EXTENSION OF TIME FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 6 TO REMAIN AT THE DESK

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January 12, 1965
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Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE cosponsor of these bills at the next print- ing of the bills. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With- out objection, it is so ordered. EXTENSION OF TIME FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 6 TO REMAIN AT THE DESK Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senate Joint Resolution 6 be kept at the desk until the close of business on Friday, January 15. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With- out objection, it is so ordered. ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS, ETC. Under authority of the orders of the Senate of January 6, 1965, the following names have been added as additional co- sponsors for the following bills and con- current resolution: S. 1. A bill to provide a hospital insurance program for the,.gged under social security, to amend the Federal old-age, survivors, and disability insurance system to increase benefits, improve the actuarial. status of the disability insurance trust fund, and ex- tend coverage, to amend the Social Security Act to provide additional Federal financial participation in the Federal-State public as- sistance programs, and for other purposes: Mr. KENNEDY of New York and Mr. MONRONEY. 5.21. A bill to provide for the optimum development of the Nation's natural resources through the coordinated planning of water and related land resources, through the establishment of a water resources council and river basin commission, and by provid- ing financial assistance to the States in order to increage State participation in such plan- ning: Mr. BIBLE, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. YAR- BOROUGH. S. 22. A bill tqr promote a more adequate national program of, water research: Mr. BIBLE and Mr. TOWER. S.23. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a program in five areas of the United States to increase usable pre- cipitation, and for other purposes: Mr. DOMINICK, Mr. LONG of Missouri, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. YARBOROU9H. S. 24. A bill to expand, extend, and ac- celerate the saline water conversion program conducted by the Secretary of the Interior, and for other purposes: Mr. BIBLE, Mr. LONG of Missouri, Mr. Moss, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. YARBOROUGH. S. 288. A bill to amend Public Law 874, 81st Congress, in order to provide assistance to local educational agencies in the educa- tion of children of needy families and chil- dren residing in areas of substantial unem- ployment with unemployed parents: Mr. Lone of Missouri. S. Con. Res, 2. Concurrent resolution to establish a Joint Committee on the Organiza- tion of the Congress: Mr. FANNIN, Mr. JACK- SON, Mr. JORDAN of Idaho, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. MONDALE, and Mr. SfYMINGTON. NOTIC9 .OF RECEIPT OF NOMINA- TIONS BY COMMITTEE ON FOR- EIGN RELATIONS Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I desire to announce that today the Senate received the nomination of Maurice M. Bernbaum, of Illinois, to be Ambassador to Venezuela; and Wym- berley DeR. Coerr, of Connecticut, to be Ambassador to Ecuador. In accordance with the committee rule, these pending nominations may not be considered prior to the expiration 'of 6 days of their receipt in the Senate. EI' ROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, January 12, 1965, he pre- sented to the President of the United States the enrolled joint resolution (S.J. Res. 3) extending the date for trans- mission of the budget and the Economic Report. ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX On request, and by unanimous con- sent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Ap- pendix, as follows: By Mr. CARLSON: Statement by James Blakely, of Topeka, Kans., at presentation of 24th National Bellamy Award Flag to the Wausau, Wis., Senior High School. By Mr. INOUYE: Speech entitled "Free Enterprise, America's Heritage," delivered by Eagle Scout John I. Kotake, at Honolulu, Hawaii, on November 5, 1964. By Mr. RANDOLPH: Editorial from the Spirit of Jefferson-Ad- vocate, of Charles Town, W. Va. By Mr. METCALF: Excerpt from article entitled "America's 10 Outstanding Young Men of 1964," pay- ing tribute to John Artichoker, Jr., superin- tendent of the Northern Cheyenne Agency, published in Look magazine for January 26, 1965. By Mr. FULBRIGHT: Article entitled "Little Rock Women's Panel Wages War on Prejudice," written by Matilda Tuohey, and published in the Sun- day Arkansas Gazette of December 27, 1964. APPROVED STATEMENTS ISSUED BY SENATE AND HOUSE MINOR- ITY LEADERS Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on Monday, January 11, the joint Senate- House Republican leadership, which has been operating as a joint group through- out the 87th and 88th Congresses, and which continues into the 89th Congress, approved statements issued by the two minority leaders. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the state- ments were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRKSEN When defeat comes to a major political party in this country invariably there are outcries for revolutionary changes in party structure, party leadership, and party poli- cies. The Republican defeat of 1964 has pro- duced these manifestations of uncertainty, unrest, and uneasiness. Many suggestions, both formal and informal, for action pour from numerous sources. We, the members of the joint Senate- House Republican leadership, are fully cog- nizant of the situation. There Is no doubt 529 in our minds that action is indicated and we are taking it. In our conversations since the November defeat we have discussed among ourselves and with other recognized party leaders, numerous paths that might be followed. Always, certain basic facts have emerged : First, that the only elected Republican officials of the Federal Establishment are1the 32 Republican Members of the U.S. Senate and the 140 Members of the House of Repre- sentatives. Obviously and beyond dispute, they will guide Republican Party policy at the national level, in the absence of a Re- publican President and Vice President, by the record they write in the Congress. It is their responsibility. Second, that an additional repository of advice and counsel on party policy exists in former Presidents and nominees for Presi- dent, in our present elected Governors, in the members of the Republican National Committee and the State chairmen of our several States, and, of course, in active Re- publican advocates at all other levels of the party structure. Their wisdom must be channeled into party policy formulation. In the conviction that the Republican Party for a century has been and is an essen- tial element in this Nation's forward prog- ress, and with the firm belief that all Re- publicans must join the effort, we, the mem- bers of the joint Senate-House Republican leadership, have on this day initiated a pro- posed mechanism to achieve a broad consen- sus on vital objectives for our country and our party. It is an honor to introduce my colleague, the new Republican leader of the House, JERRY FORD, to provide the details of tho proposal. STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE FORD We propose to give the Republican Party a unified leadership. As a chart we are mak- ing public will show, we are inviting the five living Republican nominees for Presi- dent-one of whom, Dwight D. Eisenhower, served two terms in that office-and repre- sentatives of the Republican Governors As- sociation to join with us in the establish- ment of a Republican Coordinating Commit- tee to continuously examine party policy and party operations. We have asked the presiding officer of the joint Senate-House Republican leadership, the Republican National Chairman, Mr. Dean Burch, to serve as presiding and administra- tive officer of the new Republican Coordinat- ing Committee, and through the Republican National Committee to provide such staff as- sistance and funds as may be necessary. As Mr. Burch, himself, suggested, we regard this role an implicit responsibility for him or whoever may occupy his office in the future. It will be the funption of the Republican Coordinating Committee, composed of the 11 members of the joint Senate-House Repub- lican leadership, the five living Republican nominees for President, and five representa- tives of the Republican Governors Associa- tion to facilitate the broadest party repre- sentation and the establishment of task forces for the study and examination of ma- jor national problems and issues. The re- cruiting sources for these task forces, which would report to the joint leadership, are clearly delineated on the organization chart which we are making public. For the joint leadership, I have been asked to add these two pertinent points: First, the Republican National Chairman has been re- quested to immediately invite the other par- ticipants to join us in forming the Republi- can Coordinating Committee. Second, we are convinced that the Republican Party is not only a great force in the American way of life, but it is the only living political in- strument which can make the American dream a reality, not a mere collection of words apd promises. Our only goal is re- suits and we intend to achieve them. Approved For Release 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP67B00446R000360170026-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 530 u CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE January 12 INTERVIEWS OF SENATOR CHURCH Question. There are some who argue that degree, committed this error both in South CONCERNING VIETNAM even though the North Korean forces are Korea and Formosa. much smaller, there is the vast army of Red Question. The dilemmas we seem to have Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, re- China just across the Yalu River. From that vis-a-vis South Korea and Formosa appear cently, the Senate appointed the Senator point of view, wouldn't it seem advisable to to find their ultimate expression in the sit- from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] a member of keep American troops in there? uation in South Vietnam. Wouldn't you the Committee on Foreign Relations. Answer. If we Were to accept that premise, agree, Senator? Senator CHURCH has made an excellent then it would follow that American troops Answer. Yes, I think that's so. Andhere poi - must remain permanently on the 38th paral- again, it is a fact that we are in South Viet- statement with regard to what our lel so long as Red China endures. I think nam only because the Communists refuse icy should be in southeast Asia. that this is a faulty argument. It may lead to let the Saigon government alone. If they I ask unanimous consent that this China, North Korea, and other Asian noun- were to call off the insurrection against that statement, together with a number of tries to conclude that we are, in fact, inter- government and leave South Vietnam and editorials from the New York Times of ested in maintaining some kind of perma- her neighbors alone, we'd be only too willing December 28, 1964, the Evening Star of nent foothold on the Asian mainland. Re- to withdraw our forces from that region of Washington, December 30, 1964, the St. member, we have a large and mobile military the world. Nevertheless, it may not seem Louis Post-Dispatch of December 30, force on Okinawa, within easy striking dis- this way to many Asians. I remember spend- tance of Korea, should another invasion ever ing some months in India during the Sec. 1964, the Salt Lake Tribune of December occur, Moreover, we could, if necessary, and World War. I had the oportunity to 31, 1964, the Idaho Statesman of De- leave a single regimental combat team, talk to Indian intellectuals and revolution- cember 18, 1964, and the New Britain rather than two full divisions, on the line In aries. They made a sharp distinction be- Herald of December 28, 1964, be printed Korea, which would be a sufficient "trigger tween me, as an American, and my English at this point in the RECORD. force" to guarantee our renewed participa- friends. They understood that the United There being no objection, the state- tion in the defense of South Korea, if the States had been the first colony to achieve ment and editorials were ordered to be need were ever to arise again. But, no mat- Its independence from George III. They had ter how one looks at it, there is no military read our Declaration of Independence; they printed in the RECORD, as follows: requirement for keeping a whole American could quote passages from Thomas Paine, [From Ramparts magazine, January- Army there indefinitely, in view of the pies- from Thomas Jefferson and from Abraham February 19651 eut strength and capacity of the South Lincoln. But once I left their company and INTERVrEW WITH SENATOR FRANK CHURCH Korean Army to defend their boundary line. went out onto the great flatlands of India I think that if there is a basic fault with Question. If there is no military need for itself, and encountered ordinary Indian our Asian policy, it might well be our failure the 55,000 troops, is there a possibility that people, it was apparent from the way they to confine it to the practical limits of our there is a political need? treated all Americans, that they made no power. We conquered the Pacific in the Sec- Answer. The only political reason for distinction between us and- the British. We and World War, Afterward, the Pacific was maintaining so large an American army were all white men. To them, we all repre- a very broad most. protecting the United there would be to assist in buoying up the rented Western imperialism. I'm afraik that States against hostile encroachment. Had weak South Korean economy. But this is, in in South Vietnam today, there are a great we established, as our westernmost rampart, itself, an admission of the failure of Ameri- many of the indigenous peoples who make the island chain which rims the Asian con- can policy in Korea. Twelve years after the little distinction between our American uni- tinent, and had we made it clear that we end of the war, South Korea is still a gar- forms and the old French uniforms, and were prepared to meet-with our own mili- rison state, incapable of self-support, and therefore, we are once again faced with the tary force-any hostile penetration of the each year it is necessary for the United States problem of making our position in Vietnam Pacific, we would have established a bound- to give South Korea close to half a billion credible to the Asian people with whom we ary line fully within our military power to - dollars in rations. We can't continue in- must deal. maintain. The United States is essentially definitely to finance the South Korean na- Question. Then that raises probably the a naval and aerial power, and there is no way tion and yet, we seem unable to find an al- most fundamental question of all. Should for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us ternative to this dole. we have gone into South Vietnam in the from the Pacific. The elephant cannot drive Question. Senator CHURCH, returning to first place? the whale from the sea nor the eagle from the matter of the island string, what about Answer. Looking back upon it, I would the sky. But it is also true that neither the our being In Formosa? Is this compatible say that Mr. Dulles was mistaken when he whale nor the eagle can drive the elephant with traditional American policy in Asia? persuaded President Eisenhower that we from his jungle. I think our failure to es- Answer. Of course, we are not in Formosa ought to intervene in South Vietnam after tablish such an island rampart, conforming with a whole American army as we are in Ko- the French defeat. After all, the French to the character of our military power, has rea. I think we were correct in giving for- had fought for years with an army of some been a fundamental cause for some of the mal assurances to Formosa that we will de- 400,000 men in a vain effort to preserve difficulties that now face us in Asia. fend her against Communist attack. Our French Indochina, and that proud army was se commitment extends not only to the island defeated could not by be ragged overcome. guerrilla Nevertheless, forces which Question. Senator CHURCH, you would re- we did strict American intervention to the defense of Formosa, but the Pescadores as well. I make that decision and we now have to live of this string of islands. Is that correct? would view these islands as a part of the with it. Answer. That might have been our pos- ocean rampart I previously mentioned, and ture, but it has not been. well within the American military capacity Question. Thus far, the Saigon govern- Question. If you are going to limit the line to defend. Our 7th Fleet is, indeed, the ment has not been able to win the war. Do like that, how can you justify our presence shield for Formosa. My only criticism of you think that the war can ever be won? in Korea, which is on the mainland? American policy in Formosa is that we have Answer. I really don't know. I think that Answer. I think that we were right, in the helped to finance the maintenance of an we have to continue to honor our commit- first instance, to intervene in Korea. An in- army for Chiang Kai-shek, which is twice ments to the Saigon government to make vasion by North Korea had occurred, and we too big for the needs of the island's defenses sure that it has all of the weapons, the undertook, in the name of the United Na- and not a tenth big enough to retake the equipment, food, and financial assistance tions, to defend the independence of South mainland. So the policy has been unduly needed to carry on the war. We have given Korea against that invasion. Many other costly for us, and at the same time, may well such help in massive quantity, and I think countries joined us, at least in a token way, be giving China cause to suspect that we are that we must continue to do so. to uphold the U.N. shield against an aggres- preparing Chiang Kai-shek to act as a spear- But in the end, the capacity of Saigon to sion of this kind. Our mistake was not in head for an invasion of the mainland. I do win the war will depend on the cohesiveness undertaking the defense of South Korea, but not regard this as our objective, but It may of public support that can be achieved. in having remained there afterward longer seem so to the government of Red China. Some political stability will be essential. than required. Today, for example, there Question. It might seem, from the two in- The people themselves must have the will to still are 55,000 American troops on the 38th stances of South Korea and Formosa, that continue the fight. For nearly 20 years now, parallel. From all appearances, they are per- we are trying to preserve an American grip fighting has been going on in this unhappy manently entrenched as though the 38th upon Asia. Do you think Asians so view the region of the world. The people are weary parallel had become an American boundary, situation? of war. If the spirit to fight on is preserved, and this, despite the fact that the South Answer. It disturbs me that we may well we can provide the material aid necessary, Korean Army has been equipped as a modern be creating such an impression even though and the war eventually can be won. To do military force, nearly twice as large as the this is not, in fact, our objective. We fully this, I think South Vietnam must be sealed North Korean Army which faces it. There understand the importance of credibility off from supplies from the north, both over is no military necessity for so large a con- when it comes to our military forces. We the jungle trails and from the sea. But in tinued American presence along the 38th take great precautions to make certain that the last analysis, victory or defeat will de- pa:rall.el, and I think that we would give our nuclear deterrent is a credible one in pend upon the South Vietnamese people added credibility to our oft-spoken purpose order to avoid a nuclear war through enemy themselves. The thing we must remember is of leaving Asia for the Asians if we were to miscalculation. But we seem to give precious that there is no way for us to win their war commence to withdraw American forces from little attention to making our diplomatic ob- for them. It is a guerrilla war, at root an In- Korea. jectives credible. I think we have, to some digenous revolution against the existing gov- Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 531 ernment, the kind of war where it's exceed- ingly difficult to tell the enemy from the people. It can only be won by the people themselves. Question. When you say seal off supplies to the Vietcong from North Vietnam and from the sea, are you implying that the South Vietnamese have sufficient military capability to do this? Answer. I think that it's possible for them to accomplish this militarily, particularly if we can bring about a joint military effort in Laos which will interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail. It's possible, also, that we can find a role for the United Nations to play in maintaining the integrity of the boundaries in this area. Question. Isn't it true that a lot of the warfare is being waged by captured American arms, with the result that the Insurrection- ists are already rather self-sufficient? Answer. Yes. It isn't well enough under- stood that the war in the south cannot be won in the north, even though it would be helpful to out off the supply lines which continue to give aid and comfort to the Viet- cong. Basically, the Vietcong consists of South Vietnamese; the bulk of their weap- onry is captured, and they have the capa- bility of maintaining their attacks, inde- pendent of North Vietnam. Therefore, it's folly to think that, by extending the war northward, there is a way out for us. All one needs to do is to look at the map to see that this is the way in, not out, and that the war can be more easily won, not by tak- 1ng on the whole North Vietnamese army, but by confining it to the 25,000 hard-core Vietcong that are involved in the south. If they cannot be put down by the Saigon government, with all of the aid and assist- ance we are giving it, then our predicament will only be worsened by extending the war northward and increasing the enemy force many times. Moreover, let us remember that, within the past 2 years, China invaded India. Also, it was Red China that came down from the north when she felt herself threatened by approaching American troops in Korea. Thus, there is little basis for us to assume that China might not respond in like fashion to Vietnam, if the war were to be extended northward. Then, we would have the whole of the Chinese army to contend with as well, and we would be faced with a tragic trail of casualties in this region of the world, out of all proportion to the vital interests of the United States. Question. Assuming that South Vietnam could be insulated and assuming further that we kept pouring in more and more supplies, what should be the policy of the United States If this effort failed nonetheless, and the war in South Vietnam could not be won? Answer. I. would hope that we could then find the maturity to accept that fact. France did so, both here and in Algeria. Algeria, incidentally, meant a great deal more to the economy of France than Vietnam does to ours. Besides, Algeria was for many years considered a part of France where more than a million Frenchmen lived. When, in the end, the French Government found that there was no way to put down the insurrec- tion against it, that the will for independ- ence in Algeria was irresistible, the states- manship of De Gaulle made it possible for the French to recognize the inevitable and to make a peaceful settlement in Algeria. This involved a French withdrawal. Now, Soutli Vietnam has never been, nor do we want it to be, an American possession. It is alien to the United States in almost every way, and it is as remote from the United States as any country in the world. If, despite all of its material advantages, the Saigon Government can't prevail, because it simply lacks the indigenous support of the people of the country, then I would hope that we would recognize that it is not our country and never has been. The war is there for them to win or to lose. If it is lost and there is no way left to win it, we should accept that fact. Question. And by that, do you mean that we should withdraw our support? Answer. I think in that event, withdrawal Would be forced upon us, for the Vietnamese themselves would form some kind of govern- ment which would invite us out. I hope it never comes to that, but we must be prepared for that possibility. , Question. Wouldn't it be possible, even before that time, for the United States to make certain diplomatic moves to support the French proposals advocating neutrality for all of southeast Asia? Wouldn't that bring about a resolution of the problem, par- ticularly as it wouldn't require withdrawal in the face of defeat? Neutrality for all of southeast Asia, for the whole of that great peninsula, is a proper objective, providing that it is not a camou- flage for a Communist takeover. If we were able to sustain the Saigon government suffi- ciently long to permit it to win its war, or if we were to stabilize the situation in this re- gion in such a way that it would be possible to go with some trump cards to the confer- ence table, then I think we might reach an international agreement, declaring this whole region to be neutral, and requiring the withdrawal of all foreign troops. We could guarantee the integrity of that agree- ment with our own military power. If it were violated by invasion from China or any other country, we could commit ourselves, along with the other nations joined in the international accord, to the maintenance of its integrity. Question. That would only guarantee ter- ritorial integrity from external aggression. How would that help in terms of internal insurrection? Answer. The only answer to Communist subversion, burrowing from within a coun- try, is to be found within that country itself. If its government is a decent one and enjoys general popular support, the internal Com- munist problem can be successfully dealt with. Malaya is a good example. There, a few years ago, Communists undertook the same kind of guerrilla war against the Malayan Government as South Vietnam is plagued with today. The same tactics were used. The same dedicated, hard-core revolu- tionaries were at work and, too, there was a very large Chinese population in Singapore which might have given shelter and support to the Communist activity. Yet, Malaya was able to deal with this problem, to isolate the Communist guerrillas from the rest of the population, and to stamp out the insurrec- tion. Malaya had the kind of government that enjoyed the confidence and support of the people. The thing for us to remember is that, unless the people themselves are will- ing to rally behind their government, unless they regard a Communist insurrection as a menace to their own well-being, there is no way that American forces can intervene to save the day. If we move in and take over in an effort to thwart the impending success of a Communist insurrection, the Asian peo- ples involved will forget entirely our good motivation, and will come at once to regard the war as one between a white Western force on the one hand, and indigenous Asian forces on the other. And there is no way for us to win such a war on the Asian continent- We have to recognize that the period of Western occupation and control in Asia is gone. It is now Asia for the Asians. Noth- ing would be more futile than to permit our- selves to be sucked into a war which would pit Western forces against Asian forces, for even if we were able, by brute musclepower, to take a large chunk of Asian territory, we could not stay there long. Our only harvest would be implacable hostility on all sides and the tides of history would, in the end, wash over us. No lasting victory could be achieved. Question. Everything you say seems 'to fit the situation in South Vietnam at the time that we are talking. 'We have had, in the last year or two, any number of regimes in South Vietnam, plus a war that seems to be hopelessly bogged down. Is it because of the failure of the Saigon government, or I should say governments, to fulfill the, needs of the people? Answer. I think that the Government in South Vietnam has been incompetent, to say the least. It must be viewed for what it is, a military despotism. Communist North Vietnam is also such a despotism, but this hardly gives the people of South Vietnam a clear-cut choice between free government and tyranny. Nor should we think of this war in terms of preserving a free economic system against the imposition of a Socialist system, for the fact is that both the Gov- ernments are committed to socialism. Question. Taking into consideration every- thing that you've said so far about our policy toward Asia, don't we face a rather difficult future now that China is a nuclear power? Answer. Yes. The situation will become increasingly difficult once China has a nu- clear arsenal. Of course, the recent detona- tion of a nuclear device is significant in terms of prospects, but the ultimate signifi- cance will be realized, say, about 10 years from now when the, Chinese will probably have an effective nuclear arm. This would change the power balance In Asia immensely, and China might well seek to use her new- found power to establish a hegemony over southeast Asia, where China has traditionally enjoyed a sphere of influence. I would hope, by then, that we will have drawn our lines in strict conformity with our vital interests, so that we never find ourselves faced in southeast Asia with the dilemma that con- fronted Khrushchev in Cuba, when he was compelled to withdraw under highly hu- miliating circumstances, simply because his gamble was not worth the candle. When it comes to nuclear confrontation, countries must make their stand conform to their mortal interests. The stakes must be ab- solute, for the consequences are too terrible to permit the frivolous commitment of nuclear weapons. Question. In other words, once China has atomic capability, any South Vietnam situa- tion would be almost certain to end with the humiliation of having to withdraw or face a nuclear threat from virtually next door. Is that what you are implying, Senator? Answer. Yes. Unless we look ahead and undertake now to revise our policy in Asia, we could face such a debacle some time in the future. Question. Assuming that China will have a nuclear capability in the foreseeable fu- ture, does this automatically imply that China is going to take over all of Asia? Answer. I wouldn't think so. Chinese divisions decisively defeated the Indian troops defending India 2 years ago, but China recognized that the conquest of India would not only strain her own resources to the limit, but would also result in greater problems for.her than solutions, and, there- fore, elected-having shown her capabili- ties-to withdraw her forces once more. In the event that China establishes her own nuclear arsenal, It is much more likely that she will seek to create a sphere of influence in southeast Asia, similar to the one the old Chinese emperors once enjoyed, which would leave other countries like Vietnam, Cam- bodia, and Laos somewhat independent, even Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 12 though these countries may become Com- munist in name. The important thing to remember is that there is now an unraveling within the Communist world. It isn't all one great Red dominion as it appears on the maps. Today, even those who would regard it this way, concede that there are at least two Romes, and Moscow and Peiping grow increasingly hostile. Moreover, in Eastern Europe we see the satellite countries assert- ing their independence in more and more obvious ways, striving with some success to loosen the Rusisan grip upon them. The point is, that the same unraveling process is likely to occur in Asia as is now occurring in Europe, and that these satellite countries will become increasingly independent of domina- tion from either Peiping or Moscow. Thus it will become more and more possible for us to establish our separate relationships with them, as we are even now doing in the case of both Poland and Yugoslavia. One flinal question: vis-a-vis South Korea, Formosa, and South Vietnam, we seem to be in a position that can best be described as involvement. If the world situation changes or the war, for example, in South Vietnam cannot be won, how can we prepare our- selves as a nation, psychlogicaily and politi- cally, for a change from involvement to disengagement? It's especially hard for a free, popular gov- ernment to change course. We have a tendency to oversell our policy with respect to any given country in such a way that public opinion hardens behind it, and then it becomes very difficult to change course. I think we have to find the statesmanship to do this. It's possible that we have swung on the pendulum of public opinion, from the extreme of isolationism 30 years ago, when the prevailing opinion in this coun- try was that it didn't matter to us what happened abroad, to the opposite extreme where we regard it as an American respon- sibility to maintain the governments of all those countries that are now nominally non- Communist. This, in a sense, is an imperial attitude, even though we seek no possessions, and even though we are not attempting to impose American rule upon any of these countries. However, unless we come to ac- cept the fact that it is neither within the power nor the interest of the United States to preserve the status quo everywhere, our policy is doomed to failure. Here again, the requirement for statesmanship is very high, but if we strive to inform the American people of the upheaval and ferment of our times, and if we give them all the facts, I think the American people will be prepared to support a flexible foreign policy, better tailored to serve the real interest of the United States in a changing world. against the Vietcong and American aid to wage it, no solution to the Vietnamese crisis can offer much real hope. Senator CHURCH deserves to be heard, not only because he is a thoughtful voice but because he has been right in the past on Vietnam. In the autumn of 1963, when Sec- retary McNamara and General Taylor were giving out optimistic reports on the Diem regime, Mr. CHURCH was publicly skeptical and critical. He now argues that "neutrality for all of southeast Asia is a proper objective, providing that it is not a camouflage for a Communist takeover." Senator MANSFIELD, the Democratic majority leader, has taken a similar line; but his colleague, Senator MON- RoNEr, returns from an Asian tour convinced that neutrality would be a mistake. The proviso of keeping the Communists out is all important. The basic objective of the United States in southeast Asia is what was called "containment" in 1954. The American aim was to stop theCommunists from taking over all Vietnam, and that is still our objet-, tive. A true neutrality would serve that pur- pose, but it is unrealistic to think that weak nations on the fringe of Communist China can preserve a Swiss-type of neutrality. A Yugloslav-type, perhaps, but then the de- finition of neutrality would have to be stretched. As Senator CHURCH points out in his Ram- part interview, a number of Democratic Con- gressmen are dissatisfied with the present policies toward southeast Asia. The dilemma is that no one has an alternate course to suggest that does not involve the enormous risks of an expanded war or an abandonment of all our commitments in the area. [From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Dec. 30, 1964] SENATOR CHURCH CALLS FOR CAUTION (By Max Freedman) Senator FRANK CHURCH, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, deserves the highest praise for speaking so frankly, in his interview with Ramparts magazine, about the situation in Vietnam. He has not ignored the hazards and humil- iations that now face the United States; but he has not advocated the abandonment of South Vietnam to Communist domination as an easy way for the U.S. Gdvernment to escape from its growing difficulties. He is ready to support military aid to South Vietnma while its rulers and people are willing to fight for their freedom. The test of this willingness is to be provided not by the wishes of Washington but by the actions of Saigon. One of the great misfortunes of the Unit- ed States entanglement with Vietnam has been the lack of clarity In defining long- term purposes. Perhaps CHURCH Is right in blaming the late John Foster Dulles for making Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia so im- portant to U.S. security. But CHURCH surely will agree, on reflection, that the blame can- not be carried by Dulles alone. The Dulles initiative took place as long ago as 1954. The U.S. absorption with the affairs of Viet- nam has continued steadily. Our military, economic, and emotional commitment seemed to grow more intense as our failure to control events became more evident. President Kennedy did not reduce former President Dwight Eisenhower's com- mitment, he increased it; and President Johnson is under growing pressure to in- crease that commitment still further. During all these years there has been no critical protest in Congress, except by a few notable Senators, at this enlargement of U.S. risks and responsibilities. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara discouraged open debate. They preferred to testify before secret con- gressional committees. As the war continued to go badly, there was a growing reluctance to challenge U.S. policy in Congress. Respon- sible Members wished to do nothing that would endanger U.S. security or weaken the fighting resolve of the hard-pressed Viet- namese Government. But CHURCH is not alone in thinking that continued silence imposes greater risks on the United States than a responsible chal- lenge that will force this country, at a calamitously late hour, to answer some hard questions about its purposes in southeast Asia. In his interview, CHURCH has discussed some of the first principles of U.S. policy that should have been fully examined years ago. In essence, he has asked two basic questions. Has the United States made the best use of its limited resources in the Pa- cific? And has the United States assumed more responsibility in southeast Asia than can be justified by its own national interest? Not everyolie will - agree with CHURCH'S an- swers, but there will be wide agreement with his contention that the present policy can- not be continued without the gravest risks for this country. He is even more opposed to launching a war on North Vietnam. CHURCH will no doubt take the first op- portunity in the new session of Congress to amplify his proposal for giving the United Nations special duties for protecting a neu- tralized southeast Asia. He recognizes, what President Charles de Gaulle, of France, has failed to admit, that these neutral borders would soon fall under Communist control unless they were placed under some kind of supervision and protection. This means that outside countries would have to assume eco- nomic and military duties in southeast Asia, under the guidance of the United Nations, to prevent a Communist attack and to assure the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that their national independence would re- main intact. This theme, and similar proposals, will be taken up by CHURCH and other Democratic Senators in the new Congress. They do not want to embarrass the Johnson administra- tion. They want to save the country from mistakes and perils in Asia that can yet be avoided. The somber misfortunes in Viet- nam assure that their criticisms and sug- gestions will be more favorably considered by the public now than In the past. [From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1964] A SENATOR ON VIETNAM Senator CHURCH, of Idaho, made perceptive comments on U.S. policy in South Vietnam in an interview published in Ramparts maga- zine. He is one of a small group of Demo- cratic Senators who have shown growing un- easiness over the course of events in Saigon, and there is a belief in Washington that a major discussion of foreign policy may be in the making. Senator CHURCH believes the United States must continue to honor its commitments; he does not advocate an immediate end of U.S. economic and military support for the floun- dering Vietnamese Government. He thinks the United States should not have picked up the burden of the defeated French in Indo- china in 1954, but he recognizes that the problem is not to deplore the past but to decide what to do about the present and future. The Senator, a member of the Foreign Re- lations Committee, advocates neutralization for southeast Asia as a fair objective of U.S. policy, and he hopes that the United Na- tions can be brought into the picture as a guarantor of national boundaries. He also hopes the United States will never be forced to withdraw, but he thinks "we must be pre- pared for that possibility." Anyone who reads the dispatches from Sai- gon must share that feeling. The Commu- nist rebels now are reported to control three- [From the New York Times, Dec. 28, 1964] A FRESH VOICE ON VIETNAM Senator FRANK CHURCH, in his interview with the liberal Catholic magazine, Rampart, as said publicly what many U.S. officials are saying privately about Vietnam. Mr. CHURCH argues that the United States should never have got in in the first place and, while there is no immediate way out, the ground should be laid for ultimate extrication. The tough line Washington is taking in regard to the military purge of the South Vietnamese National Council would indicate a belief that General Khanh's position is not strong as he has made it out to be. His de- finance of a few days ago has now been tem- pered by 'a warm Christmas message to the U.S. forces expressing "grateful appreciation" for what the Americans are doing: This represents no assurance, however, that General Khanh will yield to American de- mands. The political crisis in Saigon gives many signs of being beyond repair. It can be` papered over or it can be held down forcibly by the military, but so long as the Buddhists refuse to cooperate and oppose both the war Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 ApprovedFor Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE fourths of South Vietnam and half the peo- ple; there have been six upheavals in the Saigon government in the last 14 months. If the South Vietnamese are to have any bar- gaining power in a move for a new Geneva conference or some sort of U.N. intervention there is no time to lose-if, indeed, there is any time left. A U.N. presence would be de- sirable, but since Red China, not a U.N. mem- ber, would have to participate in guarantees, there are many complications. Senator CHURCH is right when he says we must find the statesmanship to change our course, and must accept the fact that "it is neither within the power nor the interest of the United States to preserve the status quo everywhere." We have failed to distinguish the difference between our vital national in- terests and our emotional commitments. A constructive debate in this field might serve the Nation well. [From the Salt Lake City Tribune, Dec. 31, 1964] ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IN VIETNAM POLICY Amid the uneasiness and the welter of sug- gestions as to U.S. policy in the long, drawn out war in South Vietnam, one of the newest voices is that of Senator FRANK CHURCH, Of Idaho, who is becoming somewhat of a for- eign policy figure in the Senate. In a recent magazine article, Senator CHURCH recommends the neutralization of all southeast Asia and suggests that a role be found for the United Nations as a guaran- tor of national boundaries in that area. Along with several other prominent mem- bers of the majority party, Senator CHURCH Is showing the restiveness that many Amer- icans feel about the Government policy in Asia generally and in South Vietnam in particular. SOME FAVOR WITHDRAWAL Senators ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska, and WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon, have favored with- drawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam now while Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana, the majority leader, has indicated support for the neutralization of South Vietnam only. Another Democratic Senator, GEORGE D. McGovERN, of South Dakota, has proposed a 14-nation conference to seek a political settlement. It is clear that the new Congress convening next month will stage a major foreign policy debate and that possibly the heaviest opposi- tion to the administration's policies may well come from Democrats. Senator CHURCH'S recommendations de- serve careful study. If the kaleidoscopic changes of the government in South Vietnam continue at the pace they have in recent months and d if the most powerful figures, militarily speaking, such as Gen. Nguyen Khanh, continue to mutter about U.S. inter- ference while demanding astronomical aid for a war which is far from won (and, it seems from all dispatches, pursued desul- torily by the Vietnamese), then it may not be a bad idea to throw the whole matter into the hands of the Security Council of the 'United Nations. ASSEMBLY'S VIEW The U.N. General Assembly would, of course, view the Vietnam struggle as a "colonial adventure" by the United States, thanks mainly to the new and excessively touchy nations of Africa and Asia. But, the Security Council could take up the matter and possibly work out a solution which, while it may not satisfy all conditions of both sides in the dispute, could at least bring the whole southeast Asian question into the world forum, relieving this country of the odor as well as the actuality of dictating to the unstable politicians in Vietnam. One problem in the U.N. Security Council, of course, would be the veto power of the Soviet Union. However, it is not impossible that, due to the rift with the Red Chinese, the Russians would refrain from vetoing U.N. action In Vietnam. FOLLY TO ESCALATE In his magazine article, Senator CHURCH declared that it would be folly to escalate the present military operations into North Vietnam because such an expansion of the fighting would inevitably bring Communist China into the war. This is probably true for Peiping is much more aggressively doctrinaire than Moscow and assumes the mask of protector against white colonialism all over the world with an unction which only deceives those who wish to be deceived. Yet the complete and immediate with- drawal of all U.S. forces and aid from South Vietnam would be a massive loss of "face" in the Asian world (although what "face" is left is certainly bruised and bloody). So, the Senator from Idaho may have an acceptable solution for the Vietnam dilemma which President Johnson and his advisers would do well to examine closely. [From the Boise (Idaho) Statesman, Dec. 18, 1964] CHURCH VIEWS THE FAR EAST In the current Catholic laymen's maga- zine, Ramparts, Senator FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho, gives an interview, stat- ing: "I think that if there is a basic fault with our Asian policy, it might well be our failure to confine it to the practical limits of our power." The Senator, as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, looks back and pinpoints mistakes: "We conquered the Pacific in the Second World War. Afterward, the Pacific was a very broad moat protecting the United States against hostile encroach- ment. Had we established, as our western- most rampart, the island chain which rims the Asian Continent, and had we made it clear that we were prepared to meet-with our own military force-any hostile pene- tration of the Pacific, we would have estab- lished a boundary line fully within our mili- tary power to maintain." That lengthy sentence sets the theme for a present-day critique of our policies in the Far East. Senator CHURCH finds the United States still a major naval and aerial power with no way for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific. "The elephant cannot drive the whale from the sea nor the eagle from the sky," CHURCH philosophizes with his usual elo- quence. "But it is also true that neither the whale nor the eagle can drive the ele- phant from his jungle." The Senator "might" restrict American intervention to the defense of this string of Pacific islands. How does that theory fit in with our presence in South Korea? He answers that the United States was cor- rect in intervening in Korea, but erred in re- maining there long after "our presence was no longer required." He finds no military necessity for so large (55,000 American troops) a continued presence along the 38th parallel and "I think we would give added credibility to our oft-spoken purpose of leav- ing Asia for the Asians if we were to com- mence to withdraw American forces from Korea." The Idahoan would retain an American regiment in South Korea. He believes the present South Korean Army could defend alone their boundary line. Senator CHURCH views the island of For- mosa and the Pescadores as being part of the ocean rampart he has delineated. As to South Vietnam, he thinks that pos- sibly former. Secretary of State Dulles was mistaken in persuading President Eisenhow- er to intervene after the French defeat. The Senator notes that France had an army of 533 some 400,000 men fighting in a vain effort to preserve French Indochina. The Senator declares the United States must continue to honor her commitments to the Saigon government, to make sure it has all the weapons, equipment, food, and finan- cial assistance necessary to carry on the war. He is concerned about a lack of political stability, a certain amount which will be necessary for the South Vietnamese to pur- sue their Communist invaders. "To do this," CHURCH said, "I think South Vietnam must be sealed off from supplies from the north, both over the jungle trails and from the sea. But in the last analysis, victory or defeat depend upon the South Vietnamese people themselves." The Senator is critical of the South Viet- nam Government, recalls its incompetency and views it as a military despotism. "Com- munist North Vietnam is also such a despot- ism, but this hardly gives the people of South Vietnam a clearcut choice between free government and tyranny." In other matters, Senator CHURCH consid- ers the Far Eastern situation more complex with Red China on the way toward becom- ing a potential nuclear power. But he is not forecasting that Red China will take over all Asia. He cited the Chinese invasion of India and the decisive defeat which the Indian army suffered. "But China recog- nized that the conquest of India would only strain her own resources to the limit." The Senator is correct when he acknowl- edges no sure way for resolving the Far East conflicts. His remarks in Ramparts were scholarly and thought provoking. There is no easy way out. The United States must stand by its commitments and continue to work for the cause of freedom. [From the New Britain (Conn.) Herald, Dec. 28, 1964] DISINVOLVEMENT A popular, young Senate Democrat who is widely respected In both political parties had some things to say in a just-published mag- azine, interview which ought to set a lot of Americans to thinking. Senator FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho, writing in the Rampart magazine, a Catholic lay- man's publication, expresses the view that the United States ought to be setting its sights on getting out of southeast Asia. He doesn't think that we, as a nation, ever should have been in there in the first place. What makes the Senator's view worthy of more than passing comment is that it is a position widely talked about privately in Washington, seldom publicly. His view is not simply a throwback to iso- lationism. It is, rather, a carefully con- ceived attitude which calls for gradual re- duction of all foreign involvements through- out Asia, and as a substitute therefore, guaranteed maintenance of national bound- aries through the United Nations. In Vietnam, in particular, Senator CHURCH feels that continuation of the present course of guerrilla involvement is folly, leading no- where. He believes that escalation of the war would likewise be futile, leading to dangerous possibilities. The United States, he feels, ought to be making plans for grad- ual elimination of its troops from South Vietnam. Likewise, he feels that continued main- tenance of the Korean truce line by Ameri- can troops is a situation which could go on as long as China is under a Communist gov- ernment. The important part of his thesis is that he would not simply have the United States withdraw and create a power vacuum. Rather, the United Nations would become the guarantor of peace in that far-off conti- nent. The American people would not be un- happy to learn of some alternative to the Vietnam situation which does not call for Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3 534 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE expansion of the war or abandonment of our commitments to the people of Asia. [From the Lewiston (Idaho) Morning Tribune, Dec. 21, 1964] ANOTHER SETBACK IN SOUTH VIETNAM Another military putsch, the latest in a long series, has brought new upheaval to the Government of South Vietnam, illus- trating again the dilemma that faces Amer- ican policymakera in Asia. American troops are in South Vietnam to support the govern- ment In a civil war with the Communist- backed Vietcong rebels, but there is no real government to support. In its latest show of force, the military junta which rules South Vietnam dissolved the National Council, the country's legis- lature, and set about arresting many of its members. The civilian premier, Tran Van Huong, seems not to have been deposed, and the chief of state, Phan Kac Suu, was evi- dently still in power Saturday night. This doesn't mean a great deal, however, since it is clear that the military chiefs could depose either of them whenever they wished. The situation does not encourage confidence in the ability of the government to secure the country against rebellion, and so long as the government remains helpless there is little the United States can do to help it save itself. South Vietnam has been without an effec- tive government since the French were forced to pull out. At no time have the South Vietnamese people felt a national identity with the government, and so it has been a simple matter for the Communists to stir up trouble in the villages. Senator FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho, discussed the problem in an interview published in this newspaper yesterday. The only answer to Communist subversion, burrowing from within," CHURCH said, "is to be found with- in that country itself. If its government is a deecnt one and enjoys general popular sup- port, the internal Communist problem can be successfully dealt with * * *. The thing for us to remember is that, unless the people themselves are willing to rally behind their government, unless they regard a Communist insurrection as a menace to their own well- being, there is no way that American forces can intervene to save the day." This is why CHURCH, Senator WAYNE MORSE, and some others in and out of Con- gross now consider American policy in Viet- nam fruitless. We are caught in a civil war on the ;side of a government which is barely functioning and we find ourselves unable to avoid taking sides in a religious conflict between Buddhists and Catholics. What is worse, as Senator CHURCH pointed out, we are white people fighting against Asians in Asia? and in the eyes of many Asians simply carrying on where the French left off. And our position there deteriorates with each new demonstration of the government's in- capacity to govern. DEDICATION OF ARKANSANS TO THE ARKANSAS RAZORBACK FOOTBALL TEAM Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the people of Arkansas are warm, friendly, and lighthearted about most matters, but on one question we are deadly sera, ous. Where the Arkansas Razorbacks football team is concerned, Arkansans have a dedication not unlike that of the most fervent true believer. As the only non-Texas team in the Southwest Conference, we have the for- midable prospect each fall of playing seven Texas football teams; and as ev- eryone knows, Texas football players, like most things from that State, come pretty big. In less prosperous times when Arkan- sas teams had all they could do to stay in the league, Arkansas fans displayed the dogged devotion which many be- lieved to be the peculiar possession of New York Mets followers. However, like all things in Arkansas, the Razorbacks in recent years have steadily risen the ladder of success. This year this devo- tion was repaid. We reached the top. Last week the Razorbacks, who won 10 in a row in the regular season and de- feated Nebraska in the Cotton Bowl, were announced as the winner of the Grantland Rice Award as the No. 1 team in the country. All of Arkansas is very proud of the team which was not as ponderous as its opponents and did not have any super- stars in the lineup but which played each game as a team and with steady im- provement. Much of the credit for the team's success must go to the student body of the university and to the peo- ple of the State who have given the Razorbacks solid support. But to Coach Broyles must go much of the credit for having given the essential training and having created the spirit in both the players and the public. Having played a little football at Ar- kansas some 40 years ago, I can truth- fully say this year's team is one of the best ever, possibly the best-at least since my last year on the squad. To my colleagues from Texas I can- not offer much hope for the future. All reports indicate that our freshman team is better than ever. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that an article from last night's Washington Star about the selection of the Arkansas Razorbacks to receive the Grantland Rice Award be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: AWARD COMPLETES ARKANSAS DREAM-IRISH SECOND IN RICE VOTE HONOLULU.-"I'm prouder than I've ever been in my life," said Coach Frank Broyles Wednesday on learning that his unbeaten, untied Arkansas Razorbacks will receive the Grantland Rice Award. The memorial to the late sports-writing great goes to the team rated No. 1 in the United States by a five-man committee repre- senting the Football Writers Association of America. "This is something I know the people of Arkansas have dreamed about for a long time," he said. "I know that this has to be the proudest moment in the athletic his- tory of Arkansas-for the players, the uni- 'versity, and our fans. "They all rank No. 1," Broyles said. Arkansas, the Southwest Conference champion, defeated Nebraska, 10 to 7, in the Cotton Bowl game for an 11 to 0 record. Arkansas was the only major college football team without a loss. SECOND IN ASSOCIATED PRESS POLL The Razorbacks finished second in the final Associated Press football poll, which was released before the bowl games. Ala- bama, No. 1 in the last poll, lost in the Orange Bowl to Texas, which was defending national champion and No. 1 when it lost by a point to Arkansas. January 12 The Razorbacks received four first-place votes and one for third. Notre Dame was runner-up with five second-place votes. Texas had one first-place vote and one third- place vote for four points and Michigan re- ceived three third-place votes for three. Alabama Yeceived no votes for first, second, or third place. The five-man committee was composed of Si Burick, Dayton News; Fred Russell, Nash- ville Banner; Blackie Sherrod, Dallas Times- Herald; Steve Weller, Buffalo Evening News, and Paul Zimmerman, Los Angeles Times. HULA BOWL COACH Broyles is here to coach the South squad in the Hula Bowl game, which has been won every year by the North. "The award is a great reward for this Razorback team," he said. "The players ded- icated themselves to this end after our vic- tory over Texas. 1 "It required hard work, tremendous leader- ship and unselfishness," Broyles said. "They improved steadily each week and climaxed the season with a championship drive in the Cotton Bowl against an outstanding Ne- braska team. "We received the greatest support of any team in America from our students and fans throughout the State," he said. "I think it's wonderful for our squad and the State. We had such great effort all year long. I'm as excited as everybody in Arkansas is." CAN THE STATE LIVE ON CRUMBS? Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, State governments face what is probably the worst fiscal crisis in their history. Most State legislatures meet in odd- numbered years. Before 1963 had ended, no less than 35 State legislatures had passed tax increases, estimated to raise annual collections by $1 billion. The revenue sources in many in- stances are in direct conflict with Fed- eral taxation. In 5 years 1958-63, State and local tax rates rose twice as fast as Federal taxes. State and local taxation is now in- creasing twice as fast as income. Since World War II Federal debt has gone up only 20 percent-State and local debt has gone up six times or 600 per- cent. John Anderson, former Governor of Kansas, and past chairman of the Gov- ernors' conference, has written a very outstanding article on the problems of Federal and State taxation. This article appeared in the January 9 issue of the Saturday Review. I ask unanimous con- sent that it be made a part of these remarks. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE CHALLENGE OF PROSPERITY: CAN THE STATE LIVE ON CRUMBS? WHAT HAPPENS WHEN WASHINGTON CUTS INTO THE PIE OF LOCAL REVENUE? (By John Anderson) The choices which Americans must make over the next 2 or 3 years concerning the critical question of Federal-State fiscal rela- tions will greatly affect the future nature of the Federal system. The best way to begin a consideration of Federal and State fiscal re- lations is to sort out the salient facts about Federal, State, and local governmental rev- enues and expenditures. Some of these facts are startling and all of them have serious implications for the future. (By "serious" Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170026-3