator think
Gent, no request for American combat as- ordinary aspects of the first formal announce- COngeSS should declare war?
sistance has been received from the South ment that a decision has been made to com- Mr. JAVITS. I do not.
Vietnamese Army. Such a request, however, mat American ground forces to open com- Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator think
is viewed as inevitable, particularly since the bat in South Vietnam: The Nation is in- the Congress should declare war to re-
United States has now virtually invited it formed about it not by the President, not by lieve the President of all responsibility
by openly offering combat assistance. a Cabinet member, not even by a sub-Cabinet
At least for the present, the administra- official, but by a public relations officer. for what has been done and what it is
tion is not contemplating a general offensive There is still no official explanation offered planned to do? Congress would'do so if
by U.S. forces operating on their own. In- for a move that fundamentally alters the it were asked to declare war.
stead, American troops are to serve as a re- character of the American Involvement in Mr. JAVITS. I believe that is true.
serve force, coming to the assistance of Viet- Vietnam. A program of weapons supply, However, I hope that Congress will not
namese forces if they are overwhelmed or training, and combat advice to South Viet- do it.
Pinned down by the Communist guerrillas. namese, initiated by Presidents Eisenhower
Mr. McCloskey said the "coordination" ar- and Kennedy, has now been transformed by' Mr. AIKEN. Congress would do it if
rangements between American and Viet- President Johnson into an American war it were asked to do so by the President.
namese cq,;np151>,aeA were "still being worked against Asians. If that were to happen, the
out," W#fi-le fighting "shoulder to shoulder" g President
t41th It was the bombing of North Vietnam that would be relieved of responsibility. It
Vietnamese troops, the American forces led, in turn, to the use of American jet air- would take him off the hook. It would
Would fight as ,a unit under an American offi- craft in South Vietnam_ and the emplace- be exactly what he . I am sure of
cer. ment of American marines and paratroops to wants. ' "BEST' MILITARX JUDGMENT" defend American airbases. Now, with Amer- that and I cannot say that I blame him.
Mr. ,McCloskey said the decision to embark !can air support hampered by the monsoon Mr. JAVITS. I agree with the Sena-
upon the expanded combat role was the "re- rains, American ground troops are to be made tor from Vermont that if the President
s11lt of the best military judgment as to what available as a tactical reserve to help South were to ask Congress to declare war, it
1 reuired? in tie situation ahead." From its Vietnamese units in trouble. would probably do so. But I think that
tng, it was apparent that the decision was It can all be made to sound like a gradual would be most unwise.
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12522
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, a par- vowas ted one of the thtwo at inresolution the CongI feared
time of the senator from New York has liamentary inquiry.
expired. Mr. GRUENING. The Senator from precisely what is happening now in
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask New York has yielded to me for a southeast Asia. I if earsdsteha at the war
unanimous consent that I be permitted question. would to continue for an additional 3 minutes. I should like to ask the distinguished We are actually engaged in an unde-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Senator from New York if he does not clared war with steady mounting casual-
objection, the Senator from New York is think that the President received the ties. While the President has a perfect justifie
in assuming recur. JAfor . M. President, 3 minutes. consentof last August, with only two th ate he fhaseel co sent of Congress
Mr. JAVITS. President, I hope
that will not M not be done. I believe that Senators voting against it, which resolu- because of the overwhelming vote on vievi
r that modern bet r off not are so subtle ec authoriity to use r the Armed Forces of the actionuwas unctonst ut on l and that
are better off not having a formal al dec-
lauration of war. I do believe, however, the United States anywhere he saw fit we are waging war without a specific
that what is tantamount to that-in resolution southeast Asia was I voted against that declaarrnati not prepared to urge that Con-
terms of tying the Congress and the pthe The PRESIDING OFFICER.. The gress declare war. However, I think that , but enacted. I pie in with ohe to si foan e for the time of the Senator has expired. the situation is getting to be very much resident of opinionto co now, me to when for it r s seems s rather er Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask more dangerous than my colleagues who
of opinioe unanmous consent that I may be per- voted for the resolution expected. If my
late n to the situation grn about gl ea- mitted to continue for 1 additional colleagues had read. the resolution, they
late ity a major ground struggle. minute. would have seen that the authorization
I have served in the military. I he PRESIDING OFFICER, The for the President to use the Armed
understand what is meant dy wffensive .T Senator from New York is recognized Forces as he saw fit was clearly spelled
patrol. I also understand by the Is for 1 additional minute. out, and they might have anticipated
meant peace-which offensive action to protect ttMr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the what is happening and what will hap-
engage in sthe. a we are about headed President did not need authority last pen in the future. That is one of the
i-
the ii. I o seems board ca huse of August. He does not need authority reasons that I voted against the resolu
g direction f the board scale use now. He has authority as Commander tion. I have had no reason to regret it.
mount d to forces owar. es which would be tents- in Chief. He sought the advice of Con- I deeply feel that what we are getting
gress last August, and, in my judgment, into is tragic. We are going to lose
I , 'believe that under thpresent so us in the interest of our national policy, thousands of American lives In a war
sloe, that a may ought voice to come e he should again seek the advice of Con- that we are not going to win ultimately,
so that to may have e a vtt the de- us
gress. That is what I ask him to do. that is going to have to be settled at the
raion, of wa war, With him, unnecessary, cea yan-e The PRESIDING OFFICER. The conference table, as was the Korean war.
ration wicay, which is and of the Senator from New York has I think we ought to get to it before we
which, in my judgment, is is too o primitive expired. lose far more lives and get into a
for the times. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I greater tragedy.
the e two hold co theschools--on on the one ha tne hand, those between ask unanimous consent that I may be Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the
who are ready to "go get them wherever permitted to speak for 3 minutes. Senator yield?
they are," and, on the other hand, those The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- Mr. GRUENING. I yield.
who want us to pull out. out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McGEE. I do not think the times
I believe that the best thing to do Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the afford us the luxury of a semantic de-
would be to have Congress join with the senior Senator from New York has ex- bate over the meaning of "war" and
President in a solemn, national determi- pressed his view that the President had "waging of war." Because of the nature
nation and debate to decide on the the authority, without the resolution, to of modern warfare and the changing
proper course of action. I believe that, wage the kind of war that we have been times of which we are a part, a rigid
just as, the President erred for a long waging, including the bombing of an- constitutional definition of whether we
time, until he made his speech at Johns other country from the air without any are in war or not seems to me to be, from
Hopkins, in not being willing to express specific authorization from Congress. I the practical viewpoint, irrelevant.
fully our policy in Vietnam-at which disagree most emphatically with that I think we must remember that we are
point, the country backed him to the statement. Without that resolution he living in times when it is possible to con-
hilt--I think he is erring now in not could not have sent our planes to bomb duct aai fare without the old-fas ion set
giving Congress a chance to debate this North Vietnam.
Issue-as I am trying to encourage my We are now waging an undeclared war tor from New York said, there are -certain,
colleagues to do--with a view to coming in southeast Asia. However, the Presi- ramifications involved in having a formal
to a vote on the question of whether we dent takes the position, and understand- declaration of war. I think the Senator
approve the line of policy that is being ably so, that when Congress approved from Alaska will agree that we do not
pursued. We followed that course in the resolution, it gave him the power to want a formal declaration of war at the
respect to Lebanon. We followed that wage war anywhere in southeast Asia present time. This is an entirely differ-
courselast August in respect to what we with the use of armed forces as he saw ent area of political contest, and if it can
had been doing in Vietnam. We must fit. He did get that authorization. be resolved without the formality of a
follow that course now If we are to move Therefore, it would seem to me that the declaration of war, I think we agree this
to a new plateau in the struggle in suggestion of the senior Senator from would be the better course.
Vietnam. - - - New York that we now need a further Likewise, what has been transpired in
That is what I urge the President to declaration of war or a further declare- Vietnam has been in accordance with the
do. I have little doubt that if the Presi- tion of some kind by Congress is super- resolution of last August, and there was
dent were to do so, We would back him. fluous. He voted to give the Presi- the support of Congress for new appro-
However, if the President does not dent all the authority the President priations needed for this struggle. In
follow such a course, the country will, of needs. view of the President's repeated declari.-
necessity, in the course of time, face a The PRESIDING OFFICER. The tion of these matters, I would think that
situation which could be damaging to time of the Senator from Alaska has ex- no other declaration in particular from
our whole effort. pired. Congress is in order at this time, though
If Congress were to back the President, Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I I appreciate the question the Senator
it would temper the Policy and make it ask unanimous - consent that I may be from New York raises because of what
a'policy of both the President and the permitted to continue for an additional changing demands in Vietnam may re-
peolile? 3 minutes. quire.
t as is
e 8 GRU yield "Mr. President, will out The obje tion, it is so orrderedER With- cal iMr. JAVITS. To ssue. The meesiden there
thenatt>r yield?
,7P,tTiT8.' I- yield. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I in Chief, has the right to dispatch troops
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 .le 10,
wr~e ~, 1 t CONGRESSIONAL .RECORD - SENATE
situation
States anywhere in the world: That fact fundity that the Congress and the people arose when we moved into
YNorth Korea
is acknowledged completely. Under the ought to have an opportunity to consider and there was a danger of our crossing
doctrine of protecting that interest, the it and have an opportunity to follow the Yalu into China. The Chinese Com-
President definitely has the right to the traditional course which we have munists reacted when we moved into
reach out wherever it is necessary, acted on in a number of cases, and which North Korea.
When our ships were attacked in Tonkin I regard as necessary when we contem- Second. What I am talking about is
Bay,, we responded by attacking back. plate a different kind of danger. Let us our willingness to undertake a Korean
The President has that right because he not make such a decision except in the type of struggle in Asia.
is is Commander in Chief. But we un- most considered way in which it is pos- Big nations cannot bluff. Therefore,
derstand that present events can lead to sible for us to do it. when we move so many major international war, and the Presi- Mr. McGEE. Where I fail to see the troops into South Vietnam we shou dbbe
dent should have the advice and consent need of the Senator's proposal in view prepared to carry through. It is at the
of Congress, joining its will and that of of the incident at Tonkin Bay- moment When we first commit ourselves
the American people to his, in order to The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time in this way-which is now-that I feel
keep pace- of the Senator has expired. Congress should be asked to join the
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask President in making this national deci-
time of the Senator has expired. unanimous consent to have 1 additional sion.
Mr. JAVITS. I ask unanimous con- minute.
sent for l additional minute. Mr. Me GEE. Ie I am in error, I underd
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without like to be corrected, but it is my under-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it,is so ordered. standing that geographically the deci-
objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McGEE. In view of the incident sion to bomb across the Yalu involved
Mr. JASIITS.. In order to keep pace at Tonkin Bay and the bombardments of the decision to bomb Chinese territory in
with such problems as may arise. The North Vietnam, where we have already order to get to their bases of supply, and
resolution process is new, but it is a good crossed the 17th parallel, I ask whether at places they were hoping to use as
one, because it enables Congress and the any dispatch of whatever limited move- bases for aircraft which they were hop-
people to-express themselves as being in ment may be needed along the 17th par- ing to use in assistance of the North
agreement, and then the President can allel, or beyond that parallel, would Koreans, that this 4vas a specific, im-
proceed together with the whole coun- change the dimensions of the conflict. mediate, and dangerous pressure on
try. I urge that it be done on the high- Mr. JAVITS. We must remember the China proper, and that this is, therefore,
est policy level. This will make the Yalu incident. There was a point when in a slightly different context. I believe
President's position stronger and that of the Red Chinese felt they had to come that the parallel is well taken. How-
Congress stronger, and the whole coun- into the Korean conflict. I do not know ever, there is nothing new in the com-
try will be stronger and in a better posi- whether they will or not come into this mitment of any extra manpower in
tion in South Vietnam. situation, but the national purpose in South Vietnam, or in speculating on the
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, before the this regard will be have to be consid- prospect that some of those men may go
time runs put, I ask unanimous consent ered. When we look at the matter and across the 17th parallel.
that I may have 1 additional minute. consider the danger we may face, I say Mr. JAVITS. Let me give the Senator
The PRE IDING OFFICER. Without that the people and the Congress should from Wyoming my best understanding
objection, it is so ordered. be joined with the President in whatever of the situation with respect to the re-
Mr. McGEE, It seems to me, if I may implementation of the national will may action of the Communist Chinese when
r so to the Senator from New York, be necessary. That is the complete we moved our ground troops north of the
issues have been so clearly drawn in theme of my argument.
the Vietnamese struggle, the reasons, in Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask across the parallelYalu was the result of a feel-
the President's ?judgment, and the judg- unanimous consent to proceed for 1 addi- ing on the part of General MacArthur
-ment of many of us, have been defined tional minute.
time and time again that for us.to re- The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- Cthat we
hinese should take on the Communist
quest a kind of succession of congres- out objection, it is so ordered.
atonal reaffirmations of faith in itself
Mr.. McGEE. With all Mr. McGEE. JAVITS. And b.
would not have the salutary effect that agars a n we are we are due respect, Mr. JAVITS. And beat them, this
the Senator from New York has en- talking about the Hanoi time.
visioned. government, and not about China. The Mr. McGEE. In China.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time Yalu decision was a decision of the Chi- Mr. JAVITS. But the Chinese reac-
of the Senator has expired." nese. I would agree with the Senator tion came as a result of our moving
th Mc ato ase unanimous consent that if we were to reach the point of ground troops across the 38th parallel.
to have 1 additional minute. Chinese borders, it would be I do not say that the Vietnam situation
The PR additional OFFICER. e. With- quite another matter; but I believe the is so close as to be like a template upon
out objection, D is so ordered. distinction here is that what the Sen- the Korean. We may engage in ground
ator suggests will not increase the pres- action without Communist Chinese re-
Mr. McGEE. If we were to go the sure on China to change its posture, nor action. But history dictates that we
route which has, been suggested, perhaps will the movement of whatever group of must be prepared for any eventuality
we would still try to define the dimen- men we may need to be headed toward once we take on a ground war in Asia.
sions of it. I think the dimensions have the 17th parallel. It has not happened. As I have just said, a big nation cannot
been clearly drawn, and we know it is It may not happen. But even if it did, bluff. Congress and the President should
going to take time, and a. long time, be- it would still be no more of a threat than be joined at this crucial moment in this
fore we have run the course of testing our air raids, and I think the Chinese kind of decision, in order to avoid to the
the, President's solemn declarations short would be far more concerned with air maximum extent any division in our
of what we all hope to avoid-namely, raids, so far as their national purpose is country.
a major war.. For that reason, I think concerned, than with any movement of Mr. the Senator from New York's sugges- ground troops that might be made, be- repeat that Mr. President, I
tion would not necessarily have the im- cause we know that on the ground China repeat pr view w that the the Congress which
pact he suggests. has an. overwhelming and understand- spouse was approved
es request ast
Mr. JAVITS. The Senator and I are able advantage, whereas in airpower g the presidential th rt of last
not arguing the, issue on the basis of time she faces a direct threat to her security August gives him ample authority to d-
or cost. I am suggesting that are we get- and is in a vulnerable position. Ivor what he is doing, that ho nerds on fury
tins 04 ,a new plateau of activity, in Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask # voted against That is one reason why
which, we. could possibly move troops on unanimous consent that I may proceed I at against the resolution.
the ground outside of South Vietnam in for 2 additional minutes. Senator r from Net that York [ efforts of the Mr. the proximate future, which would be a The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rus- and I should like to have his attention
JAVITSI-
new situation vis-a-vis all of Asia, in- SELL of South Carolina in the chair). if I could-may be an expression of the
cluding Communist China. I think such Without objection, it is so ordered, embarassment that he and some of his
12523
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12524
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE June 9, 1965
colleagues feel, that they have got them-
selves into this mess and would therefore
like to have further reassurance by an
additional testing of the sentiment of
Congress.
I have no doubt that the Senator from
New York is receiving a great deal of
mail critical of his support of the posi-
tion which the administration is taking
and that, therefore, he would like a fur-
ther reassurance from Congress. I can
understand his desire for such comfort.
However, I repeat my view, that when
the President sent down his resolution
last August it gave him the power to use
American troops wherever he saw fit, and
that gave him ample authority to do
what he is now doing. The resolution
was approved by Congress, and the Sena-
tor from New York voted for it. I voted
against it, for reasons that I have amply
set forth on the floor of the Senate. I
can-understand, however, why those who
voted against it want to bring up the
matter again.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, on my
own time, I ask unanimous consent for
time to mention two factors in this sit-
uation, which has been brought tip by
my friend, the Senator from Alaska. The
two. comments he made-In regard to
which I believe that I should share an
observation-dealt with the suggestion
of the Senator from Alaska that, after
all, those of us who have supported ad-
ministration policy In Vietnam have now
discovered what a mess we have got our-
selves "into, and that we do not know
why` we are in this kind of dilemma at
the present time.
I believe It should be stated for the
RECORD that no one person got us Into
this mess.' If we had not moved, the kind
of mess we would have would be the very
same kind of mess that the Senator from
Alaska and other great Americans like
him would have been protesting with
even greater vigor.
This kind of mess stems from the kind
of war which our opponents on the other
side of the line in southeast Asia have
invented as a means of continuing the
terrible, steady, pressure for penetration
and erosion of those nations which would
like to stay outside the orbit of influence
of mainland China.
How else are we going to combat guer-
rilla warfare? How else are we going to
combat terrorism, if we do not take a
stand now?
Therefore, I challenge the use of the
phrase that we are in some kind of mess
that somehow we got ourselves Into.
We did not wish to become Involved,
in the first place. History thrust It upon
us. We accepted it as one of the com-
mandments that went with victory in
World War II, that we could take the
lead in helping to rebuild the world, that
we could help to reconstruct it ourselves
with thekind of profile that we believed
offered a better opportunity for peace in
the future.
It is this principle, it seems to me,
which Is really behind the'so-called mess
in South Vietnam which my friend the
Senator from Alaska says we are
namely, a war which we cannot win.
Mr. President, we do not win wars any
More. We are all sophisticated enough
to know that in the nuclear age we do
not accumulate points as in a basketball
game. What we are trying to do, if not
to win a war, Is to win the opportunity to
make a lasting peace. That is what we
have in mind even when we cannot win
a war.
We can lose the world. We can lose
Vietnam. We can lose the opportunity
for which World War II was waged, to
try to reconstitute a balanced world, with
a more peaceful image than heretofore
has been the case.
That is really the context in which
we should view the way in which the con-
flict is going, to and fro, in Vietnam.
I beseech my colleague not to use sim-
ple cliches about "the mess we are al-
ready in," and that "we cannot win the
war in Vietnam." It seems to me to be
an oversimplification of the complex-
ities of a problem which the President
and the Nation have to face in deciding
the policy that must govern the United
States in any part of the world.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Wyoming yield?
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that my time may be
extended for 3 minutes, in order that I
may yield to the Senator from Alaska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
Mr. GRUENING. I congratulate my
distinguished colleague from Wyoming
for creating a new villain in the world.
Coming from him, as a professor of his-
tory, it has considerable significance.
He has made the statement that history
thrust us into this situation. This is the
first time I ever knew that history had
that kind of motive power.. But as my
colleague has been a teacher of history,
a university professor in this field, he
may be presumed to speak with sub-
stantial authority on the role of history.
He has declared that history thrust us
into the war in southeast Asia. But I do
not think the responsibility for our being
there can thus be assigned. Human
beings in high places got us into that war.
Mr. McGEE. History probably has
thrust more than one man into the front
ranks of decisionmaking in the world.
History creates events that even-Repub-
licans and Democrats, or the Senator
from Alaska, sometimes cannot control.
ESSAYS BY WYOMING STUDENTS
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may return to
morning business and take my 3 minutes
in order to bring a matter to the atten-
tion of the Congress.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, In Wash-
ington with me this week are two out-
standing young students from Wyoming.
Each year I conduct a competition in _
the State of Wyoming for every graduat-
ing high school senior. They submit
studied essays on one proposition: How
to make democracy work better.
The winners of that statewide con-
test were one young man and one young
woman who have now come to Washing-
ton and are spending the week in my
office and around the Capitol studying
democracy in the living laboratory of our
day-to-day procedure.
These two outstanding students are
Miss Joan Magagna, of Rock Springs
High School, Rock Springs, Wyo., and
Craig Fansler, of Fremont County Voca-
tional High School at Lander, Wyo.
Their accomplishments are many.
They, are both outstanding students,
keenly Interested in the policies of the
world. One of them is an outstanding
Democrat and the other comes from an
outstanding Republican family. This
contest has nothing to do with partisan-
ship. It has everything to do with pub-
lic responsibility to try to raise the
political conduct of our country to ever
higher levels.
The essays which they have submitted
In this contest are of such- quality that I
should like to share them with all Sena-
tors. Therefore, Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have. them printed
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the essays
were ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK
(By Joan Magagna, Rock Springs, Wyo.)
Nineteen hundred and sixty-five is a
troubled, anxious time. Every citizen of
1965's world pursues his daily tasks ever
aware of the threatening "facts of life" of
this, our 20th century. Frightening shadows
of aggressive communism, racial crises, and
nuclear weapons menace every waking mo-
ment. Each of these heavy problems rests
especially heavily upon our shoulders as
Americans. We have taken up a mammoth
task in this year of strife. We Americans
since the birth of our Nation have acclaimed
to the world that our country is that promised
land of milk and honey anr' freedom and Jus-
tice for all. The duty falls to us to make
America's promises of life and hope more than
just empty words to the downtrodden peoples
of earth. For the freedom-loving and free-
dom-seeking peoples of the world, for our
selves, and for generations to come after 1985,
we must find a way to make democracy work.
The American democracy was best defined
by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Ad-
dress as "a government of the people, by the
people, and for the people." His pointed ref-
erence to "the people" indicates the promi-
nent role every citizen plays on the stage of
democracy. Since our large population and
enormous landmass prohibits pure or abso-
lute democracy, the U.S. Government is a
function of representative democracy. But
Lincoln's words "of the people" imply that
the masses must still be the government.
Making our democracy work necessitates every
individual's making his own influence felt
through his representatives. If one citizen's
voice Is hushed or falls to be heard, then
democracy fails to work. If a government
voices the opinions of only some of the people,
it cannot be a genuine democracy.
By constitutional provision, the opinions
of the people of our Nation are expressed
through the polls. It is tragic to realize
that nearly 40 percent of our voting popula-
tion did not vote in the last general election,
when peoples in other parts of the world
are still fighting to obtain such rights. In
one Latin American country a few years ago.
the population was warned under pain of
death to stay away from the polls on elec-
tion day. Ninety-nine percent of the popu-
lation cast their votes that day. In America,
where we have no fears of punishment, only
60 percent of the population turn out at the
polls.
Obviously, we Americans cannot be gen-
uinely aware that the right to vote is the
lifeblood of democracy. However, the trite
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June 9, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
record. I was a.strong and outspoken sup-
porter of President Kennedy's Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962 and I view a mutual reduc-
tion of tariffs among the Western nations as
absolutely essential to the long-run economic
prosperity and political solidarity of the free
world. But I also believe it, is essential that
every nation be willing to abide by basic
ground rules of international trade. One of
these rules is not to sell large quantities of
surplus merchandise in a country at prices
below those charged in home markets if
such sales will injure domestic producers.
Senator Hurv1PHREY summarized his
views in words that I feel are equally a_
,propriate with respect to the June 1, 1965,
editorial:
it appears to me that the editorials were
primarily theoretical rather than being based
upon an actual observation of the laws and
the facts that relate to these laws * * *. In
short, whether by official statute or decree or
by unofficial agreement, other nations of the
free world sanction procedures to protect
their domestic industries and markets from
dumping,of surplus products. To the extent
that the Post editorials conveyed the impres-
'ion that the U.S, Antidumping Act repre-
sented a unique. trade practice unknown to
our Western partners, they were grossly mis-
leading. In fact, dumping is an interna-
tionally recognized unfair trade practice and
action taken against dumping should be and
is taken without-regard to attempts to en-
courage and expand fair international trade._
Furthermore, the June 1 editorial'
misses the point that it is the apparent,
lack of consensus among the Commis-
sioners since. mid-1963 as to what con-
stitutes injury, which underscores the
fallacy of referring to the Commission's
collective "judgment, when in fact, dif-
fering judgments exist among the Com-
missioners as, to some of the basic con-
cepts to be applied. In the absence of
standards established by the Congress,
there will continue to be confusion and
uncertainty in both the domestic and
importing communities as to the inter-
pretation of basic concepts in the act.
Once the applicable standards are
made known, there 's a reasonable ex-
pectation that cases will not be brought
by domestic industry in which no injury
is likely to be found, but which previously
might have been worth a try. Also,
where injury is likely to be found because
of the clearer standards, there will be
less reluctance to bring a ,valid case.
Both of these situations would result in
a higher percentage of findings of injury,
and for solid reasons. I believe it there-
fore inappropriate that the Post editorial
The Hartke-Scott bill would foist,.upon the
CommissiQn rules that ,would make findings
of injury far more likely.
Next, I should like to say a word about
the continuing reference in Post edi-
torials to retaliation against U.S. ex-
ports. In. the -June 1 editorial a series of
retaliations from. European countries is
prophesied. I will not deny that some
European countries have the capability
of reassessing their own antidumping
laws, but I do object to the use of the
retaliation argument, just as then-Sena-
tor HUMPHREY did in his response to
earlier Post editorials, as an attempt
to sti~$ema ,y discussion pf neededd.changes
in our foreign trade laws. 1k
It Is clear that the most effective way
to influence antidumping developments
in the countries of our trading partners
would be to provide a model in the U.S.
experience. In a sense this has been ac-
complished inasmuch as the U.S. law
and the GATT provision on dumping are
very similar. However,' it is equally evi-
dent that our U.S, Antidumping Act re-
quires improvement. A model law must
be clear in its terms, and it must be
effective and efficient in its application.
Once such a law is in,.being, we can
hold it out to our trading partners as
a measure by which their laws can be
tested, and we can be more certain that
our export trade will not be unfairly
treated.
We need not be ashamed of the U.S.
Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended,
with its two stage investigation, which
does not make dumping alone actionable,
but only when injury is also shown. U.S.
exports which may be dumped but do not
cause injury abroad are not likely to be
complained of by foreign governments.
Furthermore, since the U.S. antidumping
-law, and the proposed amendment as
well, would apply to products of all coun-
tries equally (with certain special pro-
visions for dealing effectively with Com-
munist products), it does not discrim-
inate against European countries, and
retalitatory measures aimed at only U.S.
exports would be in violation of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-
GATT-which provides the framework
for the Kennedy round of tariff-cutting
negotiations now in progress, and from
which the European countries, as well as
all others, hope to benefit. Thus, it
should be kept in perspective that the
foreign countries have been asking for
many changes in U.S. law in addition to
the Antidumping Act, and that recent
Treasury changes in its regulations,
many of which would be ratified by the
1965 amendment, have already acceded
in substantial part to the major foreign
requests.
The third point which needs clarifica-
tion is the editorial's misleading implica-
tion that only the steel and cement in-
dustries would benefit from this bill.
This is put in the form of a statement
that the bill would strengthen the mar-
ket position of steel and cement, when in
fact many of the principal beneficiaries
will be small domestic industries and
their labor force which have the most
difficulty in withstanding dumping. In a
survey made last year covering the pre-
vious 10-year period it was found that
141 different product types were involved
in 319 dumping cases, broken down into
the following categories:
Agricultural products_______________
Aluminumproducts----------------
Automobiles --____ ______ ___
Baking products____________________
Chemical products ------------------
Fish products-----------------------
Glass products______________________
Metal products_____________________
Portland cement products -----------
Rayon staple fiber products ---------
Textile products---------------------
Wood products _ _______ ___ _ _
Miscellaneousproducts-------------
Product
types
12
Thus, it is understandable that the
predecessor antidumping amendment
was endorsed by a number of organiza-
tions representing substantial segments
of their industries including, in alpha-
betical order; Automotive parts, sup-
plies, and equipment, braided rug, cast
iron soil pipe, cement, cheese, copper and
brass, electrical and electronics, fine and
specialty wire, fish, glove, hardwood
plywood, hat, musical instrument, scien-
tific apparatus, shoe and leather, tool
and stainless steel, vegetable and melon,
and wire and cable. Backing has been
provided also by such national organiza-
tions as the American Mining Congress
and several labor unions.
I believe that the foregoing should
make it clear that this is not special in-
terest legislation. Moreover, it now
appears that the newly revised 1965
amendment is likely to receive even
stronger and more widespread industry,
labor, and congressional support than
did the 1964 bill.
There is no doubt that injurious
dumping will be easier to curtail if our
bill is passed. This is an important ob-
jective of S. 2045. It is clear, also, that
.the market positions of steel, cement,
and many other industries-as well as
the well-being of employees who work in
these industries-will be strengthened
insofar as American companies, which
are already in tough competition with
each other and nondumped imports,
will have a better chance to combat un-
fair competition from dumped imports.
Market disruption by hit-and-run tac-
tics, leaving to U.S. Producers the slow
task of rebuilding to earlier price levels,
is clearly an irresponsible International
trade practice. The broad generaliza-
tion of the editorial that import compe-
tition makes an important contribution
to price stability and the welfare of the
consumer, is misused when overextended
to a dumping situation. In this "highly
interdependent world," as the editorial
calls it, I believe it becomes increasingly
essential that imports compete fairly.
On this point I should like to quote
once again from then, Senator HuM-
PHREY's remarks of May 27, 1963, and
from those of Senator HUGH SCOTT, the
principal cosponsor in the Senate of the
1965 bill, as he was of the 1963 bill. Both
men stressed a significant facet of this
problem, one which I heartily endorse.
The HuMPHREY observation was:
I have always maintained that American
manufacturers were fully capable of meeting
legitimate foreign competition, but no do-
mestic producer should be expected to with-
stand the long-term effects of irresponsible
dumping actions by foreign competitors.
Senator SCOTT stated in his introduc-
tory remarks on May 26, 1965:
Manufacturers in this country have never
feared legitimate competition. Drawing up-
on principles evolved by the courts under
U.S. antitrust laws, my amendment would
ask foreign suppliers selling in the United
States to comply with the same type of
ground rules that guide U.S. domestic in-
dustries The unfair double standard where
our companies are bound to obey certain
laws that do not apply to foreign suppliers
would be eliminated. The great majority of
our industries ask only the opportunity to
compete fairly. They cannot do this when
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12542 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 9, 1965
confronted with the artificially low pricing Peiping. To acknowledge this does not from Moscow. This explains why Assistant
which characterizes dumping. alter the situation. It only makes it more Secretary of State William Bundy often
the leaves his desk in Washington to debate
Finally, it is time to bring some per- clear that factor into critics of President Johnson's Vietnam
take are this making tor policy.
spective on the last-ditch argument statements those should who
kes that lower account. I urge them to do so. It seems The reason these critics have an influence
~. dit
i
hi
r
a ti
sJ sumer. ? - be tempered even if they are unwilling
SmeNow everybody knows that the give the President the support I think
ultimate consumer, or any buyer, will he deserves for his courageous and forth-
have a benefit if he pays less for some- right policy of resisting the open and
thing. We are all for this-who could 1+ the eo le of
a ns
n
p
i
l
t
tion, when a short-term benefit to the
consumer is at the cost of injury to U.S.
industry and labor, we are forced to look
at the consumer benefit argument not in
a vacuum, but as part of our whole eco-
nomic theory-that the reasonable ex-
pectation of a profit is the stimulus to
business venture in the first place. it is
competition in our private enterprise
system which brings lower prices to the
consumer-not the destruction of com-
petition by dumping.
:Mr. President, in responding to the
recent Post editorial and clarifying some
of the inaccurate assessments it made,
Ialso should like to take this opportu-
nity to remind those of my colleagues
who have not yet signed up as cospon-
sors of the 1965 Antidumping Act
Amendment that S. 2045 remains at the
desk today. I urge all Senators who feel
as we do, on both sides of the aisle, to
NSEEN ALLIES OF THE VIETCONG
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, there appeared in yesterday's
Washington Post an article written by
the. syndicated columnists Rowland
Evans and Robert Novak. In this article
the authors discuss the "unseen allies" of
the Vietcong in the war in Vietnam. As
one of these "allies" they name the
critics of President Johnson's firm
policy of resisting aggression in south-
east Asia.
I am sure that these critics do not
wish to advance the Moscow line, as they
are described in this article as doing, by
giving assistance to the active enemy of
the United States in the Vietnam war.
The authors make it plain that the
assistance is unwitting. The fact that it
is unintentional, however, does not make
it, less damaging, and I urge the critics
to give serious consideration to the effect
which their statements are having.
All of us, and especially President
Johnson, are hoping for and looking for-
ward to the day when we can end the
fighting in Vietnam and sit dawn at the
negotiating table to find the basis for a
stable and peaceful South Vietnam. In
order for this hope to be realized, how-
ever, the Vietcong must come to accept
the fact, and it is a fact, that we are not
going to be driven out of South Viet-
nam-we are not going to abandon the
Vietnamese people. It is clear that the
criticisms of the President's policy and
actions are delaying the time when the
ag
p
aggressio
o
en
v
South Vietnam.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this very well conceived and
written article be printed at this point in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SUMMER IN VIETNAM
(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)
in the dangerous rainy season offensive, the
Communist Vietcong guerrillas have two un-
seen allies--one an intentional ally, the other
an unwitting ally.
The intentional ally is Moscow. By its
statements of new support and weapons, the
Soviet Union shows how far it has allowed
itself to be pushed into North Vietnam's cor-
ner. And this In turn provides a crucial
boost in Hanoi's will to win. Hanoi Is the
Vietcong's sponsor and supplier.
The unwilling ally in this dangerous sum-
mer are the U.S. critics of President John-
son's firm policy in southeast Asia. Every
critical statement is puffed up far out of pro-
portion as proof that in the end the United
States really won't stick it out in the jungles
of southeast Asia.
These factors assume special importance
in the critical new phase of the war. With
arrival of the summer monsoons the less
mobile United States-South Vietnam forces
are slowed, their air operations are impeded,
and the light-traveling Red guerrillas gain
a new advantage. Each year the Vietcong
conduct intensive probing operations in
June, then move into a major offensive in
July.
Nobody believes the success or failure of
the Vietcong summer offensive will settle the
war once and for all. But if the Commu-
nists score anything like their summer suc-
cesses of 1963 and 1964, the entire gain in
morale in South Vietnam generated by the
U.S. bombing in the north (a gain already
being dissipated) could be erased altogether.
A repeat of Vietcong successes of 1963 and
1964 might even lead to a coalition govern-
ment in Saigon, a disastrous mixture of Viet-
cong leaders and non-Communists.
But if the Vietcong are stopped for the first
time, it could be a turning point of the war.
Among other things, it would much en-
chance the new amnesty campaign aimed at
the Vietcong (duplicating the campaign used
so well in combating Communist guerrillas
in Malaya a decade ago).
In guerriilla war, morale is nearly as im-
portant as military tactics. That's why the
out of proportion to their numbers is the
dangerous tendency of the Communist intel-
ligence community (a tendency not peculiar
to Communist nations) to believe what it
wants to believe.
For Instance, there is good reason to be-
lieve that Communist China really thought
India would fall apart when invaded 3 years
ago.
By the same token, both Peiping and
Hanoi are known to overemphasize the im-
portance of domestic criticism here.
Of course, more is involved than psycho-
logical warfare. The continuing growth of
U.S. ground forces has freed Vietnamese
troops for field duty. Moreover, U.S. officials
hope that new battle techniques will enable
the Vietnamese to do better against the
Vietcong's hit-and-run guerrilla tactics than
the last two summers.
A guerrilla war is beyond prediction. One
thing certain, however, Is that Hanoi is
adamant against negotiations. This, to-
gether with the growing moral and physical
aid from Moscow, has reinforced Hanoi's
determination to go all out on another sum-
mer offensive. If peace is to come to Viet-
nam, that offensive must be stopped cold.
SENATE SHOULD REJECT NOMINA-
TION OF GEN. WILLIAM F. McKEE
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
I am opposed to S. 1900, now on the Sen-
ate Calendar, to appoint Gen. William
F. McKee as the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Agency.
The Founding Fathers provided that
in the United States, civilian authority
must always be supreme over military
authority. They specifically included in
the Constitution the provision that the
President of the United States shall be
Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces. This has been a basic principle
of our democracy.
They were mindful of the inevitable
conflict between civilian and military
leaders. Apparently, from what has
taken place in the executive branch of
our Government during recent months,
they were Justified in being fearful of
military domination in our Republic.
These 18th century fears on the part of
those patriots who won the Revolution-
ary War and later wrote the Constitu-
tion and Bill of Rights are equally valid
in the 20th century. It is suggested that
top officials in the executive branch of
our Government would do well to reread
some of the debates in the Federal Con-
vention and refresh their minds that
James Madison and other architects of
our Constitution were determined that
Moreover, the expected early arrival in North to civilian power."
Vietnam of sophisticated Soviet antiaircraft The Congress has specifically provided
weaponry is considered significant more for that numerous high Federal offices shall
psychological than military reasons, always be filled by civilians, including
Soviet Soon after leaders laid Khrushchev's
plans ans to o give fall, Hanoi the new more the posts of Secretary of Defense, Sec
help-mainly to counteract Red Chinese in- retary of the Air Force, and many others.
fluence. This help was accelerated by the Among them is the position of Adminis-
U.S. bombings iiR the north. One negative trator of the Federal Aviation Agency.
Vietcong will come to accept this fact. feature of the bombings is that it has pushed At this time, Mr. President, 94 retired
to maintain a stronger
The authors acknowledge that the nom in order Moscow into
in its sr stand position in in Viet- the and active officers of our Armed Forces, damaging effect of the statements of communist world. many of them generals, enjoy executive
these critics is in- part due to the exag- But as we have reported previously, the assignments in the Federal Aviation
gerated attention given to them by the unwitting aid from the United States can Agency alone. Major General Grant is
Vietcong and their allies, Moscow and be just as dangerous as the intentional aid Deputy Administrator. The Federal Air
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300180029-9