VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

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1965, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Jr
shall be my intention to try with determina-
tion.
My personal regards to you.
Cordially and sincerely,
JOHN Q. MCADAMS.
VIETNAM
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
PRICE). Under previous order of the
House the gentleman from New York
[Mr. RYAN] is recognized for 30-minutes.
(Mr. RYAN asked 'and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his remarks
and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, I am de-
lighted today that Members of the House
of Representatives have taken time in
which to discuss the serious situation
which exists in Vietnam. I believe that
we have heard this afternoon from the
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GAL-
LACxER] and the other Members who
have addressed the House,. a very sincere
discussion of some of the very compli-
cated and complex problems which con-
front us in the entire area.
Mr. Speaker, last June 10 when the
Foreign Aid Act of 1964 was under con-
sideration on the floor of the House, I
discussed some of the very serious prob-
lems confronting the United States in
Vietnam. I said then:
The military situation in the area is stead-
ily deteriorating and the United States is
becoming more and more involved in a
mean and ugly war.
I suggested then that there should be
debate in the House of Representatives
concerning our policy in this war-torn
area. Unfortunately, since then the mili-
tary situation has gone from bad to worse
and our involvement has become even
deeper. But debate has begun in the
House of Representatives and in the
other body. It is very important that
elected Representatives of the people
present their views on an issue which
is fraught with so much complexity and
so much danger and has so many rami-
fications for the American people.
Although recent events, including the
bombing of North Vietnam, have height-
ened the crisis, the fundamental situation
has not really changed since I talked on
June 10. It is still true that the shifting
governments in Saigon have not been
able to gain the support of the South
Vrietnamese people. Indeed, it is diffi-
cult to see how anyone in South Vietnam
could be fiercely loyal to the Central Gov-
ernment when that Government hardly
exists. There have been eight coups in
16 months. The most recent occurred
only a few days ago.
Mr. Speaker, this political instability,
this pattern of coup after cbup, coup
within coup, and coup and countercoup-
can onlY breed cynicism and indifference
3367
The Saigon government has the allegiance Increasing escalation of the war in
of probably no more than 30 percent of the South Vietnam will bring the Chinese
people and controls (even in daylight) not closer and closer to open intervention
xauch more than a quarter of the territory, and increase the possibility of a Korean
The lack of support of the people is style war. Moreover, this would provide
of great military significance, for this the paste and glue for the Chinese and
is not a conventional war. It is a guer- the Russians to paper over their differ-
rilla war. The enemy infiltrates into ences-differences which we should seek
South Vietnam by walking through the to exploit. As Walter Lippmann said in
jungle. He mingles with, and is usually his column of February 18:
indistinguishable from, the local popula- For this country to involve itself in such
tion which supports him. Since the a war in Asia would be an act of supreme
Vietcong live among the South Vietnam- folly. While the warhawks would rejoice
ese, it is highly unlikely that attacks when it began, the people would weep before
such as the one at Pleiku, which require it ended.
advance planning and coordination, can While it would be highly dangerous
be successful unless the South Vietnam- to escalate the war, while there is no
ese can be counted on not to inform pat answer to the problem, I do not stand
the Americans. Mr. Speaker, we must here to advocate a complete withdrawal.
face the facts in South Vietnam. A complete withdrawal from the area
In spite of the evidence, it often is would probably lead to Communist con-
argued that this guerrilla war can be trol of the whole peninsula. The pres-
won in;South Vietnam. The experiences sures on Cambodia, the pressures on
in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines Thailand, would be enormous. In addi-
are cited. Without going into great de- tion, we have a commitment, and if we
tail, there are essential differences be- were to abrogate that commitment, our
tween those situations and the one we action would lessen the reliability of our
face in South Vietnam. commitments elsewhere in the world.
In Greece the Communist guerrillas Therefore, in considering our future
were not defeated until Yugoslavia course, we must make it clear that we
closed its border, depriving them of their do not intend to bargain away the in-
sanctuary. Moreover, the Greeks were dependence of South Vietnam.
motivated to win. However, within that framework it
In Malaya the guerrillas belonged to seems to me there are reasonable, sensi-
the Chinese minority, and there was no ble, and honorable alternatives which ad- vantages tBritish sanctuary next door. in Mtealayyaa, , should be explored and which we must
which hich do the h not exist in had South Malaya, for time is running out. If we
which do keep in mind President Kennedy's im-
it took de Ieat 8,000 13 years and cost 300,000 men. t , mortal words, "Let us never negotiate
In the e Huk uprising g in the e Philippines d guerrillas rrsi with out of fear but let us never fear to ne-
the guerrillas were cut off from outside gotiate," we can seek a negotiated set-
help, and a sound agricultural reform tlement which guarantees the indepen-
program deprived the Communists of dence of South Vietnam.
much of their appeal. Yet it took 7 years I suggested last June that we steer
for approximately 60,000 men to defeat such a course. The United States today
8,000 to 10,000 guerrillas. is still in a good position to negotiate
If one seeks a parallel to Vietnam, let an honorable settlement. Despite the
us look to the French involvement in deteriorating position in the south, North
Algeria where 760,000 men were tied Vietnam has its difficulties and
down for 8 years at a cost of $12 billion, faces serious problems. The North Viet-
fighting a guerrilla force which shrank namese have spent 10 long and arduous
from 60,000 to 7,000 at the time of the years in building up their industrial pol-
cease-fire. By the time the French were icy, which they know could be destroyed
"winning the war" it appeared that it overnight by the U.S. Air Force. Our
would require the maintenance of 200,- recent bombing raids should have left
000 to 300,000 troops in Algeria to prevent little doubt of the increasing possibility
the recurrence of guerrilla activity. The that the United States will use its air
Algerian experience suggests that, if the power to the fullest and maximum
minds and hearts of the people are lost, extent.
it is almost impossible to win a guerrilla Moreover, as the situation grows more
war by military means. intense, as the war steps up, there is the
Mr. Speaker, what alternatives are greater possibility that Communist China
feasible in this situation? It has been will "volunteer" to aid North Vietnam
seriously proposed in some quarters that by sending troops into that country.
the war be greatly expanded by massive The North Vietnamese have had exper-
bombing of North Vietnam and a massive ience with Chinese occupation before.
troop commitment to South Vietnam. The Chinese occupied North Vietnam for
The New York Times editorial of last centuries, and it is doubtful that the
on'the part of the great majority of the Sunday, February 21, pointed out:
people of South Vietnam. The political Not one of our major allies in the West
situation in South Vietnam casts doubt could be expected to endorse, much less
upon slogans about protecting the "free- actively assist, an American involvement so
dom" of the people. The fact is that massive it would amount to a military oc-
there is no elected government. cupation of leaderless South Vietnam.
Not only is there no constitutional gov- Furthermore, the New York Times
ernment in South Vietnam, but the dis- said that the costs of such an adventure
content of the Buddhists, students, and would end America's efforts to demon-
others is apparent. No wonder a respon- strate the superiority of its social sys-
sible commentator, Walter Lippman, al- tem by abolishing poverty and building
most a year ago estimated: a Great Society.
North Vietnamese would want to repeat
that experience. It also appears that
the Russians would not want to see the
Chinese take over North Vietnam be-
cause that would lead to further expan-
sion into southeastern Asia.
Economically and geographically
North and South Vietnam complement
each other. The north needs the rice
from the south. Before the war there
were large imports of rice from the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 24,
south. Certainly the south could use
the industrial goods of the north.
Mr. Speaker, the elements for negotia-
tion in this situation do exit. Once
there is a willingness to negotiate, a
proper forum within which to negotiate
can be found whether it is through the
machinery which was set up in 1954 at
the Geneva Conference or through the
United Nations or some other, forum or
international conference.
It is impossible at this moment, I
realize, to set forth any surefire formula
for negotiations. However, various pos-
sibilities can be suggested. Again let me
stress that any plan must insure the in-
dependence of South Vietnam.
In the first place, there must be an
immediate cease-fire. Then there can
be serious discussion of the terms of a
potential political settlement. Any
agreement for a settlement would have to
be guaranteed by both the United States
and the Soviet Union.
A minimal agreement might guarantee
that both North and South Vietnam
would agree not to join any military alli-
ances or attempt to overthrow each other
either directly or by subversion. Each
would be allowed to develop its own form
of government. The South would agree
to normalize trade relations with the
North, but it would not be necessary to
offer diplomatic recognition. The rela-
tionship between East and West Ger-
many might be used as an example in
that respect. As I suggested last June,
joint economic projects between the
North and South might lead to eventual
reunification and free elections.
Another possible area of solution
might be to provide for both North and
South Vietnam to enter the United Na-
tions on the stipulation that all aggres-
sive action, including subversion, cease
between them and, furthermore, that
trade be resumed. The United Nations
might very well be called upon to send
a peacekeeping force into the area to
supervise such an agreement.
Then there is another possibility, one
which in the long scope of history and
on the basis of a long-range look into the
future should be given very serious con-
sideration. That is the creation on a
regional level of an agreement which
would include North and South Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Such an
agreement would prohibit the signatory
countries from ;joining any military alli-
ances or attempting to overthrow the
governments which are parties to the
agreement.
A common market might be devised for
North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cam-
bodia, and Thailand. Consideration
might be given to the establishment of a
customs union and a payments union to
finance special projects and long-term
economic development. A regional plan-
ning bank could plan projects for the en-
tire area or for the individual countries.
Mr. Speaker, whatever political settle-
ment is envisioned would have, I say
again, to be guaranteed by the great
powers. Either the International Con-
trol Commission under the Geneva
agreement or the United Nations would
be expected to play a peacekeeping role
in the area.
As I said at the beginning, there are
no final answers to the difficult problem
of South Vietnam. However, neither is
there any satisfactory military solution.
Therefore, a diplomatic resolution of the
problem must be found.
I return to The thought of a recent
editorial which appeared in the New York
Times on February 9, 1965, which is ex-
pressed in this way:
The only way out is diplomatic, inter-
national, political, economic-not military.
A solution will not be found by exchanging
harder and harder blows. Perhaps a new
start can be made from an untried base-
that Americans, Vietnamese, Chinese, and
Russians are all sensible human beings who
are ready for peace in southeast Asia, or at
least willing to consider it.
Mr. Speaker, it is time to make a new
start in Vietnam.
MR. JUSTICE FELIX FRANKFURTER
(Mr. CONTE (at the request of Mrs.
REID of Illinois) was granted permission
to extend his remarks at this point in
the RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, it is an
irony of life that amid our rejoicing and
celebrations we must give pause to
mour. Two days ago, on the birthday of
the first American President, we lost a
man who had become within his lifetime
first among American judges. Felix
Frankfurter never sat as the Chief Jus-
tice of this land, but he was its chief
jurist.
Long before his death, novice and
trained lawyers studied and were guided
by the brilliance of the law he set down
in his opinions and as, indeed, they
shall long be guided after his death. For
no man more epitomized the clarity, the
intricacy, the sternness and the mercy of
the law than did Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
And if for future generations we must
mark this man, if mark him we can, then
let us say: "To no one did he sell, to
none did he deny or delay, right or jus-
tice."
Mr. Speaker, at this point, I wish to
insert into the RECORD the New York
Times editorial of February 24, 1965:
FELIX FRANKFURTER
Felix Frankfurter was the heir and exem-
plar of several traditions that have mingled
successfully in the rich tapestry of American
life.
Had he lived in the 18th century enlighten-
ment, he would have been at home in Dr.
Johnson's London or in the Paris that so
warmly welcomed Thomas Jefferson and
Benjamin Franklin. He had a Jewish love of
learning for its own sake as befit the descend-
ant of six generations of rabbis and Talmudic
scholars. He was an effervescent, insatiable
conversationalist-a suitable taste and talent
for a man born, as he was, in 19th-century
Vienna.
Frankfurter had the authentic radical's
need to protest against injustice and, in so
doing, to risk unpopularity with the rich and
respectable. He exposed the wrongful con-
viction of labor leader Tom Mooney during
the patriotic excitement of World War I.. He
crusaded in behalf of a new trial for Sacco
and Vanzetti, in 1927, shocking many de-
fenders of the status quo in Harvard Yard
and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
He was active in innumerable dissenting
movements.
But Frankfurter had also the authentic
conservative's devotion to the past, respect
for power and taste for balance and order
and moderation. He entered public life un-
der the auspices of Henry L. Stimson, one
of America's great conservative statesmen.
As Chairman of the War Labor Policies Board
in World War I, adviser to Presidents and fin-
ally Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
Frankfurter served his Government with con-
spicuous devotion. Nor was it any accident
that he contributed the phrase "with all de-
liberate speed"-with its nicely balanced
double imperative-to the Supreme Court's
school desegregation decision.
During more than 20 years at the Harvard
Law School, he was a superb teacher of law.
Combining erudition with enthusiasm, he
awakened, stimulated, goaded, enlighter.ed
and finally educated hundreds of young
men-not only as skilled professionals but
as civilized men and as future public servants
with lively consciences.
Among his admirers there was a school of
thought- that for Frankfurter elevation to
the Supreme Court, although it seemed to
crown his career, was in fact an anticlimax
and a wrong turning. This greatest of
teachers, some believed, lacked the ultimate
self-confidence to wield judicial power, inti-
mately acquired though he was with the
workings of political power.
Certainly his death will only temporarily
still the long-continuing controversy between
the judicial activists and the advocates of
judicial self-restraint whose cause he cham-
pioned. There isno need here to arbitrate
this rich and fruitful intellectual dispute.
One has only to observe that he was ad-
mirably brilliant, honest and unsparing in
his contribution to the public dialog.
As a philosopher and scholar of the law, a
judicial craftsman, a master of prose style
and a formative influence on a generation of
American lawyers and public officials, Felix
Frankfurter was a major shaper of the his-
tory of his age.
FORT SNELLING
(Mr. MACGREGOR (at the request of
Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include extra-
neous matter.)
Mr. MACGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, a cit-
izens' group in Minnesota, named the
Fort' Snelling State Park Association and
headed by Samuel H. Morgan, of St.
Paul, has been doing a magnificent job In
working to preserve the historic and nat-
ural values of the Fort Snelling area, the
birthplace of modern Minnesota. Plans
are underway now, with notable accom-
plishments already recorded, for a State
park in the fast-growing Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area within easy ac-
cess of nearly two-thirds of the popula-
tion of the State. It has been designated
as a national historic landmark.
Over $200,000 has been raised from
private sources to implement the work of
this association. Because this park is so
important to the entire State of Minne-
sota I am inserting iri the RECORD today
a portion of the chapter entitled "The
Americans Build Fort Snelling," from
the book "Minnesota-A History of the
State," by Dr. Theodore C. Blegen, the
dean emeritus of the University of Min-
nesota graduate school. Dr. Blegen's
excellent one-volume history of our State
was published in 1963 by the University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minn.
The excerpt is as follows:
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE'
had to get military advice to the proper
authorities, and to determine who was in
power very often caused a cessation of
combat operations with the enemy. In
effect, the war would stop while the heads
of government and the key leaders in the
Army were changed, and this meant a
complete retraining program by the
American mission of all military unit
heads as well as political subdivision
chiefs.
Probably one of the hallmarks of our
mission in Vietnam has been the extreme
patience of our American advisers, from
our Ambassador and military command-
ers, down to the valiant Americans who
spill their'blood along with their Viet-
namese comrades. The situation to say
the least is vexatious but we must always
keep our eyes on our strategic role-that
of thwarting these Communist advances.
We will be successful. The Viet-
namese will win their struggle. How-
ever, the road to victory never has been
easy. The future may call for more in-
tensive strikes at the base and source of
Communist power and aggression in
North Vietnam. The borders of South
Vietnam may have to be sealed to pre-
vent the flow of reinforcements and war
material to the subversive Communist
army. The 1,800 miles of coastline must
be patrolled and the potential for re-
supply of North Vietnamese operations
on the sea be destroyed.
The American people stand firm be-
hind their President and behind the
principles of freedom everywhere.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MURPHY of New York. I yield to
the gentleman from New Jersey.
. Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I
would like at this point in the RECORD to
include an observation, to the effect that
the gentleman from New York [Mr.
MURPHY] is speaking from a very knowl-
edgeab1e position, being a graduate of
the Military Academy and having been
one of the great heroes of the Korean
war. He full well knows what the battle
with the Communists means. He is
fully prepared to evaluate properly ex-
actly what we are doing in southeast
Asia.
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gen-
tleman for his very knowledgeable opin-
ions in this debate here today.
Mr. MURPHY of New York. I thank
the gentleman from New Jersey.
BANKING POLICY AND NEW BANKS
(Mr. HANNA asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD.)
Mr. HANNA. Mr. Speaker, it is fairly
obvious that the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency's office in general, and the recent
more liberal policy for new bank entry
in particular, has become a popular
agency not only for criticism but also a
rebuke. No agency has operated infal-
libly and, therefore, all are open to criti-
cism. Also, it is fair to observe that these
/ departments of Government are no more
likely to be completely clear of partisan-
ship under a Democratic administration
than they were under a Republican ad-
No. 36-4
ministration and I do not think that any-
one is surprised that this is so.
The Office of Comptroller has taken on
the vigor and assertedness not always
present in its operations and there are
many who would have preferred the
previous status. Mr. Saxon announced
candidly his intention of broad competi-
tion in the banking field, and injected
new ideas and new personalities into the
field. This he has done in the normal
course available under the law by char-
tering new banks. This policy, coming
as it did after a long history of very
limited new bank entry, gave the appear-
ance of a revolutionary change and, in
fact, on filling the area of banking ex-
pansion to meet the level of banking
service and need as determined by his
office. Mr. Saxon's first year's service
struck with particular impact. In our
judgment, and I think those of sober ob-
jective observers, the soundness of the
Saxon policy can only be ultimately
determined by the results of that policy
when time has given a sufficient period
to correctly assess the affects of that
policy.
Banking is, under our laws, a quasi-
public activity, with special privileges
and special responsibilities. To the de-
gree that new bank entries are extremely
limited it can become a private monop-
oly under public protection. It occurs to
this Representative that our country, in
its past, has preferred policies of maxi-
mum competition in a free market and
such a policy is ill served by a banking
policy which would develop fewer and
fewer banks as our population and eco-
nomic strength expanded.
Mr. Speaker, if an investigation, upon
appropriate grounds, is indicated as being
desirable-, I would suggest that such in-
vestigation direct itself to an objective
scrutiny of the policy of the Controller,
seeking to determine whether the re-
sults of free competiton, better and
newer services, and wider business op-
portunity have in fact been achieved.
The operations of all Government agen-
cies are no doubt open to some sniping
on the details of particular cases, but
if there is, beyond that, a charge raising
the question of criminal action or mal-
feasance in office, these should be par-
ticularly made and particularly pursued,
with emphasis of responsibility on the
part of those making the charges.
There remains one further observa-
tion Mr. Speaker. Some of the confusion
and much of the criticism should be
directed against the confusion in the laws
Congress has drawn relative to banking
regulations. Some recent events have
demonstrated clearly that responsibilty
has been too broadly proliferated in three
It is our opinion that when time has
given a proper measure for performance,
Mr. Saxon's contribution will, on bal-
ance, have been a constructive one.
INVESTIGATION NEEDED WITH RE-
SPECT TO SOME PHASES OF THE
BANKING BUSINESS
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Iowa [Mr. Gaossl is recog-
nized for 15 minutes.
(Mr. GROSS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his
remarks and to include extraneous
material.)
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, an inves-
tigation of some phases of the banking
business in this country is overdue.
Evidence has come to the surface in-
dicating there is something wrong in the
way national banks are being chartered,
denied charters, and in the general ad-
ministration of banking laws.
The Bobby Baker investigation, as
halfhearted and spineless as it has been,
has provided evidence indicating political
influence is involved at least to some ex-
tent in the chartering of national banks
by Comptroller of the Currency James
Saxon.
Certainly, the strong political com-
plexion of some of the stockholders of
the District of Columbia National Bank
raises some serious questions that call for
a much deeper investigation than there
has been to this date.
Such an investigation, to have any real
meaning, must disclose the names of all
political figures-including Members of
the U.S. Senate and House of Represent-
atives-who are dealt in on the original
stock and thereby stand in a position to
make a financial killing.
The payment of a $5,000 fee to Wayne
Bromley, a former assistant to Bobby
Baker, and the cashing of the check in
that amount by Baker, certainly raises
some questions in connection with the
Redwood National Bank at San Rafael,
Calif. Baker and Bromley have taken
the fifth amendment on all questions re-
lating to the possible use of political in-
fluence in that and other matters, but
this provides no excuse for Congress to
fail to do a full investigation.
I repeat that these cases and others
raise danger signals that the chartering
of national banks is serving a type of
political patronage. There is also evi-
dence that the activity of political figures
has been an important factor in the de-
cision to reject an application for a na-
tional bank charter.
The full evidence is not available but
agencies: the Federal Reserve, the Con- what is available indicates that former
troller, and the Federal Deposit Insur- Secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth, of
ance Corporation. Some better mech- Fort Worth, Tex., was involved in politi-
anism for cooperation between the State cal string pulling to block the issuance
and Federal agencies should be devised of a national bank charter in Winters,
and finally, such new regulatory laws as Tex. Only a thorough investigation by
may in the future be devised, should pro- the Senate or House, or both, will deter-
vide administrative action that assists mine the extent of the hanky pank in-
compliance with the laws more than to volved in this case.
punish for failure to comply. The agency If Korth was not involved in the use of
should be as much a partner as it is a political influence at the office of the
policeman. Comptroller of the Currency, then he and
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3366 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
some of his banking associates misrepre-
sented their political fixing ability in
order to get additional new deposits for
Korth's Continental National Bank in
Forth Worth.
Correspondence that Korth made
available in connection with the TFX
warplane investigation discloses strong
evidence of political manipulations in
connection with at least one national
bank charter. Here is a brief chronology
of what happened in this case:
First. An application was filed for a
new national bank charter in Winter,
Tex. It was opposed by several bankers,
including Fred Holland, president of the
Merchants and Planters National Bank
of Sherman, Tex., and John Q. McAdams,
president of the Winters State Bank of
Winters, Tex.
Second. Holland wrote to Korth on
November 7, 1962, asking the then Secre-
tary of the Navy for help in blocking the
national charter for Winters, and prom-
ising to "make it worthwhile" to the
Continental National Bank at Fort
Worth. Holland commented that there
were other banks in the Winters, Tex.,
area that would be equally grateful if
Korth and his associates at Continental
in Fort Worth would block the Winters
Charter.
It should be noted at this point that
Winters, Tex., is a considerable distance
from either Fort Worth or Sherman,
Tex.-far too distant to be competitive
in normal banking business.
Third. On November 9, 1962, Korth re-
plied to Holland stating he would "do
everything I can" to assist in blocking
the Winters application.
Fourth. Holland replied on January
22, 1963, enclosing a copy of a letter to
Comptroller of the Currency Saxon and
making reference to the fact that G. E.
"Gus" Holmstrom, senior executive vice
president of Korth's bank, knew all about
it and added:
We will greatly appreciate you helping us
With this matter and shall certainly look for-
ward to the opportunity of returning the
favor.
Bear in mind that Korth, then Secre-
tary of the Navy, was the former presi-
dent of Continental National Bank and
still owned about $160,000 worth of stock
in Continental.
Fifth. On April 23, 1963, Holmstrom
wrote to McAdams, of the Winters State
Bank, assuring him that he and Korth
would do all they could to block the is-
suance of a national bank charter at
Winters.
Sixth. On the same day, April 23, 1963,
Holmstrom, the senior vice president of
Fort Worth's Continental National, wrote
to Korth, then Navy Secretary, and I
quote the following from that letter:
Just a short note to let you know that John
Q. McAdams has increased his account with
us substantially, and I am convinced now
that if the application for a national bank
charter at Winters could be declined, we
would probably get all of his business.
Thought you might be interested in having
this Information.
Seventh. On June 21, 1963, Comp-
troller of the Currency Saxon rejected
the application for the new national bank
charter at Winters.
Eighth. A few days later, on June 29,
1963, McAdams wrote to Navy Secretary
Korth :
Want to thank you as sincerely as I know
for the assistance you gave in defeating an
application for a national bank in our town.
If the opportunity is ever presented for me
to show my appreciation for this favor it
shall be my intention to try with determina-
tion.
This is not the whole story but it is
enough to demonstrate that a penetrat-
ing investigation is called for in this case
and other cases involving the business of
banking. And let it be a fair and decent
investigation, not a repetition of the
Bobby Baker affair which has long been
smothered under an avalanche of white-
wash.
Following are the texts of the letters
released by Korth after he found an in-
vestigating committee hot on his trail in
the TFX fighter plane contract case:
THE MERCHANTS & PLANTERS
NATIONAL BANK,
Sherman, Tex., November 7, 1962.
Hon. FRED KORTH,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR FRED: I first want to apologize for
taking your valuable time to discuss a mat-
ter of relative unimportance, in view of the
fact that you have so many very important
,things to do.
Gus told me a couple of days ago that he
had talked with you about the application
here for a national bank charter. I be-
lieve he also told you, at the same time, that
the sponsoring group was Charles Spears and
his associates, who presently have the Gray-
son County State Bank and the Texoma
Savings & Loan Association.
Presently there are 2 banks in Sher-
man and 10 banks in Grayson County, which
we sincerely believe take care of the bank-
ing needs of our community. The proposed
location of this new bank is less than five
city blocks from the Grayson County State
Bank, and is to be located in a shopping cen-
ter which we understand will be started in
the near future.
We know the prevailing attitude with
respect to new charters, as well as branch
banks in general, and feel that we must have
assistance from friends like you if we are to
effectively oppose this application.
I have assured Gus that if we are success-
ful in our efforts that we shall certainly
make it worth while to his bank, and would
like nothing better than to solicit similar
assistance from the banks in Denison,
Whitesboro, Whitewright, and the others in
our area.
When you have time I would appreciate
having your thoughts on this subject.
Respectfully yours,
FRED HOLLAND,
President.
Mr. FRED HOLLAND,
President, the Merchants & Planters National
Bank, Sherman, Tex.
DEAR FRED: I have your letter of November
7 and certainly share your concern with
reference to the proposed new national bank
charter. I shall do everything I can con-
sistently to assist you in blocking what I
consider an improper application.
I will discuss this matter with the proper
people.
With best regards.
Sincerely,
February ;2~
THE MERCHANTS & PLANTERS
NATIONAL BANK,
Sherman, Tex., January 22, 196.3.
Hon. FRED KORTH,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR FRED: I am enclosing copy of a let-
ter to Mr. Saxon relative to our opposition
to the granting of the new bank charter
here. You will notice that we have based
our opposition on the lack of community
need and stayed completely away from the
fact that it will be actually a part of the
Grayson County State Bank and Texcma
Savings & Loan Association, which you will
remember are both controlled by Cha:-les
Spears.
Gus Holmstrom knows the situation here
well and I am sure he would tell you that
if there was a need for another bank at
this time we would be the first to recognize
it.
We will greatly appreciate your helping us
with this matter and shall certainly look
forward to the opportunity of returning the
favor. ,
Cordially yours,
FRED HOLLAND,
Presidenr..
Hon. FRED KORTH,
Pentagon Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR FRED: John Q. McAdams keeps call-
ing me concerning a new bank charter appli-
cation in Winters. I have told him that we
would do whatever we could, and I also ad-
monished him to be very careful as to w sat
statements he made, as we were not in it
position to commit ourselves in any way, due
to our correspondent at Abiline.
However, it seems rather foolish for the
national department to grant a charter in
a town with only 3,000 people, and only $4
million on deposit.
The bank now located there is adequate
for this size town, especially when there are
many banks in the county in every direction
from Winters.
With kindest regards.
Yours very truly,
G. E. HOLMSTROM,
Senior Executive Vice President.
Hon. FRED KORTH,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.
FORT WORTH,
Fort Worth, Tex.
DEAR FRED: Just a short note to let you
know John Q. McAdams has increased .his
account with us substantially, and I am con-,
vinced now that if the application for the
national charter at Winters could be de-
clined, we would probably get all of his busi-
ness. Thought you might be interested in.
having this information.
With kindest regards.
Sincerely,
G. E. HOLMSTROM,
THE WINTERS STATE BANK,
WINTERS, TEx., June 29, 1963.
Hon. FRED KORTH,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR FRED: Want to thank you as sincerely
as I know for the assistance you gave in de-
feating an application for a national bank
in our town. When word came a day or two
ago of this negative answer the whole town
and those composing the area, except for a
few individuals, were as happy as people can
get. You know, Fred, If the Lord himself
had a bank he could not have 100-percent
support.
If the opportunity is ever presented for me
to show my appreciation for this favor, it
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Indonesia would be lost forever to the
free world.
Should this happen the great subcon-
tinent of India, already under Chinese
pressure along its Himalayan frontier,
would be a prime target for further ex-
pansion of communism. Here we have
involved not only the Indians but also
the Pakistani. The Philippines, Taiwan
and Japan are likewise flanked and could
not survive infiltration, subversion or as-
sault. The Chinese colossus would then
be at the front door of Australia and New
Zealand, both with only token defense
forces.
Where can the stand be made? Un-
favorable as Vietnam might be, where
will conditions be better? With'each vic-
tory, with each swallow our enemy will
grow stronger and the free world weaker.
This lesson is not lost on Australia and
New Zealand, both of which are begin-
ning to look to their defenses.
Our policy, through both Republican
and Democratic administrations, has
been to contain communism-and it has
generally been successful. Since the
dust settled on World War II with East-
ern Europe behind the Iron Curtain, only
North Vietnam, North Korea,- and Cuba
have fallen to the Communists. Even in
Korea, unsatisfactory as the conclusion
there might seem to many people, com-
munism did not advance beyond the 17th
-parallel. It was contained.
We have heard-it said that commu-
nism contains within itself the seeds
of its own destruction. There are signs
that these seeds are maturing and that
the Communist empire is beginning to
break up. Freedom cannot be forever
suppressed. A successful policy of con-
tainment-of denying the expansion of
communism-will expedite this process.
Expansion to include the mushrooming
population and the great resources of
southeast Asia can only strengthen our
enemy and weaken the free world's abil-
ity to finally take a stand-as take a
stand we must.
It is far easier to say what must be
done than it is to say how it should be
done. On this score we must rely on
those better informed than we, but we
cannot help but speculate on what might
work.
I am pleased to note the observations
of the gentleman from New Jersey that
the South Vietnamese in the field are
prepared to continue the battle. I agree
that a prime objective must be a stable
government in Safgon capable of attract-
ing the loyalty of the South Vietnamese.
I deplore the lack of leadership and the
internecine strife that has characterized
South Vietnam for too long. Yet, I think
it is not too much to expect that South
Vietnam will produce-perhaps with
our help-the leadership it so desperately
requires just as England produced its
Churchill at the ebb of the 'tide, as
France accepted De Gaulle in the midst
of chaos, indeed as Malaysia produced its
Tunku. This must, be the objective of
our diplomacy.
Militarily, all is not as black as is
painted but success in the field is vital to
the establishment of a stable government.
I would support-as all of us would-'a
multi-nation effort in lieu of bearing the
3363
entire responsibility 'ourselves. But order of the gentleman from Illinois
there is no possibility at this point of a [Mr. PVCINSKt], may be printed in the
United Nations peacekeeping operation. RECORD immediately following that of
The current U.N. financial crises makes the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.
this apparent. Britain has its hands GALLAGHER].
full with its commitment in Malaysia, The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without
France urges vitrual withdrawal. Only objection, it is so ordered.
token internationalization is possible but There vvs no objection.
this I would support.
ursue with even greater
ld then
I
p
wou
diligence and a greater commitment of SOUTH VIETNAM
\ t"
Western troops-yes, American troops, if TheomPEAKER pro tempore. Under
necessary-the fortified village concept previous order of the House, the gentle-
which ultimately led to success in Ma- man from New York [Mr. MURPHY] is
laya. I say Western troops because the
job in Malaya was easier in that the
enemy-the Chinese Communists-were
ethnically different from the Malayans.
The Vietcong refuse to wear black hats
and the "protected villages" which the
South Vietnamese "liberate" fall when
left to the protection of the home guard
which frequently contains one or more
of the Vietcong. I am aware of the
greatly increased effort this would re-
quire of the United States and South
Vietnam.
A greater effort must then be made to
interdict the border and stop the flow of
men and arms to the south. This is a
tremendous job. I like to think of our
air strikes to the north as being not
only "retaliatory"-in which objective I
have little confidence-but also as being
aimed at marshalling points and trans-
portation lines and therefore an effort to
interdict the border by the best and
easiest means at hand. I am apprehen-
sive of escalation but doubt that such
will occur at the present level of "re-
taliation."
And then, long since, I would have
brought the Soviet Union into conversa-
tions about this area. A major war be-
tween China and the United States,
from which Russia could abstain, would
of course be in the Russian interest.
Short of that, however, Russian inter-
ests in southeast Asia far more closely
parallel American interests than they
do those of the Chinese.
We had a bitter lesson in opportunis-
tic negotiation before World War II,
as area after area was sacrificed, to
fascism by the inactivity and, perhaps,
the fear of the Western powers. The
list is long-Ethiopia, Albania, Austria,
the Saar, the Sudentenland. We need
not, I hope, learn that lesson again.
The task is not easy. It calls for the
highest level of diplomacy, the most
persistent, skillful, and patient military
policy. The President's job-which is
the job of all of us-is most difficult.
The President has my confident and
assured support.
GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
who wish to do so may be permitted 5
legislative days in which to extend their
remarks at this point in the RECORD.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr.
PRICE) Is there objection to the request
of the gentleman from Illinois?
There was no objection.
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I also
ask unanimous consent that the special
recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. MURPHY of New York. Mr.
Speaker, it is a pleasure for me to join
my colleague the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] in expressing
my personal, and I know the overwhelm-
ing sentiments of my district, concerning
the militant role that we must play in
southeast Asia.,
I think we must bear in mind that mil-
itary force is an extension of a nation's
foreign policy and that force is used
when diplomacy fails. The question in
this case, however, is, Who used force
first and what is the proper solution in
dealing with a foe that has resorted to
the tactics the Communist bloc has initi-
ated in the southeast Asian region?
The Honorable William P. Bundy, As-
sistant Secretary of State for Far East-
ern Affairs, spoke before the Washington
Chamber of Commerce, Washington,
Mo., on Saturday, January 23, 1965, and
traced the history of the present situa-
tion starting with the year 1898. I in-
clude some of his remarks:
AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA
(Address by Hon. William P. Bundy)
I
The first question requires a look at his-
tory.
Even when the Far East was much more
distant than it is today, we Americans had
deep concern for developments there. Amer-
icans pioneered in trade and missionary ef-
fort with China and in opening up Japan to
Western Influence. In 1898 we became in a
sense a colonial power in the Philippines,
but began almost at once to prepare the way
for independence and self-government
there-an independence promised by act of
Congress in 1936 and achieved on schedule
in 1946. By the 1930's, we had wide interests
of many types in the Far East, though only
few direct contacts in southeast Asia apart
from the individual Americans who had
served over decades as political advisers to
the independent Kingdom of Thailand.
Events then took a more ominous turn.
We became aware that the ambitions of
Japanese military leaders to dominate all of
Asia were a threat not only to the specific
interests of ourselves and other Western na-
tions, but to the peace of the whole area and
indeed of the world. China, in which we had
taken a lead in dismantling the 19th century
system of foreign special privileges, was
progressively threatened and large parts
overrun. We ourselves were finally attacked
at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. We
responded to aggression by conducting with
our allies a major Pacific war that cost the
United States alone 272,700 casualties and
over a hundred billion dollars.
In the end Japanese militarism was de-
feated, and the way apparently cleared for
an Asia of free and independent national
states that would be progressively freed of
colonialism, that need threaten neither each
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 2.4
other nor neighboring states, and that could
tackle in their own way the eternal problems
of building political and economic struc-
tures that would satisfy the aspiration of
their peoples.
That kind of Far East was a pretty good
definition of our national interests then. It
is equally valid today. We cared about the
Far East, and we care today, because we
know that what happensthere--among peo-
ples numbering 33 percent of the world's
population, with great talent, past historic
greatness, and capacity--is bound to make a
crucial difference whether there will be the
kind of world in which the common Ideals
of freedom can spread, nations live and work
together without strife, and-most basic of
all-we ourselves, in the long run, survive as
the kind of nation we are determined to be.
Our basic stake in the Far East is our stake
in a peaceful and secure world as distinct
from a violent and chaotic one. But there
were three great flaws in the 1945 picture
after the defeat of Japan.
1. In China, a civil war had been raging
since the 1920's between the Government, led
by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Com-
munist movement. After a brief and edgy
truce during the war against Japan, that
civil war was resumed in circumstances
where the Government had been gravely
weakened. We assisted that government in
every way possible. Mistakes may have been
made, but in the last analysis mainland
China could not have been saved from com-
munism without the commitment of major
U.S. ground and air forces to a second
war on the Asian mainland. Faced with
a concurrent threat from Soviet Russia
against Europe and the Near East, we did not
make-and perhaps could not then have
made-that commitment. And there came
to power on the mainland, in the fall of 1949,
a Communist regime filled with hatred of
the West, with the vision of a potential
dominant role for China, but imbued above
all with a primitive Communist ideology In
its must virulent and expansionist form.
2. In Korea, a divided country stood un-
easily, half free and half Communist. With
our military might sharply reduced after the
war, as part of what may have been an in-
evitable slackening of effort, we withdrew our
forces and reduced our economic aid before
there was In existence a strong South Korean
defensive capacity. With Soviet backing
North Korea attacked across the 38th parallel
in June 1950. With the Soviets then absent
from the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. was
able to condemn the aggression and to mount
a U.N. effort to assist South Korea. The
United States played by far the greatest out-
side role in a conflict that brought 157,530
U.S. casualties, cost us at least $18 billion in
direct expenses, and in the end--after Com-
munist China had also intervened-restored
an independent South Korea, although It left
a unified and free Korea to be worked out in
the future.
In retrospect, our action In Korea reflected
three elements:
A recognition that aggression of any sort
must be met early and head on, or it will
have to be met later and in tougher circum-
stances. We had relearned the lessons of the
1930's-Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland,
Czechoslovakia.
A recognition that a defense line in Asia,
stated in terms of an island perimeter, did
not adequately define our vital interests-
that those vital Interests could be affected by
action on the mainland of Asia.
An understanding that, for the future, a
power vacuum was an invitation to aggres-
sion, that there must be local political,
economic, and military strength in being to
make aggression unprofitable, but also that
there must be a demonstrated willingness of
major external power both toassist and to
intervene if required.
8. In southeast Asia, finally, there was a
third major flaw-the difficulty of liquidat-
ing colonial regimes and replacing them by
new and stable independent governments.
The Philippines became independent and
with our hhlp overcame the ravages of war
and the Communist Rule rebellion. The
British, who had likewise prepared India
and Burma and made them independent,
were In the process of doing the same in
Malaya even as they joined with the Ma-
layans in beating back a 12-year Communist
subversive effort. Indonesia was less well
prepared; it gained its independence, too,
with our support, but with scars that have
continued to affect the otherwise natural
and healthy development of Indonesian na-
tionalism.
French Indochina was the toughest case.
The French had thought in terms of a slow
evolution to an eventual status within some
French union of states--a concept too lei-
surely to fit the postwar mood of Asia. And
militant Vietnamese nationalism-had fallen
to the leadership of dedicated Communists.
We all know the result. Even with sub-
stantial help from us, France was unable to
defeat the Communist-led nationalist move-
ment. Despite last-minute promises of in-
dependence, the struggle inevitably appeared
as an attempt to preserve a colonial position.
By 1954, it could only have been won, again,
by a major U.S. military commitment, and
perhaps not even then. The result was the
settlement at Geneva. The accords reached
there were almost certainly the best achiev-
able, but they left a situation with many
seeds of future trouble. Briefly:
1. North Vietnam was militantly Com-
munist, and ha., developed during the war
against the French an army well equipped
and highly skilled Inboth conventional and
subversive warfare. From the start, North
Vietnam planned and expected to take over
the south and in due course Laos and Cam-
bodia, thinking that this would probably
happen by sheer decay under pressure, but
prepared to resort to other means if needed.
2. South Vietnam had no effective or pop-
ular leadership to start with, was demoral-
ized and unprepared for self-government,
and had only the remnants of the Vietnamese
military forces who had fought with the
French. Under the accords, external mili-
tary help was limited to a few hundred ad-
visers. Apart from its natural self-sufficien-
cy in food, South Vietnam had few assets
that appeared to match those of the north
in the struggle that was sure to come.
S. Cambodia was more hopeful In some
respects, more remote from North Vietnam,
with a leader in Prince Sihanouk, a strong
historical tradition, and the freedom to ac-
cept external assistance as she saw fit. From
the start Sihanouk Insisted, with our full
and continuing support, on a status of neu-
trality.
4. Laos, however, was less unified and was
left under the accords with a built-in and
legalized Communist presence, a disrupted
and weak economy, and no military forces of
significance.
Such was the situation President Eisen-
hower and Secretary Dulles faced in 1954.
Two things were clear-that in the absence
of external help communism was virtually
certain to take over the successor states of
Indochina and to move to the borders of
Thailand and perhaps beyond, and that with
France no longer ready to act, at least in
South Vietnam, no power other than the
United States could move in to help fill the
vacuum.
Their decision, expressed in a series of ac-
tions starting In late 1954, was to move in to
help these countries. Besides South Vietnam
and more modest efforts in Laos and Cam-
bodia, substantial assistance was begun to
Thailand.
The appropriations for these actions were-
voted by successive Congresses, and in 1954
the Senate likewise ratified the Southeast
Asia Treaty, to which Thailand and the Phil-
ippines adhered along with the United States,
Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and
Pakistan. Although not signers of the
treaty, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
could call on the SEATO members for help
against aggression.
So a commitment was made, with the sup-
port of both political parties, that has
guided our policy in southeast Asia for a
decade now. It was not a commitment that
envisaged a U.S. position of power in south-
east Asia or U.S. military bases there. We
threatened no one. Nor was it a commit-
ment that substituted U.S. responsibility for
the basic responsibility of the nations them-
selves for their own defense, political sta-
bility, and economic progress. It was a com-
mitment to do what we could to help these
nations attain and maintain the independ-
ence and security to which they were en-
titled-both for their own sake and because
we recognized that, like South Korea, south-
east Asia was a key area of the mainland of
Asia. If it fell to Communist control, this
would enormously add to the momentum
and power of the expansionist Communist
regimes in Communist China and North
Vietnam, and thus to the threat to the whole
free world position in the Pacific.
Let us look at Vietnam from the
beautiful city of Saigon. I visited Saigon
in December of 1963 with five of my col-
leagues, and spoke at length with Gen..
Paul D. Harkins, commander of our Mili-
tary Assistance Advisory Group, Ambas-
sador Henry Cabot Lodge, and many of
our American military and businessmen
in the area. The most striking thing
about Vietnam is the fact that it is the
richest agricultural area In the world.
The experts have said that sufficient food
can be produced in this area to feed al.
most all of Asia. This territory in the
southern portion of Vietnam also per.-
mits guerrilla forces to live off the land
without a constant resupply to sustain
their activities in the field. The area is
abundant in geese, ducks, and of course
the staple commodity-rice.
During the early phase of the Viet-
namese operation against the Vietcong,
our military adviser initiated a policy
wherein all of the villages of the country
were organized and defended in a.
unique manner. Instead of letting the
farmers fall prey to small marauding:
bands of Vietcong, each town was forti-
fied. The valuables were placed in a,
warehouse or hut in the center of town.
and at the first sign of an attack, the
villagers would retreat to this redoubt,
and a radio call for help was sent to the
nearest army force whose immediate re-
sponse was guaranteed through the use
of helicopters and other high-speed air-
craft, in conjunction with paratroop op-
erations. When the war was virtually
won in the north the Vietcong were
starved out, but in the south they could
rely upon the overabundance in the
Mekong Delta to support their operation,
hence their success in the Saigon
area.
The war has been further complicated
by the very complex situation within the
country. You can imagine the problems
our advisers had with the turnover of
governments. The American advisers
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 3361
,what the gentleman says and in support
of what the President of the United
States says.
Mr. Speaker, I am more than pleased
to see that this discussion today has been
treated on a nonpartisan basis-that the
great leaders in the? Republican Party
are speaking as Americans and speaking
in behalf of the United States.
Mr. S13eaker, I think the gentleman
from New Jersey has done the country
a great service today.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gen-
tleman for his kind observations.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
. Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gen-
tleman.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Speaker, I consider
it a high honor and a great privilege to
associate myself with the remarks of the
distinguished gentleman from New Jer-
sey [Mr. GALLAGHER]. The gentleman
has made a very valuable contribution
to our foreign policy and well being
policy here today and I commend him
very highly for taking this time to dis-
cuss this vital subject.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gen-
tleman from Illinois very much for his
kind remarks.
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentle-
man from Florida, a member of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I join
in the general commendation of the gen-
tleman in the well of the House who is
discussing this subject and giving the
House an opportunity to give its support
to the policy of the President of the
United States in this very difficult situa-
tion.
The rest of the world must and should
know that the United States is not frus-
trated-we do know what our duty is and
we are doing our duty. Despite the fact
that there may be some question of
what needs to be done, we know in our
hearts we are doing the only thing that
can be done at the present time, looking
to the future and working for a different
way to resolve the problem. I think
most of us agree that we must hold the
line and beat back the efforts being made
by the aggressors, or we will not have the
future opportunity to work toward an-
other solution.
the Communists will have gained an im-
portant victory in a strategic area of the
world and 'will have made the United
States look like the paper tiger that Red
China claims she is. If that should ever
happen, how could we expect our allies
to believe us when we say that we stand
shoulder to shoulder with them.
I am tired of listening to proposals of
retreat and appeasement to the Com-
munists. I believe that these proposals
do a great deal of harm to American
world leadership.
Since, the emergence of the United
States as the natural and willing leader
of the free world we have led and will
continue to lead the fight against Com-
munist aggression.
If the time should come that we are
no longer willing to oppose communism,
then let us make that clear. But we are
not going to abandon the battle now.
And if we should quit in Vietnam, the
rest of the world will take this as a signal
that we are quitting the fight and giving
the Reds a victory by default. And they
will think that this is the beginning of
a policy of giving in to the Communists
throughout the world.
Mr. Speaker, during the past few years
things have not been easy. They have
been far from easy. But we have always
shown the world that we will fight the
Communist aggressors and will stick to
our commitments.
We should not and will not quit the
battle now-or until the face and soul
of communism is wiped from the face
of the earth.
Mr. FARNUM. Mr. Speaker, in my
opinion this honorable body has been
greatly enlightened by the report of my
distinguished colleague from the State
of New Jersey, the Honorable CORNELIUS
E. GALLAGHER, on the conditions prevail-
ing in Vietnam.
Without necessarily agreeing in their
entirety with my colleague's conclusions,
it appears to me that in his factual re-
port he has rendered a significant serv-
ice in calling the attention of this body
and of our Nation to the necessity for a
view of the entire situation when state-
ments are made about our policies in
that area of conflict with communism.
There is certainly no suggestion on my
part that free and unlimited debate be
limited in the slightest. That is un-
thinkable in a democracy.
But it would serve the national in-
terest, I believe, if all who have occasion
to speak of affairs beyond our borders,
and particularly at this point in history
of affairs in the Far East, keep in mind
some of the points made by the honorable
Member.
Certainly all of us agree with him
that we must continually serve notice on
the world that our Nation is united in
meeting the challenge of communism in
Vietnam.
Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, we who join
in today's discussion are conscious of
the need for the House of Representa-
tives to speak responsibly and with un-
derstanding on the situation in Viet-
nam. I am pleased that we are doing so.
Both Houses of Congress have a role
to play, as elected representatives of
the people, in reviewing, criticizing, and
But we have not solved the basic
problem of how to deal effectively in non-
military terms with what is commonly
called subversion either military, eco-
nomic, or political. We are willing and
should be willing to commit the neces-
sary manpower, materiel, and resources
to met any military threat, but we must
also look one step ahead and be working
to obtain those solutions which will per-
mit us to deal effectively with subver-
sion without being forced into a partial
or full military response.
Vietnam is not the last place that we
are going to meet subversion.
The United States cannot afford to be
nibbled to death and we are not going to
be nibbled to death.
We have made that clear. No enemy
should have any doubt about that. The
history of the American people is clear,
that we will stand up, fight and die if
necessary to protect what we believe in.
But we face a new kind of warfare and
we must be prepared to deal in every way
with that new kind of warfare.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FASCELL. I yield to. the gentle-
man from Illinois.
Mr. MICHEL. The point the gentle-
man from Florida makes is a good one.
I have heard mentioned earlier in this
discussion Korea and several other cases
in point.
Would the gentleman not agree that
Korea was an act of overt aggression?
Rather than lumping the two together,
here we see a classic example of indirect
aggression at play. It is something new.
Here we make, really, the first full test
of whether or not we will meet this as we
met the overt aggression.
. Mr. FASCELL. The gentleman from
Illinois is correct. Of course, we must
meet it. We will meet it. The fact is
that our enemy is working in all other
countries of the world in this same fash-
ion, but without the obvious military
overtones to their acts.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gen-
tleman, who is a most knowledgeable
member of the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs.
Mr. GRABOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I
have made it clear over the past few
weeks that I am opposed to any with-
drawal of American forces from South
Vietnam at the present time.
The Vietnam and Cuban problem, em- There is no other honorable action
phasizes the continuing difficulty that that we can take at the present time.
the United States and the free world We must stand up to the Communist
have in dealing with a new concept of threat here as we did in Cuba. We must
international politics which has been evi- let the Communists know we mean busi-
denced by the Communist world. We no ness as we did in Berlin. We must draw
longer have fixed lines in the old mili- the line on Communist aggression as we
tary sense. That went out many years did in Korea.
ago. We no longer have a direct or This Nation intends to live up to its
overt crossing armed a force. W boundary We n no o longer a commitments and we intend to live up
recognizable to our commitment in Vietnam.
armed, overt, , or or just plain aggression. a clear-cut definition of what is I have stated before and I say again
.
This requires us on the free world side that I support President Johnson's ac-
to maintain more than military flexi- tions in Vietnam and will support future
bility. A standard, flexible, or new mili- additional steps that are necessary to in-
tary response appears to be insufficient sure the continued freedom of this area.
to a problem like the one we are facing The American people-judging by my
in Vietnam, despite the fact that we are mail-are beginning to realize that not
committed to a military response and only is South Vietnam at stake, but free-
may have to respond in an even greater dom-freedom for every peace-loving na-
degree. tion in the world. If we back down here,
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3362 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Februaty 24
explaining our foreign policy. But we of nation, a relatively small number can bility without coming forth with any real,'
should do so with the constant realiza- disrupt the normal processes of living. affirmative, viable alternatives.
tion that the President has the constitu- Of course, our response must be more Let the Vietcong abandon their aggres-
tional duty to make foreign policy. than military. Of course, progressive sion and no negotiations, no new Geneva
While not infallible, he has far more economic, and social programs -are conference will be needed. Peace would
military and diplomatic intelligence needed. But in recognizing this, we return to Vietnam.
available to him than any of us. He has must not ignore the role that terrorism The President has rejected surrender,
acted with wisdom and restraint in South plays. The majority of people are un- and he has rejected brash action. I com-
Vietnam. I trust him, and I support committed. Moreover, they are natu- mend him for his restraint, his patience,
him. rally afraid to get stuck backing a loser. and his wisdom In dealing with this
In the last few weeks, we have seen Eliminate terrorism, give the people a thicket, where no easy answers are to be
the appearance of an abundance of decent chance to make a choice, and you found, and our alternatives are limited
oversimpliflers' those who see the will probably get a favorable choice. and harsh Let us meet our responsibili-
see er answer escal t on," and those who We should remind the critics that when ties with toughness, patience, and under-
my Vietnam was divided in 1955, many ob- standing.
judgment, neither view is appropriate at servers gave the south a life expectancy Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon. Mr.
this time. of 6 months. Its economy and adminis- Speaker, I am delighted that the debate
Bombing of North Vietnamese targets tration was a shambles, and transporta-
is not an answer in itself, although we tion had broken down. fi American pahey ou Vietnam has
must be prepared to pursue it if cir- But the south survived. It wi debted to the gein-
ntleman out ally so the ge the House. ouse. from We New we Jr er-
cumstances warrant. I say this fully city gangs and absorbed over a million sey for of the risk of escalation in- northerners. who had fled across the bor- think f his
thatith in this matter. I
herent in our policy of measured der to escape the Communist system. In he-has further drat the colloquy in which
response. - the first 4 years, school population In as engaged with the gentleman from
11V1411'
futile idea under present circumstances. The contrast was not permitted to standThere has been discussed on this floor .
For one thing, it implies that the Com- In 1959, the Vietcong began a calculated the question of the desirability of a
munists will not only abandon their effort of terrorism and infiltration. If negotiated settlement in South Vietnam.
drive to communize all of southeast Asia, this can be cut down, progress can be One of the difficulties we have in ex-
but will also agree to neutralize North renewed. pressing ourselves in the English Ian..
Vietnam. This is illusory. Indeed, North What of the recent coordinated attacks guage-as Winston Churchill once
Vietnam and China have.made it abun- on U.S. personnel? For one thing, they pointed out-is that we must not only
dantly clear in radio broadcasts that they should dispel the view still held by some listen to what is said but also try to un-?
will not negotiate until the United States that the struggle in South Vietnam is derstand what the speaker means to say.
withdraws from South Vietnam. This is merely a local civil war. It is not. It is Someone else has recently pointed out
not negotiation; this is a call for uncon- largely planned, equipped, and directed that every armed conflict sooner or later
ditional surrender. from Hanoi. must end up at the conference table.
There are two ultimate ways to end Let the critics address themselves to So I think we must define what we mean
any war: you either beat the enemy in these questions: by "a negotiated settlement."
a full scale confrontation, or you nego- First. What impact would U.S. with- A negotiated settlement of the prob-
tiate a settlement. That is obvious. If drawal from South Vietnam have on lems in South Vietnam which accom-
we do not have an all-out war, then we Thailand and Malaysia, and the rest of plished the objectives for which we have
will ultimately have some settlement by southeast Asia? made a military commitment in that un-
negotiation. But the blunt truth is that Second. What would our withdrawal happy country would surely be welcomed
in Vietnam today, there is little, if any- mean to Japan and India, two democra- by all of us. Negotiation with less than
thing, that is negotiable. ties without nuclear arms who might that objective cannot, it seems to me, be
We are in a situation where events some day need our nuclear guarantee in accepted or even undertaken. Those who
compel us to continue a policy in between the face of a hostile, nuclear-armed fear negotiation at this juncture cannot
escalation on the one hand, and with- China? What would it mean to their forget that the present conflict rose from
drawal on the other. It is a difficult confidence in us? negotiations which followed Dien Bien
position, inconsistent with characteris- Third. What would our withdrawal Phu. Those who fear negotiation cannot
tic American preference for quick and mean to the people of South Vietnam, forget the story of the rising young Com-
clean solutions. Regardless of the dif- who have resisted communism for a dec- munist officer who, when asked on an
ficulties, however, we must persevere. ade? examination what he would do in an
Under the best of circumstances, the Fourth. Would our collapse in this in- engagement with the enemy as his am-
creation of a secure Vietnamese state will surgency encourage more insurgency in munition ran low, replied, "I would com-
be a long, slow process. Inevitably, the Asia, Africa, and Latin America? mence negotiations for a settlement un-
main burden of meeting and beating the One does not have to fully accept the til more ammunition was brought up,"
Vietcong must fall on the people of South automatic operation of the so-called. I cannot help but feel that a defeat in
Vietnam. They have accepted this bur- "domino theory" to recognize the strate- South Vietnam, whether at the negotiat-
den in large measure, particularly in gic and psychological importance of ing table or in the field, would lead to
military operations. We should observe, South Vietnam. an envelopment by Red China and
for example, that their fighting forces go Our policy is to stay until South Viet- nations satellite to Red China of portions
into battle day after day, notwithstand- nam's ability to maintain its own security of Asia and the South Pacific the equal
Ing coup and countercoup in Saigon. Is firmly established. Our aim is to help of or greater than that to which Japan
Their will to fight :s still strong. stabilize the government, pacify the aspired a quarter of a century ago. And
Now, nobody is happy with the politi- countryside and present an attractive we will all remember the 4 years of
cal instability in Saigon. The American alternative to communism. bloodshed we accepted to frustrate
Ambassador awakes every morning not Whatever we do in the short run, af- Japan's ambitions in World War II.
knowing if he will have a coup as an fects our interests in the long run. As I fear not just for the fall of Laos,
appetizer with his breakfast. We do not the principal guardian of the free world, Cambodia and Thailand. I do not see
pretend that things are going well. But we must honor our commitments now, or how the new nation of Malaysia could
the case is not hopeless. risk complicating our expected responsi- survive in the nutcracker of Red China
Insurgency tactics are not unbeatable, bilities 10 and 20 years from now. on the north and Indonesia on the south.
While, admittedly, there are some signifi- Those calling for immediate negotia- Indonesia is the fifth most populous va-
cant differences, we have seen similar tions are harming the situation rather tion in the world, rich in natural re-
tactics beaten in Greece, in the Philip- than helping it. They are not thinking sources and scattered across the trade
pines and in Malaya. In a jungle coun- things through. Moreover, they are nar- routes of the East Indies. It already
try, where many villagers have no sense rowing the President's options and flexi- harkens to the pipes of Peiping. I fear
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE'
l tion, to be left alone. He, therefore, posed antee, the inevitable result would be the
the question, "Why not get all the foreigners fall of that country to a Communist at-
out of Laos and let these. people work out tack which, while waged in the south,
their own future as an independent and is financed and supplied and supported
neutral nation without outside inter- from the countries to the north-from
Terence?" North Vietnam and Communist China
And, as Secretary Rusk so rightly
Chairman Khrushchev agreed to that in
Vienna in 1961, and that became the object
of the Geneva Conference on Laos and was
the result agreed to in the accords of 1962.
But before the ink was'dry, Hanoi, with the
backing of Peiping, treated with contempt
the pledges it had just given. All Viet Minh,
that is North Vietnamese military personnel,
were not withdrawn from Laos-
And, having been in Loas in Novem-
ber 1964, I can testify that half of the
Country is occupied by the Vietminh
and Pathet Lao forces-
thousands remained. And North Vietnam
continued to infiltrate guerrilla cadres and
certain supplies through Laos into South
Vietnam. The International Control Com-
mission was paralyzed in its efforts to ob-
serve noncompliance. And Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma of the government of Na-
tional Union, who supported those accords
of 1962, was denied authority over territory
or forces controlled by the Pathet Lao and
the Vietminh.
It is true that today neutralists and con-
servatives are now working together and that
there is no Soviet supply line supporting the
Pathet Lao. But a peace which would be so
simple to achieve is blocked by the continu-
ing refusal of Hanoi and Peiping to comply
with the accords of 1962.
And so, when people ask you, "What about
the neutralization of South Vietnam?" keep
your eye on Laos because there was a sin-
cere and genuine effort to give the Lao-
tians a chance to be independent and neutral
in the most fundamental sense of those
terms. And there was an agreement which
has been frustrated by those who seem not
to be content so long as there is any chance
to expand their world revolution.
Mr. Speaker, there are no quick or easy
or ready solutions to the very difficult
situation confronting us in South Viet-
nam and southeast Asia.
It is too late to debate the question of
whether or not the United States should
have responded in 1954 to a cry for help
from a new country seeking to preserve
its newly found and shaky independence.
The fact is that we joined in an agree-
ment to defend southeast Asia from ag-
gression-a policy which has been sup-
ported by President Eisenhower, Presi-
dent Kennedy, and President Johnson.
We have stayed to help an embattled
people free themselves from outside in-
terference and domination so that they
might develop their own society, choose
their own leaders, and determine their
owns course of development. We have
stayed because we believed our national
'security as well as the great principles
for which we stand are at stake.
There are those who argue that we
should pull out now; that we should
withdraw on the best terms possible, but
in any case withdraw.
But, Mr. Speaker, we are in no posi-
tion to, pull out of Vietnam or southeast
Asia until and unless an effective means
is found to-guarantee the independence
of these people. If we were to withdraw
from South Vietnam today, or tomorrow,
or even the next day without such a guar-
itself.
The loss of South Vietnam to the Com-
munists would clearly menace neighbor-
ing Thailand and Cambodia. It would
bring increased pressure to bear on al-
ready beleaguered Malaysia. It would
open a side door into India. It would
threaten the Philippines and even Aus-
tralia. It would make impossible any
alternatives for Indonesia. In brief,
Western interests and indeed freedom
itself throughout southeast Asia and the
Pacific would be imperiled.
James Reston, writing in the New York
Times 10 days ago, stated:
Very few people here question the neces-
sity for a limited expansion of the war by
U.S. bombers into Communist territory. The
American and the South Vietnamese posi-
tion was crumbling fast, and the political
and strategic consequences of defeat would
have been serious for the free world all
over Asia.
But, Mr. Speaker, a series of retalia-
tory bombings do not constitute a for-
eign policy and I am fully confident that
this fact is recognized by the President
of the United States.
He has stated that, "We seek no wider
war," that "our goal is peace in southeast
Asia."
This peace cannot be achieved by arms
alone; neither can it be achieved by uni-
lateral withdrawal or surrender.
Mr. Speaker, it is imperative, I feel,
that we heed the wise words of Secretary
Rusk concerning Laos; that we keep our
eyes on the relevant facts of current his-
tory.
It is also imperative, I feel, that we
remember the President is charged under
our Constitution with the conduct of our
foreign policy; that we support him in
his efforts to preserve both peace and
freedom in southeast Asia in this very
sensitive and delicate period of world
history.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentle-
man for his observations, and also com-
pliment him for the suggestions he made
on his tour in southeast Asia.
Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentle-
man from Texas.
(Mr. PICKLE asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.) .
Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, I would
like to make this one point. We all want
peace in Asia and throughout the world.
We should bear in mind that we do not
gain ground by giving up. You do not
improve your position by retreat and you
do not strengthen your leadership by a
statement of weakness. You cannot
negotiate with the deaf.
Mr. Speaker, as the headlines continue
to blare at us every day, many cuestions
are being raised about our involvement
in southeast Asia, "flow did we ever get
in Vietnam? What are we doing so
deeply committed in far-off parts of
Asia? Whose idea was all this, any-
way?"
3359
Most of the people asking these ques-
tions seem to believe that our interest in
Asia, and especially southeast Asia, is
something brand new, something strange,
and even something a bit irregular. But
nothing could be further from the truth.
Our interest in southeast Asia goes back
some 130 years, when the first diplomatic
contacts between the United States and
the Kingdom of Siali, now Thailand,
took place. Since that time, we have
helped in the opening of Japan to the
West; we were the ruling power in the
Philippines for nearly 50 years; and we
risked and waged two wars because we
were concerned over the basic proposi-
tion that it was in the interest of the free
world-and particularly of the United
States-that Asian nations be allowed to
develop themselves free from outside ag-
gression.
Whether we like it or not-especially
some of our short-memoried and rain-
bow-seeking friends-we are looked to
throughout the world as the one Gov-
ernment which will help small independ-
ent nations remain free. It is a heavy
responsibility; but it is a proud banner
we carry. At their invitation, we have
offered help to the nation of Vietnam.
That little country-beset with the
greatest conflicts of racial riddles, re-
ligion and distrust-is fighting for its
life-fighting against communism.
These are tortuous and exasperating
times for all of us. Voices of doubt and
appeasement and negotiation plead that
we should take the easy-and tempo-
rary-course of immediate withdrawal.
But this is unthinkable; we cannot give
an inch to aggression, or the aggres-
sors-like the proverbial camel-will
soon be inside our own tent. We must
steel our determination and stiffen our
backs with the firm faith that right
makes might.
In the beginning, we were either right
or wrong to help the free people of Viet-
nam; and we are either right or wrong
now to preserve and maintain our com-
mitment. There is no middle ground.
Our course is the right one; the de-
termination to see it through tough times
is the difficult task. The wise and the
worried know this. The weak and
doubtful want to ignore it. But history
cannot let us escape it.
In our time, our society faces one
great issue-we must meet and answer
the threat of communism. It is a con-
frontation that cannot be escaped. In
Korea, we either met it or lost north
Asia; in Vietnam, we either meet it or
lose all of southeast Asia. You do not
gain ground by giving it up. You do not
improve your position by retreating; you
do not strengthen your leadership by a
statement of weakness. And you cannot
negotiate with the devil.
What would it profit us to abandon
Vietnam only to have a worse threat in
India or Pakistan or Turkey or France
or Mexico-on and on-until the cries of
retreat grow into a thunderous tidal wave
of isolationism-and we are left alone.
It is better to have the confrontation
now-to firm up our resolute position-
than to close our eyes to the tyranny.
President Johnson has answered these
threats with positive and forthright ac-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 24
tion. You can be sure that this same
kind of reply will be forthcoming when-
ever and wherever freedom Is endan-
gered. The American people support the
President in these hours. And history
will praise him for the strong leadership
he is giving us today.
We are not embarked on some new
and remote adventure in Vietnam; we are
embarked on just one part of the de-
fense of freedom that has occupied us
since we became a nation almost 190
years ago. The scale of our participa-
tion may be new, but the fact of our par-
ticipation is old, continuous, and honor-
able.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gen-
tleman from Texas for his statement.
Mr. ICHORD, Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Missouri.
Mr. ICHORD, Mr. Speaker, I would
like to take this opportunity to highly
commend the gentleman from New
Jersey for taking this special order to
speak out on this very important ques-
tion. I unhesitatingly associate myself
with the remarks of the gentleman who,
as a member of the Committee on For-
eign Affairs, is in a position to have a
superior knowledge of the background
of the South Vietnam situation and the
present state of affairs.
I personally feel that there have been
altogether too many speeches both in-
side and outside of the Congress by gen-
tlemen who are not as highly informed
on the situation as the gentleman from
New Jersey. We of the Armed Services
Committee-and the Presiding Officer
now in the chair is a ranking member of
that committee-also had the occasion,
the opportunity and the duty of dealing
with the South Vietnam situation at
length. Although I am not authorized to
speak on behalf of the committee I be-
lieve I would be correct in saying that
all members of the committee, both on
the Republican side and on the Demo-
cratic side, give the President of the
United States their wholehearted support
iri his announced policy on South Viet-
nam.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gen-
tleman for his kind words.
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Florida.
Mr. PEPPER. I wish to commend the
able gentleman from New Jersey and
those who have worked with him in this
important matter on the splendid sen-
timents which he and they today have
expi essed giving notice to the President
and to the potential aggressors of the
world that America will not falter in
standing against those who commit ag-
gression in any part of the world.
I think all of us realize that it is of
the utmost importance at this critical
time that nothing which shall be said
in the Congress or in the country by any
responsible voice shall give any encour-
agement to those who are watching with
the most critical eye to see whether the
faith and the courage of the people of
America will falter in this high resolve
of defending freedom; whether we will
regard the end as hopeless; or whether
we will count the cost too great and the
cause not worthy of the aid that we
give.
Mr. Speaker, many of us for a long
time have had great hope in the United
Nations organization as the peacekeep-
ing force of the world. Unfortunately,
it has not been able to achieve that
status; unhappily, recent events in the
Assembly have discouraged the hope
that the United Nations was making real
progress toward stemming aggression
and keeping the peace of the world.
So today, Mr. Speaker, if the United
States with the strength and the will
that it possesses does not defend the
cause of freedom in the world, where
will freedom find a champion? If we
falter here, withdraw elsewhere where
we stand as the bulwark of freedom, the
aggressors can sweep across a large part
of the world without any effective oppo-
sition. Until more collective machinery
can be provided effectively to defend
freedom, the dedicated might of Amer-
ica is the only force which can shield
the weak and the free against the ag-
gressive strong in many vital parts of
the world.
Mr. Speaker, the motives of the peo-
ple of America In respect to Vietnam and
wherever else we assert our power have
no selfish ends. We seek no ill gain;
we support no colonialism; we are a part
of no conspiracy to preserve the status
quo because It is the status quo. We are
in league with none who would suppress
the legitimate ambitions of those slow
to arrive at the center part of the world
stage. We are part of no combine to
hold back any who have the right to
progress, whoever it be and wherever
they are. We do not propose to dictate
anywhere to establish for selfish purposes
any area of influence or to dominate any
field or play the game of power politics
according to the old way of nations. We
do not arrogate to ourselves the only
righteousness or infallibility of judgment
and, of course, we are always willing to
reason with those who want to reason
about right and how to do it or to ne-
gotiate over what is negotiable and here
in Vietnam as well as elsewhere we will
negotiate about the best way of preserv-
ing the freedom of an independent peo=
pie and protecting them against aggres-
sion with any of good will. But, we
shall not negotiate relative to our deter-
mination to discharge our solemn duty
under ' the United Nations Charter to
defend freedom against aggression and
we shall not negotiate as to whether we
withdraw from duty whatever the diffi-
culty, however great the danger.
So, Mr. Speaker, I think it is highly
important that we let the word go forth
from the will and the heart of America
that there is no weakening of our will,
there is no division in our sentiment,
there is no faltering in our faith to stand
behind the cause of freedom and against
aggression wherever that threat occurs.
Let the word go forth that in pursuance
of this high resolve we will stand with
others if we can or, God helping us, we
will stand alone if we must.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the dis-
tinguished gentleman, who has served
with such distinction in the other body
and in this House of Representatives.
Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentle-
man from South Carolina.
Mr. DORN. I join in supporting the
President and the distinguished gentle-
man in the well, and congratulate the
gentleman on having taken this time,
because this issue is the greatest single
issue before the American people today.
It is one of national survival.
To me it is utterly fantastic and incred-
ible that any responsible person in the
United States in view of the past 20 or
30 years of history of the modern world
would propose that we pull out of South
Vietnam or negotiate at a time when
Kosygin in Hanoi a few days ago de-
manded that we get out of South Viet-
nam. He demanded that we leave there,
and branded the United States as im-
perialist; this at a time when Mao Tse
Tung has also demanded that we abandon
the cause of freedom in South Vietnam.
To me it is inconceivable that anyone
in this country should acquiesce in that
blackmail and turn these people over to
the ruthless international banditry
known as communism.
I want to commend the gentleman, and
point out that during the last few days
reports continue to come through that
hordes of Red Chinese soldiers are mass-
ing on the borders of India. As Lenin
is reported to have said more than 45
years ago, the road to Paris is the road
through Peiping. They have Peiping. If
we give them South Vietnam, we would
be giving them all southeast Asia.
India and 67 percent of the world's un-
tapped oil in the Near East would be
next. Then north Africa, which is just
a part of the great Afro-Eurasian land
mass, will fall. Western Europe would be
outflanked and would collapse as predict-
ed by the Communists. The road to
America will be completely open because,
as the gentleman knows, it is only 1,500
miles from Africa to South America,
The defense and security of this Na-
tion and of-the entire western world and
our western civilization is hanging in
jeopardy today in South Vietnam.
Mr. Speaker, I want to again commend
the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.
GALLAGHER] and I rise to stand by the
President of the United States in his
earnest desire that there be no with-
drawal and, certainly I think at this
time, no negotiation, with the Commu-
nist gangsters.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gen-
tleman for his contribution and for his
kind words.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentle-
man from New Mexico.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, I have
long admired the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] for his wide
knowledge in the field of foreign affairs.
Today the gentleman has brought some-
thing to the attention of this House and
to the attention of the Nation, and I am
very proud to stand here in this House of
Representatives at his side in support of
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 3357
ham confident that North Vietnam will a greater number of casualties than in complexities. We cannot, however, let
find there is nothing inflexible about the any similar period during the war. Dur- this war serve as an exercise in futility.
policy of the United States. We want ing the same period, the Vietcong like- No one wants war. I, too, am appalled
peace and security in South Vietnam. wise suffered more casualties than during that our American soldiers are dying on
(Mr. PATTEN (at the request of Mr. any other week. battlefields in Vietnam. Most of the per-
DANIELS) was given permission to ex- During that week, 290 members of the sons with whom I have talked wish there
tend his remarks at this point in the South Vietnamese armed forces were were no fighting in Vietnam. So do I.
RECORD and to include extraneous killed, 655 were wounded in action and However, these same people also express
matter.) 610 are missing in action. At the same a desire that the United States not bow
Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Speaker, domestic time, the Communist Vietcong lost 795 to this aggression by the Chinese Com-
critics of our Government's policy of ex- dead and 105 captured. This may be munists. These people know that sur-
tending military and economic support considered a low estimate for Communist render here would merely serve as a
to South Vietnam are speaking and writ- casualties, since the Vietcong carry away signal for the Chinese Communists to
ing a great deal these days about the high their dead and wounded with them when- open up new aggressions elsewhere.
and increasing number of American mili- ever possible, and total figures cannot I favor a negotiated peace but not at
tary casualties there, as well as the huge therefore be tabulated for the Vietcong. the price of defeat. I agree with Presi-
cost of maintaining our support effort All Americans can, take very great dent Johnson that we should withdraw
to that southeast Asian nation. Some of pride in the personal courage and devo- only when foreign powers supporting this
these critics-and they are not military tion which have been exhibited by our war also withdraw and begin living up
experts-are calling either for major in- American military advisers. One Con- to the commitments agreed to in 1954
creases in U.S. military involvement in gressional Medal of Honor and numerous with the French and the Laotian agree-
the war in South Vietnam, or a total Silver Star, Bronze Star, and Air ment in 1962.
pullout of U.S. forces and support. The Medals-all awarded for bravery in com- What assurances do we have the Com-
argument seems to run like this: If we bat-have been bestowed on our ground munists would respect agreements made
cannot win the war in South Vietnam, and air advisers. U.S. naval forces are at a forced negotiated peace such as
or if the South Vietnamese cannot do also doing a fine job of supporting the some persons are now demanding? Why,
it even with massive U.S. assistance, let South Vietnamese junk fleet, which when the Communists are currently vio-
us cut our losses and get out. patrols the coastline and guards against lating agreements made in 1954 and
Another argument which the critics of the introduction of Communist men and 1962, should we believe they will not
U.S. policy in South Vietnam are using munitions by sea. violate any agreement with us as soon
these days is that the South Vietnamese Mr. Speaker, our U.S. military advisers as we withdraw from South Vietnam?
has been
armed forces cannot or will not fight ef- now serving in South Vietnam are aware The to war a in in great South deal h of Vietnam has taeen
fectively against the Communist Viet- of the criticisms which I mentioned at subject the United of mind abroad.
cong. Some people claim that the Viet- the beginning of my speech. Their wives ing here to It is sometimes represented States s and a local
amese soldier is lacking in aggressive- and families clip these articles out of Vietnamese are fighting
ness. Others claim that he and his of- newspapers and magazines and mail war, is which
ficers are unwilling to accept advice from them to South Vietnam. against as an Asian war,
represented
their A erican military advisers. It is also Vietnamese.
Our military advisers in Vietnam are in which the Communists charge that
Both these arguments, Mr. Speaker, helping their Vietnamese counterparts Americans and other westerners are il-
are grossly unfair to the Vietnamese and fight a dirty, vicious, and extremely diffi- legally interfering.
American soldiers who are daily risking cult guerrilla war. Of course they are It is often represented as a popular
their lives-and in many instances dy- not enjoying it, but they have both dem- uprising against an unpopular and un-
ing-in the fields, swamps, and jungles onstrated great stamina and tenacity. representative Government in Saigon.
of South Vietnam. The Vietnamese are not quitting, and Now, in the jargon of communism, "wars
The record of both South Vietnamese they are profoundly grateful for our help. of national liberation" are essentially
and Americans in Vietnam today is one Our own soldiers are convinced of the local efforts to overthrow oppressive and
in which all Americans and other free necessity for their presence there, and imperialistic governments and to replace
world peoples can take pride. that with our assistance the Vietnamese them with so-called democratic gav-
Reports of individual heroism and self- can win their fight against the Com- ernments which will truly represent the
sacrifice appear frequently in our news- munists, if we on the home front con- interests of the people. The Communist
papers and news magazines. Does any- tinue to give them our full support. countries furnish political, military, eco-
one doubt the truth of these reports by Secretary of Defense McNamara told nomic and psychological support to their
experienced American news correspond- the Armed Services Committee last week foreign "brothers" in such common, fra-
ents? that the situation in Vietnam is grave ternal struggles against imperialism.
I remember reading of one recent case but by no means hopeless. This country This is how the Communists represent
in which a village hamlet in South Viet- has been in tough spots before, and has the situation in South Vietnam and else-
nam was attacked and its outnumbered not survived all these years by throwing where.
garrison overrun by the Communist Viet- in its cards and walking away from the The true facts, however, are quite dif-
Cang attackers. The hamlet defenders table when the going got rough. ferent.
were not regular South Vietnamese Let us support our armed forces in These wars of national liberation are
armed forces, but a small detachment of South Vietnam. They are doing a cru- actually guerrilla wars which are orga-
r Forces-some- cial job out there for all of us. They nized, direr ed, and supplied by foreign
the Alike thal ate Guard in
tr -like they two or three Uthis.Scll- deserve our full backing, no less than the Communist powers utilizing the tools of,
txy advss er by two or U.S. mils- South Vietnamese armed forces and murder, wholesale destruction of prop
tart' as, I believe a lieutenant and people, as the record shows, deserve our erty, and terrorism to intimidate the lo-
two serge antr v
. full backing against a common enemy. cal population and to subvert and de-
help, arrived r too lradioed for (Mr. HOWARD (at the request of Mr. stroy the legally constituted government.
help, which ich aed cat late a casualties, but prevent e t the e nh DANIELS) was given permission to ex- This terrorism is compounded by open
Government heavy rescuing force succeeded t din driving away tend his remarks at this point in the irregular warfare in which guerrilla
the Vforce a survivors RECORD and to include extraneous mat- units, sometimes operating in battalion
who ter.) strength, ambush Government military
a Vietcong. ie wounded Among Popular the
Forces soldier was
a
had fired his machinegun until he ran Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Speaker, my units, mount sneak attacks on airfields,
out of ammunition. Then, although esteemed colleague, the gentleman from damage railroad lines, assassinate local and do everyt
ing
possible wounded, had buried his weapon in ew liveredea Jersey [Mr.
penetrating outline dest oy,the Governmenthand eco omy of
the mud to prevent it from falling into to
the hands of the Vietcong. of the problems in Vietnam, the country under attack.
During the week of February 7-13, the Certainly it is obvious to one and all Behind the Communist Vietcong guer-
South Vietnamese armed forces suffered that the war in. Vietnam is filled with rillas in South Vietnam are the North
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 3358
Vietnamese Communists in Hanoi, Be- There would be no need for large num- It might be well to remember that
hind the North Vietnamese Communists hers of U.S. military advisers in South the Communists have been fighting con-
-are the Chinese Communists in Peiping, Vietnam if that country had not been tinually in southeast Asia since the Jap-
ruling over the world's largest nation of attacked by its Cm W-
o
mu
neighbor co anese began their invasion of the Asian
more than 650 million people, the north. As Secretary of State Rusk mainland in the late 1930's. In many
Down through the mountain passes stated not long ago: "We have no desire respects, the burdens on the Cornmu-
from Communist China into North Viet- for any bases or permanent military nists have been heavier and the rewards
nam roll the railroad cars with their presence In that area." We are there fewer for them than have been the bur-
freight of Communist Chinese and So- today because the South Vietnamese dens and rewards of the United States.
viet arms and military equipment. Down Government has asked for our support. Therefore, it behooves all Americans
the Ho Chi Minh trail through south- That support should and must be con- to fall into step behind President John-Laos
roll
carrying same deadly f eight. tOver the mountathe in ti We sh long it
sight of the fact South1dVietnamaintain our m and other resolve
south ee ep
trails from Laos into South Vietnam, on that almost 30 other free world nations, Asian nations from falling prey to corn-
the backs of thousands of porters, go including many other Asian nations, are munism. Only with all of us pulling
the same arms and equipment into the providing or have agreed to provide mili- together can we at home support the
hands of the Communist guerrillas who tary and economic support to South Viet- sacrifices our military men are making
will use them to kill Vietnamese soldiers nam. This support 1 -
and their American military advisers, as
well as many innocent women and chil-
dren who happen to get in the way. A
smaller, but still significant amount of
military equipment is smuggled into
South Vietnam by sea, usually in harm-
less-appearing fishing boats.
By. this time, isn't the nature and
source of this insurgency clear enough?
In addition to the incontrovertible evi-
dence consisting of captured Communist
documents, testimony obtained from
Vietcong prisoners, and the seizure of
thousands of weapons manufactured in
the Communist bloc, the most recent and
dramatic proof of foreign Communist in-
trusion In South Vietnam came last week,
and on a massive scale.
A Communist Vietcong ship was spot-
ted hidden in a cove on the South Viet-
nmese coast, in Phu Yen Province.
After aerial investigation, air strikes
were called for and the ship was sunk.
South Vietnamese military units moving
into the area encountered unusually
fierce Vietcong resistance. When the
area was finally cleared after several
days' fighting, Government forces found
themselves in possession of a Vietcong
weapons cache covering about 100 by 300
yards-an estimated 80 tons of Commu-
nist-manufactured weapons. Among
this arsenal were 2,000 rifles and 150
crew-served weapons-machineguns,
mortars and antiaircraft guns-enough
war material to equip many Vietcong
battalions. More arms, ammunition and
explosives now being off-loaded from the
sunken ship will bring the total even
higher.
The capture of these Communist weap-
ons and the sinking of the Communist
ship which was in the act of bringing
arms from North Vietnam should prove
to even the most doubting that the Com-
munist claim that the war in South Viet-
nam is simply a "civil war" is utterly
false.
The Communist North Vietnamese
leader, Ho Chi Minh, and the Chinese
Communists have regularly and insist-
ently demanded that the United States
get out of South Vietnam. They demand
that we remove our 23,500 military ad-
visory personnel, end our military assist-
ance to the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment, and depart from the area. The
problems of Vietnam, the Communists
say, would then be settled by the Viet-
namese people themselves without out-
side interference,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 24,
Some nations are providing mobilehoss min blood and, unists thattourereesolve convince
o
implacable,
pitals and ambulances, other technicians our resources unstintingly given and our
and commodities for water supply and faith in the righteousness of our cause
communications improvement, still is unending.
others are sending teachers and offer- Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, will the
ing scholarships. Even though a war is gentleman yield?
services must continue. -
It is a test of the will of the entire free
world In the face of Communist aggres-
sion. In this struggle, I am confident
that the United States willnot be found
wanting in will or action, and that we
shall Continue to set an example for
other free world nations who, though
smaller, are just as dedicated as we are
to the preservation of freedom.
(Mr. McGRATH (at the request of Mr.
DANIELS) was given permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECORD
and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. MCGRATH. Mr. Speaker, recent
events in South Vietnam appear to be
causing a noticeable strain on the pa-
tience of Americans with both the con-
duct of the fighting there and the con-
tinually unsettled state of the South
Vietnamese Government.
In some quarters, this strain has given
rise to fears on the part of some and
hope on the part of others that the
patience of the Government of the
United States might soon evaporate.
Further, stepped-up Communist military
activity has caused insistence by some
Americans that the United State nego-
tiate itself out of South Vietnam.
I cannot agree with those of short
patience who would hurry the United
States to the negotiations table. I can-
not agree that this is the time to "play
it safe," and back out of our pledge to
the South Vietnamese people by face-
saving agreements which, in the light
of past experiences with the Commu-
nists, we could not expect to be honored.
I do agree, however, with President
Johnson's actions aimed at convincing
the Communists in North Vietnam and
their advisers and conspirators elsewhere
that the United States is determined to
abide by its pledge to the South Viet-
namese and continue to fight Communist
aggression and subversion in southeast
Asia.
The situation in South Vietnam has
now become a test of wills between the
Communists and the United States and
other defenders of freedom. To win this
test, we must be patient and must not
permit our determination to waiver.
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gen-
tleman from California.
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, I would
like to take this opportunity to compli-
ment the gentleman from New Jersey
[Mr. GALLAGHER) for his very forthright
and excellent statement.
It was my great privilege only this last
fall to be in southeast Asia at the same
time the gentleman from New Jersey was
in that area for the Committee on Po;:-
eign Affairs.
In the interest of time I am not going
into any great detail other than to say
that in 1964, prior to the great national
political campaign, the issue of Vietnam,
of course, was very important and very
much a part of that national debate. It
was my good fortune to be present at the
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on
September 22, 1964, when the Honorable
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, dealt with
this general question in a major address.
Mr. Speaker, I believe it ?s relevant at
this point in the discussion this after-
noon to quote one section of his very
thoughtful speech on the subject of
southeast Asia.
He said to the Commonwealth Club in
San Francisco:
Let me turn for a few minutes to our most
serious immediate problems In southeast
Asia. That area entered a new chapter in
its strife-torn history with the partition of
Vietnam in 1954 and the consolidation of
the Communist regime in Hanoi. It re-
quires no domino theory to explain the sub-
sequent pressures on Laos and South Viet-
nam. One need only recall the Communist
appetite for world revolution, an appetite
which grows upon feeding.
When President Kennedy took office in
January 1961, he found in Laos, for example,
an active battleground between government
forces supported by the United States and a
combination of neutralists, Pathet Lao and
North Vietnamese forces supported by a So-
viet airlift. He became convinced afte:-
studying the evidence that the Laotians
themselves, if left to themselves, had no in-
clination to kill each other or to cause
trouble for their neighbors-
Anti may I say as an aside, having:
been In Laos while in southeast Asia on
two separate occasions over a period of
3 years, I can attest to that fact-
their tradition was one of peace; their am-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
of inevitable divine right, and it is no
such thing.
When we criticize the South Viet-
namese, let us remember that for four
long years the South Vietnamese people
have suffered 5,000 fatalities a year in
the fight against communism-fatalities
at a higher rate in proportion to their
population than the United States has
ever incurred in any war it has ever,
fought. Can we say that such a people
don't have the will to fight? Can we
say that we should abandon such a peo-
ple? When we criticize the instability
of their government, and Lord knows we
wish that a George Washington or a
Ulysses S. Grant or a Robert E. Lee were
to rise among them who could unite
his people and coordinate their efforts,
let us nevertheless remember that this
Is a nation just 11 years old, which has
spent 5 of those years in stability and
increasing prosperity, and 6 of those
years under an outright subversion and
attack.
I do not say that we should not ever
negotiate. I certainly do not say that
we have any desire to lose more lives in
South Vietnam, or spent more money
there, or broaden the war there. But
I do say that it is in our own self-interest
to demonstrate there, as we have been
called upon to demonstrate time and
again throughout our history, that ag-
gression, whether overt or subversive,
against the freedom and against the dig-
nity of human beings, will not go un-
challenged.
Two weeks ago the halls of this Cham-
ber rang with voices saying, "Don't
weaken the President's position in deal-
ing with the Arab nations"; "Don't
weaken the President's position in the
conduct of our foreign affairs." What on
earth are we doing to the President's
position in the conduct of our foreign af-
fairs when voices are raised in the Con-
gress of the United States, saying, We
have to pull out of South Vietnam"? We
have lost 281 lives fighting the Commu-
nists in South Vietnam. The South
Vietnamese have lost over 20,000 lives
fighting the Communists in South Viet-
nam. We talk about their will to fight,
but what on earth do you think it does
to their will to fight when the Halls of
Congress ring with the demand that we
abandon them.?
America has to be something more
than a hardware store selling fine mili-
tary hardware. It must remain the prin-
cipal advocate of those principles in
which the free world believes if it is to
retain any claim to its position as the
leader of the free world. We believe in
the right of human beings to guide their
own destinies, and we believe in free
elections as the means by which people
guide their own destinies. We believe in
social evolution through political means,
and not through war, but we do not rec-
ognize kidnaping and assassination as
legitimate political means.
The call will be for a neutralization
of South Vietnam. In 1954 the call was
for a neutralization of all of Vietnam.
Any time that the Communists indicate
any desire to abide by the Geneva ac-
cords, I believe that our people would be
delighted to pull out of Vietnam. But I
do not believe that so long as the Com-
munists persist in the techniques of sub-
version, of bombings of civilians, of the
kidnaping and assassination of civilian
governmental officials, that our people
are prepared to abandon another people
who fight such techniques.
The Communists say, and the Com-
munists believe, that we have lost the will
to resist communism. Those who say,
"Negotiate," are rendering a great dis-
service to the cause of freedom, unless
they also say, "Negotiate from a position
of strength. Negotiate not simply for
the disengagement of American forces,
but for the preservation of American
ideals."
Perhaps we have lost our will; perhaps
we have become too fat from eating what
we should have saved; perhaps we have
become too soft from riding where we
should have walked; perhaps we have be-
come too dulled from watching where we
should have participated; perhaps we
have become so spoiled from being one
of the most pampered people the world
has ever seen, that we have lost the will
to respond to the cry of humanity in
trouble.
I believe, and pray, that we have not.
Our enemies have always underestimated
us; our enemies have always underesti-
mated our dedication to the cause of free-
dom, our determination that man shall be
the master of his own destiny. Each
generation of Americans in its time has
been tested, and no generation of Ameri-
cans has been found wanting. For us to
be found wanting at this hour will not
only mark the end of America's day as
the leader of the free world, it will mark
the beginning of the night for freedom
everywhere.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
PRICE). Under previous order of the
House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr.
PUCINSKI] is recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I yield
to the gentleman from New York [Mr.
STRATTON].
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I
thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
I would like to take just a moment to
commend the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] for taking this
time so that all of us who feel, as he does,
that the President is doing a brilliant job
in handling the Vietnamese situation
might have a chance to express that
sentiment publicly.
The gentleman may recall that early
in January I had occasion to speak
briefly on the floor of this body to ex-
press my concern over the fact that some
Members of the other body were talking
about negotiating and talking about get-
ting out of Vietnam. I had occasion
then to say that I felt this was extremely
dangerous, that this talk was jeopardiz-
ing our position there, and that it would
be as foolish for us to pull out of the com-
mitment we had made in Vietnam as it
would have been to pull out of the com-
mitments we had made in Greece or in
Turkey or the commitment we had made
in Berlin or the commitment we had
made in Korea and in the Formosa
Straits.
Since that time, of course, President
Johnson has taken actions that rein-
force, as the gentleman from New Jersey
has pointed out, our determination to
stay in Vietnam not only with the strikes
against the north, but also, as today's
news reports indicate, with American-
piloted jet attacks against the Vietcong
in South Vietnam. Both actions are de-
signed to demonstrate to the Communists
that their continued support of infiltra-
tion in the south will be increasingly
costly to them and to convince them that
perhaps they might agree to live up to
the promise the gentleman from New
York [Mr; PIKE] mentioned a moment
ago they had made way back in 1954 and
have since been violating.
I fully support President Johnson in
these actions and I agree with what the
gentleman from New Jersey says with
regard to these demands for negotiation.
There have been Members of the other
body and there have been people in the
press too who say, "Why, does not the
President go on television and tell us
what our policy is?" Well, perhaps one
thing that this special order today can
do is to reiterate the very simple policy
that, as I see it, we are following; namely,
we are doing in Vietnam the same thing
we did with the Marshall plan, the same
thing we did in Greece and Turkey, the
same thing we did in Berlin, the same
thing we did in Korea, and the same
thing we did in Formosa and in Cuba-
we are resisting and trying to contain
the spread of aggressive expansionist
communism.
If we were to pull out of Vietnam now
under such circumstances I think a
very substantial part of what our courage
and our money and our patience accom-
plished in years past would go down the
drain, as the gentleman from New Jersey
[Mr. GALLAGHER] has so eloquently dem-
onstrated. Certainly there is no unwill-
ingness on our part to sit down around
a table and talk at any time. But as the
gentleman from New York [Mr. PIKE]
mentioned a moment ago, if the Com-
munists are prepared to agree to get out
of South Vietnam and to leave the South
Vietnamese people alone, and to abide
by the commitment they made in 1954,
we would all be happy. But any other
kind of agreement, any other kind of
negotiation, would, as Senator DIRKSEN
stated on the floor of the other body some
days ago, be tantamount to running up
the white flag of surrender. I believe our
policy is that the commitment in 1954
be honored by the North Vietnamese.
Communists.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to say one
further thing. The gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. PucrNSKI] mentioned that
the Gallup poll indicates that 83 per-
cent of the people of this country are
behind the President in this matter. I
would like to add a personal experience
to back that up. Over the past weekend
I had occasion to go back to my district
and, without feeling that this was neces-
sarily the popular view, I took advantage
of several speaking engagements to re-
iterate this particular position in support
of the President on Vietnam. I would
like to advise the gentleman from New
Jersey that I was surprised and pleased
to find the sentiment in my district of
upstate New York overwhelmingly in
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 24
favor of this policy and behind the Presi-
dent of the United States.
I think it is time, as the gentleman
has said, for us here in the House to say
this out loud, and make crystal clear
that we in the Congress are not about
to throw away the long and successful
history of American responses to Com-
munist expansion in critical areas around
the globe.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speak-
er, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentle-
man from New Jersey.
(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and
was given permission to- revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speak-
er, I should like to commend the gentle-
man from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGIiER]
for his presentation today and for the
opportunity which it gives all of us to
discuss a very serious subject. This sit-
uation in Vietnam is, of course, quite
sensitive, because there are admittedly
differences of opinion back home and
here in Washington, too, as to what the
appropriate course of this country should
be.
Let me state that in my opinion it is
important that we remain firm with re-
spect to our policy in Vietnam. In my
opinion, also, our present policy is cor-
rect. It seems to me a most inopportune
time for us to be considering publicly the
possibility of a neutralization which
almost surely would riot be meaningful,
of southeast Asia or of South Vietnam.
It seems highly unlikely that discussions
at this time would ever result in condi-
tions that would bring about an end to
the tensions which- plague that area.
For that reason I think we have really no
alternative but to proceed along the
course we have taken.
Unlike some, I do not believe this is a
question of whether the Gallup polls
support the position of the President of
the United States. National policies need
the support of public opinion, but pub-
lic opinion should not be the decisive fac-
tor in determining the wisdom of na-
tional policies. Nor do I think it is a
question of deciding whether or not the
President is doing a brilliant job. There
Is room for differences of opinion about
the way in which he is exercising his
responsibilities for leadership.
I do feel, however, that we could un-
dercut the vital interests of this country
if we should, for one reason or another,
decide to abandon what we have been
doing. If we do not show steadiness of
purpose, if we do not recognize that a
firm response is necessary to the contin-
uing subjugation and aggression which
has been occurring, we might well con-
tribute to the political instability in Sai-
gon, which is presently one of the prob-
lems that South Vietnam faces. For that
reason I think we should support the ad-
ministration in its efforts to see to it
that the Communists do not take over
South Vietnam. Should this occur, it
would inevitably increase the possibility
of widening communist aggressions still
further. I should hope that differences
of opinion among us will not confuse us
as to the essentiality of what we are at-
tempting and the justification for the
course we are following at-.the present
time.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gen-
tleman for his enlightening remarks, his
observations, and his contribution to the
discussion.
Mr. DANIELS. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentle-
man from New Jersey.
(Mr. DANIELS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DANIELS. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman for yielding.
I wish to compliment my able colleague
from New Jersey for his stand and views
on this most important issue and wish to
associate myself with him. Increas-
ingly, we are hearing calls from col-
leagues in both Houses and from the
press for negotiations leading to a politi-
cal settlement in South Vietnam. The
argument is made that neither side can
win a guerrilla war in Vietnam, that the
South Vietnamese people are weary and
unwilling to support the war further, and
that the United States and South Viet-
nam are risking a major conflict by
bombing targets in North Vietnam.
The position of the U.S. Government is
frequently interpreted as not favoring
the idea of negotiations leading to a
political settlement. Obviously, our
Government wants the killing of soldiers
and civilians in South Vietnam to cease.
It wants to see an end to the wanton
destruction of property, and the cruel
disruption of the lives of the Vietnamese
population. Our administration leaders
have made it clear that the United States
does not seek the destruction of North
Vietnam. Our country seeks no special
privileges or concessions in South Viet-
nam, and we would be glad if all our
assistance could be channeled into the
peaceful economic development of the
country instead of into arms, military
assistance, barbed wire, and floodlights.
The very real question before us today
is: What is there to make us think that
a new political settlement would solve
the problems of South Vietnam when
there has already been a political settle-
ment?
On July 21, 1954, there was concluded
at Geneva a treaty which bound the par-
ticipants to respect the independence
and territorial integrity of both North
and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
These 1954 Geneva Accords were agreed
to both by North Vietnam and Commu-
nist China. North Vietnam specifically
agreed to withdraw its military forces
from South Vietnam and not to interfere
in the internal affairs of that country.
The U.S. Government had reservations
about a political settlement which
handed over the entire territory of North
Vietnam to Communist administration.
Even though we did not subscribe to the
Geneva Accords, however, we issued a
statement at that time promising to re-
spect them and warning that we would
view renewed Communist aggression in
violation of the Accords as a serious
threat to the peace and security of the
area.
We all know what has since happened.
The North Vietnamese Communists,
confident that the chaotic political and
economic situation existing in South
Vietnam would soon lead to a total
breakdown, bided their time for several
years in the belief that South Vietnam
would drop Into their hands like a ripe
mango. Meanwhile, the North Vietna-
mese had secretly left behind in South
Vietnam a large number of Vietcong
agents and numerous arms caches, ready
to be activated in the manner of an ex-
prosive device when the proper time ar-
rived.
When it became apparent to North
Vietnam that South Vietnam was grow-
ing stronger instead of weaker, and
would not easily fall victim to North
Vietnamese subversion, the decision was
taken in Hanoi, initially in 1957 and then
on a more ambitious scale in 1959, to ac-
tivate the subversive apparatus already
present in South Vietnam and to step up
the rate of infiltration of guerrilla fight-
ers, arms, and terrorism into the south-
ern part of the country. Last year, an
estimated 37,000 guerrillas were infil-
trated from North Vietnam into South
Vietnam. This is the peak figure which
has been steadily increasing during the
past 5 years.
The South Vietnamese efforts to de-
fend themselves, their appeal to the
United States and other free world na-
tions for assistance, and the events
which have flowed from these Commu-
nist and South Vietnamese decisions are
well known to all of us. Ever since 1954,
on a day-month-and-year basis, the
Communist North Vietnamese have will-
fully and systematically violated the Ge-
neve Accords they are pledged to ob-
serve. These violations have also ex-
tended to North Vietnamese obstruc-
tion of the work of the International
Control Commission teams to inspect re-
ported violations of the Accords, which
established the ICC's right of operation
in both North and South Vietnam.
In these difficult circumstances, the
South Vietnamese Government and peo-
ple have and are taking military action
to defend themselves. This action, and
the U.S. military assistance given in re-
sponse to requests for help from South
Vietnam, is consistent with International
law and with the Charter of the United
Nations-every nation possesses the right
of self-defense.
Since there already exists a political
solution for Vietnam which has not
been lived up to by the Communist side,
what is present today which would make
us believe that a new negotiated agree-
ment would solve all our problems? Cer-
tainly the record of Communist actions
since 1954 gives us no cause for assurance
on this score.
The late President Kennedy once
stated that we would never negotiate
from fear, but that we would never fear
to negotiate. The United States has
never shut the door to negotiations on
any matter. What is required in the
present situation, however, is an end to
North Vietnamese infiltration into South
Vietnam and evidence that the North
Vietnamese Government is prepared to
leave its neighbors alone. The decision
will be made by Hanoi. Should it decide
to cease attacking its southern neighbor,
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CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD - HOUSE 3353
Mr. MICHEL. Is this really the big-
gest deterrent or detriment to political
stability?
Mr. GALLAGHER. The gentleman
has stated it correctly. Political stabil-
ity is the most significant detriment or
deterrent to military victory and the sav-
ing of freedom in South Vietnam from
the Communist aggressors. If they have
stability I think we can move on to vic-
tory without esculation.
Mr. MICHEL. Does the gentleman feel
our retaliatory strikes to date have been
effective, and that they should be stepped
up or continued?
Mr. GALLAGHER. No doubt they
have been extremely effective. I think
the Communists now know they are not
going to have an easy time if they pur-
sue their present game. They are no
longer immune from the violence they
enjoy handing out. It is becoming quite
costly to them.
Mr. MICHEL. What answer would
the gentleman have-to those who argue
or say we ought to recruit volunteers
from some of the other neighboring
Asian countries out there to help South
Vietnam defend their own land or for
that matter to carry on guerrilla war-
fare in the north?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I would agree to
that. In some of the other countries
that I visited on my way to Vietnam I
found there is a growing desire to send
troops and trained guerrillas, especially
in the Philippines. They are prepared
to send a regiment. They had a similar
problem during the Huk uprising, so
they are knowledgable to the ways of
this war. There is a stability there now,
freedom is flourishing. I think there
have been five or six nations that al-
ready indicated a desire to send volun-
teers.
Mr. MICHEL. Does the gentleman
feel our Government, as such, is giving
sufficient encouragement to that ven-
ture?
Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, I do.
Mr. MICHEL. I thank the gentleman
for yielding.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gen-
tleman very much for his remarks.
They were most helpful.
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the
gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. PUCINSKI. I should like to join
in commending the gentleman from New
Jersey for taking this time to make pos-
sible a discussion of asubject that I think
is more on the minds of the American
people today than any single subject in
America. I am sure the gentleman will
be most encouraged to know that the
very inspiring statement he made here
in attempting to define American policy
in Vietnam is supported by more than 83
percent of the American people.
It was my privilege to include in the
RECORD last Monday the latest Harris
survey which clearly indicates that 83
percent of the American people support
President Johnson's policy of measured
retaliation against military staging areas
in North Vietnam from which the Com-
munists launch their aggression against
South Vietnam.
I am sure that the discusison here to-
day in the House, being led by a dis-
tinguished member of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, will be of great solace
and comfort to the people of South Viet-
nam. It gains in significance particul-
arly when they hear of the statement
made by the highly respected majority
leader of this Chamber, the gentleman
from Oklahoma [Mr. ALBERT], and also
the statement of the very capable and
dedicated Chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House, Dr.
MORGAN, all joining ranks behind Presi-
dent Johnson in his determined effort to
keep the spirit of freedom alive in South
Vietnam.
The gentleman from Iowa read a dis-
patch from the wire services which re-
ferred to efforts being made by Secre-
tary General U Thant to resolve the prob-
lems in Vietnam. There also are reports
that the British have been engaged in
similar efforts to find a solution to this
problem. Certainly we as Americans
have no objection to either U Thant or
the British, or any other responsible_gov-
ernment, trying to find a solution to the
problem of Vietnam. This indicates that
Vietnam is not a 'battle in which we alone
are involved, but one that properly con-
cerns the entire world; at least that seg-
ment of the world which should be in-
erested in preserving freedom for the peo-
ple of South Vietnam.
But I think that notwithstanding these
efforts, well meaning as they may be,
the President of the United States, Mr.
Johnson, has set forth our policy as
clearly and succinctly as anyone I know
of, a policy that all Americans can sup-
port and rally behind regardless of their
political affiliation. Mr. Johnson has
made it clear that our position on South
Vietnam is to remain there and continue
helping them until the North Vietnamese
Communists have withdrawn all their
forces from South Vietnam; cease their
aggression, and stop their subversion.
We can then, and only then, begin seri-
ously considering some form of discus-
sion or negotiation for settlement of the
conflict between North and South Viet-
nam.
I believe it would be unfair to Presi-
dent Johnson and indeed to our Govern-
ment, to try to read into the actions of
U Thant or the British action, some
meaning that the United States plans to
withdrawn its commitment to the people
of South Vietnam. President Johnson
has never closed the door to a discus-
sion about methods to peacefully resolve
the conflict but he has made it crystal
clear that we shall remain in South Viet-
nam until the freedom of her people is
secure from Communist aggression or
subversion.
We have never refused to consider ne-
gotiations, but we are reminded that it
was only 10 years from Manchuria to
Pearl Harbor. It was Only 18 months
from Moscow to the rape of Poland.
Both of these tragedies occurred while
the world was negotiating.
We must never forget that we were
negotiating in Panmunjon for 11
years. President Eisenhower went to
Korea in 1953 in good faith. He won a
truce while both sides were to negotiate
a peace treaty. There were specific
conditions laid down for this truce.
One of the conditions was that the Com-
munists would not move in any addi-
tional troops or firearms, aircraft, or
ships or build any military installations
in North Korea, and we would do like-
wise in South Korea. Yet the fact of
the matter is that while we have been
negotiating in Panmunjon, the Commu-
nists have moved large supplies of air-
craft and munitions into North Korea
during these past 11 years of negotia-
tions. North Korea has become one of
the most powerful Communist bastions
in the world.
We are also aware that in Warsaw we
have been holding informal discussions
with the Peiping Communists. We have
had more than 128 meetings with them.
Not in one instance have they shown
their willingness to stop their aggression
and subversion in Asia and conduct
themselves as civilized people.
In southeast Asia, indeed, there have
been many other examples of negotia-
tions, all falling to Communist infamy.
We need only look at the broken Commu-
nist promises in Laos. Furthermore
Mr. Speaker, we would not be in South
Vietnam today if the North Vietnam
Communists had not violated the pledges
we negotiated from them in the Geneva
Conference in 1954.
So it would seem to me, Mr. Speaker,
that this discussion today is essential
because it helps emphasize the deter-
mination of the American people to
stand firm in South Vietnam.
It would be my hope that the Member
in the well and the other members of
the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs would give careful and favorable
consideration to House Joint Resolution
341, which I introduced last week. I
should like to read it:
Announcing the sense of Congress in sup-
port of President Johnson's policy of meas-
ured retaliation against North Vietnam mili-
tary installations as the situation requires.
Whereas the United states, during the ad-
ministrations of President Truman, Presi-
dent Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and
President Johnson, has been committed to a
policy of assisting the people of South Viet-
nam preserve their freedom and independ-
ence from Communist aggression; and
Whereas the North Vietnamese Commu-
nists have in recent months stepped up con-
siderably their aggression against both civil-
ian and military installations in South Viet-
nam; and
Whereas this aggression has caused the
serious loss of life to South Vietnamese sol-
diers and civilians and to American observ-
ers presently stationed in South Vietnam to
help train South Vietnamese troops against
Communist aggression; and
Whereas the President of the United States
has had to order carefully measured retalia-
tory action against the North Vietnamese
military staging areas where Hanoi and Pei-
ping Communists have been or axe being
trained for aggression against South Viet-
nam; and
Whereas the President of the United States
has made it abundantly clear that to with-
draw American assistance from South Viet-
nam would expose the whole of southeast
Asia to occupation by the Chinese Commu-
nist forces; and
Whereas such occupation would violate all
the principles of the Geneva Conference of
1954 in which South Vietnam was guaran-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 24
teed its independence and freedom from
Communist aggression; and
Whereas withdrawal of Amepican support
from South Vietnam would only serve to
hasten the day when Communist farces In
Asia and China would wage all-out aggres-
sion against the rest of the world; and
Whereas the Hanoi and Peiping Commu-
nists have failed to show a single overt sign
which would indicate the problems of Viet-
nam could be settled through negotiation:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of Amer-
ica in Congress assembled, That it is the
sense of Congress, speaking for the American
people, that
(1) This Nation stands firmly behind
President Johnson's determination to wage
carefully measured and meaningful retalia-
tion against military Installations in North
Vietnam which serve as the staging areas for
training Communist forces to carry on con-
tinued aggression against South Vietnam,
(2) That the people of the United States
stand firmly behind the people of South Viet-
nam in their long and tireless efforts to pre-
serve for South Vietnam freedom and in-
dependence, and
(3) The. people of the United States,
through their elected representatives in the
Congress of the United States, send to the
people of South Vietnam their heartfelt
admiration for the great sacrifices which the
people of South Vietnam have endured dur-
ing the past twenty years in their struggle
to retain self-determination and human
dignity.
I sincerely hope the Congress will ap-
prove the resolution as a reaffirmation
of our position in supporting President
Johnson and the people of South Viet-
nam.
It would be my hope that this Joint
resolution would do much to strengthen
the spirit of the South Vietnamese.
Very often we hear people say, "Do the
Vietnamese have the spirit to win?"
Any nation, any people, who have sur-
vived and endured the hardships of Com-
munist aggression and subversion for 20
years as the people of South Vietnam
have done, certainly do not need any
further proof of their will to win. While
we are aware and concerned about the
internal problems in South Vietnam, we
must understand that these are prob-
lems which frequently follow in nations
in turmoil. But the fact of the matter
is that the South Vietnamese also have
the right to ask to what extent the free
world is ready to help them in their
heroic struggle.
I think the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] and the Mem-
bers who have participated in this dis-
cussion have made a great contribution
today in sending word to the people of
South Vietnam and in the final analysis
it is the people of a nation who really
count-that we stand firmly along side
of them in their heroic struggle and we
shall remain in South Vietnam until her
brave people can take their place among
the free peoples of the World.
Again I congratulate the gentleman
from New Jersey for leading this very
significant discussion here today.
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the
gentleman.
(Mr. PIKE asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Speaker, I, too, want
to congratulate the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] for taking this
time today. We have heard so much of
the voices of criticism and the voices of
opposition.
It is so easy to stand back and snap at
a policy that somebody else has to carry
out.
Mr. Speaker, we have heard very little
of the support I feel is in the hearts of
the American people. I appreciate the
opportunity to add my own support to-
day.
Mr. Speaker, in common with every
other Member of Congress, I have re-
celved a great many letters from my
constituents calling for "negotiations" to
end the war in Vietnam. Almost with-
out exception the writers refer to some
vague "international guarantees" which
can assure security there. Some call for
"United Nations' guarantees of the
peace," while others call for turning the
matter over to the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization. These people are Indulg-
ing in wishful thinking, and I would ex-
pect that deep in their hearts they know
they are indulging in wishful thinking.
In the year 1954 there were negotia-
tions of exactly the type which they re-
quest, and these negotiations resulted in
the division of Vietnam into two nations,
a North Vietnam which was to be Com-
munist, and South Vietnam, which was
not. The United States was not a party
to these negotiations, nor to the Geneva
Accord which resulted from them, but
it has abided by them.
The Communists of China, the Soviet
Union and North Vietnam were a party
to those negotiations, and that accord,
and let us examine whether they have
abided by them. From 1954 to 1959 the
new nation of South Vietnam was becom-
ing the success story in southeast Asia.
One hundred and forty thousand land-
less peasant families were given land
through an agrarian reform program.
The principal crop, rice, jumped from
the prewar production of 31/2 million tons
to 5 million tons by 1960. Rubber pro-
duction exceeded prewar totals. School
enrollments had tripled; primary school
teachers had tripled; almost 3,000 medi-
cal aid stations and maternity clinics had
been established throughout the country.
What had happened in North Viet-
nam? Its per capita gross national prod-
uct was 38 percent lower than South
Vietnam; its per capita food production
was 10 percent lower by 1960 than it had
been in 1956; so North Vietnam, which
had participated in the negotiations, and
which had signed the Geneva accord of
1954, cast hungry eyes southward.
In 1960 Ho Chi Minh stated that the
north was being "more and more con-
solidated and transformed into a firm
base for the struggle for national re-
unification." Just 6 years after the
Geneva Accord, the head of North Viet-
nam publicly declared his intention to
violate it. To those who say that shoot-
ing is not the answer, I can only say, I
agree. But let them remember that in
1959 the Communists embarked in South
Vietnam on a program of sabotage, ter-
ror and assassination, in a program of
attacks on innocent hamlets and villages,
and on a program of the coldblooded
murder of thousands of schoolteachers,
health workers, and local officials who
opposed their form of liberation. This
was how the Communists who, had signed
it honored the Geneva accord.
In the years 1960 and 1961 almost 3,000
South Vietnamese civilians in and out
of government were assassinated; 2,500
were kidnaped. So to those who say
"Let us negotiate," I say, "What is the
purpose of negotiating a new treaty with
people who will not honor the treaty al-
ready negotiated?"
Negotiation is not an end in itself, but
is only a means to an end. All of us rec-
ognize the frightful dangers implicit in
an escalation of the war in Vietnam, or
in the latter half of the 20th century of
any other war, any other place, any other
time. But does this mean that at all
times and at all places we will make
meaningless treaties rather than fight
for those things to which Americans have
always been most deeply committed? Do
we fail-to recognize the equally frightful
dangers of making aggression easy and
attractive? Have we learned nothing
from the lessons of recorded history?
Do we fail to recognize the dangers of
an escalation of appeasement? The sit-
uation in South Vietnam is in a state of
daily change, and we live in a time of
peril where all of the alternatives are
ugly alternatives, but I submit that the
ugliest of all of them would be for an
American retreat which would make ag-
gression look easy and attractive.
In this time of change, the one thing
which does not change, and the one
thing which has not changed through-
out recorded history, is that when ag-
gression is allowed to become attractive
anywhere, when aggression is allowed to
become easy anywhere, when aggression
is unopposed anywhere, then attractive,
easy, unopposed aggression breeds more
aggression, as surely as the night follows
the day.
There are those who say that South
Vietnam is not the right place to fight
communism? that the South Vietnamese
people and their leaders are neither the
right people nor the right leaders with
whom to fight communism. I believe
that the place to fight communism is
where communism is being fought. In
4 years of American military commit-
ment in South Vietnam we had, as of
February 15, lost 281 lives due to Com-
munist military action. In the year
1964 alone, in the county in which I re-
side, we lost 202 lives in traffic accidents.
I- have not received one letter condemn-
ing the waste of lives upon our highways.
We accept it as part of the American way
of life, and it may be part of our diffi-
culty that we accept too much as part
of our American way of life; that we
take the kind of government under
which we have prospered so much for
granted that we assume it to be some sort
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
We should have learned from that ex-
perience and many others since that no
nation's independence is expendable, that
every loss of freedom on the part of some
other people chips away at our own and
merely postpones an inevitable showdown
with the forces of aggression. We are
supporting ourselves in supporting the
people of South Vietnam.
There mtlst not be any American Dien-
bienphu. Let us not negotiate ourselves
into one, either, for the effect could be
the same.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to recall to
this House the text of the joint resolu-
tion of the 88th Congress last August in.
support of President Johnson's response
to the Gulf of Tonkin attack:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
representatives of the United States of Amer-
ica in Congress assembled, That the Congress
approves and supports the determination of
the President, as Commander in Chief, to
take all necessary measures to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression.
The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the
maintennace of international peace and se-
curity in southeast Asia. Consonant with
Constitution of the United States and the
Charter of the United Nations and in ac-
cordance with its obligations under the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,
the United States is, therefore, prepared, as
the President determines, to take all neces-
sary steps, including the use of armed force,
to assist any member or protocol state of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re-
questing assistance in defense of its free-
dom.
Mr. Speaker, President Johnson de-
serves our support on Vietnam at this
time-even more than he did last Au-
gust. I am confident that the Congress
and the American people will continue
to support him. Let us be ever mindful
that our security and the security of the
free world depends in large measure on
our success in Vietnam. It is his deter-
mination to assure our security which
guides the President in the difficult de-
cisions he must make in this critical sit-
uation.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the dis-
tinguished majority leader.
Mr. ALBERT. First, Mr. Speaker, I
desire to associate myself with the re-
marks of the able gentleman from New
Jersey, who is a very industrious, con-
structive, and effective member of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs. He has
stated this matter succinctly and he has
stated this matter well. I commend him
on the high quality of his statement.
Next, Mr. Speaker, I cannot let this
discussion pass without taking the op-
portunity to speak out in support of the
courageous and difficult policy President
Johnson has followed in the Vietnam
crisis.
Let me, at the outset, disassociate my-
self from 'those who would question the
motives of those who disapprove of these
policies. God knows, Mr. Speaker, these
are not days of ease and comfort in our
Nation's life. American men are en-
gaged in a life and death struggle in
Vietnam. Their own lives and the life
of this Republic are both involved. If we
believe, as I believe, that a democratic
society can best make its greatest de-
cisions through discussion, then we must
encourage free and searching discussion
of this problem. We can only have such
a discussion if we are prepared to assume
that difference of opinion does not in-
volve divergence of objective-that those
who agree with the details of a given
policy are not necessarily more patriotic
that those who disagree.
Further,, Mr. Speaker, I hope we can
all find common ground on the proposi-
tion that neither political party can gain
any partisan advantage from this debate.
There are vast areas of public policy in
which each of the two great political par-
ties can, with pride, point to its own
position and criticize that of the other
party. But in foreign policy, when the
future of the whole people is the stake, a
striving for partisan advantage is, at the
very least, in poor taste. I hope we can
avoid it now, and in whatever circum-
stances the present crisis may bring
forth.
Mr. Speaker, I support the President.
I support him because it seems to me that
he is making every effort to prevent the
collapse of an important bastion of the
free world. I support him because he
has adopted a cautious policy of the use
of American strength on a scale precisely
measured to fit the needs of the situation.
We could, of course, lash out against
the Vietcong or their allies with-all the
overwhelming strength of American
arms. We could bring to all of Indo-
china-perhaps all of southeast Asia-
the all-pervading peace and quiet of the
graveyard. This is a solution that is
not open to us alone. If it were a mo-
rally acceptable choice-which I ques-
tion-it would still hardly be a strategi-
cally sensible option.
At the other extreme of the spectrum
of choice lies paralysis or retreat. We
could let a healthy respect for what can
happen degenerate into a craven fear
of the consequences of any action at all.
Hesitating-and Mr. Speaker, we
ought to hesitate-before we throw our-
selves fully into an all out war, we could
decide that no risks are worth such
stakes.
President Johnson has shown him-
self to be able to steer capably between
both these dangerous alternatives. He
has used force effectively. He has used
it in a way and at a level calculated to
make our position in southeast Asia crys-
tal clear-and yet he has neither plunged
over any brink himself, nor has he
pushed our adversaries nearer to one.
I am reminded, in these critical days,
of the tense 2 weeks in October 1962,
when John F. Kennedy was guiding the
Nation-and the free world-through
what we all knew could have been its
ultimate crisis. In those dramatic days,
John F. Kennedy coolly weighed the al-
ternatives, courageously prepared him-
self to wield the mightiest weapons man
has ever developed-and patiently sought
a means by which those weapons might
remain unused.
He succeeded and his Vice President,
who sat with him throughout that 2
weeks, and who has now succeeded to
those awful responsibilities-is follow-
3351
jag that same prudeist proud, and patient
path.
Lyndon. Johnson'_; task is, if anything,
more difficult. The nature, even the
identity, of our enemy is more obscure.
The strategic stakes and the tactical
imperatives are less obvious. In the
Vietnamese crisis, to an even greater
extent than in the Cuban missile crisis,
the full facts, in all their intricacy, must
of necessity, be known only by the Presi-
dent and his immediate advisers.
During the Cuban crisis, there was an
outpouring of national dedication to the
task ahead that must have been very
encouraging to President Kennedy.
People who had, a week earlier, bitterly
criticized the President, then picketed
the White House in support of his stand.
Without knowing of and drawing
strength from, the ability of this great
people to face whatever the dawn might
bring, even the cool courage of John
Fitzgerald Kennedy might not have been
equal to the task.
Today, with the stakes as great, with
the need for patience, understanding,
and courage even greater, the President
of the United States deserves to be told
that his countrymen are behind him.
Debate and honest criticism are very
much in order-as they always are
among free men.
But expressions of what I believe to
be the sentiments of the great majority
of the American people are also in order.
Mr. Speaker, I hope this discussion will
show the President-and the tough-
minded adversaries he faces on our be-
half-that his prudence meets our de-
mands, his determination is matched by
our readiness to support him, and his
courage is rooted in that of a free people.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the dis-
tinguished chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs.
(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, the dis-
tinguished gentleman from New Jersey
is to be commended for securing this
time to focus on U.S. policy and actions
in Vietnam. As chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, I have kept posted
on developments In that troubled area,
and I am personally convinced that
President Johnson is cautiously follow-
ing a course of action there which is
aimed primarily at serving our long-
range security interests and needs.
The constant probing aggression of
the Communist forces in Vietnam is proof
of their savage and implacable resolve
to impose their control in every area
lacking strength to oppose their creep-
ing conquest. We are in South Vietnam
because it is in our security interest to
help these people retain their freedom
from Communist aggression. We are
there at their request.
Our President has wisely followed the
course of firmness in Vietnam. He has
demonstrated a strong desire to achieve
a realistic peace on honorable terms.
He has shown every wish to limit conflict
and steer the conduct of operations in
Vietnam toward the goal of peace.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 24
At the same time, the President has
resisted premature demands for nego-
tiations with the aggressors. We would
all like to see negotiations leading to
peace, but to negotiate now would be to
repeat and compound the folly that lead
Chamberlain to compromise with Hitler.
Neither our generation nor those that
follow us can forget the terrible after-
math of those futile negotiations.
While the situation has deteriorated in
Vietnam, we must remember that the
people of that country have had a long
history of disunity, and unlike t4e Brit-
ish in India, the French, on departing,
left no legacy of equipment for self-
government. In spite of this, the strug-
gle for freedom has gone on and in some
respects has even improved recently.
This is not the time to urge the Presi-
dent to relax in the firmness of his policy.
When the North Vietnamese give satis-
factory assurances of a real desire for
peace on honorable terms, there will be
no problem in negotiating. Until then,
the President deserves and merits our
strongest support in his efforts to win our
goals in Vietnam. We must never allow
ourselves to forget that this is but an-
other of many Communist probes, in
which they tirelessly seek to press their
conquests in areas where the free world
might fail to marshal its forces to stop
them. If we let premature negotiations
cost us the eventual, enslavement of
South Vietnam, we can only look forward
to a renewal and an escalation of Com-
munist aggression in other areas.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate this oppor-
tunity to express my full confidence in
our President, in the Secretary of De-
fense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in
the bipartisan leadership who all stand
united in support of U.S. policy in Viet-
nam.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I
thank the distinguished chairman of our
committee. At this time I yield to the
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Gnoss], a
member ' of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I have
asked the gentleman to yield so that I
may read a short two-paragraph news
dispatch of this afternoon. It is as fol-
lows :
UNITED NATIONS.-Secretary General U
Thant disclosed today he had been engaged
In private discussions for some time with the
United States and other parties to the Viet-
nam conflict and had made concrete pro-
posals aimed at a negotiated settlement.
He declined to disclose the nature of his
proposals, but told a news conference he was
confident a formula could be found which
would end the fighting and enable the
United States to withdraw gracefully once
stability has been achieved.
Mr. Speaker, I wonder how this gentle-
man injected himself into the picture in
the nature of a peacemaker or an alleged
peacemaker?
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I
thank the gentleman for his comments
and observations. I think the statement
he read reflects the desire of the admin-
istration to leave South Vietnam when-
evei^ the Communists decide to leave that
nation to its freedom. If the Commu-
nists go on home and call off the war I
am sure we would be happy to make a
graceful exit.
Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, the
gentleman from New Jersey has made a
constructive and a 'statesmanlike speech,
and I commend him for his firm state-
ment of support for President Johnson's
policy in Vietnam.
I want to join the gentleman from
New Jersey, and our distinguished ma-
jority leader, in declaring my own sup-
port for the President's strong stand in
Vietnam, and for his declared determi-
nation to prevent any expansion of Com-
munist power in Asia.
This is an issue on which all Americans
should stand united, and on which we
can have only one Commander in Chief-
the President of the United States.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Illinois.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I want to
say to the gentleman from New Jersey
that I appreciate his having taken this
special order to open up the discussion
of this subject matter.
I do not happen to be one of those who
feels that a discussion of this nature in
the foreign policy field should be limited
to the other body. It is a legitimate area
for discussion in the House of Repre-
sentatives.
I am sorry that I did not get to hear
all of the remarks of the gentleman from
New Jersey but I believe in essence I
heard the greater part of them. I hope
the gentleman will correct me if I am
in error, but the gentleman takes the
position, does he not at this time, that he
is opposed to our going into any nego-
tiations at the present time and that the
gentleman's position in a general way
would be opposed to one of neutralizing
the area?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I believe that the
gentleman from Illinois states the case
with regard to my position on neutraliza-
tion of South Vietnam.
I believe that history has demonstrated
that the course of neutralization merely
means a new Communist campaign of
insurgency to begin the next day in an-
other country.
I do not believe that it has ever been
the policy of our country to refuse mean-
ingful and honest negotiations. We are
perhaps the greatest negotiators in his-
tory. But I do not believe we should run
to a conference table at which no one
has yet taken seats. I believe if we panic
ourselves into a position of negotiation,
disregarding our moral obligation not to
barter away another nation's freedom,
that this in itself would be the greatest
detriment to a diplomatic termination of
the struggle now going on in Vietnam.
Mr. MICHEL. If the gentleman will
yield further, I recall the gentleman's
reference to the year of 1938 at the time
of the partitioning of Czechoslovakia.
I had occasion to look up the direct
quote of Winston Churchill with ref-
erence to that in which he said:
The belief that security can be obtained.
but by throwing a small state to the wolves.
is a fatal delusion.
Mr. Speaker, I feel that this state-
ment is very apropos for the present day
with respect to South Vietnam.
Might I ask the gentleman from New
Jersey, if he will yield further, if he
feels, as I do, that before we go into any
negotiations, we want to go into such
negotiations from a position of strength"
How does the gentleman feel we could
strengthen our position in South Viet-
nam in order to go to any kind of a con-
ference table for a negotiation from that
position of strength to which I am sure
he referred?
Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gen-
tleman for participating in this discus-
sion as well as the other Members of this,
body. We are demonstrating staying
power. The Communists seem to feel
that we will grow tired and weary of the
battle there and will withdraw. I think
the President has demonstrated
strength, prudence, and a desire to pro-
tect freedom. He is demonstrating the
staying power of the United States.
Just today we have learned of the first
use of heavy bombers in the fight in
South Vietnam. So I think the demon-
stration of our determination to remain
there, if need be, is the best way to let
the Communist leaders know that we
mean business and, perhaps, they will
then live up to the agreements to which
they themselves were a party in 1954 and
in 1962.
Mr. MICHEL. If the gentleman will
yield further, I am sure the American
people are somewhat concerned over
these frequent turnovers of government
and of generals themselves tossing out
one another.
Since the gentleman from New Jersey
has just come back from that area, did
he obtain any kind of impression as to
whether or not the generals in the mili-
tary themselves, the South Vietnamese,
were wearying of the battle? Is there
still that determination from top to bot-
tom among the military in South Viet-
nam to the effect that the fight should
continue to be joined?
Mr. GALLAGHER. Strangely enough,
when you leave Saigon in South Viet-
nam and go out into the country you
find a fierce determination on the level
of field officers and company command-
ers as well as the provincial governors
to continue the fight. These people are
each day fighting and dying to protect
their country and for the cause of free-
dom.
Of course, it is my own opinion-that
until there is political stability in Saigon
the military plans cannot move ahead
in the field. In other words, if the field
commander must keep one eye on Saigon
and the other eye on the enemy, it is
difficult for them to carry on the fight
with maximum efficiency.
I think the forces that are presently
there are sufficient to do the job, but no
job can be done well unless we have
political stability in Saigon. So, I thin;
that the generals and religious politi-
cians should start putting their country
ahead of their own personal feuds.
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1965' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE 3349.
gomery county would receive $572,864 of the House to the inequities in this giving ground to the Communists in
from this bill. measure. I believe that you can but southeast Asia than they are in favor of
Compare this with the poorest of all agree with me that this bill does not abandoning our positions in Europe or
the Nation's counties, Tunica County, meet the objectives for which it was Korea.
Miss. The median family income in intended. Hanoi and Peiping have been intrac-
Tunica is $1,260, only 22 percent of the If we were to be honest, we would re- table in their demands that we not only
national median family. income; and title this bill and change it to read: "A terminate our assistance to South Viet-
77.8 percent of its families earn less than bill to assist schools by providing the nam, but that we surrender the entire
$3,000 per year. Over one-half-54 per- most help where it is least needed and western Pacific to Communist domina-
cent-of its school-age children are from the least help where it is most' needed." tion. This hardly leaves room for gen-
families with less than a $2,000 income. Equality of opportunity through edu- uine negotiations at a conference table.
There are 2,965 such children in Tunica. cation should indeed be our goal. The The fact is that there already have
Yet Tunica County would receive only proposed bill does not further our at- been two political settlements with the
$357,283 from this bill-or $215,581 less tempts to bring this most worthy objec- Communists in southeast Asia; the Ge-
than wealthy Montgomery County. tive into rqa t, neva accord on Vietnam in 1954, and the
Mr. Speaker, this situation is even .VI Laotian agreement in 1962. Both of
ted to effect a
m
tt
f
p
e
erences a
more ridiculous when we consider that these con
THE D IN ACCEPTING permanent settlement by political means.
Montgomery County last year got near-
ly $4 million in Federal impact aid for THE REASONING OF THOSE WHO The agreement at Geneva committed
Its schools. In fact, the second and third ADVOCATE NEGOTIATED PEACE North Vietnam and Communist China
wealthiest counties in the United States IN VIETNAM to respect the independence of South
are nearby Arlington and Fairfax in The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Vietnam. But since 1954 these two
Virginia, and these three wealthiest ALBERT). Under previous order of the countries have masterminded the Viet-
counties last year received over $11 mil- House the gentleman from New Jersey cong campaign of terrior against South
lion in impact aid for their schools. [Mr. GALLAGHER] is recognized for 60 Vietnam. They have continually vio-
Under this bill, they would total over minutes. lated the Geneva agreement by provid-
$1 million additional Federal aid for their (Mr. GALLAGHER asked and was ing material support to the Vietcong, and
schools. in the case of Hanoi, by providing thou-
I am not picking on these three coun- given permission to revise and extend sands of soldiers and technicians to the
his remarks and to include extraneous Vietcong-the stepchild they have tried
ties, but this bill is a strange way to fight matter.) to foist off as a homegrown "liberation
poverty in our schools. Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, it is front."
One more example should suffice to difficult to accept the reasoning of those the ink was as still moist
show that the administration bill is wild- who advocate, at this time, a so-called Fagreement ink
ly inconsistent with its supposed pur- negotiated peace in Vietnam. Need we o on the became Laotian Furthermore, ore clear hre Nort h Vietn 1962 when
am was
pose of concentrating Federal funds in be reminded that the aggressions of the that military prsonwal,
rwithdrawing w the its
poverty-ridden schools. Compare West- Communist Vietcong, supported and not
sr agreement; that onnel,
chester County, N.Y., and Williamsburg, directed by the Communist government as required equi using corridor nt; that LNort aos
County, S.C. Each has just over 6,000 of North Vietnam, and encouraged by Vietnam was in both
school-age children from families with the Government of Red China, are al- supply upPathet p y y men na Lao and and the equipment Vietcong, to
bot
again
less than $2,000 annual income. ready a violation and abuse of a nego- in violation of the agreement; that in
Westchester is the sixth wealthiest of tiated peace? short, Hanoi and Peiping still had no in-
our 3,000 counties. Its impoverished It is even more difficult to rationalize tention of abandoning their expansionist
children represent only 3 percent of its the statements of those responsible citi- plans among their Asian neighbors.
total school-age population. Its schools zens who urge withdrawal from South Negotiation at this time and under
are about as good as money can buy. Vietnam. This we must view in the existing circumstances would be merely
If more mont needed to help the harsh light of political realism as a first a renegotiation of the Geneva agreement
schools, Weste y chesster County unty should be step toward ultimate abandonment of and once again the only thing to be nego-
able to find it. the free nations of southeast Asia to tiated is our part of the last negotia-
poorest is one of the Nation's Communist control. tian, South Vietnam. Under existing
poorest counties. Its median family in- In the face of some stepped up Com- conditions, the advantages would be
come of $1,631 is one-fifth h of its school- t West- munist pressure in South Vietnam and wholly on the side of the Communists.
age children and 41 come from mounting political frustrations, an easier Negotiated settlements mean absolute-
under 0 0 come annual om m neomfamilies Y et with course may appear, at least for the pres- ly nothing unless they are kept. If the
the under same 0 number of eligible children, t, ent, to be one of those actions. Communists cannot keep the agreements
m
Williamsburg County would receive I am certain that situations somewhat they already have signed in regard to
$810,000 from this bill, less than one- like that which confronts us in south- southeast Asia, what reason is there to
half the $2,189,026 that would flow into east Asia are precisely what the late believe they would keep a new one?
Westchester County. President Kennedy had in mind when Since the beginning the Vietcong cam-
Mr. Speaker, our committee may tinker he said in his inaugural address, "Let paign has been directed politically and
with this bill, but mere tinkering is not us never fear to negotiate, but let us militarily by the Communist regime in
enough. For example, we could raise the never negotiate from fear." North Vietnam. With typical Commu-
qualifying family income level to $3,000 Certainly we must keep open the door nist inconsistency, Hanoi has, from time
and cut the percentage of the State per to negotiation, but shall we fall on our to time, dropped the masquerade, and
pupil educational expenditure to 25 per- knees and hammer on a door that was admitted that its objective is to "liber-
cent. That would change a few of these slammed on our face? If we are not to ate" South Vietnam by all the means at
appalling figures a few dollars one way or negotiate from fear, let us not negotiate its disposal.
the other, but it would not change the either from a position of "peace at any The Vietcong effort is supplied by weap-
overall effect. price." To compel negotiation let us ons and equipment sent by North Viet-
We need a whole new look at the walk in dignity to any conference table nam which is in turn. ^npported by Red
evidence
problem of educational finance and a but let us not run before anyone is there China. And there is su ease tantialCommunist the flow of whole new approach from that found in at a time when it appears that the psy-
this bill. Surely the States themselves, chological and political resources of the weapons and military supplies has been
if they were permitted to distribute these defender are at a momentary low ebb is increasing steadily.
funds, would not squander $9 million on the long-range objective of the Commu- Our Military Establishment also has
our 10 wealthiest counties. nists in their war of insurgency. Nego- proof that the infiltration of North Viet-
Mr. Speaker, I do not speak out, here tiation under these circumstances is namese military personnel into South
on the floor of the House, in a sense of capitulation, and I do not believe the Vietnam has strongly increased during
partisanship. I would call the attention American people are any more in favor of the past year. Although much of the
No. 36-2
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 24
Vietcong enlisted force Is recruited in the
south, largely through intimidation, the
hard core units, including most of the
Vietcong leaders and technicians, are
supplied from North Vietnam.
The talk of neutralization and aban-
donment of our commitment in south-
east Asia gives new validity to the argu-
ment of the Communists, that we will
grow tired, impatient, and weary in Viet-
nam and retire and leave the field to
them and that their conquest will be won
by default.
It seems to me that this is the biggest
impediment to a diplomatic termination
of the agony of Vietnam. Diplomatic
termination will come only when we
demonstrate our resolve to protect free-
dom, and reassure them of our staying
power.
Our President has made it clear that
we are willing to withdraw as soon as the
foreign powers supporting the Vietcong
leave the field and live up to commit-
ments they agreed to in 1954 and 1962,
which means a free nation in South
Vietnam.
Does such a thing exist as unilateral
negotiation? For if Peiping and Hanoi
remain intractable in their right to sub-
vert a free government in violation of
our existing agreements, what is there to
negotiate except the abandonment of
freedom? It would mean stepped-up
military activity on their part and a need
for an accommodation with the Com-
munist powers by those who are now free
in southeast Asia, as well as a defeat by
default on our part.
Can anyone seriously believe that neu-
tralization of South Vietnam would not
mean immediate Communist takeover
there and a new battle beginning in
Thailand the next day?
The advocates of such a policy must
understand that our abandonment of
commitments to protect freedom in
southeast Asia is a recognition that we
expect Communist China to absorb all
of southeast Asia. Are we prepared for
some future negotiations for the parti-
tioning of Hawaii which is on the col-
lision course of the Communists an their
way to Seattle?
Vietnam must be viewed in its military
and political context and as its status
relates to the whole of southeast Asia.
I do not necessarily subscribe to the so-
called falling domino theory, which to my
mind is an oversimplification of the prob-
lem. I am certain, however, that aban-
donment of South Vietnam to the Red
hordes of China and North Vietnam,
either through negotiation or withdrawal
of military support, will lead to increased
Communist pressures on the other coun-
tries of southeast Asia and their eventual
takeover by the Communists.
We are not seeking in South Vietnam
only to save a nation. We are attempt-
ing to hold a militarily strategic land
area encompassing four countries with-
out committing the U.S. military in
.
forces of sufficient size to do the Job I was impressed by the assurances of
itself. Our goal is to eventually bring our advisers that the efficiency and com-
about in all of those countries-South bat effectiveness of the greater number
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thai- of units in the regional and Popular
land-the political, economic and mili- forces are Improving. Certainly the
tary stabilitj that will permit them to army and its reserve elements do not
are unavoidable. But we should realize
that the risks of inaction are surely as
great as the perils of action. If some
risk had been takenon behalf of Poland
in 1938, the Second World War could con-
ceivably have been avoided.
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stand alone as free nations and free from measure up to our standards, but George
Communist aggression or subversion. Washington's army was thought to be
We must weigh, the strategic impor- substandard when it fought for freedom.
tance of South Vietnam as a critical The South Vietnamese Army was de-
landmass bordering the South China Sea scribed to me by U.S. officers as being,
and as a holding point against Commu- "sophisticated and well trained consid-
nist military aggressions in Malaysia and ering the relatively few years it has been
the other independent countries that dot organized." It would be, in my opinion,
the south Pacific. They are themselves sheer folly to abandon our military ad-
of strategic value because they stand as visory effort at a time when its years of
outposts along the air- and sealanes that effort are showing cumulative results.
lead to Australia, New Zealand, Japan, I was similarly encouraged by favor-
and the Philippines. able reports by U.S. Air Force advisers
We must consider South Vietnam as who are helping to train the fledgling
a holding point essential to the continued South Vietnam Air Force.
independence of Thailand, Cambodia, The United States has a tremendous
Laos, and Burma as tenuous as that inde- investment in that military force and I
pendence may be. Occupation of the shudder at the prospect of turning it
landmass incorporated in those coun- over-rifle stock and gun barrel-to the
tries would give Red China a corridor Asian Communists, which is what could
to and control of the Indian Ocean. well happen as the result of renegotia-
These are the military factors that tion at this point and what would eet-
must determine our policies and actions tainly happen if we were to withdraw our
in that part of the world. South Viet- support from South Vietnam.
nam is a link in the free world perimeter During my stay in South Vietnam I
and I do not expect that a marauding was made aware of the many accom-
force of Communist guerrillas, no matter piishments of our Agency for Interna-
how well supported by the Communist tional Development whose programs
governments of North Vietnam or Red parallel our military effort in that coun-
China, will be able to snap that link or try. Here, too, the many years of dedi-
thwart the determination of the United cated effort by AID men and women are
States and her allies to stand unyield- bearing fruit. Our investment in dollars
ing on a line that was defined and agreed and human effort is too great to consider
to in the Geneva accord of 1954. That abandonment.
accord is not subject to renegotiation There is no easy path to the accom-
so long as the Communist government plishment of our whole task in South
of Ho Chi Minh continues to support Vietnam-nor is there a shortcut. The
and direct from its command post in trail is long, arduous, frustrating, and
Hanoi a campaign of terror and insur- complex.
rection in South Vietnam in total dis- I rise, Mr. Speaker, to voice my full
regard of conditions to which it agreed support for the manner in which Presi-
a decade ago. dent Johnson and his administration has
To talk of new negotiations when the responded to the events of the past sev-
Communists show no inclination to honor eral weeks in Vietnam. Many Amen.
past agreements is merely a sign to them cans tend to reduce complicated issue..;
of weakness on our part. To talk of such as Vietnam to fairly simple alter..
withdrawal from South Vietnam merely natives.
encourages the schemers in Hanoi and
Peiping to plan new aggressions In south- The Chief Executive-who is privy to
east Asia. far more information and many more
I returned recently from a factfinding considerations-must avoid what often
trip to South Vietnam convinced that appears to be the easy and most popular
all in that country is not as bleak as course and choose the course that reflects
newspaper accounts from Saigon would the best interests of the American people
indicate. The years of intelligent and and the free world.
dedicated work by U.S. military advisers Let none delude themselves that the
in organizing and training the South conflict in South Vietnam has been a civil
Vietnam Army and the regional and war. The aggressive actions of Hanoi
popular forces are showing even bet- and Peiping have made the fate of South
ter results. I was impressed too, by the Vietnam our most important responsibil-?
desire of the South Vietnam forces to ity In world affairs today. This is not,
fight and the in defense of their country Mr. Speaker, a partisan issue. I woulc'.
and its freedom and each day they are like for the RECORD to state that the ac-
doing just that. Increasing numbers of tions taken by President Johnson on
technically qualified officers and non- Vietnam have the support of former
commissioned officers and specialists are Presidents Truman and Eisenhower
being graduated from army schools British Prime Minister Wilson, the dis-,
.
which are conducted under our guidance. tinguished minority leader of the Senate.
This phase of our effort brings improve- the Honorable EVERETT DIRKSEN, Gen,
ment throughout the armed force. I Lucius Clay, Gen. Mark Clark, and Am-
was assured by U.S. military advisers bassador Henry Cabot Lodge.
that the leadership and command of the If we are to remain a great power, risks
South Vietnamese Army are improving
such as we are taking in South Vietnam
 1965
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3395
table until March 2 for additional
cosponsors.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro
tempore. The joint resolution will be
received and appropriately referred;
and, without objection, the joint resolu-
tion will lie on the table as requested by
the Senator from New York.
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 52) to
establish the fourth Friday in September
of every year as American Indian Day,
introduced by Mr. JAVITS (for himself
and other Senators), was received, read
twice by its title, and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
TERCENTENARY COMMISSION TO
COMMEMORATE THE ADVENT AND
THE HISTORY OF FATHER
JACQUES MARQUETTE IN NORTH
AMERICA
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I intro-
duce, for appropriate reference, a joint
resolution to establish a Tercentenary
Commission to commemorate the historic
presence of Father Jacques Marquette in
North America.
The function of the Commission will be
to develop and execute suitable plans for
the celebration of the 300th anniversary
of the arrival of Father Marquette at
Quebec on September 20, 1666. In con-
junction with these plans, the Commis-
sion, in cooperation with the Secretary of
the Interior, will investigate the desir-
ability, of establishing a permanent na-
tional monument or memorial.
Mr. President, Michigan is proud to
claim Father Marquette as one of her
own. Two years after his arrival in North
America, he established a mission at
Sault Ste. Marie. Later in 1671 he
founded the Mission of St. Ignatius at
the Straits of Mackinac, and this re-
mained his home until his death.
Returning from a missionary trip to
Illinois in 1675, he died on the eastern
shore of Lake Michigan near the present
city of Ludington. He is buried in our
State. Michigan rivers, counties, town-
ships, cities, and streets proudly bear his
name.
But Father Marquette is known in
American history for what he accom-
plished beyond our boundaries. Two
hundred and ninety-two years ago,
Father Marquette and the renowned ex-
plorer, Louis Joliet, set out to explore our
continent's greatest river-the Missis-
sippi. The histories say that on May 17,
1673, Father Marquette and Joliet left
St. Ignace with two bark canoes, five
French guides, and a little smoked meat
and Indian corn.
In 4 months they descended the Missis-
sippi to the mouth of the Arkansas,
satisfied themselves that the river emp-
tied into the Gulf of Mexico, and re-
turned to St. Ignace-a journey of 3,000
miles. They brought back with them
knowledge of America's greatest river
and richest wilderness.
Today as we puzzle the complex prob-
lems of science, space, economic growth,
and human relations, I believe it not in-
appropriate that we give thought to those
early pioneers-among them Father
Marquette-who met with determination
and courage the basic and compelling
challenges of their day-the exploration
of a vast uncharted continent, and the
planting in its rich soil of the tender
shoots of civilization.
Mr. President, I hope Congress will
act to make possible an appropriate an-
niversary observance in commemoration
of Father Marquette's contributions to
our country.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The joint resolution will be re-
ceived and appropriately referred.
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 53) to
establish a Tercentenary Commission to
commemorate the advent and history of
Father Jacques Marquette in North
America, and for other purposes, in-
troduced by Mr. HART, was received,
read twice by its title, and referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary.
APPROPRIATIONS ; FOR PROCURE-
MENT OF VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT
AND CONSTRUCTION OF SHORE
AND OFFSHORE ESTABLISH-
MENTS FOR THE COAST GUARD-
AMENDMENT (AMENDMENT NO.
43)
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr.. President, by
request, I submit an amendment, in-
tended to be proposed by me, to the bill
(S. 1053) to authorize appropriations for
procurement of vessels and aircraft and
construction of shore and offshore estab-
lishments for the Coast Guard. I ask
unanimous consent that the amendment
be printed in the RECORD, together with
the letter from the Secretary of the
Treasury requesting its submission.
.The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The amendment will be received,
printed, and appropriately referred' and,
without objection, the amendment and
the letter will be printed in the RECORD.
The amendment (No. 43) was referred
to the Committee on Commerce, as fol-
lows:
At the end of the bill insert the following
new section:
"SEC. 2. Any of the authority in the first
section of this Act may be utilized for al-
teration, addition, expansion, and extension
to facilities acquired from any military de-
partment: Provided, That the total cost of
projects constructed under this section shall
not exceed $5,000,000."
The letter presented by Mr. MAGNUSON
is as follows:
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, February 17, 1965.
The Honorable WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On February 1, 1965,
this Department transmitted to the Presi-
dent of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives a draft bill to
authorize appropriations for procuement of
vessels and aircraft and construction of shore
and offshore establishments for the Coast
Guard. The draft bill was referred in the
Senate to the Committee on Commerce and
introduced by you as S. 1053 on February 9,
1965,
Since the submission of this bill, the pos-
sibility has developed that the Coast Guard
will acquire facilities which are to be closed
or deactivated by the Department of Defense
pursuant to the recent announcement of
such closings throughout the United States,
At least one such facility will be acquired by
the Coast Guard when it is vacated by the
Department of the Army and in connection
with that acquisition, construction and re-
habilitation to make the facility suitable
for Coast Guard use is required.
In the circumstances, the Department
recommends the addition of the enclosed
new section to S. 1053 in order to permit the
Coast Guard to use funds authorized by the
bill for the construction and rehabilitation
required at this facility. Since the ac-
quisition will" take place prior to the end
of the next flscal_ year, it would be inex-
pedient to await submission of the next au-
thorization bill to provide for the necessary
work. The language of the section would
establish a maximum limit on the total
amount of funds appropriated for acquisition,
construction, and improvement which could
be used for the work contemplated. If
necessary, these funds would be made avail-
able through the deferment of projects which
have previously been authorized.
In support of this addition, information
will be_furnished to the committee as to the
projects which are intended to be accom.
plished in a form similar to that for the
items listed in the first section of the bill.
Additionally, the Department will be pre-
pared to submit any other available data that
the committee or staff may require.
An identical proposal has been transmitted
to the chairman of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries.
The Department has been advised by the
Bureau of the Budget that the proposed
legislation would be in accord with the
President's program.
Sincerely yours,
AMENDMENT OF INTER-AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK ACT, RE-
LATING TO AN INCREASE IN THE
RESOURCES OF THE FUND FOR
SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK (AMENDMENT NO. 44)
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I of-
fer an amendment which I send to the
desk. The amendment proposes to
change the authorization for increased
capital from the recommended sum in
the bill of $900 million to a reduced sum
of $480 million.
Under my amendment the U.S. Gov-
ernment would obligate itself to pay $200
million a year for 2 years, instead of
$250 million a year as provided in the
bill now pending before the Senate.
Mr. President, I ask that the amend.
ment be printed.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The amendment will be received,
printed, and lie on the table.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the junior Sen-
ator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN] be added
as a cosponsor of S. 21, a bill to provide
for the optimum development of the Na-
tion's natural resources through the co-
ordinated planning of water and related
land resources, through the establish-
ment of a water resources council and
river basin commissions, and by provid-
ing financial assistance to the States in
order to increase State participation in
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3396 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
such planning, and that his name be
listed in the next printing of the bill.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, in in-
troducing my bill for establishment of
the Lincoln Trail Memorial Parkway ex-
tending from Hodgenville, Ky., to Spring-
field, Ill., I correctly stated in my remarks
that it had the cosponsorship of all six
Senators from the three States involved.
However, the name of the senior Senator
from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] was inad-
vertently omitted from the bill as it was
sent to the Printer. In order to correct
the RECORD, and to make clear that my
statement was correct, I ask unanimous
consent that his name may be added at
the next printing, as it should have been
in the beginning, as one of the cosponsors
of S. 1226.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
MARINE EXPLORATION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT ACT-ADDITIONAL CO-
SPONSORS OF BILL
Under authority of the order of the
Senate of February 10, 1965, the names
of Mr. FONG, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachu-
setts, Mr. KucHEL, Mr. MORSE, Mr. Mus-
KIE, Mrs. NEUBERGER, Mr. TYDINGS, and
Mr. YARBOROUGH were added as addition-
al cosponsors of the bill (S. 1091) to
provide a program of marine exploration
and development of the resources of the
Continental Shelf, introduced by Mr.
BARTLETT (for himself and other Sena-
tors) on February 10, 1965.
NOTICE OF FINAL HEARING ON
BILLS RELATING TO THE FORMA-
TION OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON
THE REORGANIZATION OF CON-
GRESS
Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, I would
like to announce for the information of
the Senate and other interested persons
that the Senate Subcommittee on the
Standing Rules has scheduled a final
hearing on bills relating to the forma-
tion of a joint committee on the reorga-
nization of Congress. The hearing will
be held on March 1 in room 301, Old Sen-
ate Office Building, starting at 2 p.m.*
Any Senator or other person wishing
to testify at the hearing should notify
the staff director, Kent Watkins, room
133, Senate Office Building, extension
2235, in order to be scheduled as a wit-
ness.
NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION
BEFORE COMMITTEE ON THE
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the
following nomination has been referred
to and is now pending before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary: William P.
Copple, of Arizona, to be U.S. attorney,
district of Arizona, for a term of 4 years,
vice Charles A. Muecke, resigned.
On behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all
persons interested in this nomination to
file with the committee, in writing, on
or before Wednesday, March 3, 1965, any
representations or objections they may
wish to present concerning the above
nomination, with a further statement
whether it is their intention to appear
at any hearing which may be scheduled.
NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING ON
S. 1228
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, as
chairman of the standing Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights
of the Committee an the Judiciary, I have
previously announced that the subcom-
mittee will conduct a public hearing on
bills pending before the subcommittee
to fix the fees payable to the Patent Of-
fice. Subsequent to this announcement,
Senator JOSEPH D. TYDINGS, introduced
S. 1228, which likewise fixes Patent Of-
fice fees.
I wish to announce that S. 1228 will
be included as part of the subcommittee
hearing which will commence on
Wednesday, March 3, 1965, at 10 a.m., in
room 3302, New Senate Office Building.
The subcommittee consists of the Sen-
ator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHN-
STON], the Senator from Michigan [Mr.
HART], the Senator from North Dakota
[Mr. BURDICK], the Senator from Penn-
sylvania [Mr. SCOTT], t1fe Senator from
Hawaii [Mr. FoNG], and myself.
ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTI-
CLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE AP-
PENDIX
On request, and by unanimous consent,
addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were
ordered to be printed in the Appendix,
as follows:
By Mr. HARTKE:
Address delivered by James G. Patton to
the Indiana Farmers Union Convention, at
Indianapolis, Ind., on February 3, 1965.
Resolution of the National Lutheran coun-
cil commending the VISTA program of the
Economic Opportunity Act.
By Mr. THURMOND:
Editorial by radio station WOKE, of
Charleston, S.C., in opposition to H.R. 2998,
to extend the life of the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency.
By Mr. METCALF:
Resolutions of the Mid-West Electric Con-
sumers Association, which will appear here-
after in the Appendix.
Resolutions of the Upper Missouri Water
Users Association.
By Mr. JAVITS:
Request for an Empire State Building com-
memorative 5-cent postage stamp.
By Mrs. NEUBERGER:
Article entitled "A Topsy-Turvy World,"
written by Rlbbi David Polish, of Evanston,
REFLECTIONS ON VIETNAM FACTS-
ARTICLE BY ERIC SEVAREID
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the RECORD an article entitled "Re-
flections on Vietnam Facts," written by
Eric Sevareid, and published in the
Washington Evening Star of February
23. In part, the article reads as follows:
No vital facts arebeing withheld from us.
The difficulty is that one set of facts falls
from one side of the road, another set from
the other side, and the result is a roadblock.
February 24
Elsewhere in his article, Mr. Sevareld
says:
There are no good solutions; there are only
choices between evils, some of which, we must
remember, are more evil than the existing
evil.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
REFLECTIONS ON VIETNAM FACTS
(By Eric Sevareid)
My credentials as a card-carrying colum-
nist and compulsive commentator would
surely be revoked by what follows, If a com-
mittee of professional censure existed in this
calling. Like all those whose slow brain
must make the daily race with rapid events,
I have periodically longed for a week, say,
of enforced illness, be it at home, in a hos-
pital, or jallhouse-a week for nothing but
reading, listening, and reflection. Ah, the
mental mists that would melt away, the
clarity that would emerge.
Now I have been granted the blessed
week-in a most accommodating hospital,
ordered thence for rest and routine tests of
minor ailments; and I have read, listened to,
and thought about virtually nothing but
Vietnam, in detail and in cosmic conse-
quence.
No, that is somewhat misleading. What I
have read, what I have listened to, are other
men's reflections on Vietnam, and what I
have found myself actually reflecting on is
this mass of reflection. I cannot recall an
intellectual stalemate quite like this one
over Vietnam and what the U.S. course
should be. An intellectual blockade, really,
since the mass of suggestions, which run the
gamut from A to B-from the preposterous
to the dubious-confuse, in their totality,
far more than they clarify.
This is a prime example of the falsity of
the cliche that if only the people are given
the facts they will always find the road. No
vital facts are being withheld from us. The
difficulty is that one set of facts falls from
one side of the road, another set from the
other side, and the result is a roadblock.
But our system ordains that writers must
write, speakers must speak, and politicians
must do both. The net result amounts to a
supreme example of what Voltaire meant by
his remark: "The necessity of saying some-
thing, the embarrassment produced by the
consciousness of having nothing to say, and
the desire to exhibit ability, are three things
sufficient to render even a great man ridicu-
lous."
I find myself In the same predicament with
the great. I must say something since news-
paper space, like nature, abhors a vacuum,
but I can illuminate nothing. If I feel less
ridiculous about this than most, it may be
because when I first began a career of utter-
ing in public, the remarkable man who hired
me, Ed Murrow, gave this unprecedented ad-
vice, "When there is no news, just say so.
When you are unsure of your facts, admit it.
When you have no solution to offer, don't
pretend otherwise. Who knows, people might
appreciate that."
The only facts I feel sure about are mostly
negative in nature-the heaviest conceivable
bombing of the supply lanes from North Viet-
nam will not stop the supplies, since there is
always the night and the brush; even a very
large American air- and road-oriented ground
force will not destroy a guerrilla force; pin-
prick bombing Inside North Vietnam will not
seriously injure them militarily or weaken
their will; saturation bombing of North Viet-
namese barbers, railways, bridges, and fac-
tories may produce favorable political results
(it may also bring a mass infantry Invasion
of South Vietnam), but we would kill hun-
dreds of women and children in the process;
negotiation for a neutral and unified Viet-
nam is a hopeless Idea, since it implies ask-
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1965. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE 3397
ing the northern Communists to abandon dilemma in Vietnam, to De Gaulle, to Presi- that's about all. I mean, we can't make
communism; negotiation for a neutralized dent Johnson and his Great Society. South Vietnam, and we can't make southeast
South Vietnam can probably be brought Now here is Mr. Lippmann and Eric Seva- Asia, an American outpost. We don't want
about only if the Vietcong agrees to a cease- reid in a conversation filmed in Washington to, the President says we don't want to.
fire; and a neutral South Vietnam could be 4 days ago. And we maintained only by a heavy international- Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, there's a that it doesn tobecome at Chinese dmilitary
ized presence that the United Nations, at great deal we'd like to hear from you tonight. outpost, which is quite a different thing
least, can no longer risk or afford. This is the 20th year since the end of the from saying that it will be eventually within
There are no good solutions; there are only great war. We seem to be surrounded by a the Chinese sphere of influence.
choices between evils, some of which, we lot of paradox. We're the most powerful I don't know of any man living who thinks
must remember, are more evil than the exist- country in the world, and we can't seem to that 35 years from now, when the Chinese
ing evil. This remains very limited warfare. find either victory or peace in a small Asiatic are one-half of the whole human race, they
The political world has not been overturned land. There's almost a feeling that this is a aren't going to be the dominant power in
by our bombing retaliation; the basic aline- prewar period. What do you think the Presi- southeast Asia. Of course they are, but
ments and hostilities among the great powers dent's real choices are now in Vietnam? they're not there now, and we have to pro-
remain as they were. I do not believe that Mr. LIPPMANN. The President has a very tect the people who would be liquidated,
great power war is going to grow out of the hard choice to make. He's really in a dilem- killed, really, persecuted if we suddenly dis-
mess in southeast Asia, partly because Com- ma, and either horn of that dilemma is
munist China will probably not risk winning extremely uncomfortable, and unpleasant. Mr. That's our problem.
a war on foreign ground at the cost of all she One horn is to escalate, that is to widen and whether . SEVAREID. Isn't m
can nh of the the dilemma
has built up at home. Increase the war, which is a very terrible get -
choice because it almost certainly would Mr. tiggoing?
I fall to follow the argument that a with- you actualLIPPMANN. It is a real question wheth-
drawal from South Vietnam would mean n the lead us into a war with China before it end-
er we can rally enough world opinion, and
retreat of U.S. military power to Pearl Harbor. ed. And we can't tell what Russia would_ enough diplomatic support from the Soviet I fail to
follow
the
contrary
ent getting off the Asiatic m inlanarg d and re tint way, the risks are incalcula leCofi widenin Union particularly, and from Japan and India
on our air and sea power would leave us in the war, and the President, of, course, Is and other Asiatic countries, something to
a stronger position. If air and sea power can- doing his best to avoid that. induce them to negotiate. So we have to
find ways of going behind the scenes. And
not prevent the subversion of South Vietnam. The other dilemma is to nevotlate a truc,.F~ I .
lion of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. because the interior situation in South Viet- t Rica, to Moscow, to Tokyo--of course,
What nam is breaking up, crumbling, and that is there's no great difficulty for us-and New
we are,, doing now is stalling and what the victory pf the Vietcong Is feeding Delhi, and so on, also to London and Paris,
muddling through, hoping ng that something upon. Were not sure that thegChinese or to create a situation diplomatically which
will turn up. This is unsatisfying to the the North Vietnamese, who think they're nobody in the world can define today, which
American temperament and tradition, but winning and, have good rto think that will make it advantageous and necessary for
the scoffers should remember that an aston- they're winning, would reason e willing to negoti- the Communists to negotiate.
ishing number of Micawbers in life avoid ate something that, that sto Mr. SEVAREID. You'd need acease-fire from
heartbreak as well as heart attacks. Time g peed them short of the Vietcong before such ne o
and patience don't always heal, but often complete v . Complete victory would g tiation
be a collapse o of f the Vietnamese Government, Mr. LIPPMANN. You'd have to dot
the dip-
enough they do. and a setting up of a new government which lomatic exploration which I've been talking
Put this down as the special prejudice would Invite the United States to go out, to about, which is not a conference, you'll have
natural to anyone doing 14s reflecting from a leave. to do that before there's a cease-fire. Now,
hospital bed. 't ! ' } The reason that dilemma is so bad is one of the terms I would think indispensable
not only that it would be embarrassing and to a negotiation, or any kind of talk, back
and forth
humili
ti
would b
b
th
,
a
ng,
e
ut because we have, in the
at before we would not
SIXTH ANNUAL INTERVIEW OF course of these years we've been in there, withdraw while the thing was going on.
WALTER LIPPMANN ON COLUMBIA whether we ought to have been there in the You see, we are faced with an ultimatum-
BROADCASTING SYSTEM first place is another question, but having have been from Hanoi, and Peiping, that we
got in there, a great many Vietnameseiave must get out, and then talk. Now, that we
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on become dependent on us, and the chances can't do, because that means abandoning all
February 22, a telecast-the sixth in an for their future if we leave is very slim. I our friends and all our interests and that
annual series-of an interview with Wal- don't know that they'd all be liquidated, would be scuttling the ship.
ter Lippmann was carried on the CBS some of them would have to flee the coun- Mr. SEVAREID. Mr, Lippmann, there are
network. Mr. Lippmann was interro- try, but we have a debt of honor to these complaints in the press that this is not only
Vietnamese who have thrown themselves on an undeclared war we're conducting, but -an
gated by Eric Sevareid, our side in this civil war. And therefore, it's unexplained war, and the President is criti-
Mr. Sevareid's expert questions led very hard for the President to choose that cized for not talking to the public about this
this distinguished journalist through a side which is disengagement. What he is involvement. Do you think he should?
wide ranging and penetrating survey of doing now, of course, is to try to find some- Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think he's in a very
the situation-domestic and internation- thing between these two extremes, difficult position. An irresponsible journal-
al-in contemporary public affairs. The Mr. SEVAREID? Mr. Lippmann, you've called 1st can tell the truth, but if the President
results of the interview, as tthis a civil war. The administration talk of the United States tells it, morale will prob-
res Of immediate value to public transcribed, ri under- is always about the intervention from North ably collapse in Saigon. That government
Vietnam, another state. You really think would just blow up. If he tells what he
standing of these affairs as well as of his- it is just a civil war? wants to do, on what terms he would be will-
toric value. Mr. LIPPMANN. I think it is, but like all Ing to consider negotiating, they'll imme-
I ask unanimous consent that the civil wars, foreign outer powers intervene in diately reject them publicly, which makes it
transcript previously described be in- them, and that's been true of every civil impossible for them to accept it in the end,
serted at this point in the R> coon. war you can think of, from our own, begin- and here, there'll be a great outcry from the
Ring with the French intervention in that. war hawks that he's appeasing. So he's
There being no objection, the text Of The intervention from the outside Is very Caught in a jam and I don't think he can
the interview was ordered to be printed important, but it isn't the revolution. The explain the war more-I think he has to
in the RECORD, as follows: American Revolution wasn't made by the work, because of the nature of this involve-
CBS REPORTS "WALTER LIPPMANN, 1965" AS French, it was made by the Americans, and ment, and that's one of the mischiefs of.get-
BROADCAST OVER THE CBS TELEVISION NET- all these revolutions, the Russian revolu- ting involved in it-he has to work through
woax, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1965, 10-11 ti-, the Chinese revolution, all were made really what amounts to secret diplomacy.
SEVAREID, In your own work here in
P.M., E.S.T. by the people of the country itself, and that's Mr.
Mr. SEVAREID. What is the most we can war party, warhawks so to speak, who want
on the coast of Maine, Walter Lippmann,
to make a big roar out of this war in Viet-
newspaperman% whose column appears in 285 hope for as the outcome of negotiations, name
newspapers here and abroad and who has however it takes place? Mr. LIPPMANN. They're very strong and
been called one of the essential Americans, Mr. LIPPMANN. The most we could hope for, powerful. I don't think they're a big camp,
made his television debut on "CBS Reports." is that there will be a sufficient political but I think they're quite powerful and in-
He has been a television tradition over since, truce in the civil war, for a period of time- fluential.
Tonight, that tradition continues as Mr. some years-so that they can adjust them- Mr. SEVAREID, Do you care to say ih what
Lippmann discusses with CBS News Corre- selves to each other-I mean the people who areas they would be found?
spondent Eric Sevareid the state of the Na- have been fighting on opposite sides in the Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think as a matter
tion, and the state of the world, from our civil war, This can heal their wounds, and of fact, they would be found in the military
No. 36--6
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 2J
area, and to some degree in the diplomatic teaching, military teaching and doctrine, we countries that are threatened by the bomb,
area. But they're not found in the interior have to expect topay some price for it. You which would be India, Japan-those would
and at the top of the White House. That I can't expect to get out gloriously from a be the two important countries-they can't
feel sure of. mistake. But if you mean by that, that the use the bomb on South Vietnam, or some-
Mr. SEvAREm. Well, in the White House United States will cease to be a power in thing like that-India and Japan-a guaran-
there's only one.topman, so I assume that Asia because it negotiates itself out of Viet- tee not that we'd defend them with troops
you mean that you're convinced that the nam eventually, the answer to that is not and ships and everything else, airplanes, but
President- true. The United States controls the whole that if they are hit with a nuclear bomb,
Mr. LIPPMANN. I mean that the President Pacific Ocean, all the water, all the air above we'll hit back with a nuclear bomb. We could
is not a warhawk. The warhawks want to it, and all the air' over the way into the give a nuclear guarantee to them, and while
bomb Hanoi, and all the industries. They interior of China and so on. Now that is a I'm not stare that that's the right policy,
want to knock out the whole industrial sys- situation which has never existed before in r think we ought to consider it very care-
temn of North Vietnam; if anybody says "Well, American history, and that will continue to fully.
the Chinese will come in, intervene if be exist. Mr. SEVAREID. Well then, that would make
does," he says, "Then bomb China, too." The Mr. SEVAREID. I take it you're not con- a full circle, wouldn't it, of American corn-
President's policy in bombing is a very cerned about any immediate toppling of mitment? We have made this commitment
strictly controlled and regulated policy. dominoes in the rest of southeast Asia. for Europe, for Latin America under Mr.
We're not bombing North Vietnam, we're Mr. LIPPMANN. Not immediate. But I never Kennedy, at the time of the Cuban missile
bombing the borderland above the 17th deceive myself. I never believed in going into crisis, and now you would include Asia, too.
parallel, which is a rather empty country, southeast Asia, I've said many times, and Mr. LIPPMANN. That is a commitment
and we signal our attacks and they know written it in all kinds of things. I've never which we are able to fulfill. Holding vil-
when we're coming. There's no surprise believed we ought to be there, but as long lages in the jungles of Vietnam is not a
attack, and they are really public rela- as we are there, I believe what we have to do commitment that the American troops can
tions jobs, much more than they are mili- is to stay there long enough to make the really fulfill.
tary jobs. process orderly rather than disorderly and Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, do you think
Mr. SEVAREID. They're political bomb- violent. what's happened recently in Vietnam, in-
ing- Mr. SEvAREm. Does this Government have cluding our bombing, has altered the rela-
Mr. LIPPMANN. They're political bombings, an overall policy for Asia? tions between Moscow and Peiping?
and they don't kill many people. I don't Mr. LIPPMANN. We have objective commit- Mr. Lu'PMANN. Moscow is forced to aline
think they kill anybody. There's no evi- ments, which I do not believe is policy for itself with Peiping, but the underlying differ-
dence that they do, because what we bomb is the long run. I'm not talking about tomor- ences between those two powers are so deep
wooden sheds. Now, I don't think there's row, but 5, 10, 15, 20 years from now, are that I don't think in the long run, they can
any doubt at all, that if we bomb North not tenable. We have these commitments become one power again, and I think there-
Vietnam the way the warhawks want it as a result of our victory over the Japanese fore, we can count on, in this diplomatic of-
bombed, and make it uninhabitable, the Empire in the Second World War. We find fensive which I was talking about before, on
Vietnamese Army, which by the way is the ourselves in places where we can't expect to quiet Russian support. First of all, they have
largest land army in eastern Asia, except stay for the rest of time. We aren't going to a territorial conflict, over a frontier which is
China's, will move right down into South stay forever in South Korea, and we aren't the longest In the world, and the most badly
Vietnam where they can't be bombed, and going to stay forever in South Vietnam, nor defined, stretches 4,000 miles across Asia.
where there are rich prizes, and. I don't forever in Taiwan, nor in Okinawa, which is between Siberia-Soviet Siberia, and China,
think South Vietnam will resist them. part of Japan. If we have any sense, any with territory in dispute all along the way.
They couldn't, maturity, we will adjust our minds to the That doesn't make for peace, and there's
Now, the warhawks' answer to that is: fact that over the generations, thereb going been a lot of fighting going on that never go'~
Yes, it's so important we must send troops to be-the tide is going to recede to some- reported on that frontier.
in. And they're talking when they-when thing more normal and natural. The other thing is, that they're in differ--
they, you really press them, in hundreds of MI. SEVAREID. What you're saying then, as ent stages of development. The Russians
thousands of American troops to hold the I understand it, is that in the long run, we have passed the revolutionary stage in thei'
line. If we are in the position in Vietnam must be prepared to live with Chinese Com- own development. They have a going so-
that England was under with Churchill munist domination of southeast Asia. ciety with big industry, and they don't have
1940, if they were on our beaches, we'd have e Mr. LIPPMANN. The situation for us in the to keep the country in a state of war alarm--
, 6,000 don' th do to h but do miles away, I 'tI Pacific is very like what happened in Europe war tension-in order to get the people to
think a have to do that, and I don't- t
with the Russians. We have lived with the endure the hardships that the regime re-
hope we won't. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe since quires. China doesn't want a war any more
Mr. SEVAREID. h war re, hawkMr. s, so to Lippmann, speak, k, 1945, and look at it now. It's dissolving. than Russia does, but she wants a state of
the showdown the e war we can hold China, in a great military war feeling, because she needs it for her own
have their way. Then what happens? sense, from building a navy like the Japanese affairs, and Russia needs the opposite. She
we At bfirst, if ecome the war a hawks Navy was at Pearl Harbor, becoming a real needs intercourse and commerce with the
Mr. LiPPMANN.
prevail, and we become involved in a big e threat to our peace, and wait as we've waited West. That was the original-that's the
war, they will rejoice, but t In in the end the h with the Soviet Union, in the end the same original root of the quarrel between Khru-
people will weep. forces will work in China that have worked in schev and Mao Tse-tung, and it continues
MT. SEVAREID. You don't agree then with the Soviet Union. She'll relax her grip. with Khrushchev's successors, and that's an
those who say that South VletnalYl is an- irreconcilable difference.
other Berlin or Korea? Mr. SEVAREID. But East Europe is con- Mr. SEVAREID. Well, when China is a highly
Mr, LIPPMANN. No. It's not a Korea, be- fronted with a countervailing force in the industrialized country, she's apt to be much
cause it's not an invasion as Korea was. sense of the great weight and prosperity of more cautious, is she not? She'll be more
That was an open, old-fashioned invasion by West Germany and the rest of West Europe vulnerable to atomic attack and destruction,
an army that crossed a frontier and you pressing close on East Europe's very borders. for one thing, than she is as a village.
had battles in the open. This is not. This You wouldn't have that, really, would you, Mr. LIPPMANN. She'll go through the sane
is like a flood, like water spreading, and in the Far East? Where would the contrast evolution that every revolutionary society
you can't beat it back or shoot it with a and the other force come from? goes through. She'll become middle class,
shotgun. It won't go back. Mr. LIPPMANN. The best I would expect on which is what the Russians are becoming.
Mr. SEVAREID. One would suppose the war looking now at the long run, I mean, we can And when they're middle class, they don't
hawks learned their own lesson, a military get the kind of pause, and interlude-that like to have their property destroyed, and
lesson from Korea when the Chinese came I think, is the best we can hope for. I think their families broken up, and their savings
into it. that, for instance, Vietnam, which was al- lost, and in other words, they become soft.
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, they will tell you, ways anti-Chinese, will follow the same line And that softening process has happened in
they say the Korean syndrome, they call it, that Tito has followed in Europe as against Russia, and it will happen if we can hold off
has made the Americans frightened. Well, the Soviet Union. It will be Socialist or war long enough, for say 15, 20 years, in
I don't know, maybe they've learned from Communist in a manner of speaking, because China.
experience. That's another way of putting those words don't apply very well in Asia, The ANNOUNCER. You are watching Walter
it. but it'll be tending to be anti-Chinese and Lippmann, 1965, a 1 hour conversation be-
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, there are., independent and that will be, from our point tween America's distinguished newspaper-
many people here who think that if we do of view, quite satisfactory. man, Walter Lippmann, and CBS News Ccr-
withdraw from that part of southeast Asia. Mr. SEVAREID. Do you fear the Chinese pos- respondent Eric Sevareid.
however it happens, that we will have suf- session of the bomb? Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, may I turn
fered an enormous and historic American Mr. LIPPMANN. I certainly do. I fear it to our relations with Europe now for a min-
defeat. very much. I'm not having hysterics about ute. There's a sense here, in Washington,
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I tell you, if you made it, because it's a long way off, before it's a that President Johnson has changed the
a mistake, and I think we made a mistake threat to us. And I'd be willing, I haven't terms of reference in our relations with the
to involve ourselves in a war on the land in absolutely made up my mind about it, but I NATO Alliance countries; what is this
Asia, contrary to all previous American. think we probably could afford to offer the change?
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3399
' Mr. LIPPMANN. He has changed them, I from lots of people, De Gaulle is like a man
think, and changed them for the better. who can't see very clearly what's right in
After the World War, and up to President front of him, who sees pretty well what's
Johnson's time, the United States was not
only the protector of Europe, the defender,
military protector, but it was the banker,
and it was the general political and moral
boss, superintendent at least, of Europe.
And in the course of that, we got ourselves
very badly entangled,. first with the British,
who thought they were our special friend,
resulted in their being excluded from the
Common Market, by General de Gaulle.
Then we got into a tangle with the Germans,
who thought they were the special favorites
of the United States. In those days, Chan-
cellor Adenauer was the Chancellor of Ger-
many. He was our chief adviser on Euro-
pean affairs.
We oughtn't to have special favorites
among our Allies, and President Johnson,
who has kept on excellent terms with the
British, and with the Germans, has ended
that. And the key to that whole business,
that came over this proposal to create a
multilateral mixed-manned nuclear fleet,
which the Germans would have owned 40
percent of, and that aroused fury all over-
in France, among all the people who fear
Germany, and there are a great many people
who still fear Germany in Europe, all over
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,
and he put that on ice, he suspended that.
Mr. SEVAREID. Is this what you once called
masterly inactivity?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Masterly inactivity. You
see, when you are no longer needed as the
leader of Europe, then the right thing to do
is to stop trying to lead it. Let Europe de-
velop in its own way, which is I think going
quite satisfactorily.
Mr. SEVAREID. Is it going in the direction
of a more cohesive united Europe?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Yes; it's going in the direc-
tion of the breaking down of the Iron Cur-
tain, between the two halves of Europe.
This is a process of trade, and sport and cul-
tural communication between the two halves
of Europe.
Mr. SEVAREID. Do you think we could have
arrived at that rather favorable point had
ewe not taken the great leadership for many
years, had we not had all these troops in
Europe?
Mr. LIPPMANN. We had to do it. It was
under our protection, and with our finan-
cial help, that Europe recovered, but it has
recovered. It's like a family, you have to
recognize that the child has grown up, it
has grown up and you can't treat it as if it
were a baby.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, in Germany
now, there seems to be a revival of interest
in the reunification of that country;- Do you
see this coming about?
Mr. LIPPMANN. I think it's going to come.
I'm not surprised at the revival of interest,
because Germany without, divided as it is,
not even in possession of its own capital, is
a sick country. It's done very *ell economi-
cally, but politically, it's sick. And it will
never be well until St's reunified. The re-
unification can come about, I think, only by
the process I was talking about, by the
gradual weaving together of the two parts
of Europe. When that has taken place, Ger-
many will be reunited in the process.
Mr. SEVAREID. President de Gaulle is now
the }ast of the great wartime leaders of the
West, and the most powerful political per-
sonality in Europe. Why don't we get along
with him better? Who misunderstands
whom?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, there's a good deal of
misunderstanding both ways, I don't doubt.
Memories of the war. He and President
Roosevelt didn't get on. He and Churchill
had difficulties, but they got on better'than
President Roosevelt and De Gaulle. But the
basic difficulty about De Gaulle, 't find' this
across the room, or halfway down the street,
but who sees absolutely perfectly what's in
the distance., He has the farthest vision, he
can see further, than any man in our time,
and I don't even exclude Churchill. De
Gaulle foresaw, at the worst moment in the
fall of France, how in the end, the war would
be won; namely, by the coming in of Russia
and the United States. That kind of vision
is very annoying to public men who don't see
that far.
On the other hand, the fact that he doesn't
see very clearly in front of him, and stumbles
over the furniture, is very annoying too, and
kicks their shins, as he goes, that sort of
thing. But that's the problem and the
genius of his vision is so important. For in-
stance, he has foreseen, and we have fol-
lowed-we didn't take it from him, but we
are following the same policy by the same
logic-he has foreseen, that the reunification
of Germany and of Europe, would have to
come about through increasing connections
with Eastern Europe, between East and West
Europe. He's doing that. He's been much
closer to the East Europeans than anybody.
Well, we're doing that too. In the Far
East, it is very annoying to us that he recog-
nized China. It was a sign of very great
vision, to see that there'd never be peace in
the Far East until it was made with China.
You can't make it with anybody else, and
that kind of thing is the cause of the diffi-
culty.
Mr. SEVAREID. You think President Johnson
ought to personally meet with President de
Gaulle any time soon?
Mr. LIPPMANN. I'm in no hurry for that.
I don't think they're built to understand
each other too well. I think they'd better
meet through very skillful ambassadors.
Mr. SEVARIED. Apparently the President
wants to go to Europe sometime soon, and
to Russia too. Do you think the time is really
ripe for that? .
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, if he asked my ad-
vice, which he hasn't, I would not advise
him to go.
Mr. SEVAREID. Why not?
Mr. LIPPMANN. I'd advise him to get the
Great Society going in this country, and we
have something in the bank to talk about.
His style isn't the style that Europeans natu-
rally understand, this old-fashioned Ameri-
can style, and I wouldn't think he'd do too
well, and I don't think you can accomplish
anything by face-to-face talk with a man like
De Gaulle, or with a man like Kosygin.
Mr. SEVAREID. It's just a mass public rela-
tions exercise.
Mr. LLPPMANN. It will be public relations,
and too many reporters, and too many cam-
eras, and too many everything, and it
wouldn't work, and they'd all say things that
they'd wish they hadn't said, when it's over.
So I'm in favor of the President staying home.
If he wants to travel I think he might go to
South America, one or two trips. That might
be useful.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, if the Presi-
dent does go to Russia, he'll find a new regime
now, Mr. Khrushchev gone since we last had
these conversations. Why do you think he
did go, and what's different about this new
regime?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I don't know. I
haven't been to Russia. I don't think-the
cards are not face up on the table. We can't
read it clearly. If you look at the underlying
forces, Kosygin has just as great an interest
as Khrushchev had first of all, in avoiding
nuclear war with the United States, and also,
an interest in getting better relations with
Eastern Europe, and the Western World for
'economic reasons. I'm told by everybody I've talked to, and
I've only talked to one relative of one of the
new rulers of Russia, who was here on a
scholarship, they got tired of Khrushchev's
inefficiency, and his wildness. He promised
things that he hadn't the authority to
promise. And that was the reason they said
let's get this more organized, and more
orderly, and the very noticeable fact is that
first, they've divided Khrushchev's jobs into
two jobs. Khrushchev was both Secretary
of the Communist Party, which was consid-
ered the most powerful job, and the other
job, he was Prime Minister of the Soviet
Union, or Chairman of whatever they call it.
Now they have two men, Kosygin and Brezh-
nev, and it's very interesting, they no longer
travel together. They don't go to foreign
countries together as in the early days be-
fore Khrushchev got the both jobs, he used
to travel around with his other man.
Mr. SEVAREID. Bulganin.
Mr. LIPPMANN. Bulganin.
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, I suppose one of these
two men must be the prevailing one even-
tually.
Mr. LIPPMANN. Unless there's been a change
and this-Russia is evolving unless the evolu-
tion is that the Communist Party is no long-
er the militant world party that it was
when Khrushchev first came into power.
Mr. SEVAREID. The established church in-
stead of church militant, in other words.
Mr. LIPPMANN. Yes.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, about Great
Britain, I think you were there recently.
There seems to be a feeling of deep crisis
about that country. Financial crisis for
one thing, a government with a bare ma-
jority in Parliament, what is really hap-
pening with them?
Mr. LIPPMANN. There is a deep crisis in
Great Britain, and it may be that the his-
torians will say that it was Labor Party's
misfortune to come into power too soon, be-
cause the things that prevent the Labor
Party from doing what it says it wants to do,
and may be able to do which is to revivify
Great Britain from within; its industrial
life, and its technology and its education, is
postponed because they're still dealing with
the remnants of their Empire out in Malaya,
all the way from Aden to Singapore, and with
the remnants of their old sterling area, which
is a remnant from the days when London
was the banker of the world. Now Labor
is having the job of dealing with that, and
that's a job that should be done by Conserva-
tives. That's their business.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, did you fol-
low the Churchill funeral ceremonies on tel-
evision?
Mr. LIPPMANN. I did.
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, what was the real sig-
nificance in your mind of the enormous emo-
tional impact of this? Merely the man as a
personality, great turning point in British
history? What was it?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Oh, I think the fundamen-
tal emotion here, at least the one I felt,
and I assume that other people-was one of
immense gratitude to this man who had
saved the world from nazism, and fascism.
That's one of the great achievements of a
single man in modern history.
Mr. SEVAREID. You mean, he did this?
Mr. LIPPMANN. He did that. Without him,
there was no reason to think that Great
Britain could have resisted, or would have
resisted.
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, did the funeral of this
man represent in a sense the burial of the
British lion that the world has known for
300 years, everywhere in the world?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I've heard people say
that, but I don't think we're in a position
to make any such-reach any such conclu-
sion here. I don't think so. I remember a
song of Beatrice Lillie, "There's Life in the
Old Girl Yet," and we'll probably see that.
Mr. SEVAREID. Were you particularly upset
about the fact that the Vice President did
not go to the funeral?
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 2ri
Mr. LIPPMANN. No, I think the President
made a mistake about this, when he couldn't
go himself. I think he was too sick. His
head wasn't clear enough to have done the
obvious and right thing to do, which was
to appoint General Eisenhower as his per-
sonal representative. Eisenhower was al-
ready invited by Lady Churchill to come to
the funeral, but he should have been the
American representative. He was the man
who was Supreme Commander under
Churchill, he had been President twice, he
was the man. There was too much con-
fusion in the White House to think out
the right thing. I don't blame the President
for not wanting the Vice President to leave
when he himself was sick.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, a moment ago
you said that the President, before he goes
abroad, ought to get the Great Society pro-
gram really' working. How do you define
this program, the Great Society? What's
the essence of it?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think the best way
to answer that is to say how it differs from
the New Deal, the Fair Deal, or the Square
Deal, of all those deals, that have preceded
it. All of those older deals were based on the
assumption that the amount of wealth in
the country was more or less fixed, and that
in order to help the poor, or to educate peo-
ple or to do anything, you had to divide the
wealth, take away from the well-to-do, and
give it either to the Government or to the
poor or somebody. That's why it's called a
New Deal. It's the same pack, but you deal
it differently-or a Square Deal, and so on.
Now, the Great Society is a result of a
revolution that's occurred, a silent and be-
neficent revolution that's occurred in our
generation, under which, we have learned
not perfectly, because it's very difficult-it's
a new art, we have learned how to control,
regulate and promote the production of
wealth in an advanced industrial society like
our own. We are able to produce more
wealth by putting on taxes, interest rates, and
all the budgetary arrangements that we use,
and make the thing grow, and we finance the
new developments, education and everything
that we talk about in the Great Society, the
beautifying of cities, and everying of that
sort out of the taxes on the increase of
wealth that we're able to produce. We in-
creased the wealth, the product of the United
States by-I don't know-30 billions last
year. The taxes on that will pay for the
whole of the Great Society, and nobody is
any poorer, everybody's richer. Now, that is
what the Great Society-that's its basis.
Mr. SEvAREID. Well, what's the single most
important aspect of the President's pro-
gram?
Mr. LIPPMANN. It's education, because it's
like a vestibule from which all the corridors
lead out, unless you have education you
cannot take away from the poorest part of
the population, the thing which keeps them
poor, their inability to-they haven't learned
enough and been trained enough to keep a
good job, to do a good job. It also leads to
research, to production of people to increase
the scientific knowledge and the technical
knowledge. It's the basic of making the
democracy work.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, do you agree
with the claims of some people in the press,
that President Johnson in trying to govern
by consensus, so to speak, is refusing to
spend any of his political capital; that he
doesn't want to lose any of his mass public
support; that a great President ought to be
more courageous on that score. Do you feel
that way?
Mr. LIPPMANN. On the contrary, I think
he's just-I am in entire sympathy with
him. It applies internally. Now, when you
get abroad, that's another question. But
within the country, the only real way to
solve a problem like, for Instance, the racial
problem, is by having an overwhelming ma-
jority in favor of enforcement of civil rights.
Unless you get--a concensus, really means
that about between 65 and 75 percent of the
people are in favor of the policy, that's really
what it means. Not everybody's going to be
in favor of it, and that's what the President
had-he was in that range, when he was
elected-and that's what he's trying to con-
serve. And he's quite right to conserve it.
He will, if anybody can solve the civil rights
problem in the United States, It will be done
that way, having the law, enforcing the law,
but getting observance of the law by con-
sent, voluntary consent, by a great mass of
people.
The same is true of capital and labor.
You can't solve them, except by a consensus,
and the same is true of this whole argument
that we heard so much about, about the
welfare state, and what do you do for the
poor, and what do you do for the rich and
all that. Now, consensus politics is possible
only in a society which has reached the kind
of revolutionary condition that we have,
where we can control the output of wealth.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, most of us
don't think of President Johnson as a philos-
opher in any formalized sense, or an ideo-
logist in any sense, what's the secret of his
appeal to the people?
Mr. LIPPMANN. The root basis of it is that
he is really one of them, to a degree, which
very few Presidents in recent times have
been. He doesn't have to be told what
simple Americans, farmers, businessmen, are
thinking. He already feels it himself. It's
in him, and they know he feels it, and that's
what gives-that creates the relationship
between them.
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, does he have that qual-
ity of appreciation instinctively, more than
President Kennedy, or President Eisenhower?
Mr. LIPPMANN. He does indeed. If you
think of their careers, as compared with his,
you'll see that they were as compared with
Johnson, outsiders, coming into the political
life of this country. But he's right in the
heart of it, where it grows, and the thing
is in him. He doesn't have to be taught it.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, since we last
had one of these conversations, we had quite
a considerable national election. The Re-
publican Party, in terms of offices held at all
levels in the country, is at its lowest point in
about 30 years. Are we In danger of a one
party system here?
Mr. LIPPMANN. No, we're in no danger of
having a one party system. We may have
a condition which we've had several times
before in our history when one party was
predominant for a generation. But theparty
system always revives in a free country and
we're a free country, so there's no danger.
The problem is for the other party to mean
something and correct its mistakes. The
great mistake of the Republican Party since
the time of Theodore Roosevelt, is that it
quarreled with the intellectual community
in the-United States, and they all went over
to the Democrats and that gave the Demo-
crats an intellectual capacity for dealing with
issues that the Republicans simply didn't
have.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, this is the
20th year since the birth of the United Na-
tions. President Kennedy I think, once
called it the keystone of our foreign policy.
Most people in the world seem to have great
hopes for it. What do you think now about
its present condition, and its prospects?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think it's in great
difficulties. It's going through a crisis. The
League of Nations and the United Nations,
these two versions of the same idea, both
required before they could operate success-
fully, that peace should be made. The rea-
son the League of Nations failed was that
it couldn't make a peace, it needed to have a
peace to keep. The same is happening to the
United Nations. It's in the grave difficulty
because there's no peace In Europe from the
Second World War, Berlin, you know, the
occupation, division, and there's no peace in
Asia, and I don't expect that the United
Nations can make that peace, the great
powers have got to make the peace.
After It's made, and on the basis of its
being made, the United Nations can function
to keep it from tipping over and keeping
order and balance and the question is, I
think, it's the crucial question for not merely
for the United Nations but for the world, is
whether we can bridge these next years cf
10, 15 years without war, in which case the
United Nations will survive, and so will the
peace of the world.
Mr. SEVAREID. But surely there will always
in this revolutionary time, be outbreaks of
one kind or another in many, many places.
Mr. LIPPMANN. There'll be outbreaks and,
of course, the world is In ferment, and mov-
ing very rapidly, but the great power con-
frontations, which are a very different thing
from rioting, even in the Congo, or a place
like that, those great power confrontations
have to be put in order, in some balance that
is acceptable to the g-eat powers.
Mr. SEVAREID. Would any institutional re-
organization of the United Nations be of
much value?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think we made a
great mistake about the United Nations In,
I forget the year, I think it was about 1948.
We had wanted to use the United Nations to
prevent wars and troubles breaking out, anti
the Soviet Union vetoed everything, and we
wanted to get around the veto, and so we
decided let's give the power to keep the
peace to the General Assembly, where we
then had a perfectly clear and certain ma-
jority. Now, that is the decision which the
Soviet Union is rebelling against. That's
why they won't pay their dues, because they
won't admit that the General Assembly ever
had the right to raise an army and use it
for peacekeeping purposes, and we admit Ir.
theory that actually, we don't want to have
the General Assembly commit us to go into
war anywhere. We're willing to, theoreti-
cally, we're not really arguing with the Rus-
sians. We're just saying these were the rules
The U.N. is bankrupt, Congress won't appro-
priate money, if you don't pay up, if we pay
all the bills, pay up and then we'll go on
from there. That's the situation as I under-
stand It.
Mr. SEVAREID. Would there be any great
advantage in putting the decisive power back
in the Security Council?
Mr. LIPPMANN. The only advantage of it is
that that's the only place you can put de-
cisive power. When you have decisive
power, you have to give a veto. The Sen-
ate of the United States would never have
ratified the charter if we hadn't had a veto.
And if the Senate of the United States were
asked to day, would you be willing to go to
war, because 75 of the 112 nations in the
General Assembly voted you to go, but you
didn't want to go, would you go? Well, of
course you wouldn't go.
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, the whole affair in the
Congo beginning 1960, when the U.N. tried
to intervene and stabilize it, this has dam-
aged the U.N. In more than financial ways
certainly. But what about Africa and this
central part of it, the Congo? How far ought
we to go in trying to stabilize that place?
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, we've always known,
we knew then back in, when was it, 1960,
whenever it was that the Congo was liberated,
or made independent, we knew then that
we didn't want to get in there. We were
afraid that the Russians would come in and
therefore we turned to the United Nations,
and asked Dag Hammarskjold to take care
of the Congo, keep it in order so that we
wouldn't get involved and the Russians
wouldn't get involved. And that's how the
United Nations got in there, and that was
done successfully for quite a long time.
The original idea of giving it the United
Nations was correct. The United States has
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3401
no business becoming militarily involved in great. We have neglected our own affairs: in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin by its able
Africa. It's bad enough to be involved in Our education is inadequate, our cities are editor and veteran war correspondent,
southeast Asia, but to be involved in Africa, badly built, our social arrangements are un- William H. Ewing. It is a masterly per-
too, would be the height of absurdity, and satisfactory. We can't wait another genera-
we per-
couldn't do everything at once. tion. Unless we can surmount this crisis, sonality sketch of the admiral and his
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, you're not terribly con- and work and get going on to the path of ability to mobilize and transform our
cerned about what happens in the middle a settlement in Asia, and a settlement in military forces from defeat to victory.
of Africa, are you? Europe, all of these plans of the Great So- It is written with sincere admiration and
Mr. LIPPMANN. I'm rather concerned, but I ciety here at home, all the plans for rebuild- affection.
don't take the thing iideologically as serious- ing of backward countries in other con- The people of Hawaii share these warm
ly as some people do. I think the war and tinents will all be put on the shelf because sentiments. We are proud and grateful
trouble in the eastern Congo with the war interrupts everything like that.
Chinese mixing in and so on is tribal fighting , Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, thank you to have had such an outstanding military
and not really a question of communism or very much. commander directing the war from our
anticommunism, and even if it were, what The ANNOUNCER. "CBS Reports: Walter mid-Pacific bastion.
difference does it make in that corner of the Lippmann, 1965," was filmed and edited by In tribute to Admiral Nimitz on his
middle of Africa, and if it does make a dif- the staff of "CBS Reports" under the super- 80th birthday today, I salute him and ask
ference, what can we do about it, and why vision and control of CBS News. - unanimous consent to have printed in
should we have to do it?
Ewing's
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, Mr. Lippmann, there is the RECORD at this article which appeared point in the Paeific 20
a great argument here, again this year, and ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY
it gets more critical every year about just special edition of the Honolulu Star-
how far we ought to go in many places in Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, 47 years Bulletin on February 15, 1965.
the world in terms of our Involvement, even ago today, February 24, the people of There being no objection, the article
our economic involvement. Now, why has Estonia celebrated the Declaration of was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
this disenchantment come about, about Independence of the Republic of Esto- as follows:
American economic and diplomatic interven- nia. Like the other Baltic States, Esto- NIMITZ
tions around the world?
m
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think basically, it's nia's enjoyment of self-government was (By William H. Ewing)
come about because have Involved ours brief, for in 1940 the armies of Soviet Christmas Day, 1941, fell on a Thursday.
cselves ome in too man laces and we couldn't ~'
y p Russia ruthlessly took over the country. But those of us on duty in Pearl Harbor,
fulfill the promises we made, when we went In spite of the years of Communist op- along with other thousands in uniform or
in and therefore, it's reacted against us. So pression, the people of Estonia have kept out elsewhere in Hawaii, hardly noted the
our involvement causes not friendliness to alive their hopes for freedom and even- passage of the day as such. A harbor covered
the United States but unfriendliness and we tual independence. The United States with debris and grimy oil from sunken ships,
have to concentrate and focus our effort. cannot accept the enslavement of these plus the knowledge that thousands of dead
these men still lay beneath those waters, was
Mr. SEVAREID, One manifestation has been once free peoples. The Soviet action
this great wave of riots and burning of our enough to demand our full attention to the
has no basis in international law and is
information offices, libraries, attacking em-
bassies. tragedy that had befallen us and our coun-
How far can a great power tolerate in violation of understandings given by try.
this, really? Do we just continue to stand the Soviet Union to the Allied Powers of It was on this Christmas Day, Thursday,
by and just ask for apologies? World War II. The right of self-deter- December 25, 1941, that I first saw Fleet Adm.
lVfr. LIPPMANN. Well I think what we ought mination is a principle of international Chester W. Nimitz. With a companion I was
to o in a place like say Cairo, if they burned justice and the United States has em- standing on the second deck of the Admin-
down our library, is leave it burned down. phasized over and again that it Will istration Building when an elderly officer and
Just leave it there. Don't rebuild it, don't never become reconciled to Communist his aide emerged from a door and walked
clean the street even, and let it stand there domination of the Estonian and other ahead of us. "That's Nimitz," said my
as a monument to the thing. I think they'll friend. "He's come to take over."
soon want to clean it up themselves. non-Russian captive peoples. I looked again, and I was not impressed.
Mr. SAVAREID. You mentioned Cairo, and As we commemorate the anniversary I thought Admiral Nimitz looked more like
President Nasser. Sukarno of Indonesia Is of Estonia's Independence Day, we must a retired banker than the kind of hell-for-
another example. It would appear that for- reaffirm the hopes of the people of Es- leather leader we needed to pull us out of
eign aid from this country is becoming a tonia for the return of self-determina- the worst hole the country had ever been in.
political instrument in the hands of the re- Lion-their zeal for independence must I suppose I, along with nearly everyone else,
cipients rather than the donor. had formed an image of what kind of man
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think I'm right in be kept alive by our support. We must we would require. But Admiral Nimitz had
saying_ that Sukarno told us to go jump in Use all the resources of diplomacy, white hair, he had a kindly, fatherly expres-
the lake or something like the equivalent of morality, and world public opinion in a sion, and his khaki uniform was too big. It
it, about our aid, and I would do that, I continued effort to free these captive probably was the first khaki uniform he had
would just stop it. peoples, ever worn; khaki was new to the Navy, and,
Mr. SEVAREID. Nasser also said we could having just come from Washington, he prob-
take our aid and jump in the lake. ably had changed from his normal blues to
Mr. LIPPMANN. I would not-I'd stop the TRIBUTE TO FLEET ADM. CHESTER khaki en route. He had traveled, inciden-
Aia .T. -t--- ---- --__ --- - - --
Mr. LIPPMANN fI'd send him a formal note, DAY ANNIVERSARY The admiral's gentle demeanor, however,
and say, you are reported as saying you don't Mr. FONG. Mr. President, today that lay y beneath th it. Most of the time his
want our aid. Don't you want our aid? And marks the 80th birthday anniversary of steel-blue eyes twinkled but I have seen them
let him say which he wants. a magnificent American-Fleet Adm. glitter when the chips were down and there
Mr. SEVAREID. Then why don't we stop it? Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy. The name was an absolute implacability about his de-
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, don't ask me why we
don't of this brilliant, yet modest, military termination to go ahead, to win. There was
stop it. I think I would stop it if I had leader is preserved for all time in the the period of uncertainty after the landing
anything to say about it. on Tarawa, for example. I happe
s
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, the brunt of history of World War II, for it was his Admiral Nimitz for a moment t during o hi
t
much of what you said in this hour is to unfailing overall command in, the Pa- a obviously had been up p all night
ough
the effect that we are overextended in the cific theater that turned the tragic deba- at hme. is He Makalapa headquarters, t through
night orld, we are in too many places, we will cle of Pearl Harbor. into a sweeping Al- that long ng nignobody had been and quite cer-
have to pull in our horns to a considerable lied victory less than 4 years later, tain whether the Marines would stay on
extent. Is it fair to say that Walter Lipp- The People of Hawaii know Admiral Tarawa or not. Admiral Nimitz's face that
mann, 1965, has become an isolationist? morning expressed anything but gentleness;
Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I don't think those Nimitz well and affectionately. From his it was chiseled out of stone. Our casualties
words mean anything or at least I don't care Pearl Harbor headquarters, shortly after had been very heavy-over 3,000 in the first
whether anybody uses them. I don't care he took command in the dark days after few hours of fighting. Admiral Nimitz knew
about the word "isolationism," and I don't the attack, Admiral Nimitz rebuilt a that many more must die if the island was
care about the word "appeasement." I'm in- shattered Navy, unified all branches of to be held. But he also knew that retiring,
terested in the rights and needs and respon- our armed services in that vast area, and and then trying again, would be even more
sibilities of the United States. We are not rolled the enemy back thousands of miles costly. So the order was to stay, and the
the policeman of mankind. We are not able Marines stayed. Later, at a press conference,
to run the world, and we shouldn't pretend to his homeland. Gen. Howland "Howling Mad" Smith, who
that we can. Let us tend to our own busi- A most timely article about Admiral was in active command, said it was the Ma-
ness which is great enough as it is. It's very Nimitz has been written, and published rines'.,"will to die" that accounted for the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 214
victory, and this was literally true. It ought
to be remembered that this was the first
step of the offensive against Japan, and that
the forces under Admiral Nimitz' command,
from Tarawa to Iwo, never took a backward
step.
A RARE CHARACTERISTIC
This characteristic of Admiral. Nimitz, of
ranging from thb benign and gentle to
heights of resolution, of accepting terrible
costs in order to win a necessary objective,
is a very rare one. It was noted in Abra-
ham Lincoln by Carl Sandburg in an ad-
dress before a joint session of Congress on
Lincoln's birthday, February 12, in 1959.
Sandburg referred to Lincoln as a man "of
both steel and velvet * * * as hard as a rock
and soft as drifting fog." The analogy is ap-
plicable to Chester William Nimitz as well.
As Mark Van Doren, the playwright, said of
Lincoln: "He was gentle but this gentleness
was combined with a terrific toughness, an
Iron strength."
Looking back now on how swiftly things
happened after that memorable Christmas
Day in 1941 which marked the Admiral's ar-
rival, it seems amazing that so much could
have been achieved so soon. Six weeks after
that Christmas Day, Adm. William F. Halsey
was in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands with
a task force compiled out of the slender
resources left to the fleet. Within less than
6 months the Battle of Midway would be
fought, the great turning point of the Pa-
cific War in which Japan lost fighting ships
and aircraft it could never replace. Japan
actually lost the war at Midway. Six months
Is not a long time from the desperate plight
of late December to one of the greatest sea
battles of all time, in which men who had
never been in action fought with superb gal-
lantry to break the back of Japanese sea-
power.
To go back to the beginning, Admiral
Nimitz was seated in his home in Washing-
ton early in the afternoon of December 7,
1941, listening to Toscanini conduct the Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. orchestra. In his
own words, "There was a pause in the pro-
gram and a flash: `Pearl Harbor had been
attacked by the Japanese'-and this report
was repeated several times."
TO DUTY STATIONS
"In a very few minutes the Assistant Chief
of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Adm. Jack
Shafroth, who lived nearby (Admiral Nimitz
was then the officer in charge of the Bureau
which is now known as the Bureau of Per-
sonnel) called me and said he would join me
to go down to our duty stations at the Navy
Department." They found the old Navy De-
partment on Constitution Avenue buzzing
with excitement. Hundreds of telegrams and
telephone calls were pouring in from anxious
parents and relatives of personnel in the
Navy and Marine Corps at Pearl Harbor. This
situation continued for many days and Ad-
miral Nimitz and his assistants spent most
of their time trying to establish current lists
of casualties and notifying next of kin. Also
during this period, a number of Congressmen
came in to enlist in the Navy.
Again, in Admiral Nimitz' own words: "On
the 16th of December, I was called to the
Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Frank
Knox, who asked me how soon I could travel.
To this I responded that it depended on
where I was going and how long I would be
away. Then he told me he had just returned
from a conference with President Roosevelt
where it had been decided that I was to go
out to Pearl Harbor to take command of what
was left of the Pacific Fleet."
The President, it developed, had decided
that a relief for Adm. Husband E. Kimmel as
commander In chief, Pacific, was imperative.
The reason was that the Roberts Commission,
headed by Assistant Justice Owen J. Roberts
Of the U.S. Supreme `Court, had already pro-
ceeded to Pearl Harbor and begun an investi-
gation of the entire situation. Mr. Roose-
velt decided that it would be inconceivable
to have Admiral Kimmel in command at the
same time that he was under investigation
and hence had relieved him.
In response to Admiral Nimitz' question
as to where he was going and how long
he would stay, Colonel Knox had a ready
answer. He told the admiral that he would
go and stay as long as necessary to bring
the war to a successful conclusion.
It was characteristic of Admiral Nimitz
that his first concern on reaching Pearl Har-
bor was the officers under whose command
the United States had suffered the most
tragic defeat in its history. He inherited
three staffs, those of Admiral Kimmel, Vice
Adm. William S. Pye, and Rear Adm. Milo S.
Draemel. Says Admiral Nimitz today, "These
were all fine men but they had just under-
gone a terrible shock and it was my first
duty to restore morale and to salvage these
fine officers for further use and this I pro-
ceeded to do."
Having been told of his mission, Admiral
Nimitz proceeded as thoughtfully and with-
out undue haste as though he were under-
taking an ordinary mission instead of one
that would require Herculean powers of pa-
tience, faith, and resolution. Before leav-
ing Colonel Knox's office he told the Secre-
tary that he should have a relief in the
office of the Bureau of Navigation who could
take over without a long period of indoc-
trination. He suggested Rear Adm. Randall
Jacobs, who had been Admiral Nimitz' As-
sistant Chief of Bureau until a short time
before the attack. At first Colonel Knox
demurred, partly because Admiral Jacobs
had just taken command of the Atlantic
Fleet Base Force. But he finally agreed and
when Admiral Nimitz left Colonel Knox's
office he ran into Admiral Jacobs in the cor-
ridor. He took him by the arm, led him to
his own desk, and Informed him that he
was thenceforth Chief of the Bureau of Navi-
gatton.
Thereafter occurred 2 days of confused
and hurried packing, as Admiral Nimitz de-
scribes it, and then the railway trip from
Washington to San Diego which put him in
San Diego on December 22.
"I needed that railroad journey," says Ad-
miral Nimitz, "to catch up on my sleep and
collect my thoughts. Stormy weather de-
layed my departure from San Diego until
December 24, when I took off and landed
at Pearl Harbor In the early forenoon of
December 25.
"I found the lochs covered with oil one-
half inch thick from the sunken ships.
Many boats were hurrying back and forth be-
tween the wrecks and the peninsula. I was
met by Rear Adm. P. N. L. Bellinger, the
Pacific Fleet aviation officer, who informed
me that the boats were picking up drowned
sailors and marines from ships and taking
their bodies to a central point on the penin-
sula.
"I was met at the landing by Admiral Pye
who escorted me to the quarters that I oc-
cunied during the time I was in Pearl Harbor
before I shifted headquarters to Guam (in
1944). When I asked who lived in the
quarters with me, Pye said, 'Nobody.' I then
invited him to come In and, over his protest,
made him eat a second breakfast while I had
mine. Thus was my cheerful reception at
Pearl Harbor on Christmas Day, 1941."
Nobody recognized better than Admiral
Nimitz the tremendous task he was under-
taking or the colossal responsibility pressed
upon him. I had remarked in my letter to
him that our military situation in the Pacific
was "chaotic" after the attack on Pearl
Harbor. That, said Admiral Nimitz in his
reply, was definitely an understatement. He
added:
"From the time the Japanese dropped
those bombs on December 7 until at least 2
months later, there was hardly a day passed
that the situation did not get more chaotic
and confused and appear more hopeless. The
decision at the highest level of government
to concentrate on the defeat of Germany,
while holding off Japan, was a wise one and
was well understood by all of us who had
to carry on the war In the Pacific.
"The several errors made by the Japanese
on December 7, 1941, helped very materially
to shorten the war. Their failure to come
back a second day to destroy our repair fa-
cilities at the Navy yard and to burn our
41/2 million barrels of fuel oil in surface tanks
was a most serious error. These tanks could
have been destroyed by machinegunning
them with 50-caliber incendiary machine-
gun bullets.
"Likewise, the Japanese made an even
more serious error on December 7 by leav-
ing our submarine base on Quarry Point free
from attack. As a consequence, no subma-
rines or supporting equipment were damaged
and submarines could proceed immediately
to stations in the far western Pacific and
start their long campaign of destruction of
the Japanese merchant marine which we-
a primary factor in the defeat of Japan. The
submarines sank in excess of 75 percent of
Japanese merchant marine shipping.
"At the time of the attack on December 7,
there was under construction at Red Hill,
back of Pearl Harbor, an underground bomb-.
proof storage for all petroleum products. At
that time In the Atlantic, allied tankers were
the principal targets of the German sub-
marines and you need only check the figures
for 1941 and 1942 of the Atlantic losses to
see what might have happened had the
Japanese destroyed the 41/2 million barrels of
oil we had on the surface at Pearl Harbor.
"For me, meantime, after my arrival on
Christmas morning of 1941, I sweated blood
until the underground bombproof storage
was complete and our oil supply safely piped
therein. Had our oil supply been destroyed,
and considering the tremendous shortage of
fuel and petroleum production, generally,
in Europe, it would have taken years to re-
establish that supply and would have de-
layed our Pacific war accordingly. Had our
Pearl Harbor installations for repairs been
destroyed, our fleet would have been forced
back to- the west coast of the United States
for support, another item which would have
prolonged the war.
"So in spite of the reverses we suffered on
December 7, 1941, there were some spots on
which we could congratulate ourselves on
our luck."
There was further cause for rejoicing t.,i
the fact that the Japanese had made the at-
tack on our fleet while it was inside Pearl
Harbor. Had the fleet been at sea, Admiral
Kimmel would certainly have tried to force
a battle to bring into play the powerful arma-
ment that our battleships carried. However,
Admiral Nimitz points out, these ships would
have been limited to a maximum speed of
about 18 knots while the Japanese task force
had a fleet speed of 22 knots.
This difference in speed would have im-
posed on Admiral Kimmel a tremendous dis-
advantage. He could not have forced a fleet
engagement until the Japanese commander
was ready for it.
Furthermore, said Admiral Nimitz:
"The Japanese Task Force that came to
Pearl Harbor that day had six aircraft car-
riers whereas Admiral Kimmel had none--
the Lexington being far to the westward on
another mission. Imagine, if you can, what
would have happened to our slower battle-
ships in such an action with the aircraft of
six carriers working on them and with our
fleet having no air cover at all. Remember
that on December 7, the Japanese destroyed
all of the aviation strength of the Army
Navy, and Marine Corps on Oahu. Instead
of losing some 3,700 to 3,800 men as we did at
Pearl Harbor, we would have lost by drowin-
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Here was the patriarch of Wyoming-a
gentle, smiling, green-eyed Irishman who had
seen the whole transition from playing games
with Sioux Indian kids outside the stockade
of Camp Carlin where he was born August 7,
1877, to Carlin's Atlas missiles burrowed in
silos on the perimeter of Cheyenne.
Here was Mr. Wyoming-the beloved T. Joe
whose acquaintances ranged from Chief Sit-
ting Bull to J.F.K. and L.B.J., popes and
potentates, and princes.
Here was a frontiersman who lived with
Indians before they were subdued, who
helped freight the plains, who ranched, who
was a sheriff, who tamed the old cattle wars,
who helped found Cheyenne and to make it
great, who gave the world a wild and wooly
kind of entertainment called the rodeo, who
gave literature a new set of romantic and
symbolic western terms, whose sunset years
were spent in dedication to the orphanage
he helped found in 1927 at Torrington, Wyo.
And T. Joe became part of Colorado, too.
He had more friends, in Denver and Colorado
than he had in Wyoming just because there
are more people here. It is significant that
when T. Joe was made a chief of the Crow
Indian tribe, they named him well-Chief
Travels Well Known.
God blessed him with strength of body
and spirit to allow him a life of almost nine
decades-years filled with sadness, tribula-
tion, and much joy. We know that Chief
Travels Well Known will be well received in
There are cavalry horns, rowels, spurs,
peace pipes, headresses he got in tribal cere-
monies, wampuum, fire horns, badges from
the most famous firemen and policemen of
his times.
The cowboy art and photographs are price-
less-pictures of the early pokes of the 2-Bar
Warren Ranch at Chugwater, the Y Cross at
Horse Creek, Charlie Irwin's Y-6. The pic-
tures of the first rodeos with the early
greats-Thad Sowder, Harry Brennan, Sam
Scobey, Clayton Danks, Bill Pickett, Will
Rogers, and Buffalo Bill Cody.
I hear talk Cheyenne wants to do some-
thing with T. Joe's home, the basement of
which is filled with these priceless histori-
cal treasures. Why not take it over and
create a memorial called the T. Joe Cahill
Museum,of Western Americana?
THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND
CLARK
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, last
night viewers on NBC were privileged to
witness one of the finest documentaries
yet produced by the skill and expertise
of American television. .
From 10 to 11 o'clock, those watching
Channel 4 became a part of the Lewis
and Clark Expedition, which began at
St. Louis
Mo
in 1804
and ended 2
ears
,
.,
,
y
the Happy Hunting Ground, for his lifetime later on the Pacific shore of Oregon.
on earth was dedicated to making it a better This program and the excellent review
and more exciting place to live. it received from Washington Post Critic
From the Denver (Colo.) Rocky Mountain Lawrence Laurent are of particular in-
News, Feb. 15, 1965] terest to me, not only as a member of
A. T. JOE CAHILL MUSEUM? the Lewis and Clark Trail Commission,
(By Pasquale Marranzino) but also because a portion of the docu-
made in his will for the small museum of Producer Ted Yates, formerly of
Western Americana he had in the basement Sheridan, Wyo., is an old and valued
of his Cheyenne home. friend. He did indeed take on-in the
When Mr. Wyoming died Friday he left words of Mr. Laurent-"a most difficult
little behind, I'm certain, in a monetary way assignment when he decided to film `The
He left a great legend and his museum and Journals of Lewis and Clark.' "
many happy memories I was happy to share. Mr. Yates, his writers, and the camera-
The museum, however, was his pride and men produced a most remarkable story
joy because it represented to T. Joe the real West that he saw dying in his watery green- of an unforgettable journey. They also
ish eyes in the final years. Produced a chronicle of the destruction
The Wyoming he was born in nearly 88 of the tribes and wildlife that once in-
years ago was a raw, wide open territory habited the Northwest Passage country,
shared by Indians and the invading whites- The filming was made even more re-
among whom was his father, Thomas Joseph markable by Producer Yates' ability to
Cahill, "Roarin' Tip" from Tipperary who find, for the filming, tracts of wilderness
was quartermaster and horse wrangler for the
U.S. Cavalry at Fort Carlin outside Cheyenne, unspoiled by excesses of man and in-
where T. Joe was born., dustry.
As a boy Joe helped wrangle horses and I commend the National Broadcasting
then helped his father in the freighting Co., Ted Yates, and all who acted and
business. Why Joe ran a team that dredged took part in the filming of "The Jour-
the foundations for the Wyoming State nals of Lewis and Clark," and I request
Capitol.
He was insurance salesman, fireman, that the Laurent column be published
sheriff, chief of Cheyenne police, and prime in the RECORD, with my remarks.
mover in the founding of the Cheyenne fron- There being no objection, the article
tier days, the daddy of them all. was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
He had a sense of history that was hap- as follows:
pening around him and he squirreled away HISTORIC EXPEDITION REVIEWED TONIGHT
many mementoes-paintings, photographs, (By Lawrence Laurent)
letters, the flotsam and jetsam of those pio-
neer Wyoming days. Preview: Producer Ted Yates took on a
The photographs are remarkable because most difficult assignment when he decided to
they are a running history of Wyoming with film "The Journals of Lewis and Clark."
T. Joe lb most of them standing with famous The filming demanded physical endurance,
Indian chiefs, the first rodeo hands, scouts, enormous logistics problems and it faced
cavalry greats, great lawmen, great outlaw- the unalterable fact that little is left in the
men, celebrities, dignitaries. United States that was seen by the adven-
In his basement is a strand of the rope turers during the years 1804-06.
with which he carried out the execution of . On that remarkable expedition, Meri-
Tom Horn, the hired gun who bloodied up wether Lewis and George Rogers Clark lost
Wyoming ranges in the days of the cattle only one man, a sergeant who died of a rup-
wars. And there is the limb from which the tared appendix. During the filming, one
famous Cattle Kate, the woman rustler, was man was killed. He was a pilot who worked
hanged in 1893. rounding up antelope.
No. 36-10
3413
Neither Yates nor NBC executives will dis-
cuss the cost of this 1-hour program. It
was as expensive as any television documen-
tary ever made. But whatever the cost, the
results are worth the money.
What Yates, along with Writer Calvin
Tomkins, Cameramen Dexter Alley and
Richard Norling, and Film Editor Georges
Klotz have succeeded in doing is to make
every viewer a participant in that transcon-
tinental journey.
There is a lot of blood in the show. Buf-
falo were killed, antelope were shot and one
silver tipped grizzly bear died. One might,
with validity, object to the gore, until he
remembers that this program is supposed to
create the sights, sounds and the attitude of
a more violent time.
The narrator is Lorne Green, the man with
the rich voice who is known as Ben Cart-
wright on "Bonanza." His work on "The
Journals of Lewis and Clark" reminds us,
once more, that Greene was Canada's top an-
nouncer before he took up acting and resi-
dence on the Ponderosa.
Yates, who grew up in Sheridan, Wyo., used
the program to make observations on topics
about which he feels quite strongly. One
is our treatment of the American Indians.
Another is the terrible, tragic waste of the
Nation's natural beauty and scenic splendor.
The script notes that the friendly Otos
Indians are now extinct; that a million buf-
falo "were killed just for their tongues"; that
for 80 years the Teton Sioux Indians "fought
their losing battle with the white man," and
that once Lewis and Clark had explored the
West, "the days of the plains Indian, as well
as the beaver, were numbered."
There is particular eloquence in the story
of the Nez Perce Indians. This tribe was
friendly for "70 years, until a long succes-
sion of betrayals and broken promises forced
the Nez Perce to revolt. The U.S. Army then
destroyed them."
Along with pictures and Clark's descrip-
tion of the "remarkably clear Columbia
River," narrator Greene comments: "that re-
markably clear river is polluted today and
no longer crowded with salmon."
This-is another of the programs that must
be seen in color for full enjoyment. It is the
kind of program that has permanent value
and as producer Yates said: "You won't be
able to do such a show a few years from now.
Civilization, in the name of progress, will
have ruined all of the scenery."
OREGON LEGSLATURE CALLS FOR
CONTINUATION. OF VETERANS'
ADMINISTRATION DOMICILIARY
AT CAMP WHITE
Mrs. NEUBERGER. Mr. President,
the Oregon Legislature, now in session,
recently adopted House Joint Memorial
1, which states in clear and concise terms
the need for continuing the Veterans'
Administration domiciliary at White
City, Medford, Oreg. The resolution
speaks for itself; and I ask unanimous
consent that it be printed in the CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD.
There being no objection, the resolu-
tion was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
HOUSE JOINT MEMORIAL 1
To the Honorable Senate and the Honorable
House of Representatives of the United
States of America, in Congress As-
sembled:
We, your memorialists, the 53d Legislative
Assembly of the State of Oregon, in legisla-
tive session assembled, most respectfully
represent.as follows:
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CONGRESSIONAL \RECORD - SENATE February 24
Whereas planned closure of White City an agreement with a hospital (not an ordi- The subsidized insurance would pay for
Domiciliary, Medford, Oreg., has been an- nary, custodial-care nursing home). physicians' and surgeons' bills and drug
nounced; and Pay for up to 240 home nursing visits a costs as well as hospital bills, and an AMA
Whereas the domiciliary provides a much- year under medical supervision, in programs statement asserts that this would be "com-
needed facility for veterans with disabilities organized by nonprofit voluntary or public prehensive health care" and not "limited to
which incapacitate them from earning a agencies. hospital and nursing home care representing
living but which are not so severe as to re- Provide payment for hospital outpatient only a fraction of the cost of sickness." As
quire hospitalization; and diagnostic services and tests, minus a deduc- CU has pointed out, however, this "fraction"
Whereas the domiciliary has a waiting list tible that would exclude routine low-cost covers the heaviest, the most financially
and operates at less cost than a hospital can; laboratory or other diagnostic procedures. crippling share of the burden. Further-
and These provisions would be financed by an more, since the AMA has not spelled out spe-?
Whereas the domiciliary houses 1,015 increase in the social security withholding cifically what the private insurance would
members and employs 202 persons; and tax. Ultimately, a citizen would contribute cover (and in existing voluntary insurance
Whereas members of the domiciliary, its (to a special, separate health care trust fund policies, cash benefits, days of coverage, and
employees and their families have become within the social security system) 0.45 per- other provisions vary widely from plan to
part of the Medford community; and cent of his earnings up to $5,600, and his plan and from area to area), it is difficult to
Whereas the proposed closing has been employer would contribute an equal amount. tell how "comprehensive" the protection of
protested by the Oregon Departments of the Special provision would be made for those the AMA's proposal would be.
Disabled American Veterans, the Veterans of now over 65 who are not covered by social The current medicare proposal, obviously,
Foreign Wars, the American Legion, and the security through the Government's general will not solve every aspect of the Nation's
Veterans of World War I of the United States fund. health problems, even for those over 65. It
of America, by the United Labor Lobby of The medicare program gives the citizen does not and cannot guarantee good medi-
Oregon, consisting of the Oregon AFL-CIO free choice of physician and hospital. It cal care to its beneficiaries, and it pays rela-
and independent unions in Oregon, and by does not pay the costs of doctor bills, out- tively little attention to the quality of the
the Oregon State Grange; now, therefore, of-hospital drugs, prolonged or catastrophic services It pays for (though the bill does con-
Be it resolved by the Legislative Assembly illness requiring long, continuous hoepitali- tain a provision for periodic review, by the
of the State of Oregon: zation, or extended custodial care in nursing medical staffs of participating hospitals, of
(1) The Congress of the United States homes. the necessity for hospitalization, length of
is memorialized to prevent the closing of CU's medical consultants believe that this stay, and other such features). However,
White City Domiciliary. is, by and large, a sound basic package. The it, is a significant beginning.
(2) A copy of this memorial shall be trans- 60-day provision would encompass all but
mitted to the President of the United States, about 5 percent of the usual hospital stays Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
to the Administrator of the Veterans' Admin- of older persons, and the extended-care pro- suggest the absence of a quorum.
istration, and to each member of the Oregon posal would both relieve the pressure on gen- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
congressional delegation, eral hospital beds and spur the construction clerk will call the roll.
of badly needed convalescent and rehabilita-
tion facilities In many communities. Serv- the roll.
ELDERCARE ices of this kind are essential in many ill-
nesses following their acute stage and prior Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, during to the time a patient can return to his ask unanimous consent that the order
the past few weeks the American Medi- home or transfer (if necessary) to a custodial for the quorum call be dispensed with.
cal Association has spent a great deal institution. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
of time and money in promoting what The provision for organized home nursing out objection, it is so ordered.
has obvious value: such services
i
ces
it has chosen to call "eldercare." "El- serv
dereare," presumably, is the AMA's at- often preclude the need for hospitalization
and permit earlier discharge from hospital or
l
tempt to answer the King-Anderson bil
. convalescent center. Outpatient diagnostic
The current issue of Consumer Re- services also are capable of averting many
ports contains an excellent analysis and costly hospitalizations by encouraging the
evaluation of "eldercare" in relation to early detection and treatment of disease--at a
the King-Anderson bill. I believe Mem- time when It may be cured or controlled by
ber of the Senate will find the article in- relatively simple short-term procedures.
structive and enlightening. Therefore, Since the heaviest health cost of the elder-
is ,
I ask unanimous consent that the article co o tul ldh make eal it financially possible for the
entitled "Medicine Versus the AMA's first time for many citizens to purchase
Latest Substitute," be printed at this voluntary insurance (of the Blue Shield
point in the RECORD. type) to cover physicians' bills and other
There being no objection, the article Supplementary costs.
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, The AMA substitute for medicare at first
glance seems invitingly comprehensive. (It
as follows: is, in fact, a resurrection of proposals made
[From Consumer Reports for March 1965] during the Eisenhower administration that
MEDICARE VERSUS THE AMA's LATEST the AMA bitterly opposed at the time, and
SUBSTITUTE again just a few months ago at its house of
After two decades of effort, 1965 appears delegates meeting. The AMA now refers to
to be the year for medicare-a federally ad- its "new" proposal as a "redefinition" of
ministered national hospital insurance plan, policy.) The AMA substitute simply pro-
financed through social security contribu- poses the use of State and Federal funds to
tions for persons over 65. This time the ad- buy Blue Cross-Blue Shield or commercial
ministration's medicare bill seems assured health insurance for Indigent persons over
of passage. As usual, though, the American 65-it does not say how the funds would be
Medical Association has proposed a last-gasp raised, in the absence of a social security
substitute. A comparison of the two pro- tax.
posals is instructive. The proposal does say, however, that a
means test
The medicare bill may of course be altered the would be required to determine
in the legislative process, bunts four basic eligible poor, with the States using State
and
provisions are not likely to be changed sig- of the Federal insurance money to pay all, some, none
n nificantly. They can be outlined briefly. For premium t
Y on the citizen's qualification cost, t, depending
under the
those over 65, medicare would: means test. Means tests are-moral con-
Pay the full costs of up to 60 days of hospit sideratlons aside-enormously expensive and
alization (in ward or semiprivate accommo- difficult to administer. Furthermore, the
dations), minus a first-day deductible, for program would be administered by the
each benefit period (which begins on the States, raising the possibility that there
first day of hospitalization and ends when- would be 50 different kinds of governmental
ever the patient has accumulated 90 days machinery, eligibility standards, and pay-
out of the hospital within a period of 180 ment procedures. (Under some State rules
days). setting eligibility,for help under the current
Provide for an additional 60 days of post- Kerr-Mills law, ownership of property or
hospital care for each illness in a convales- even ability of one's children to pay can
cent or rehabilitation center operating under make an old person ineligible.)
the past few days there has emerged here
on this floor an expression of views on
the great crisis in Vietnam that seems
to have flowered into what some choose
to call the great debate. To the extent
that it can in truth remain a great de-
bate, it can serve well the best interest of
our country's concern about the peace of
the world.
In the course of the floor debate, I ad-
dressed myself some few days ago to the
two central questions at issue: First,
why not negotiate now; and, second, if
there are to be no negotiations now, what
policy can we best pursue that affords
the greatest opportunity to stabilize the
balance of power in the world at the same
time that we best preserve the chances
for an acceptable settlement in the Far
East?
In regard to the first question, that of
negotiations now, it seems to me that it
Is unthinkable to undertake them at this
moment. They could only be interpreted
in Hanoi as a sign of weakness, however
else we might intend them. To Invite
in North Vietnam the conclusion that we
lead from fear or weakness could only
risk an explosive impasse unintended by
either side. If indeed it is true that
North Vietnam believes that we intend to
pull out and go home, and if it is like-
wise true that the President of the
United States and those of us who sup-
port his policy genuinely intend to have
us stay, there are thus the makings for
the type of international explosion that
could lead irresponsibly to a war that no
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19 65 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
one wants. It would be war by accident
or by misunderstanding.
In order, therefore, to clear the air and
to remove the uncertainties, at least on
our side, it is important that we address
to the North Vietnamese and, through
them, to Peiping a clear and unequivocal
declaration of the American intention to
remain in southeast Asia. It is for the
purpose of placing this intent beyond
any misunderstanding that I have sug-
gested a firm six-step approach which,
in my judgment, would achieve that end.
That approach includes the following
measures :
First. We should make crystal clear
to both Hanoi and to Peiping, and in-
cidentally to the world at large, that we
have no territorial ambitions anywhere
in Asia-or around the globe, for that
matter; and that we have no designs on
their government or their internal poli-
tics. They must wrestle with their own
internal futures, so far as we are
concerned.
Second. We should announce the
drawing of a firm line along the 17th
parallel and projected westward along
a route to conform with the independent
status of the other countries bordering
on China, making it clear that we intend
to tolerate no breeches of that line; and
that, starting along the 17th parallel,
the Vietcong infiltrations from the north
must cease at once.
Third. If within a specified number of
days the Vietnamese do not cut off their
probing activities across the line, we
should announce our intention to bomb
all military bases, airfields, marshaling
areas, and encampments in North
Vietnam.
Fourth. If this still does not persuade
them of our intention to stand in south-
east Asia, then we should announce that
we will proceed to the bombing of logistic
targets-bridges and transportation.
lines.
Fifth. Should the above measures still
not persuade the Vietcong of our full
intentions, we should also announce that
we shall next proceed to the bombing of
industrial centers and other obvious sup-
ply targets in support of their military
effort.
Sixth. Simultaneously, we should
make clear that we are ready to talk,
that we are prepared to negotiate a rea-
sonable settlement in Indochina. We
should make clear, however, that the
17th parallel and the land below it are
not negotiable.
The advantage of this approach would
be first, to strengthen our bargaining
position at such a time as negotiations
would seem to become practicable; and
second, to remove all uncertainties in
the minds of the men in Hanoi or Pei-
ping as to our intentions. It would leave
up to them the clear-cut decision as to
whether then they are willing to talk
terms or whether they are willing to
plunge the region into large-scale war-
fare.
In the latter eventuality, that would
be their decision, not ours. In any case,
we would not be stumbling into war or
retreating into it piecemeal, as might
conceivably be the case under our pres-
ent policy of tit for tat. Under these
circumstances, we are forced to assume
the worst, but hope for the best. Should
the worst occur, it is better that we face
it now in a position of relative strength
and greater capability, rather than later,
when time and indifference might take
the same frightful course in regard to
national capabilities that they did in
other parts of the world when the will
to resist aggression wavered.
Because this proposal has engendered
a good deal of discussion since I first
advanced it on the floor of the Senate,
on February 17, 1965, I ask unanimous
consent to have printed in the RECORD
editorial comment on the proposal from
two Wyoming newspapers, as well as a
transcript of a radio interview by the
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. In the
latter, entitled "Washington Viewpoint,"
I was interviewed by Ann M. Corrick, As-
sistant Chief of WBC Washington news
bureau, and Pete Clapper, WBC corre-
spondent.
There being no objection, the edi-
torials and the interview were ordered
to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[From the Wyoming State Tribune,
Feb. 18, 1965]
AMEN-CALL THE REDS' HAND
One of the pleasures of living is the un-
expected: One never knows what might
happen next.
Today, we have been rocked to our Gold-
water-Miller buttons by a statement by Sen-
ator MCGEE, with whom we have quarreled
on many occasions, on the Vietnam
situation.
Differing with a group of Senate liberals,
Mr. MCGEE says this country ought to call
the hand of Red China and the Communists
"even if it means risking full-scale war."
Says the Senator from Wyoming: "If Red
China is prepared to go to war to expand
its sphere of influence and territory in south-
east Asia, we might as well find that out
right now, before it's too late."
This is the hottest war-hawk statement
we have seen since the Republicans in .1962
were crying for aggressive action against the
Russian meddling in Cuba; but it is one
that a lot of citizens will support.
McGEE says that, to negotiate now "is as
unthinkable as it was to negotiate when the
Communists threatened to take West Berlin
and Germany; when they attempted to take
Korea; when they attempted to make an
armed camp of Cuba."
"Our commitment in Vietnam is no less
than our commitments were and are in those
other areas of the globe," MCGEE says.
He also suggested that the United States
deliver an ultimatum to the Hanoi regime
"that would be every bit as serious and de-
liberate as the late President Kennedy's ulti-
matum to Russia during the Cuban crisis."
Furthermore, the United States should
serve notice it will no longer tolerate infil-
tration or military raids in Vietnam below
the 17th parallel; and that this should be
coupled with a reaffirmation that this coun-
try has no desire to intrude into North
Vietnam and no territorial ambitions in
Asia.
This was in direct contrast and opposition
to a statement issued by a group of other
Democratic Senators Including Senators
GEORGE MCGOVERN, of South Dakota, STEPHEN
YOUNG, of Ohio, and FRANK CHURCH, Of
Idaho, that this country ought to seek a
negotiated settlement in Vietnam.
It is in direct opposition to the stance ?pf
Oregon's WAYNE MORSE who long has ques-
tioned the fact that we are in Vietnam at
all. Mr. MORSE wants the United States out
of there.
3415
In fact, it even is a stronger statement
than one issued by the Republican leader-
ship yesterday, which was praised and ac-
cepted by two other Democratic Senators,
LONG, of Louisiana and LAUSCHE, of Ohio.
The Republican leaders, DIRKSEN, of Illinois
and FORD, of Michigan, said they support
President Johnson's action in ordering strikes
against the Communist supply bases in North
Vietnam.
But Mr. MCGEE would go even further. He
urges action which would, in effect, tell the
Red Chinese, "Put up or shut up."
Mr. MCGEE'S statements are the most ag-
gressive we have heard uttered on the Viet-
nam situation; if a certain person whose
initials are BMG had made such statements
a few months ago, the outcries against him
would have been even greater than they
were.
But we support the McGee thesis none-
theless. It is time to call the hand of the
Communists in Asia; in fact, it is long past
due.
This goes beyond what President Johnson
has said thus far, which is that we seek no
extension of the war there.
Mr. MCGEE suggests a deadline with the
Ho Chi Minh regime being warned that to
cross it will mean dire consequences. He
doesn't say what the consequences should
be but we should imagine the threat is one
of all-out retaliation.
Whatever this latter might be, the pro-
posal is to call the hands of the Red Chinese
as well as of all the Communists; and we
hope the Johnson administration will hear
and act.
We can no longer procrastinate, parley,
and persevere. Time is on the side of our
enemies.
[From the Laramie Daily Boomerang, Feb. 19,
1965]
TIME To CALL THE HAND
Vietnam is the key to southeast Asia.
That is the primary reason why the Commu-
nists are seeking to infiltrate the area and
take over control of the South Vietnam
Government. That is the reason the United
States is just as stubbornly trying to main-
tain its freedom.
There are three reasons why Vietnam oc-
cupies a position of importance in Asia. It
raises a surplus of rice in a part of the world
where hunger is an always present feature.
A Communist victory in South Vietnam
would flank a vital part of the Asian land
mass setting up other nations for conquest,
and third, if the Communists would win,
nations threatened by them could have no
future confidence in the United States.
The Vietcong has stepped up its efforts in
South Vietnam, reportedly on orders from
Hanoi in North Vietnam. For this reason
the United States and the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment have carried out retaliatory raids
into North Vietnam.
We're at war in Vietnam whether it's an
official or recognized war. The price in
American lives hasn't been as high as it has
been previously in other areas, but one life is
a high price to pay. That price is mounting
daily with the Vietcong carrying out raids
against American installations. Yet, how
can we say the price is too high if the effort
results in freedom?
We're not winning the war in Vietnam, but
then neither are the Communists.
The Vietcong is ahead at present because
of propaganda and partly because the will-
power of the American people isn't strong
enough. We fight in Vietnam against the
protests of many of our leaders. Many urge
negotiation, others suggest withdrawal.
We protest the seemingly lone defense of
the United States against the spread of com-
munism, but somewhere it has to be stopped.
Many say we should let Vietnam go, that it
is of no importance, but barring its im-
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CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -SENATE February '24
portance for the above-named reasons, it's
still another nation in the communistic plan
to take over more and more territory, and
with each country gained the Reds grow in
strength.
We believe that, our country is the best in
the world. We feel that we are the leader
in the free world, but if we are, then we have
to take the lead in defending that freedom.
Senator GALE MCGEE said. Wednesday that
the United States "should call the hand of
Red China and the Communists in South
Vietnam even if it means full scale war."
We've lived for several years under the
premise of peaceful coexistence with the
Communists, yet, all of that time the Com-
munists have had world designs, working
to infiltrate various countries as they did
in Cuba, taking over against the wishes of
the majority. These countries have fallen
from the ranks of the free. Others are en-
dangered. As long as we don't make a
stand the pattern will continue.
We must stop the Communists somewhere
if there is to be any justification for the term
"peaceful coexistence." If we don't do it in
Vietnam we lose the confidence of the rest
of the free world, and it's unlikely we'll
have the guts to stop them some place in
some future time. If we do stop them
here and hold the line, then it could mean
an end to future communistic encroach-
ment.
Senator MCGEE called the shot, and we
think that we, as a free nation, must go
along with that call if we hope to preserve
our freedom for our children.
WASHINGTON VIEWPOINT
Miss CoRRICx. Good evening. This is Ann
Corrick with Pete Clapper in the Senate
Radio-Television Gallery on Capitol Hill,
Our guest on Washington Viewpoint this
evening is Democratic Senator GALE McGEE,
of Wyoming, a former university history
professor, who was reelected last November
to his second term in "the Senate. Sen-
ator McGEE is a member of the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee, Commerce, and the
Post Office and Civil Service Committees.
Senator, a full-scale great debate appears
to be developing In the Senate over Vietnam
and the Communist influence in southeast
Asia. For your part, you have said we should
call the hand of Red China and the Commu-
nists even if it means risking full-scale war.
Red China already has exploded one nuclear
device and the State Department says it has
reason to believe she will touch off another
one any day. Doesn't that mean that a full-
scale war means nuclear war? And isn't
that too high a price to pay to save a country
that doesn't appear to have the determina-
tion to save itself?
Senator MCGEE. Well, you ask a very deep
question and a very long question, in terms
at least of the reply. First, the stakes are
high in Vietnam. I view Vietnam as the
last in a link of crisis areas that have to be
stabilized before the world is fully bal-
anced-its stability restored in the wake of
the last World War. You can draw a line
now from Finland all the way across Eastern
:Europe and across northern Greece and Tur-
key and Pakistan and India to the China
Sea, and that line is not crossed recklessly
by either side, until you get the southeast
.Asia, The world will not be back in balance
until that line is drawn firmly. If we don't
draw it firmly, southeast Asia goes to the
Chinese or Communists. That is enough
and its resources to unbalance the world. So
what I'm saying is that the same price we
risked at Berlin, that we risked in Greece,
which was all-out war, if they wanted to go
that far, that we risked in Korea, has to be
risked in Vietnam. I believe that this a
probing action that's going on there, the
same as it was in the other areas of the globe.
They're testing us out, but we have to assume
the worst, and hope for the best. And that
was the reason for my reference, that if they
chose this to be the occasion for war, that
would be their choice-better we learn it
now rather than discover it piecemeal much
later under less favorable circumstances.
Miss CosaIcK. Do you really believe that at
this stage in the game and considering the
alliance with Hanoi and Peiping and Moscow,
that the Communists will back down simply
if we issue an ultimatum.
Senator McGEE. Oh, I don't know. Only
they can answer that. First, I don't think
that Hanoi is too comfortable with the pro-
spect of China moving in. I think Hanoi
worries as much about Peiping as do the rest
of the countries in southeast Asia. Secondly,
I don't believe that the Russians relish China
dominating this large and fruitful area of
the world to the exclusion of the Russians.
Therefore, there are some inhibiting factors
present. The other is that they alone can
decide whether a showdown in Vietnam is
worth risking their current emerging econ-
omy. China doesn't have nuclear capabili-
ties, won't have for some time to come. She
has exploded nuclear devices. Her cities are
vulnerable. Her industry has not yet really
gotten off the ground. If this is what she's
ready to risk now in an all out war, that's
for her to decide. I would doubt that she
would, but if she does, it's better we know
that now when we have every measurable
advantage of striking capability than to dis-
cover it as we discovered it with Mr. Hitler
in Czechoslovakia and then in Poland, where
we surrendered to an aggressor one step at
a time. I think that it's imperative to force
a showdown.
Miss CORRICu. If we should force a show-
down, which side would Russia go on?
Senator MCGEE. My guess is that Russia
would probably applaud any kind of an open
conflict between the Chinese and the Ameri-
cans. It gives Russia a free hand.
Miss CoRRICK. You mean she'd stay out?
Senator MCGEE. I think that she would
stay out, as she did in the Far East in World
War II until it could be determined what
the shape of it was going to be. It's to her
advantage. There are three giants in the
world-two real giants-Russia and the Unit-
ed States. China is only a budding giant, a
long way from arriving yet. And I think
that the Soviets would not get directly in-
volved, would not find it desirable to do so, or
fruitful to do so. Every advantage would ac-
crue to them not to do so. There's no
friendship of any substantive sort between
Peiping and Moscow. Historically there's
never been. There's not about to be now.
And I think from the Soviet point of view,
there would be no reason for involvement
there. They're not deeply involved in south-
east Asia even at this time. This has been
largely a Chinese affair.
Miss CoRRIcx. They're not supplying aid to
the Vietcong?
Senator MCGEE. No. They haven't been
involved there in any way as a matter of fact.
This has been pretty much preempted by
China. They're making noises now, but
that's, I think, for propaganda purposes in
the Communist world, rather than for any
realistic purpose in our own world.
Miss CoRRicie. Pete Clapper.
Mr. CLAPPER. Senator MCGEE, there has
been a good deal of concern expressed on
the Senate floor, but not many positive pro-
posals for what to do about South Vietnam.
And you have a plan of action. What is it?
Senator MCGEE. Well, the first plan of
action, in my judgment, is that we dare not
negotiate right now. I think we've got to
be sure that we don't do the wrong thing.
I think it would be a mistake to seek negotia-
tions right now. And that's important.
And that's been the real nub of the debates
in the Senate this past week. There's been
a drive on by some of the very excellent
Senators to demand negotiations at this
time. The reason I say this is not the time is
that we have reason to known that Hanoi and
Peiping both are convinced we're going to
get out of there; if not this week, next year.
And that time is on their side. There-
fore, they're not interested in negotiating in
realistic terms.
The noises that are being made on the
floor of the Senate, the protestations that are
being made in some portions of the press,
all are taken 10,000 miles away as indications
that America is beginning to waiver in its
position in southeast Asia, and therefore, if
we were to approach now on negotiation,
after these airstrikes that they have just
made on our airfields and our billets and
other installations in South Vietnam, it could
only, and would only be interpreted by them
as leading from weakness. Now you and I
know that we're going to stay. The American
President has made it clear that we're going
to stay. But what we know is irrelevant.
What the Communists think is what really
counts because that's what motivates them.
And they're confident, even as illustrated in
the conservations that Edgar Snow had not
very long ago with Mr. Mao, that we're going
to be out of there in a measurable period of
time. That's why we dare not negotiate now.
So I propose that we serve an ultimatum on
North Vietnam which says that the infiltra-
tion of northern troops across the 17th
parallel must stop at once, and give them a
chance to stop-x number of days. If they
continue to cross the line, then we tell
them-we will have warned them-we bomb
every bona fide military installation-that
means, every encampment, every barracks,
every airfield, that sort of thing, in North
Vietnam. If they still think that's a joke,
that it's only bluff, then after the passage of
a specified number of preannounced days,
we then would bomb all of the logistical fa-
cilities-the bridges, the highways, the rail-
roads. And if this still hasn't communicated
in a language that they alone seem to under-
stand when the chips are down, then we
should announce that we will bomb the in-
dustrial centers. That would be the planned,
announced, and scheduled acceleration of the
war. The purpose would be, not to spread
the war, but to write in strong, unadulter-
ated terms, our intentions to stay there. I
think this would have a great advantage in
clearing the air and getting through to both
Hanoi and Peiping. We should accompany
this ultimatum with a very clear statement
again that we don't want their country, we
don't want, their government, we have no
territorial ambitions in Asia, but we do in-
tend to kep them north of the 17th parallel,
and nothing below the 17th is negotiable. I
think those are the terms in which we ought
to speak, and that does raise the question
whether Hanoi would accept it or not. May-
be they won't. I think this will hurt Hanoi
enough that they would have to,-but it leads
us inescapably, then would China decide that
she had to go into the war. And I think it's
timewe know the answer to that question.
Mr. CLAPPER. Senator McGEE, two practical
questions: Do you think that our side could
tell If the infiltration is coming to an end
at x number of days? Is this possible in that
jungle?
Senator MCGEE. Yes. I think without be-
traying any classified information, we know
who comes across, where they cross, where
they came- from in crossing, where they go
after they've gotten across. Our intelligence
there is not without some real strength.
Mr. CLAPPER. OK. The next question is,
Do you think that bombing would be enough?
This is a backward country, this North Viet-
nam. Does bombing really knock anything
worthwhile out?
Senator MCGEE. Bombing doesn't knock
armies out.
Mr. CLAPPER. That is right.
Senator MCGEE. But bombing knocks out a
warwaging capability. Because the troops
that are coming into South Vietnamnow are
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3417
highly trained, skilled troops. These are not freedom. And I think that's why we have that people might start calling you a war-
the in guerrillas that we've been talking to draw this firm line, monger?
about for several years over there. These are Miss CoRRICK. Doesn't South Vietnam It- Senator McGEE. Oh, they already have
highly skilled, highly trained, imported guer- self present a problem in reaching any sort started. I suppose I'm one of the strangest
rilla fighters. And by destroying their bases, of a solution to this problem? It keeps ones to be talking this language, being
you're going to at once cut down their source changing its government. If we should have dubbed on most questions a liberal and all
of supply. They'll still be over in there. You negotiations, the, South Vietnam Govern- that, but I likewise would like to be realistic.
will not have thrown them out of the south, ment might change overnight. Who would And the risk that we have there in Vietnam
But out' first task, it seems to me is to do want to negotiate with- right now is exactly the risk we took in Ber-
two things--cut off that supply and commu- Senator McGRE. The basis of a negotiation, lin, exactly the same risk. That was, to call
nicate the message. It would be very difficult in my judgment, would first be that there the Russian hand. It's the risk we took in
for Hanoi to continue any protracted cam- will be no further depredations across the Cuba. We didn't know the Russians would
paign except on the isolated guerrilla basis. 17th parallel. They would center around back down. We hoped they might. But we
And this Is the real issue at stake here. Win- the terms under which we would police such pledged all-out nuclear war if necessary,
ning the guerrilla combat is, quite another a firm line. That would then stabilize, the backing up our firm line beyond which we
problem. That's another question. But we situation, much as it did the 38th parallel would not retreat.
want to make sure that Hanoi understands in Korea. That's not the most desirable We did it in Greece-this same commit-
that by carrying this along in a delaying way settlement in the world, but it's a pretty ment was made. And I say this is the one
is not going to cause the Americans to pull fair substitute to all of the bloodletting that language that these fellows can understand
out or to get tired and go home. was going on up there. We've learned to In the critical areas, and this is a critical
Mr. CLAPPER. Senator MCGEE, you touched live with two Koreas, two Berlins, two Ger- area.
on something a little while ago that fas- manys, two Chinas. I think we could learn Miss CORRICK. But you know, now today
clnates me. Do you feel that the Senators to live with two Vietnams. And I think that we've got these terrible weapons of destruc-
who are now urging negotiations might, in the conditions in South Vietnam and around tion-the hydrogen bomb, the nuclear
fact, be giving the wrong signal to the Com- Saigon are secondary in this case. The pri- bombs. We didn't have those in 1947.
munists and thus might be doing a disservice mary consideration is to prevent the break- Senator MCGEE. We bad them in 1962 when
to our country? through from the north. The basic con- the showdown in Cuba came, and the show-
Senator MCGEE. Well, I think that. these sideration is to rebalance this section of the down in Cuba was: Do you want the big war?
Senators making these speeches are doing a world. Having done that, what happens to That was the ultimatum. It's language that
great service to our own people.., I think the future of economic development, and you've got to be prepared to use and back
this.question should have been out in the the political maturing of South Vietnam, up, not bluff, over the critical points around
open and being debated in these hard terms are secondary Issues, which we have an in- the world. And I classify those critical
long ago. That has been one of our blind terest in only as people who wish well for points as the equivalent of Berlin or Ger-
spots. I do think that the Communists will all nations, but it should not become a point many, as the southeastern part of Europe-
misread and misinterpret these remarks. of dictation by us. We can't make little the eastern Mediterranean-and as south-
And to that extent, it is unfortunate. It Is democrats out of those people. We can't eastern Asia. The wealth, the resources, as
even dangerous. But nonetheless, I am not make little Americans out of them. And well as the people-not to mention the peo-
one of those that thinks that you ought to whatever they can put together in the way ple-constitute an empire that can affect the
shut up debate on a great question such as of their own independent government is their rebalancing of the world. Japan was will-
this. I think that is one of the risks that business. And I think our only interest is ing to wage World War II to get it. Britain
.we have to take now for not having made it in that one word "independent." We could waged a war to get it. France waged a war
clear earlier that we are there really to stay. care less what type. They're not going to to get It. The Dutch did. The Portuguese
Mr. CLAPPER. Senator, one last question on get democracy in that part of the world for did. In all history this has been one of the
this general area, Have you discussed your a hundred years or 50 years. It take a long great balancing contingents in this thing we
proposals with the White House yet? time. We've been working at it nearly 200, ca11 the balance of power. I think that the
Senator MCGEE. I have sent the proposals and we still haven't quite arrived in the true Chinese and the Russians fit into a category
to the White House. democratic concept. I draw the parallel very that Lord Palmerston once described best of
Miss CoRRIcK. Senator MCGEE, if we should often with Greece. In-Greece we plunged all when he said: "They will continually
reach the point where negotiation would be in in 1946 and 1947 because of the Commu- probe outward along their peripheries seek-
possible and honorable, whom would be nego- nist threat to the north, and we had to ing weakness; finding weakness they'll break
tiate with? back the wrong guys in Greece for a while through and grab it, but finding resistance,
Senator MCGEE. There is no one to nego- in order to win the first round; namely, to they pull away." And I think this is a
tiate with if Hanoi and Peping won't nego- keep the Communists out so that there would probing action in southeast Asia. And I
tiate. Again, negotiations are at least bi- be time for Greece to become more demo- think that's the reason a line has to be
lateral and preferably multilateral. This cratic and more economically viable. And drawn. If it's the issue for a war, then I
could include third powers, at least in initi- I think the parallel is not without its point say that we've got to know that now rather
acing the negotiations. We would negotiate in Vietnam. than discover it several years after Munich.
such negotiations depending upon the Mr. CLAPPER. Senator MCGEE, does it con- Mr. CLAPPER. Senator MCGEE, you're a
agenda that would be agreed upon. It might cern you at all that the motive of some Democrat. Do you think that President
be limited between Hanoi and the Vietna- Pentagon war hawks in possibly bombing Johnson has said enough-has told the
mese, with us as participants in the discus- North Vietnam might be an escalation of the American people enough about this war in
sions. But it would almost certainly have war aimed ultimately at destroying the Red Vietnam?
to include spokesmen, unofficially at least, Chinese nuclear plants? Senator MCGEE. I think all of us have failed
from Peiping. Anyone that pretends that Senator MCGEE. Yes. That concerns me a to tell the people enough about the war in
we can isolate this whole question as though great deal. I don't happen to believe that Vietnam. We've talked too much about eco-
Peiping didn't exist is just playing a little' this at any time ought to be one of our nomic reforms, and land reforms and the
game of fairy tales, and you've got to be motivations, one of our targets, of bringing dreams of working toward democratic gov-
realistic about it. Peiping is there and it's it to a head for that reason. I would bring the well-being of these people, of ions, g our u fish ht permit e l-
ea about to about t. Peiping
ime to
and it's there in a very it to a head only as the last recourse by be-
sinister way. ing realistic. I think that there are enough talk about the harsh realities of power r p ol
Miss CORRICK. If we get Red China to the inhibiting ,circumstances present in Hanoi tics. And before you can really raise the
conference table, wouldn't that be de facto to lead us to believe that a firm and Con-
recognition of Red China, which we have trolled escalation will bring about a realistic the wake of any war, the world balance of
denied up to this point? willingness to talk. Only If that fails must power. It's doing that that is really the
Senator MCGEE. This would be de facto we then be prepared for the worst. But I extension of the war itself, and who wins
recognition of a crisis that we're willing to think that puts it clear down the list, that phase is going to have a pretty strong
talk about. whereas the suggestion that you just made, hand in the shape of the world to come.
Miss CORRICK. Wouldn't that lead to Red Pete, would indicate that there are those And so what we've been waging is a fight ever
since clear China's admission into the U.N.? manipulating it in that direction as the pri- chance t to o have e a voice down to in the the present shape for a
mary objective. And I would reject that. v sshhape of the
Senator MCGEE. It wouldn't lead to that. world to come. And people sometimes get
But It would be talking with the Chinese. Mr. CLAPPER. What's your own feeling impatient and think that what we're doing
We've already talked to the Red Chinese. about destroying those Red Chinese nuclear is trying to arrive at peace. We haven't won
We've talked to Red Chinese in Czechoslo- plants? Should we? the chance to shape the peace yet, as I see it.
cakia. We've talked to the Red Chinese in Senator MCGEE. Well, only if the Chinese We're still fighting for that chance.
Geneva-that is, with their spokesmen. And were to make the decision that-this was Mr. CLAPPER. Senator, shouldn't the Presi-
as President Kennedy once said, we must worth an all-out commitment of 2% million dent call a spade a spade the way you just
never be afraid to talk with ali_ybody. And trained Chinese military. If they are willing have? Don't you think he should?
I mean anybody.. We must always be will- to commit that to this real estate in south- Senator MCGEE. I think he has done that
ing to negotiate freely, was his actual phrase, east Asia, then I think the answer Is yes. In the last several weeks. I think he's laid
but we should never be willing to negotiate Miss CoRRIcK.,Aren',t you worried, Senator, the cards on the table for us, but this has
1..
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 24
to be done again and again and again, in
order to get the idea fully understood around
the country. You just don't say something
once. It's been a long time coming. But I
think it ought to be phrased in these terms
bluntly. And I think while the people may
not like it, I think our people would rather
know it as the truth or the direction things
are going, and they rise to the occasion.
Miss CoaRIcx. Do you think the President
is 'firmly convinced in his own mind of a
policy-tactics and objectives in southeast
Asia?
Senator McGEE. I think he is, yes. I think
that he understands this question better
than any of us as a matter of fact. And
when it really comes down to the final fate-
ful moment, he and he alone has all the
facts at his fingertips and only he can
make the decision. And I'm confident that
he has these, that he knows these, and that's
the reason I think we should take this strong
stand and 'support the position that he is
beginning to make very clear.
Miss CORRICK. Thank you, Senator McGEE.
I'm sorry we have to bring our discussion to
a close, but our time is up. Our guest on
"Washington Viewpoint" this evening has
been Democratic Senator GALE McGEE, of
Wyoming. This is Ann Corrick With Pete
Clapper in the Senate radio-television gallery
on Capitol Hill.
Wyoming has great geysers
That rise so very high,
They seem to reach the sky.
I think it is in order to brag and boast.
For the geyser known
From coast to coast
Old Faithful is the one,
To bring endless pleasure and lots of fun.
OUR 44TH STATE
(By Lucille Storen)
In this year of its diamond jubilee,
The State of Wyoming looks back,
A glorious page in our country's history
It presents; not much does it lack.
The Wyoming rodeo, known far and wide;
Its Indians, Cheyenne and Crow;
The legendary cowboys, saddles and rawhide;
This State, to all seekers, will show.
A State in 1890, yes, Wyoming is there,
Forty-fourth is its star in our flag,
We know it wouldn't be fair to say
It ever dishonored that flag.
Wyoming, Wyoming, pride of our land,
To us you will always be
A loyal State, a great State, beautiful and
grand.
Spectacular, amazing, Ohl We all agree.
TREASURE STATE
(By John Krantz)
Wyoming! Wyoming!
Your treasure is great.
Some are hot springs, geysers,
Yellowstone National too.
Wyoming, Wyoming,
It is your diamond jubilee.
The Green River rendezvous,
Could only be for you.
Wyoming! Wyoming!
People trot your land of late
So we the pupils of New York State
Give you a hand=and congratulate.
A SISTER STATE
(By Wanda Kowalski)
In eighteen hundred ninety
This land became a State
And nature blessed it greatly -
With forest, cattle, and bait
You recognize this place too
Where resources abound
Wyoming, peopled with races two
Has a wonderful heritage all around.
With equality a password
And freedom so common a thing
This State truly must be rated well
So its praises must New Yorkers sing.
POEMS ON WYOMING'S 75TH
-ANNIVERSARY
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, as I have
pointed out previously, the year 1965 is
a landmark year for the State of Wyo-
ming. Wyoming-the Equality State-
this year marks its 75th anniversary of
statehood, and will do so formally at
ceremonies in Cheyenne on July 10.
Evidence that the people of the United
States are not only aware of Wyoming's
diamond jubilee, but also will aid Wyo-
mingites everywhere in marking the an-
niversary is certainly welcome. Such
evidence has come to me from Andrea
DeMaio, of the Holy Family Civics Club,
in the Bronx, New York City. She en-
closed some poetry composed by mem-
bers of the club in honor of Wyoming's
diamond jubilee. In behalf of all Wyo-
ming citizens, I express my thanks to the
club and to its moderator, Sister Joan
of Are, for their interest in a sister State.
I ask unanimous consent that the
poems be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the poems
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
EAST GREETS WEST
(By Carole Lochard)
Wyoming, our sister State of diamond jubilee
boast
Greetings from New York, and to you our
birthday toast.
We hope your mighty forests continue to
thrive and grow
And grasslands furnish health and hoe.
May your rivers and valleys flow, run, and
blend,
Your canyons and your mountains your
mightiness contend,
May you always, clear sister, enjoy birthdays
evermore,
Happy 75th birthday from the Bronx in New
York State.
WYOMING CELEBRATES
(By Beth Campbell)
Wyoming is the home
Of majestic Yellowstone.
It is the land in which not too long ago
Were found Indians and buffalo.
COME TO THE JUBILEE
(By Eileen Tils)
Wyoming land of beauty and grace
Whose heritage is great.
Became our 44th State
July 10, 1890, is the date.
Now this year Wyomingites celebrate
Their diamond jubilee.
All their festivities you can see
If you go to Wyoming State.
People will come from everywhere
To see the beauty of their fair.
Indian girls of 70 tribes
Miss Indian American to try.
Adventure will head the show.
With a great big race, you know,
If you want adventure and fun,
To Wyoming you must come.
All visitors stop and stare
At Old Faithful still there.
New York, go to Wyoming, take a dare
You might find yourself staying there.
INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the unfin-
ished business be laid before the Senate
and made the pending business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will state the bill by title.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R.
45) to amend the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank Act to authorize the United
States to participate in an increase in the
resources of the Fund for Special Opera-
tions of the Inter-American Development
Bank.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
There being no objection, the Senate
resumed the consideration of the bill.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is
there an amendment pending?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
pending amendment is the amendment
of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAuscsni).
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator will state it.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Am I correct in my
understanding that my amendment, No.
42, is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the
pending amendment, if adopted, would
prevent the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank from floating in the United
States any bond issues which by the
natural impact of such flotation would
take American dollars out of our coun--
try and put them into foreign countries.
The question may well be asked as to
why I have proposed that if and when
more money is subscribed to the Inter-
American Development Bank, we should
prohibit the bank from selling bonds in
the United States, if and when it deter-
mines to procure more money for its
operations. That question is quite perti-
nent, and, of course, it must be answered.
Yesterday I made the statement that
last week there was before the Senate a
bill dealing with gold. We discussed the
perilous position in which we find our-
selves because of the constant movement
of gold out of the country.
In the face of those arguments, but
having hanging over us another threat,
which was of greater consequence, we de-
cided to remove the 25-percent gold
coverage on deposits which the member
banks of the Federal Reserve System
have in their Federal Reserve banks.
WYOMING Now "
(By Rita Moore)
Where the Indians used to roam
Is where some had to make their home
They couldn't resist canyons and parks,
The State where geysers still can spark.
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1965
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have no objec-
tion. I would rather consider some fur-
ther restrictions on tourism, because it
would be much better for a year or two
for Americans to take a look at their own
country. But that is not the issue before
us. I do not believe that this is the
vehicle to solve our problem. We have a
bill involving $750 million for a period
of 3 years, and I would hope that we
can dispose of that. All the other good
ideas for improvements we can leave for
some other vehicle.
Mr. HARTKE. I see a basic incon-
sistency with what the Senator has
pointed out. We cannot. take the bal-
ance-of-payments problem and be on
one side of the situation one moment
and on the other sido the next moment.
We should adopt a policy which should
apply universally throughout the Gov-
ernment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not believe
that the President, even though he is
concerned about the balance of pay-
ments-as we all are-believes this to
be so important that our foreign policy-
every activity that we have-will be sub-
ject to that one consideration. I do not
believe it is quite that critical. It may
become such. If the program that the
President suggests does not work as effi-
ciently as he would like it to work, I am
sure he would be prepared to come in
,with stronger controls until we do work
out a balance.
I am sure that 'if it continues, tourism
can be restricted in more direct ways. I
notice in this morning's newspapers that
Secretary Udall and others have been
trying to persuade Americans to travel
in the United States for a year or two,
to look at our own country. This is a
healthy way of approaching the prob-
lem. It will not work if people insist on
going to Monte Carlo to be fleeced in-
stead of going to Las Vegas to be fleeced.
If they continue to go to Monte Carlo
we may have to 'put some restrictions on
their travel abroad. However, I believe
they may be content to be fleeced in Las
Vegas, rather than in Monte Carlo, for a
year or two, at least, and then, if we are
in a better position, they can go over
there again.
At any rate, we have a specific prob-
lem before us, and that is whether
we wish to participate in carry-
ing out an agreement which has been
entered with all the members of the
Bank over a period of many months. We
can either take it or not. Of course,
Congress is at liberty to reject it if it
wishes to reject it. At any rate, I do not
believe we should issue congressional di-
rectives that are not to the, point. We
have a way of reaching the issue properly
if we wish to do it through putting on a
tax which would make it unattractive to
float such bonds in this country.,
Mr. LA J CHE. Mr. President, I shall
be very brief. We are not telling the
International Development Bank what to
do. It wants $750 million of our money,
at the rate, of $250 million a year. We
are, in effect, saying, if my amendment
is adopted, "We will allow you to have
.,that money, , but you must remember
that we hve a balance-of-payments
'problem, and therefore if in the future
you should decide to sell bonds, you must
agree not to sell them in the United
States."
The manager of the bill has argued
that our Government through the Sec-
retary might be able to handle it with-
out my amendment.
To that statement I give the answer
that from 1962 to 1964, at a time when
our balance-of-payments situation was
growing worse, $225 million worth of
bonds were sold in the United States.
Those dollars paid ' by our private in-
vestors for bonds of the Inter-American
Development Bank are not tied into the
purchase of U.S. goods. They can be
used to buy goods wherever the recipient
country desires to buy them.
It is argued that we should enact a
law which would increase the interest
equalization tax rate. That has not
worked. I would not be at all surprised
to have a new request made of us.
To the Senator from Indiana I should
like to say that our balance-of-payments
problem, as described by the Senator
from Arkansas, does grow from a number
of causes. One is'the presence of Amer-
lean troops in foreign countries, where
they spend our dollars. The second, to
a substantial degree, is the large number
of American tourists who are spending
dollars in foreign countries, and the
small number of foreign tourists who are
coming to the United States to spend
their dollars here. The third is the in-
vestments which American business is
making directly in building factories
around the world. The fourth-and
not in a minor degree, but in a substan-
tial degree-is the American dollars that
are buying foreign bonds.
There may be other causes, but these
are the primary ones. All of them con-
tribute to create the grave problem that
is facing us.
All I wish to do is to start effectively.
Secretary Udall has asked the people of
the United States to travel in America.
President Kennedy asked the people to
do the same thing in 1963. The Com-
merce Department set up a program to
encourage travel in America. These
efforts did not work. There was not
much response to it. My belief is that
it did not work because the people were
not conscious of the grave problems con-
fronting us.
The Senator from Arkansas speaks of
solving the problem in some wishful way.
He says, "Let us speak with sweet words;
let us appeal, and it will be solved."
My proposal is to write it into the law
and say to the Bank "We will make this
money available to you in the amount
that is suggested, but all we want is that
you, the Bank, will not further aggravate
our balance-of-payments problem by
selling new issues of bonds in the United
States."
The Senator from Arkansas admits
that our interest rates are low. In Eng-
land, as I pointed out earlier, the interest
rate is 7 percent for loans. When these
20 countries assemble and decide to sell
bonds, the normal impulse will be to sell
them in the market that charges the low-
est ,rate of interest. Where is that? It
is in the United States.. Therefore I re-
34.?
spectfully suggest that we should not try
to wish ourselves out of'. this task and
problem that confronts us and that we
had better start taking affirmative action.
Adopting my amendment is one way of
doing it.
Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and
nays on my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
a sufficient second? The report is not
sufficiently seconded.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceed to call the
roll.
Mr. LO14G of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I ask for the
yeas and nays on the pending amend-
ment.
Theyeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KEN-
NEDY of New York in the chair). The
question is on agreeing to amendment
No. 42, offered by the Senator from Ohio
[Mr. LAUscHE]. The yeas and nays have
been ordered, and the clerk will call the
roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce
that the Senator from Indiana [Mr.
BAYHI, the 'Senator from Minnesota
[Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from
Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator
from Wisconsin [Mr. NELSON], the Sena-
tor from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER], the
Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RAN-
DOLPH], the Senator from Florida [Mr.
SMATHERS], and the Senator from New
Jersey [Mr. WILLIAMS]. are absent on
official business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] is absent because
of illness.
I further announce that the Senator
from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON],
the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr.
PASTORE], and the Senator from-Mary-
land [Mr. TYDINCS] are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Montana
[Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Rhode
Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from
West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], and the
Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS]
would each vote "nay."
Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the
Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON]
and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICK-
ENLOOPER] are absent on official business
to attend meetings of the British-
American Interparliamentary Group.
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr.
COOPER] is necessarily absent.
The Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRK-
SEN] is absent because of illness.
The Senator from Nebraska [Mr.
HRUSKA] is absent on official business.
The Senator from Vermont [Mr.
PROUTY] is absent by leave of the Senate
because of illness in his family.
,The Senator from Delaware [Mr.
BOGGS] is detained on official business.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE February 24
If present and voting, the Senator
from Vermont [Mr. PROUTY] would vote
"yea."
On this vote, the Senator from
Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKAl is paired with
the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Boccs].
If present and voting, the Senator from
Nebrajka would vote "yea" and the Sen-
ator from Delaware would vote "nay."
The result was announced-yeas 35,
nays 46, as follows:
[No. 25 Leg.]
YEAS--35
Allott
Fong
Pearson
Bennett
Gore
Robertson
Bible
Grueniug
Simpson
Burdick
Hartke
Stennis
Byrd, Va.
Jordan, N.C.
Symington
Cotton
Jordan, Idaho
Talmadge
Curtis
Lausche
Thurmond
Dominick
McClellan
Tower
Eastland
Miller
Williams, Del.
Ellender
Morse
Young, N. Dak.
Ervin
Mundt
Young, Ohio
Fannin
Murphy
NAYS--46
Aiken
Hill
Mondale
Anderson
Holland
Monroney
Bartlett
Inouye
Montoya
Bass
Jackson
Morton
Brewster
Javits
Moss
Byrd, W. Va.
Kennedy, Mass. Muskie
Cannon
Kennedy, N.Y. Pell
Case
Kuchel Proxmire
Church
Long, Mo. Ribicoff
Clark
Long, La. Saltonstall
Dodd
Magnuson Scott
Douglas
Mansfield Smith
Fulbright
McGee Sparkman
Harris
McGovern Yarborough
Hart
McIntyre
Hayden
McNamara
NOT VOTING-la
Bayh
Johnston
Randolph
Boggs
McCarthy
Russell
Carlson
Metcalf
Smathers
Cooper
Nelson
Tydings
Dirksen
Neuberger
Williams, N.J.
Hickenlooper
Pastore
Hruska
Prouty
So Mr.
LAUSCHE's amendment was
rejected.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
should like to inquire if It is possible
to obtain an agreement to vote on the
amendments and on the final passage
of the bill.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I believe
I can answer the Senator from Arkan-
sas. The answer is "No."
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator
not agree to any kind of agreement?
Mr. MORSE. None: at all.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. At any time?
Mr. MORSE. At any time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator
from Oregon indicate, for the informa-
tion of the Senator in charge the bill,
whether he objects to a voteo,today or
tomorrow?
Mr. MORSE. Let the debate run its
course. I doubt whether there can be
a vote today or tomorrow.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator
doubts it?
,Mr. MORSE. I doubt its
AT.JANZA, POR PROGRESO NEEDS SUPPORT TO FUR-
THER DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
neighbors, be they nations or individ-
uals, inevitably find that mutual advan-
tage lies along the path of good rela-
tions. We are neighbors with all the
nations on earth, because we inhabit the
same planet. But, both historically and
geographically, we bear a special rela-
tionship to our neighbors to the south.
today, the Latin American nations of
this hemisphere face a great challenge.
Social, political, and economic change
must, of necessity, be brought about.
The question impatiently awaiting an-
swer is this: Will the change be evolu-
tionary or revolutionary?
The Alliance for Progress has been
advanced as our primary offering to
meet the challenge, by evolutionary
steps. We in Congress have the duty
to do everything we can to enable the
Alliance to succeed in its work.
The people of Texas feel a particularly
close friendship for our Latin American
neighbors. Texas was once a part of
Mexico; we still share a long border with
our good friends to the south. The cul-
ture of Texas reflects the influence of
our unique Mexican past,and Is one of
our irreplaceable treasures. Fifteen per-
cent of all Texans, more than 11/2 million
people, have Spanish surnames.
Mr. President, I state categorically my
support of the aims of the Alliance for
Progress. Thus far, the program has not
lived up to the expectations of many;
but perhaps some of those expectations
were unrealistic. It would be difficult to
imagine a more difficult goal than that to
which the Alliance is dedicated: Wide-
spread, rapid, evolutionary-rather than
revolutionary-social change.
The Alianza pare el Progreso has taken a
giant leap forward. In terms of where it has
to go, it has taken only a short, faltering
step.
These words were written in 1963 by
the then, SenatorHUBERT H. HUMPHREY.
They still serve to describe the Alliance's
accomplishments. Hundreds of thou-
sands of housing units have been built.
But the need is for over 10 million.
Classrooms have been built, and the
number of persons in Latin America who
can read and write is at an alltime high;
but 54 percent of the population is still
illiterate.
Experience has taught us that the con-
ditions of extreme poverty and inequality
of opportunity which exist throughout
so much of Latin America are breeding
grounds for the Communist line which
preaches economic advancement, but
which results in shackles of totalitarian
control. Thus far, Castro has not suc-
ceeded in getting any other nation to fol-
low his example. But if the values of
Western civilization are to shape the
future of Latin America, then it is im-
perative that, at this crucial stage in the
development of this hemisphere, we show
what can be accomplished by a free peo-
ple in a democratic society. More houses
and more schools must be built. Agri-
cultural and industrial production must
be stepped up. Land reform is needed.
The barriers to social and economic
justice must be blasted away. At the
same time, attention must be paid to the
unrest and the insecurity which arise
during times of rapid social change. We
must show the people of Latin America
that the future belongs to those with the
on to see that man's fulfillment comes
not only from material accomplishment,
but also from a realization of the nature
of the human spirit; that man is more
than an animal, more than a mouth to
be fed, more than a number in a statis-
tician's notebook.
The pending bill, which authorizes a
$750 million increase in the U.S. contri-
bution to the Fund for Special Opera-
tions of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, and which permits the
merger of the PSO with the Social Prog-
ress Trust Fund, can bring us one step
farther down the long road to a stable,
democratic Latin America.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thy
Senator from Alaska is recognized.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I
yield to the senior Senator from Oregon
with the understanding that I may have
the floor after he speaks.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator will state it.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, What is
the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
is open to amendment.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I offer
the amendment which I send to the destc
and ask to have stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will state the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
At the end of the bill strike out the quota-
tion marks and add the following new para-
graph :
"(c) The contribution of the United States
under this section shall be made upon con-
dition that at least 50 per centum of the
aggregate amount of loans made from such
contribution shall be repayable in United
States dollars."
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Alaska yield for a question.?
Mr. GRUENING. I yield.
Mr. MORSE. How long does the Sen-
ator intend to speak?
Mr. GRUENING. Approximately 12
minutes.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I often
find myself in my present predicament.
I am trying to operate an education dem-
onstration. I see that the senior Seri-
ator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], a great
teacher, is present in the Chamber. He
ought to be here with me. The delri-
onstration is employing the use of audio-
visual techniques from Chicago, and a
group of sixth grade youngsters.
I am sorry that the Presiding Officer
cannot be with me. He has heard me
discuss this question in the committee.
I shall leave the floor to attend as
much as I can of the demonstration. I'
would not be surprised if the Senator
from Alaska were asked some questions.
May I have a gentleman's understand-
ing with the Senator from Alaska that
when he finishes his speech, he will ask
for a quorum call and protect me with
respect to any unanimous-consent agree-
ment relating to limiting debate on this
bill?
MT. GRUENING. I will.
HE MESS IN VIETNAM-IV
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, day
by day, events in South Vietnam are
making the United States look evermore
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1965
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
ridiculous in the eyes of the rest of the
world.
If almost every edition of the news-
papers did not carry reports of more
American fighting men being killed and
wounded in a bloody, senseless war in the
swamps of South Vietnam, the political
and, military situation there would be
huorous-indeed farcical-if it were
not so tragic.
What is our excuse _for being in South
Vietnam fighting an undeclared war?
Because, answers our Government, we
were asked for assistance in resisting
Communist aggression by the free, demo-
cratic Government of South Vietnam.
What government? Yesterday's? To-
day's? Tomorrow's?
Why were we given the signal honor of
having our fighting men killed in the
swamps of South Vietnam? .
3433
imminent. To send hundreds of thousands
of Americans into an endless jungle war or
to bomb North Vietnamese ports and indus-
trial centers on a saturation basis would be
a surer road to global holocaust than to a
"victory" arms can never win for either side.
As Mr. James Reston stated in his col-
umn in the New York Times on the same
day:
But most of the people in Washington, in-
cluding President Johnson, are neither
hawks nor doves but something in between,
who want to find an honorable way out of
the confusion.
The opportunity for an honorable way
out of the mess in Vietnam has been
afforded the United States by the pleas
for negotiation made by the Pope, by the
Secretary General of the United Nations,
by India, and by France, and by numer-
ous private citizens, including some of
our colleagues.
Those who urged the escalation of the
undeclared war in South Vietnam should
ponder well the words of the then-Sen-
ator from Massachusetts John F. Ken-
nedy who, on April 6, 1954, beginning on
page 4671 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
said:
To pour money, material, and men into the
jungles of Indochina without at least a pros-
pect of victory would be dangerously futile
and self-destructive * * *, I am frankly of
the belief that no amount of American
military assistance in Indochina can conquer
an enemy which is everywhere, and at the
same time nowhere, an enemy of the people
which has the sympathy and covert support
of the people * * *. For the United States
to intervene unilaterally and to send troops
into the most difficult terrain of the world,
with the Chinese able to pour in unlimited
manpower, would mean that we would face
a situation which would be far more diffi-
cult than even that we encountered in Korea.
type of conflict there. We are aiding
one side in a civil war. We are already
providing more military support to our
side in the civil war-the South Vietna-
mese-than North Vietnam is supplying
to its side-the Vietcong.
But unless we are willing to drop the
futile disguise that our military men are
in South Vietnam as advisers and take
over all of the actual fighting, then the
civil war will be successful only to the ex-
tent that the South Vietnamese are
willing to fight-and this they are not
willing to do. They are more concerned
with being left alone.
And now on.the horizon appear the
"hawks," urging that the United States
take over the actual fighting in South
Vietnam; even if it means taking on in
ground battle the fighting forces of
North Vietnam Red Ch'
I na, and -
Our men are dying in defense of a peo- sia; even' if it
means risking the last
ple who do not care, who only want to world war-a thermonuclear war de-
be left alone, and who have so little ap- stroying civilization.
predation of our efforts that, when What is involved in escalating the war
placed on guard duty, they permit our as demanded by the "hawks" is clearly
men to be sia ht d ' +',
ere
u
b
g
in er
l
arracks.
One of our officers reported that the
barbed wire entanglements around our
barracks were designed not to, keep the
Vietcong out, but to keep the South Viet-
namese in and thus keep them from
deserting.
Our men are dying in defense of a
government that is no real government at
all, that is composed of civilians and/or
military having little regard for any-
thing other than their own personal gain
and of power-grasping, petty military
men similarly interested only in their
own gain and advancement. The last
year's record on this, score is conclusive
and unansTerable. And there is no pros-
pect of anything different.
Why are we fighting alone in Vietnam?
Where are our allies-our cosigners of
the Southeast Asia Treaty? Where are
the fighting men from Australia, from
France, from New Zealand, from Pakis-
tan, from the Philippines, from Thailand,
and from the United Kingdom?
Are treaty obligations honored only by
us and not by the other signatories?
Or do we interpret our treaty obliga-
p
e
o
tions differently? am prepared to support
Times. ...
Mr. -President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the article entitled, "We Must
Choose," by Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin,
published in Sunday's New York Times
of February 21, 1965, be printed in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, Mr.
Baldwin openly admits that escalation
of the war could result in our having up
to a million men fighting in South Viet-
nam in a Korea-type military operation.
This does not include the number of
military troops we would have to send to
Korea if Red China-as is most likely
decided to reopen that front.
Such an escalation of the war would
stop our steps towards economy in Gov-
ernment, our war against poverty, and
our attempts to establish the Great So-
ciety. -
In defense of the United States, this
we should be pra
er
d t
do. This I
Our interpretation has certainly But I cannot support those who urge
changed since September 15, 1954, when an escalation of an undeclared war in a
Secretary of State Dulles, explaining our remote area of the world at a time, in a
obligations under the Southeast Asia place and under circumstances chosen
Treaty, stated: by the Communists.
Thus, the treaty will not require us to The New York Times stated last Fri-
make material changes in our military plans. day, February 19, 1965, in its editorial
These plans already call for our maintaining entitled "The War Hawks," criticizing
at all times powerful naval and air forces their proposal, the "road out of the pres-
-in the western Pacific capable of striking ent hazardous situation is to invite world
at any aggressor by means and at places of
our choosing. The deterrent power we thus destruction. The American people made
create can protect many as effectively as it overwhelmingly clear in the last elec-
it protects one. tion that they do not want to plunge
I reiterate. Secretary Dulles empha- recklessly down that road."
sized that we were not prepared to com- The New York Times, Sunday, again in
mit foot soldiers to fight in the swamps crisis editorial, in Viet tnamurged said a of the
of Vietnam. We would have, however, The e V. It s said part:
course of sanity is to explore the
according to Secretary Dulles "powerful initiatives opened up by Secretary General
naval and air forces in the western. Pa- Thant and General de Gaulle for negotia-
cific capable of striking at any aggres- tions to seek a neutralization of Vietnam and
sor b
y means and at places of our choos- all southeast Asia. For a year the objection
ing." has been that our military position is too
Our present. involvement in the la.nel weak to allow negotiations. Every week it
I ask unanimous consent that there be
printed at the conclusion of my remarks
the editorials from the New York Times
for Friday, February 19, 1965, and Sun-
day, February 21, 1965, and the column
by Mr. James Reston in the same paper
on February 21, 1965.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. GRUENING. I hope the President
will not attach too much significance to
the urging he has received that he adopt
the position of the "hawks" from such
outstanding Republican leaders as the
former Vice President, Richard Nixon,
the former GOP presidential candidate,
Barry Goldwater, and the able and dis-
tinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRx-
sEN]. As has been pointed out, if we be-
come involved in a Korea-type, bogged-
down foot war in South Vietnam, all
three of these distinguished gentlemen
will, when the casualty lists froman es-
calated war start coming in, be among
the first to dub the war "Johnson's war"
and to revive the eery that the Democratic
Party is the "war party."
I hope, also, that the President will
heed well the voices raised by his former
colleagues on this side of the aisle who,
having at heart only his best interests
and the best interests of our country,
have been urging him to heed the pleas
ui.o v.w,namese military and political Nations and the Pope, as well as those of
judged in the light of an analysis-of-
nalysis of the. structure indicate that total collapse may be our friends and allies in India and
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3434 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE February 24
France, that the Vietnamese Problem be For a long time after the politically stale- greater than that of Paris. Both suggestions
the negotiating table. mated end of the Korean war, Peiping was are absurd. found to
successfully depicting the United States to As some of our diplomats have
brought to
ExHtsrr 1 the peoples of Asia as a "paper tiger." The their discomfort, South Vietnam is distinctly
[From New York Times Magazine, Feb. 21, defeat of the French-backed heavily by an independent country-not, as in France's
1965] American aid-in Indochina enhanced this day, part of a colonial empire. In fact, the
WE MUST CHOOSE-(1) "BuG OuT", (2) Nz- image of a windy-weak-willed, feeble Uncle fear of Chinese
renter Cmll ofi t colon alism in
GOTIATE, (3) FIGHT-A MILITARY COMMEN- Sam. That image has since been dis- probably greater
ARGUES FOR A GREATER USE of OUR pelled by U.S. actions in and around the North Vietnam in particular, than the fear
As for
of U.S.
n missile
by P esidentaJohnson s between ithhe poi tical, economic, and militay
POWER IN
m WAR To PREVENT MAN IRREPARABn E DEFEAT" Crisis a and, recently during
retaliatory air attacks upon North Viet- power of the United States and France,
(By Hanson W. Baldwin) namese objectives. But the portrait of there Is none. Particularly in the air and at
What should we do--"bug out" or fight? flabby indecision could be easily revived sea we can mobilize power completely
ultimate
Should we be "hawks" or "doves"? Or is if the United States loses in Vietnam. vailable to France, backed up by, the
there a third choice-negotiations now? Strategically, South Vietnam is too im- force which France did not possess-a nuclear
Recent events in Vietnam indicate that portant to be allowed to go by default. North arsenal.
"the war that is not a war" has reached a Vietnam badly needs the rice of the South. "You can't win a war against guerrillas."
crossroads. Washington's policy of the past More important, the area Is the traditional Not true. We have dressed up the fight-
4 years, based on the polite fiction that we rice bowl of the continent. Geographically, ing in Vietnam with a fancy name-
were not fighting a war but merely helping Vietnam is a long appendix pointing toward "counterinsurgency," but some of its basic
the Vietnamese to defeat the Vietcong in- the rich archipelago of Indonesia and abut- military elements resemble the kind of war
surgents within their own territory, has ting strategic sea passages. Whoever domi- Americans have fought successfully many
reached a point of no return. erha s ap- nates it will eventually control most of the times in the past in Nicaragua, Haiti, and be-
Compromise and ce Nansuss great Indonesian archipelago. hind the main fighting fronts during the
placpble to some problems-can t the N be ation's guideposts osat domes- The strategic importance of the area is Korean war. Other anti-Communst guer-
eiupolicy. There be a clear-cut for- similar to the so-called rimlands, or maritime rilla wars were won in Greece, the Philip-
courageous There must be a uand nations, of Western Europe which represent pines, and Malaya. The Portuguese seem to Viet- courageeoous decision. And though h in risking a powerful bastion against the "heartland" have done a pretty good job of stamping out
nom we gain the hard pskblem of risking of Soviet Russia. In Asia, the non-Commu- the rebellion in Angola. Guerrillas can be
must gh a the risk must be taken: nist strategic position vis-a-vis Red China is defeated, but it takes careful organization,
much
We fight a war to prevent an irreparable based upon mainland positions-Pakistan, special training, and security forces that
defeat. We must use what it takes to win. India, southeast Asia and the island bastions should be from 10 to 30 times larger than
Our policy should not victory. "unconditional Our goal Of the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, and the guerrillas. It takes infinite determina?-
Victonder" should d be ehad efeaoOur gl Communist Japan. If the rimlands of Asia fall to com- tion and patience.
t "Continued fighting or, expanded U.S. in.-
aery su conquer South defeat of a Vietnam and id ex munism, the island
t d their control rol deep into sooner o or later. Ultimately ely the will be doomed Communists volvement will mean hiher U.S, casual sirs
attempts
tend southeast Asia. . mat
The reasons we must fight for Vietnam will challenge us upon what is now our un- and greater risks of broadening the war."
challenged domain-the oceans. Of course, you cannot win a war without
have little c do with making Saigon s safe In a word, we must remain in southeast spilling blood. We must pay the price of
for democracy or freedom. There has been Asia for our own security needs. South Viet- power. Risks are unavoidable in any foreign
much too much cant to this point, far too worthy of its name. The question is
much effort devoted to trying to establish a nom in States not vital in the sense that policy Y
politically legitimate South ing South Vietnamese Gov- the United States cannot live without it. But not whether there will be risks, but the degree
ernment after our own image. Nor does it if lost we would be forced to commence the of risk. For against the perils of action rust
do much good to argue the past, debating next chapter of the world conflict in retreat, oe and weeeighad ed thistory s ofrireveal Political al ilitary and at a disadvantage. hesitancy, or appeasement merely
whether or not we should have become in- Despite the admitted importance of South promise,
facts are Vietnam in the first place. The Vietnam to the U.S. global position, the cur- lead to ultimate disaster. In Vietnam, the
facts are that Communist expansionism and rent breed of neoisolationists and the longer we wait, the greater the price we shall
Asia has been con end o, related, the tan pro- o war, "doves" who believe we must cut our losses have to pay for even partial victory (as we
with hiveout , a that the end simultaneous of thsettlement in Korean Viet- . and get out advance many arguments against are now discovering), and the more restricted
wi nom, gave Peiping and North Vietnam's Ho deeper involvement and in favor of with- our choice of options.
"We have no moral right to be in Vietnam,
they Chi Minh have s the well opportunity exploited. in southeast Asia drawal. of the arguments represent the voices or to attack North Vietnam."
Belatedly, , but nevertheless clearly, the of defeat and despair, caution, and fear. Neither do the Vietcong. Nor does North
Vietnam have the right to support the civil
United States became aware of the threat. WHY NOT NEGOTIATE Now? war in the South. Our involvement was a
Our commitments to Saigon began in the Any negotiations opened now would lead response to Communist aggression. Since
after and were enor- from weakness, not strength. If we want to the beginning, Hanoi has organized, supplied,
Eisenhower administration
trausn took amplified the s ago. oday, we negotiate-and not to surrender-we shall and directed the Vietcong insurgency. We
t ration took power l 4 years m t Today, he have to raise our ante considerably. And were invited by the South Vietnamese Gov-
are ration sully committed-by the ..meaningful" negotiations are "meaningful" ernment to come to its aid. A high moral
words of Presidents and Cabinet members, the Communists only if they are faced purpose is an essential element of our for-
U . milit ryfo, es the with superior power and a position of eign policy but we can be left with no pu.r-
deep the actions t the
deep involvement of U.S. military forces. strength. pose-moral or otherwise-if we are con-
U.S. global prestige and power is intimately We must "arm to parley." Personally, i quered by the doctrine that the ends justify
bound up with the outcome of the Viet- seriously doubt whether talks can guarantee the means. If we are inhibited from action
peace in Vietnam and southeast Asia, as by Hamlet-like indecision over legalistic con-
tempting ete struggle. In Vietnam, we are at-
teto formulate an answer to the world.
Communist strategy of creeping aggression, some quarters have suggested, by neutraliz- cepts of international law, we shall lose the
g the area politically and militarily; In "What's the use of further military In-
of subversion and insurgency, of what Khru- s In g by eliminating the struggle for influ- when the political instability of
shchev called "wars of national liberation." sure between Communists and non-Coin- volvementSouth , Vietnam pules the rug from under
cannot o my and will of the United s answer States munsts. Nevertheless, we need not fear our feet?"
evolve a victorious awer t to such negotiations if we speak from strength, by Here is one of the more cogent objections
tactics, we are undone; the map of the world really putting up a fight for Vietnam.
to greater involvement. But in the long his-
not ght in became red. And if will Continuing U.S. air and sea attacks on tory of Vietnam there have always been feud-
not fight n Vietnam, where after the see- 20 North Vietnam would serve notice on Hanoi, ing sects and factions. Moreover, the French
rear of Communist on Whet'ei n will the we past draw w Peiping, and Moscow that the United States left behind them a people still unequipped
years-will we fight? Where will no longer tolerate "sanctuary warfare." for self-govcrrment. Yet somehow or other
the line? They might-hopefully-force Hanoi to the the war has gone on, and somewhat better In
The psychological and Vi political II cruse .S. conference table. Indeed, such a policy some respects recently. Greater U.S. In-quence of withdr aa a
l or a U.S. defeat negotiated peace likely would appear to be the minimum necessary volvement-above all, a tangible deterinina-
lead to a Communist peewee t - to open any kind of negotiations. Yet even tion,to win-may well do more for Saigon's
lead astrous In a. It It would takeover, would undermine be mine such a program will not "win" the war in political stability than any amount of dip-
Thailand much Asia. threatened by Pei- the south. lomatic pressures.
ping) id (already openly alt conquered b "If the French couldn't win, how can the "Isn't the real danger that escalation :might
communism), Laos (even M(Manalaya, now the halt c(with United States achieve victory?" involve us in a larger war? Wouldn't the its growing anti-Americanism), Burma, . In- The implication of this argument store- Chinese come in?" mantle Ts Is the $64
llion . 11; is
our power is no quite clear that if t elUn ted St tes becomes
Au Japan, and even Taiwan, Okinawa, and ofi the )Fro ch, sand nO the
Australia.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170002-9
 Approved For Release .2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170002-9
96
.
5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
more involved we must be prepared for Vietnamese, who have been responsible for
greater effort by the enemy. Escalation in the job in the past.
some form would be not only possible, but We need U.S. tactical units in South Viet-
likely. But we have advantages. We are nam to defend our installations. We need
fighting, as we did in Korea, on a peninsula Infantry battalions,, Military Police com-
where our superior sea and airpower can be parties, Army Engineers and Navy Seabees to
most effective. North Vietnam's few power- build aircraft revetments, dugouts and pro-
plants and industries are vulnerable to de- tected barracks. Yet all this is purely de-
struction. The Gulf of Tonkin is easily Pensive; it should reduce U.S. casualties but
blockaded. And China itself, with an obso- it will not "win" the war.
lete air force and minimal naval power, could Another essential measure is simplification
not defend itself effectively against a deter- and streamlining of both the high military
mined air and sea attack. command
nd
"
a
the
country team" units,
Nevertheless, an expanded effort by the composed of representatives from various
United States in Vietnam may well be an- Government agencies, that support our aid
sw
men from
ered by an increased flow of supplies and effort in Vietnam. We must get more , perhaps by an all- out attack Nbytt ei Nor h Vietnamese Army, bistros of Saigon more into artheebu out the
h of The
and perhaps ultimately by aid from China coordination between the military, the Cen-
into South Vietnam. Though the flow could tral Intelligence Agency, the State Depart-
be hampered and reduced by air attacks it ment, the U.S. Information Agency and the
could not be completely halted. It is quite Agency for International Development is far
possible that the United States might become better than it once was. But it is still far
involved in a new kind of Korean war. But from perfect, in Saigon or in Washington.
this would not be hopeless by any means. The war has shown, for instance, that South
In fact, some well-informed authorities be- Vietnamese-United States teams have been
lieve the United tSates could win a Korean- able in many instances to carry out the mili-
type of war in South Vietnam-Laos against tary portion of the clear-and-hold pre-
the best that the Chinese Communists could scription for victory. But AID-not the
throw against us. military-is responsible for police and inter-
"What about the specter of nuclear weap- nal security forces in Vietnam, and these
ons? Wouldn't Russia join in, even if China cadres rarely have been able to hold an area
didn't have enough A-bombs to do us any once it has been cleared of the Vietcong.
harm?" Perhaps military troops should be charged
There is no certain answer to these ques- with the "hold," as well as the "clear," part
tions, but a full-scale nuclear war is highly of the operations. Certainly internal polic-
unlikely. The United States has scared itself ing needs a major overhaul.
to death by its own nuclear propaganda. The A basic change in the prescription for vic-
fear of a nuclear exchange-never probable, tory demands a United States-South Viet-
or even likely-has been the greatest single namese unified command such as now exists
restraint upon a positive and firm U.S. diplo- in South Korea.
macy since World War II. Continuous and heavy air and sea attacks
Presidents and public alike have been in- against staging areas, supply routes, train-
hibited by the nightmare of the mushroom ing fields, camps and recuperation centers of
cloud. Yet the lessons of the Cuban missile the Vietcong in North and South Vietnam
crisis should be remembered. Is it in any and Laos will be necessary for any appreci-
way probable that the Kremlin would risk able diminution in the flow of men and sup-
for Vietnam what it would not risk for Cuba? plies to the Communists. The one-shot re-
Moscow knows our nuclear power. Would taliatory raids have only temporary and
Russia invite its own destruction as a nation minimum military Importance; viewed as
by invoking the use of nuclear weapons in political and psychological warnings, they
any cause except the defense of its own ani1? are lik
---- ._ .. -_. .
ely to
-lain To a reciOUbled war effort.
We must also remember the risks of delay, vi Th
e history of airpower dictates the
If there is a danger of nuclear retaliation to- for unrelenting, need
massive attacks. Bombing
day by Peiping, how much greater will it b t
e
could not anticipate quick success.
would be long, nasty, and wearin
3435
No one could relish such a prospect as this;
the stark statistics of war explain the Presi-
dent's reluctance to embark upon a path that
has no turning.
Vietnam is a nasty place to fight. But
there are no neat and tidy battlefields in
the struggle for freedom; there is no "good"
place to die. And it is far better to fight
in Vietnam-on China's doorstep-than fight
some years hence in Hawaii, on our own
frontiers.
EXHIBIT 2
the New York Times, Feb. 19, 19651
THE WAR HAwKS-
A comparatively small group of Americans,
at this moment predominantly political in
character and predominantly Republican in
politics, is doing its best to multiply the
perils and frustrations of the war in south-
east Asia.
This group ignores the realities of the
present situation. It ignores the obvious
war weariness of the people of South Viet-
nam. It ignores the steady stream of deser-
tions from the Vietnamese Army. It ignores
the difficulty of protecting isolated American
bases against the surprise attacks of guer-
rillas.
It ignores the possibility of an invasion of
South Vietnam by the very considerable
North Vietnamese Army. It ignores the
problem of how an aerial counterattack could
cope successfully with a massive ground at-
tack of this character. It ignores the possi-
bility of Chinese intervention. It ignores the
logistics and belittles the cost in lives lost,
blood spilled and treasure wasted, of fighting
a war on a jungle front 7,000 miles from the
coast of California.
The whole aim of this group is to expand
the Vietnamese war, even if it means draw-
ing in China and perhaps the Soviet Union as
well. By its lights, Presidents Johnson's dec-
laration that the United States seeks no
wider war is as much a prescription for fail-
ure as any attempt at a negotiated peace.' It
is one thing to say, as Secretary McNamara
did in his testimony yesterday, that this
country has "no other alternative than con-
tinuing to support South Vietnam against
the Red overrule ,. _ _
- ib quire an-
arge s in North Vietnam probably would other to argue that the road out of the tomorrow when China will have p es-
accumulated have to be broadened to include power- ent hazardous situation is to invite world
a stockpile of weapons? Time is restricting plants, bridges, industries, road junctions, destruction. The American people made it
our options. docks and oil storage facilities. A naval overwhelmingly clear in the last election that
Clearly, then, the stakes in Vietnam are blockade and naval gunfire may well sup- they do not want to plunge recklessly down
large enough to warrant the risks of greater plement the air bombardment. To carry that road.
U.S. involvement. Whether or not we raise o
t
ff
u
e
ectively any such program as this, U.S.
our ante, the enemy will. The Communists air and naval forces in the Western Pacific
are implacably determined to triu
h
mp
, and
the only factor that can prevent their victory
is superior power in all its forms. More of
the same on our part will no longer serve any
purpose, save slow defeat.
What should we do? First and foremost,
we must recognize as a government and as a
people that we are fighting a war in Vietnam
not merely advising how to fight one. Such
a recognition would awaken a greater sense
of national and Military determination, in-
spire a Presidential and congressional enun-
ciation of purpose, and create a more stream-
lined military operation in Vietnam.
Second, the United States itself must pro-
vide maximum possible security in Vietnam
to major U.S. Installations, such as airfields,
supply depots, and headquarters. Secretary
McNamara's statement that it was impossi-
ble to guard against such attacks as those
recently made by the Vietcong against U.S.
airfields and barracks is no answer. Of
course, 100-percent security is impossible in
any war; defense against terrorism and sabo-
tage is especially difficult. But there is no
doubt whatsoever that we can provide better
security to key instanAri n