THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170022-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

1965
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
be a median average of $2,500 more a year for
these veterans. Assuming even a very con-
servative average of 25 productive years from
these GI bill educated veterans, this means
an increased income of $62,500 in lifetime
.earnings.
Since about half of the eligible veterans
take advantage of their educational benefits
when offered, this means that we are passing
up the opportunity for 21/2 million veterans
to benefit the national economy as much as
$156 billion. The argument that "we can-
not afford the GI bill" ignores the future
benefits that would accrue through this
additional income. And it flies in the face
of all previous experience with the 01 bills.
Measured in another way, the GI bill has
been a large factor in providing this country
with its, essential leadership. Almost 10
percent of all U.S. Senators and 11.5 percent
of the Members of the House of Representa-
tives utilized their educational benefits under
the GI bill. Add to this two Cabinet. officers
and seven Governors and this single piece of
legislation has given a significant boost to
the quality of leadership which we have in
this country.
This impressive progress of the World War
II and Korean veterans underscores the prob-
lems cold war veterans now encounter.
These cold war veterans are the victims of a
great inequality; only 44 percent of the
draft-eligible men ever see active duty in the
cold war, and they are placed at a 2- to 4-year
disadvantage In. their competitive standing
with their peer group. These young men
enter the service unskilled and upon dis-
charge find themselves in the same plight-
untrained, unemployable, and unable to com-
pete for scarce jobs with the 56 percent of
their age group who do not see military duty.
Last year there was an increase of $2 mil-
liori in unemployment compensation paid
to veterans-a total of $96 million, which if
invested in education would have brought
profits to our country. The discouraging
aspect of this problem is that with the in-
crease in automation and the continued ne-
cessity for education, this situation shows
little prospect of improvement in the future.
The only solution is to provide these young
veterans with the means of escaping the
category of "uneducated, therefore unem-
ployable." We must provide the arms of
education, before we can expect this group to
take their place in the fight against unem-
ployment'and poverty.
It is essential for our Nation to provide
readjustment assistance to these veterans in
the pursuit of equality for all. These GI's
should be leading the war on poverty, instead
of being objects of it.
For these and many other good reasons, I
have joined 38 other Senators in cosponsor-
ing a cold war GI bill which would provide
readjustment benefits to our veterans similar
to those provided by previous GI bills. This
bill would assist our cold war veterans in ad-
justing from military service to civilian life
without the hazards of experimentation.
The bill is designed to render assistance to
veterans who have served in the military for
more than 180 days between January 31, 1955,
and July 1, 1967. As with former GI bills, it
is anticipated that the cost will be entirely
self-liquidating through additional taxes
paid by the veterans who benefit from the
bill. Hence the bill is not a bonus bill, but it
is readjustment training to help our veterans
help our country in the future as they have
done in the past.
Despite the fact that the cost of this bill
would be only three-fifths of 1 percent of the
total military budget, the Defense Depart-
ment.. and the bureau of the Budget have
joined forces in opposition to the bill. Their
objection is that the program would discour-
age military men from making a career out
of the armed services.
Besides lacking any proof for this assertion,
it fails to coincide with the fact that with
increased benefits a military career becomes
more attractive.
One of the major improvements of this bill
over previous GI bills is that a serviceman
does not lose his Cducational benefits be-
cause of extended service. Although that
was sometimes the case under other GI bills,
under the cold war GI bill a serviceman
does not face this choice just because he con-
tinues to defend,his country.
As this bill prepares our returning vet-
erans for better roles in our expanding econ-
my, it can make a major contribution for
furthering the progress of our country. It
is .inconsistent for the United States as an
international leader to boast of our defense
facing the Communists around the perimeter
of the free world, and then to cast our re-
turning veterans out upon society, unskilled,
uneducated, and unarmed for civilian pur-
suits.
In celebrating the 20th anniversary year of
the original GI bill, I think that the experi-
ence and principles of our Nation demand
that the cold war 01 bill be written into pub-
lic law by the hand of justice. I hope the
Congress enacts this act of justice.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
TUESDAY NEXT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that, when the
Senate completes its business today, it
stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock
noon on Tuesday next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AID
PROPOSALS
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I wish
to comment on the President's message
on foreign aid.
Our foreign aid program must be
founded, first, on the interests of the
United States-upon what it contributes
to our security and freedom, and the
security and freedom of other free coun-
tries. It embraces also our concern that
developing countries will be strengthened
in their independence and will be enabled
to raise the living standards of their peo-
ple.
I believe that the decisions and recom-
mendations of the President in his mes-
sage on foreign aid were based on these
premises, and could go far in removing
some of the defects of our foreign aid
program-defects which have brought it
to the Verge of rejection.
Among his important recommenda-
tions is the President's emphasis on aid
to Latin America. The security of the
Western Hemisphere is essential, and the
.Alliance for Progress expresses our tra-
dition of friendship for our neighbors,
and our shared concern in the living
standards of their people.
The President's recommendation that
greater emphasis be placed on multi-
lateral aid through the World Bank, the
International Development Association,
and the Inter-American Bank-to all of
which we contribute-reflects the grow-
ing recognition that these professional
organizations can make better judg-
ments on the value of specific projects,
and more effectively require self-help
and reform on the part of recipient coun-
tries, than can our Agency for Interna-
tional Development.
I also hope that AID will carry out his
recommendations that emphasis be
placed on the development of agricul-
ture, rather than industrial deevlopment,
in many of the countries which seek our
aid. For food is the first requirement
of any country in raising the living
standards of its people.
Even with the important improvements
that the President has recommended, I
hope very much that the President will
take other steps to assure that our aid
program is being used effectively. For,
if it is not effective, it is my belief that
this program will die.
Two years ago, a committee headed
by Gen. Lucius Clay made an examina-
tion of the foreign aid program in its
totality, and made many valuable recom-
mendations. But I do not believe that
the effectiveness of the program can be
assured until a further step is taken.
That necessary step is a searching exam-
ination of the program in specific coun-
tries, by committees composed of experi-
enced private citizens and members of
the AID organization.
I recognize that such examinations
could not be accomplished quickly, but
they could be started with respect to the
12 or 15 countries which receive the
major part of our aid, and in others
where there are specific problems which
I shall discuss.
Two years ago, Congress adopted an
amendment which I offered to the For-
eign Aid Act, recommending that these
specific examinations be undertaken.
The President noted his interest in this
recommendation in his message to Con-
gress last year. I have no doubt that it
will be implemented.
I make one further suggestion. It is
that the President shall not make avail-
able to other countries any further aid,
except to fulfill commitments and for
humanitarian purposes, until an assess-
ment of the effectiveness of our aid pro-
gram be made in a number of countries
receiving the major part of our foreign
aid. This would give an opportunity,
also, to withhold aid from those coun-
tries which are using their resources,
supplemented by our foreign aid, to pro-
vide weapons and supplies to others for
aggressive purposes, and from those
countries which condone the destruction
of our property, or its seizure without
provision for payment.
To withhold aid for a time, and I mean
a considerable time, until this assess-
ment is made, would not, as some coun-
tries claim, be an interference in their
internal affairs, or the offer of aid "with
strings." It is our program, and the
resources of our people that are
extended.
We Nave the right to insist that our
aid be used properly, and that the United
States be treated with respect. With-
holding aid to all countries for a time,
until we know that it is being used ef-
fectively, would let all countries know
that our aid program, established for
good purposes, is our program, and not
theirs; that it is not fair to our people
who must pay the bill, or to their people
whose welfare is its object, unless it is
used effectively; and as a nation which
has shown restraint and decency in -its
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 15
international relations, that we have the
right to expect the same treatment and
respect.
I have always believed that a President,
at the beginning of his administration,
has the great opportunity to break away
from old molds and establish policies
that will be more effectiveand will assert
the dignity as well as the good purposes
of our policy. I shall never forget the
statement made to me years ago by the
former Premier of Italy, Mr. DeGasperi,
who, in speaking of our foreign aid pro-
grain, said :
No other country in all the history of the
world could do, or would do, what the United
States is doing.
I have confidence that the President
is moving to make our foreign aid pro-
gram effective and consonant with its
purposes and with the dignity of the
United States.
I repeat my chief recommendation:
that, with the exception of commitments
which we have made, and for humani-
tarian purposes, we should not extend
any further aid to any country until an
assessment is made of the effectiveness of
the program in the countries which are
receiving the major part of this aid, and
in those countries which are condoning
the destruction of our property, and
which will not adhere to the inter-
national standards of conduct and de-
cency to which our country adheres.
I thank the Senator from. South
Dakota [Mr. McGovEizul for his courtesy
in yielding to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bux-
nicix in the chair). The Senator from
South Dakota is recognized.
N P
SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I
want to take a hardheaded, realistic look
at the situation in South Vietnam. It is
somewhat puzzling to me that the terms
"hard line" and "soft line" seem to be
reversed when we get over to the other
side of the world. Those who discount
the present and offer only hopes for the
future are considered "hard" whereas
those who look at the actual situation and
point to the present map of Communist-
controlled areas of Vietnam are accused
of following a "soft line."
So far as I am concerned, it is both
hard-in the sense of being difficult-
and hardheaded-in the sense of being
realistic-to admit honestly to ourselves
what the facts are in Vietnam.
We are not winning in South Vietnam.
'yVe are backing a Government there that
is incapable either of winning a military
struggle or governing its people. We are
fighting a determined army of guerrillas
that seems to enjoy the cooperation of
the countryside and that grows stronger
in the face of foreign intervention,
whether it be from the Japanese, some 20
years ago, the French, in the 1940's and
1950's, or from the United States.
In this circumstance, expanding the
American military involvement is an act
of folly designed in the end to create
simply a larger, more inglorious debacle.
For nearly a quarter of a century,
southeast Asia has been torn by military
and political conflict. First was the Jap-
anese invasion of World War II. Then
came nearly a decade of struggle with
the French, culminating in the collapse
of the French Army at Dienbienphu
in 1954.
The French lost the cream of their
army-a force which reached 400,000
men--in an unsuccessful effort to re-
establish French control over Indochina.
U.S. aid to the tune of $2 billion financed
80 percent of the French was effort.
Then came the gradually deepening
American involvement in southeast Asia
in the 10 years after 1954 following defeat
of the French.
American expenditures in Vietnam in
addition to $2 billion in aid to the French,
now approach $4 billion and, according
to Defense Department figures, 248, and
perhaps a total of over 300 Americans
have died since 1964 trying to counsel
and assist the Vietnamese' forces.
It should be recognized, in the interest
of truth, that, unlike the Japanese, who
came to conquer southeast Asia, and the
French, who set out to reestablish colo-
nial control, we seek neither conquest
nor colonies.
Yet we are further away from victory
over the guerrilla forces in Vietnam to-
day than we were a-decade ago. The re-
cent confrontation of the Vietcong Com-
munist guerrillas and the South Viet-
namese Army at Blain Gia was a painful,
dramatic demonstration that the strug-
gle is going badly for our side. Govern-
ment prestige was hurt seriously in that
battle. Communist stock has gone up.
Concerned Americans are asking, "What
has gone wrong?" and it seems a fair
question.
In my judgment, the first answer is
that South Vietnam is not basically a
military problem but a political one.
Neither the Diem regime nor its succes-
sors has won the political loyalty and
active support of the people of South
Vietnam, especially those who live out-
side town and city limits.
There are rarely military answers to
political dilemmas of this nature. Just
as the multilateral force plan in Europe-
a military gimmick designed to create
closer political unity in nuclear policy-
has not -achieved its objective-in the
last few days the Turks have announced
their withdrawal from participation in
any such scheme-so military proposals
in South Vietnam, whether for special
forces, strategic hamlets, insurgency
programs, or more suitably designed air-
planes are not likely to overcome the
political weaknesses of the existing
South Vietnamese Government. Even
the sophisticated weapons of the nuclear
age cannot overrule the basic precepts of
successful government.
This Is a political problem, and it is a
South Vietnamese problem. The United
States can accomplish much through
foreign aid and military support, but we
cannot create strong, effective and popu-
lar national leadership where that lead-
ership either does not exist or does not
exert itself. That is not only expensive
and impractical, it is just plain impos-
sible.
For 9 years the United States helped
the Diem government, to the tune of $3
billion.
I will not chronicle in detail the years
of Diem's rule, the achievement of some
measure of economic stability, but the
increasing political disaffection. That
disaffection was encouraged, of course, by
North Vietnam but basically Diem's own
arbitrary rule made possible Vietcong
gains. The very fact that Vietcong
strength was and still is greatest in the
Mekong Delta and around Saigon-more
than a thousand miles away from North
Vietnam-indicates that there is basic
popular support for the guerrillas among
the South Vietnamese peasants.
It is not isolationism, either of the old
variety or the' new, to recognize that
U.S. advisers, however able, are sim-
ply no substitute for a competent and
popular indigenous government. It
is not idealism either; it is simply real-
ism.
Only the Vietnamese themselves can
provide the leaders and the sustained
support to defeat the Vietcong. The
United States can at most only hold a
finger in the dike until the South Viet-
namese find themselves.
Therefore, even at this 11th hour,
when there is mounting pressure to in-
crease U.S. troops in South Vietnam and
step up aid policies, we must be hard-
headed realists.
Americans In Asia are basically aliens,
of a different race, religion and culture.
Moreover, the Vietnamese are national-
istic and race-conscious in their outlook.
As one on-the-scene observer pointed out,
out, "If you Imagine a Chinese sheriff
speaking Cantonese and trying to keep
order in Tombstone, Ariz., in its heyday,
you will begin to get the problem."
More Americans, over and above the
25,000 now in South Vietnam, would not
mean more success because victory in
the Vietnam countryside depends on ac-
curate intelligence information, peasant
support and `quick action by Vietnamese
troops. These factors cannot be con-
trolled by Americans. They must de-
pend on the South Vietnamese.
We must recognize that fact.
I recently spent a long and interesting
evening with an astute observer of the
Vietnam struggle who argued that vic-
tory is possible with a proper military
formula. American military advisers in
South Vietnam, he said, are highly able
men who know how to win a guerrilla
war. They have tried without success to
persuade the South Vietnamese army to
engage in night patrols against the Viet-
cong. They have urged small, fast mov-
ing units to attack the enemy directly
with small arms rather than relying so
heavily on artillery, airpower and large,
cumbersome forces. But, said my friend,
the South Vietnamese leaders and mili-
tary.forces will not accept this formula
for victory.
Granted that my friend's analysis may
be correct, this is still basically a political
problem. If we are unable to persuade
the Vietnamese to take either the mili-
tary or nonmilitary steps necessary to
insure the defeat of the Vietcong, we are
indeed confronted by a dilemma that will
not respond to larger imports of arms
and advisers.
The more Americans are brought in to
do what should be the responsibility of
the Vietnamese Government, the greater
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,1965 . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
one can predict, will be the tendency of
the Government to rely on U.S. advisers
rather than on able Vietnamese, the
greater will be the prestige of the Viet-
cong and North Vietnamese for holding
at bay not merely their own countrymen
but also the gathered might of the United
States and, finally, the greater will be
the grassroots reaction against Ameri-
.cans, In theory, our Government has
recognized that the South Vietnamese
bear primary responsibility for the war
and civilian policies. In practice, Amer-
icans have assumed roles of increasing
influence and leadership with slight mili-
tary gains but disturbing deterioration
on the local political level.
Personally, I am very much opposed to
the policy, now gaining support in Wash-
ington, of extending the war to the
North. I am disturbed by the recent re-
ports of American air strikes in Laos and
'North Vietnam.
Attacks an North Vietnam will not se-
riously weaken guerrilla fighters a thou-
sand miles away, fighters who depend for
80 percent of their weapons on captured
U.S. equipment and for food on a sym-
pathetic local peasantry. The principal
foe is not the limited industrial capacity
of North Vietnam, nor the North Viet-
namese who have remained at home, and
have not become involved in the conflict
in the south, nor even their training
camps and trails. The target is the 30,-
000 individual guerrilla fighters from
North and South who have no trouble,
apparently, finding sanctuary within
South Vietnam or the neighboring states
of Laos and Cambodia. Bombing North
Vietnam is not calculated to reduce their
determination, but undoubtedly it would
antagonize many other Asians and could
easily lead to increased Red. Chinese in-
volvement in the whole Indochinese
peninsula.
We might easily be confronted by the
large and well-trained forces of North
Vietnam, and perhaps the legions of Red
China that took such a heavy toll of lives
in the Korean conflict.
The present strength of the North Viet-
namese army, an army that is thus far
not involved in the conflict in the south,
is twice that of the Japanese forces which
overran all of southeast Asia during
World War II. These are tough, disci-
plined fighters-tough divisions which
defeated the large veteran French army
at Dien Bien Phu over 10 years ago.
So, Mr. President, it seems to me that
the most practical way, if we are to take
further action in Vietnam, is to put pres-
sure on North Vietnam quietly through
infiltration and subversion by South
Vietnamese units, The aim of any such
infiltration should not be military vic-
tory. but bringing Ho Chi Minh to the
negotiating table.
. The most viable and practical policy
for, the United States in Vietnam is ne-
gotiation and a political settlement. Un-
til such time as negotiation is possible
and settlement can be devised which will
not surrender South Vietnam to commu-
nism, the United States would doubtless
not find it feasible or desirable to with-
draw. If necessary, we can maintain our
military position in Vietnam indefinitely,
since it is essentially a policy of holding
the cities while taking whatever attri-
tion is possible of the guerrillas in the
countryside. But the aim of that policy
must be seen as a prelude to diplomatic
settlement and not an occasion for war
against North Vietnam, or even worse,
against Red China, with all the dangers
that holds for our_o*n security and for
the peace of the world.
There are many ways to approach such
a diplomatic settlement. Last August,
during the Bay of Tonkin crisis, I sug-
gested that we might take up French
President de Gaulle's proposal for a 14-
nation conference, including the United
States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France,
China, Malaya, Thailand, Laos, Cam-
bodia, Burma, Canada, Poland, India,
and North and South Vietnam. More
recently, the noted columnist, Walter
Lippmann, raised the possibility of a Con-
gress of Asia, dealing not only with Viet-
nam, but also with other problems re-
lating to the stability and progress of
Asia. _ The groundwork for any such
gathering would have to be carefully laid,
of course. Therefore, for the present, it
would seem that the first step should
probably be informal approaches to the
interested nations and preliminary pri-
vate talks. It is my understanding that
it was in some such fashion that the con-
ference of 1954 was created.
What are the objectives or terms on
which we might be willing to put an end
to fighting in South Vietnam? If mili-
tary victory is impossible-and I am not
talking about the stalemate in which we
are presently involved, that we could
probably continue for some time to
come-but if a clear-cut military victory
is impossible, we can only settle on the
kind of terms that would be generally ac-
ceptable to ourselves to North Vietnam,
and to other countries which have an
interest in this area. We cannot simply
walk out and permit the Vietcong to
march into Saigon.
The minimum terms which might be
acceptable on both sides would probably
include:
First. Closer association or confedera-
tion between North and South Vietnam,
not under a unitary Communist govern-
ment from the North, but with local au-
tonomy for the South as well as the
North.
Second. Renewed trade and rail links
between North and South Vietnam, which
admittedly would be most useful to the
North where there is a pressing need for
the food grown in South Vietnam.
Third. Cooperative planning to benefit
North and South Vietnam from the Me-
kong River development. For the South,
it would mean primarily flood control.
For the North, now outside of this
promising Mekong watershed, it could
mean valuable hydroelectric power for
the industrial sector of the North.
Fourth. Neutralization of North and
South Vietnam, meaning specifically
guarantees that foreign troops and mili-
tary advisers would gradually be elimi-
nated as the situation permits.
Although this is a key point, it would
not by any means eliminate all U.S.
military forces from Asia nor would it
bar AID and other civilian advisers. At
the same time it would represent some
771
protection to North Vietnam from the
North as well as the South, which should
be attractive to them.
Fifth. Establishment of a United Na-
tions presence or unit in southeast Asia
with the right to enter every country in
the area to guarantee national borders,
to offer protection against external ag-
gression, and insofar as possible to in-
sure fair treatment of tribal and other
minority groups within the boundaries of
a given state.
Would such terms be acceptable to
North Vietnam? Why, someone might
ask, should Ho Chi Minh settle for even
half a loaf if he sees the prospect for
ultimate victory or thinks the United
States might soon be ready to pull out,
if he resists any efforts at all toward a
negotiated settlement?
Actually, North Vietnam cannot bene-
fit, any more than South Vietnam, from
a prolonged conflict. I would hope that
we would be prepared to wage such a
conflict rather than to surrender the
area to communism. The north has
much to fear from any spread of the war,
even subversion or infiltration. The
North Vietnamese know very well what
happened to the people and resources
of North Korea during that war. Even
though the fighting was not on their ter-
ritory, neither was the subsequent U.S.
assistance which helped rebuild the war
torn areas in the south. The economic
burden was devastating both in North
Korea and in North Vietnam.
Moreover, although Ho Chi Minh of
North Vietnam is closely allied to Red
China in what probably amounts to a
marriage of convenience, the Vietna-
mese have for centuries regarded the
Chinese with suspicion and even out-
right hostility and strong resistance.
Obviously, Peiping's desire to exert
control over Indochina runs directly con-
trary to all Vietnamese ambitions.
Escalation of the war by the United
States, on the other hand, would make
North Vietnam increasingly dependent
on Red China and would strengthen, not
Ho Chi Minh's influence, but, rather,
would strengthen the influence of Mao
Tse-tung in southeast Asia.
In fact, apart from Red China, no
nation, North Vietnam included, has any-
thing to gain from a long drawn out and
inconclusive, struggle in Vietnam. Only
Red China gains from continuing the
present confusion and weakness in Viet-
nam. Only Red China gains, in time
and resources, so that it will be better
able at some future time to exert its in-
fluence in southeast Asia.
France, for example, with considerable
property and economic investment in
North Vietnam, is eager for peace, put-
ting economic stability ahead of almost
any political consideration.
Great Britain, with a conflict looming
between Malaysia and Indonesia, has
never really endorsed U.S. policies in
South Vietnam.
Even the Soviet Union can be expected
to give quiet support to policies designed
to prevent expansion of fighting and to
reduce Peiping's influence in southeast
Asia. New links both economic and
diplomatic, between Moscow and Hanoi
in North. Vietnam are now being forged.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 15
Moscow's influence could well be thrown,
as it was in 1-954, at the time the French
left Vietnam, toward a negotiated settle-
ment In -southeast Asia.
The United States certainly is not
anxious for broader commitments on the
Asian mainland, but the key element in
U.S. thinking is whether such a settle-
ment would pave the way for Communist
takeover in South Vietnam or elsewhere.
To that question, I recognize, there
can be no simple answer, for the answer
would depend on the abilities of the
South Vietnamese to form a government
with popular support and with the abil-
ity to cooperate in some fields with the
North Vietnamese without losing their
own independence.
To be realistic, any settlement in the
foreseeable future will have to replace
the present hostility between the North
and the South, with greater economic
cooperation and more political accept-
ance.
The policies and directions that Viet-
nam takes will depend on the character
of the leadership from Saigon as well as
Hanoi. The United States can help that
leadership in a number of ways, but in
this nationalistic day - and age, the
United States cannot offer American
leadership or American soldiers as a sub-
stitute for popular and effective govern-
ment from Saigon.
THE MESS IN VIETNAM WORSENS
STEADILY-IT IS HIGH TIME
THAT WE WAGED PEACE
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, since
I first spoke in this Chamber on March
10, 1964, analyzing in detail the U.S. posi-
tion in South Vietnam, the situation
there and our position there has steadily
deteriorated.
I said at that time, as I said repeatedly
since that time and as I repeat now, the
United States should take the most hon-
orable route and employ the most effec-
tive means from the standpoint of U.S.
prestige to disengage ourselves from our
unilateral military foray in South Viet-
nam and withdraw our so-called advisory
but actually combat troops there. But,
in any event, get out we should and must,
and stop both our killing and the killing
of our American boys.
In my speech on March 10, 1964-10
months ago almost to the day-I pointed
out:
President Johnson, let me repeat, inherited
this mess. It was not of his making. As he
approaches the difficult task of making the
necessarily hard decisions with respect to the
problems In South Vietnam, problems cre-
ated long before he was President, he should
feel no compunction to act in such a way as
to justify past actions, past decisions and
past mistakes. He should feel entirely free to
act in such a manner and to make such de-
cisions as are calculated best to serve the
interests of the United States and the free
world-a world changed greatly from the
time President Eisenhower and Secretary
Dulles initiated our southeast Asia policies.
From March 10, 1964, until the close of
the 2d session of the 88th Congress; I
repeated my admonitions on the floor of
the Senate with respect to our steadily
deteriorating legal, military, and moral
position in South Vietnam.
I pointed out that we were "going it
alone" there with our SEATO allies con-
spicuous by their absence. I pointed out
repeatedly that Australia, France, New
Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the
Philippines, Thailand, and the United
Kingdom had no fighting forces in South
Vietnam-as we had-as thinly disguised
"advisers" I emphasized the fact that
many of our growing number of so-called
advisers were right In the thick of
battle fighting and being wounded and
being killed in unfortunately growing
numbers.
I have stated repeatedly that the legal
position of the United States supporting
our being in South Vietnam lacked sub-
stance and foundation. Our claim has
been that we are in South Vietnam at the
behest of the legally constituted Govern-
ment of South Vietnam, irrespective of
the fact that that Government has owed
Its continued existence on U.S. sup-
port and despite the fact that we have
been actively taking sides in what is In
reality a civil war. Of course, events of
the last few weeks raise serious doubts as
to whether we are actually in South Viet-
nam with our arms and military equip-
ment at the Invitation of the duly consti-
tuted Government of South Vietnam
since we cannot tell, from day to day
and from hour to hour who or what is the
duly constituted legal Government of
South Vietnam. As a matter of fact we
now seem to be engaged inheated dis-
cussions controverting the claims of
highly placed Vietnamese as to what
constitutes their legal government. In
fact we seem unable to get along with
the various governments that we help
install despite lavish aid and blandish-
ments.
I have repeatedly referred to our ob-
ligations under the Charter of the United
Nations to bring the South Vietnamese
situation to the attention of that body.
Thus I stated:
There are ways to a peaceful solution in
Vietnam and in all southeast Asia if we would
but pursue them.
Last fall, when there was before this
body a broad, blank check resolution on
the crisis in southeast Asia, I voted
against that resolution, explaining my
position, in part, in the following words:
By long established practice, the Execu-
tive conducts the Nation's foreign policy.
But the Congress and particularly, by con-
stitutional mandate, the Senate has a right
and duty in these premises to "advise and
consent." Especially is this true when It
is specifically called upon by the Executive
as is the case now, for Its participation in
momentous decisions of foreign policy.
Therefore we in the Senate would be derelict
in our duty if we did-not Individually express
our views if those views embody doubt or dis-
sent. and where a vote is called for, to cast
that vote as our conscience directs.
As early as March 10, nearly 5 months ago,
I took the floor and in an address of con-
siderable length urged that the United States
get out of South Vietnam, at least to the
extent of participation by our soldiery. Since
that time, I have discussed U.S. participa-
tion In this area of the world repeatedly. I
have stated and restated my view that this
was not our war; that we were wholly mis-
guided in picking up the burden abandoned
by France 10 years ago after the French had
suffered staggering losses running into tens
of thousands of French young lives and vast
sums of money to which the United States
contributed heavily, and thereupon entering
upon a policy which would be bound to
result, as it has resulted, in the sacrificing
of the lives of our young Americans in an
area, and in a cause that in my reasoned
judgment poses no threat to our national
security.
Mr. President, since the Congress ap-
proved the southeast Asia resolution, the
situation in South Vietnam has gone not
only from bad to worse, but from worse
to still worse.
In an excellent summary of the present
"Shameful Mess" in South Vietnam,
Richard Starnes, writing in the Wash-
ington Daily News on January 4, 1965,
states:
There are, sadly, times when such terrible
risks must be taken. The Cuban missile
crisis was one such time, for it threatened
the very existence of the American Nation.
No such threat exists In South Vietnam.
The fact that the Vietcong are Communists
does not make the war any less a civil war.
Talk that we are fighting to keep a foothold
on the Asian mainland makes no more sense
than the Soviet gibberish that it was in-
stalling defensive missiles in Cuba. It is
equally indefensible.
American interests In the Western Pacific
can be handsomely garrisoned from Okinawa,
the Philippines, and South Korea. There
is no more military rationale for risking war
over South Vietnam than there is moral or
legal justification.
President Johnson needs to remind him-
self of Clemenceau's dictum that war is too
important a concern to be left in the hands
of generals, and he needs to find the courage
and statecraft to extricate us from the
shameful mess we are in in southeast Asia.
I ask unanimous consent that the en-
tire article by Mr. Starnes be printed at
the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
McNAMsRA in the chair). Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, our
strained situation In South Vietnam
causes us to assume a strained posture
with respect to our allies and to make re-
quests of them which are not to their
advantage and which will ultimately
prove to be to our disadvantage.
Those able political observers and com-
mentators, Robert S. Allen and Paul
Scott, writing in the Anchorage Daily
Times on January 2, 1965, report:
At least five Latin American countries are
being strongly urged by the United States tc
send token military or economic units to
strife-lacerated South Vietnam.
The article goes on to name the coun-
tries being strongly urged by the
United States to send military or eco.
nomic aid to South Vietnam as Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.
That list is obviously incomplete, since
earlier this week I read where Uruguay
was sending a token force to South Viet-
nam, so obviously that country had also
been strongly urged by the United States
to show the flag in South Vietnam.
Yesterday's Washington News carried
a report that Argentina, at the request of
the United States has agreed to send a
medical team, medicine, sanitary equip-
ment, and food to South Vietnam. It
should be noted that the report specifi-
cally states that this contribution was
made at the request of the Government
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1965,
of the United States not the Government
of South Vietnam, whatever that may
be.
I ask unanimous consent that the en-
tire column by Allen and Scott be printed
at the conclusion of my remarks, since
what they report is highly significant.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mc-
NAMARA in the chair). Without objec-
tion, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in
the first place it should be noted that
they report that it was the Government
of the United States and not the Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam that was
"strongly urging" our Latin American
neighbors to send the flag to South Viet-
nam. It is difficult to understand the
legal right which the United States pro-
fesses to exercise in extending an invita-
tion to the Latin American countries to
join us in the fighting in South Vietnam.
Even the fact that the U.S. representa-
tives in South Vietnam could not deter-
mine which was the legally constituted
Government in South Vietnam when it
was determined to approach the Latin
American countries does not clothe us
with any legal right to extend such an
invitation, unless we are publicly pro-
claiming that the United States is in
fact the Government of South Vietnam.
We should at least have kept up the
pretense and made certain that the in-
vitation to the Latin American countries
to participate in the civil war in South
Vietnam was issued in the name of the
Government of South Vietnam.
In the second place, the pressures ex-
erted by the United States on our part-
ners in the Alliance for Progress will se-
riously retard the Alliance and will cast
doubt upon its very objectives.
Our neighbors to the south need to de-
vote all their energies and resources, to
their economic development. They have
a long way to go in correcting the social
and economic inequalities with which
they are beset. Our efforts should be
devoted to convincing them that they
should begrudge every single dollar spent
in their military budgets since such ex-
penditures are economically unproduc-
tive. We should not be encouraging
them to spend additional funds in the
empty gesture of "showing the flag" in
a war not of their concern waged thou-
sands of miles away. Such activities are
counterproductive even if the United
States offers to pay the cost of such a
"token" show of force. The money could
better be spent on the construction of a
new school or a new clinic, both of which
are sorely. needed in every country.
There is much which we must expect
our partners in the Alliance for Progress
to do to aid in their economic develop-
ment. _ We cannot and should not add to
the burden of the obligations which they
must assume by calling upon them, in
however small a way, to engage in ex-
traneous and unnecessary military ac-
tivities,
In his state of the Union message,
President Johnson pledged that he would
"steadily enlarge our commitment to the
Alliance for Progress as the instrument
of our war against poverty and injustice
in. the hemisphere." It is difficult for me
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
to see how embroiling our partners under
the Alliance can in any way further our
commitment to help them wage war
against "poverty and injustice in the
hemisphere."
But, Mr. President, we are dealing in
South Vietnam with more than U.S. dol-
lars and U.S. military equipment. The
war in Vietnam is costing the United
States dearly in killed and wounded
American military men, for, despite
whatever labels may be attached to them,
they are in the frontlines fighting the
Vietcong.
According to an Associated Press dis-
patch from Saigon appearing in the Jan-
uary 6, 1965, Washington Star:
The United States suffered nearly twice as
many battle casualties in South Vietnam in
1964 as in the 3 previous years combined,
official sources announced today.
I ask unanimous, consent that the en-
tire item as it appeared in the paper be
printed at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HARTKE in the chair). Without objec-
tion, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, trans-
lated into concrete figures, in the 3-year
period from 1961 through 1963, 107
American servicemen were killed in the
war in South Vietnam. In the last year
alone, more men were killed-136-than
in the previous 3 years. The ratio for
men injured last year was even worse. In
the 3 previous years, 615 men were in-
jured. Last year, 1,037 American fight-
ing men were injured.
It is extremely unfortunate when a
single American military man is killed in
the steamy jungles of South Vietnam
fighting in a civil war for a people most
reluctant to fight in a cause which can-
not be settled by arms, but can only be
settled politically, and cannot in any
event be settled by the United States act-
ing unilaterally.
But to suffer almost 1,800 casualties
there is a national disgrace.
Even worse, the killings and the
woundings continue almost daily. To
what end?
Consider the lives that would have
been saved and the number of men who
could have been saved from battle
wounds if the advice I have given over
the past several months had been heeded
and the South Vietnam mess had been
taken to the conference table.
In his state of the Union message,
President Johnson-explaining why we
are fighting South Vietnam-stated:
We are there, first, because a friendly na-
tion has asked us for help against Commu-
nist aggression. Ten years ago we pledged
our help. Three Presidents have supported
that pledge. We will not break it.
I will not at this point discuss this
interpretation of the pledge given 10
years ago or the implications of our being
put in a position of agreeing to fight
communism at the time and on the bat-
tlefield of their choosing anywhere in
the world.
I will say that there is nothing incon-
sistent with this pledge-even as inter-
preted by President Johnson-and the
course of action I have strongly advo-
cated of taking the conflict in South
773
Vietnam to the conference table. Even
if our pledge of assistance to South Viet-
nam is interpreted as meaning that we
agreed to send our fighting men to die
in South Vietnam, even if we overlook the
fact that the conflict is a civil war, never-
theless our pledge cannot and must not
be interpreted as meaning that we
agreed to continue a futile military ef-
fort until the United States had con-
quered South Vietnam and the last Viet-
cong had been wiped out.
We can keep our pledge to South Viet-
nam by seeking to bring peace to that
beleaguered country via the conference
route as well as by force of arms. This
we should do without delay. I can well
see the U.S. military forces taking part
in peacekeeping efforts in South Viet-
nam under the aegis of the United Na-
tions. That is the only way American
men and American arms should be used
there.
Since I first spoke out on this issue, my
mail has been exceedingly heavy on this
subject. The astonishing thing is that
this heavy mail is running well over 100
to 1 in favor of my stand. The mail has
come from all over the United States and
from people in all walks of life.
I ask unanimous consent that a sam-
pling of these letters be printed at the
conclusion of my remarks, together with
certain selected articles and editorials
from various newspapers and periodicals.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 4.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, ear-
lier in my remarks, I quoted from an ar-
ticle by Richard Starnes, entitled
"Shameful Mess," but I did not quote
the first four paragraphs which now
have assumed a new pertinence which
they did not have when the article was
printed 10 days ago.
The four paragraphs read:
The pretense of legality cloaking American
intervention in southeast Asia grows more
threadbare with every passing hour.
U.S. aircraft are preparing to launch
strikes agianst parts of the miscalled Ho Chi
Minh Trail that cross Laos, in clear violation
of the Geneva accord of 1962, which we
signed.
The 1962 pact, which undertook to neu-
tralize Laos, prohibits introduction of for-
eign regular and irregular troops, foreign
paramilitary formations, and foreign mili-
tary personnel into Laos.
Our excuse for this calculated violation of
a solemn covenant is that North Vietnam vio-
lated it first. Even if this is true, it reveals
a corrosive cynicism on the part of the one
nation on earth that has always preached the
rule of law in international affairs.
Mr. President, the disastrous conse-
quences of the escalation of the war,
which is only now revealed to the Ameri-
can people because of the loss of our jet
planes, as well as its futility, is further
discussed in another article by Richard
Starnes in the Washington News of Jan-
uary 15, entitled "Raising the Ante." I
ask unanimous consent that it be in-
serted in the RECORD at this point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
RAISING THE ANTE
(By Richard Starnes)
Whatever else may be said about the U.S.
twilight war in Laos, it needs to be pointed
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 15
out that it has conspicuously failed to ful-
fill Its announced mission.
Bombing of Communist supply trails and
depots in Laos was proposed (proposed after
it was already underway, as it turns out)
as a means of stifling the flow of arms to the
Vietcong. This in turn was to reduce their
ability to fight, and thus make them recep-
tive to some species of negotiated settlement.
It has been revealed now that raids against
Vietcong supply lines have been in progress
since June. There has been no diminution
of the Communist guerilla war potential dur-
ing that time. Indeed, even the eternally
optimistic Pentagon line has been modified
to admit now what every honest correspond-
ent has known for 2 years-that the war is
going very bady indeed for our side.
As a consequence it is not even possible
to argue that this extension of war in south-
east Asia has the virtue of success. Raids in
Laos apparently have been on a small scale,
but experience in Korea taught that even
large-scale air bombardment did not sig-
nificantly reduct the enemy's ability to sup-
ply his troops.
This was understood, of course, before the
first sortie was flown. Why, then, take the
risks inherent in extending the war? And
why further mortgage American prestige by
an act that is clearly In violation of the
1962 Geneva accord on the neutralization
of Laos, which the United States and 13
other nations signed? The agreement spells
out a clear prohibition against warlike acts
based in or carried out against Laos, and
we are in clear violation of it.
The argument cannot be advanced that
we have had to meet new aggression; the
Laos supply routes were in use in 1962, when
we signed, just as they are now. The only
thing that has changed is the United States
willingness to honor a solemn covenant.
The reason for this extraordinary-and
extraordinarily dangerous-move is not hard
to find. It is a manifestation of the grow-
ing mood of frustration in the Nation's $50
billion a year Defense Establishment. We
cannot endure the knowledge that our costly
war machine may be defeated by barefooted
irregulars. We will, in the phase currently
favor in the Pentagon? raise the ante. Make
it tough and expensive enough, this reason-
ing goes, and the enemy will quit.
Unfortunately for our side, the lessons
of history do not support this rationale any
more than they support the efficacy of aerial
interdiction of supply. We made it expen-
sive in Korea, and the enemy saw our raise.
It appears that half a year of raising the
ante in Laos has had the same effect, since
it has been half a year of almost unbroken
Vietcong successes.
The trouble with raising the ante, to con-
tinue the poker analogy, is that the game
stands in serious danger of turning into table
stakes-that is, the players bet everything
they can lay hand to. What is our response
to be 6 months hence when it becomes clear
that we have been called and we will have
raise again or get out of the game?
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I
hope that President Johnson and his
advisers will read these paragraphs, take
them to heart and move, instead of in
the direction of escalating or even main-
taining the war, in the direction of all-
out effort to promote peace by negotiat-
ing. Why not enlist the United Na-
tions?
We have not yet made that effort. We
have not tried to take the matter to the
conference table. We have not used the
provisions in the United Nations Char-
ter which spell out clearly half a dozen
methods which are the legal and moral
obligation of the signatories of that
charter. It is high time that we use
them and stop the killing of Vietnamese
men, women, and children and of Ameri-
can boys.
ExHmIr 1
[From the Washington Daily News,
Jan. 4, 19651
SHAMEFUL MESS
(By Richard Starnes)
The pretense of legality cloaking American
intervention in southeast Asia grows more
threadbare with every passing hour.
U.S. aircraft are preparing to launch strikes
against parts of the miscalled He Chi Minh
Trail that cross Laos, in clear violation of
the Geneva accord of 1962, which we signed.
The 1962 pact, which undertook to neu-
tralize Laos, prohibits introduction of for-
eign regular and irregular troops, foreign
paramilitary formations, and foreign military
personnel into Laos.
Our excuse for this calculated violation of
a solemn covenant is that North Vietnam
violated it first. Even if this is true, it re-
veals a corrosive cynicism on the part of the
one nation on earth that has always preached
the rule of law in international affairs.
Leaving for the moment the moral and
legal character of our resolve to enlarge the
war, we find that the more practical aspects
of the decision are no more durable. The
theory (which even our most ardent war
hawks cannot really believe) is that bombing
the Ho Chi Minh trail will somehow per-
suade North Vietnam and Communist China
to withdraw support from the Vietcong in-
surgency that is winning South Vietnam.
There are three tragically dangerous fal-
lacies involved here-fallacies that could cost
a great many young American lives.
Fallacy No. 1: That any amount of bomb-
ing (short of laying a massive radioactive
carpet across the waist of the peninsula)
would be effective. Korea proved that no
amount of conventional bombing could di-
minish the enemy's ability to supply his
troops. There is, moreover, not one shred of
credible evidence that the bulk of munitions
used by the Vietcong originate in the north.
At the outset, the Vietcong used crude home-
made weapons, but the bulk of their arms
now are captured or otherwise acquired from
the woefully inept defenders of South Viet-
nam.
Fallacy No. 2: On no evidence at all, the
proponents of escalation insist that this
demonstration of Western armed power
would create an atmosphere in which nego-
tiations for peace could be undertaken from
a position of strength. This reasoning sim-
ply won't float, for it assumes that North
Vietnam and Red China would be willing
to do what we ourselves are so unwilling to
do-that is, negotiate from a position of
weakness.
Underlying all else is fallacy No. 3: That
the insurgency in South Vietnam is primarily
an external war of aggression. Again, there
is no real evidence of this. The war is
nurtured and encouraged by North Viet-
nam, to be sure, but there is no assurance
that Hanoi could stop the war even if it so
willed.
In Korea we hypnotized ourselves into be-
lieving that Communist China would not
enter the war. We are now in the process
of repeating this catastrophic piece of self-
deception. On past performance, Red China
is calculated to respond in kind if the United
States falls into the trap of stepping up the
war in Southeast Asia. It is a mistake to
assume that this would simply result in an-
other Korea. It would result in something
infinitely worse, for we are now dealing with
a Communist China that has the bomb.
Thus the smallest increment in the war
contains the frightful seeds of nuclear holo-
caust.
There are, sadly, times when such terrible
risks must be taken. The Cuban missile
crisis was one such time, for it threatened
the very existence of the American Nation.
No such threat exists in South Vietnam.
The fact that the Vietcong are Communists
does not make the war any less a civil war.
Talk that we are fighting to keep a foothold
on the Asian mainland makes no more sense
than the Soviet gibberish that it was Install-
ing defensive missiles in Cuba. It is equally
indefensible.
American interests in the western Pacific
can be handsomely garrisoned from Okinawa,
the Philippines, and South Korea. There is
no more military rationale for risking war
over South Vietnam than there is moral or
legal justification.
President Johnson needs to remind him-
self of Clemenceau's dictum that war is too
important a concern to be left in the hands
of generals, and he needs to find the cour-
age and statecraft to extricate us from the
shameful mess we are in Insoutheast Asia.
ExHIBrr 2
[From the Anchorage Daily Times, Jan. 2,
19651
SOUTH VIETNAM PUZZLE
(By Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott)
WASHINGTON.--At least five Latin American
countries are being strongly urged by the
United States to send token military or eco-
nomic units to strife-lacerated South Viet-
nam.
They are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru,
and Venzuela.
Other South American nations reputedly
are under similar backstage pressure, but
this has not yet been positively established.
The five definitely known to be im-
portuned are among the leading bene-
ficiaries of U.S. aid. Latest available official
figures show that since 1946 they have re-
ceived the following huge totals:
Brazil, more than $2.25 billion. This does
not include $1 billion in new credits the
United States took the lead in arranging last
month, with several other NATO countries,
to enable the reform regime of President
Humberto Branco to combat soaring inflation
and other grave economic disorders.
Chile, upwards of $850 million, with new
large-scale aid proposals pending.
Colombia, more than $550 million, with
additional grants and loans under considera-
tion.
Peru, upwards of $500 million, and like the
others seeking more funds.
Venezuela, around $350 million, of which
more than $317 million has been in loans
and only $18 million in outright grants.
Since 1962 this oil-rich nation has received
less than $10 million in U.S. aid.
All these countries are markedly cool to
getting involved in the increasingly chaotic
and unpredictable South Vietnam conflict.
They are displaying distinct reluctance to
dispatching even token forces, such as med-
ical or logistic units, or teachers, agricul-
tural experts, and technicians-as the State
Department has pointedly "suggested."
Various objections are being raised, fore-
most among them lack of funds to meet the
considerable cost of "showing the flag" in
distant southeast Asia.
The United States countered by offering
to foot the bill.
Presumably that would include financ-
ing transportation, pay, maintenance, and
other charges.
These urgent backstage exhortations and
proposals are in striking contrast to the ad-
ministration's cold shouldering of offers
from three U.S. Allies in the Far East to
send thousands of combat troops to South
Vietnam.
South Korea, National China, and the
Philippines expressed readiness to send some
50,000 fully equipped and trained fighting
men.
In each instance, they were turned down.
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1.965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
The official explanation was that employ-
ment of these Asian battle forces would seri-
ously risk escalating the conflict into a major
war. Secretary Rusk asked the three allies
to dispatch instead noncombat elements,
such as medical and logistic units.
All three have complied.
Another baffling South Vietnam enigma is
the role of Thrich Tri Quang, leading Bud-
dhist who was given refuge in the U.S. Em-
bassy in the 1963 struggle with the late
President Ngo Dinh Diem.
U.S. Intelligence has flatly tagged Quang
as an agent of Communist North Vietnam
acting on instructions from the Hanoi regime.
Yet Quang is a key adviser of both Maj.
Gen. Nguyen Khanh and Buddhist mem-
bers of the civilian council that was abolished
by the so-called young turk generals with
Khanh's backing.
Quang also has been consulted by Deputy
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on estab-
lishing a stable government in Saigon.
Early last fall former Ambassador Henry
Cabot Lodge visited a number of NATO capi-
tals seeking assistance for South Vietnam.
He undertook this mission as the personal
emissary of President Johnson.
Lodge's results were virtually nil.
None of the European allies offered any
personnel. The only contribution was a small
regime in West Germany.
In the Washington diplomatic corps, one
explanation being discussed for the admin-
istration.y apparent strong desire for Latin
American representation in South Vietnam
is to broaden the Western base in prepara-
tion for shifting this tortuous problem to the
United Nations.
Such a move, it is pointed out, could be the
prelude to negotiations to neturalize not only
South Vietnam, but Laos, Cambodia, and
Thailand under "U.N. guarantees."
Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Averall
Harriman reputedly favor such a solution of
the whole southeast Asian problem.
Rusk is credited as having discussed this
with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in
their series of Washington and New York
talks last month. Rusk is said to have
stressed the administration is willing to agree
to coalition governments in these countries
in which Communists would participate.
Also to allow Soviet economic missions and
advisers to operate in these countries.
ExHIRrr 3
[From the Washington Star, Jan. 6, 1965]
U.S. CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM RISE
SAIGON.-The United States suffered nearly
twice as many battle casualties in South
Vietnam in 1964 as in the three previous
years combined, official sources announced
today.
A total of 1,173 U.S. battle casualties were
reported for 1964, including 136 killed. The
combined figure for 1961, 1962, and 1963 was
615 casualties, including 107 killed.
During the last year, the U.S. Army suf-
fered 1,009 casualties, the Navy 25, the
Marine Corps 39 and the Air Force 100.
Fourteen American servicemen were listed
as missing in action for 1964.
ExHrsrr 4
CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
Ithaca, N.Y., August 9, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Please accept my
sincere congratulations and my strong sup-
port for your vote against the southeast
Asia resolution,
I am not at all sure that the interests of
.our country are best served by our being
No. 10-14
involved in Vietnam. Your vote, expressing
some serious doubts about this entire mili-
tary enterprise, was extremely heartening.
What is it that makes so many of the deni-
zens of Capitol Hill so bellicose? Nowadays
I find myself worrying less about the military
and more about the military-minded civil-
ians-who rattle their paper sabers with such
frightening displays of toughness. I am fully
persuaded that it takes a lot more courage
not to be "tough" nowadays.
Your vote represented more than your
Alaska constituents last week.
Sincerely yours,
ANDREW HACKER,
Associate Professor.
BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.,
August 11, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am writing this
letter to you to commend you on your
thoughtful and sensible comments on the
threatening situation in southeast Asia.
Though extremists may criticize your point
of view, time will prove that your recom-
mendations for a peaceful solution are the
only course to follow if mankind is to sur-
vive.
Sincerely yours,
WALTER BRIEHL, M.D.,
Lieutenant Colonel, Medical Corps, U.S.
Army Air Force (Inactive).
BERKELEY, CALIF.,
August 8, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Applaud courage and good sense in posi-
tion against Vietnam resolution.
Mr. and Mrs. WILLIAM PITT,
Department of Mathematics,
University of California.
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
August 8, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Although I am
not one of your constituents, I would like to
commend you for your courageous stand in
voting against the recent resolution on Viet-
nam. I am not a pacifist (absolute style, I
mean) nor am I a Communist sympathizer.
But everything I read (e.g., your fine article
in Fact) leads me to conclude that we are
acting stupidly and dangerously over there.
Cordially,
PAUL E. MEEHL.
Same to Senator MORSE.
WILLAMINA, OREG.,
November 28, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We were glad to
receive your reply and learn that you received
many letters in support of your opposition to
our policy in Vietnam.
I do not know when this will reach you or
if you will be in a position to act upon it
when it does, but in any case I feel I must
write. The point is that with Maxwell Taylor
in Washington, D.C., and conferences sched-
uled, it would seem that in all probability
important decisions will be made this week
concerning our war in Vietnam. If there is
anything you can do to influence our turning
the whole thing over to the U.N., I am
writing to urge you to do so.
Respectfully yours,
TACOMA, WASH.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Keep up the
fight on double standard of assistance. I
hope the new Congress heeds your advice and
cuts most of this foolish foreign aid.
As for the Vietnam war, I'm totally on your
side. I think we have no business there at
775
all especially losing American lives. I agree
with you completely that the Vietnam affair
is an internal affair of that nation. Let the
Communist have it, and let us use the funds
wasted there to rebuild and develop Alaska,
further education throughout the United
States, and the other so much more worthy
and necessary causes-checking mental re-
tardation, juvenile delinquency, etc.
ANDREW Was. VACHON, S.J.
DULUTH, MINN.
DEAR SIR: I understand you voted against
the recent Vietnam resolution. Thank you.
I agree that it's not worth our lives and
money.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am writing to
commend you for your lonely struggle against
the horrors and imbecilities of America's
current military program in Vietnam. It
is indeed a lamentable fact that men in your
position must deal with a public opinion
that, for the most part, is dreadfully mal-,
mis-, and downright un-informed about the
events and issues in question. Following its
present course, this American military pro-
gram seems in exorably destined to result in
another unfortunate (and eventually highly
unpopular) war with China. If that should
happen, your present stand will, of course, be
vindicated and this same public opinion will
(just as monolithically, no doubt) howl for
an end to the slaughter. Even if you happen
to be "wrong" in regard to Vietnam, and this
does not appear to be the case, I salute you
for your courage.
Very truly yours,
T. G. POWELL.
-? BROOKLINE, MASS.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to com-
mend you for your good stand for the with-
drawal of troops from Vietnam. I have al-
ready written to the Senators and Congress-
men from my State to use their influence for
such withdrawal.
Yours truly,
CELIA BARAP.
SAN DIEGO, CALIF.,
August 12, 1964.
Senator EaNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Although your
vote against the President's plan for retalia-
tory action in Vietnam was in a pitiful, and
to me strange, minority, you were, in a man-
ner of speaking, voting for me, even though I
be a Californian, and I am writing to thank
you for that vote, and to assure you that
there are many others who are not your con-
stituents who are grateful to you for your
stand.
Sincerely yours,
ST. MATTHEW'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH,
Louisville, Ky., August 5, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I have just read
your article in the recent issue of Fact mag-
azine. It is one of the few stories about
Vietnam which I have read which makes
any sense to me.
Now we are having a flareup on account
of attacks on our destroyers. It is inevitable
that there should be such crises as this from
time to time as long as we are messing
around over in South Vietnam.
I am writing Senators COOPER and MORTON
today to tell them that I, for one, am in
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 15
you expressed.
Gratefully yours,
BAYSID:E, N.Y.,
August 8,1964.
Ron, ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I read in the
New York Times that you were one of the
two Senators voting against the joint reso-
lution approving President Johnson's actions
in the Vietnam crisis.
While the voice of wisdom is thus reduced
to a small whisper, I believe, nevertheless,
that it will be heard throughout the land.
If, by some miracle, we are spared the dread
horrors of universal atomic war, the credit
should, in a large measure, go to you and
Senator MORSE who have been consistent in
counseling moderation.
Geographically, you are thousands of miles
away from me and I will never be able to
express my thanks for your refusal to be
bulldozed Into conformity by voting for your
reelection. However, I am proud that in the
Senate there are, even now in the time of
hysteria, two men who think independently
and vote according to their conscience. This,
I ant sure, is a good omen for our future
and that of the world.
Respectfully yours,
MOUNT RAINIER, MD.,
August 13, 1964.
Ron. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Your courageous
vote on the President's declaration concern-
ing Vietnam is appreciated by ever American
citizen who is concerned with the moral
basis of U.S. policy. Your action in this
matter is what true patriotism is all about.
Sincerely,
OAK PARK, ILL,,
August 11, 1964.
Senator GRUENING of Alaska,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to thank
you and praise you for voting against Presi-
dent Johnson's resolution last Friday.
I have recently visited Taiwan, Malaysia,
Thailand, Burma and other spots in the Far
East and Middle East and I feel very deeply
that we are following a precarious and pro-
vocative course in that part of the world.
It is tragic that a great Nation such as the
United States of America could be so misled
as to accept and approve such a resolution
with only two dissenting votes. You should
be proud to be one of the dissenters. I
would like to join you.
May your reward be great as I am sure it
will--if not in this life and time, in some
future life.
Best wishes for your continued success
and your good influence.
Sincerely,
HELEN R. LAUGHLIN.
THE WISCASSET INN,
Wiscasset, Maine, August 9, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: This is a short
note to say bravo for your stand against gun-
boat diplomacy in southeast Asia.
May you win over many to your cause.
Sincerely,
FANNY VENTADOUR.
DENvER, COLO.,
August 11, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We wish to com-
mend you for voting against supporting the
President in the southeast Asia situation.
Your forthright stand on important issues
Is very much appreciated.
We are very much alarmed at the possi-
bility of spreading nuclear weapons and urge
you to do all possible to get a full debate in
the Senate on a concurrent resolution dis-
approving the agreement to permit NATO
countries to share nuclear information.
Sincerely yours,
Mrs. DOROTHY JACOB.
Mrs. ANN BEATTY.
Mrs. ANNE R. ROBNETT.
MISS SONIA Gi9'IEBURG.
NORTH WHITE PLAINS, N.Y.,
May 7, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to let you
know that I support your efforts to find a
peaceful solution to the costly and unjust
war in Vietnam. I urge you to use your in-
fluence to set up procedure for negotiations
to enable the termination of U.S. military
involvement.
Respectfully yours,
EVELYN MALKIN.
RADBURN, FAIR LAWN, N.J.,
August 7, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Good for you,
That was a brave vote against warmaking
power for President Johnson. I hope you
keep on fighting against the dirty business
in southeast Asia, which can result only in
disaster for us. Honest history will vindicate
you.
BURLINGTON, VT.,
August 10, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
SIR: This is to express sympathy with your
stand on Vietnam and admiration for your
courage in opposing endorsement of the
President's actions.
With every good wish.
Yours sincerely,
ROWENA P. ANSBACHER,
H. L. ANSEACHER.
PHILADELPHIA, PA.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Please keep up
your valiant opposition to further U.S. mili-
tary involvement in Vietnam.
With gratitude and respect,
LUCY P. CARNER.
Los ANGLES, CALIF.,
August 8, 1965.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Was. ington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I Wish to COm-
mend you for your courage in voting against
the resolution giving war powers to the Pres-
ident in Vietnam.
I know it was not easy to go against the
tide of hysteria on this issue, but I am glad
you did, and I am sure that someday the his-
torians will say you were right.
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
MARION, IOWA,
August 5, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I read your ar-
ticle on Vietnam in the July-August issue of
Fact, and so glad you wrote it. Am so afraid
this war will continue in the north of Viet-
nam and on into China. This dirty war
could easily get us into nuclear world war
III.
Am sorry there is not more debate as to
the advisability of continuing this war
which was never declared.
Thanking you for the article.
Sincerely,
PORTLAND, OREG.,
September 24, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thank you for
your stand on Vietnam, calling for negotia-
tions instead of military force.
Sincerely,
Mrs. MILDRED MONROE.
EMBARRASS, MINN.,
August 8, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR: I am glad to see that the gentle-
man from our newest State expressed reason
and a value for human life in the vote on
the resolution regarding the President's
action in Vietnam.
One voice may no longer matter in affect-
ing the policies of this country, but I wish
you to know that I admire your courage, and
support your stand.
Sincerely,
AUGUST 10, 1964.
SENATOR GRUrijNING: We feel thankful for
your stand against American aggression in
Vietnam.
MICHAEL LURIE.
CANANDAIGUA, N.Y.,
July 28, 1964.
Hon. SENATOR GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We commend
the efforts you are making by speaking out
aganist the consequences of our U.S. policy
in Vietnam. We agree that there can be no
winning of this kind war, and that there are
terrible dangers from the possibility of its
escalating into something that no one, in-
cluding the Chinese and the North Viet-
namese; would want, but might be forced
into. The more weapons we send to Viet-
nam, the more we are outfitting the guer-
rillas; they seem to have captured so many
of our modern weapons-in fact, seem to get
few from other sources in comparison.
If you and others can put pressure on our
Government to stop wasting our money in
this fashion, and to make a big, sincere ef-
fort to influence other countries in finding
some way to work toward neutralizing the
area, we will find our prestige in the eyes of
the underdeveloped countries but also Rus-
sia, France and others will be increased.
And the South Vietnamese people will fight
harder with us if they know there is a goal-
a possibility of peace-before they are an-
nihilated or decide to join the Communists.
Yours very sincerely,
Mrs. WALTER GRUEN,
LANESBORO, MASS.,
August 8, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Your forthright
stand against the extension of the U.S. mili-
tary involvement in southeast Asia has been
repeatedly noted and appreciated in the last
several years. I am indeed impressed by the
simple clarity of your statements in this re-
gard. You-show an ability, all too rare these
days, to rise about parties politics and sec-
tional interests and even above selfish na-
tionalism to see what is right. This is states-
manship and I commend you for it.
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 777
We are waging a losing battle for a lost
cause, even a wrong cause, in southeast Asia.
I am heartsick that there are so few voices
,courageous enough to speak out aganist this
latest form of economic imperialism-but
proud indeed that there are these few.
-Congratulations and thank you-you
speak for many of us.
Respectfully yours,
Mrs. ROBERT M. POLLOCK.
Senator GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR: Thank you for your
courageous stand. Would we had many more
like you. '
ST. PETERSBURG, FLA.,
July 27, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SENATOR: Permit me to commend
you for your forceful, forthright opposition
to our part in the "dirty war" in South Viet-
name, t, too, am opposed to our interven-
tion in that country's internal affairs. It is
bound to hurt our prestige in southeast
Asia as well as in the United Nations. I
have received documents regarding this mat-
ter from other Members in Congress. After
reading them, I have passed them an to
other voters in this area. I never throw
anything in my wastepaper basket like that,
and find that most Americans are glad to
read about the war in South Vietnam. I
hope that our Government will find ways to
withdraw our Armed Forces from South Viet-
nam without losing too much "face."
Thank you again for your opposition to the
'(dirty war" in South Vietnam. I hope your
efforts will be successful, at least in educat-
ing the citizens of the United States. Good
luck and best wishes to you;
I am,
Very truly yours,
'EDWARD K. FIELD.
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
May 23,1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING: -We fully support
your stand on nonexpansion of the fighting
in southeast Asia and particularly South
Vietnam.
It now seems that the United States will
soon commit itself to even more extensive
military action in this area. Continued in-
volvement can only lead to further unjusti-
fied killings of women and children, as in
the recent attack on Cambodian villages. In
such cases, the United States will always be
blamed, regardless of how much control our
advisers have of the situation. This dis-
tresses us very much.
We strongly urge and hope that you will
speak out for the removal of U.S. advisers.
Now is the time to start building a lasting
peace in this area-by such means as another
Geneva conference or neutralization of the
area-in which foreign powers (from both
sides) will not dominate.
Sincerely,
Mr. and Mrs. PETER HUNT.
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
August 9, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING; Thank you for
your honesty and courage in taking a stand
against extending the conflict in southeast
Asia. I believe that a negotiated settlement
of the Issues is the only -way to achieve a
lasting peace.
Sincerely yours,
HAYWARD, CALIF.,
August 13, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
'Washington, D.C.
HON. SENATOR ORUENINO: We wish to
let you know that we appreciate and support
the statement you made concerning south-
east Asia.
Our country, has abrogated its agreement
to the decisions made at the SEATO Con-
ference in 1954 with its military involvement
in Vietnam. We share with you the attitude
that in order to preserve the peace, the prob-
lem must be handled around the conference
table. Otherwise, we are in grave danger of
igniting a worldwide nuclear war, and of
course, the destruction of mankind.
We cannot let ourselves be guided only
by the militarists.
Sincerely,
Mr. and Mrs. ALEX S. TRESKIN.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Just a note to
affirm my support for your statements on
South Vietnam. Keep it up, we cannot per-
mit this war to continue.
Very truly yours,
LIVINGSTON, N.J.,
August 15, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to con-
gratulate you for the position that you took
with reference to the President's order for
the bombing of North Vietnam.
It is unfortunate that there are only two
voices of moderation in Congress. The
use of the United Nations is bypassed. Our
Constitution is worthless and a hallow
mockery. The incident smacks of the Maine
in Havana Harbor and such conduct on our
part makes the Japanese at Pearl Harbor
look like Sunday school children.
If there is any way I can help, please let
me know. Just as in pre-Hitlerite Germany,
to hold an unpopular view which is against
that painted in the press makes one suspect
I am fearful for my country, my family, and
myself.
Respectfully,
BURLINGTON, VT.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I commenn
you for your courageous stand against U.S.
policy in Vietnam.
Sincerely,
DAVID S. MOE.
PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
January 5, 1966.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.
,DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thank you for
your unrelenting stand against the disas-
trous position which our country has taken
In southeast Asia. Many stubbornly' igno-
rant men oppose you. We are sure that
you will keep on fighting interventionism
in Asia, and must finally, win, and we hope
that it will be soon.
Very sincerely yours,
HELEN and ARTHUR BERTHOLF.
SAN ANSELMO, CALIF.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR: I want you to know
that your statements on U.S. foreign policy,
particularly Vietnam, are greatly appreci-
ated. Men like you, holding a responsible
office, who speak out for a more intelligent
policy are very important in these dangerous
times. Please keep the fight up.
Sincerely,
CLARE MCKEAGE.
INDIANAPOLIS, IND.,
August 11, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: This is to express
appreciation for your vote against the ex-
tension of operations in Vietnam. Our peo-
ple are confused on what is taking place
there and it is to be hoped that your coura-
geous and realistic stand will win many ad-
herents.
Sincerely,
AMHERST, MASS.,
August 9, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I support your
position on the Vietnam resolution, and I
wish to express my respect for your willing-
ness to stand almost alone in this serious
matter.
I have had occasion to sit in on a few of
the sessions of the World Assembly of Youth,
now meeting here at the University of Massa-
chusetts. Delegates and observers from over
100 countries are present. For the most part
they are opposed to military action in Viet-
nam. They favor U.N. intervention and a
return to the 1954 Geneva agreemente, in-
cluding withdrawal of foreign troops. I wish
that our Senate might have had the oppor-
tunity, as I have had, to listen to articulate
foreign opinion. And I wonder how much
the ugly shadow of Goldwaterism may be
already influencing U.S. foreign policy.
With best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
Hon. Senator GRUENING,
U.S. Senator,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: Your declaration that "All
Vietnam is -not worth the life of a single
American" has my 100 percent approval.
Although, being just a poor physician, I
know what it means for a mother to bear
a child.
Just keep on opposing and try your best to
uphold peace.
May God bless you always.
Very cordially yours,
JOSEPH S. FERACA, M.D.
Senator GRUENING.
DEAR SIR: I support yor stand and vote
on Vietnam.
Keep it up.
Sincerely,
BETHESDA, MD.,
August 7,1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to express
my thanks to you for your sensible and
courageous stand on the Vietnam resolution.
Sincerely,
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA,
September 20, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C. _
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Our support and
sincere respect goes with you on your stand
on U.S. policy in southeast Asia.
Thank you for sending the very complete
and informative CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Of
March 10 and August 7. The receipt of any
future proceedings along this subject will
be appreciated.
Sincerely,
Mr. and Mrs, C. S. SPARKS.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE January 15
TH:E SOUTH PARK METHODIST CHURCH,
Hartford, Conn, December 29, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
U.S. Government, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to express
my support for a change in our Vietnam
policy. I am glad to read in a recent New
York Times story that you too feel that a
change is in order.
Enclosed are two statements on Vietnam
which I have recently distributed to our
church members and to others. The re-
sponse has been such as to convince me that
the public would support an intelligent pol-
icy toward southeast Asia if such policy was
forthrightly and persuasively presented.
Yours truly,
GEORGE G. HILL,
Minister.
Senator GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to
write this line of strong support and very
real gratitude for your stand in regard to the
war in South Vietnam.
I, too, am disturbed by the actions of the
U.S. Government in the choice of the Am-
bassador to replace Lodge, the overflights
and bombings in Laos by U.S. planes, and
the statements of Secretary Dean Rusk.
More power to you.
Yours gratefully,
Rt. Rev. W. APPLETON LAWRENCE,
Retired Bishop of the Episcopal Dio-
cese of Western Massachusetts.
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCE,
DEPARTMENT, MICHIGAN COLLEGE
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., August 3, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Please accept my
strong and sincere support of your position
taken on southeast Asia and Vietnani-on
the floor of the Senate, in press interviews,
and volume, I, Issue 4, Fact, July-August 1964
issue.
Keep up the good work.
MILTON E. SCHERER.
P.S.-I'm a Demo too. Best.
SILVER SPRING, MD.,
August 7, 1964.
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Wholeheartedly support your endeavors to
have Vietnam problem negotiated.
Mrs. J. WEICHBROD.
CRESCENT CITY, FLA.,
January 5,1965.
MY DEAR MR. GRUENING: Now that a few
more people in Washington seem to be awak-
ing to the insanity of our southeast Asia
policy I hope that you will again tell the
American people that we have no business
in 'Vietnam and that all military aid and all
armies should be withdrawn, and southeast
Asia made a neutral zone.
Sincerely,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
August 12, 1964.
Los ANGELES, CALIF.,
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to thank
you for the position which you have taken
on our military presence in South Vietnam.
I have urged my friends to write to the Presi-
dent supporting your arguments to withdraw
troops from the area and encourage a peace-
ful settlement in Vietnam. We are not sup-
porting a free government nor adhering to
the wishes of the Vietnamese people by fight-
ing an unjust war.
Sincerely,
RIDGEFIELD, N.J.,
August 11, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR: Want you to know how much
I appreciate your continuing to fight for a
peaceful solution to the situation in Vietnam.
Reconvening the 14 nations for a conference
seems to be the only rational way to stop the
war from escalating into a world holocaust.
It has been very evident that the Viet-
namese people have no will to fight and only
want an opportunity to solve their own
affairs without interference.
By bringing devastation to their land and
continuing to send more and more American
boys to die there will not solve the problem.
Thanks again for your forthright position
in calling for our withdrawal of troops and
a peaceful solution around the conference
table.
ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEx.,
August 8, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thanks sincerely
for voting against the Vietnam resolution.
History well may make you a prophet. Please
send any of your speeches.
Appreciatively,
PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
September 17,1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I hail you
on the good sense, courage, and humanity
which you demonstrated in your stand
.gainst the present policy of Vietnam (Fact
magazine).
I support your position 100 percent and
have written to my Congressmen and to Pres-
ident Johnson urging them to pull us out
of Vietnam.
Very truly yours,
Mrs. PENNY ARONSON.
LEMON GROVE, CALIF.,
August 11, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to express
the appreciation we feel in your forthright
expression of concern about President John-
son's recent action in South Vietnam. We
need people like you in the Senate-People
who look at situations clearly and freshly
and who have the courage to stand.
Thank you.
OLIVIA W. DAVIS.
JUNEAU, ALASKA,
August 10, 1964.
Senator ERNEST-GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Three cheers for
your recent vote against the war in Vietnam.
I wish more Senators had the courage and
commonsense to vote against sending Ameri-
can men and money into an area which is
none of our business. The fact we have been
pouring billions into Vietnam for years and
have got nowhere should prove that a mili-
tary solution is not the answer. The Viet-
namese didn't want the Japanese or the
French, so why should they want the Ameri-
cans telling them what to do? This is a
problem for the United Nations.
I hope your voice continues to be heard
on this subject.
Yours sincerely,
MODESTO, CALIF.,
August 12, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: It was with-
heartfelt thanks that we noted your vote
on the recent congressional support of Presi-
dent Johnson's actions in southeast Asia.
As Quakers we have a high regard for unani-
mity, but we are well aware that truth often
stands alone, shunned by the raucus cries
of the multitude. Sir, persist in the best
lights God has given you.
Our best religious insights tell us that war
and violence never achieve good ends, though
it does, at times, seem-to bring some resolu-
tions in man's affairs. Truly, the ends never,
justify the means when viewed dispassion-
ately in the wider reaches of time and space.
As rationalists and humanitarians there
are reasons enough to question the attitudes
and acts of our national leaders in this and
Other areas of world conflict. If the United
States is to continue its leadership of the
free world, we desperately need a sober and
mature voice; for we are dealing in areas
where mankind is at stake.
Once again, may we thank you for your
good services to our Nation as well as the
world.
Sincerely,
RUDY POTOCHNIK,
Acting Clerk, Delta Monthly Meeting of
the Religious Society of Friends.
CUMBERLAND HOSPITAL,
Brooklyn, August 12, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: We all-although some of
us don't know it-owe you a debt of grati-
tude for your wish to keep us from sinking
Into the quicksands of war in South Vietnam,
and for your courage in taking a stand
publicly.
Respectfully,
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.G.
DEAR SIR: We would like to commend you
for speaking out so strongly on the unhappy
situation In South Vietnam and to support
your efforts to bring about a negotiated
peace.
Sincerely,
Mr. and Mrs. MAXWELL NURNBERG.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I very much ad-
mire your stand on the war in Vietnam. I
hope you will continue to express your views
on this vital subject.
Please know that you have the support of
many Americans in your effort to save us
from this folly.
Yours truly,
BENJAMIN B. SHERWIN.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR SENATOR: I support your stand on
Vietnam and hope that disaster can be
averted-total disaser, that is. It is already
disaster. How can the American people fol-
low such an evil course? If we continue
there is no way to predict the results of our
folly.
Respectfully yours,
COLOMA, MICH., August 8, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations for your courageous stand
on Vietnam. We need more statesmen like
you.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 779
FLUSHING, N.Y., January 1, 1965.
Senator GRUENING, of Alaska,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We want to thank
you for your courageous stand in opposition
to our present course of action in Vietnam.
It seems to us that our policy in Vietnam
involves us in needless risk in an area where
our national well-being is not threatened.
Sincerely,
ANDREW L. JOHNSON.
DOROTHY M. JOHNSON.
GRACE H. HINMAN.
BAYSIDE, N.Y., August 10, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I support your
principled stand in opposition to the reckless
bombing of North Vietnam and to the con-
gressional resolution. You are not alone.
Yours truly,
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
January 8, 1965.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Congratulations
to you for the courage you have displayed in
condemning U.S. support to the war of
atrocities taking place in Vietnam.
Yours truly,
NORTH CHEVY CHASE, MD.,
August 8, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATORGRUENING: Congratulations
on your independent position regarding our
bombings of North Vietnam. The Nation
owes Alaska a debt of gratitude for sending
to the Senate a man who does his own think-
ing and who holds the welfare of men in
greater esteem than the traditions of narrow
nationalism so dear to many of our mercan-
tilist hearts.
Cordially,
CHICAGO, ILL.,
August 8, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: I wish to express my ap-
proval and admiration for your stand on
Vietnam. Your voice is practically alone
and therefore you deserve a lot of credit for
having the courage of your convictions. Let
me assure you that I share your convictions,
and hope the present situation will be net-
ted not by guns or bombs, but through
negotiations.
Sincerely yours,
SAM L. TALMY.
ST. PETERSBURG, FLA.
Senator GRUENING.
DEAR SIR: I certainly do think we should
pull our boys out of Vietnam. Where are
the United Nations troops?
Mrs. WM. LONG.
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
. August 12, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I thank my
Heavenly Father for your humanitarian and
statesmanlike stand concerning Vietnam.
Respectfully yours,
MISS CATHERINE POWELL,
SAN PEDRO, CALIF.,
June 25, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: My heartfelt
approval of your statement on the unten-
able position the United States has taken
in southeast Asia.
I hope you continue to make your view-
point heard on this explosive situation.
Sincerely,
CRANFORD, N.J.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: My sincerest best
wishes and deepest respect go out to you for
your vote in the Senate against President
Johnson's carte blanche resolution on Viet-
nam.
Your voice has been heard in New Jersey.
You have consistently made sense.
If. only a few others would show similar
courage and good sense. Again, thank you.
LESTER GOLDBERG.
MADISON, WIS.,
January 7, 1965.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR:, In the past several months, I
and all other Americans have been concerned
with events involving the United States in
South Vietnam. I heartily congratulate you
on your courageous stand on this question.
As you know, the American press has hardly
given your statements on the subject wide
coverage. I would greatly appreciate it if
you could send me a copy of your Senate
speeches concerning American involvement
in Vietnam, and any other information which
you deem pertinent.
Thank you very much.
Sincerely,
PHILADELP IA, PA.,
November 24,1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING.
DEAR SIR: We are grateful to you for your
fight for U.S. policy in southeast Asia based
on commonsense and responsibility. Please
do not get discouraged.
We would like to know the name of a
newspaper in Alaska and address. Perhaps
they need to be told what your patriotic
stand means to the country and world.
Sincerely yours,
ARTHUR BERTHOLF.
HELEN BERTHOLF.
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
August 11, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to thank
you for having the principle and courage to
vote against the sheeplike resolution backing
the military action In southeast Asia.
Many, many people deplore this situation
and fear the consequences. Yet they have
been intimidated to the point of remaining
silent. An influential voice raised against
madness In a time of hysteria goes a long
way to give heart and backbone to the silent
millions. May you have the strength to
speak the truth and uphold your convictions
if the going gets rougher.
Sincerely,
Mrs. C. H. DORSEY.
COPPER CENTER, ALASKA,
September 10, 1964.
Senator GRUENING.
DEAR SIR: I admire the stand you have
taken in regard to withdrawing from Viet-
nam. Keep up the good work.
SAMUEL J. N. LIGHTWOOD.
THE FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION,
Nyack, N.Y., January 8, 1965.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. GRUENING: We would like to bring
to your personal attention a copy of the
letter we sent to President Johnson in No-
vember because of the increasing importance
of its message. We cannot agree with the
view expressed by the President on Monday
evening that because we committed ourselves
to a certain policy under President Eisen-
hower, we must continue it under subse-
quent administrations regardless of how
wrong it is proven to be, how many thousands
of human lives are lost or maimed every
week, or how much anti-American feeling it
generates.
We deeply appreciate what you are trying
to do to bring about a realistic and con-
structive policy on Vietnam.
Sincerely,
GLENN E. SMILEY,
Acting Executive Secretary.
SANTA MONICA, CALIF.,
August 8, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.
HONORABLE SIR: Permit me to express my
admiration for your courage in expressing
your negative attitude to President Johnson's
stand in the South Vietnam affair.
Sincerely,
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION,
Nyack, N.Y.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Expansion of the war
into North Vietnam appears to be a unilateral
decision that would scrap previous agree-
ments, flout the United Nations and brand
the United States as aggressor In the eyes of
uncommitted peoples. It would be an act
of incredible folly that could easily serve to
solidify the determination of the opposition
to fight to the last survivor in this hapless
peninsula as in the case of France's long and
tragic struggle there.
It is a strange paradox that in southeast
Asia we seem to be led by military advisers
into a policy closer to that advocated by Mr.
Goldwater than to that faith so well enunci-
ated by you just a year ago which so en-
deared you to the American People. To us,
this appears a blind and immoral policy that
can end only in the most terrible tragedy be-
cause it considers the situation only in mili-
tary terms. Considerations of human suffer-
ing and compassion are lost when a small
nation whose people have apparently little
interest in political doctrines, whether Com-
munist or anti-Communist, is made the un-
willing pawn in a cold or hot war struggle
between these doctrines. In the past, Gov-
ernment and military personnel have erred
in practically every judgment they have
made on Vietnam because they have been in-
sensitive to the heartbeat of these people.
Their sources of contact and information
come largely from a group enticed by the
prospects of receiving some of the immense
wealth we are pouring into that area in re-
turn for their "loyalty" to the United States
in its war against the Communists. The
pleas of the great masses go unheeded while
bitterness against the United States mounts.
The Nation will never forget the way, 1
year ago, you lifted up and unified a sorrow-
ing people, calling for a new sense of com-
mon responsibility: a morality based on con-
sideration, mutual respect and compassion.
Your sweeping victory in the recent election
may be attributed in large measure to the
widespread support of this policy as opposed
to one based on mutual suspicion and irre-
sponsible brinkmanship in foreign affairs.
We prayerfully urge you to stand against
the powerful forces that are attempting to
drive the present administration into the
very policies of military adventure and ex-
pediency that were so firmly rejected by the
electorate earlier this tpnth. Vietnam rep-
resents a gaping hole : in the reservoir of
human decency and consideration you built
a year ago. We urge you to mend this hole
by statesmanlike means that could bring
about a cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign
troops and neutralization of the area. We
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believe this could only enhance your great
moral leadership.
Sincerely,
GLENN E. SMILEY,
Acting Executive Secretary for the Staff
of the Fellowship of Reconciliation,
Nyack, N.Y.
PORTLAND, OREG.,
July 29, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: How many more
American youths are to be sacrificed in a war
with no chance of victory; a war with little
support and much opposition from the peo-
ple being "defended," a war that for U.S.
soldiers hasn't even a name?
The people of southeast Asia have an in-
delible resentment of Western involvement
in their affairs, a resentment acquired over
decades of foreign rule. No military cam-
paign lacking genuine support of the people
has the slightest chance of success, regard-
less of how many dollars are siphoned from
the rank-and-file American taxpayer to fi-
nance it. This has been amply demonstrated,
of course, by the bankruptcy and collapse of
French military involvement in- Indochina.
If for no other reason, the cynical pro-
nouncement made July 28 by Premier Khanh
that he will send U.S. arms and men where
he sees fit, in defiance of administration
policy, should force us to withhold this
extravagant assistance.
What "national Interest" can possibly be
served by continuing to invest potentially
creative lives and vast amounts of money in
a government which cannot rally the sup-
port of the population it purports to rule?
The investment would be more to the point
here at home, where many millions still lack
the decent material conditions prerequisite
to true freedom.
Very sincerely yours,
JOHN P. VAN HYNING.
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
August 11, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We agree whole-
heartedly with your stand on the war in
Vietnam. We urge the withdrawal of all
U.S. military personnel and military aid from
Vietnam. We support the suggestion that
that United States initiate and participate in
a reconvened Geneva Conference at which
such a peaceful political solution might be
reached.
The values from which you work are
humanistic and rational in contrast to those
of your colleagues who assume that democ-
racy may best be saved and communism de-
feated bynondemocratic means. Your non-
conformist stand in Senate debate is greatly
appreciated.
Sincerely,
ANTON H. TURRTTTIN,
JANE SAWYER TURRTTTIN.
NEW Yonsr, N.Y.,
August 11, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am writing to
express my extreme concern over the sit-
uation in Vietnam and the position which
our Government has taken and continues to
take with regard to it. In addition, I want
to say that I appreciate your position par-
ticularly on the vote taken in the Senate
Friday in which you did not support the
President's military action.
I urge you to continue to press for our
withdrawal from Vietnam. Time has become
of the essence.
Sincerely yours,
DEBORAH A. JACKSON.
AUGUST 7, 1963.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Congratulations your patriotic stand for
peace in southeast Asia.
BRONX, N.Y.,
August 8, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING, -
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I commend you
for your vote in the Congress yesterday
and can only wish you were of a majority
voting against the resolution, but then again,
when has there ever been a majority voting,
or doing anything, on the side of the angels?
Respectfully yours,
HARRY GRANT.
BRONX, N.Y.,
August 7, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR: Though you will in all like-
lihood be much maligned for your extraor-
dinarily courageous position in voting
against support for the Vietnam war, I wish
to express my humble and heartfelt support
for your actions of recent months.
You are a great man.
T. RICHARDS.
P.S. I sincerely hope that you will some-
day run for national office so that nonresi-
dents of Alaska can support you.
PITTSFIELD, MASS.,
August 5, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am writing to
support your position on the U.S. involve-
ment in Vietnam. I agree wholeheartedly
that the United States has no proper concern
in that area and cannot win a war where
there is so little support for the policies and
regimes among the people themselves.
This country is becoming more and more
deeply involved in a war that could lead to
gigantic proportions and the United States
has not sought negotiations but has resorted
to military action unilaterally. I'm sick at
heart about the entire immoral involvement.
I hope you will be able to continue your
intelligent opposition to the trend toward
war. So many people agree with you.
Very truly yours,
Mrs. ALBERT ROWE.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
We applaud your courageous stand and in-
tegrity In opposing the President's recent ac-
tion in Vietnam. We hope you will continue
to show continued courage in the face of
powerful majority who seem eager to escalate
present crisis into a world war.
RUTH and EDWARD ROSELAND.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I heartily com-
mend you on your stand regarding the folly
of supporting the war in South Vietnam.
Missionaries and church publications report
facts similar to those you have stated In the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
May your efforts to keep the peace of the
world be blessed.
Sincerely yours,
WHEATON, ILL.,
August 19, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR: May I Voice my ap-
proval of your position with reference to the
war in South Vietnam. Sure we must seek
some settlement, with the help of everybody
and the United Nations, and get the United
States troops out of southeast Asia.
As I see it, there is no hope of stopping
communism, taking the long time view, by
military methods. The longer the war con-
tinues the greater will be the danger of some
kind of totalitarianism taking over all of
southeast Asia (not right away of course)
because war, disorder and lack of internal
harmony prepares the soil for some kind of
extreme "ism".
After a long time of ignorance, I have come
to see that the Vietnam war is a civil war
mostly in the southern part of South Viet-
nam, aided on the one side by the United
States and on the other by North Vietnam.
The problem is that so many people in South
Vietnam are not loyal to their government,
I mean that this creates a serious problem
for the United States of America.
I saw a report of your speech at the din-
ner meeting sponsored by the Chicago Com-
mittee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, on June 25,
1964, as reported in the Sun-Times.
Cordially,
FRED E. JOHNSON.
P.S.-I see extreme lack of wisdom in the
idea of extending the war outside of South
Vietnam. F.E.J.
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
August 8, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING, _
Senator from Alaska,
Senate Office Building.
DEAR SENATOR: I wish to thank you sin-
cerely for voicing your opposition to our
policy regarding Vietnam. I can see no valid
reason for our interference in the affairs of
southeast Asia.
President Johnson speaks of a limited war.
Facts show that when war begins there is no
knowing when and how It will end.
Please continue your outcry. We need you.
ARLINE D. HAYS.
BEATRICE, NEBR.,
August 10, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: It is encouraging
for the average citizen to know there are
men in the U.S. Senate who believe that
government should have a moral responsi-
bility, and are willing to exercise that belief.
I wish to commend you on the stand you
took against the President's Far East resolu-
tion which could plunge the whole world
into total war.
Sincerely,
STANFORD, CALIF.,
August 10, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Congress of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR: We wish to express our deep
appreciation to you for your vote against the
resolution authorizing President Johnson to
take all steps necessary to "defend southeast
Asia."
Although it may be the case, as asserted
in section 2 of the resolution, that main-
tenance of international peace and security
in southeast Asia is vital to the national
interests of the United States and to world
peace, it is not clear to us that U.S. military
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 781
Intervention is the best-or any-way to
secure such peace.
We regret and fear the situation in south-
east Asia. We are obviously not experts on
U.S. foreign policy; but given the information
available to us, we feel that it is a tragic error
to risk an already tenuous peace by active
participation in the civil war of another
country.
It is our hope that your constituents will
return you to the Congress that your pleas
for sanity in foreign policy may continue to
be heard.
Sincerely,
DONALD L. and MERRILL PROVENCE.
HAMPTON, VA.,
January 7, 1965.
DEAR SIR: Thank you for having the cour-
age to state your views on Vietnam.
Most of the American people are completely
in the dark about what's going on there and
why.
My son is 22 years old and will be there
as a helicopter pilot after only 6 months
training. If the situation is that urgent,
can't these young men and boys be given
more training and all possible aid?
I don't want him to give his life in a place
where the people don't seem to care one
way or another, and the Americans are
afraid to call it war and our boys are called
advisers.
Now is the time to stop all this fence sit-
ting and facesaving (too much of that has
already been done at the cost of thousands
of lives).
I'm sure you will hold your own in the up-
coming full-scale debate on the situation in
Vietnam.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
STATE COLLEGE, PA.,
August 10,1964.
Senator GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Congratulations
on your recent statements concerning our
actions in Vietnam. It is heartening to
have one or two voices speaking out in an
election year saying we are wrong and point-
ing out that sticking to a mistake is no
virtue.
Sincerely,
EUGENE, OREG.,
November 28, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: This is to reaffirm
my earlier support of your brave stand on
Vietnam.
I should like to urge Congress and the
President to think the unthinkable and help
promote a peaceful solution of this problem
at the conference table.
Thank you for all you have done.
AUGUST 6, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to ex-
press my concern over the current crisis in
Vietnam. Your previous remarks calling at-
tention to the dangers in the situation there
are supported and appreciated.
In a crisis situation, it is difficult to sound
critical opinion, but at least questions and
caution can be expressed. I know that you
are aware of the questions to be raised.
I may well be that now is the time for
the suggestion of a creative alternative.
Could, not a factfinding mission under the
U.N. be proposed leading to a proposal for
negotiation to create a policekeeping force
for the area. Perhaps it is true that the
Russians have suggested this, but what did
we expect. Could it not be true that such
a proposal would be in the interests of all
sides. Certainly we have no interest, and
nothing to gain by continuing the present
course, unchanged.
Thank you for your concern and good
luck.
Sincerely yours,
LOUIS F. BRAKEMAN,
Assistant Professor of Government,
Denison University.
CHAPEL HILL, N.C.,
August 8, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am glad to see
you oppose our bristling military display
against North Vietnam and would be glad
to be placed on your mailing list. I recall
meeting you here years ago.
EAST LANSING, MICH.,
December 17, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING, i
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Concerning the
situation in Vietnam, we feel that:
1. an immediate cease-fire in all lands con-
tested by the regimes of Indochina;
2. withdrawal-either staged or immediate
of all troops not native to these regions;
3. convening of the Fourteen Nation Con-
ference to neutralize all of southeast Asia;
4. the United States then to abide by the
1964 Geneva Agreement to plan free elec-
tions in both North and South Vietnam
is a pattern we would like to see followed.
We are grateful for the good work you are
doing for the cause of peace.
Very sincerely,
EARLE D. HARRISON.
LYNN, MASS.,
August 6, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I admired your
stand on South Vietnam and hope you con-
tinue to use your influence to help change
our present policy. I feel a war there is a
wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong
time.
Thank you.
BROOKLYN, N.Y.,
August 10, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I express
my gratitude to you for your courageous vote
against the surrender of Congress to execu-
tive power in the most basic area, that is,
war and peace. It seems to me that our
country's best hope lies in the rational
thinking you have expressed. May I have
a copy of your full statement on the subject
of Vietnam and an advance declaration of
war.
Sincerely yours,
ACTON, MASS.,
August 11, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I congratu-
late you on your vote against the joint res-
olution supporting further military action
in southeast Asia.
I urge you to continue to voice disapproval
of the use of armed force in settlement of
this conflict.
Sincerely yours,
(Mrs. J. H.) JANE WESTOVER.
BEL AIR, MD.,
August 7, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C:
Heartfelt thanks and strong support for
your wise courageous decision regarding Viet-
nam.
Senator GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
HONORABLE SIR: I wish you to know that
I am in full accord with your position on
Vietnam.
Let's get out of there now.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We wish to en-
courage you to continue your courageous
stand regarding the Vietnam situation. The
truth needs telling, and we admire your cour-
age for informing the American people on
the terrible dangers that are involved.
Our local papers have not published your
speeches. Would you please send me copies
of any that are available.
Please keep up this important work.
Sincerely yours,
Mr. and Mrs. S. L. STRINEL.
DELAND, FLA.,
December 23, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: I understand that you have
said earlier this year, "The time has come to
reverse our policy of undertaking to defend
such areas as South Vietnam" * * *. Also,
A return of troops to our own shores should
begin * * *.11
I hope. you are still of this same opinion.
What can we all do to give President John-
son a sense of strong support among U.S.
citizens for a complete change of policy in
South Vietnam?
That very unjust war must stop somehow.
Sincerely,
HAMDEN, CONN.,
August 8, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May we express
our distinct approval of your logical, sane,
and courageous stand on the Vietnam situa-
tion, particularly with respect to what seems
to us the ill conceived and somewhat hyster-
ical move on the part of the administration.
We believe that the United Nations should
have been called into the case immediately
rather than ex post facto.
Very sincerely,
Mr. and Mrs. RICHARD F. MELZOTERO.
MENLO PARK, CALIF.,
August 9, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR ERNEST GRUENING: We appre-
ciate your courageous vote against military
participation in Vietnam.
We agree that the United States should
get out.
Cordially yours,
Miss ELSIE R. RENNE.
COLLEGE PARK, MD.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Your vote
against southeast Asia resolution was a vote
for freedom and democracy. The United
States has not right to aggression in south-
east Asia. We should withdraw all troops
and all aid to the Dictator Khanh.
For peace,
CHICAGO, ILL.,
August 7, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to con-
gratulate you on your courageous vote on
the southeast Asia problem. Be assured that
there are many who support your unpopular
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 15
position. I hope that you will continue to
voice a thoughtful dissident opinion.
Sincerely,
LEIGH E. ROSENBLUM, M.D.
RIDGEWOOD, N.J.,
August 1, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I would like to
take this opportunity to thank you for all
that you have done for the State of Alaska
and for the United States. You are truly a
great patriot and a great American. At this
time, when the free world is confronted with
communism, we, the people of the United
States, need truly great and strong leaders
to represent us. I believe that you are such
a leader. You are truly an inspiration to
free men the world over, for it is men like
yourself who make the world, a better place
in which to live.
Very sincerely,
JOHN S. SCHMOLZE, Jr.
PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
September 17, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I hail you
on the good sense, courage, and humanity
which you demonstrated in your stand
against the present policy of Vietnam (Fact
Magazine).
I support your position 100 percent and
have written to my Congressmen and to
President Johnson urging them to pull us
out of Vietnam.
Very truly yours,
Mrs. PENNY ARONSON.
WOODMERE, N.Y.,
August 7, 1964.
DEAR MR. GRUENING: Thank you for your
stand against escalating or continuing the
war in Vietnam. We have indeed no busi-
ness there that can justify the sacrifice of
American lives. Nor, in fact, that can con-
done the death and travail that we are
bringing upon the people of Vietnam.
Moreover, I am sure that anything worth-
while that is to be gained there could be
secured better by means other than war
and that the war we are waging is only driv-
ing the desperate peasants into the forces
arrayed against us and greatly lessening any
influence we could have in that area of the
world.
I am grateful to have some voices such as
yours raised in the cause of sanity and
decency.
Sincerely yours,
CHARLES T. JACKSON.
Los ANGELES, CALIF.,
August 8, 1964.
IJEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I would like to
express my deep admiration for your courage
in taking a stand against what many people
believe to be a preliminary step in the prepa-
ration for an extended land war in Asia. It
is due to your courage, dedication to freedom
and democracy, and tenacity In searching
out facts that the realities of southeast Asia
are, coming to light. Your job is and will be
a lonely one with little consolation from
those quarters that should be most thank-
ful. Nevertheless, I know you realize that
you are performing an essential and crucial
function that in the long run will not bo un-
appreciated.
Fifteen years of the cold war have reduced
our flexibility to respond to new situations.
Too many people look at the world as a
struggle between the forces of good and evil
with unchanging truths and grand alterna-
tives. This picture Is not accurate, especially
in southeast Asia and unless we begin to face
this fact, we are in for serious trouble which
can only culminate in defeat for all.
With profound gratitude,
ROBERT FRIEDMAN.
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
August 11, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I strongly sup-
port your statement that "the road to peace
in southeast Asia lies through the conference
table."
I urge that the 14-nation Geneva Confer-
ence be reconvened to implement a United
Nations settlement.
We need more complete information (and
accurate) about our involvement in Vietnam
and full public discussion and congressional
debate.
FAIRBANKS, ALASKA,
August 8, 1964.
Senator GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.
Your debate and vote on southeast Asian
joint resolution is commendable.
LARRY BRAYTON, Bulletin News.
EVANSVILLE, IND.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Many people ap-
preciate your endeavor to warn our Govern-
ment of the folly of engaging in war in Viet-
nam. We cannot risk a world war for such
a cause. Should the Chinese Communists
take over it would certainly be a liability to
them.
May you continue to receive guidance in
the important work you are doing.
Sincerely yours,
Mr. and Mrs. GEORGE HESSENAUER.
DETROIT, MICH.,
August 8, 1964.
Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
SIR: Your opposition. to yesterday's con-
gressional resolution of Vietnam was the last
ray of light before a long age of darkness.
Yours very truly,
RICHARD SCHICK, M.A.,
School of Advanced International Stud-
ies of the Johns Hopkins University.
BRONX, N.Y.
January 9, 1965.
Hon. SENATOR ERNEST GRUENING of Alaska:
My friends and I applaud your stand in
opposing our country's policy in Vietnam.
We urge you to continue your efforts until
our men are withdrawn and peace is re-
stored.
Respectfully,
GERMANTOWN, OHIO,
September 19, 1964.
DEAR SIR: We recently heard about your
stand concerning the crisis of Vietnam. We
wish to commend a person with courage to
stand for what he believes when the majority
is against him. May you continue to stand
for the right.
Mrs. DORIS COOLEY.
ST. PAUL, MINN.,
November 24, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR: Again I voice my heartfelt
thanks to you for your firm stand against our
getting more deeply involved in South Viet-
nam. I agree with you completely.
I feel we should negotiate peace and help
set up democratic elections throughout that
troubled country now.
It is obvious that the majority detest their
present government so why should we sacri-
fice American lives to keep it in power?
JAMES F. McEvoy.
PAWLING, N.Y.,
August 24, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: In view of your declared
opposition to the administration's policy in
southeast Asia, with which I fully agree, I
enclose herewith a copy of a Iettee I wrote
the other day to the New York Times on the
subject.
The Times did not see fit to publish this
letter, pleading the familiar excuse of the
"pressure of space," etc., which is hogwash,
of course, as they have published much
longer letters of mine in the past. This re-
minds me of a letter I read in the Times by
Norman Thomas on June 23, wherein he re-
fers to a bitter attack in the Senate on the
administration's policy, by Senator MonsE,
but did not see it reported in the Times.
In my letter I make a point of the factor
of destiny which I feel should play an im-
portant part in our calculations regarding
the future. The significance to be attached
to my letter, as I look at it, lies in the fact
that even though we were to gain our objec-
tive In southeast Asia, whatever that may be,
and however it is to be determined, the odds,
over the years, will remain the same: South
Vietnam is unlikely to be any stronger mili-
tarily, nor is its political position likely to be
any more stable, while there will still be a
North Vietnam, and more important, a China
with a population of three-quarters of a
billion people, sooner or later armed with
atomic weapons, making Judge Edgerton's
comment tragically pertinent. It is the
future probabilities, it seems to me, about
which we must think, not the present.
Respectfully yours,
EMERSON C. IVES.
PAWLING, N.Y.,
August 9, 1964.
To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:
I wholly agree with and commend the
letter of Judge Henry W. Edgerton respect-
ing our Vietnam policy appearing in today's
Sunday Times.
I would particularly call attention to his
comment that "When, if not before, Com-
munist China has atomic weapons, it will no
more tolerate American military action in
southeast Asia than we would tolerate Rus-
sian military action in Cuba."
I would like to reiterate a comment I made
in a recent letter to the Times to underscore
his and Senators GRUENING'S and MORSE'S
assertions "that we have no business in
southeast Asia."
"What we and our Government officials
seem unable to comprehend Is the fact that
these millions of people are permanent in-
habitants of Asia, and that what we do there
can be put of a temporary nature, and can-
not alter the ultimate destiny that inevita-
bly must rest in the hands of the people
living in that part of the world."
Destiny is not a matter of the few years
we may choose to concern ourselves in the
affairs of southeast Asia, it is a matter that
involves decades in time, and it is short-
sighted and futile for us to think we can
change the ultimate interrelationships of
nations that inevitably must be resolved by
the hundreds of millions of people perma-
nently living contiguous to one another, and
that thousands of miles from our shores on
the opposite side of-the world.
EMERSON C. IVES.
EXHIBIT 5
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 3,
1964]
CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: LODGE IN ORBIT
(By Art Buchwald)
Probably the man who has the toughest
job in the world at the moment is Henry
Cabot Lodge, who has been traveling around
the world at the request of President John-
son, explaining our Vietnam policies to heads
of state. It's a lonely job and a perilous one.
Although we haven't attended any of the
briefings, we can just imagine what is going
on as Ambassador Lodge is presenting his
case, let us say, to the King of Denmark.
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"Now, sir, let me say at the outset that the
United'States has the situation in Vietnam
well in hand. Under the firm leadership of
Gen. Nguyen Khanh many new reforms have
been instituted."
As Ambassador Lodge is speaking, a courier
from the American Embassy rushes in and
gives him a telegram. The Ambassador reads
it.
"Well, as I was saying, General Khanh has
been dividing the country, and the United
States feels he can no longer control the
various factions. It is our belief that the
best solution to the problem would be to
support a general who has the confidence of
the people."
The phone rings and the King hands it to
Ambassador Lodge.
"Yes, I see, sir. Right, sir. I understand.
Of course. Thank you."
He hangs up the phone and continues:
"You see, Your Majesty,. our experts be-
lieve the best solution-to the problem would
be to have a three-man military junta govern
until we can have elections. We feel Gen-
eral Khanh has been a handicap and we in-
tend to support General Minh, whom General
Khanh had disposed of several months ago
with our help. Our strategy is to send the
South Vietnamese Army out into the field
to fight the Vietcong on their own terms."
An aide whispers something in Ambassa-
dor Lodge's ear. He nods and says, "Because
of the rioting in Saigon our strategy has
been flexible and we are now urging the
South Vietnamese forces to return to Saigon
to prevent the breakdown of law and order.
We feel this can best be done with General
Minh in command of the
Another messenger from the American Em-
'b'assy dashes in and hands Lodge a cable.
"Therefore, in line with what our people
have worked out, we are happy to announce
that Dr. Nguyen Xuan Oanh is now in charge
of the Saigon government. Dr. Oanh is a
Harvard-educated economist and gets along
.very well with Ambassador Taylor. General
Khanh is now in Dalat resting up from a
physical and mental breakdown."
. The phone rings again and Ambassador
Lodge answers it. "Thank you very much.
That's very interesting.
"I want you to understand, Your Majesty,
we have not ruled out General Khanh's con-
tribution to our effort in Vietnam. We have
decided that in spite of everything he still
holds the title of Premier and we have every
Intention at this time of supporting his gov-
ernment." '
The Ambassador's secretary hands him an-
other paper.
"As you have probably read, the main prob-
lem in Vietnam is the friction between the
Catholics and the Buddhists. Realizing this,
the Americans have a plan to prevent rioting
-
between the two factions."
The secretary hands him another paper.
"But we feel at the same time that some
rioting would have a good effect and there-
fore we've authorized the riots now going
on throughout the country.
"Our main objective, of course, Is to win
the war, but we realize that this cannot be
done until there is a stable government in
Vietnam. We feel we have such a govern-
ment with Dr. Oanh and * * *.11
The phone rings again and Ambassador
Lodge answers it wearily. "Yes, sir. Whom
did you say? Mme. Nhu? Thank you.
He turns back to the King. "Well, where
was I?"
FRAMINGHAM, MASS.,
August 3, 1964.
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to con-
gratulate you.on your courageous stand re-
garding our escalating military involvement
in Vietnam. Thousands of U.S. citizens are
No. 10-15
solidly behind you, and applaud your oppo-
sition to the present immoral policy in
southeast Asia.
Sincerely,
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Jan. 14, -1965]
CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: CRACK TROOPS OF
NONOMURA
(By Art Buchwald)
As you probably remember, the country of
South Nonomura has been fighting the Com-
munist guerrillas for 4 years. Thanks to
American military aid and American ad-
visers. South Nonomura now has one of the
best equipped armies in the world, and when
it comes to hardware the South Nonomuran
soldier lacks nothing. Newsreels of the crack
South Nonomuran army show them flying off
Into the jungle in American helicopters,
armed to the teeth. You get a feeling of pride
that a group of peasants like the South Nono-
murans can be whipped into a first-class
fighting outfit.
Unfortunately, despite all the aid, the
South Nonomurans haven't been doing very
well against the North Nonomuran guerrillas
who are armed with nothing more than fish-
ing rods and World War II rifles. Why, every-
one asks, can't the South Nonomuran army,
contain the guerrillas?
One of our correspondents just came back
after an interview with a crack South Nono-
muran officer and showed us his notes. The
interview shed some light on the problem.
Correspondent: Captain, how is the war go-
ing?
Captain. War going great. Tell Americans
we like K-rations very much, but Q-ratlons
lousy. We need more cigarettes and beer.
Morale very low without beer.
Correspondent. Why hasn't your army been
able to contain the guerrillas?
Captain. Our army trained by Americans
to fight enemy in open. Lousy Communists
hide in jungle.
Correspondent. Why don't you go into the
jungle and get them?
Captain. You crazy or something? You
can get bitten by snakes in the jungle. Be-
sides, your uniform gets dirty. We have to
keep uniforms nice and clean for coup d'etat.
Correspondent. That's true.
Captain. And don't forget, you have to
walk in jungle, Since Americans came, my
men won't go anywhere unless it's by truck
or helicopter. Walking is for lousy Com-
munists.
Correspondent. There have been many in-
stances where you have had the Communists
surrounded and they've disappeared. How
do you explain this?
Captain. Very simple. As soon as we hear
about lousy Communist attack, we send
crack soldiers there to fight them. But crack
soldiers must be supported by many men.
We must have hot food, showers, officers' club,
noncommissioned officers' club, PX, chaplain,
movies, and comfortable living quarters. By
the time my crack outfit is ready to fight,
lousy Communists have escaped into jungle.
Correspondent. Wouldn't it be better if
you fought the war without all these things?
Captain. We crack outfit. Thanks to
American training and know-how we not
going to fight dirty war like dirty Commu-
nists.
Correspondent. But you're not getting any-
where.
Captain. That's what you think. In an-
other year I make colonel. Then I overthrow
the Government. You see me then, I give
you good interview.
Correspondent. But, Captain, isn't there
some way of turning the tide against the
guerrillas?
Captain. It's too late. My crack troops
have taste of American way of life. We are
so busy keeping them supplied, we don't
have much time to fight lousy Communists.
All they talk about these days is GI bill of
rights.
Correspondent. Is there anything you need
that would help speed up the war?
Captain. Yes, send us more Japs.
Correspondent. Japs?
Captain. You knoww_Jap transistor radios.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News,
Jan. 14, 1965 ]
AID FOR VIETS
BUENOS AIRES, January 14.-Argentina will
send a medical team, medicine, sanitary
equipment and food to South Vietnam,
usually reliable sources said yesterday. The
foodstuffs will consist mainly of tinned
meats. The decfsion to make the shipments
was understood to have been in response to
an appeal by the United States.
VIETNAM "HAWKS" AND "DovEs"
(By Bernard B. Fall)
"In Vietnam today * * * we have the
equivalent of about 4.8 divisions' worth of
majors and captains, about 3.5 divisions'
worth of lieutenants, and about 3 divisions'
worth of master sergeants * * *. They * * *
come out of our formally conceived deterrent
forces."
That important statement was made last
November by. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.,
Vice Chief of Staff, to the Association of
the U.S. Army. When shorn of profes-
sional jargon it gives a vivid picture of the
enormous cadre drain caused by the Vietnam
war. Of a worldwide total of 16 U.S. Army
divisions, between three and four operate
without their combat leaders or, more likely,
a great many more units experience serious
cadre shortages.
As the Vietcong has hardly any Russian
advisers and few if any Chinese advisers, the
nasty little war in the mountains and
swamps of South Vietnam represents a uni-
lateral net drain to the United States in what
every army lacks most-highly qualified jun-
ior leaders. In that sense as in many others
the American commitment begins to resem-
ble the French Indochina War. The French
lost 1,300 lieutenants in Indochina; to date,
the United States has suffered over 1,500
wounded and over 300 dead in South Viet-
nam, most of them junior combat leaders.
What the drain would become If the war
should be broadened to include North Viet-
nam or mainland China is anyone's guess,
but no one in his senses believes it would
be small.
It is In these circumstances that a small
but extremely vocal group advocates full-
scale American commitment, and contrari-
wise an ever-widening group, now including
for the first time a broad spectrum of middle-
of-the-road members of the Senate and
House, advocates some sort of negotiated
solution to the Vietnam problem. Recently
there were rumors that "contacts" had been
made with the Chinese in Warsaw to explore
possible solutions of the Vietnamese prob-
lem, and that the Chinese had rebuffed those
overtures. To the "hawks," the alleged Chi-
nese rebuff was proof that only a military
confrontation with China would solve the
Vietnamese problem, just as an "eyeball-to-
eyeball" confrontation with Russia over
Cuba apparently solved the problem of Rus-
sian intervention in this hemisphere. To
"doves," the mere report of "contact" with
the other side about the problem was evi-
dence of the basic moderation of the present
policy as well as an implicit promise that
further such contacts might well take place.
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Many however are confused by it all and cake, after some sort of political-military down by "the fact that even that lush rice
see no good way out of the mess at present; accommodation has been found. Can one bowl would make only a marginal difference
they hope that, by merely holding on and be? for China's vast needs." The Chinese lead-
accepting the present rates of loss and levels Pressures that may not seem ominous to ers are quite sane, and they have computers.
of spending until the politicians and gen- 700 million Chinese-whether they involve a They know that the only solution for their
erals in Saigon finally realize that their small "escalation" such as introducing sab- population-food problem is birth control
country is at war, something acceptable can oteurs, an actual landing of an American and more efficient agriculture.
be snatched from the debacle. expeditionary force, or a threat of some On April 6, the Nation ran an article by
The "hawks" seem to concentrate entirely measure in between-may well appear Senator FRANK CKVRCH, the lead sentence
on Red China rather than on North Vietnam thoroughly menacing to 18 million North of which read: "American foreign policy
or on the Vietcong, and on maximum use Vietnamese, who know the shambles that tends to maintain fixed positions long after
of military force to the exclusion of other a years of Sino-American fighting made these have ceased to serve our best interests."
means. The fact that almost all their pre- out of. North Korea. North Vietnam already Senator CHuxcH pointed particularly to the
raises are partly or wholly erroneous does not faces in Laos (through the hardly vieled 52,000 American troops still stationed in
seem to bother them. bombardment of Communist bases and sup- South Korea, and a
time PParentht thrf for all
Once more the Saigon military are trotted ply lines), and along its own shores, mount-
out as the only guarantors of South Vietnam . This forbidden though was foll,
ing evidence of American strength. The pos- g months later, by another, when the Senwednator
from. the
were not evivils ls of neutralism, as if the woods sibilities of a diplomatic confrontation at the gave an intetview to the progressive Catholic
today neutralist military conference table exist in Vietnam today as magazine, Ramparts, calling for a new Amer-
leaders, from Egypt to Laos. In South Viet- they existed 14 years ago at Panmunjom in ican policy in southeast Asia and considera-
n , Gb eras K a t year purged severa Korea, and it would be as unrealistic to tion of a negotiated peace, with safeguards
of his generals gr underestimate America's leverage on Hanoi against a Communist takeover. Three weeks
tralism," and he himself has made noises as it would be to overestimate Peiping 'a lev- after the appearance of the story, the New
sufficient) anti-American to qualify for erage on the guerrillas of South Vietnam.
good-conduct marks on the other side of the want York to Times front-paged ie Did the Times
fence. It is true as the "hawks" assert that F ,", r~ T~ ,, umn suggest that there are American
is
have no choice but to follow policies of peace
would It seems possible. Once only Senators 'any -be neutra lss it gimporta As t in the
abroad and welfare at home. The policies of MORSE and GRUENING were in opposition, now
,case of the Chinese Nationalist generals who globalism, as Walter Lippmann calls it, are they are joined by FULBRIGHT, MCGOVERN,
surrendered Manchuria, Peiping, or Yunnan a disastrous failure, in contrast to American NELSON, PELL, BARTLETT, and CHURCH, and
to surrendered
Communists, such p army, or with its success at home. By globalism Lippmann who knows how many others who have not the shiny A omm erican sts such a would make an means intervention all over the world in yet spoken out'? Perhaps President Johnson
impressive wedding gift or bargainin regions where we have no primary vital in- is beginning to think forbidden thoughts
counter. terest, but where the policies of the past himself. He will be difficult to punish.
Tne other major unreality into regard the (going back to Harry Truman, Dean Acheson
North Vietnamese and Vietcong as helpless John Foster Dulles) call for an attack Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the
North puppets depending Vi on Peiping for s on communism in whatever form it shows it- Senator yield?
their survipaWe are being told self. As a corollary, we must ally ourselves Mr. GRUENING. I yield.
their ver obso survival. of the a Chinese A r sult is defeat and frustration. Despite the distinguished Senator from Alaska
forces in south China, but not that the North vast power of the United States, indeed, be- knows, I, too, entertain serious doubts
Vietnamese People's Army present strength cause of that power, we have overextended
ourselves, and all over Africa and Asia we are about our American policy in southeast
is about twice that of the Japanese forces defied and insulted both by our enemies and Asia.
which captured all of mainland southeast the governments whose freedom we are sup- I commend the Senator espec l1 for
Asia in 1941-42. The South Vietnamese ha y
situation on the ground is bad enough with- posedly defending. Nasser, Nguyen Khanh, having referred in the course of his re-
si
out tuation the weight of four or five enough with the Philippine masses, the African delegates marks to the nature of the American
oivisidds which defeated the flower othose the in the United Nations and a host of others commitment to Saigon. As I under-
divnc sowhi h Defeated he seem to hate us as much as the Communists
Fr at .
P do, stand-indeed, as it has always been re-
The final unreality is to make believe In this lugubrious situation, it is worth ported to the American people under
that the war in South Vietnam is being lost going back over a few of the harbingers that three different administrations-that'
by the American prss.on o That further nonsense i have appeared in the Nation over the past commitment has been to give assistance
trotted out with su e year. In the April 27 issue, Barrows Dun- in the form of military instruction,
ening the already ludicruously tight cen- ham, writing about the imperfections of the equipment, ammunition, nd materiel, as
sorship; not in Vietnam, but here. There human mind that lead to unthinkable well as economic aid, to the Government
has been no map published showing an. ac- thoughts, suggested that they arise "not be-in , to effort
tual military operation on a scale where it cause the mind is too narrow or too distant n the be used in its on. to put
becomes intelligible. The South Vietnamese from phenomena, but because some social down the Vi etcong insurrection.
Army releases detailed reports on the Com- body acts to prevent criticism of its purposes No one can say that we have not ful-
munist units it faces, which make of the and policies. Thus unthinkable thoughts filled that commitment. Indeed, so
enemy the respectable military force it has are, in fact, forbidden thoughts, that is to much equipment, materiel, food, and
become. Here in the United States the say, forbidden by some organization able to so many advisers have been sent to Sai-
ies to stick "gooks anony- punish thinkers." gon that the whole peninsula is in some
mous." It is not the press which sank a The policy of the Nation has always been danger of sinking under the weight of it.
helicopter carrier in the port of Saigon, al- to refuse to be proscribed in this fashion, and
lowed a major airbase to remain virtually to knock down, as fax as lies within its power, Never, however, have we committed
unprotected, allowed a bomb to be smuggled the delusions which the powers that be sys- ourselves to converting the Vietnamese
into a key officers' billet, and bungled a whole tematically disseminate in order further to war into an American war. Never have
Vietnamese marine battalion into a rescue addle the brains of their victims. A sample we said that if, despite all of the assist-
operation for four dead American soldiers of the latter is the domino theory which ance and support we have given to Sai-
who, in all decency, could have remained for years has buttressed suicidal U.S. policies gon, it still is unable to cope with the up-
buried in Vietnamese soil until it was cer- in southeast Asia. In the August 24 Nation, rising against it, we will then undertake
tain that they would not be used as bait in John Gange took a look at this fiction of to move in with American forces and
a gigantic trap. "inevitable, irresistible and sequential mas-
On the other side of the spectrum, little sive defeat" that was supposedly the cone- transform the struggle into an American
cart be gained by believing that North Viet- quence of the fall of the first domino. This war.
natn would seriously consider giving up all theory of course fits perfectly into the scheme Mr. GRUENING. That is true.
the political and military advantages which of globalism or unlimited military interven- Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I could
it has secured at a heavy price, for the tion in civil wars. In Christmas week, Secre- not feature any war that would be more
sake of joining some sort of regional TVA. tary Rusk ducked a press question as to foolish or futile than a war involving
Americans with a nostalgia for Point 4, and whether the United States still subscribed to the fuel commitment of white, Western
Frenchmen who can see a role for France in the domino theory. Probably he has his own
a reconstituted, neutralist Indochina Feder- doubts by now. troops against Asian troops and the
ation, share that belief, which may be just Another sacred tenet of American policy is Asian mainland.
as illusory as the "hawk" idea of treating the the rice bowl theory-that Communist China I commend the Senator for his address
Vietnam crisis as "Cuba II." An Indochina is bent on expansion to the south in search this afternoon. I believe it is important
Common Market, a TVA on the Mekong- of food, Warren Unna writes in the Wash- that we continue to stress the true nature
well and good, but only?as frosting on the ington Post that this argument is knocked of the American Commitment, so that
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 1965 Approved For Rele s & 3 lgogA~Ii-p8ft 00ftWgg300170022-7 785
there will be no confusion over what we
have obligated ourselves' to do in
Vietnam.
I have said, and I say again, that com-
mitments solemnly made must be kept,
whether made wisely or unwisely. But,
there never, at any time, has been any
commitment on the part of the United
States to undertake to fight the war in
South Vietnam. It is the kind of war
that can only be won by the South Viet-
namese themselves.
I commend the Senator for his address.
I am sorry that I was not here at the
time the distinguished Senator from
South Dakota [Mr. McGovEax] spoke
on the subject of Vietnam. I want the
Senator from South Dakota to know that
he, too, is rendering a very important
service in registering his independent
views.
The Senate has a responsibility in the
field of foreign affairs. We have suffered
from too much conformity of thought
on the matter of Vietnam. A dissent,
constructively expressed, indeed, a full-
fledged debate on the subject of Vietnam,
is long overdue. At the very least, such
a debate would give the American peo-
ple a better idea of the alternatives avail-
able to us. It would give the President
more elbow room, should he need it,
within which to deal with this difficult
situation in southeast Asia.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished Senator from
Idaho for his very helpful and construc-
tive contribution.
Does the Senator not fear that the very
policy which he considers unthinkable
and unwarranted; namely, a gradual
takeover of the Armed Forces of the
United States, is not actually taking
place? In the first place, we know that
many of our so-called advisers have
been and are actually in combat. With
in the last 48 hours, we have heard of
strikes by American combat planes at
installations outside of Vietnam.
In effect, this would seem to be a policy
which could easily degenerate or escalate
into total military participation. There-
fore, I think the Senator's suggestion is
excellent, that we keep our eyes fixed on
these original pledges. I think that that
is extremely important. Nevertheless,
although we may keep our eyes upon it,
it may be happening while we look. I
feel very much that it is happening now.
As I stated in my remarks, the pledge
to which the President alluded in the
state of the Union message certainly
does not preclude our taking this matter
to the conference table. If we can stop
the war, if we can have a cease-fire, if we
can prevent a Communist military take-
over by going to the peace table, I believe
we would be fulfilling our pledge, and
serving our own interests and those of
mankind far better than-by the mistaken
policy which I deeply feel we are now
pursuing.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I feel
that there is much truth in what the
Senator has said. I heard only this
morning a news report out of Saigon that
American and South Vietnamese planes
have Joined in attacks upon North
Vietnam.
I was very much alarmed at this news.
I am happy to say that the Secretary of
State assured us this morning that there
was no truth whatever in the report, and
that American planes have not engaged
in any attack upon the territory of North
Vietnam, except, of course, in the one
case where we retaliated against the
torpedo attacks upon our destroyers in
the Gulf of Tonkin. Nevertheless, as the
Senator has pointed out, there is always
the danger of our becoming more and
more involved, and, step by step, finding
ourselves drawn into a war which is not
ours to fight.
Mr. GRUENING. There are subtle
involvements. One of the brave and
courageous fighters in the uniform of the
United States-although we are not sup-
posed to be fighting there-has received
the Medal of Honor-all to his credit-
but that is an indication that our mili-
tary are actively fighting. Likewise leg-
islation is being introduced to treat vet-
erans of the war in Vietnam as we treated
the GI's of World War I and World War
II. These are indications that we are
edging into the tragic situation upon
which the senior Senator from Idaho
says we must keep our eyes at all times,
and not permit it to occur.
I welcome his support. I agree with
him that there should be a full-fledged
debate on this question, because in the
Senate we have a responsibility in the
field of foreign relations. Every alterna-
tive to the present tragic situation should
be explored on the floor of the Senate.
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AID
PROGRAM
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Sen-
ate can find much cause for gratification
in the President's message concerning
the foreign aid program.
Our foreign assistance programs be-
gan with the passage of the Greek-
Turkish aid bill in 1947. Our effort is 18
years old. There are sigfis that the pro-
gram is coming of age.
We have accomplished much, and we
have learned much in the accomplish-
ment.
At the time of the Marshall plan we
were engaged in an effort which required
innovation and experimentation. In-
evitably some of our best laid plans
went awry.
We have, of course, not achieved the
millenium. But we have achieved more
than many thought possible after World
War II. We have reached many of our
goals ; more are in sight.
Seventeen countries have moved from
the need for outside aid to self-support;
our economic aid programs have been
ended in 15 European countries, Japan,
and Lebanon.
In 14, more countries in Asia, Latin
America, and Africa, the transition to
economic self-support is underway. The
need for U.S., foreign aid there is draw-
ing to a close. These include Greece and
Taiwan, where economic aid will end
this year.
With our help, Taiwan has been ex-
panding its gross national product at
an average rate of 7 percent per year..
Industrial production has gone up 12
percent annually. From a needy devel-
oping nation 15 years ago, it has grown
into a net exporter, and a bastion of
strength in the Pacific.
Encouraging signs of maturity and
progress can be found in Latin America.
We can now point to a third of a million
houses which will be built by the end
of fiscal year 1965, 36,400 classrooms, al-
most 12,000 schoolbooks, 300,000 farmers
who will., have received credit loans,
2,120 water systems constructed, and 734
hospitals and mobile health centers in
operation.
These U.S. programs alone will, by
then, have directly touched the lives of
some 24 million people. The efforts of
our partner nations in the alliance will
multiply these figures many times.
This is progress. But even this tan-
gible progress is less important than the
willingness of the people of Latin Amer-
ica to move. The success of the alliance
depends upon the people of Latin Amer-
ica. We are seeing a gradual but im-
portant shift in attitude, a willingness
to discuss the heavy burdens of the com-
mitment to develop that Latin America
has assumed for itself and a willingness
to enter into the self-help efforts required
to achieve the alliance goals.
There are other reasons for encourage-
ment. Events in Venezuela, Brazil, and
Chile indicate that Castroism is not ac-
cepted as an answer to the problems of
this hemisphere. Cuban interference has
been significantly reduced by the sharp
reaction of the hemisphere to the Cuban
effort.
There are also encouraging signs of
improvements in the management, of our
foreign aid program. Where we once
were using a shotgun, we are now more
and more employing a rifle. This pro-
gram would give some kind of assistance
to some 70 countries. Nearly 90 percent
of all our economic assistance would be
directed to 25 of 70 countries receiving
some kind of assistance.
In terms of the budget, we are pre-
sented with a rockbottom request. It
is the smallest in the history of the for-
eign aid program. The sum requested is
less than the amount appropriated to run
the State of California for 1 year. It is
less than six-tenths of 1 percent of the
gross national product.
We are making progress in coordi-
nating our aid with the efforts of other
nations and multilaterial agencies. Elev-
en other free world countries now con-
duct aid programs of their own. The
transition from AID economic help to
more conventional resources of finance
such as Export-Import Bank lending,
World Bank lending, and private invest-
ment, is now underway in 14 countries
where AID conducts programs.
Private enterprise will continue to
have incentives for investment abroad
and opportunity to expand trade and
improve international standards of liv-
There has been steady improvement in
the efficiency of the administration of
the aid program. We have developed a
set of techniques for increasing economic
progress in a variety of political and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 15
economic environments. The people
working in AID are realists, not theorists.
Their test of the aid program is-will it
be effective?
The long list of countries where prog-
ress toward self-support is evident does
not include countries like Vietnam where
survival and stability must still be se-
cured before development can begin. It
does not include the newly independent
nations of Africa where the first steps
toward development are just being
taken.
A WORD ON EXISTING MAJOR PROBLEMS
The problem of population growth re-
mains a matter of grave concern. Also,
it has been found easier to increase in-
dustrial output than farm production,
and in countries where most people still
earn their living from the land, this
presents a challenge that cannot be
ignored. There remain major problems
in the world trade area. None of these
problems will be easy to solve.
But we have demonstrated that we
have both the ability and determination
to help in the accelerated development
of the free world, and we have given
substance to the dreams of more than
a billion people for a better life in free-
dom.
I believe it should be encouraged, not
discouraged.
I believe the foreign aid program has
come of age.
I believe we should enact the Presi-
dent's program, as proposed.
I ask unanimous consent to have print-
ed in the RECORD at this point a table
showing the fiscal year 1966 request as
compared with the fiscal year 1965 re-
quest and appropriations.
There being no objection, the table
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Mutual defense and development programs
FISCAL YEAR 1966 REQUEST COMPARED WITH FISCAL YEAR 1965 REQUEST AND FISCAL
YEAR 1965 APPROPRIATIONS
[In thousands oy
f dollars]
President's
request for
fiscal year
1965
Congressional
appropriation,
fiscal year
1965
President's
request for
fiscal year
1966
Economic assistance:
Development loans --------------------------- ------------.-.
Technical coo-_---_
peratiou------------?-------------__.-..... Alliance for Progress:
922,200
224,600
773,728
204, 600
780, 250
210:600
Development loans-----------------------------------------------
T
485,000
425, 000
495
125
echnical cooperation-------------------------------------------
Su
85, 000
84, 700
,
85
000
pporting assistance -------------------------------------------------
C
405,000
401
000
,
369
200
ontingency fund--------------------------------------------------
I
t
150,000
,
99,200
:
50
000
n
ernational organizations and programs ----------------------- --_---
134,400
134, 272
,
155
455
American schools and hospitals abroad---------------------------------
18,000
16
800
,
7
000
Survey of investment opportunities ---..-----------------------------__-
Administrativeexpenses, AID ---_----..---------------------- --------
2,100
52,500
,
1,600
51
200
,
240
--- ---55
Administrative and other expenses, State ------------------------------
2,900
:
2,900
,
3,100
Totaleconomic assistance--------------------_---- -----_-- ---,
Milit
i
t
2, 461, 700
2,195,000
2,210,370
ary ass
s
ance ------------------------------------------
1, 055, 000
1, 055, 000
1,170, 000
Total, mutual defense and development program--___
3,250,000
MUTUAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENTPROGRAMS
Budget requests fiscal years 1948-66
[In millions of dollars] '
Fiscal year
Economic
assistance
Military
assistance
1948-49_----------
27,370.0
------------
7, 370.0
1950-----.---------
4,`280.0
1,400.0
5, 680.0
1961--------------
2,950.0
5,222.5
8,172.5
1952--------------
2,197.0
6,303.0
8, 500. 0
1953--------------
2,475.0
5, 425.0
7, 900. 0
1954----
1,543.2
3,931.5
5,474.7
1955--------------
1,798.1
1,650.0
3,448.1
1956--------------
1,812.8
1,717.2
3,530.0
1957---------------
1,860.0
3, 000.0
4,860.0
1958_--_-'.----
1, 964.4
1,900. 0
3
864.4
1959------.--------
2,142.1
1,800.0
,
3,942. 1
1960---------------
2
330.0
1,600.0
3
930.0
1961-------------
:
2875.0
2,000.0
,
4
876. 0
1962-
2,883.5
1,885.0
4, 768.5
:
1963--------------
3,461.3
1,500.0
4
961 .3
lS64--------------
3,120.3
1,405.0
:
4525.3
1966.--------------
22,461.7
1, 055.
13,516.7
1966 _- -----------
2,210.4
1,170.0
3,380.4
1 Including supplementals and amendments initiated
by the executive branch.
2 Covers last quarter of fiscal year 1948 and furl fiscal
yes! 1949.
8 Includes amended request for Vietnam.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I move
that the Senate proceed to the considera-\
tion of executive business.
The motion was agreed to; and the
Senate proceeded to consider executive
business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HARTKE in the chair). If there be no re-
ports of committees, the clerk will state
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
The legislative clerk read the nomina-
tion of John A. Carver, Jr., of Idaho, to be
Under Secretary of the Interior.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I am
more than proud to endorse John A. Car-
ver, Jr., to be Under Secretary of Interior.
He has been a remarkably diligent and
adept public servant, and his many tal-
ents have demonstrated themselves in
abundance since he came to Washington
as my administrative assistant in 1957.
Before that he was a very successful
lawyer in Boise, Idaho, and a person
whose friendship I came to cherish.
That friendship has been kept in repair.
As my administrative assistant Mr. Car-
ver quickly demonstrated that he had the
intuition to locate the "jugular vein" of a
difficult problem; that he could organize
an office staff and inspire it to work ef-
ficiently and hard; and perhaps most of
all, that he was dedicated to the public
welfare, and evaluated legislative and
administrative functions within that
framework.
With his advent to an assistant secre-
taryship at Interior in 1961, Mr. Carver
began the supervision of the work of half
a dozen top Government agencies, and
I firmly believe these have advanced con-
siderably in their effectiveness under his
leadership and administration. Mr. Car-
ver kept an "open door" policy in his of-
fice, and people who came to see him
and discuss their problems found a will-
ing listener, and an official ready to move
adroitly and effectively against redtape,
Mr. Carver also took to the road, not
only to inform the public of Interior
functions and programs, but to acquaint
himself at the grassroots level with the
problems of the rancher, the Indian on
the reservation, the lumberman, the
mine operator, and all others whose
livelihood had a dependency on the
Federal lands under his jurisdiction. I
believe that he has made the agencies
under his guidance more responsive to
the public interest, more pliable in meet-
ing the needs of today, and more alert
to the requirements of the future.
Mr. President, I think we have in John
A. Carver, Jr., that rare public servant
who combines high honor, fine intelli-
gence, and great capability for the ad-
ministration of the laws we make here
in the Congress. I recommend him
without reservation for the undersecre-
taryship of the Interior.
Mr. President, following John Car-
ver's appearance before the Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee, the commit-
tee, In a most unusual procedure, en-
dorsed his nomination in a rising vote,
without going into executive session,
which is testimony to the confidence
that the members of the committee had
in this proven and able appointee.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD extracts from edi-
torials in western newspapers praising
the nomination of Mr. Carver for this
new position.
There being no objection, the extracts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Lewiston (Idaho) Morning
Tribune, Dec. 30, 1964 ]
A Boise attorney before his latest move to
Washington, D.C., Carver is thoroughly
familiar with the intricacies of Federal Gov-
ernment. He began as a messenger for a
Senate committee in 1936. He served in vari-
ous civilian and military assignments for the
National Government before he joined the
staff of Gov. Robert E. Smylle, then Idaho's
attorney general, in 1947. He practiced law
at Boise from 1948 to 1957, then returned to
Washington as administrative assistant to
Senator FRANK CHURCH. There he was rec-
ognized as one of the ablest administrative
assistants in the Senate, and Udall quickly
selected him for a key Interior Department
role after Udall's appointment as Secretary.
As Assistant Secretary in Charge of Public
Lands, Carver has encountered some of the
most complicated and controversial problems
in domestic government. He has not evaded
these problems, nor has he compromised the
administration's basic principles of land
management. Yet he has won not merely
the respect but the outspoken admiration of
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