HOW AND WHY WE GOT INTO VIETNAM

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January 1, 1965
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Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67800446R000300170020-9 CON.G i,.ESSIONAL RECORD -? SENATE This program was attacked by American parts makers who asserted It hurt domestic business by 'giving a subsidy in effect for the manufacture of parts in Canada and f there- fore Illegal under current trade agreements. The free trade arrangeiiients was designed to replace it. The independent parts suppliers, members of the Automotive Service Industry Associa- tlon, have also criticizes the new plan which they say "would "deny i's free` access to the Canadian market" since it requires auto firms to channel as much production as economi- cally feasible to Canada- _ Added incentives fof manuTit6turing in Canada are'-lower lab or costs and the low exchange rate of the Canadian dollar. PLAN SPI',CIltISATIUN The interlocking of regional plants, already begun in the Detroit-Windsor area in a limited fashion by Chrysler Corp. and the Ford Motor Co... would generally have Cana- 'dian.plants concentrate on certain parts for both- United States States and Canadian produc- tion Thus a Windsor plant now makes all the engines for a certain Plymouth Valiant model made in both countries: _ Through such specialization and division of labor, Canadian trade officials here said, Canadian auto producers: most of whom are U.S. subsidiaries, will cut their net trade deficit with ;the United States and become effectively integrated. SUPPORTED $Y TOWNSEND Chrysler Corp. President Lynn T. Townsend hailed the agreement as an encouraging step toward the `full realization of the kind of economic partnership between Canada and the United States. [From the Detroit Free Press] UNITED STATES Alto CANADA AGREE To END Mo?,T TARIFFS 0# CARS, PARTS f,X (By Robert Boyd) The United States and Canada agreed Friday to forma limited "common market" on, new automobiles and auto parts. The. agreement, to be signed by President Johnson and Canadian Prime, Minister Les- ter Pearson at, 11 am?aturday at the LBJ Rauch In Texas, will wipe out most tariffs on automotive products between the two coun- tries, It takes gft'ect as soon as enabling'legisla- tion is passed by Congress and the Canadian Parliament. It also applies to trucks, buses, and parts for those vehicles: The main effect, of the agreement will be to ,permit Canadian auto p`tants to' import Amer- scan-made cars and parts without paying the present i71% to 25 percent duties Imposed by Canada. Canadian auto dealers and private citizens will still -have to pay, duty on American- built cars and parts. The tariff will be erased only for auto manufacturers. lmpst all Canadian'car makers are sub- sidiaries of American firms. The tariff Will be lifted only so long as the Canadian auto plants 'continue to produce ..at existing rates or higher. In turn, American duties of from 61/2 to 81/2 percent on Canadian-made cars and parts will-be abolished. American auto dealers or manufacturers andprivate citizens will be able to buy cars and parts duty-free from Canada. The agreement would mean that Detroiters, for eeanppie, could go 'to Windsor and `buy a Canad'pay, t ,car, or auto' parts, and "not have to ' uty to bring the- car or parts across the etroit River. But Windsor residents who bought a car or parts ' in Detroit would have to pay the regular duty to ' bring llTem-back to Windsor. The purpose" of the 'agreement as `stated in a text issued simulta-neously at the Texas ranch and in WashingTon, are: Ko create a broader market for automo- tive-products within which the full benefits of specialization and large-scale production can be achieved. "To liberalize United States and Canadian automotive trade * * * to enable the indus- tries of both countries to participate on a fair and equitable basis in the expanding to- tal market of the two countries. "To develop conditions in which market forces may operate effectively to attain the most economic pattern of investment, pro- duction, and trade." U.S. officials said both countries would benefit from the tariff cuts. The officials said no estimate of jobs that might be added to-'the Canadian auto indus- try was available, but there were reports that as many as 60,000 additional workers could be employed. And it was reported that Canadian sub- sidiaries of U.S. auto firms had assured the Canadian Government that they would in- crease annual production by $250 million over the next 3 years. Further details of the assurances were de- scribed as "commercial secrets." Congress is expected to demand a full dis- closure of the "secrets." Canada obviously lpoks upon the agree- ment as a spur to its auto industry, but some U.S. officials claimed industry employ- ment in the United States should also rise as the total market expands. Such thinking is based on the theory that a large common market trading area should permit more economical car production and hence increase sales in both countries. The agreement is also expected to end, or at least soothe, the United States-Canadian con- troversy over a "duty-remission scheme" which has irritated U.S. auto parts makers. This scheme involves rebates of Canadian tariffs to Canadian auto makers who increase their exports to the United States. It has been termed illegal and unfair by independ- ent V.S. parts makers who do not have man- ufacturing outlets in Canada. Complaints by these parts makers in Ohio, Wisconsin, and Missouri may cause diffi- culty in Congress when the agreement comes up for passage. TARIFF CUT CHEERS AUTO FIRMS, UAW The automotive, industry-both manage- merit and labor-Friday hailed the an- nouncement of a United States-Canadian treaty eliminating most tariffs on autos and parts. GM Board Chairman Frederic G. Donner said his firm "will cooperate fully to imple- ment the program and make every effort to assure its success:" - ? Ford Board Chairman Henry Ford II Called the agreement "ail historic event. I have long believed that the elimination of arti- ficial obstacles to international trade Is one of the best ways to promote economic de- velopment and to strengthen the ties of friendship and understanding between na- tions," he said. Chrysler President Lynn A. Townsend called the treaty "an encouraging step to- ward the full realization of-the kind of economic partnership between Canada and the United States that we all know is possible." AMC President Roy Abernethy said the consumers, and the economies of both "the United States and Canada "should ultlrn-ately, benefit from the long-range effects of pro- grams to eliminate trade barriers between the two countries," Reuther said the union was "pieased an agreement has been worked out by the United States and Canadian Governments to provide for a common market in automobiles and parts." Windsor's two biggest auto dealers-each yclaims to be No. 1-reacted differently to the tariff-cutting announcement: 10-15 Burl J'anies, owner of James Chevrolets Oldsmobile, Ltd., was elated. "I think it's a terrific thing," he said in his showroom at 917 Goyeau. "It will bring additional people into the car market be- cause of reduced prices. It will make more two-, three-, and four-car families." Al Sternberg, new car sales manager at Webster Motors, a Ford dealership, saw no such a bonanza. "Eventually I think you'll get more for your money on cars," he said In his office at 485 Windsor. "But I don't think prices on most cars will come down." Both said they are convinced Canadians will continue buying their cars in Canada, and Americans will continue buying theirs In the United States. Sternberg said the new agreement would remove tariffs only for manufacturers and business-an individual couldn't hop a bus In Canada, buy a car in the United States and drive it back home duty-free. Canadians pay more for their cars. Dealers said that a Chevrolet selling for about $2,950 in Detroit costs about $3,300 in Canada. [From the- Kansas City Times, Jan. 16, 1965] TARIFF ACCORD AFTER LONG FIGHT BY MISSOURIANS (By John R. Cauley) WASHINGTON.-The United States-Ca- nadian agreement which will eliminate cus- tom duties on motor vehicles and original parts by both countries climaxes a long and successful fight on discrimination against American manufacturers In which two of the leading participants were Senator STUART SYMINGTON, Democrat, of Missouri, and Jack F. Whitaker, president of the Whitaker Cable Corp., of Kansas City. The agreement is expected to be signed to- day at Johnson City, Tex. "Naturally I am very grateful to the Presi- dent for carrying this matter through to a conclusion," SYMINGTON said last night. "The proposed agreement should result In holding many thousands of jobs in Missouri." Senator SYMINGTON expressed some con- cern that replacement parts were not in- cluded in the agreement, but said he had a8surance8 the matter would'be considered. GROWTH OF FLOW Last year Whitaker, as chairman of an in- dustrywide committee, wrote President Johnson that due to the Canadian tariff re- bating plan the Canadians were shipping motor car parts into this country at the rate of $50 million a year-six times what they were shipping 2 years ago. Whitaker said the Canadian intent, which they openly expressed, was to obtain 60,000 jobs for Canada at the expense of American labor. The Kansas C'itian asked the President to order the Treasury Secretary to place count- eravailing duties on the importation of Ca- nadian parts. - SYMINGTON said Whitaker brought the Ca- nadian manipulation to his attention about 2 years ago and predicted what would happen unless something was done. "His prediction turned out to be only too right," SYMINGTON said. STUDEBAKER IS CITED The Missouri Senator added that "when the Studebaker Corp:, a prominent customer of Whitaker, saw the handwriting on the wall, it decided to move its entire assembly operation to Canada" SYMINGTON said he immediately took the issue to the proper Government agencies and later as a member of the Canadian affairs subcommittee obtained a hearing to investi- gate the tariff question. American officials said last night that the tiouble_'began in 1962 when Canada initiated a program under which automo- bile companies operating in Canada were Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170020-9 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170020-9 10441 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE January 22 -allowed to have the benefit of tariff-free treatment on certain car parts through the technique of tariff rebates, in return for in- creased exports of cars or parts. This Canadian program was challenged by Whitaker and others in the industry as being contrary to a section of. our basic tariff act concerned with foreign bounties or grants on exports to the United States. TRADE WAR SEEN Their request for countervailing duties by the United States as a counteraction was not granted because, as officials explained, it was believed this would have set in motion a chain reactiou of retaliatory protective meas- ures and a trade war would have developed. Instead, the United States and Canada began discussions in an effort to bring peace. The result was the agreement announced yesterday. Officials said the tariff rebate scheme which was at the root of most of the complaints will be dropped by Canada, probably on Monday. They said the replacement-parts issue was not included because a study is needed to determine its impact on many small firms. Officials said the--principal concern of the Canadians was whether their car industry could exist in the face of the concentration of absentee American ownership. Officials said because Americans and Canadians live side by side and are big customers of each other an agreement to end-a-potentially dis- astrous trade war was imperative. They said that some dislocations would occur in the parts industry with perhaps, some American parts factories moving to Canada and some Canadian factories to the United States. In Kansas City, Jack F. Whitaker said last night, "I think this is a major step in United States-Canadian relationships, and if we are capable of taking care of ourselves competi- tively, it should work out to the best for both countries. Whitaker's company, which is at 13th and Burlington Streets in North Kansas City, supplies electrical wiring to all U.S. motor- car makers except General Motors Corp., and employs about 1,000 persons here. The trade pact is especially beneficial to Missouri, Whitaker said, because it is the second largest assembler of motor-cars in the United States. "Without the agreement we would have had to put a plant in Canada to increase services and cut costs," Whitaker said. "It is still iossible we may have to move part of our operation to Canada, but not nearly as probable as before." YE OW AND WHY WE GOT INTO VIETNAM Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, even to those of us who lived for a long time with the problems of our involvement in southeast Asia, the complex history of the past 11 or 12 years there is not in our minds in a clear and orderly fashion. But that story has been told, clearly and succinctly and with the history com- piled for the understanding of every reader, in an excellent article which ap- peared in the December issue of the American Legion magazine. The article is entitled "The Long Struggle in Viet- nam" and it" was written by Gerald L. Steiibel. Mr. Steibel's review of the history makes clear how and why we got there. He relates the manner in which our pol- icy there is connected with what hap- pened in the Korean war, and how our involvement began as early as 1953 be- fore the French were entirely out of what was then Indochina. He discusses the world situation as it existed, and the elements of our own foreign policy which dictated the measures we have taken. Because this seems to me, Mr. Presi- dent, perhaps the most enlightening single summary I have seen, and the most comprehensive, setting forth this background of history and policy, I ask unanimous consent that it may appear following these introductory remarks, as a part of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE LONG STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM (By Gerald L. Steibel) (In Korea we fought a huge -war to con- tain communism on Red China's north. It was barely over, when the French left a vacuum for the Reds to fill, if we'd let them, in Indochina to the south. Here, in all its strange detail, is the complex history of our first 11 years of meeting in Indochina the challenge we accepted in Korea-the how and why of our involvement in Vietnam and Laos.) In 1964, the United States had spent about 10 years and $3 billion defending Laos and South Vietnam from Communist aggression; and by ones, twos and threes, Americans in uniform had died and were still dying there. Yet 6 out of 10 people here at home told the Gallup poll that they didn't know what was going on there. Of the four who said they did, only one had any opinion on what ought to be done, and he was half for getting out altogether, half for getting In further. It is not surprising that so many people are unsure about their grasp of the Vietnam situation. The Indochinese Peninsula is strange country to most Americans. Until recent years, Indochinese world problems were French, not American, worries. Before the present dilemma evolved, we had no background or tradition there. Even the few familiar place names have changed. The entire region has no well- known, traditional name. It's just south- east Asia, a land mass hanging down from the southeast corner of China. It has a fat upper peninsula-Indochina--where Viet- nam and the other areas of acute present concern are located; and a long, slim lower part known as the Malay Peninsula. Our maps show the divisions, and trace the name- changes. Siam is still on the map, but now it's Thailand. The maps show how Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam came into being out of French Indochina. Then, in the Geneva agreement of 1954, Vietnam - had a line drawn straight across it-the "cease-fire line of July 1954"-dividing it into North Viet- nain (Communist, with the seat at Hanoi) and South Vietnam (non-Communist, with the capital at Saigon). The hottest problem today arises from guerrilla and political ac- tivity in South Vietnam, chiefly flowing from North Vietnam, now a political arm of Red China. Broad U.S. policy is aimed at keep- ing communism north of the line in Vietnam, and preventing Laos and Cambodia (as well as Thailand, Burma, and Malaya) from fall- ing lock, stock, and barrel into the Com- munist orbit. All the events in the area are actually all of one piece, with respect to both free world and Communist policy, but they are complex and confusing to the man in the street in the United States because sev- eral different countries with different leaders, and different Communist and other op- position factions are involved. On top of that, within each country old local an- tagonisms, interests, and factions are jockeying for position in the big battle between East and West. Before World War U, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia had been one French colonial area-French Indochina-for nearly a cen- tury. In World War D: the Japanese moved in. When they left, after loss of the war in the Pacific, France returned, but her old ascendancy was shaken. The Japanese had proved that France, now weakened by the war in Europe, need not be all powerful there. V-J Day had hardly dawned in 1945 when the Annarnese, one of the dominant people of Indochina, were in revolt. Other natives throughout the provinces of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam joined the agita- tion, organizing and fighting- for independ- ence. Different groups had different long- term aims, especially the local nationalists and Communist-organized groups. The nationalist - groups sought permanent in- dependence as an end; the Communists sought independence as the first step toward delivering the whole peninsula into the world Communist camp. But they were united on getting rid of France. The Indochinese war for independence from France was successful, culminating in the terrible defeat of the French at Dienbienphu in 1954. In the settlement with France after her defeat, the three territories be- came the new independent nations of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Meanwhile, also as a result of the post-World War II power vacuum and the failure of U.S. policy to maintain Chiang Kai-shek in China, all of mainland China went Communist in 1949. It became the seat of Communist power in Asia, bent on making all Asia Communist. U.S. policy stiffened against this. By the time the French were out of Indochina, the United States had wound up the bloodbath of the Korean war in conjunction with the U.N. in a major expression of its determina- tion to block further Communist expansion in Asia. Very broadly, our present involvement in the whole Indochinese area is our Korea policy all over again, applied to the area south of Red China as Korea applied it to the northeast. The events in Indochina can be compared with those in Korea as an effort to achieve the same containment of communism that we achieved in Korea while avoiding, if possible, a major war on the Korean scale of 1950-53, or greater. The beginning of U.S. involvement in Indochina came in 1953, even before France was entirely out. The well-organized Communists, aided by Red China, were hell- bent to turn the coming independence into Communist captivity. They were strongest in Northern Vietnam, closest to Red China, and in Laos where a second Communist force, the Pathet Lao, controlled an island of terri- tory in the northern part of the country. It seemed that the militant and better orga- nized Communists, with powerful outside aid, would carry the day. While France still held out, China and Russia had been warned by the United States, in September 1953, not to try to over- run the French colonies. This, the United States said, would have "grave consequencies which might not be confined to Indochina." That was a part of the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' "brink of war" policy. In 1954, President Eisenhower considered U.S. 'military intervention to save the French at Dienbienphu. On April 8, he said the rest of Asia "would fall like dominoes" if Indo- china went Communist. But in the fight against the French, the Indochinese were together. The United States would be at- tacking the freedom-seeking forces as well as the Communists, so intervention to save the French was out of the question. The French defeat led to an international conference in Geneva, Switzerland, called by Britain and the U.S.S.R. Geneva agreements signed June 21, 1954, drew the cease-fire line across Vietnam. This line gave half of Viet- Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170020-9 1965"x..::: Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67800446R000300170020-9. 66TORTSSIOtTAL RECOR7 ENA'TE rum's 126,000 square miles to tfre new Com- ,r a second stage lasted fort years, until 'la"ochina disappeared from the headlines, munist "Democratic Republic of Vietnam"- the beginning of 1958, and it was deceptively which were taken over by the East-West built around the powerful Vietminh armies. quiet. Convinced they could not overrun good will summit meeting at Geneva in 1955, The Geneva agreements were supposed to pre- Laos or South Vietnam, the Communists now the Polish and Hungarian uprisings in 1956, vent civil war and they scheduled a "perma- reverted to the slower tactics of infiltration and the first Soviet sputnik space vehicle neat settlement" to be arrived at by "all and buildup, concentrating on Laos. With launching in 1957. Vietnam", elections in Jul `1558. The agree- the breathing spell thus offered him in South In 1958, the Indochinese calm began to dis- melits were to'be policed by an international Vietnam, and with substantial U.S.. economic integrate and the second stage gave way to conunission,. but 'they had little more effect and military aid, Ngo Dinh Diem began to a third, filled with alarms and crises and than to consolidate the Communist control vindicate the faith of his American sup- culminating in two further major U.S. deci- ,of North Vietnam, making it an interna- porters. sions 3 years later, in 1961. tionally recognized haven out of which they To begin with, Diem received a big psycho- The first alarm went off in Laos. In No- could laterolierate south of the line with logical lift when almost 900,000 Vietnamese vember 1957, the refurbished Pathet Lao set political agitation and guerrilla warfare. "voted with their feet" and left the Commu- itself up as a party and pushed its way into Though the United States did not sign the nist North to come South in a 300-day period the neutralist government of Prince Sou- the Geneva accords. (Only a vanna Phouma. The United States, which d b l id y prov e agreements, its representative, Gen. Bedel Smith issued a statement saying it would trickle elected to go North.) This jolted Red had been giving Laos about $50 million a not interfere with them. "popularity" claims throughout Asia, al- year, declared it was "seriously concerned" Washington now faced Its first big de- though 900,000 new citizens added to Diem's by this event. It said that letting Commu- cision: to back out quietly and by degrees economic problems. nists into the government was a "perilous permit the Communists to complete their Second, he moved immediately and vigor- course" for Laos. By 1958, Washington had conquests by political means, or to commit ously to assert his control over the army. become very worried over what the Commu- itself to trying to maintain the freedom of That secured, he cracked down hard on reli- nists might accomplish in organizing other the new nations. gious sects which had their own private leftwing elements for the assembly elections Most foreign diplomats in the summer of armies, like the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. set for 1959 in Laos. 1954 gave Laos and South Vietnam no more These had long defied all efforts by the To counter the Communist weight, the than 6 months to a year before the Commu- French to curb their power. Diem also broke United States now threw its support to an nists would take over, and Washintgon was the power of the Binh Xuyen, a "syndicate" army-based group there headed by Gen. very much inclined to concur. In the pro- that ran the country's commercialized vices Phoumi Nosavan. A rapid buildup of his posed all-Vietnam elections of 1956, Com- such as narcotics and prostitution, and which forces followed, and by December 1958 they -munist North Vietnam would come in with terrorized businessmen and peasants into were in open skirmishes with the Pathet Lao over 17 million people to South Vietnam's submission to it. in the northeast. In February 1959, the Lao- less than 14. million. It also had most of the Then, on October 23, 1955, Diem called a tian Government denounced the Geneva industry, and the whole region' was in the referendum which ousted the playboy king agreements as having been robbed of mean- middle oY Red China's own front yard. of South Vietnam, Bao Dai, and made Diem ing by the Communists. The United States Sotxie quarters in the Eisenhower adman- chief of state. A Republic of South Vietnam approved the denunciation and prepared to was proclaimed on October 26, with Diem as send a military mission to Laos-a move the of the nttue French withdrawal. its president. Next year, a constitution was Chinese and Vietnamese Communists at- They eye ate Departmen, urged re Goawa- adopted and a measure of political stability tacked as an American plot to restore ffn- Tment s irwe by the French h not b t bee was finally achieved in the country. (The perialism to all Indochina. saved from view that Indochina could "all-Vietnam" elections, slated for 1956, were At first, General Phoumi seemed to be sflved the Communists, and that the simply never held.) "All-Vietnam" was by the answer Washington was looking for in best deal obtainable would be a Red promise then really two countries, one Red, one free. Laos, perhaps a leader as good as South Viet- to respect the neutrality established by the To the further satisfaction of his Ameri- nam's Ngo Dinh Diem. In December 1959, Geneva accords. This was the French Gov- can allies, Diem turned his attention to his Phoumi drove the Communists out of the ernment's position more than 4 years before shattered economy. In the next 5 years, Laotian Government. But his 50,000 U.S.- Gen. Charles de Gaulle returned to power 140,000 landless peasants received their own trained and U.S.-backed troops proved un- end adopted the neutralization policy as farms in a program a former U.S. Agriculture able to defeat the 18,000 Pathet Lao and their his own policy. - Department specialist, Wolf Ladejinsky, instructors operating out of the North Viet- Other U.S. voices' argued differently, helped design and oversee. Diem rebuilt the nam sanctuary. A new crisis in Laos rapidly among them Senators Mike' Mant'freld transportation system; rice and rubber pro- approached. and g John V. Kennedy, Gen. William J. Dono- duction climbed above prewar levels; and a In August 1960, Phoumi himself was ousted van, and Francis Cardinal Spellman. "To- base for national industrial growth was by a rebel officer named Capt. Kong Le, who ether with officials of private refugee-aid erected. School enrollments and teaching declared his loyalty to the neutralist pre- organizations, they urged that help be given staffs were tripled and almost 3,000 medical inter, Prince Souvanna Phouma. Immedi- to the new Premier of South Vietnam, Ngo aid stations and maternity clinics were aly, the Pathet Lao military threat erupted Dinh 15i appointed They weeks before the opened. Into what looked like the start of a complete Geneva a reement. The insisted that Diem, The contrast with Ho Chi Minh's Commu- takeover. In September 1960, the United A stanch anti-Communist who had spent nist North Vietnam was painfully clear. States repeated the warning of 1953 against many years in the United States, could save Though the Reds had inherited a much a military conquest of Laos. But this time his beleaguered country if he were helped. larger industrial plant when Vietnam was it sent a carrier force into the South China The administration sent some economic split, their estimated gross national product Sea, including 1,000 combat-ready Marines. aid in August 1954, but wrestled with the was only "$70 per person 'by 1961, as against This assertion of U.S. willingness to use larger question of permanent policy until $110 in the free south. And, while per capita its military held the Communists in check, late in the fall. Even as Gen. J. Lawton Col- food production dropped 10 percent in the but the settlement for Laos of 1954 was hope- Tins-prepared to go to Saigon as President north after 1956, it went up 20 percent in lessly shattered. In December, Phoumi once Eisenhower's special representative. Wash- the south. more came back into power, but the neu- ington was still leaning toward a pullout. Finally, the United States continued to tralists now set up their own government in But the pro-Diem advocates finally prevailed help train and equip the South Vietnam the south, and Laos was in effect split in and Collins was ordered to make a definite armed forces to meet the invasion from the three parts, with Phoumi's pro-Western offi- U.$. commitmen't. north which was still believed to constitute cial government sandwiched between Com- 'the Arai commitment was small and limit- the main danger. munists and neutralists. ed primarily to economic assistance. The ' American gratification with events in Meanwhile, South Vietnam, too, had come United States was then setting up the next South Vietnam was tempered by the gloomier under the Communist gun, in spite of the fallback position in Asia, pinned to the Pak- picture in Laos. From the start, the Com- 1954 cease fire. In 1958, Ho Chi Minh's radio istan-Thailand-Malaya-Philippines arc, and munist Pathet Lao military forces violated in North Vietnam announced that the Cm- embodied in the then new Southeast Asia the Geneva neutrality stipulations. Men munists would mount a major campaign Treaty Organization (SEATO) established at and arms were brought in from North Viet- against the Diem regime. A virulent propa- Manila_in September 1954. Dulles induced nam, and the Pathet Lao maintained a vir- Banda offensive tore at Diem's American "im- $EATO to give Laos, Cambodia, and South tual state-within-a-state in Laos' northeast- perialist" sponsors, and Red guerrilla fighters $TtetfiaW one-way guarantees against Com- ern Provinces of Samneua and Phongsaly. known as Vietcong appeared in South Viet- r'iihnlst invasion from North Vietnam. (The Repeated appeals for help by the Royal Lao nam. They were led by tough cadres trained Geneva, treaties forbade offering them'mem- Government to the International Control in North Vietnam and supplied with weapons bership in tie' alliance itself.) Commission proved fruitless. The Commis- and material originating in Moscow and Pei- Though there was little appreciation of sion, set up at Geneva to police the agree- ping, and transported through North Viet- what really lay ahead, this hesitant commit- ments, was made up of a Communist Pole, an nam and northeastern Laos over what came meat war 'a historic, decision for the United Indian, and a Canadian member. Neither to be called the Ho Chi Minh trail through States., From there on, no withdrawal would the Pathet Lao nor the Polish member would the jungles. be possible without great loss of "face." With permit it to function. The Vietcong offensive hit the Diem gov- that, the first stage of U.S. involvement was Despite the Laotian troubles, there were no ernment at one of its most sensitive points: f Diem and l l l i i y persona ru e o ncreas ng overt major crises or decisions in the years 1955-58. the Approved For Release 2003/10/15 :CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170020-9 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170020-9 1048 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Janu6W 22 his brothers, particularly Ngo Dinh Nhu. (Note that what we call the first name is the Last.) By 1958, the Ngo Dinh family had replaced or stripped of power most of the old leaders. Nhu was head of a strong secu- rity police, which had learned many lessons from the Communists. His wife, Madame Nhu, wielded great influence behind the scenes, particularly in propaganda and cul- turaa affairs. Diem's two brothers, Catholic Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thue and Ngo Dinh Can, controlled political power levers In the north. Diem, a cautious and suspicious man, trusted no one except his own family. Un- der him they built a formidable ruling ma- chine that brought cries of outrage from the better educated South Vietnamese-and from many quarters In the United States. As the Vietcong stepped up their attacks, the stern measures of theDiem government increased. By June 1960, assassinations by Reds were taking place at the rate of 2 to 10 a day. In 1 year alone, 3,000 South Vietnamese civilians were killed and 2,500 kidnaped. Red insur- gent organizers, many of whom had come in with the 900,000 refugees 6 years earlier, were persuading and forcing South Vietnamese peasants to give them havens. Many had family ties in the countryside and the cities, and they exploited them to the full. A front for the liberation of the south, inspired and backed by Hanoi, the capital of Communist North Vietnam, added to Diem's burdens by calling for the departure of the Americans and their puppet Diem. In the South Vietnam countryside, the Vietcong grew bolder, too. Its guerrillas at- tacked in force, sometimes with as many as 500 men. When pursued by government troops, they often fled into Laos or Cam- bodia as well as North Vietnam. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's leader, de- nied that his country was a privileged sanc- tuary for them, but Sihanouk was a declared believer in the ultimate victory of the Com- munists and in the necessity to come to terms with them before that happened. He neither defended nor impounded the rebels, so to all practical Intents 'Cambodia was a sanctuary. The year 1961 opened with both Laos and South Vietnam showing signs of impending collapse. For the United States it was to be the year of decision in southeast Asia- and the year when it finally recognized what its decisions really meant. On January 6, Khrushchev made what Secretary of Rusk later called "one of the most important speeches on Communist strategy of recent decades." In. it, Khru- shchev said world nuclear wars and large- scale "conventional" wars were too danger- ous for the big powers to risk. But "wars of national liberation" were different. Nam- ing Vietnam specifically, he said, "It is a sacred war? We recognize such wars." The Incoming Kennedy administration read this speech with the deepest interest, deriving these three major clues from it: (1) Khrushchev's split with Communist China had now widened to the point where he was ready,toput a virtual ban on big, war, in defiance of Peiping's' insistence on more risk taking; (2) the price the West- would have to pay was more sublimited wars of insurgency (3) the Laos-Vietnam insurgency would get much more intense, with both Moscow and Peiping behind it, though disagreeing over the degree of Inten- sity. Khrushchev later spelled all this out in detail for Kennedy when they met at Vienna in June. He and the U.S. President did agree that Laos could drag both of them into a world war neither wanted, and that some kind of limitation had to be placed on it. Kennedy came home calling this a "somber" meeting. With the Laos situation in turmoil and the Communists convinced the United States would probably come in to stop a final vic- tory, it was time for them to revert to their classic 1954 maneuver-a new, 14-nation Geneva conference. The Peiping, Vietnam- ese and Laotian Reds went to it to get at the bargaining table some of what they could not claim in the field. The United States went also-to stave off the old, nasty choice of (1) a major land war in Asia or (2) a Com- munist sweep. The new conference met in Geneva on May 16, 1961, and wrangled for the next 15 months, while the three Laotian factions battled in the field for positions of advantage in the ultimate settlement. Before it could forge new agreements, the United States was faced with far more serious problems In South Vietnam. Throughout 1961, the Diem forces strove to meet the Vietcong challenge, but by the fall it was obvious they were failing badly, Diem called on the United States for addi- tional help, and President Kennedy sent Gen. Maxwell Taylor to Indochina to review the entire situation there. Taylor's findings were a landmark. He re- ported the lack of everything from proper equipment and weapons to understanding the nature of the war itself. In effect, Tay- lor said the South Vietnamese were trying to meet a skillful and effective Communist insurgency with arms, organization, and doc- trine designed for an altogether dif- ferent kind of conventional war. Though his criticisms necessarily fell most heavily on the South Vietnamese, they implied an In- dictment of U.S. past involvement for the failure to see the changed nature of the war. He recommended an immediate and vast stepup in U.S. help, especially in the categories of men and materiel needed for counterinsurgency operations. Taylor's recommendations were adopted with little hesitation, and a flood of Amer- ican men, money, and equipment began to flow into Saigon, South Vietnam's capital, in 1961. In the next 2 years, U.S. personnel in- creased from a few hundred to over 12,000. Our spending there rapidly shot up to almost half a million dollars a day. The United States has now passed over the most important watershed since the Korean war: its acceptance of the Communist chal- lenge of liberation war. The Communist challenge of conventional war has been met in Korea; the Communist challenge of nu- clear war would be met in Cuba a year later. In Indochina we accepted engagement on the third level of Communist revolutionary war, the sublimated. This was the last chance for the United States to get out without to- tal disaster to its international prestige. It was not taken. Sending 12,000 Americans to Saigon meant that the United States would accept the con- flict even if it stepped up to general war, and communicated to the Reds in advance that they could run into overwhelming force. But the United States emphasized that It was not taking over the war. President Ken- nedy said, later, "It is their war [South Viet- nam's). They are the ones who have to win or lose It." The State Department took pains to tell the Communists that "the U.S. measures are not a threat to North Vietnam but are merely a response to the Communist assault on South Vietnam." The measures were, in other words, not a rollback of Communist power, or liberation of North Vietnam from Red rule, but a move to stop Red expansion. Thus began our full commitment In Indo- china. The first effects were felt in Laos in the early spring of 1962. While the 14 na- tions still at in Geneva dueling verbally, the Pathet Lao once more attacked the stability of Laos with arms, driving the government forces westward toward the Mekong River boundary with Thailand. At the same time, Red guerrillas brought Thailand under threat with attacks in northeastern Thailand, backed by arms slipped across the Mekong from Laos, while a free Thai radio propt.- ganda campaign spewed out of Hanoi. On May 15, 1962, the United States moved 5,000 troops into Thailand and made clear they would respond if the Pathet Lao tried to reach the Mekong. This plain threat by the United States to make it "our war" worked, and the Communists switched back to the bargaining table. The long-dead- locked Geneva Conference came to a quick new agreement on June 12, 1962. It set up a Lao Government which included all three of the warring factions-Communist, free and neutral--and, in thory, reaffirmed Lao neutralization. In July, U.S. troops began leaving Thailand, and Laos went back to an uneasy truce punctuated frequently by new clashes between the Communists and government ned.tralist troops. Criticism of the new U.S. commitment grew from two directions at home. Senator WAYNE MoasE decried our stepped-up partici- pation and said It would lead to a head-on clash with China. He called Diem a "tyrant" and said that his kind of rule made victory against the Reds impossible and that the United States was making "a great mistake in South Vietnam." Columnist Walter Lipp- Mann went further, describing the original commitment in 1954 as an error and saying the United States should admit it and with- draw. From the other direction, Senator THOMAS Donn said the commitment was not enough, that coalition governments In any country between free and Communist factions were open invitations to eventual Red takeover. Others pointed out that as long as Red power was intact in Laos, in the form of the Pathet Lao, it would feed the revolt In South Viet- nam and that therefore U.S. withdrawal from Laos would be inconsistent with its growing involvement in South Vietnam. Administration spokesmen admitted that the Laos agreements are fragile at best, but defended them as the best obtainable under the circumstances. President Kennedy said, "We've got a very simple policy in Vietnam * * * we want the war to be won, the Com- munists to be contained, and the Americans to go home." The point, as he further em- phasized, was that "we are not there to see a war lost." The dispute went to crisis point in 1963. In May, Diem's police fired on demonstrating Buddhists in the northern South Vietnam city of Hue, and riots spread throughout the country as students protested and monks burned themselves in public. The Kennedy administration fought off demands that the United States abandon southeast Asia, while bringing strong pressure on Diem to reform his methods of rule. The dissension over whether to back Diem or try to oust him reached all the way into the U.S. mission in Saigon. Before a showdown could be reached, Diem was overthrown and assassinated by a junta of 16 South Vietnamese generals, on Novem- ber 1, 1963. This got Washington off the worst part of the hook, but the disappear- ance of the Ngo Dinh family from power did not solve the prime question: How could any South Vietnamese Government long sur- vive in a war which had no apparent end" This was a point Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, who took over the junta rule of South Viet- nam on January 30, 1964, pressed on his U.S. allies. Throughout the spring of 1964, while the Communists in both Laos and South Vietnam stepped up the pace of their at- tacks, Khanh urged on the United States the need for carrying the fight to the enemy. In March 1964, under President Johnson, another 1,500 U.S. military men were sent to Vietnam, raising the total to 16,500. Though it was carefully explained that these were advisers, the move unleashed specula- tion that the war was about to be widened. On April 26, Secretary of State Rusk made a deliberately vague reference to military ac- tions against North Vietnam and said, "This Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-ROP67B00446R000300170020-9 .196,5 ' Approved For Release 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170020-9' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE course of action-its implications and ways of carrying it out-has been carefully stud- Further well-advertised American hints that some kind of initiative against North Vietnam was under consideration followed. In June, top-level U.S. military and civilian leaders 'met at 'Honolulu and new stories of impending strikes against North Vietnam were leaked. Next, U.S.. reconnaissance planes appeared over Red-held territory in Laos, and the U.S.-trained Royal Laotian Air Force also went into action. On June 11, six U.S,-built jets bombed the Pathet Lao base at Khang Kay, in Laos, while the United States denied they had U.S. pilots. In July, the movement of 5,000 more Amer- ican troops into South Vietnam ; was an- nounced, and U.S. spending increases, were projected over the $700 million level for fis- cal year 1965. Maximum publicity was given these facts, too. it was now the Communists' turn to worry, especially the North 'Vietnamese. From China and Russia came the demand for a new. conference of the 14 nations that signed the, 1962 Geneva agreements. ' France, as well as many neutrals, backed this demand, while in_ the United States 5,000 college pro- fessore called for a neutralized Vietnam and pacifist groups circulated an open 'letter from North Vietnam leader, Ho Chi Minh, aaldng the American people to force their Government to negotiate with him. 'Though the scale of combat had risen ap- preciably, what had escalated enormously was the U.S. commitment in the intangibles: will, prestige, determination, The United States was now fully immersed in the kind of political-psychological-military war the Reds had made their own specialty, in which the intangibles were often the most impor- tant stakes. Late this fall, General Khanh stepped out in favor of a civilian government under Tran Van Huong, former Saigon mayor. Then, after the Vietcong attacked a U.S. bomber base, rumors were rife of sterner U.S. action. As these words go to press the last chapter is not written, but the struggle in Indochina is seen as an extension of our Korea policy to hold Red colonialism where it is in Asia while, unlike Korea, avoiding any bigger mili- tary commitment than is necessary. It is a neat trick to win any struggle with the mini- mum possible involvement. The Communists have done it many times. In Vietnam to- day we are witnessing our own first big at- tempt to walk that tightrope. 1049 High among his accomplishments, cer- tainly, rank his leadership in the affairs of the Advertising Club, of which he was the founder and a former president; his years of service on the city park board, during which he was at the forefront of the suc- cessful drives for the erection of Memorial Stadium and the upgrading of the city zoo; and his successful chairmanship of the State commission on forests and parks, which he headed at the time of his sudden death. This friendly, outgoing man made his pres- ence felt in everything he undertook. The Advertising Club in its present form is largely his creation-and the plush, glittery style which has made the Ad Club Award Banquet a sellout every year, attracting the top names in the city's political, commercial, and civic life, is due to his verve and en- thusiasm. "In many ways Sam Hammerman was Mr. Baltimore himself," Mayor McKeldin recalls. "For he understood deeply and was an inte- gral part of our city's aspiration, personality, growth, and municipal pride." In paying homage to this outstanding citi- zen, we can do no better than to repeat a tribute paid to him a dozen years ago by the Jesuit priest, the Very Rev. Edward B. Bunn, at a testimonial dinner. It was brief and to the point: "The fulcrum of. Sam's successful life has been his unabashed love of mankind." SAMUEL L. HAMMERMAN Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to call the attention of the Senate to the passing of an outstanding Mary- lander and a fine American. Samuel L. Hammerman gave the high- est kind of service to the welfare of the general public. As a successful business- man, he could have rested on his many laurels in the field of real-estate develop- ment. But this was not the way of Sam Hammerman. At age 70, he accepted the responsibility of chairman of the State Commission of Forests and Parks in Maryland. On the day of his death, he presided over a meeting of that group. Under his compassionate and creative direction, Maryland parks have grown in their utility to people, while remain- ing true to the highest standards of con- servation. Sam Hammerman was a man who bought a piece of property, spend- ing more than $1,000 to save a tree doomed to destruction, a tree which is still growing. The bill to establish a national park on Assateague Island, of which I am a cosponsor with my colleague, Senator BREWSTER, IS, at least in some part, a monument to his foresight and courage as a creative conservationist. I am sure that no finer tribute could be paid to this wonderful man than the establishment of a national park on Assateague Island. Maryland and the Nation are truly poorer for his passing. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD appropriate edi- torial comment from the Baltimore Evening Sun and the Baltimore News American of January 20, 1965. There beiiig no objection, the edito- rials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: TheUnited States refused to entertain the conference idea, saying that it would only serveo "ratify'the violations" of the exist- ing treaties the Communists had committed. The buildup went on, with South Viet- nam's General Khanh adding new tension when ' he declared in July that his govern- lnent . felt free to carry the war into North Vietnam on its own. Amjd awelter of speculation about just what action would be taken, a clash between United States and North Vietnamese warships took place in early August. Part of the new posture of the United States now became clear. U.S. planes struck at North Vietnam bases, destroyed PT boats, bases and oil facilities. This was the first organized military blow by the United States against Communist ter- 21tory since the Korean war. It was followed by an immediate augmentation of U.S. forces in southeast Asia in readiness for any coun- ter blow of any size. pre$dent Johnson went on the air as the stye was beginning to assure the Commu- nists that this "response will be limited and fitting." He emphasized pointedly, "We still seek no wider war." Publicity was given to Ambassador Taylor's notification of General Khanh that his call for an extension of the war was against present U.S. policy. , For the first time in the long Indochinese struggle, too, the two sides had exchanged roles. It was now the Communists who had to decide what response to make-or whether $0 respond, at all-and the -United States Which had the initiative. Nor would this be the last such time, said President Johnson .on August 8. The air and naval action in the Gulf of Tonkin, he announced, applied more broadly to "aggression in southeast `Asia as a whole." This threatened the "priv- iliged sanctuary" in North Vietnam and the Bed-held areas of Laos, where Red forces strikes. SAMUEL L. HAMMERMAN To sum up where the United States stood in the fall of 1964: The community mourns Samuel L. Ham- The range of our responses to the Commu- merinan, who gave so much of himself to its nist "war of liberation" had been widened- betterment. New risks considered to be "manageable" Mr. Hammerman, Who was "a successful were taken. -They could'le'ad to more gen- ' realtor in his business life, made contribu- el'al war,'but the belief'was they would stay tions in so many different fields of civic en- within the confines of.limited war, and would deavor that it is difficult to single out his No. 15-10 [From the Baltimore (Md.) Evening Sun, Jan. 20, 1965] S. L. HAMMERMAN For a leading businessman to enter public life as a member of one or more advisory or regulatory bodies is far from difficult; the job often seeks out the appointee.- What can come hard is for the businessman to reorient his outlook, putting the public interest ahead of the private or commercial considerations. An example, indeed a model, of the success- ful changeover will long be available to Baltimoreans and Marylanders in the career of the late S. L. Hammerman. A man whose profession was the development of residen- tial real estate, Mr. Hammerman went to work, when named head successively of the city's park board and the State's commis- sion for forests and parks, to advance the public's cause. Outstanding instances of such action on the part of Hammerman-led boards included the defense of Druid Hill Park against an attempt to locate the civic center there, ardent support of the effort to bring about Federal acquisition of the full Maryland length of Assateague Island and, within re- cent days, the rebuff of an executive attempt to allow destructive strip mining on a stretch of State parkland in western Maryland. A gregarious man and a driving force whose death will be mourned also at Advertising Club banquets and in interfaith programs, Sam Hammerman could count many achieve- ments, and not least among them a role as a distinct part of the flavor or color of the city's collective personality. WYOMING'S UNEMPLOYMENT COM- PENSATION LAW Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, the Reader's Digest, in its January 1965 is- Sue, presented its readers with what it termed "a case study of unemployment- compensation abuse-and its cure." The article about the State of Wyo- ming and its unemployment compensa- tion law was a broadly embroidered one, based on only bare threads of truth. The Wyoming Employment Outlook, a publication of the Employment Security Approves i-or Keiease uusi1uin5 : G4A-KUF_'bttSUU44bK000SUUI.IUUZU-y 1050 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170020-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Januai''. 22 Commission of Wyoming, gives a differ- ent outlook on the situation. It sets the record straight. I ask unanimous consent that the Em- ployment Security Commission editorial in reply to the Reader's Digest article be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:_ READER'S DIGEST STRIKES AGAIN The Reader's Digest has once more zeroed in on its favorite target, the Bureau of Em- ployment Security. In its latest issue, the magazine has chosen Wyoming's unemploy- ment compensation law for its attack. The story swarms with villains (the bureaucrats) and white knights (three special-interest group technicians), and the fight ensues. The technicians, according to the story, be- came unemployment insurance experts prac- tically overnight. They snatch a "hoop and holler" victory from the bureaucrats by virtue of an early morning breakfast with two mem- bers of the State legislature. The hoop and holler victory even with the two members voting for the proposals, would have meant a margin of one vote for the proposals. The Reader's Digest intentions become quite obvious when one reads the advertise- ment displayed in local Wyoming papers. Its ads are even more sensational than the story itself. Quoting from one such ad: "Wyo- ming tightens up on 'happy time' money. Freeloaders were coming from as far away as California. Anybody who refused to work could sign up for unemployment compensa- tion--even convicted criminals. Then the public woke up." The inference of the ads and the story is that any out-of-State worker'who comes to fill available jobs in Wyoming, does so for the sole purpose of becoming qualified to draw unemployment compensation from the Wyoming fund and thus, have a "happy time." During the construction time of the year, Wyoming never has enough workers within its borders to fill all the jobs available. The contractors know this and offer the entice- ment of good wages and working conditions to encourage the migration of the right kind of worker. This is what brings these workers into Wyoming, not the promise of a good time at the "trough" of public, funds, as the maga- zine suggests. The article emphasizes the fact that some workers can earn as little its $375 and become eligible for "happy time" money. The article does not mention that on this bare minimum of wage earnings, the }benefits would have been $10 a week for 12 weeks. Nor does it mention that the average weekly benefit for all claimants is only $35. Most of these workers who come into Wyo- ming to work on construction and other out- side type jobs can, while they are working, earn at least four to five times this amount and would find it difficult to have a "happy time" on such a reduced rate of earning. The ad said that anybody who refused to work could sign up for unemployment com- pensation, This, as with many of the state- XIEW ments made by the magazine, has a thread amendment will be received, printed, a nd of truth. The law states that the commis- appropriately referred; and, without sion cannot refuse to accept an application for compensation from anyone. However, objection, the amendment will be printed they must qualify for entitlement and meet in the RECORD, and Will lie on the desk, eligibility tests. A refusal to work would re- as requested. sult in a denial of payments of benefi s. The amendment was referred to the In the past, many experts have taken the Committee on Public Works, as follows: magazine to task and have exposed their On page 1, strike out lines 3 and 4 and In- blasts at the Bureau of Employment Security sert In lieu thereof the following: for what they are: illogical assumptions based only on threads of truth. "CHAPTER I-APPALACHIAN REGIONAL DEVELOP- The experts' answers were printed In pub- MENT lications with a circulation of thousands. "Short Title The Reader's Digest claims a circulation of "SECTION 1. This chapter may be cited as over 25 million. By the time a rebuttal comes the 'Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965', and all references in this chapter t3 this Act shall be held to refer to this chapter." At the end of the bill add the following new chapter: "CHAPTER 2--REGIONAL ACTION PLANNING "Title V-Regional Action Planning Act of 1965 "Short Title "SEC. 501. This chapter may be cited as the 'Regional Action Planning Act of 1965'. "(4) region-wide development is feasible, desirable, and urgently needed. "(b) The Administrator may designate not to exceed-six regions pursuant to sub- section (a). "(c) The Administrator shall assign an ap- propriate department or agency of the Fed- eral Government the responsibility for de- veloping a Federal-regional action plan pur- suant to this chapter for each region estab- lished pursuant to subsection (a). Such plan shall be developed with the participa- tion of other Federal departments and agen- cies which in the Administrator's opinion can make a substantial contribution, and with representatives from each State involved. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170020-9 out, the Lilliputian magazine is once more trying to pin down another Bureau of Em- ployment Security Gulliver with thin, weak threads of truth. AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE DEVEL- OPMENT OF THE NATION'S DE- PRESSED REGIONS-AMENDMENT (AMENDMENT NO. 2) Mr. NELSON. Mr. President. I send be proposed by me to the bill (S. 3 to "SEC. 502. The Congress recognizes that provide public works and economic de- many regions of the country, while abundant velopment programs and the planning in natural resources and rich in potential, and coordination needed to assist in the lag behind- the Nation In economic growth so development of the Appalachian region. that the people of such regions have not I ask that the amendment be referred to shared properly i the Nations prosperity. Often a region's uneven past development, the Committee on Public Works and be with historical reliance on a few basic Indus- printed. I also ask unanimous consent tries and marginal agriculture, have failed that the amendment be printed in the to provide the economic base vital as a pre- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at the conclusion requisite for vigorous self-sustaining growth. of my remarks. In some cases the uneven distribution of This amendment is designed to su- productive Federal expenditures has left te- thorize immediate planning for up to six theless, pions a c manyra area disadvantage. None- other regions in the country with prob- State and m local any vnsme the country the Std governments and the people lems similar to those of Appalachia, of the region understand their problems and The legislation would establish a Fed- have been and are prepared to work purpose- eral Action Plan Administrator with au- fully toward their solution. It is the pur- thority to designate regions for imme- pose of this chapter to assist such regions in diate development planning, meeting their special problems and promot- Up to $2.5 million for any one region ing their economic development by helping could be used for the development of an State, and policies and programs for Federal, Snd local efforts essential to an attack k action plan, to be completed within 18 upon common problems through a coor- months by Federal and State representa- dinated and concerted regional approach. +;v- No more than $10 million could be "SEC. 503. (a) The provisions of this chap- spent on the total program, ter shall be administered by a Regional Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., who pre- Action Plan Administrator (hereinafter re- pared the Appalachian legislation, told ferred to as the 'Administrator') in the the House Public Works Committee last Executive Office of the President. The Ad- Year that plans for other regions could ministrator shall be appointed by and with be completed within 6 months if they the advice and consent of the Senate and were authorized. shall be compensated at the rate provided Only regions which meet the general for level Iv of the Federal Executive Salary criteria established by the Senate in as- Schedule. sage of last year's Appalachian legisla- the civil servi emandtclassification laws,tap- tion would be eligible for action plan point and fix the compensation of such ofli- money. To receive such planning funds, cers and employees as may be necessary to the region must: Lag substantially be- carry out the provisions of this chapter. hind the rest of the Nation in economic "Determination of Regions growth; have an uneven past develop- 'SE(~. 504. (a) The Administrator shall ment which has not permitted self- designate areas representing two or more sustaining growth; have demonstrated contiguous States as a region for Federal- that local people and governments are regional action planning pursuant to this prepared for immediate planning and pee chapter upon determining that- velopnlent; and have common problems hind d the e rest region of f the Nation in in Its econs econ bomic ic which offer hope of a regional solution. growth, and its people have not shared prop- In addition to the upper Great Lakes erly in the Nation's prosperity; area, the standards in this bill might be "(2) such region's uneven past develop- met by the Ozarks; the northwestern ment has failed to provide the economic base mountain regions; the upper New Eng- that is a vital prerequisite for vigorous self- land area; the desert high plateau corner sustaining growth; of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Ari- people State the ra egion local ens governmentstand theirand pr oho zona, and parts of the Deep South. lems s a and d have been and d are are prepared thto work k and The PDT. 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