EXTENSION OF TIME FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 6 TO REMAIN AT THE DESK
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January 12, 1965
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
cosponsor of these bills at the next print-
ing of the bills.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
EXTENSION OF TIME FOR SENATE
JOINT RESOLUTION 6 TO REMAIN
AT THE DESK
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Senate Joint
Resolution 6 be kept at the desk until
the close of business on Friday, January
15.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF
BILLS, ETC.
Under authority of the orders of the
Senate of January 6, 1965, the following
names have been added as additional co-
sponsors for the following bills and con-
current resolution:
S. 1. A bill to provide a hospital insurance
program for the,.gged under social security,
to amend the Federal old-age, survivors,
and disability insurance system to increase
benefits, improve the actuarial. status of the
disability insurance trust fund, and ex-
tend coverage, to amend the Social Security
Act to provide additional Federal financial
participation in the Federal-State public as-
sistance programs, and for other purposes:
Mr. KENNEDY of New York and Mr.
MONRONEY.
5.21. A bill to provide for the optimum
development of the Nation's natural resources
through the coordinated planning of water
and related land resources, through the
establishment of a water resources council
and river basin commission, and by provid-
ing financial assistance to the States in order
to increage State participation in such plan-
ning: Mr. BIBLE, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. YAR-
BOROUGH.
S. 22. A bill tqr promote a more adequate
national program of, water research: Mr.
BIBLE and Mr. TOWER.
S.23. A bill to direct the Secretary of the
Interior to conduct a program in five areas
of the United States to increase usable pre-
cipitation, and for other purposes: Mr.
DOMINICK, Mr. LONG of Missouri, Mr. TOWER,
and Mr. YARBOROU9H.
S. 24. A bill to expand, extend, and ac-
celerate the saline water conversion program
conducted by the Secretary of the Interior,
and for other purposes: Mr. BIBLE, Mr. LONG
of Missouri, Mr. Moss, Mr. TOWER, and Mr.
YARBOROUGH.
S. 288. A bill to amend Public Law 874,
81st Congress, in order to provide assistance
to local educational agencies in the educa-
tion of children of needy families and chil-
dren residing in areas of substantial unem-
ployment with unemployed parents: Mr.
Lone of Missouri.
S. Con. Res, 2. Concurrent resolution to
establish a Joint Committee on the Organiza-
tion of the Congress: Mr. FANNIN, Mr. JACK-
SON, Mr. JORDAN of Idaho, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr.
MONDALE, and Mr. SfYMINGTON.
NOTIC9 .OF RECEIPT OF NOMINA-
TIONS BY COMMITTEE ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, I desire to announce that today
the Senate received the nomination of
Maurice M. Bernbaum, of Illinois, to be
Ambassador to Venezuela; and Wym-
berley DeR. Coerr, of Connecticut, to be
Ambassador to Ecuador.
In accordance with the committee
rule, these pending nominations may not
be considered prior to the expiration 'of
6 days of their receipt in the Senate.
EI' ROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION
PRESENTED
The Secretary of the Senate reported
that on today, January 12, 1965, he pre-
sented to the President of the United
States the enrolled joint resolution (S.J.
Res. 3) extending the date for trans-
mission of the budget and the Economic
Report.
ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES,
ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX
On request, and by unanimous con-
sent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc.,
were ordered to be printed in the Ap-
pendix, as follows:
By Mr. CARLSON:
Statement by James Blakely, of Topeka,
Kans., at presentation of 24th National
Bellamy Award Flag to the Wausau, Wis.,
Senior High School.
By Mr. INOUYE:
Speech entitled "Free Enterprise, America's
Heritage," delivered by Eagle Scout John I.
Kotake, at Honolulu, Hawaii, on November
5, 1964.
By Mr. RANDOLPH:
Editorial from the Spirit of Jefferson-Ad-
vocate, of Charles Town, W. Va.
By Mr. METCALF:
Excerpt from article entitled "America's
10 Outstanding Young Men of 1964," pay-
ing tribute to John Artichoker, Jr., superin-
tendent of the Northern Cheyenne Agency,
published in Look magazine for January 26,
1965.
By Mr. FULBRIGHT:
Article entitled "Little Rock Women's
Panel Wages War on Prejudice," written by
Matilda Tuohey, and published in the Sun-
day Arkansas Gazette of December 27, 1964.
APPROVED STATEMENTS ISSUED
BY SENATE AND HOUSE MINOR-
ITY LEADERS
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on
Monday, January 11, the joint Senate-
House Republican leadership, which has
been operating as a joint group through-
out the 87th and 88th Congresses, and
which continues into the 89th Congress,
approved statements issued by the two
minority leaders.
I ask unanimous consent that they be
printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ments were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRKSEN
When defeat comes to a major political
party in this country invariably there are
outcries for revolutionary changes in party
structure, party leadership, and party poli-
cies. The Republican defeat of 1964 has pro-
duced these manifestations of uncertainty,
unrest, and uneasiness. Many suggestions,
both formal and informal, for action pour
from numerous sources.
We, the members of the joint Senate-
House Republican leadership, are fully cog-
nizant of the situation. There Is no doubt
529
in our minds that action is indicated and
we are taking it. In our conversations since
the November defeat we have discussed
among ourselves and with other recognized
party leaders, numerous paths that might be
followed. Always, certain basic facts have
emerged :
First, that the only elected Republican
officials of the Federal Establishment are1the
32 Republican Members of the U.S. Senate
and the 140 Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives. Obviously and beyond dispute,
they will guide Republican Party policy at
the national level, in the absence of a Re-
publican President and Vice President, by
the record they write in the Congress. It is
their responsibility.
Second, that an additional repository of
advice and counsel on party policy exists in
former Presidents and nominees for Presi-
dent, in our present elected Governors, in
the members of the Republican National
Committee and the State chairmen of our
several States, and, of course, in active Re-
publican advocates at all other levels of the
party structure. Their wisdom must be
channeled into party policy formulation.
In the conviction that the Republican
Party for a century has been and is an essen-
tial element in this Nation's forward prog-
ress, and with the firm belief that all Re-
publicans must join the effort, we, the mem-
bers of the joint Senate-House Republican
leadership, have on this day initiated a pro-
posed mechanism to achieve a broad consen-
sus on vital objectives for our country and
our party. It is an honor to introduce my
colleague, the new Republican leader of the
House, JERRY FORD, to provide the details of
tho proposal.
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE FORD
We propose to give the Republican Party a
unified leadership. As a chart we are mak-
ing public will show, we are inviting the
five living Republican nominees for Presi-
dent-one of whom, Dwight D. Eisenhower,
served two terms in that office-and repre-
sentatives of the Republican Governors As-
sociation to join with us in the establish-
ment of a Republican Coordinating Commit-
tee to continuously examine party policy
and party operations.
We have asked the presiding officer of the
joint Senate-House Republican leadership,
the Republican National Chairman, Mr. Dean
Burch, to serve as presiding and administra-
tive officer of the new Republican Coordinat-
ing Committee, and through the Republican
National Committee to provide such staff as-
sistance and funds as may be necessary. As
Mr. Burch, himself, suggested, we regard this
role an implicit responsibility for him or
whoever may occupy his office in the future.
It will be the funption of the Republican
Coordinating Committee, composed of the 11
members of the joint Senate-House Repub-
lican leadership, the five living Republican
nominees for President, and five representa-
tives of the Republican Governors Associa-
tion to facilitate the broadest party repre-
sentation and the establishment of task
forces for the study and examination of ma-
jor national problems and issues. The re-
cruiting sources for these task forces, which
would report to the joint leadership, are
clearly delineated on the organization chart
which we are making public.
For the joint leadership, I have been asked
to add these two pertinent points: First, the
Republican National Chairman has been re-
quested to immediately invite the other par-
ticipants to join us in forming the Republi-
can Coordinating Committee. Second, we
are convinced that the Republican Party is
not only a great force in the American way
of life, but it is the only living political in-
strument which can make the American
dream a reality, not a mere collection of
words apd promises. Our only goal is re-
suits and we intend to achieve them.
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530 u CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE January 12
INTERVIEWS OF SENATOR CHURCH Question. There are some who argue that degree, committed this error both in South
CONCERNING VIETNAM even though the North Korean forces are Korea and Formosa.
much smaller, there is the vast army of Red Question. The dilemmas we seem to have
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, re- China just across the Yalu River. From that vis-a-vis South Korea and Formosa appear
cently, the Senate appointed the Senator point of view, wouldn't it seem advisable to to find their ultimate expression in the sit-
from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] a member of keep American troops in there? uation in South Vietnam. Wouldn't you
the Committee on Foreign Relations. Answer. If we Were to accept that premise, agree, Senator?
Senator CHURCH has made an excellent then it would follow that American troops Answer. Yes, I think that's so. Andhere
poi - must remain permanently on the 38th paral- again, it is a fact that we are in South Viet-
statement with regard to what our lel so long as Red China endures. I think nam only because the Communists refuse
icy should be in southeast Asia. that this is a faulty argument. It may lead to let the Saigon government alone. If they
I ask unanimous consent that this China, North Korea, and other Asian noun- were to call off the insurrection against that
statement, together with a number of tries to conclude that we are, in fact, inter- government and leave South Vietnam and
editorials from the New York Times of ested in maintaining some kind of perma- her neighbors alone, we'd be only too willing
December 28, 1964, the Evening Star of nent foothold on the Asian mainland. Re- to withdraw our forces from that region of
Washington, December 30, 1964, the St. member, we have a large and mobile military the world. Nevertheless, it may not seem
Louis Post-Dispatch of December 30, force on Okinawa, within easy striking dis- this way to many Asians. I remember spend-
tance of Korea, should another invasion ever ing some months in India during the Sec.
1964, the Salt Lake Tribune of December occur, Moreover, we could, if necessary, and World War. I had the oportunity to
31, 1964, the Idaho Statesman of De- leave a single regimental combat team, talk to Indian intellectuals and revolution-
cember 18, 1964, and the New Britain rather than two full divisions, on the line In aries. They made a sharp distinction be-
Herald of December 28, 1964, be printed Korea, which would be a sufficient "trigger tween me, as an American, and my English
at this point in the RECORD. force" to guarantee our renewed participa- friends. They understood that the United
There being no objection, the state- tion in the defense of South Korea, if the States had been the first colony to achieve
ment and editorials were ordered to be need were ever to arise again. But, no mat- Its independence from George III. They had
ter how one looks at it, there is no military read our Declaration of Independence; they
printed in the RECORD, as follows: requirement for keeping a whole American could quote passages from Thomas Paine,
[From Ramparts magazine, January- Army there indefinitely, in view of the pies- from Thomas Jefferson and from Abraham
February 19651 eut strength and capacity of the South Lincoln. But once I left their company and
INTERVrEW WITH SENATOR FRANK CHURCH Korean Army to defend their boundary line. went out onto the great flatlands of India
I think that if there is a basic fault with Question. If there is no military need for itself, and encountered ordinary Indian
our Asian policy, it might well be our failure the 55,000 troops, is there a possibility that people, it was apparent from the way they
to confine it to the practical limits of our there is a political need? treated all Americans, that they made no
power. We conquered the Pacific in the Sec- Answer. The only political reason for distinction between us and- the British. We
and World War, Afterward, the Pacific was maintaining so large an American army were all white men. To them, we all repre-
a very broad most. protecting the United there would be to assist in buoying up the rented Western imperialism. I'm afraik that
States against hostile encroachment. Had weak South Korean economy. But this is, in in South Vietnam today, there are a great
we established, as our westernmost rampart, itself, an admission of the failure of Ameri- many of the indigenous peoples who make
the island chain which rims the Asian con- can policy in Korea. Twelve years after the little distinction between our American uni-
tinent, and had we made it clear that we end of the war, South Korea is still a gar- forms and the old French uniforms, and
were prepared to meet-with our own mili- rison state, incapable of self-support, and therefore, we are once again faced with the
tary force-any hostile penetration of the each year it is necessary for the United States problem of making our position in Vietnam
Pacific, we would have established a bound- to give South Korea close to half a billion credible to the Asian people with whom we
ary line fully within our military power to - dollars in rations. We can't continue in- must deal.
maintain. The United States is essentially definitely to finance the South Korean na- Question. Then that raises probably the
a naval and aerial power, and there is no way tion and yet, we seem unable to find an al- most fundamental question of all. Should
for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us ternative to this dole. we have gone into South Vietnam in the
from the Pacific. The elephant cannot drive Question. Senator CHURCH, returning to first place?
the whale from the sea nor the eagle from the matter of the island string, what about Answer. Looking back upon it, I would
the sky. But it is also true that neither the our being In Formosa? Is this compatible say that Mr. Dulles was mistaken when he
whale nor the eagle can drive the elephant with traditional American policy in Asia? persuaded President Eisenhower that we
from his jungle. I think our failure to es- Answer. Of course, we are not in Formosa ought to intervene in South Vietnam after
tablish such an island rampart, conforming with a whole American army as we are in Ko- the French defeat. After all, the French
to the character of our military power, has rea. I think we were correct in giving for- had fought for years with an army of some
been a fundamental cause for some of the mal assurances to Formosa that we will de- 400,000 men in a vain effort to preserve
difficulties that now face us in Asia. fend her against Communist attack. Our French Indochina, and that proud army was
se commitment extends not only to the island defeated could not by be ragged overcome. guerrilla Nevertheless, forces which
Question. Senator CHURCH, you would re-
we did
strict American intervention to the defense of Formosa, but the Pescadores as well. I make that decision and we now have to live
of this string of islands. Is that correct? would view these islands as a part of the with it.
Answer. That might have been our pos- ocean rampart I previously mentioned, and
ture, but it has not been. well within the American military capacity Question. Thus far, the Saigon govern-
Question. If you are going to limit the line to defend. Our 7th Fleet is, indeed, the ment has not been able to win the war. Do
like that, how can you justify our presence shield for Formosa. My only criticism of you think that the war can ever be won?
in Korea, which is on the mainland? American policy in Formosa is that we have Answer. I really don't know. I think that
Answer. I think that we were right, in the helped to finance the maintenance of an we have to continue to honor our commit-
first instance, to intervene in Korea. An in- army for Chiang Kai-shek, which is twice ments to the Saigon government to make
vasion by North Korea had occurred, and we too big for the needs of the island's defenses sure that it has all of the weapons, the
undertook, in the name of the United Na- and not a tenth big enough to retake the equipment, food, and financial assistance
tions, to defend the independence of South mainland. So the policy has been unduly needed to carry on the war. We have given
Korea against that invasion. Many other costly for us, and at the same time, may well such help in massive quantity, and I think
countries joined us, at least in a token way, be giving China cause to suspect that we are that we must continue to do so.
to uphold the U.N. shield against an aggres- preparing Chiang Kai-shek to act as a spear- But in the end, the capacity of Saigon to
sion of this kind. Our mistake was not in head for an invasion of the mainland. I do win the war will depend on the cohesiveness
undertaking the defense of South Korea, but not regard this as our objective, but It may of public support that can be achieved.
in having remained there afterward longer seem so to the government of Red China. Some political stability will be essential.
than required. Today, for example, there Question. It might seem, from the two in- The people themselves must have the will to
still are 55,000 American troops on the 38th stances of South Korea and Formosa, that continue the fight. For nearly 20 years now,
parallel. From all appearances, they are per- we are trying to preserve an American grip fighting has been going on in this unhappy
manently entrenched as though the 38th upon Asia. Do you think Asians so view the region of the world. The people are weary
parallel had become an American boundary, situation? of war. If the spirit to fight on is preserved,
and this, despite the fact that the South Answer. It disturbs me that we may well we can provide the material aid necessary,
Korean Army has been equipped as a modern be creating such an impression even though and the war eventually can be won. To do
military force, nearly twice as large as the this is not, in fact, our objective. We fully this, I think South Vietnam must be sealed
North Korean Army which faces it. There understand the importance of credibility off from supplies from the north, both over
is no military necessity for so large a con- when it comes to our military forces. We the jungle trails and from the sea. But in
tinued American presence along the 38th take great precautions to make certain that the last analysis, victory or defeat will de-
pa:rall.el, and I think that we would give our nuclear deterrent is a credible one in pend upon the South Vietnamese people
added credibility to our oft-spoken purpose order to avoid a nuclear war through enemy themselves. The thing we must remember is
of leaving Asia for the Asians if we were to miscalculation. But we seem to give precious that there is no way for us to win their war
commence to withdraw American forces from little attention to making our diplomatic ob- for them. It is a guerrilla war, at root an In-
Korea. jectives credible. I think we have, to some digenous revolution against the existing gov-
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 531
ernment, the kind of war where it's exceed-
ingly difficult to tell the enemy from the
people. It can only be won by the people
themselves.
Question. When you say seal off supplies
to the Vietcong from North Vietnam and
from the sea, are you implying that the
South Vietnamese have sufficient military
capability to do this?
Answer. I think that it's possible for them
to accomplish this militarily, particularly if
we can bring about a joint military effort in
Laos which will interdict the Ho Chi Minh
trail. It's possible, also, that we can find
a role for the United Nations to play in
maintaining the integrity of the boundaries
in this area.
Question. Isn't it true that a lot of the
warfare is being waged by captured American
arms, with the result that the Insurrection-
ists are already rather self-sufficient?
Answer. Yes. It isn't well enough under-
stood that the war in the south cannot be
won in the north, even though it would be
helpful to out off the supply lines which
continue to give aid and comfort to the Viet-
cong. Basically, the Vietcong consists of
South Vietnamese; the bulk of their weap-
onry is captured, and they have the capa-
bility of maintaining their attacks, inde-
pendent of North Vietnam. Therefore, it's
folly to think that, by extending the war
northward, there is a way out for us. All
one needs to do is to look at the map to
see that this is the way in, not out, and that
the war can be more easily won, not by tak-
1ng on the whole North Vietnamese army,
but by confining it to the 25,000 hard-core
Vietcong that are involved in the south. If
they cannot be put down by the Saigon
government, with all of the aid and assist-
ance we are giving it, then our predicament
will only be worsened by extending the war
northward and increasing the enemy force
many times.
Moreover, let us remember that, within
the past 2 years, China invaded India. Also,
it was Red China that came down from the
north when she felt herself threatened by
approaching American troops in Korea.
Thus, there is little basis for us to assume
that China might not respond in like fashion
to Vietnam, if the war were to be extended
northward. Then, we would have the whole
of the Chinese army to contend with as well,
and we would be faced with a tragic trail of
casualties in this region of the world, out of
all proportion to the vital interests of the
United States.
Question. Assuming that South Vietnam
could be insulated and assuming further that
we kept pouring in more and more supplies,
what should be the policy of the United
States If this effort failed nonetheless, and
the war in South Vietnam could not be won?
Answer. I. would hope that we could then
find the maturity to accept that fact.
France did so, both here and in Algeria.
Algeria, incidentally, meant a great deal more
to the economy of France than Vietnam does
to ours. Besides, Algeria was for many years
considered a part of France where more than
a million Frenchmen lived. When, in the
end, the French Government found that
there was no way to put down the insurrec-
tion against it, that the will for independ-
ence in Algeria was irresistible, the states-
manship of De Gaulle made it possible for
the French to recognize the inevitable and
to make a peaceful settlement in Algeria.
This involved a French withdrawal.
Now, Soutli Vietnam has never been, nor
do we want it to be, an American possession.
It is alien to the United States in almost
every way, and it is as remote from the
United States as any country in the world.
If, despite all of its material advantages, the
Saigon Government can't prevail, because it
simply lacks the indigenous support of the
people of the country, then I would hope
that we would recognize that it is not our
country and never has been. The war is
there for them to win or to lose. If it is lost
and there is no way left to win it, we should
accept that fact.
Question. And by that, do you mean that
we should withdraw our support?
Answer. I think in that event, withdrawal
Would be forced upon us, for the Vietnamese
themselves would form some kind of govern-
ment which would invite us out. I hope it
never comes to that, but we must be prepared
for that possibility. ,
Question. Wouldn't it be possible, even
before that time, for the United States to
make certain diplomatic moves to support
the French proposals advocating neutrality
for all of southeast Asia? Wouldn't that
bring about a resolution of the problem, par-
ticularly as it wouldn't require withdrawal in
the face of defeat?
Neutrality for all of southeast Asia, for
the whole of that great peninsula, is a proper
objective, providing that it is not a camou-
flage for a Communist takeover. If we were
able to sustain the Saigon government suffi-
ciently long to permit it to win its war, or if
we were to stabilize the situation in this re-
gion in such a way that it would be possible
to go with some trump cards to the confer-
ence table, then I think we might reach an
international agreement, declaring this
whole region to be neutral, and requiring
the withdrawal of all foreign troops. We
could guarantee the integrity of that agree-
ment with our own military power. If it
were violated by invasion from China or any
other country, we could commit ourselves,
along with the other nations joined in the
international accord, to the maintenance of
its integrity.
Question. That would only guarantee ter-
ritorial integrity from external aggression.
How would that help in terms of internal
insurrection?
Answer. The only answer to Communist
subversion, burrowing from within a coun-
try, is to be found within that country itself.
If its government is a decent one and enjoys
general popular support, the internal Com-
munist problem can be successfully dealt
with. Malaya is a good example. There, a
few years ago, Communists undertook the
same kind of guerrilla war against the
Malayan Government as South Vietnam is
plagued with today. The same tactics were
used. The same dedicated, hard-core revolu-
tionaries were at work and, too, there was a
very large Chinese population in Singapore
which might have given shelter and support
to the Communist activity. Yet, Malaya was
able to deal with this problem, to isolate the
Communist guerrillas from the rest of the
population, and to stamp out the insurrec-
tion. Malaya had the kind of government
that enjoyed the confidence and support of
the people. The thing for us to remember is
that, unless the people themselves are will-
ing to rally behind their government, unless
they regard a Communist insurrection as a
menace to their own well-being, there is no
way that American forces can intervene to
save the day. If we move in and take over
in an effort to thwart the impending success
of a Communist insurrection, the Asian peo-
ples involved will forget entirely our good
motivation, and will come at once to regard
the war as one between a white Western
force on the one hand, and indigenous Asian
forces on the other. And there is no way for
us to win such a war on the Asian continent-
We have to recognize that the period of
Western occupation and control in Asia is
gone. It is now Asia for the Asians. Noth-
ing would be more futile than to permit our-
selves to be sucked into a war which would
pit Western forces against Asian forces, for
even if we were able, by brute musclepower,
to take a large chunk of Asian territory, we
could not stay there long. Our only harvest
would be implacable hostility on all sides
and the tides of history would, in the end,
wash over us. No lasting victory could be
achieved.
Question. Everything you say seems 'to
fit the situation in South Vietnam at the
time that we are talking. 'We have had, in
the last year or two, any number of regimes
in South Vietnam, plus a war that seems to
be hopelessly bogged down. Is it because
of the failure of the Saigon government, or
I should say governments, to fulfill the, needs
of the people?
Answer. I think that the Government in
South Vietnam has been incompetent, to say
the least. It must be viewed for what it is,
a military despotism. Communist North
Vietnam is also such a despotism, but this
hardly gives the people of South Vietnam
a clear-cut choice between free government
and tyranny. Nor should we think of this
war in terms of preserving a free economic
system against the imposition of a Socialist
system, for the fact is that both the Gov-
ernments are committed to socialism.
Question. Taking into consideration every-
thing that you've said so far about our policy
toward Asia, don't we face a rather difficult
future now that China is a nuclear power?
Answer. Yes. The situation will become
increasingly difficult once China has a nu-
clear arsenal. Of course, the recent detona-
tion of a nuclear device is significant in
terms of prospects, but the ultimate signifi-
cance will be realized, say, about 10 years
from now when the, Chinese will probably
have an effective nuclear arm. This would
change the power balance In Asia immensely,
and China might well seek to use her new-
found power to establish a hegemony over
southeast Asia, where China has traditionally
enjoyed a sphere of influence. I would hope,
by then, that we will have drawn our lines
in strict conformity with our vital interests,
so that we never find ourselves faced in
southeast Asia with the dilemma that con-
fronted Khrushchev in Cuba, when he was
compelled to withdraw under highly hu-
miliating circumstances, simply because his
gamble was not worth the candle. When it
comes to nuclear confrontation, countries
must make their stand conform to their
mortal interests. The stakes must be ab-
solute, for the consequences are too terrible
to permit the frivolous commitment of
nuclear weapons.
Question. In other words, once China has
atomic capability, any South Vietnam situa-
tion would be almost certain to end with
the humiliation of having to withdraw or
face a nuclear threat from virtually next
door. Is that what you are implying,
Senator?
Answer. Yes. Unless we look ahead and
undertake now to revise our policy in Asia,
we could face such a debacle some time in
the future.
Question. Assuming that China will have
a nuclear capability in the foreseeable fu-
ture, does this automatically imply that
China is going to take over all of Asia?
Answer. I wouldn't think so. Chinese
divisions decisively defeated the Indian
troops defending India 2 years ago, but
China recognized that the conquest of India
would not only strain her own resources to
the limit, but would also result in greater
problems for.her than solutions, and, there-
fore, elected-having shown her capabili-
ties-to withdraw her forces once more. In
the event that China establishes her own
nuclear arsenal, It is much more likely that
she will seek to create a sphere of influence
in southeast Asia, similar to the one the old
Chinese emperors once enjoyed, which would
leave other countries like Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, and Laos somewhat independent, even
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 12
though these countries may become Com-
munist in name. The important thing to
remember is that there is now an unraveling
within the Communist world. It isn't all
one great Red dominion as it appears on the
maps. Today, even those who would regard
it this way, concede that there are at least
two Romes, and Moscow and Peiping grow
increasingly hostile. Moreover, in Eastern
Europe we see the satellite countries assert-
ing their independence in more and more
obvious ways, striving with some success to
loosen the Rusisan grip upon them. The
point is, that the same unraveling process is
likely to occur in Asia as is now occurring in
Europe, and that these satellite countries will
become increasingly independent of domina-
tion from either Peiping or Moscow. Thus
it will become more and more possible for
us to establish our separate relationships
with them, as we are even now doing in the
case of both Poland and Yugoslavia.
One flinal question: vis-a-vis South Korea,
Formosa, and South Vietnam, we seem to be
in a position that can best be described as
involvement. If the world situation changes
or the war, for example, in South Vietnam
cannot be won, how can we prepare our-
selves as a nation, psychlogicaily and politi-
cally, for a change from involvement to
disengagement?
It's especially hard for a free, popular gov-
ernment to change course. We have a
tendency to oversell our policy with respect
to any given country in such a way that
public opinion hardens behind it, and then
it becomes very difficult to change course.
I think we have to find the statesmanship
to do this. It's possible that we have swung
on the pendulum of public opinion, from
the extreme of isolationism 30 years ago,
when the prevailing opinion in this coun-
try was that it didn't matter to us what
happened abroad, to the opposite extreme
where we regard it as an American respon-
sibility to maintain the governments of all
those countries that are now nominally non-
Communist. This, in a sense, is an imperial
attitude, even though we seek no possessions,
and even though we are not attempting to
impose American rule upon any of these
countries. However, unless we come to ac-
cept the fact that it is neither within the
power nor the interest of the United States
to preserve the status quo everywhere, our
policy is doomed to failure. Here again, the
requirement for statesmanship is very high,
but if we strive to inform the American
people of the upheaval and ferment of our
times, and if we give them all the facts, I
think the American people will be prepared
to support a flexible foreign policy, better
tailored to serve the real interest of the
United States in a changing world.
against the Vietcong and American aid to
wage it, no solution to the Vietnamese crisis
can offer much real hope.
Senator CHURCH deserves to be heard, not
only because he is a thoughtful voice but
because he has been right in the past on
Vietnam. In the autumn of 1963, when Sec-
retary McNamara and General Taylor were
giving out optimistic reports on the Diem
regime, Mr. CHURCH was publicly skeptical
and critical. He now argues that "neutrality
for all of southeast Asia is a proper objective,
providing that it is not a camouflage for a
Communist takeover." Senator MANSFIELD,
the Democratic majority leader, has taken a
similar line; but his colleague, Senator MON-
RoNEr, returns from an Asian tour convinced
that neutrality would be a mistake.
The proviso of keeping the Communists out
is all important. The basic objective of the
United States in southeast Asia is what was
called "containment" in 1954. The American
aim was to stop theCommunists from taking
over all Vietnam, and that is still our objet-,
tive. A true neutrality would serve that pur-
pose, but it is unrealistic to think that weak
nations on the fringe of Communist China
can preserve a Swiss-type of neutrality. A
Yugloslav-type, perhaps, but then the de-
finition of neutrality would have to be
stretched.
As Senator CHURCH points out in his Ram-
part interview, a number of Democratic Con-
gressmen are dissatisfied with the present
policies toward southeast Asia. The dilemma
is that no one has an alternate course to
suggest that does not involve the enormous
risks of an expanded war or an abandonment
of all our commitments in the area.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
Dec. 30, 1964]
SENATOR CHURCH CALLS FOR CAUTION
(By Max Freedman)
Senator FRANK CHURCH, a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, deserves the
highest praise for speaking so frankly, in
his interview with Ramparts magazine, about
the situation in Vietnam.
He has not ignored the hazards and humil-
iations that now face the United States; but
he has not advocated the abandonment of
South Vietnam to Communist domination
as an easy way for the U.S. Gdvernment to
escape from its growing difficulties.
He is ready to support military aid to
South Vietnma while its rulers and people
are willing to fight for their freedom. The
test of this willingness is to be provided not
by the wishes of Washington but by the
actions of Saigon.
One of the great misfortunes of the Unit-
ed States entanglement with Vietnam has
been the lack of clarity In defining long-
term purposes. Perhaps CHURCH Is right
in blaming the late John Foster Dulles for
making Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia so im-
portant to U.S. security. But CHURCH surely
will agree, on reflection, that the blame can-
not be carried by Dulles alone. The Dulles
initiative took place as long ago as 1954.
The U.S. absorption with the affairs of Viet-
nam has continued steadily.
Our military, economic, and emotional
commitment seemed to grow more intense
as our failure to control events became more
evident. President Kennedy did not reduce
former President Dwight Eisenhower's com-
mitment, he increased it; and President
Johnson is under growing pressure to in-
crease that commitment still further.
During all these years there has been no
critical protest in Congress, except by a few
notable Senators, at this enlargement of U.S.
risks and responsibilities. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara discouraged open debate.
They preferred to testify before secret con-
gressional committees. As the war continued
to go badly, there was a growing reluctance
to challenge U.S. policy in Congress. Respon-
sible Members wished to do nothing that
would endanger U.S. security or weaken the
fighting resolve of the hard-pressed Viet-
namese Government.
But CHURCH is not alone in thinking that
continued silence imposes greater risks on
the United States than a responsible chal-
lenge that will force this country, at a
calamitously late hour, to answer some hard
questions about its purposes in southeast
Asia.
In his interview, CHURCH has discussed
some of the first principles of U.S. policy
that should have been fully examined years
ago. In essence, he has asked two basic
questions. Has the United States made the
best use of its limited resources in the Pa-
cific? And has the United States assumed
more responsibility in southeast Asia than
can be justified by its own national interest?
Not everyolie will - agree with CHURCH'S an-
swers, but there will be wide agreement with
his contention that the present policy can-
not be continued without the gravest risks
for this country. He is even more opposed
to launching a war on North Vietnam.
CHURCH will no doubt take the first op-
portunity in the new session of Congress to
amplify his proposal for giving the United
Nations special duties for protecting a neu-
tralized southeast Asia. He recognizes, what
President Charles de Gaulle, of France, has
failed to admit, that these neutral borders
would soon fall under Communist control
unless they were placed under some kind of
supervision and protection. This means that
outside countries would have to assume eco-
nomic and military duties in southeast Asia,
under the guidance of the United Nations,
to prevent a Communist attack and to assure
the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
that their national independence would re-
main intact.
This theme, and similar proposals, will be
taken up by CHURCH and other Democratic
Senators in the new Congress. They do not
want to embarrass the Johnson administra-
tion. They want to save the country from
mistakes and perils in Asia that can yet be
avoided. The somber misfortunes in Viet-
nam assure that their criticisms and sug-
gestions will be more favorably considered by
the public now than In the past.
[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch,
Dec. 30, 1964]
A SENATOR ON VIETNAM
Senator CHURCH, of Idaho, made perceptive
comments on U.S. policy in South Vietnam
in an interview published in Ramparts maga-
zine. He is one of a small group of Demo-
cratic Senators who have shown growing un-
easiness over the course of events in Saigon,
and there is a belief in Washington that a
major discussion of foreign policy may be in
the making.
Senator CHURCH believes the United States
must continue to honor its commitments; he
does not advocate an immediate end of U.S.
economic and military support for the floun-
dering Vietnamese Government. He thinks
the United States should not have picked up
the burden of the defeated French in Indo-
china in 1954, but he recognizes that the
problem is not to deplore the past but to
decide what to do about the present and
future.
The Senator, a member of the Foreign Re-
lations Committee, advocates neutralization
for southeast Asia as a fair objective of
U.S. policy, and he hopes that the United Na-
tions can be brought into the picture as a
guarantor of national boundaries. He also
hopes the United States will never be forced
to withdraw, but he thinks "we must be pre-
pared for that possibility."
Anyone who reads the dispatches from Sai-
gon must share that feeling. The Commu-
nist rebels now are reported to control three-
[From the New York Times, Dec. 28, 1964]
A FRESH VOICE ON VIETNAM
Senator FRANK CHURCH, in his interview
with the liberal Catholic magazine, Rampart,
as said publicly what many U.S. officials are
saying privately about Vietnam. Mr. CHURCH
argues that the United States should never
have got in in the first place and, while
there is no immediate way out, the ground
should be laid for ultimate extrication.
The tough line Washington is taking in
regard to the military purge of the South
Vietnamese National Council would indicate
a belief that General Khanh's position is not
strong as he has made it out to be. His de-
finance of a few days ago has now been tem-
pered by 'a warm Christmas message to the
U.S. forces expressing "grateful appreciation"
for what the Americans are doing:
This represents no assurance, however, that
General Khanh will yield to American de-
mands. The political crisis in Saigon gives
many signs of being beyond repair. It can be`
papered over or it can be held down forcibly
by the military, but so long as the Buddhists
refuse to cooperate and oppose both the war
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
fourths of South Vietnam and half the peo-
ple; there have been six upheavals in the
Saigon government in the last 14 months. If
the South Vietnamese are to have any bar-
gaining power in a move for a new Geneva
conference or some sort of U.N. intervention
there is no time to lose-if, indeed, there is
any time left. A U.N. presence would be de-
sirable, but since Red China, not a U.N. mem-
ber, would have to participate in guarantees,
there are many complications.
Senator CHURCH is right when he says we
must find the statesmanship to change our
course, and must accept the fact that "it is
neither within the power nor the interest of
the United States to preserve the status quo
everywhere." We have failed to distinguish
the difference between our vital national in-
terests and our emotional commitments. A
constructive debate in this field might serve
the Nation well.
[From the Salt Lake City Tribune, Dec. 31,
1964]
ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IN VIETNAM POLICY
Amid the uneasiness and the welter of sug-
gestions as to U.S. policy in the long, drawn
out war in South Vietnam, one of the newest
voices is that of Senator FRANK CHURCH, Of
Idaho, who is becoming somewhat of a for-
eign policy figure in the Senate.
In a recent magazine article, Senator
CHURCH recommends the neutralization of
all southeast Asia and suggests that a role
be found for the United Nations as a guaran-
tor of national boundaries in that area.
Along with several other prominent mem-
bers of the majority party, Senator CHURCH
Is showing the restiveness that many Amer-
icans feel about the Government policy in
Asia generally and in South Vietnam in
particular.
SOME FAVOR WITHDRAWAL
Senators ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska, and
WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon, have favored with-
drawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam now while
Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana, the
majority leader, has indicated support for
the neutralization of South Vietnam only.
Another Democratic Senator, GEORGE D.
McGovERN, of South Dakota, has proposed a
14-nation conference to seek a political
settlement.
It is clear that the new Congress convening
next month will stage a major foreign policy
debate and that possibly the heaviest opposi-
tion to the administration's policies may well
come from Democrats.
Senator CHURCH'S recommendations de-
serve careful study. If the kaleidoscopic
changes of the government in South Vietnam
continue at the pace they have in recent
months and d if the most powerful figures,
militarily speaking, such as Gen. Nguyen
Khanh, continue to mutter about U.S. inter-
ference while demanding astronomical aid
for a war which is far from won (and, it
seems from all dispatches, pursued desul-
torily by the Vietnamese), then it may not be
a bad idea to throw the whole matter into
the hands of the Security Council of the
'United Nations.
ASSEMBLY'S VIEW
The U.N. General Assembly would, of
course, view the Vietnam struggle as a
"colonial adventure" by the United States,
thanks mainly to the new and excessively
touchy nations of Africa and Asia.
But, the Security Council could take up
the matter and possibly work out a solution
which, while it may not satisfy all conditions
of both sides in the dispute, could at least
bring the whole southeast Asian question
into the world forum, relieving this country
of the odor as well as the actuality
of dictating to the unstable politicians in
Vietnam.
One problem in the U.N. Security Council,
of course, would be the veto power of the
Soviet Union. However, it is not impossible
that, due to the rift with the Red Chinese,
the Russians would refrain from vetoing U.N.
action In Vietnam.
FOLLY TO ESCALATE
In his magazine article, Senator CHURCH
declared that it would be folly to escalate
the present military operations into North
Vietnam because such an expansion of the
fighting would inevitably bring Communist
China into the war.
This is probably true for Peiping is much
more aggressively doctrinaire than Moscow
and assumes the mask of protector against
white colonialism all over the world with an
unction which only deceives those who wish
to be deceived.
Yet the complete and immediate with-
drawal of all U.S. forces and aid from South
Vietnam would be a massive loss of "face" in
the Asian world (although what "face" is left
is certainly bruised and bloody).
So, the Senator from Idaho may have an
acceptable solution for the Vietnam dilemma
which President Johnson and his advisers
would do well to examine closely.
[From the Boise (Idaho) Statesman, Dec. 18,
1964]
CHURCH VIEWS THE FAR EAST
In the current Catholic laymen's maga-
zine, Ramparts, Senator FRANK CHURCH,
Democrat, of Idaho, gives an interview, stat-
ing: "I think that if there is a basic fault
with our Asian policy, it might well be our
failure to confine it to the practical limits
of our power."
The Senator, as a member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, looks back
and pinpoints mistakes: "We conquered the
Pacific in the Second World War. Afterward,
the Pacific was a very broad moat protecting
the United States against hostile encroach-
ment. Had we established, as our western-
most rampart, the island chain which rims
the Asian Continent, and had we made it
clear that we were prepared to meet-with
our own military force-any hostile pene-
tration of the Pacific, we would have estab-
lished a boundary line fully within our mili-
tary power to maintain."
That lengthy sentence sets the theme for
a present-day critique of our policies in the
Far East. Senator CHURCH finds the United
States still a major naval and aerial power
with no way for the landlocked forces of
Asia to drive us from the Pacific.
"The elephant cannot drive the whale
from the sea nor the eagle from the sky,"
CHURCH philosophizes with his usual elo-
quence. "But it is also true that neither
the whale nor the eagle can drive the ele-
phant from his jungle."
The Senator "might" restrict American
intervention to the defense of this string
of Pacific islands. How does that theory fit
in with our presence in South Korea?
He answers that the United States was cor-
rect in intervening in Korea, but erred in re-
maining there long after "our presence was
no longer required." He finds no military
necessity for so large (55,000 American
troops) a continued presence along the 38th
parallel and "I think we would give added
credibility to our oft-spoken purpose of leav-
ing Asia for the Asians if we were to com-
mence to withdraw American forces from
Korea."
The Idahoan would retain an American
regiment in South Korea. He believes the
present South Korean Army could defend
alone their boundary line.
Senator CHURCH views the island of For-
mosa and the Pescadores as being part of
the ocean rampart he has delineated.
As to South Vietnam, he thinks that pos-
sibly former. Secretary of State Dulles was
mistaken in persuading President Eisenhow-
er to intervene after the French defeat. The
Senator notes that France had an army of
533
some 400,000 men fighting in a vain effort to
preserve French Indochina.
The Senator declares the United States
must continue to honor her commitments to
the Saigon government, to make sure it has
all the weapons, equipment, food, and finan-
cial assistance necessary to carry on the war.
He is concerned about a lack of political
stability, a certain amount which will be
necessary for the South Vietnamese to pur-
sue their Communist invaders.
"To do this," CHURCH said, "I think South
Vietnam must be sealed off from supplies
from the north, both over the jungle trails
and from the sea. But in the last analysis,
victory or defeat depend upon the South
Vietnamese people themselves."
The Senator is critical of the South Viet-
nam Government, recalls its incompetency
and views it as a military despotism. "Com-
munist North Vietnam is also such a despot-
ism, but this hardly gives the people of
South Vietnam a clearcut choice between
free government and tyranny."
In other matters, Senator CHURCH consid-
ers the Far Eastern situation more complex
with Red China on the way toward becom-
ing a potential nuclear power. But he is
not forecasting that Red China will take
over all Asia. He cited the Chinese invasion
of India and the decisive defeat which the
Indian army suffered. "But China recog-
nized that the conquest of India would only
strain her own resources to the limit."
The Senator is correct when he acknowl-
edges no sure way for resolving the Far East
conflicts. His remarks in Ramparts were
scholarly and thought provoking. There is
no easy way out. The United States must
stand by its commitments and continue to
work for the cause of freedom.
[From the New Britain (Conn.) Herald,
Dec. 28, 1964]
DISINVOLVEMENT
A popular, young Senate Democrat who is
widely respected In both political parties had
some things to say in a just-published mag-
azine, interview which ought to set a lot of
Americans to thinking.
Senator FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho, writing
in the Rampart magazine, a Catholic lay-
man's publication, expresses the view that
the United States ought to be setting its
sights on getting out of southeast Asia. He
doesn't think that we, as a nation, ever
should have been in there in the first place.
What makes the Senator's view worthy of
more than passing comment is that it is a
position widely talked about privately in
Washington, seldom publicly.
His view is not simply a throwback to iso-
lationism. It is, rather, a carefully con-
ceived attitude which calls for gradual re-
duction of all foreign involvements through-
out Asia, and as a substitute therefore,
guaranteed maintenance of national bound-
aries through the United Nations.
In Vietnam, in particular, Senator CHURCH
feels that continuation of the present course
of guerrilla involvement is folly, leading no-
where. He believes that escalation of the
war would likewise be futile, leading to
dangerous possibilities. The United States,
he feels, ought to be making plans for grad-
ual elimination of its troops from South
Vietnam.
Likewise, he feels that continued main-
tenance of the Korean truce line by Ameri-
can troops is a situation which could go on
as long as China is under a Communist gov-
ernment.
The important part of his thesis is that
he would not simply have the United States
withdraw and create a power vacuum.
Rather, the United Nations would become
the guarantor of peace in that far-off conti-
nent.
The American people would not be un-
happy to learn of some alternative to the
Vietnam situation which does not call for
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534 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
expansion of the war or abandonment of our
commitments to the people of Asia.
[From the Lewiston (Idaho) Morning
Tribune, Dec. 21, 1964]
ANOTHER SETBACK IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Another military putsch, the latest in a
long series, has brought new upheaval to
the Government of South Vietnam, illus-
trating again the dilemma that faces Amer-
ican policymakera in Asia. American troops
are in South Vietnam to support the govern-
ment In a civil war with the Communist-
backed Vietcong rebels, but there is no real
government to support.
In its latest show of force, the military
junta which rules South Vietnam dissolved
the National Council, the country's legis-
lature, and set about arresting many of its
members. The civilian premier, Tran Van
Huong, seems not to have been deposed, and
the chief of state, Phan Kac Suu, was evi-
dently still in power Saturday night. This
doesn't mean a great deal, however, since it
is clear that the military chiefs could depose
either of them whenever they wished. The
situation does not encourage confidence in
the ability of the government to secure the
country against rebellion, and so long as the
government remains helpless there is little
the United States can do to help it save
itself.
South Vietnam has been without an effec-
tive government since the French were forced
to pull out. At no time have the South
Vietnamese people felt a national identity
with the government, and so it has been a
simple matter for the Communists to stir
up trouble in the villages. Senator FRANK
CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho, discussed the
problem in an interview published in this
newspaper yesterday. The only answer to
Communist subversion, burrowing from
within," CHURCH said, "is to be found with-
in that country itself. If its government is a
deecnt one and enjoys general popular sup-
port, the internal Communist problem can
be successfully dealt with * * *. The thing
for us to remember is that, unless the people
themselves are willing to rally behind their
government, unless they regard a Communist
insurrection as a menace to their own well-
being, there is no way that American forces
can intervene to save the day."
This is why CHURCH, Senator WAYNE
MORSE, and some others in and out of Con-
gross now consider American policy in Viet-
nam fruitless. We are caught in a civil war
on the ;side of a government which is barely
functioning and we find ourselves unable
to avoid taking sides in a religious conflict
between Buddhists and Catholics. What is
worse, as Senator CHURCH pointed out, we
are white people fighting against Asians in
Asia? and in the eyes of many Asians simply
carrying on where the French left off. And
our position there deteriorates with each
new demonstration of the government's in-
capacity to govern.
DEDICATION OF ARKANSANS TO
THE ARKANSAS RAZORBACK
FOOTBALL TEAM
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
people of Arkansas are warm, friendly,
and lighthearted about most matters,
but on one question we are deadly sera,
ous. Where the Arkansas Razorbacks
football team is concerned, Arkansans
have a dedication not unlike that of the
most fervent true believer.
As the only non-Texas team in the
Southwest Conference, we have the for-
midable prospect each fall of playing
seven Texas football teams; and as ev-
eryone knows, Texas football players, like
most things from that State, come pretty
big.
In less prosperous times when Arkan-
sas teams had all they could do to stay
in the league, Arkansas fans displayed
the dogged devotion which many be-
lieved to be the peculiar possession of
New York Mets followers. However, like
all things in Arkansas, the Razorbacks
in recent years have steadily risen the
ladder of success. This year this devo-
tion was repaid. We reached the top.
Last week the Razorbacks, who won 10
in a row in the regular season and de-
feated Nebraska in the Cotton Bowl,
were announced as the winner of the
Grantland Rice Award as the No. 1 team
in the country.
All of Arkansas is very proud of the
team which was not as ponderous as its
opponents and did not have any super-
stars in the lineup but which played each
game as a team and with steady im-
provement. Much of the credit for the
team's success must go to the student
body of the university and to the peo-
ple of the State who have given the
Razorbacks solid support. But to Coach
Broyles must go much of the credit for
having given the essential training and
having created the spirit in both the
players and the public.
Having played a little football at Ar-
kansas some 40 years ago, I can truth-
fully say this year's team is one of the
best ever, possibly the best-at least
since my last year on the squad.
To my colleagues from Texas I can-
not offer much hope for the future. All
reports indicate that our freshman team
is better than ever.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that an article from last night's
Washington Star about the selection of
the Arkansas Razorbacks to receive the
Grantland Rice Award be printed at
this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
AWARD COMPLETES ARKANSAS DREAM-IRISH
SECOND IN RICE VOTE
HONOLULU.-"I'm prouder than I've ever
been in my life," said Coach Frank Broyles
Wednesday on learning that his unbeaten,
untied Arkansas Razorbacks will receive the
Grantland Rice Award.
The memorial to the late sports-writing
great goes to the team rated No. 1 in the
United States by a five-man committee repre-
senting the Football Writers Association of
America.
"This is something I know the people of
Arkansas have dreamed about for a long
time," he said. "I know that this has to
be the proudest moment in the athletic his-
tory of Arkansas-for the players, the uni-
'versity, and our fans.
"They all rank No. 1," Broyles said.
Arkansas, the Southwest Conference
champion, defeated Nebraska, 10 to 7, in the
Cotton Bowl game for an 11 to 0 record.
Arkansas was the only major college football
team without a loss.
SECOND IN ASSOCIATED PRESS POLL
The Razorbacks finished second in the
final Associated Press football poll, which
was released before the bowl games. Ala-
bama, No. 1 in the last poll, lost in the
Orange Bowl to Texas, which was defending
national champion and No. 1 when it lost by
a point to Arkansas.
January 12
The Razorbacks received four first-place
votes and one for third. Notre Dame was
runner-up with five second-place votes.
Texas had one first-place vote and one third-
place vote for four points and Michigan re-
ceived three third-place votes for three.
Alabama Yeceived no votes for first, second,
or third place.
The five-man committee was composed of
Si Burick, Dayton News; Fred Russell, Nash-
ville Banner; Blackie Sherrod, Dallas Times-
Herald; Steve Weller, Buffalo Evening News,
and Paul Zimmerman, Los Angeles Times.
HULA BOWL COACH
Broyles is here to coach the South squad
in the Hula Bowl game, which has been won
every year by the North.
"The award is a great reward for this
Razorback team," he said. "The players ded-
icated themselves to this end after our vic-
tory over Texas. 1
"It required hard work, tremendous leader-
ship and unselfishness," Broyles said. "They
improved steadily each week and climaxed
the season with a championship drive in the
Cotton Bowl against an outstanding Ne-
braska team.
"We received the greatest support of any
team in America from our students and fans
throughout the State," he said. "I think it's
wonderful for our squad and the State. We
had such great effort all year long. I'm as
excited as everybody in Arkansas is."
CAN THE STATE LIVE ON CRUMBS?
Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, State
governments face what is probably the
worst fiscal crisis in their history.
Most State legislatures meet in odd-
numbered years. Before 1963 had ended,
no less than 35 State legislatures had
passed tax increases, estimated to raise
annual collections by $1 billion.
The revenue sources in many in-
stances are in direct conflict with Fed-
eral taxation.
In 5 years 1958-63, State and local
tax rates rose twice as fast as Federal
taxes.
State and local taxation is now in-
creasing twice as fast as income.
Since World War II Federal debt has
gone up only 20 percent-State and local
debt has gone up six times or 600 per-
cent.
John Anderson, former Governor of
Kansas, and past chairman of the Gov-
ernors' conference, has written a very
outstanding article on the problems of
Federal and State taxation. This article
appeared in the January 9 issue of the
Saturday Review. I ask unanimous con-
sent that it be made a part of these
remarks.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE CHALLENGE OF PROSPERITY: CAN THE
STATE LIVE ON CRUMBS? WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN WASHINGTON CUTS INTO THE PIE OF
LOCAL REVENUE?
(By John Anderson)
The choices which Americans must make
over the next 2 or 3 years concerning the
critical question of Federal-State fiscal rela-
tions will greatly affect the future nature of
the Federal system. The best way to begin a
consideration of Federal and State fiscal re-
lations is to sort out the salient facts about
Federal, State, and local governmental rev-
enues and expenditures. Some of these facts
are startling and all of them have serious
implications for the future. (By "serious"
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