SENATOR KUCHEL'S COMMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300160032-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2003/10/10 C1A-RDP67B00446R000300160032-7
1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3657
Ing majority of elected Republicans and They label, automatically, as Communist- habit comes inertia, and inertia produces a 11 rank-and,-file Republicans supported. Thus, inspired almost any proposal for progress.' sterility of the mind.
6ver5yhel4jin.g Senate Republican support for It was Republican James 0. Blaine, who Such a society lives too near to danger.
the lnutual, security program, for, the United as Secretary of State conceived of the Pan- All the procedures of a well-established writ-
l
Nations
oan, 49r, .a limited nuclear test ban
treaty, for civil rights legislation, for meas-
ures to support educational opportunity and
manpower retraining, to name but a few,
were quickly forgotten. And the Nation, and
the party, watched in immobilized fascina-
tion as a small, zealous and willful handful
slowly captured the mechanism of a great
political party.
The results of November , 8 were not so
much support for the present administra-
tion as the repudiation of a party which tem-
porarily seemed to have forgotten its heri-
tage.
With the exceptions that take place when
men do political combat with each other
over time, by and large the Republican Par-
ty since its founding in the explosive, decade
before the Civil War has stood cona.istently
for certain broad, principles and themes of
public policy. With Abraham Lincoln, early
Republicans fought for a preservation of the
Union-for a nation rather than for separate
States-for internal improvements to bind
together a growing America, and for free-
men...
It was Lincoln, in a speech in Springfield,
6, years prior to his election in 1860, who
provided Republicans with a criterion as
applicable today as it was then as we seek
to determine what programs are appropriate
and inappropriate for government to under-
take. Said the first Republican President:
"The legitimate object of government is to
do for a community of people whatever they
need to have done, but cannot do at all, or
so well do for themselves, in their separate
and individual capacities. In all that the
people can individually do as well for them-
selves, government ought not to interfere.
It was for succeeding generations to deter-
mine the community to be served and the
level of government most appropriate to meet
those needs. It was for succeeding genera-
tions to determine whether particular needs
of society might most appropriately be met by
the public or the private sectors of our econ-
omy or by a combination of the two. Thus
have ensued the struggle and the challenge of
federalism and of a free economy regulated
in the public interest. It has been the Re-
publican Party, whether led by Theodore
Roosevelt, Robert A. Taft, or Dwight D.
Eisenhower, which has attempted to strike
the correct balance between the demands of
a few and the welfare of the many. Anti-
trust regulation, conservation of our natural
resources, equitable labor-management rela-
tions, and incentive for the States and the
private economy to solve specific problems
have all beer} Republican initiatives.
Serious problems confront our Nation in
the jungles of South Vietnam, in the weak-
ened NATO alliance, in the financing of the
United Nations, and in the growing prob-
ability of proliferating nuclear nations. Mil-
lions of fellow human beings suffer from
All health and malnutrition. Is it top much
eo expect to put some of the finest minds
in the country, who are Republicans, to work
on these problems Perhaps, as in science,
a breakthrough is in order by leapfrogging
ahead of the inertia of ideas and practice
which often builds up in the governmental
mechanism.
In international. affairs, the Republican
Party has never been like the proverbial
ostrich with its head in the sand despite the
outcries one. hears from a few "againers"
in our party, who would abandon the United
Nations, repeal the income tax, repudiate
mutual security and junk the theory of col-
lective security alliances such as NATO. This
small handful, a throwback to isolation,-sees
no good abroad and very little good at home.
American Union. It was Republican William ten constitution and all the armaments that
McKinley, who stated clearly that America a scientific elite can devise cannot avert
had a responsibility to educate backward danger for such a society. Sterility of the
peoples and to help bring them into the mind means that men all too easily accept
20th century. It was Republican Theodore
Roosevelt who used the office of the Presi-
dency to promote peace between warring
nations such as Russia and Japan. It was
Republicans, such as Wendell Willkie, Henry
L. Stimson, and Herbert Hoover, who clearly
stated America's responsibilities in combat-
ing foreign dictatorships whether of the left
or of the right. It was Republican Christian
Herter, as chairman of a special committee
in the Republican controlled 80th Congress,
who recommended, along with another Re-
publican, the late Senator Arthur Vanden-
berg, that stricken Western Europe, the vic-
tors and the vanquished, be resuscitated,
and that we agree with the Atlantic nations
to stand together in defense of the freedom
of each of us.
Republicans in the U.S. Senate during the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations have
worked to strengthen the President's hand
in Cuba, in Berlin, in mutual security, and
in South Vietnam. We gave leadership to
Senate ratification of the nuclear treaty.
As an American, I hope that the foreign
policy of the Johnson administration may
be successful. All free men must work to
advance the cause of peace and freedom.
As a Republican, I am concerned that ab-
stract piety not be a substitute for calm
and courage. Republicans, under Eisen-
hower, squarely faced the tensions and the
threats and demonstrated, I think, a unity
and determination in such crises as Guate-
mala, Berlin, Suez, Lebanon, and the For-
mosa Straits. Americans, under a Demo-
cratic administration, deserve no less. The
times demand candor in stating for the
American people why we must continue to
sacrifice in far-away and inconvenient places
if we are to prevent the inevitable encroach-
ment upon free peoples which seems to be
the appetite of totalitarian states.
When the Republican Party has welcomed
to its ranks men and women of good will
from all walks of life, from all faiths, and
from all races it has been successful in Na-
tional, State and local elections. When it
has not, a national political tragedy such
as 1964 was inevitable.
I believe that freedom has been best pre-
served and human well-being best advanced
in the American society by two vigorous,
competitive political parties, each creatively
seeking to devise methods by which decently
to gain the confidence of a majority of peo-
ple and go on to win. Yet, only once since
1932, has a Republican captured the Presi-
dency, the highest prize of American poli-
tics. Only twice since 1932, have Republi-
cans controlled Congress. Public opinion
polls show that nationally but a quarter of
the American people identify themselves
with the Republican Party, while the re-
mainder consider themselves as Democrats
or independents.
A persistent imbalance in political power
in favor of a single political party poses con-
public relations for public programs. Such
sterility of the mind can mean a paper set-
tlement at Geneva instead of actual political
stability in southeast Asia. It can mean a
continued nibbling at the edges of poverty
and unemployment rather than facing the
hard decisions required, the moral awaken-
ing involved, and the sacrifice needed to ex-
pand educational, health, and job opportuni-
ties for young and old alike.
Nowhere is such mental sterility more ap-
parent than in our cities, which continue to
be clogged with slums, with traffic, and with
crime. Racial tensions remain. All the
urban renewal and, public housing in the
world will not mean a better America unless
we work to aid people in becoming better.
Houses alone do not cure the problem.
Money alone, no matter how bountifully ex-
pended, does not make for morality. Legis-
lation alone cannot guarantee solutions.
The need is for dedication, for thought,
for a decent consecration by our people to the
public interest and to public affairs. Who
can provide this leadership? Who can fill
the vacuum which now exists in this land
and in the Republican Party? You can, and
so must the rest of young America if we are
are protect what we have, and to go about
improving our lot and discharging our duty
to mankind.
The birth rate of the Second World War
has provided the Republican Party with a
new opportunity which, regrettably, it was
not able to provide for itself. Next year 1
million more young Americans will reach
age 18 than have this year. The average
yearly increase in America's teenage labor
force in the 1960's will be almost six times
the average yearly increase in the 1950's. By
the next presidential election, the age of the
average American will have dropped from 33
years of age in 1960 to 25 or less.
You and your companions enter American
life with a clean slate. For you, the political
battles of the 1930's have faded and receded
into history. You are entering a society
where our philosophy must be one of ever-
expanding horizons for all, rather than mere-
ly dividing up what exists between the haves
and the have-nots. You are entering a so-
ciety where all the slogans and imagery of the
past, "New Frontier," "Fair Deal," or "New
Deal" will not solve the problems of an
urbanized America and a deeply troubled
world.
Without the rigor of thought and the en-
thusiasm for ideas which an education such
as yours should provide; without the self-
discipline to face a variety of challenges;
without the will to deal with reality rather
than appearances, this Republic could decay.
Yours is a historic opportunity to strengthen
the Nation by bringing your own energy and
your zeal to the service of the Republic
through the Republican Party.
Our system of two strong political parties
siderable of a peril to our system, even was not ordained in the Scriptures or the
though the laws provide a paper opportunity Constitution, yet it must survive, it must
at regular intervals for potential change. A remain, if our unique American free society
persistent partisan imbalance in any level of is to continue. Make no mistake about it.
our government . is conducive to political If the grand old Republican Party were to
autocracy, and a little wheeling and dealing, become a shriveled, shrunken, impotent po-
or worse. There Is one less check or balance. litical haven for. an anachronistic few, then
And to the habitual losers, there is frustra- vast changes, and not for the good, either,
tion, despair, and occasional irresponsibility. would enter our way of life. This country
Such an imbalance may well continue in urgently needs a viable, forward-looking, na-
a society of apparent plenty. Over time, a tional Republican Party, to participate in
lack of change and a lack of dynamic politi- affairs of Government and to win elections.
cal exertions 'hay indicate.somesuperficial And the Republican Party urgently needs
comfort. Comfort breeds habit. Yet, with you. Thus the choice is yours to make.
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/10 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300160032-7
365$ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March 1
APPOINTMENT OF KENNETH E. BE- In our lifetime, yours and mine, the Nest- Our goals are immutable. They will not
LIEU AS UNDER SECRETARY OF ern democracies have stood together in two and must not change. America continues
THE NAVY WELL EARNED, world wars to vanquish aggression. Then to seek peace. We believe in peace. We
came the Korean conflict. With Soviet and abhor aggression. We have no territorial
Mr, KUCHEL. Mr. President, all Red Chinese assistance, North Korea crossed aims nor desire to establish a colony in
Senators are delighted that the Presi- the 38th parallel in June 1950 to attack free southeast Asia or any place else. It is en-
South Korea. The United Nations Security tirely the other way around. It is commu-
dent has appointed Hon. Kenneth E. Be- Council forthrightly condemned the Com- nism which desires to impose its will upon
Lieu Under Secretary of the Navy. We munists as aggressors, and the United Nations free peoples, and, one by one, to further its
in this Chamber are well acquainted with came to the aid of the free Koreans. Our goals toward complete subjugation of the
the high sense of honor, integrity, and own country bore the burden of that 'defense globe. We seek an end to Communist at-
devotion to the public trust which it far more than any other nation. We suffered tacks on South Vietnam. Peace can be at-
has been Secretary BeLieu's splendid 157,000 casualties and spent $18 billions in tained simply by a cessation of all the Red
that frightful struggle. raids and sneak attacks on the South Viet-
duty to discharge to his country, both in In time of adversity, when the gravest kind namese. The Geneva Conference Agreements
uniform and now as a peacetime civilian of peril has come near, the West has united. Of 1954, to cease hostilities in Vietnam can,
esrvant of the U.S. Navy. The San But as adversity began to recede, Western even now, be respected. There is yet time
Diego Union, the other day, commented unity relaxed, and our allies, or, at any rate, for the Communists to fulfill their promise,
on the appointment of Mr. BeLieu to be some of them, began to go their separate but the hour is growing late.
Under Secretary of the Navy. I ask ways. We search for ways to help the South
unanimous consent that the text of the Who are our adversaries? Tyranny and Vietnamese people achieve stability in their
editorial in that California newspaper slavery are our foes, and always will be, no government and in their economy. We
matter whether they appear under the taw- earnestly wish to help them to preserve
appearing February 11, be printed in the dry banner of international communism or their own independence. If North Vietnam
RECORD, dictatorship in any form. We believe in free- would let their non-Communist neighbors
There being no objection, the editorial dom. We believe in justice. We believe in live in peace, and if the barbaric Marxist
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, peace. That is our creed. But safety does regime in Red China would stop pushing and
as follows: not come from putting one's head in the prodding the Vietcong, trouble would im-
PaOMOTION EARNED sand. You do not avoid trouble by turning mediately abate.
The appointment of Kenneth E. BeLieu as away or running away from it. Must not all Americans demonstrate a
solidarity of purpose behind our President?
Under Secretary of the Navy a well-earned A war rages Indochina today, and the I believe we must and I believe we do. Com-
promol sfor him and good d news ws for for the the events of the last sr few weeks heighten its munism must not misunderstand us.
natianaonal security. danger. Like it or not, the United ted States is
Mr. BeLieu brings stature and a wealth of there and participating in it. It is too late And peace loving nations in Asia and
elsewhere must see, clearly, that when
military experience to his new position. He to debate the question whether the United
has been decorated for service armed States should have responded in 1964 to a America pledges aid to those in danger, her
has no hollow ring. When commu-
tions, including and held top-level Secretary executive post- cry for help from a new country and a small l pledge av, Assistant of the Independence. seeking The reserve its newly found nism sacres attacks South her neighborVietnamese, and and our cruelly mas-
N fellow
Navyy for or Installations and logistics. . indepependence. Thfact remains that we
As an administrator, Mr, BeLieu showed joined in an agreement to defend southeast citizens, our joint retaliation must be swift
a broad understanding of problems and es- Asia against aggression, and South Vietnam, and sure-and sufficient.
Let South Vietnam fall, let Laos crumble
th career officers and men by protocol, r 1, a 1state 954, to General Eisenhower completely away, and you undermine Cam-
tablished In abr rapport with
of all h b nd of the Armed Forces. Much On October , bodia and leave Thailand a quarry, ready for
of the understanding rstanding came from personal announced our policy a as s one of f assisting the taking. Burma and India could easily
visits to installations, including San Diego. Vietnam "in developing and maintaining a be swept into the vortex. Malaysia's danger
In our opinion the choice of Mr. BeLieu strong; viable state, capable of resisting at- from Indonesia would mount. Freedom in
for the second ranking civilian in the Navy tempted subversion or aggression through southeast Asia, and beyond, would. face a
Department shows an awareness of the Pres- military means." beckoning doom.
ident of the importance of strengthening the Five years later General Eisenhower said: The cause of man's freedom everywhere is
"Unassisted, Vietnam cannot at this time
sinews of seapower. produce and support the military forma- very deeply concerned with the potential loss
tions essential to it or, equally important, the of freedom anywhere, in this vastly shrunken
U VENATOR KUCHEL'S COMMEN'T'S ON morale-the hope, the confidence, the pride- planet. Let our country stand, firm and
necessary to meet the dual threat of aggres- resolute, for the decent right of man to live
THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA sion from without and subversion within its his own life, or, in Kipling's words, "Leave
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, on Fri- borders. to live by no man's leave underneath the
law."
day, February 19, in the city of San "Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by
Francisco, I had the honor to speak to the Communists would bring their power
the 19th Annual Convention of the West- several hundred miles into a hitherto free CONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGE CAN-
re. in south-
ern States Meatpackers Association. A eastoAsiaT would beim naed byraegr at flank- YON DAM ON THE LOWER COLO-
portion of my comments were devoted to ing movement. * * * The loss of South Viet- RADO RIVER BASIN
the tragedy and travail which the free nam would set in motion a crumbling proc- Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, earlier,
world now faces in far off Indochina. I ess that could, as it progressed, have grave requested the Department of the In-
text unanimous consent that the partial consequences for us and for freedom." I terior req d the Dean questions the In-
text of my remarks on that occasion, en- Through the administration of the late to comment raised
titled "Challenge to Freedom," be printed President Kennedy and now in the adminis- by sundry constituents of mine with re-
tration of President Johnson, Red commu- spect to the proposed construction of
in the RECORD at this point. nism has continued, indeed, has intensified Bridge Canyon Dam as a part of the
There being no objection, the remarks its campaign of infiltration, subversion, and Lower Colorado River Basin develop-
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, aggression against South Vietnam. Last went project. I have received an answer
as follows: year, to make crystal clear before the world from Assistant Secretary of the Interior,
CHALLENGE TO FREEDOM the unity the American people with re- Kenneth Holum, who discusses in detail
spect to our r policy in in Indochina, a congres-
(Partial text of remarks by U.S. Senator sional resolution was adopted on August 7 the position of the Department of the In-
THOMAS H. KUCHEL before the Western which said in part: terior on the matter. I ask unanimous
States Meatpackers Association, Inc., 19th "The United States regards as vital to its consent that that letter be set forth in
Annual Convention, Sheraton-Palace Hotel, national interest and to world peace the full in the RECORD.
San Francisco, Calif., Friday, February 19, maintenance of international peace and se- There being no objection, the letter
1965) curity in southeast Asia. Consonant with wordered to be printed in the RECORD,
These are fateful and dangerous days for the Constitution of the United States and was follows:
our country and for the West. The freedom the Charter of the United Nations and in
we know is not ours simply for the asking. accordance with Its obligations under the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
It is ours to protect and to defend, as well Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
as to cherish and enjoy. Freedom is chal- United States is, therefore, prepared, as the Washington, D.C., February 17, 1965.
lenged today all around the world and in President determines, to take all necessary Hon. THOMAS H. KucHEL,
every hemisphere. That is nothing new. steps, including the use of armed force, to U.S. Senate,
Such a challenge has faced mankind assist any member or protocolstate of the Washington, D.C.
throughout its existence. There have always Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re- DEAR SENATOR KUCHEL: This letter is in re-
been bullies and tyrants intent upon over- questing assistance in defense of its free- sponse to your January 13 referral of the let-
running their neighbors. dom." ter dated January 7 from Mr. Peter Carey of
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 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3667
-fates were understandably in a state of dis- would be an appropriate date. This would ADDRESS BY MRS. LYNDON B. JOHaT-
array. These records are the requisite of extend prosecutions until 1975
.
effective prosecutions. Even now many of I recognize that your Ministry has been SON AT VISTA GRADUATION
these essential records are in the hands of requested "to report to the Bundestag not CEREMONY
other nations, a principal one of which (the later than March 1, 1965, whether in all perti- Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, Mrs.
your has been most uncooperative with nent murder cases investigations have been Lyndon B. Johnson our gracious First
our efforts tobring j us- and whether action has been
tice. taken to insure interruption of the statute Lady, who has always taken such a deep
It was not until,1958 that the Ministers of of limitations." and abiding interest in the problems of
Justice of the various I sender agreed to cre- I
ate a gathered from my conversations in Bonn our country, and particularly in the needs
central office for the coordination of that should your reply to the above question of our less fortunate citizens, made an
information and investigation of Nazi crimes be in the negative, there would be a strong excellent address on Friday, February 26,
at Ludwigsburg. As late as December 1964 disposition -in many German quarters, and 1965, on the occasion of the VISTA grad-
it was announced that the Ludwigsburg staff perhaps in your Government to extend by uation ceremonies in St. Petersburg, Fla. Increa woul ha Ileo bthat ueased to aid this work. times, direct legislation the statute of limitations I ask unanimous consent that the re-
It is Y recent if (to use the words of the Bundestag resolu-
prosecution
prosecution has not been completely possible. tion of December 9, 1964) "the criminal marks by Mrs. Johnson on this forward-
this connection we must remember that prosecution of such murders cannot be in- looking and progressive program, which
the 1871 statute means not that prosecutions sured in any other way." gives and will continue to give many of
in general became possible, but that a pro- While many have argued that "ultimate our concerned citizens opportunities for
secution of an individual is possible. I hap- justice" demands that such crimes should the discipline of service to others, be
pen to believe that if this had been so in any be punished even if special and exceptional particular case, you would have prosecuted. P printed in
the RECORD.
It follows, therefore, that the failure to pro- domestic legislation is required, you have There being no objection, the address
personally been understood to reject this
secute a. Nazi criminal means that due to the view on the ground that the desired end does as as ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
disorganization of the state for a long period not justify such means. as follows:
it was impossible to have commenced such. However, may I submit, that the decision REMARKS BY MRS, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, VISTA
I therefore conclude that applying your to ask for such legislation cannot on your GRADUATION, ST. PETERSBURG, FLA.
own domestic law, the statute of limitations stated principles, rest on any estimate as to I am delighted to be in St. Petersburg to-
should run ,for 20 years from the date pro- the number of criminals who will escape trial day to join in a program which is surely
secutl.on became in fact possible. and justice if the time for prosecution ex- an exciting landmark in the history of our
The fact that I have asserted hers have pires on May 8, 1965. Therefore, I believe it Nation.
been recognized by no less an authority than is preferable not to wait until such a survey One of the most interesting things about
the German Ambassador to the United States. and estimate is made before announcing the program to me is the name itself-Vol-
In ' News From the German Embassy," vol. clearly and firmly that the time does not v'nteers in Service to America-VISTA which
IX, No. 1, dated January 5, 1965, Ambassador expire on May 8, 1965. An announcement to oaYs in one word what the program if.
Heinrich Knappstein stated: that You know, at our ar
"As I know from my own activity in the code of effect
1871, predicated with a on the terms of the p sits a natural point of ow-
his-
denaziflication process, German courts dur- date code o which with stic became finding possible, the Utory, P to as Successive look back, a pe, this is a natural folio r
big the early postwar years were not able- would on do which justice to prosecution society and honor and hoto the confronted great hperiods uman n problems. our cn the
or only to a very limited degree-to try Nazi rule of law. early ly and 19th century we roved In the
. ear and d miners is exsted a ong u that,
criminals, because the Allies reserved these whatever
cases almost entirely for themselves. Only could function as existed among us, we
with the establishment of the Federal Re- HIGH -PROTEIN s one Nahea
c
d an In the economic
public and the conclusion of the Bonn Con- system strong FLOUR 19th century,
sron and ofle flexible ento, ough 1954 was German judicature able Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I port ever-rising fltanda enough n . In
to take on fully the prosecution of Nazi would like to invite the Members of the the P 20th ever- recognized gof living. I
criminals, This was particularly difficult in U.S. Senate, their ctablycentury, f m lex td c wr are,
the beginning as the most im staffs, and the Kansas ineluc, part of a complex and churning
portant docu- congressional delegation to be my guests world, and swung our energies toward making
ments were still in Allied hands, and because on Tuesday, March 2, from 8 a.m. to that role a force for freedom.
it was especially difficult, during those first 10 a.m., in the visitors' cafeteria, New Now we are boldly taking hold of an aspira_
tubulent years, to reach surviving witnesses Senate Office Building, to taste the tion which men have known as long as there
who were essential for such trials." g, have been human bein
In the same publication, Vol. l.VUII, No. 8, world's finest protein flour pancakes the bleak winter of poverty from the climate
dated May 28, ub Embassy published that will be served with a variety of of a whole society.
an interview with a senior prosecuting_attor- sauces. All members of the press are Of all the economic opportunity programs
ney, stating the following: also invited to attend the breakfast in being launched, none better expresses the
"Question. Now is it that the Auschwitz honor of the 15th annual International spirit of the entire war against poverty than
and similar legal proceedings were started so Pancake Day Race. the VISTA operation.
late? The breakfast will be sponsored by the I am pleased to meet you VISTA graduates
"Answer. There are many reasons for this. Liberal Junior Chamber of Commerce, in person and to see you at work-as I will
It has only been since 1956 that the Federal Liberal, Kans. ma
ter
r in the day. You have already made your
k St. here in of Petersburg. The petition
Republic of Germany has enjoyed full son- This day is set aside in Kansas as of the
ereignty in this as well as other areas. Be_ people of rest and Old Baskin's
viden
yond this the Allies conducted the Nurem- Liberal's International Pancake Day, Crossing asking for for you to stay is evidence
e
berg trials from 1945 to 1948, and in conclud- the day before the beginning of Lent, of your success.
ing them in 1948 did not call the attention Shrove Tuesday, On this day the ladies That-in this brief time-must be a spe-
of German judicial authorities to the docu- of Liberal, Kans., run an annual foot- cial source of satisfaction. You men and
menu that emailled and that despite Allied race with the ladies of Olney, England, women of all ages, from all parts of the
efforts all perpetrators of crimes had not been each runner holding a skillet in which chosen chosen from a upt yo our r careers tind have
brought to justice. The documents neces- she must flip a Paxl three times to csrru careers and well-
sary to prosecute such criminal actions course. face economics gain or give up the well-
were scattered throughout archives around while covering g the course. The wives of earned leisure of later yearns in order to help
the world. It took time to find out where Olney have been pancake racing since others.
they were and to get possession of these docu- the year 1445. Liberal challenged the American is many things. But above ali-
ments. There is a substantial body of docu- women of Olney in 1950 and the vicar more than any nation in the history of man-
ments in ,the East bloc states which remain of Olney, Rev. R. C. Collins, accepted, ever since the first frontiersman picked up
inaccessible to use even today." his musket to help protect a neighbor-we
On Shrove Tuesday, in England, it have been a nation of volunteers. We have
You have been candid enough to agree with was customary for the housewives to been a land in which the individual says-
me that some date after May 8, 1945, could stop their work and run to the church "My neighbor needs me. I will do some-
re
asonably be selected as a beginning point to be "shriven" of their sins when the thing."
with6
rule 6lt violating your it. I constitution or the church bells tolled. In 1445, a housewife You are graduating today In
a stirring
you wi lanow s a ch select adopt, and heard the bells ring, but was caught in tradition. You are aking glow again the
announce a date consistne with the farad the middle of baking pancakes. She word of that most American of poets, Wait
Whitman, fair to society, both German and interne- raced to the church carrying her griddle give , lectures who or a wrote little charity for ch "Behold, I not
tional, which suffered so much from the and pancakes with her. This was the myself.-
Nazi when I give
Nazi horrors. beginning of the annual sporting event. And mend I '
I believp the date 1958-the date when Be sure to join me for the World's fin- this cannot think V of a gradation fan
complete German Sovereignty was regained- est pancakes. place for the first VISTA graduation than
here in the prosperous city of St. Petersburg.
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e poor are not an island. Their needs
toll out to the whole community.
The very fact that a man is poor means
that he needs the help of others-that he
probably lacks the education and often the
hopefulness to lift himself unaided. Chang-
ing his lot is a decidedly practical matter for
everyone. Millions of the impoverished place
a heavy drag on the whole society, cutting
down the ability to purchase what we pro-
duce, diminishing tax revenues--easy prey to
delinquency and crime.
The intense interest of thriving St. Peters-
burg in the VISTA program is a heartening
symbol of what is happening across the Na-
tion, where all of us are realizing that all
the poor are the responsibility of all America.
I am struck, too, by the way the VISTA
program has been working out in this com-
munity. Too often well-meaning people have
approached a social problem with the as-
sumption-let Washington draw up the per-
fect blueprint, complete down to the last
comma.
But If the American experience has taught
us any one fundamental lesson, it is this:
such thing as instant utopia-
There is no suc g
abundant fields of grain, not even by space
ships aloft, but by the national vision which
calls upon us to use our resources so that
every American can walk with head high in
the tonic air of self-respect.
To all of you VISTA graduates, pioneers in
a long and proud line to come, may I express
my congratulations, my warmest best wishes,
and--let me add-more than a bit of envy.
Mr: U Thant obviously has forgotten
the existence of the Geneva pact; if he
remembers it and fails to give recognition
to its provisions, he clearly reflects an
unwarranted and unpardonable disre-
gard for the sanctity of compacts entered
into by different nations of the world.
The North Vietnamese Communists
are in violation not only of the Geneva
but also of the 1962 pact creating
accord
,
BISHOP GEORGE THEODORE
a coalition government in Laos. The
BOILEAU borders of both these nations have been
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, sad methodically and systematically violated
news from Alaska reached me over the by the Communists. Yet, Mr. U Thant
weekend when I learned that one of the sees fit to disregard these hostile bel-
great citizens of my State, the Most ligerent violations of nations' rights,
Reverend George Theodore Boileau, co- and goes out of his way to Condemn the
adjutor bishop of Alaska, died suddenly United States, whose objective in South
of a heart attack. Vietnam has been, and is, to protect the
Bishop Bolleau-and I have always, people of that nation against the wrongs
since his consecration last July, had dif- thta have been perpetrated upon them
acuity in not referring to him as Father by their neighbor-the Communists of
Boileau, because of his long service in the North Vietnam.
I ask unanimous consent that the ar-
i
F
r-
a
Jesuit order as parish priest at
banks, Alaska-was not only one of the title by Mr. White be printed in the
miles away from where it must take practical best known, but also one of the best RECORD.
form. There being no objection, the article
Here in the St. Petersburg area, for some 7 loved, members of the Catholic clergy in was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
years-long before we in Washington talked Alaska. follows:
about a war on poverty-you have been at I had known this wonderful man since as as NEGOTIATION?:
U THANT'S VIEW ON VIETNAM
work to broaden economic Opportunity. he first came to Alaska, in 1950, to serve Your many progressive educational institu- as assistant Pastor at the Immaculate (By William S. White)
tions have been deeply involved. At Ridge- Conception Church in Fairbanks. After With a rarely matched twisting of the
crest you have created a laboratory for his outstanding service as pastor, he was truth, but at least with a certain insolent
healthy social change. You have proceeded
on the only sensible assumption-that the appointed superintendent of all Catholic candor, Secretary General U Thant of the
Nations has now openly become an
national war against poverty must be fought schools in the diocese of Alaska, in 1958. United ist and propagandist for Communist
in a thousand local battles-in the slums of Mr. President, Bishop Boileau coin- ppoolog st in southeast Asia
individual cities, an wornout farms, in the bined admirably activities as a man of U Thant has now trumpeted as revealed
hollows of Appalachia, in Isolated Indian God and those of a man deeply immersed truth, and without hesitation or qualifica-
reservations-wherever human. beings stand in Civic responsibilities with his fellow- tion, the whole basic Communist line that
with their noses pressed against the windows men. He served as chairman of the Em- the war in South Vietnam was only a little
of our general affluence. to ment Security Commission of the homegrown contest involving two sets of
The result of your local progress is that p y local buntil dreadful old Uncle Sam in-
VISTA has been able to function here as it Territory of Alaska, before statehood. local boys to assist the anti-Communist gov-
ernment function everywhere In America. It He was active as a Boy Scout official etervened rnment of that country. He has called
has learned as much as it has taught. Its throughout his career in Alaska. upon us to negotiate and to withdraw our-
role has been not to bring full-blown answers Last September, Bishop Boileau tray- selves as soon as possible.
but to join with others, tentatively, quest- eled to Rome, to participate in the Ecu- In the process, he has rewritten 10 years of
ingly, on the road to a workable solution. menical Council of the Roman Catholic history, annulling 10 years in which the
So we begin here, begin superbly, I believe, Church. In assuming the office of toad- Communist government of North Vietnam
with his
VISTA proudtto have been asked to give outlyouurr Tutor bishop, in ceremonies presided over supp a nniab dlc and mandei a tirelesireand sa v
diplomas. I am privileged to share the rush by Francis Cardinal Spellman at the Cop- age invasion of South Vietnam in endless
of feelings that must be going through you. per Valley School, near Glennallen, violation of agreements made in 1954 at just
Much has been said about the difficulties Alaska, last July, Bishop Boileau an- such negotiations as are now being so pressed
you will encounter. But you and I know nounced humbly that he planned to upon us.
that you also have before you the richest travel to the Jesuit schools, churches, and Thus, with U Thant's now unhidden re-
experience of your lives. To be at the fore- missions in the far-flung Alaska diocese cruitment to them, those forces seeking to
front of a great national effort is an oppor- in the same way he did as a priest "by blackmail or persuade the United States into
tunity which comes to few in a generation, dog team, plane, and 5n0-go." abandoning its commitments in South Viet-
and the personal satisfaction it brings is I know I Speak for all of Alaska in Dam and to cut and run are at last complete.
deep and lasting. And what a pretty company they make for
For many of you this experience will be saluting the service of this dedicated any American to travel with.
transforming. You will be confirming, in man to the people of my State. His un- Thant, the Soviet Union, and Charles de
the most personal way, the wondrous truth timely death at the age of 52 is a sad Gaulle of France-this is the splendid trinity
which too often is a mere phrase. You will blow to us all. May his gr t Soul rest that, whatever the intention in individual
know, as nothing else could make you know, in peace. cases, is taking actions to remove the Amer-
that we are all of us brothers, every one of ican presence in Asia, to sully an American
us to every one of us, effort against pillage and murder of signal
You and the thousands who will follow U THANT'S VIEW ON VIETNAM honor and decency, and to open all southeast
you will have another privilege. In some Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, in the Asia to the faceless hordes of Communist
China.
countries, and in our own too, voices have February 26th issue of the Washington And it would all be done under definitlol~s
been raised to say that a land as rich as ours post appeared an article, written by
can only produce a mink-lined civilization, that. only Thant and the Communists can
marked by a moral deadening and the frenet- William S. White, under the title: "Ne- understand: If Communist forces invade or
is pursuit of push-button luxuries, a split- gotiation?-U Thant's View on Viet- infiltrate a country, the resulting fighting is
level, and a sports car. By what you are nam." only "local" and nobody is intruding any-
doing, you make those voices just so many In the article Mr. White points out where. If anti-Communist forces respond to
hollow noises. very clearly and pointedly the error of an independent country's appeal for help
You are reliving the fundamentals on Mr. U Thant's judgment in condemning against marauders, then this is not only in-
tervention but also quite unacceptable inter-
Ithicht r Nation was founded ands which the United States for its action in South vention.
t has grown great: That success is an im- Vietnam, while remaining completely si- Even the precious little band of Democratic
perative to service, not an invitation to lent on the series of wrongs committed
apathy; that democracy means a human Senators that has been crying for weeks for
spirit which sweeps beyond mere laws; that by the North Vietnamese Communists "negotiation"--even though it is perfectly
the United States is blessed not so much by against the South Vietnamese people and
plain that surrender to aggression-may
l find
its roaring furnaces, not so much by its Government
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
itseT a bit unhappy with the international
associates it now has.
When the Soviet Union pushes us toward
negotiation-again, at this stage, before we
could possibly negotiate from strength in
South Vietnam-Is it really likely that this
would be J n the interests of the United
States? When Charles de Gaulle of France
pushes us toward negotiation, Is it really like-
ly that this would be in the interests of the
United States, considering that Charles de
Gaulle for years has been attempting to break
down American influence all over the world?
Is it pot _odd that U Thant should feel
free to. interfere in this matter anyhow, since
neither North Vietnam, the aggressor state
here, nor Communist China, its master, is
even a member of the organization for which
he speaks?
And does the Democratic splinter in the
Senate know that, according to word to me
from a distinguished Allied Ambassador, it
has already succeeded in convincing the dip-
lomatic community here that the majority
party of this country is not behind the Pres-
ident in Vietnam? The fact that this esti-
mate is absurdly wrong and that a vast ma-
jority of both parties backs the President
does not cure the measureless harm that has
been done to American Interests by the
Democratic splinter.
For the President is going to take whatever
measures are necessary to defend our troops
and our position in Vietnam. If the solemn
determination of this Government continues
to be belittled on our own side of the world
by men who have chosen to follow the irre-
sponsible leadership of such a person as Sen-
ator WAYNE Mo"sE, of Oregon, the Chinese
may fatally underestimate our resolve and
bring on major war.
PROBLEMS OF COLLEGE EDUCA-
TION-MORE CONTACTS WITH
PROFESSORS NEEDED
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, in a
recent issue of the Washington Evening
Star there. appeared an article entitled
"It's Time to Return to 'Old Main'."
The article was written by Jenkin Lloyd
Jones, who very effectively demonstrates
weaknesses that have developed in our
institutions of higher learning because
of the chasm that separates the mem-
bers of the student body from true con-
tact with the professors.
I wish to quote a few of the pertinent
statements that Mr. Jones made in his
discussion of this important subject:
A college is not a factory or a supermarket,
and college bigness doesn't bring down the
cost per student. The Federal Government
and thegreat'foundation should quit en-
ticing professors away from teaching by the
lavish and idiotic business of offering re-
search, grants to almost any applicant. In
most of the great universities the actual
'teaching is being done by graduate students
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the entire article by Mr. Jones
be printed in the RECORD. I also ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD, in connecion with the article
by Mr. Jones, an article entitled "Jet-
;.Age Professors," written by Leonard
Gross.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows;
IT'S TIME To RETURN TO "OLD MAIN"
(By Jenkin Lloyd Jones)
On most, university campuses of any an-
tiquity in the United States ,there remains
the original building from which the school,
amebalike, has divided and grown. Usually
they call it old main.
Old main is almost invariably ugly, a
belfried Victorian pile of narrow windows.
creaky floors, uncertain heat and roller
shades. And in spite of its central location it
is getting harder, to find.
Dominating and dwarfing old main now
are the modern classroom buildings, the
super new laboratories, the conference cen-
ter, the student union-and farther out, the
fieldhouse. the stadium and the high rise
dormitories.
Yet old main is loved. Its picture appears
most often on the cover of the alumni maga-
zine. It represents the vanished day when
students knew their professors and profes-
sors their students. It is a wistful reminder
of the age when the institution had what
the cheerleaders used to call spirit, a
collective personality with which both
faculty and students could identify them-
selves with pride.
It doesn't do to grow too sentimental about
old main. It didn't represent any golden
age of knowledge. It dates back to frock-
coated professors and 'a rigid diet of Greek,
Latin, rhetoric, logic, and a shotgun course in
philosophy that included such sciences as
there were. But when the entire graduating
class could assemble in their wide cravats
and stiff collars on the steps of old main for
their final photograph there was no doubt
that alma mater was a mother to them all.
Following the recent student riots at the
University of California at Berkeley, which
are, perhaps, to be expected under any ad-
ministration that seems to be uncertain
about who's running the school, there has
been consideralile inquiry into the origins of
the unrest. And one theory advanced is that
students at Berkeley are sick of being non-
entities in a giant learning machine.
With 25,000 students that university has
ceased to be.a personality. As its capacity to
inspire loyalty among its charges his dimin-
ised, so has its ability to maintain discipline.
Alma mater has died and her place has been
taken by a bewildering and amorphous city
of classrooms in. which the immature and
recently arrived citizens can neither identify
themselves with any traditions nor feel any
kinship with the powers in city hall.
The time is overdue when we must con-
sider how to rehumanize our colleges and
universities.
Our first job is to handle the problem
of bigness. Ten years ago there were 2.25
million college students in America. Now
there are 4.5 million. University presidents
have been deep in the business of empire
biulding, aided by heavy Federal grants. In
the meantime, many privately endowed col-
leges, with good academic standards, have
been starved as the income tax has dried up
sources of gifts. Everywhere there are lean
little junior colleges and miserable teachers
colleges that haven't had the favor of State
legislatures.
What we ought to do is stop the physical
expansion of the great State universities.
This can be done easily by cutting the un-
dergraduate enrollments by stiff entrance
requirements so that these schools may
concentrate on graduate work.
Then we must reequip and upgrade the
smaller schools and build a lot more of
them. This would not be more expensive.
A college is not a factory or a supermarket
and college bigness doesn't bring down the
cost per student. The ideal should be a
top enrollment of 5,000. The football teams
might not be so hot, but students would
begin to belong to something again.
Then the Federal Government and the
great foundations should quit enticing pro-
fessors away from, teaching by the lavish
and idiotic business of offering research
grants -to almost any applicant.
3669
In a recent article in the New York Times,
Peter Schrag, secretary of Amherst College,
quotes one college administrator as follows:
"It's so easy to get grants,that a fellow's
dedication to teaching declines. Why labor
in the vineyards when you can get a Ful-
bright or some other grant that enables you
to. study or work at what you want? The
old publish-or-perish becomes travel-and-
triumph while enjoying life more fully in-
stead of plugging away at the old routine."
The "old routine," of course, is the busi-
ness of teaching young people, which is what
professoring used to be about. But no more.
In most of the great universities the actual
teaching is being done by graduate students
who are only slightly more acquainted with
the subjects than their pupils. It is ridicu-
lous to let brilliant lecturers amuse them-
selves in private research, writing compli-
cated treatises of interest only to other ad-
vanced scholars. Let's get them back to the
rostrum and the blackboard.
The United States should not be appalled
by the flood of young people now hammering
at the college gates. We should be delighted.
But at no greater cost than academic
megalopolises we can have undergraduate
schools small enough to have personality and
esprit, where students can once again have
contact with professors.
Old main must rise again.
JET-AGE PROFESSORS
After a century of ridicule and neglect, the
American university professor has come upon
sweet times. Everyone wants the benefit of
his brain-government, industry, founda-
tions and, of course, universities. Their
blandishments are glittery: expensive tools,
extensive time, intensive travel, and excellent
pay. Yesterday's tower-bound professor
often moonlighted to make ends meet. The
jet-age professor, if he's good, can write his
own ticket. One who is and does is pictured
here.
George Maslach, dean of Berkeley's College
of Engineering, is a professor of aeronautical
engineering. A colleague calls him "the out-
standing experimentalist in the world" in his
field, rarefied-gas dynamics. Twice recently,
Maslach has turned down "$50,000 kind of
things" from industry because life as he now
lives it is too exciting. It's 3 minutes from
his campus office, where he supervises the
education of an inordinate number of the
Nation's better engineering students, to his
contemporary home in the hills above, where,
from his balcony, the entire bay area spreads
before him. During the school year, he aver-
ages at least one trip a month East as a con-
sultant, and turns another down. During
summers and sabbaticals, he jets with his
wife and three children to Europe, where he
serves on a NATO advisory board. What-
ever can be gained from life among the aca-
demic elite, George Maslach is getting.
But are students getting what they should
from professors like George Maslach? The
question dominates academic debate today.
Critical educators charge that many profes-
sors find research grants and consulting fees
so seductive they have all but abandoned
teaching. If it's not the professor, it's his
university, which, mindful of its reputation,
demands that he "publish or perish." Either
way, the argument holds, the student loses
out. Teaching is frequently shunted to as-
sistants and graduate students. Many un-
dergraduates have only passing contact with
the best faculty minds. Students are all
but forgotten,. says a recent Carnegie Foun-
dation report, in the "headlong search for
more and better grants, fatter fees, higher
salaries, higher rank." And because Cal's
faculty is rated among the top four na-
tionally, the Berkeley campus is invariably
cited as the villainous prototype of a "uni-
versity on the make."
Such abuses dismay Maslach and George
Pimentel, the restless, committed chemistry
professor pictured on the next page. At
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 1
Berkeley, it is a matter of policy that even
the most venerated faculty stars teach under-
graduate courses in addition to graduate
seminars. It is a matter of honor that pro-
fessors not let outside work interfere with
their teaching, and not accept work that
doesn't enhance it. Neither honor nor pol-
icy is violated nearly so often as charged.
Maslach and Pimentel agree, but each would
like to see such violators as do exist sent
packing.
Both men make conscious efforts to work
with undergraduates. Says Maslach: "If
any student thinks enough of me to ask me
to advise him, I, by God, am going to respond,
even if it takes hours." Pimentel never locks
his office door. His students revere him.
Says one: "With him, you're a colleague rath-
er than an underling." The author of a pop-
ular high school chemistry textbook, Piinen-
tel learned a few years ago that high school
teachers were counseling their better stu-
dents to avoid Berkeley, lest they be lost in
the bigness. Pimentel organized. a freshman
science honors program designed to stimu-
late talented minds through close faculty-
student contact.
In one vital respect, however, both pro-
fessors find the current criticism specious.
To them, there is no choice between research
and teaching. The only choice is between
mediocrity and excellence. There are few
good teachers who don't do research, they
contend; most research translates into good
teaching. Maslach: "Research and teaching
are synonymous words. If you don't do re-
search, you're going to be a trade school."
Pimentel: "Research and teaching are like
sin, and confession. If you don't do any of
the former, you don't have anything to talk
about in the latter."
Beneath the heat are questions that Amer-
ican universities, already splitting at the
seams, must confront at once: What is a
university for? Who should study there?
The vision of men like Maslach and Pimentel
is as new as the future, as old as medieval
Oxford. A university is, above all, for schol-
arship, and for students with the potential
to be scholars. Says Pimentel.: "The pri-
mary obligation of the university is to make
sure there is a place for the very best stu-
dent. If we don't do it, nobody else will."
The average student? This year, Maslach
predicts, Berkeley will suggest to its 20,000
applicants that many of them might learn
more and be happier at one of California's
many good 4-year colleges. Given the de-
mands of the jet age, such a solution may be
unavoidable. "We want a growing percent-
age of our population to be going to the
university," says George Pimentel, "but we
don't want the caliber of their education to
decline."
ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, one
of the most tragic events of this or any
other century was the subjection of most
of Eastern Europe to Russian domina-
tion., The ruthless regimes that now
claim to be the representatives of the
people are, in reality, directed from Mos-
cow, They have systematically thwart-
ed, by force when other methods failed,
the legitimate aspirations of the peoples
By recognizing the dreams of these peo- large landowner. He was also a tobacco
pie, we are supporting their ideals, and grower and an iron miner. Even then, his
are holding out to them a hope for the home was a Tudor brick plantation home.
Into this home was born the man we are
future. The captive nations of Europe
will not be captive for long, for such
subjugation is contrary to the basic de-
sires of the people.
One of the smallest of these nations
is Estonia. Last Thursday, February 24,
she celebrated her independence from
Russia which was proclaimed on Febru-
ary 24, 1918. Russia invaded the land
of this brave people in the early part of
World War II, and again in 1944, sub-
jecting them once more to Russian im-
perialism and control.
Yet no people has held more tena-
ciously to the idea that their subjection is
only temporary. Estonian history teach-
es that the dedication to liberty and
independence in that country is strong
and enduring. In America, the Estonian
National Committee has been doing su-
perior work to alert all Americans to the
necessity of supporting our friends in
Eastern Europe.
America is dedicated to the idea that
all men ought to be able to choose their
own government. In commemoration of
this special day, we rededicate ourselves
to this ideal, and extend to the Estonian
people our hopes for a better world in
the near future. They have not been
forgotten, nor will they be. Even though
the Estonians themselves cannot cele-
brate Estonian Independence Day, we in
this country can. By doing so, we show
to the entire world that we deeply believe
that communistic imperialism is doomed
to destruction. Tyranny of one group
of rulers over another people has never
been successful, and never can be per-
manent.
Mr. President, I take this opportunity
to express my respect for the Americans
of Estonian descent who continue to work
for the day when Estonia will once again
be free.
GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE FA-
THER OF OUR COUNTRY
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, each
year on February 22, radio station KDBS,
in Alexandria, La., broadcasts a commen-
tary on the life of George Washington
and the great importance his influence
held for the birth of our Nation. Station
KDBS is owned and operated by Mr.
Irving Ward-Steinman, of Alexandria, a
longtime friend of mine. Mr. -Ward-
Steinman has always interested himself
in civic service to his city, State, and Na-
tion, and he has had this eloquent com-
mentary on George Washington printed
for distribution to all interested persons.
I believe it is worthy of inclusion in the
RECORD; and, as a matter of fact, I am
thinking about-today, some 230 years later.
Born into wealth, into luxury, into com-
fort. Born without the necessity of proving
his right to anything. It was ready made.
All he had to do was to sit in the lap of
destiny and enjoy the fruits of his father's
diligence and inheritance.
Like his - father who had inherited a tre-
mendous land estate, he was in line for this
preprepared estate. No work-no worry-no
want. All this young man had to do was to
pass his days pleasantly; enjoy his nights,
and arise for the following day's round of
enjoyment and good fellowship.
If this was all-we would not know about
our young man. If the story ended where
it began, with wealth and ease and plenty,
this would not be a memorial.
We can go further. We can make a stark
statement. If this young man had not been
born, would there be a United States of
America.
What is there in the spark known as des-
tiny, that glow which creates history, which
selects one person and to that person points
an eternal finger and whispers: "Your coun-
try needs you."
Ever since that memorable day, on Feb-
ruary 22, 1732, the nobility inherent in man
has outraced the pitiful apathy of unthink-
ing man.
The wealth this young man inherited came
from another source. The real wealth he
contained came, not from his earthly father,
but from his heavenly father-God.
He had a belief in God. He felt his re-
sponsibility- to man and mankind. Not con-
fined by the realisms of having to make a
living, he devoted his resources. both tem-
poral, and spiritual, to building a nation un-
der God. He represented a steadfast leader-
ship. There was hostility. His country-his
native land, now ours, was under a foreign
power.
There were injustices. Instictively, he re-
jected foreign domination. God had given
man an instrument to think with, a heart
to act under, and a forum to place into op-
eration the combined results.
To this person, an opportunity to serve is
a mandate from on high. Nothing is by
accident. He counted his blessings and ac-
quired skills. Throughout all these learning
processes, he retained a humility. Why had
his forebears come to this wild and un-
disciplined land.
There was work to do. Every child of
God, of every age, has a task to perform; a
work to execute; a job to complete.
And this man of destiny went to work.
The land had to be surveyed, farms laid
out, crops planted, trees grown, communi-
ties organized, leaders selected, stools es-
tablished, roads laid out, policy created, gov-
ernment achieved.
One obstacle remained. Absentee owner-
ship, foreign rule, external control-these
were alien to the ideals of justice and self-
government. No foreign entanglements and
what had been had to be severed. The um-
bilical attaching the child to the mother had
to be cut. The child was growing-with all
its pains.
Disagreement was inevitable. Disagree-
forwarding a copy of it home, for the ment between one who claimed ownership
benefit of my 13 grandchildren. It is not by a false theory-the false thinking of the
and I ask that it be printed in past centuries, the scourge of self-realiza-
long
Ver
,
y
ence. the RECORD at this point in my remarks. tion; the thinking that by inheritance, or
The United States has consistently re- There being no objection, the state- luck, or politics, there was such a valid thing
fused to admit that the governments now ment was ordered to be printed in the the divine right of kings. The divine
right to own and to rule and to legislate and
dedicated to the Communist ideology are RECORD, as follows: to control-a body of people, thousands of
the legitimate representatives of the peo- FEBRUARY 22, 1732 miles away; a carryover from the darker
ple of these countries. On the contrary, His father was rich. He had inherited ages of man's history which gave to- the
we are sure that a truly free election much. By the time his son was born, the world for centuries the dangerous doctrine
would once and for all eliminate Com- father owned a thousand-acre estate. This that "might is right."
munist influence from this area of the was in 1732. Quite a few years ago. The The era of reckoning had to come and it
world. Our strategy is a simple one, father was by inheritance and diligence a did. War. The simple protest of a simple
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
3681
nomic Opportunities Act was an indis- After the big Appalachia bill passed the administration, particularly those helping
pensable factor in moving these meas- Senate, Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY West Virginians.
ures through the Senate. A glance at scribbled out a note of high praise and sent But he probably takes more pleasure out
the list- of his committee assignments it down by a page boy to Senator RANDOLPH, of legislation he sponsored in Congress al-
at include Public Works, Labor and at his desk on the Senate floor. most 30 years ago which has provided jobs
which include e, Post Office and Civil The handwritten memorandum from the and a livelihood for 2,425 blind people.
Vice President read as follows: Once hopelessly handicapped, these sight-
Service, Small Business and Aging- U.S. SENATE, less persons, as a result of the RANDOLPH
clearly underlines how his great concern February 1965. legislation, have been trained to operate
for people has manifested itself in a MEMORANDUM news, candy and tobacco vending stands. It
practical way. JEN is a business that grosses, he estimates, $50 11 Recognition of his outstanding service done a a masterful congratulations. You have million annually.
m: job. Proud of you. Ap- He has many trophies in his office, testi-
in the Senate has always had a biparti- palachia owes you a debt of gratitude.
to his work in the House and Senate,
san flavor. Republicans and Democrats HUBERT H. fying
alike have paid tribute to JENNINGS RAN Senator RANDOLPH is a good conversation- but ut the trophy he is proudest of is one from
an association for help to the mind.n
DOLPH as an effective legislator. He is in alist, recounting anecdotes with a sure eye Senator Va
for human interest. Elkins, W ., is of whose hometown is
the front rank of those who defend the There is the story about the four-poster is Va., is a friendly, polite man.
rights of all Americans and seek to canopied bed that a Charleston man who it is small that number is one of a at rs of U achieve for all an equitable opportunity. owns it can now brag about accurately that pho listy heir numon numbers Senat he
An article which appeared in the it was where the President of the United who list their telephone in the
Wheeling, W. Va., newspaper, the Intel- States once slept. Washington telephone books.
ligencer, of February 23, 1965, sets forth That this is so was due to Senator RAN- The majority have unlisted numbers.
with great accuracy and understanding DOLPH. The Senator could point out that even the
White House number is listed in the tele-
the contributions which JENNINGS RAN- The Charleston man had been working In phone book.
DotpH has made and will continue, to Washington back in the thirties. He was
transferred, so he and his wife asked their He is married to the former Mary Kath-
.., ac
w,ntro t
f ......,,.
th
o
e
o
of his
._~i,ate and One ivatiion. I ask unanimous he could find someone who wanted to rent
consent that this article be printed in their furnished apartment.
the RECORD at this point in my remarks. RANDOLPH told him that he had a fine pros- AUTOMOBILES FOR PARAPLEGICS
There being no objection, the article Peet, a splendid couple from Texas, the hus- Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, band being a new Member of Congress. President, I ask unanimous consent to
as follows: His name, of course was Lyndon B. John- insert in the RECORD at this point a news-
[From the Wheeling (W. Va.) Intelligencer, son.
Feb. 23, 1965] Not long ago it was all written up in a paper article which appeared in the
newspaper, together with a picture of the Washington, D.C., Evening Star on Feb-
SENATOR RANDOLPH EPITOMIZES SPIRIT OF now celebrated L.B.J.-once-slept-here four ruary 14. The report deals with the loss
WEST VIRGINIA: TEMPERS HIGH IDEALISM poster. of a leg by an American soldier as a re-
WITH HARD PRACTICALITY Senator RANDOLPIH thought Mrs. Johnson suit of the recent sneak night attack on
(By Carl W. McCardle) might like to read it and saw to it that she the U.S. enlisted man's hotel at Qui Nhon,
WASHINGTON- An excerpt from a quota- got it at the White House. Vietnam. I also request permission to in-
tion that is framed on one of the walls .of Mrs. Johnson wrote to him: seat a letter which I received on Novem-
RANDOLPH, office suite of U.S. Senator JENNINcs "DEAR SENATOR: What a delight. ..The
RANDOLPH, Democrat, of West Virginia, pro- clipping you left for me last night stirred ber 12, 1964, from Capt. Donald S.
claims that "the only view that a hillman many nostalgic memories of our very first Cunningham, AUS, retired, of Vienna,
knows is to climb way up and look down." days in Washington-and will have a special W. Va., regarding the need for specially
That pretty well sums up the congres- spot in my scrapbook. equipped automobiles for paraplegic
clonal career of this happy, hearty, and tire- "Thanks so much." veterans of military service during the
less booster for West Virginia since he was It was signed "Lady Bird Johnson." first elected to the House of Representatives Some weeks ago Paul B. Martin, editor of cold war.
in 1932 when he was 30 years old, the Martinsburg (W. Va.) Journal, raised Believing that cases such as these are
Senator RANDOLPH has long been identified all sorts of havoc for a few hours by relaying fully deserving of the special assistance
with projects to assist the less privileged and a rumor that Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., necessary through grants toward the
the handicapped. might run for the U.S. Senate from West purchase of an automobile, I introduced
But he tempers this high idealism in the Virginia. S. 1199 on February 18 to liberalize the
welfare field with a hard practicality. Young Roosevelt is a citizen of New York provisions of title 38, United States Code,
"West Virginia is in the process of an un- who now lives in Washington where he is
precedented building and rebuilding pro- Under Secretary of Commerce. to permit action by the Administrator of
gram," he tells you. Editor Martin speculated upon the idea Veterans' Affairs to make the necessary
"I'm not impressed by the word 'image' that Senator RANDOLPH might not be a can- grants to service-connected paraplegic
when we speak of our State. didate for reelection to the Senate this year, veterans of the cold war. The grants, not
"West Virginians are a hardy people. because of an eye operation that the Sena- to exceed $1,600, are to be handled on
"They are not interested in handouts. tor had undergone some months ago. the same basis that such grants were
"They want to participate in a partnership The rumor was quickly knocked down, made available to seriously disabled vet-
with the Federal Government which helps with RANDOLPH stoutly declaring that he erans of World War II and the Korean
them to help themselves." would indeed be a candidate for reelection Conflict.
As an example, he cites the new city hall and F.D.R., Jr., declaring that he certainly
and community building at Philippi where would not oppose his friend, Senator RAN- There being no objection, the article
he recently delivered the dedication address. DOLPH, with whom he has worked on the and letter were ordered to be printed in
The cost of this enterprise was about Appalachia program. the RECORD, as follows:
$375,000, the Senator says. So Senator RANDOLPH, with a smile that [From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
And to raise the money in cooperation comes easily to him tells you that he is ac- Feb. 14, 1965]
with the Federal, Government, he explains companying young Roosevelt to Martinsburg LEG AMPUTATED To RESCUE GI BURIED IN
the citizens of Philippi bonded themselves next month.
for approximately $177,000. WRECKAGE OF HOTEL
Caren Senao7 RANDOLPH is bean There Roosevelt will speak at a banquet QUI NHON, VIETNAM.-Sweating and cry-
y g meeting and RANDOLPH will introduce him.
hailed on a nonpartisan basis for his leader- The Senator didn't say so, but it can be AmericAmerican an soldiers rescue
ship in alachia the
alive today from the rubble Ap- p
egislation of wthe hich $1 wbillion ill bring plus
sub- assumed that he would be pleased to have of a U.S. enlisted man's hotel destroyed by
stantial benefits to West Virginia on a Editor Martin "cover" the event. Vietcong terrorists.
matchln basis. In April, the Senator is cooling to Wheel- One of the young American survivors was
Repubcan JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, of Ken- Ing to make a speech to Ohio County school- dragged out of a tunnel dug through the de-
tucky, who championed the Appalachia mea- teachers, and he has other plans for visits bris after a Korean doctor amputated his leg
sure in the Senate for his party, had already in this city. to free him.
said of him: "Senator JENNINGS RANDOLPH Senator RANDOLPH emphasized that his The doctor, a member of a Korean medical
is an able and effective Senator for West health is fine and his energetic manner and team stationed at Qui Nhon, crawled into the
Virginia and for our country." Senator appearance seem to bear that out. tunnel smashed into the rocks by U.S. Army
COOPER extolled Senator RANDOLPH's "quali- He is now occupied with the administra- Engineers and rescue workers.
ties of heart and mind, his, integrity and tion education bill, and is taking a lively Faint cries from the trapped man were
character." interest in the antipoverty actions of the heard at 2:30 a.m., about 6 hours after Viet-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Marc, 1
tong bombs crumpled the 4-story concrete
building. The soldier was in the rubble for
18 hours before he was pulled out.
By late Thursday, the toll from the blast
was :
One American killed in the hotel when a
bomb went off in the hotel bar. Another
died later in the hospital. Sixteen Ameri-
cans were wounded but survived and got out.
Four escaped injury, and got Out. Twenty-
two others, including two believed to be still
alive, were buried under the mountain of
debris.
The blast also buried 12 Vietnamese house
servants working in the hotel. The mangled
leg of one could be seen protruding from the
rubble.
FAMILY OF SEVEN KILLED
A family of seven Vietnamese living in a
nearby house also died.
All the Americans in the hotel were Army
enlisted men with the 140th Maintenance
Detachment, except for the American killed
in the bar. He was a Special Forces man.
Soon after the first cries for help, the cries
of three other men in the rubble were heard.
One of them was pulled out, leaving two
Others trapped late Thursday.
One of the heroes of the bloody night
killed two of the Vietcong attackers and sur-
vived himself.
Spec. 5 Robert K. Marshall was on the
second floor of the building when the at-
tack began. Vietcong squads poured ma-
chinegun fire into the building.
FIRES BACK WITH RIFLE
Marshall rushed onto the balcony of the
building with his carbine and emptied his
magazine at two terrorists firing from a street
across the way. After killing both, he rushed
back into his room for more ammunition,
but the explosion went off at that moment.
Marshall was evacuated to Saigon.
Marshall saved himself by diving under his
bed when the building collapsed.
The Vietcong bomb squad hit the building
from three sides. A 40-pound explosive
charge in a suitcase was found later in a
store across the street.
Capt. Charles A. Brassart, 32, of Pittsburgh,
Pa., saw the hotel go down.
"I was standing in front of the district
railway office talking to an officer about 20
yards from the hotel," he said. "From where
I was standing I could see only the third sides. He immediately began to lose control
and fourth floors of the hotel. I heard of his regiment. I tried to get him to have
shooting and saw men firing from both di- his men hold position and fight back to no
rections from the balcony of the hotel. avail. I then called for air strikes which I
"At the same time, the lights started to go received. After 21/2 hours of moving under
out. Fifteen seconds later I heard an ex- heavy fire my radio operator and I, directing
plosion which was followed soon afterwards air strikes, stopped the Communists from
by another explosion. completely encircling the regiment. About
"The top two floors of the hotel dis- 1700 hours my luck ran out. I caught a
appeared. " " * They collapsed completely machinegune bullet in the neck, breaking my
out of my vision. I said to myself, oh God, neck and paralyzing me from the chest down.
many must be hurt in there." On August 13, 1964, I was medically retired
NOT FIGHTING MEN from the U.S. Army with 100 percent total
,
'"This was a billet for maintenance men, disability. Upon submitting my claim to the and 'then averaged out at more than a
not for combat soldiers," said Lt, Col. Theo- Veterans' Administration for my VA compen- 100 million tons through even the depres-
dore Metaxis of Seattle, Wash., senior adviser cation (the part granting $1,600 toward pur- Sion years.
to the Vietnamese army's 2d corps. chasing a specially equipped automobile), I
"There are advisers here, not fighting men. was informed that the law (38 USC 1901) Production skyrocketed at the out-
We are not in the war. This is like a pack limits this benefit to veterans whose dis- break of World War II and reached 146
of criminals hitting a bank in any city in the abilities resulted from service during World million tons at the height of our war ef-
United States. They can plan it carefully War II or the Korean conflict, such coverage fort in 1944. Thereafter, there was an-
and launch it and get away with it, and ending January 31, 1955. other slight, drop, but, to assist in the
is what the murderous Vietcong have done." m To ent, my there had knowledge at only the been time one of my other m retire- an return to a peace economy in this coun-
Rescue workers at the scene were work- totally disabled from the war in Vietnam. try and in reconstructing wartorn Eu-
ing to to the point of exhaustion. One who This man was a helicopter pilot from Cali- rope, the mines of our State sent 176 mil.
played a key role in freeing the first trapped fornia, shot down on a combat mission in lion tons to market in 1947.
American was Sp. John Huske, a tall, stocky Vietnam. Because residual oil imports have
man from Ronan, Mont. He was one of the Sir, I feel that there should be an amend- crowded domestic fuel on a progressively
first at the scene and was still there late
Thursday afternoon. meat to this law to cover battle casualties greater scale for almost two decades,
y from Vietnam or any other place in the West Virginia coal business has been
Huske built the tunnel to the trapped world where our troops are required to pull badly hurt. Yet, we have remained un-
man, then stayed, and comforted him. The combat duty.
tunnel was 2 feet wide and 1.0 feet long, In my 4 months of combat duty in Viet- challenged as the Nation's No. 1 producer.
HAD TO BREAK LEG nam, I was awarded the Second Award to After slipping to 1291/2 million tons
In the final moments of the rescue, Husks Combat Infantryman's Badge, First Oak in 1963 we are slowly moving forward
had to break the remaining part of the leg Leaf Cluster to the Purple Heart, and Silver again and last year had a production
which the Korean surgeon could not saw off.
Huske was in tears as he emerged, grimy and
dusty, from the hole.
The Korean doctor administered morphine
and another powerful drug to the trapped
man, but the soldier, who had put a tourni-
quet around his leg before help came, was
still conscious.
The leg was smashed and pierced by a
heavy metal beam.
Qui Nhon, a fairly large city, was almost
deserted on Vietnamese Thursday, and a fire-
fight with the Vietcong was still on. About
100 Vietcong who assaulted the city in junks
Thursday night were still fighting from a
spit of land across the harbor from the city.
U.S. helicopters were hitting the position
hard.
VIENNA, W. VA.,
November 12, 1964.
Hon. ROBERT C. BYRD,
Senator from West Virginia,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR: I don't know if you remember
me. I was the Army captain who fired the
small arms demonstration for you at Vet-
erans' Day ceremonies at Welch, W. Va., 1962.
In early 1963, the Army was asking for
volunteers for combat duty in Vietnam.
Being a career infantry captain, I felt if my
country needed volunteers for combat duty,
it was my responsibility. I responded to this
call. After 8 months of extensive schooling,
I reported for duty with Military Assistance
Advisory Group, Saigon, Vietnam, on Decem-
ber 6, 1983.
With my schooling and combat experience
from the Korean war, I was immediately as-
signed to a line infantry battalion as bat-
talion adviser. After 31/2 months as battal-
ion adviser, I was moved up to regimental
adviser. On the morning of April 4, 1964,
my regiment was ordered to retake a town'
2 kilometers from the Cambodian border
that the Vietcong had taken the night be-
fore. At 1030 hours that morning we made
first contact with a Communist outpost. We
reduced the Communist resistance and con-
tinued to advance. By 1430 hours that after-
noon, after three times failing to heed my
warnings to secure his flanks, the Vietnamese
regimental commander lead his regiment into
Star for gallantry in action. In my opinion,
it makes no difference whether I lost the use
of my legs in Korea or Vietnam. Either
place, I was fighting a common enemy of
the United States with the ultimate goal of
keeping this country and other countries
free from Communist domination.
Any consideration or assistance that you
can render in getting this law amended will
be greatly appreciated by me and other mem-
bers of the Armed Forces who have lost the
use of their legs while fighting In Vietnam.
I have the honor to remain,
Yours very truly,
DONALD S. CUNNINGHAM,
Captain, AUS, Retired.
WEST VIRGINIA-THE NATION'S TOP
COAL PRODUCING STATE
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, the Nation's top coal produc-
ing State is about to reach another mile-
stone. Sometime this month the mines
of West Virginia will produce the 7 bil-
lionth ton in the history of our coal in-
dustry. The occasion is important not
only in tribute to the comfort of our peo-
ple and the industrial progress of our
Nation; it also provides an opportunity to
emphasize that there is a vast volume of
solid fuel remaining within the confines
of our State which will be available to
provide heat and power for generations
to come. Coal was first found in our
part of the Appalachian basin more than
two centuries ago. As early as 1800,
commercial mines were operating in
Brooke and Monongalia Counties. When
West Virginia became an independent
State in 1863, annual production
amounted to about a quarter of a million
tons-most of which came from Ka-
nawha, Preston, Mineral, Mason, and
Marshall Counties. As soon as the War
Between the States was-terminated, pro-
duction Increased quickly, passing the
million-ton mark in 1869.
By that time coal's advantages as a
heating fuel were becoming generally
recognized; railroads branched out to
mine communities and began to take
over a growing share of the transporta-
tion that previously had been confined to
water movement. With the develop-
ment of the bessemer process for steel-
making, coal became established as one
of the world's most important commodi-
ties.
West Virginia's coal output first ex-
ceeded 100 million tons after World War
setled slightly in the middle twenties,
I
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 _L,
oa CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE 3733
tive, logistical support for the Commu- its grip, we would find the tides reversed freedom. But we will give them a
nist - forces in South Vietnam, is a and turning against us. There is no chance to be free. We will not preserve
prerequisite for any negotiation on our question that the tides have been run- freedom in the Philippines or in Malay-
part. I repeat my contention that our ning our way in the 20 years of the sia, but we will provide these nations
determination to stick to this standard cold war. To put these rich resources at with the opportunity to maintain their
should be reinforced, if necessary, by the disposal of a land with too many freedom and their national identity.
systematic air attacks upon selected people and too few resources, would We cannot choose the spot on which we
targets in North Vietnam, beginning clearly contribute to an imbalance in will defend freedom or the conditions by
with smaller tactical targets and work- that quarter and would invite the next which the conflict will be waged. Wher-
ing up, again if necessary, to the larger step, over a longer period of time, which ever freedom, or the chance for freedom,
industrial targets which make up Ha- is a war to redress that imbalance. is threatened, there is where we must go,
noi's potential to wage war. Southeast Asia's resources are rich and there is where we must stand.
The situation in Vietnam has many of enough as to have been the reason for Too often in periods of crisis we spend
the qualities of the situation that existed Japan's starting World War II. There our energies in the academic exercise of
in Czechoslovakia some 25 years ago. is no reason to think that their poten- trying to decide which conflicts affect
It was present in Berlin on another tial to buttress power is altered even in Western civilization and which do not.
occasion. This is the common denomi- the nuclear age. If southeast Asia is There is a simple answer to this question
nator that makes our. position in South to be forfeited to mainland China, this in this era of aggressive Communist ex-
Vietnam synonymous with the position is sufficient to alter the balance of power ploitation of weakness and instability.
that the West was confronted with in in Asia and the world against our na- All conflicts, all wars, anywhere on this
Munich and in many other areas and tional interest. And from the view of earth, pose a real and direct threat to
that led to the rise of Mr. Hitler and Mr. history, a world that finds its spheres Western civilization. These conflicts
Mussolini in the 1930's. of influence between its great powers un- should be eliminated by negotiation, if
During the debate, much has been balanced soon finds itself at war-a big that is possible, or by force, if all else
said about war hawks and pacifists. To war. fails.
those who have used these expressions, Therefore, if we are to keep peace in And we must also accept the realities
let me say that the quickest way to war the world, American policy must direct of existence in our world which are hard
or the inevitable way to war is to con- itself toward both of these sobering
tinue to equivocate in this situation or to. threats. The first is met by taking the non oneunless. Atndth they yia or, e but reacan-that we seek the least unfortunate terms that initiative in clarifying our intentions and expect A solution these
will allow us to ease out of our commit- taking the initiative from Hanoi. To not expect a perfect solution to these
ment in this area, because the going is make sure that we not stumble into war, may conflicts, leave a and
nation a w dividded rkafle forthlution
tough and dirty, and all alternatives are it is important that we clear the air- the i now
unpleasant, thus, the basis for my request to our mediate future. in These and will now
If there is such a bird as a "war Government for a carefully calculated ably ably in t In Vietnam. and wi por-
hawk"-someone who deliberately wants announcement spelling out American iv they a ot In historical but, for
a war now-he should realize that the prerequisites to useful negotiations. the moment, are not permanent;
comer t; but, for
quickest way to get one is to permit the To thwart a second possibility of war, the omene, they are a compromise thae
present situation along the borders to it requires that we draw a firm line future can live with the hope that the
with the Communists always across southeast Asia to match the line of settling Provide a more rational A means
keeping the initiative, and to let the dic- that has already been drawn all the way of sQ+tlig these differences. And ne-
th.tAre of ?T-,+I, Tr;..a......,.,.
----- ___- a -- ----?, -----, ?a, "'_.. "..y a?g alilSL
their actions they can force us to go the aggressors to the north. These joint We will negotiate-indeed, at some
home. Our President has determined to objectives of our policy give us the best time we must negotiates btu t that time
stay. We are determined to stand and chance to avoid war and even a chance is not now. At the presenmoment our
to see, things through. The Commu- to win peace in eastern Asia. While it task must be to set the record straight,
nists think we are going to get out. is fraught with risks and great costs, the to make clear r those whose a andithe eaten They have convinced themselves that alternatives are even worse. scu them to
freemen, the we the
time is on their side and that if they Again, let me state that I am well security , that en, that r accept the
time to strike, continue to press, aware of the risks that we must take- challenge, that risk wand firm, that ac-
we will fold up our tents and go home. they haunt me and should haunt every well take rs risk involved. Let and ex-
So
So long as they have serious doubts American. But they are as nothing cept ct tths risk now in the hope and ex-
our sticking it out, they will per- compared to the risk inherent in inac- then en he equally great risk enable
lish-
risk of es accept
sist in prodding and pushing, to hasten tion. For history shows only too clearly ing then
peace this troubled rea thr ugh
the day of the American pullout. that an aggressor's appetite is not satis- he rule f re n area understanding
I know of no situation that could be fled by peace offerings of small chunks of the rule than reason and uand the more irresponsible than to permit that the territory he is seeking; it is only rather than through terror and the force
of
kind, of policy to continue. whetted and encouraged. Certainly arms.
Our President has seen fit to draw the there are big risks involved in the course Mrsent in
President, I ask unanimous con -
line and to draw it firmly and to make it I suggest, but they are only the risks that at t that there be article p bl the Rn the
clear that we do not intend to pull out will someday have to be faced. To post- New kiTia of S day, aand is the
and that we do not intend to forfeit this pone them is only to increase their po- New York Times of Sondes, and ino an
area to the forces from the north. tential for world destruction. Daily N article News, in report that gton
Mr. President, there is a second road Nor should we be dissuaded by the ews, which ngrt that the
to war. It is a longer path by far, but local conditions of the civil war, which United States is landing a force of
it is just as certain in its horrendous has provided the soft spot now under Marines in Vietnam for the purpose of
consequences, should it ever be traveled. Communist probe. It is deeply regretta- sealing off the 17th parallel.
That, is the road that would lead to the ble that the Government of South Viet- There being no objection, the articles
surrender of this area to the Chinese. nam is unstable and undemocratic, but were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
This in my judgment would completely we are not committed to preserve the Poo- as follows:
unbalance the political forces in that part litical stakes of whichever general hap- [From the New York Times, Feb. 28, lss5
of the world. It is the unbalancing of pens to be in power at the moment. But BRITISH WARY ON CALL FOR VIETNAM
these forces, the world's balance of what we are committed to preserve is NEGOTIATIONS
power, that throughout the history of that same illusive condition for which LONDON, February 26-Officials here are
mankind has led to big wars, both in our free men have struggled, worked, fought, not persuaded that the ,publicized peace
time and in the days of old. and died for many centuries-human moves by President de Gaulle will be help-
Thgefore, if we were to withdraw, if freedom, or the chance to obtain that ful in working toward a settlement in
They .
we were to negotiate our way out of this freedom. We will not give the Viet- Vietnam
of They fear that the talk about negotiations
area that holds the balance Asia in gamete freedom. We cannot give them may obscure what they regard as the central
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 3734
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
problem: How to assure that any political
settlement reached can be enforced on the
scene.
The point is made that there once was a
political settlement-the Geneva agreement
of 1964-but that its terms have been vio-
lated by Communist infiltration from North
to South Vietnam. The need, therefore, is
to find arealistic way of seeing that agree-
ments are observed.
For these reasons British officials see the
necessity for continuing American air attacks
in North Vietnam. They think a real set-
tlement can come only if North Vietnam is
persuaded that the price of trying to take
over the south is too high.
The important thing, as one official put it,
is for the West to leave any conference
table convinced that South Vietnam will be
left alone.
The support for continuing air strikes is
conditioned on one factor-that the strikes
be aimed specifically at northern support of
the Vietcong guerrillas inT the south. Gen-
another matter. pose to do some of this fighting on our own
SOVIET INFLUENCE CRUCIAL terms."
It agreed that the the shaping of any
crucial al part to play iin
settlement. Only if Moscow believes that
the risk is getting too high In the Vietnam
fighting will the time be ripe for negotia-
tions, officials say.
One element that gives concern about Gen-
eral de Gaulle's activity is the possibility
that it may be premature. Government of-
ficials do not think publicized peace moves
are particularly helpful now.
The attitude in the British Government
seems to be close to the American position,
as far as that is known. It is a hard-boiled
attitude, based on the belief that negotia-
tions in Vietnam cannot be a cover for a
handover of the south to the Communists
without endangering the Western position
in Asia generally.
It continues to surprise many observers
that a labor government is taking so firm
a line. The Government is doing so despite
restiveness in the Labor Party's leftwing.
The leader of the conservative opposition,
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, said today that he
thought a political solution in Vietnam
would be desirable. Then he added:
"But I must say America is taking the
right position on the question of negotia-
tions now. There is no basis for a confer-
ence unless we have the certainty that there
would be a way to police what the conference
decides."
[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News,
Mar. 1, 196$j
FIRM ACTION URGED IN VIETNAM: DEMOS BACK
L.E.J. IN CONGRESS
"do whatever is necessary to win * * ? and
if Communist China comes in, we will take
them on, and if Russia wants to deal herself
a hand, we will go ahead, but there will be
no sanctuary."
Senator GALE McGEE, Democrat, of Wyo-
ming, called on the United states to take the
initiative with more aggressive policies.
Representative CLEMENT J. ZABLOcKI, Dem-
ocrat, of Wisconsin, chairman of the House
Far East Subcommittee, said the United
States has issued North Vietnam an ultima-
tum, in effect, to withdraw from South Viet-
nam or face destructive military conse-
quences.
He said North Vietnam must be forced to
realize thatnone of its territory is immune
from attack as a privileged sanctuary.
Senator MCGEE said, "I believe we should
now go a-step further" by increasing bombing
of. North Vietnam if that Is needed.
Senator LONG said bombing North Vietnam
would serve notice that the United States
,.,+ ?r1n to win "and that we don't propose
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
CLAIR ENGLE: A EULOGY
Mr. KUCHEL: Mr. President, last
July 30, 1964, it was my sad duty to an-
nounce to the Senate the death of a dis-
tinguished American statesman, our
beloved friend and late colleague from
California, U.S. Senator Clair Engle.
Clair Engle was a man of high courage
and unique ability. Forceful, colorful,
articulate, and persuasive, he faithfully
served the people of California and the
Nation during all of his adult lifetime.
The Senate had a sweet fondness and a
real respect for him, which reflected the
continuing esteem in which he was held
by all who knew him.
Clair Engle was a Californian in every
sense of the word. He was born in Bak-
ersfield on September 21, 1911. His
grandfather Engle, who was of German-
English decent, had fought in the Mexi-
can War under Gen. Zachary Taylor,
emigrated to California in search of gold
in 1849, and ended up as a cattle rancher.
Clair's father, Fred J. Engle, worked
variously as a cattle rancher, school-
teacher, lawyer, and railroad man. His
mother, whose maiden name was Keeran,
was of Irish heritage and also descended
from California pioneers.
In a State where most of the people are
newcomers, Engle's third-generation
status--on both sides of the family-
made him a Californian indeed.
A top House Republican today labeled
President Johnson's Great Society plan a
blueprint for an all-powerful, one-party
Government.
Representative MELVIN R. LAID, Republi-
can, of Wisconsin, chairman of the House
Republican conference and principal author
of the 1964 GOP national platform, also
assailed Mr. Johnson's conduct of foreign
affairs. He predicted the administration
would seek a negotiated end to the war in
Vietnam and that this would lead to a Com-
munist takeover.
He said Republicans know that commu-
nism respects strength and seeks accommo-
dation only for its own purposes. But he
said the administration apparently will seek
eventually to negotiate itself out of South
Vietnam.
In a speech prepared for House delivery,
Representative LAID said the painfully small
Republican minority in Congress would con-
tinue to speak its piece, and with the voice
of a moral majority.
y
"Though we do not win rollcall votes, we
can win for America the all-important sec- Bluff, which even today numbers only
and look that may save us from blindly ac- 7,000 in population. Red Bluff Is within
cepting a Great Society that might be just sight of Mount Lassen, the only active
another great mistake, just another great volcano in the United States. Years
scheme, just another great debt, accepted later, the Saturday Evening Post was to
without due consideration," he said. note that it was no coincidence that
Representative LAIRD'S major address was Engle grew up near the only active vol-
seen by Republicans as a sort of minority cano in the country, because in adult-
state of the Union message as well as a call
to arms to the Republican ranks. hood he became the only active volcano
He said Republicans will oppose some of in the U.S. Congress. I like that. I
Mr. Johnson's proposals, and offer alterna- thing, perhaps, Clair did too. the typical
tives to others. chilldhoodnof~boyseliving dclose to the
EULOGIES OF THE LATE SENATOR western frontier. He learned to saddle
and ride a horse and rope a calf almost
ENGLE OF CALIFORNIA as soon as he learned to read and write
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The and add. At Red Bluff High School, he
hour of 2 o'clock having arrived, the leg- played basketball, won election as a class
islative business of the Senate will be officer, and was a ferocious fighter, even
suspended, pursuant to Senate Resolu- - though he was younger and smaller than
tion 81, adopted February 23. nearly all of his classmates. That ca-
The clerk will read the resolution. pacity to stand up and fight for the right
The resolution (S. Res. 81) was read, stood the people of my State in good
as follows: stead years later, when he fought their
Resolved, That on Monday, March 1, at 2 battles in the Congress.
s Engle's penchant for fighting led him
o'clock postmeridian, the legislative business
of the Senate be suspended to permit the de- to take up boxing in high school and col-
- +hn+ -+ amatAllrs were
Democratic Congressmen, armed with a
St..te Department "white paper" document-
ing the Communist war against South Viet-
nam, gave strong backing today to President
Johnson's Vietnam policy.
Senator WILLIAM E. PROXMIRE, Democrat,
of Wisconsin, said in a speech prepared for
Senate delivery that Mr. Johnson's Vietnam
policies offer "the best chance for us to
achieve an enduring peace In this enor-
mously complex situation."
He said it would be "a grim mistake" to
attempt to negotiate a settlement if the
Communists have not shown "by their ac-
tions that they want peace and will end the
aggressive conduct that prevents it."
In opposing premature negotiations, Sen-
ator PROXMIRE said, "Perhaps the worst out-
f all -1a be a conference that ended
come o
se
blic
d
.i.._ -_- _
even the glimmer of hope that the possibility Y1Ot an
ate pu
Se
LONG SPEAKS OUT Engle , l a nate from the State of Cali- tice of opening doors and lifting heavy
of peace talks always offers."
forma. objects from the ground with his left
Senate Democratic Whip RUSSELL, B. LONG, Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I hand. His efforts to make himself a
of Louisiana, said the United Statesshould suggest the absence of a quorum. southpaw puncher paid off. He could
At the age of 6 months, Clair moved
with his family to northern California.
settled in the small town of Red
The
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Y q 65 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD' - SENATE 3731
34. An international commission shall be
set up for the control and supervision over
the application of the provisions of the
agreement on the cessation of hostilities in
Vietnam. It shall be composed of representa-
tives of the following States: Canada, India
and Poland.
It shall be presided over by the represent-
ative of India.
35. The international commission shall
set up fixed and mobile inspection teams,
composed of an equal number of officers ap-
pointed by each of the above-mentioned
States. The fixed teams shall be located at
the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-
Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen,
Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon,
Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of
location may, at a later date, be altered at the
request of the Joint Commission, or of one of
the parties, or of the International Commis-
sion itself, by agreement between the Inter-
national Commission and the command of
the party concerned. The zones of action of
the mobile teams shall be the regions border-
ing the land and sea frontiers of Vietnam,
the demarcation lines between the regrouping
zones and the demilitarized zones. Within
the limits of these zones they shall have the
right to move freely and shall receive from
the local civil and military authorities all fa-
cilities they may require for the fulfillment
of their tasks (provision of personnel, plac-
ing at their, disposal documents needed for
supervision, summoning witnesses necessary
for holding enquiries, ensuring the security
and freedom of movement of the inspection
teams, etc.) They shall have at their disposal
such modern means of transport, observation,
and communication as they may require.
Beyond the zones of action as defined above,
the mobile teams may, by agreement with
the command of the party concerned, carry
out other movements within the limits of the
tasks given them by the present agreement.
36. The International Commission shall be
responsible for supervising the proper execu-
tion by the parties of the provisions of the
agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill
the tasks of control, observation, inspection,
and investigation connected with the appli-
cation of the provisions of the agreement on
the cessation of hostilities, and It shall in
particular:
(a) Control the movement of the armed
forces of the two parties, effected within
the framework of the regroupment plan.
(b) Supervise the demarcation lines be-
tween the regrouping areas, and also the
demilitarized zones.
(c) Control the operations of releasing
prisoners of war and civilian internees.
(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well
as along all frontiers of Vietnam the execu-
tion of the provisions of the agreement on
the cessation of hostilities, regulating the
Introduction Into the country of armed
forces, military personnel, and of all kinds of
arms, munitions, and war material.
37. The International Commission shall,
through the medium of the inspection teams
mentioned above, and as soon as possible
either on its own initiative, or at the request
of the Joint Commission, or of one of the
'parties, undertake the necessary investiga-
tions both documentary and on the ground.
38. The inspection teams shall submit to
the International Commission the results of
their supervision, their investigation, and
their observations, furthermore, they shall
draw up such special reports as they may
consider necessary or as may be requested
from them by the Commission. In the case
of a disagreement within the teams, the con-
clusions of each member shall be submitted
to the Commission.
39. If , any one inspection team is unable
to settle an incident or considers that there
Is a violation or a threat of a serious viola-
tion the International Commission shall be
informed; the latter shall study the reports
and the conclusions of the inspection teams
and shall inform the parties of the measures
which should be taken for the settlement of
the incident, ending of the violation, or re-
moval of the threat of violation.
40. When the Joint Commission is unable
to reach an agreement on the interpretation
to be given to some provision or on the ap-
praisal of a fact, the International Com-
mission shall be informed of the disputed
question. Its recommendations shall be sent
directly to the parties and shall be notified
to the Joint Commission.
41. The recommendations of the Interna-
tional Commission shall be adopted by ma-
jority vote, subject to the provisions con-
tained in article 42. If the votes are divided
the Chairman's vote shall be decisive.
The International Commission may formu-
late recommendations concerning amend-
ments and additions which should be made
to the provisions of the agreement on the
cessation of hostilities-in Vietnam, in order
to insure a more effective execution of that
agreement. These recommendations shall be
adopted unanimously.
42. When dealing with questions concern-
ing violations, or threats of violations, which
might lead to a resumption of hostilities,
namely:
(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one
party to effect the movements provided for
in the regroupment plan;
(b) Violation by the armed forces of one
of the parties of the regrouping zones, ter-
ritorial waters, or air space of the other party;
The decisions of the International Com-
mission must be unanimous.
43. If one of the parties refuses to put into
effect a recommendation of the International
Commission, the parties concerned or the
Commission itself shall inform the members
of the Geneva Conference.
If the International Commission does not
teach unanimity in the cases provided for
in article 42, it shall submit a majority report
and one or more minority reports to the
members of the Conference.
The International Commission shall in-
form the members of the Conference in all
cases where its activity Is being hindered.
44. The International Commission shall be
set up at the time of the cessation of hostili-
ties in Indochina in order that it should be
able to fulfill the tasks provided for in article
36.
45. The International Commission for
Supervision and Control in Vietnam shall act
in close cooperation with the International
Commissions for Supervision and Control in
Cambodia and Laos.
The Secretaries-General of these three
Commissions shall be responsible for co-
ordinating their work and for relations be-
tween them.
46. The International Commission for
Supervision and Control in Vietnam may,
after consultation with the International
Commissions for Supervision and Control In
Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to
the development of the situation in Cam-
bodia and Laos, progressively reduce its ac-
tivities. Such a decision must be adopted
unanimously.
47 All the provisions of the present agree-
ment, save the second subparagraph of
article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours
(Geneva time) on July 22, 1954.
Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th
of July 1954 in French and in Vietnamese,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the commander in chief of the People's
Vice Minister of National Defense of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
For the commander in chief of the French
Union Forces in Indochina.
Brigadier General DELTEII.
DECLARATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS,
JULY 23, 1862
(The 1954 Geneva accords provided for
the withdrawal of Vietnamese Communist
forces from Laos and for the reintegration of
the Pathet Lao Into the national community.
However, it was not until 3 years later that
the Pathet Lao, having achieved important
concessions from the Royal Lao Government
agreed to the reunification and ostensibly to
the dissolution of Pathet Lao forces. In
1959, the Pathet Lao reverted to the use of
force and by spring of 1961 won a series of
military victories and were in a position to
take over the country. In 1961 a de facto
cease fire was achieved under the govern-
ment of Prince Boun Oum and the Geneva
Conference to settle the Lao question con-
vened, which finally resulted in agreement in
1962, by which a coalition government would
be established, all foreign troops and mili-
tary personnel withdrawn, and the use of
Lao territory for "interference in the internal
affairs of other countries" was prohibited.)
The Governments of the Union of Burma,
the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the
People's Republic of China, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of France,
the Republic of India, the Polish People's
Republic, the Republic of Vietnam, the King-
dom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America, whose representa-
tives took part in the International Confer-
ence on the Settlement of the Laotian Ques-
tion,1961-62;
Welcoming the presentation of the state-
ment of neutrality by the Royal Government
of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of
this statement, which is, with the concur-
rence of the Royal Government of Laos, in-
corporated in the present declaration. as an
integral part thereof, and the text of which
is as follows:
"The Royal Government of Laos,
"Being resolved to follow the path of peace
and neutrality in conformity with the inter-
ests and aspirations of the Laotian people,.
as well as the principles of the Joint Com-
munique of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and
of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 in order to
build a peaceful, neutral, independent, demo-
cratic, unified, and prosperous Laos,"
"Solemnly declares that:
"(1) It will resolutely apply the five
principles of peaceful co-existence in foreign
relations, and will develop friendly relations
and establish diplomatic relations with all
countries, the neighboring countries first and
foremost, on the basis of equality and of
respect for the independence and sovereignty
of Laos;
"(2) It Is the will of the Laotian people to
protect and insure respect for the sovereignty,
independence, neutrality, unity, and terri-
torial integrity of Laos;
"(3) It will not resort to the use or threat
of force in any way which might impair the
peace of other countries, and will not inter-
fere in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries;
"(4) It will not enter into any military alli-
ance or into any agreement, whether military
or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the
neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos; it will
not allow the establishment of any foreign
military base on Laotian territory, nor allow
any country to use Laotian territory for mili-
tary purposes or for the purposes of interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of other countries,
nor recognize the protection of any alliance
or military coalition, including SEATO.
"(5) It will not allow any foreign inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom
of Laos in any form whatsoever;
"(6) Subject to the provisions of article 5
of the protocol, it will require the with-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 1
drawal from Laos of all foreign troops and
military personnel, and will not allow any
foreign troops or military personnel to be
introduced into Laos;
"(7) It will accept direct and uncondition-
al aid from all countries that wish to help
the Kingdom of Laos build up an independ-
ent and autonomous national economy on
the basis of respect for the sovereignty of
Laos;
"(8) It will respect the treaties and agree-
ments signed in conformity with the inter-
ests of the Laotian people and of the policy
of peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in
particular the Geneva agreements of 1962,
and will abrogate all treaties and agreements
which are contrary to those principles.
"This statement of neutrality by the Royal
Government of Laos shall be promulgated
constitutionally and shall have the force of
law.
"The Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the
states participating in the International
Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian
Question, and to all other states, to recog-
nize the sovereignty, independence, neutral-
ity, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos,
to conform to these principles in all respects,
and to refrain from any action inconsistent
therewith.
Confirming the principles of respect for
the sovereignty, independence, unity and
territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos
and noninterfercence in its internal affairs
which are embodied in the Geneva agree-
ments of 1954;
Emphasizing the principle of respect for
the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos;
Agreeing that the above-mentioned prin-
ciples constitute a basis for the peaceful
settlement of the Laotian question;
Profoundly convinced that the independ-
ence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos
will assist the peaceful democratic develop-
ment of the Kingdom of Laos and the
achievement of national accord and unity in
that country, as well as the strengthening
of peace and security in southeast Asia;
1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with
the will of the Government and people of the
Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the state-
ment of neutrality by the royal government
of Laos of July 9, 1962, that they recognize
and will respect and observe in every way
the sovereignty, independence, neutrality,
unity and territorial integrity of the King-
dom of Laos.
2. Undertake, in particular, that
(a) they will not commit or participate
in any way in any act which mightdirectly
or indirectly impair the sovereignty, inde-
pendence, neutrality, unity or territorial in-
tegrity of the Kingdom of Laos;
(b) they will not resort to the use or
threat of force or any other measure which
might impair the peace of the Kingdom of
Laos;
(d) they will not attach conditions of a
direct. interference in the internal affairs
of the Kingdom of Laos;
(d) they will not attach conditions of a
political nature to any assistance which they
may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos may
seek;
(e) they will not bring the Kingdom of
Laos in any way into any military alliance
or any other agreement, whether military or
otherwise, which is inconsistent with her
neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to
enter into any such alliance or to conclude
any such agreement;
(f) they will respect the wish of the King-
dom of Laos not to recognize the protection
of any alliance or military coalition, includ-
ing SEATO;
(g) they will not introduce into the King-
dom of Laos foreign troops or military per-
sonnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they
in any way facilitate or connive at the intro-
duction of any foreign troops or military
personnel;
(h) they will not establish nor will they
in any way facilitate or connive at the es-
tablishment ;n the Kingdom of Laos of any
foreign military base, foreign strong point or
other foreign military installation of any
kind;
(i) they will not use the territory of the
Kingdom of Laos for interference in the in-
ternal affairs of other countries;
(j) they will not use the territory of any
country, including their own for interference
in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of
Laos.
3. Appeal to all other states to recognize,
respect, and observe in every way the sover-
eignty, independence, and neutrality, and
also the unity and territorial integrity, of the
Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any
action inconsistent with these principles or
with other provisions of the present declara-
tion.
4. Undertake, in the event of a violation
or threat of violation of the sovereignty, in-
dependence, neutrality, unity, or territorial
integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult
jointly with the Royal Government of Laos
and among themselves in order to-consider
measures which might prove to be necessary
to insure the observance of these principles
and the other provisions of the present dec-
laration.
5. The present declaration shall enter into
force on signature and together with the
statement of neutrality by the Royal Govern-
ment of Laos of July 9, 1962, shall be re-
garded as constituting an international agree-
ment. The present declaration shall be de-
posited in the archives of the Governments
of the United Kingdom and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall fur-
nish certified copies thereof to the other
signatory states and to all the other states
of the world.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Pleni-
potentiaries have signed the present declara-
tion.
Done in two copies in Geneva this 23d
day of July 1962 in the English, Chinese,
French, Laotian, and Russian languages, each
text being equally authoritative.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Mr. HILL. Mr. President, as in ex-
ecutive session, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Senate proceed to the con-
sideration of the nomination of Luther
L. Terry, of Alabama, to be Surgeon Gen-
eral of the Public Health Service for a
term of 4 years, which was reported by
me earlier today from the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
the clerk will state the nomination.
The legislative clerk read the nomina-
tion of Luther L. Terry, of Alabama, to
be Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service for a term of 4 years.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is, Will the Senate advise and
consent to the nomination of Luther L.
Terry to be Surgeon General of the Pub-
lic Health Service for a term of 4 years?
The nomination was confirmed.
Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent that the President be im-
mediately notified of the confirmation of
the nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, the President will be noti-
fied forthwith.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
On request by Mr. HILL, and by unan-
imous consent, the Senate resumed the
consideration of legislative business.
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, the
Members of this body have been making
significant contributions, it seems to me,
in their willingness to discuss the many
ramifications concerning Vietnam which
bother not only this country but also the
world at large.
It was on the 17th of February, I be-
lieve, that the marked increase in the
tempo of the discussions on this issue
began. On that occasion, the distin-
guished senior Senator fromIdaho [Mr.
CHURCH] and the distinguished junior
Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Mc-
GovERNT made known their thoughts.
We have had a very protracted collo-
quy on the implications of their sugges-
tion, that we negotiate now. A conse-
quence of that long colloquy has been
the further development and, may I say,
sophistication of the-discussion of this
question. Over this weekend one notes
that a number of things have come to a
head.
In making my own remarks I advo-
cated that in the United States we make
certain that no one on the other side
misunderstands our intentions, that we
get much tougher, that we seal off the
border of South Vietnam, and call the
hand there.
Over the weekend there has been much
discussion of the statement by Soviet
Premier Kosygin. We cannot know its
full meaning, but we can see the range
of what is implied and make our selec-
tions.
I would suspect that his remarks are
met best by the explanation that he is
seeking to get the initiative back from
Peiping, to which it had been lost in 're-
cent weeks, and that they are aimed more
at Peiping than they are Washington.
To the extent that they may have been
addressed to Washington we see the same
kind of language being employed that
was employed by Stalin at the time of
the Berlin crisis, and that was employed
when Khrushchev threatened us in Cuba.
We gave our answer then, and it is
imperative that we likewise be prepared
to give the same answers today; namely,
that we will stand and see it through.
A part of that answer has already been
given by Secretary of State Rusk, in re-
stating our basic position in southeast
Asia, in which he left no doubt as to
where we stand; namely, that as long as
the Reds continue to violate the border
between South and North Vietnam, we
will not go to the bargaining table with
them. We have said again that in-
transigence, belligerence, aggression, and
terror are not suitable credentials for
entrance to honorable negotiations be-
tween nations. Just this weekend the
State Department presented overwhelm-
ing evidence to show the nature of the
new brand of aggression.
I do not agree that all the guerrillas
could be called back by Hanoi, even if
Hanoi wanted to pull them all back, be-
cause many thousands of them could not
be found.
As I have suggested several times in
recent days, I believe we should announce
that the cessation of the act of infiltra-
tion across the Vietnam border by the
forces--regular or irregular-of North
Vietnam, and that the cessation of ac-
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N~KESSIUN~L RECOR 3 ,- 51NATE
ant forces on loth sides, the two parties are the regrouping plan shall continue to be The general delineation of the provisional
'agreed that the cease-fire shah take a ect administered by the former party until such assembly areas is set out in the maps 1 an-
completely and simultango}Isly for the differ- date as all the troops who are to be trans- vexed to the present agreement.
exit sgptors oY the country as follows: ferred have com
letel
ft th
p
y le
at territory so In order to avoid any incidents, no troops
Northern Vietnam at 8 a.m. (local .time) on as to free the zone assigned to the party in shall be stationed less than 1,500 meters from
July 27, 1954. question. From then on, such territory shall the lines delimiting the provisional assembly
Central Vietnam at 8 a.m. (local time) on be regarded as transferred to the other party, areas.
August 1, 1954. who shall assume responsibility for it. During the period until the transfers are
Southern Vietnam at 8 a.m. (local time) on Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is concluded, all the coastal islands west of the
August 11, 1954. no break in the transfer of responsibilities. following lines shall be included in the Hai-
It is agreed that Peiping mean time shall For this purpose, adequate notices shall be phong perimeter:
be taken as, local time. given by the withdrawing party to the other Meridian of the southern point of Kebao
From such time as-the cease-fire becomes party, which shall make the necessary ar- Island
effective in northern Vietnam, both parties rangements, in particular by sending admin- Northern coast of the Ile Rousse (ex-
undertake not to engage in any large-scale istrative and police detachments to prepare cluding the islands), extended as far as the
offensive action in any part of. the Indo- for the assumption of administrative respon- meridian of Campha-Mines
chinese theater of operations and not to sibility. The length of such notice shall be Meridian of Champha-Mines.
commit the air forces based on northern determined by the Trung Gia Military Com- 2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be
Vietnam outside that sector., The two mission. The transfer shall be effected in effected in the following order and within
parties also.. undertake to inform each other successive stages for the various territorial the following periods (from the date of the
of their plans for movement from one re- sectors
3729
All the operations and movements entailed completed within the respective time limits Hanoi perimeter______ _______________ 80
in the cessation of hostilitie and regrouping laid down in article 15 for military move- Haiduongperimeter ------------------ 100
must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion- ments. Haiphong periment__________________ 300
-- -
Sons or organizations on account of their
--- ` ' ? ""-----
effective, the number to be determined on.the activities during the hostilities and to uar- assembly area_____________________ 80
spot by the Triing Gia Military Commission,
antee their democratic liberties g Central Vietnam provist----assembly.
des installment provisio _________ 80
each party shall be responsible for removing d) From the e date of entry . into force of area-first
g (including ( (d) plaint des Jones provisional assem-
and inii1e a lizin bm nes river-
and the present agreement until the movement bly area___________________________ 100
Y of troops is completed, any civilians residing Point Camau provisional assembly
other dangerous substances placed by it. In in a district controlled by one party who wish area -_______-_
the event of its being impossible to complete to go and live in the zone assigned to the provisional --m- 200
the work of removal and neutralization in other party shall be permitted and helped to Central bly Vietnam provisonal asse--
time, the party concerned shall mark the do so by the authorities in that district, y area-last installment ----------- 300
spot by placing visible signs there. All de- CHAPTER III-BAN ON INTRODUCTION OF FRESH
molitlons, minefields, wire entanglements Article 15 TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMS AND
and other hazards to the free movement of The disengagement of the combatants, and MUNITIONS, MILITARY BASES
the personnel of the Joint Commission and the withdrawals and transfers of military Article 16
its joint groups, known to be present after forces, equipment and supplies shall take
the withdrawal of the military forces, shall place in accordance with the following prin. . With effect from the date of entry into
(b) From the time of the cease-fire until military forces, equipment and supplies of ments and additional military personnel is
regrouping is completed on either side of the the two parties shall be completed within prohibited.
demarcation line: 300 days, as laid down in article 2 of the It is understood, however, that the rota-
assembly areas assigned to the other withdrawals shall be made by'sectors, por- nei on a temporary duty basis and the re-
party; tions of sectors or rovinces. Transfers turn of Vietnam of individual personnel af-ter or
(2) When one party's forces withdraw by a from one regrouping zone to another shall be outside short Vietnam tnam shall be leave per temmittedporary the
route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which made in successive monthly installments pro- outside per under the
passes through the territory of the other portionate to the number of troops to be conditions laid down below:
party (see article 24), the latter party's forces transferred; (a) Rotation of units (defined in para-
must provisionally withdraw three kilometers (c) The two parties shall undertake to graph (c) of this article) and groups of per-
on each side of such route, but in such a carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers sonnel shall not be permitted for French
rimanner as to avoid interfering with the in accordance with the aims of the present Union troops stationed north of the provf-
movements of the civil population. agreement shall
sionai military demarcation li
l
i
i
perm
ne
a
d down
t no hostile act ad
,n Article 13 shall take no step whatsoever which might in article 1 of the present agreement,
From the ling of the cease-fire until the hamper such withdrawals and transfers, Ing the withdrawal period provided for In
for in
completion of the movements from one re- They shall assist one another as far as this article 2.
dory between the provisional assembly areas struction or sabotage of any public property eluding officers, shall during any 1 month
assigned to the French Union forces north and no injury to the life and property of the be permitted to enter that part of the coun-
of the demarcation line on the one hand civil population. They shall permit no in- try north of the provisional military demar-
and the Laotian,frontier and the regrouping terierence in local civil administration; cation line on a temporary duty basis or to
zone assigned to the French Union forces on (e) The Joint Commission and the Inter- return there after short periods of leave or
the other hand, national Oommjasiotl shall insure that steps temporary duty outside Vietnam.
The position of the air-corridors, their are' taken to safeguard the forces in the (b) "Rotation" is defined as the replace-
Width, the safety route for single-engined their course of withdrawal and transfer: other meer of units or
amt groups of personnel r-
military aircraft transferred to the south (f) The Trung Gla Military Commission, units of the same echelon or per-
and the search and rescue procedure for air- and later the Joint Commission, shall de- sonnel who are arriving in Vietnam ter erritory
craft in distress &shall be determined on the termine by common agreement the exact to do their oversea service there;
spot by the distress Gia Military Commission. procedure for the disengagement of the com- (c) The units rotated shall never be larger
batants and for troop withdrawals and trans- than a battalion-or the corresponding eche-
4rtiFle 24 fers, Ion for air and naval forces;
Political and on the basis of the principles men-
administrative measures in tioned above and within the framework laid (d) Rotation shall be conducted on a
the two regrouping zones, on either side of down below: man-for-man basis, provided, however, that
the provisional military demarcation line: 1. The disengagement of the combatants, in any one quarter neither party shall intro-,500 (a) Pending the general elections which including the concentration of the armed duce more than 1nam members of its armed
will bring about the unification of Vietnam, forces of all kinds and also each forces into Vietnam under the rotation
'the conduct of civil administration in each party's policy.
regrouping zone shall s the hands of movements into the provisional assembly
areas assigned to it and the other party's (e) Rotation units (defined of paragraph
the party whose forces are to be regrouped provisional withdrawal from it, shall be com- n t eh is vidua and onnel oe boned In
there in virtue of, the present agreement; pleted within a period not exceeding 15 days and the individual personnel menticed In
(b) Any territory controlled by one party after the date when the cease-fire becomes
which is transferred to the other party by effective.
Not reprinted here.
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Article 19
With effect from the date of entry into
force of the present agreement, no military
base under the control of a foreign state may
be established in the regrouping zone of
either party; the two parties shall insure
that the zones assigned to them do not ad-
here to any military alliance and are not
used for the resumption of hostilities or to
further an aggressive policy.
Article 20
The points of entry into Vietnam for rota-
tion personnel and replacements of material
are fixed as follows:
Zones to the north of the provisional mili-
this article, shall enter and leave Vietnam
only through the entry points enumerated
in article 20 below:
(f) Each party shall notify the joint
commission and the international commis-
sion at least 2 days in adance Of any
arrivals or departures of units, groups of
personnel and individual personnel in or
from Vietnam. Reports on the arrivals or
departures of units, groups of personnel and
individual personnel in or from Vietnam
shall be submitted daily to the joint com-
mission and the international commission.
All the above-mentioned notifications and
reports shall indicate the places and dates
of arrival or departure and the number of
persons arriving or departing.
(g) The international commission through
its inspection teams, shall supervise and
inspect the rotation of units and groups of
personal and the arrival and departure of
individual personnel as authorized above, at
the points of entry enumerated in article 20
below.
tary demarcation line: Laokay, Langson,
Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi,
Muong-Sen;
Zone to the south of the provisional mili-
tary demarcation line : Tourane, Quinhon,
Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques,
Tanchau.
CHAPTER IV-PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN
INTERNEES
Article 21
Article 17
(a) With effect from the date of entry
into force of the present agreement, the
introduction into Vietnam ofany reinforce-
ments in the form of all types of arms, mu-
nitions and other war material, such as
combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ord-
nance, jet engines and jet weapons and ar-
mored vehicles, is prohibited.
(b) It is understood, however, that war
material, arms, and munitions which have
been destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used
up -after the cessation of hostilities may be
replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the
same type and with similar characteristics.
Such replacement of war material, arms, and
munitions shall not be permitted for French
Union troops stationed north of the pro-
visional military demarcation line laid down
in article 1 of the present agreement, during
the withdrawal period provided for In article
2.
Naval. craft may perform transport opera-
tions between the regrouping zones.
(c) The war material, arms, and munitions
for replacement purposes provided for in
paragraph (b) of this article, shall be intro-
duced into Vietnam only through the points
of entry enumerated in article 20 below. War
material, arms, and munitions to be replaced
shall be shipped from Vietnam only through
the points of entry enumerated in article 20
below;
(d.) Apart from the replacements permitted
within the limits laid down in paragraph (b)
of this article, the introduction of war ma-
terial, arms, and munitions of all types in the
form of unassembled parts for subsequent
assembly is prohibited;
(e) Eachparty shall notify the Joint Com-
mission and the International Commission
at least 2 days in advance of any arrivals or
departures which may take place of war
material, arms, and munitions of all types.
In order to justify the requests for the
introduction into Vietnam of arms, muni-
tions, and other war material (as defined in
paragraph (a) of this article) for replace-
ment purposes, a report concerning each in-
coming shipment shall be submitted to the
Joint Commission and the International
Commission. Such reports shall Indicate the
use made of the items so replaced.
(f) The International Commission,
through its inspection teams, shall supervise
and. Inspect the replacements permitted in
the circumstances laid down In this article,
at the points of entry enumerated in article
20 below.
-Article 18
With effect from the date of entry into
force of - the present agreement, the estab-
lishment of new military bases is prohibited
throughout Vietnam territory.
The liberation and repatriation of all pris-
oners of war and civilian Internee detained
by each of the two parties at the coming into
force of the present agreement shall be car-
ried out under the following conditions:
(a) All prisoners of war and civilian in-
ternees of Vietnam, French and other na-
tionalities captured since the beginning of
hostilities in Vietnam during military opera-
tions or in any other circumstances of war
and in any part of the territory of Vietnam
shall be liberated within a period of 30 days
after the date when the cease-fire becomes
effective in each theater.
(b) The term "civilian internees" is under-
stood to mean all persons who, having in any
way contributed to the political and armed
struggle between the two parties, have been
arrested for that reason and have been kept
in detention by either party during the period
of hostilities.
(c) All prisoners of war and civilian in-
ternees held by either party shall be sur-
rendered to the appropriate authorities of
the other party, who shall give them all pos-
sible assistance in proceeding to their coun-
try of origin, place of habitual residence or
the zone of their choice.
CHAPTER V-MISCELLANEOUS
Article 22
The commanders of the forces of the two
parties shall insure that persons under their
respective commands who violate any of the
provisions of the present agreement are suit-
ably punished.
commit no act and undertake no operation
against the other party and shall not engage
in blockade of any kind in Vietnam.
For the purposes of the present article, the
word "territory" includes territorial waters
and airspace.
Article 25
The commanders of the forces of the two
parties shall afford full protection and all
possible assistance and cooperation to the
Joint Commission and its joint groups and
to the International Commission and its in-
spection teams in the performance of the
functions and tasks assigned to them by the
present agreement.
Article 26
The costs involved in the operations of the
Joint Commission and joint groups and of
the International Commission and its In-
spection teams shall be shared equally be-
tween the two parties.
Article 27
The signatories of the present agreement
and their successors in their functions shall
be responsible for insuring and observance
and enforcement of the terms and provi-
sions there of. The commanders of the
forces of the two parties shall, within their
respective commands, take all steps and
make all arrangements necessary to insure
full compliance with all the provisions of
the present agreement by all elements and
military personnel under their command.
The procedures laid down in the present
agreement shall, whenever necessary, be
studied by the commanders of the two
parties and, if necessary, defined more spe-
cifically by the Joint Commission.
CHAPTER VI-JOINT COMMISSION AND INTER-
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND
CONTROL IN VIETNAM
28. Responsibility forthe execution of the
agreement' on the cessation of hostilities
shall rest with the parties.
29. An International Commission shall in-
sure the control and supervision of this exe-
cution.
30. In order to facilitate, under the condi-
tions shown below, the execution of provi-
sions concerning joint actions by the two
parties, a Joint Commission shall be set up
in Vietnam.
31. The Joint Commission shall be com-
posed of an equal number of representatives
of the commanders of the two parties.
32. The presidents of the delegations to the
Joint Commission shall hold the rank of
general.
The Joint Commission shall set up joint
groups the number of which shall be deter-
mined by mutual agreement between the
parties. The joint groups shall be composed
of an equal number of officers from both
parties.' Their location on the demarcation
line between the regrouping zones shall be
determined by the parties whilst taking into
account the powers of the Joint Commission.
33. The Joint Commission shall insure the
execution of the following provisions of the
agreement on the cessation of hostilities:
(a) A simultaneous and general cease-
fire in Vietnam for all regular and irregular
armed forces of the two parties.
(b) A regroupment of the armed forces of
the two parties.
(c) Observance of the demarcation lines
between the regrouping zones and of the de-
militarized sectors.
Within the limits of its competence it
shall help the parties to execute the said
provisions, shall insure liaison between them
for the purpose of preparing and carrying
out plans for the application of these pro-
visions, and shall endeavor to solve such dis-
puted questions as may arise between the
parties in the course of executing these pro-
visions.
Article 23
In cases in which the place of burial is
known and the existence of graves has been
established, the commander of the forces
of either party shall, within a specific period
after the entry into force of the armistice
agreement, permit the graves service per-
sonnel of the other party to enter the part
of Vietnam territory under their military
control for the purpose of finding and re-
moving the bodies of deceased military per-
sonnel of that party, including the bodies
of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint
Commission shall determine the procedures
and the time limit for the performance of
this task. The commanders of the forces
of the two parties shall communicate to
each other all information in their posses-
sion as to the place of burial of military per-
sonnel of the other party.
Article 24
The present agreement shall apply to all
the armed forces of either party. The armed
forces of each party shall respect the de-
militarized zone and the territory under the
military control of the other party, and shall
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1965 ~ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that an Asia of free and independent national
will come only when aggressors leave their states that would be progressively freed of
neighbors in peace." colonialism, that need threaten neither each
Though it has been apparent for years that other nor neighboring states, and that could
the regime in Hanoi was conducting a cam- tackle in their own way the eternal prob-
paign of conquest against South Vietnam, lems of building political and economic
the government In Saigon and the Govern- structures that would satisfy the aspiration
ment of the United States both hoped that of their peoples.
the danger could be met within South Viet- That kind of Par East was a pretty good
nam itself. The hope that any widening of definition of our national interests then.
the conflict might be avoided was stated it is equally valid today. We cared about
frequently. the Far East, and we care today, because we
The Leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with know that what happens there-among peo-
greater violence. They apparently interpret- ples numbering 33 percent of the world's
ed restraint as indicating lack of will. Their population, with great talent, past historic
efforts were pressed with greater vigor and greatness and capacity-is bound to make a
armed attacks and Incidents of terror multi- crucial difference whether there will be the
plied. ' kind of world in which the common ideals of
Clearly the restraint of the past was not freedom can spread, nations live and work
providing adequately for the defense of South together without strife, and-most basic of
Vietnam against Hanoi's open aggression. It all-we ourselves, in the long run, survive as
was mutually agreed between the Govern- the kind of nation we are determined to be.
ments Of the Republic of Vietnam and the Our basic stake in the Far East is our stake
United States that further means for pro- in a peaceful and secure world as distinct
viding for South Vietnam's defense were from a violent and chaotic one. But there
required. Therefore, air strikes have been were three great flaws in the 1945 picture af-
made against some of the military assembly ter the defeat of Japan.
points and supply bases from which North 1. In China, a civil. war had been raging
Vietnam was conducting its aggression since the 1920's between the Government, led
against the South. These strikes constitute by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Com-
a limited response fitted to the aggression munist movement. After a brief and edgy
that produced them. truce during the war against Japan, that civil
Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt war was resumed in circumstances where
its intervention in the South, or until effec- the Government had been gravely weakened.
,tive steps are taken to maintain peace and We assisted that Government in every way
security in the area the Governments of possible. Mistakes may have been made, but
South Vietnam and the United States will in the last analysis mainland China could not
coiltinue necessary measures of defense have been saved from communism without
against the Communist armed aggression the commitment of major U.S. ground and
coming from North Vietnam. air forces to a second war on the Asian main-
land. Faced with a concurrent threat from
[From'the Washington (D.C.) Sunday Star, Soviet Russia against Europe and the Near
,Feb. 28, 1965] East, we did not make-and perhaps could
NOW_ OUR EASTERN POLICY LED To not then have made-that commitment.
VIETNAM And there came to power on the mainland,
This explanation of American policy in in the fall of 1949, a Communist regime filled
( with hatred of the West, with the vision of a
Vietnam was made by William P. Bundy, potential dominant role for China, but im-
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern bued above all with a primitive Communist
Affairs, in a recent speech in Washington, ideology in its most virulent and expansion-
Mo.) ist form.
The first question requires a look at KOREA ACTION ANALYZED
history. 2. In Korea, a divided country stood un-
-Even when the Far East was much more easily, half free and half Communist. With
distant? than it is today, we Americans had emmsharply reduced after
.deep concern for developments there. Amer- our war, military part might what may been an have
ferns pioneered in trade and missionary ef- inevitable slackening of effort, we withdrew
fort with China and in opening up Japan to our forces and reduced our economic aid be-
Western influence. In 1898 we became in a fore there was in existence a strong South
sense a colonial power in the Philippines, but Korean defensive capacity. With, Soviet
.began almost at once to prepare the way for backing, North Korea attacked across the
Independence and self-government there- 38th parallel in June 1950. With the Soviets
an independence promised by act of Con- then absent from the U.N. Security Council,
gress in 1936 and achieved on schedule in the U.N. was able to condemn the aggression
1946. By the 1930'x, we had wide interests and to mount a U.N. effort to assist South
of many types in the Far East, though only Korea. The United States played by far
few direct contacts in southeast Asia apart the greatest outside role in a conflict that
from the individual Americans who had brought 157,530 U.S. casualties, cost us at
served over decades as political advisers to least $18 billion in direct expenses, and in
the independent kingdom of Thailand. the end-after Communist China had also
Events then took a more ominous turn. intervened-restored an independent South
We became aware that the ambitions of Korea, although it left a unified and free
Japanese military leaders to dominate all of Korea to be worked out in the future.
Asia were a threat not only to the specific In retrospect; our action in Korea reflected
interests `of ourselves and other Western ha- three elements:
tions, but to the peace of the whole area A recognition that aggression of any sort
and indeed of the world. China, in which must be met early and head on, or it will have
we had taken a lead in dismantling the 19th- to be met later and in tougher circum-
century system of foreign special privileges stances. We had relearned the lessons of the
was progressively threatened and large parts 1930's-Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland,
overrun. We ourselves were finally attacked Czechoslovakia.
at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. We A recognition that a defense line in Asia,
responded to aggression by conducting with stated in terms of an island perimeter, did
our Allies a major Pacific war that cost the not adequately define our vital interest-
United States alone 272,700 casualties and that those vital interests could be affected by
over a hundred billion dollars. action on the mainland of Asia.
VIM BASIC STAKE An understanding that, for the future, a
In the end Japanese militarism was power vacuum was an invitation to aggres-
defeated, and the way apparently cleared for sion, that there must be local political, eco-
nomic, and military strength in being to
make aggression unprofitable, but also that
there must be a demonstrated willingness of
major external power both to assist and to
intervene if required.
3. In southeast Asia, finally, there was a
third major flaw-the difficulty of liquidating
colonial regimes and replacing them by new
and stable independent governments. The
Philippines became independent and with
our help overcame the ravages of war and
the Communist Huk rebellion. The British,
who had likewise prepared India and Burma
and made them independent, were in the
process of doing the same in Malaya even as
they joined with the Malayans in beating
back a 12-year Communist subversive effort.
Indonesia was less well prepared; it gained
its independence, too, with our support, but
with scars that have continued to affect the
otherwise natural and healthy development
of Indonesian nationalism.
LEADERSHIP FALLS TO COMMUNISTS
French Indochina was the toughest case.
The French had thought in terms of a slow
evolution to an eventual status within some
French union of states--a concept too lei-
surely to fit the post war mood of Asia. And
militant Vietnamese nationalism had fallen
to the leadership of dedicated Communists.
We all know the results. Even France
was unable to defeat the Communist-led na-
tionalist movement. Despite last-minute
promises of independence, the struggle in-
evitably appeared as an attempt to preserve
a colonial position. By 1954, it could only
have been won, again, by a major U.S. mili-
tary commitment, and perhaps not even
then. The result was the settlement at
Geneva. The accords reached there were
almost certainly the best achievable, but
they left a situation with many seeds of
future trouble. Briefly:
1. North Vietnam was militantly Commu-
nist, and had developed during the war
against the French an army well equipped
and highly skilled in both conventional and
subversive warfare. From the start, North'
Vietnam planned and expected to take over
the south and in due course Laos and Gam-
.podia, thinking that this would probably
happen by sheer decay under pressure, but
prepared to resort to other means if needed.
2. South Vietnam had no effective or popu-
lar leadership to start with, was demoralized
and unprepared for self-government, and
had only the remnants of the Vietnamese
military forces who had fought with the
French. Under the accords, external military
help was limited to a few hundred advisers.
Apart from its natural self-sufficiency in food,
South Vietnam had few assets that appeared
to match those of the north in the struggle
that was sure to come.
3. Cambodia was more hopeful in some
respects, more remote from North Vietnam,
with a leader in Prince Sihanouk, a strong
historical tradition, and the freedom to ac-
cept external assistance as she saw fit. From
the start Sihanouk insisted, with our full
and continuing support, on a status of
neutrality.
4. Laos, however, was less "unified and was
left under the accords with a built-in and
legalized Communist presence, a disrupted
and weak economy, and no military forces of
significance.
ACTION STARTED IN 1954
Such was the situation President Eisen-
hower and Secretary Dulles faced in 1954.
Two things were clear; that in the absence
of external help communism was virtually
certain to take over the successor states of
Indochina and to move to the borders of
Thailand and perhaps beyond, and that with
France no longer ready to act, at least in
South Vietnam, no power other than the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 1
United States could move in to help fill the
vacuum.
Their decision, expressed in a series of ac-
tions starting In late 1954, was to move in
to help these countries. Besides South Viet-
nam, and more modest efforts in Laos and
Cambodia, substantial assistance was begun
in Thailand.
The appropriations for these actions were
voted by successive Congresses, and in 1954
the Senate likewise ratified the Southeast
Asia Treaty, to which Thailand and the
Philippines adhered along with the United
States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zea-
land, and Pakistan. Although not signers
of the treaty, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia could call on the SEATO members for
help against aggression.
COMMITMENT WAS MADE
So a commitment was made with the sup-
port of both political parties, that has guided
our policy in southeast Asia for a decade
now. It was not a commitment that en-
visaged a U.S. position of power in south-
east Asia or U.S. military bases there. We
threatened no one. Nor was it a commitment
that substituted U.S. responsibility for the
basic responsibility of the nations them-
selves for their own defense, political sta-
bility, and economic progress. It was a com-
mitment to do what we could to help these
nations attain and maintain the independ-
ence and security to which they were en-
titled-both for their own sake and because
we recognized that, like South Korea, south-
east Asia was a key area of the mainland of
Asia. If it fell to Communist control, this
would enormously add to the momentum and
power of the expansionist Communist
regimes in Communist China and North Viet-
nam, and thus to the threat to the whole free
world position -in the Pacific.
Let us look at Vietnam from the beautiful
city of Saigon. I visited Saigon in December
of 1963 with five of my colleagues, and spoke
at length with Gen. Paul D. Harkins, com-
mander of our Military Assistance Advisory
Group, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and
many of our American military and business-
men. in the area. The most striking thing
about Vietnam is the fact that it is the
richest agricultural area in the world. The
experts have said that sufficient food can be
produced in this area to feed almost all of
Asia. This territory in the southern portion
of Vietnam also permits guerrilla forces to
live off the land without a constant resupply
to sustain their activities in the field. The
area is abundant in geese, ducks, and of
course the staple commodity-rice.
During the early phase of the Vietnamese
operation against the Vietcong, our military
adviser initiated a policy wherein all of the
villages of the country were organized and
defended in a unique manner. Instead of
letting the farmers fall prey to small ma-
rauding bands of Vietcong, each town was
fortified. The valuables were placed in a
warehouse or hut in the center of town, and
at the first sign of an attack, the villagers
would retreat to this redoubt, and a radio
call for help was sent to the nearest army
force whose immediate response was guaran-
teed through the use of helicopters and other
high-speed aircraft, in conjunction with para-
troop operations. When the war was vir-
tually won in the north the Vietcong were
starved out, but in the south they could rely
upon the overabundance in the Mekong
Delta to support their opeartion, hence their
success in the Saigon area.
HAD TO STOP WAR
The war has been further complicated by
the very complex situation within the coun-
try. You can imagine the problems our ad-
visers had with the turnover of governments.
The American advisers had to get military
advice to the proper authorities, and to de-
termine who was in power very often caused
a cessation of combat operations with the
enemy. In effect, the war would stop while
the heads of government and the key lead-
ers In the army were change(L and this meant
a complete retraining program by the Ameri-
can mission of all military unit heads as well
as political subdivision chiefs.
Probably one of the hallmarks of our mis-
sion in Vietnam has been the extreme pa-
tience of our American advisers, from our
Ambassador and military commandars, down
to the valiant Americans who spill their
blood along with their Vietnamese comrades.
The situation to say the least is vexatious
but we must always keep our eyes on our
strategic role-that of thwarting these Com-
munist advances.
We will be successful. The Vietnamese
will win their struggle. However, the road
to victory never has been easy. The future
may call for more intensive strikes at the
base and source of Communist power and
aggression in North Vietnam. The borders
of South Vietnam may have to be sealed
to prevent the flow of reinforcements and
war material to the subversive Communist
army. The 1,800 miles of coastline must be
patrolled and the potential for resupply of
North Vietnamese operations on the sea be
destroyed.
The American people stand firm behind
their President and behind the principles of
freedom everywhere.
AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILI-
TIES IN VIETNAM, JULY 20, 1954
(The Geneva agreements theoretically
ended the war between French Union forces
and the Vietminh In Laos, Cambodia, and
Vietnam. These states were to become fully
independent countries, with the last named
partitioned near the 17th parallel into two
states pending reunification through free
elections to be held by July 20, 1956. The
United States and Vietnam are not signa-
tories to these agreements.)
CHAPTER I-PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCA-
TIONLINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Article 1
A provisional military demarcation line
shall be fixed, on either side of which the
forces of the two parties shall be regrouped
after their withdrawal, the forces of the
People's Army of Vietnam to the north of
the line and theforces of the French Union
to the south.
The provisional military demarcation line
is fixed as shown on the map attached
(omitted).
It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone
shall be established on either side of the
demarcation line, to a width of not more
than 5 kilometers from it, to act as a buffer
zone and avoid any incidents which might
result in the resumption of hostilities.
Article 2
The period within which the movement
of all the forces of either party into its
regrouping zone on either side of the pro-
visional military demarcation line shall be
completed shall not exceed 300 days from
the date of the present agreement's entry
into force.
Article 3
When. the provisional military demarca-
tion line coincides with a waterway, the
waters of such waterway shall be open to
civil navigation by both parties wherever
one bank is controlled by one party and
the. other bank by the other party. The
Joint Commission shall establish rules of
navigation for the stretch of waterway in
question. The merchant shipping and other
civilian craft of each party shall have un-
restricted access to the land under its mili-
tary control.
Article 4
The provisional military demarcation line
between the two final regrouping zones is
extended into the territorial waters by a
line perpendicular to the general line of the
coast.
All coastal islands north of this boundary
shall be evacuated by the armed forces of
the French Union, and all islands south of
it shall be evacuated by the forces of the
People's Army of Vietnam.
Article 5
To avoid any incidents which might re-
sult in the resumption of hostilities, all
military forces, supplies, and equipment
shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized
zone within 25 days of the present agree-
ment's entry into force.
Article 6
No person, military or civilian, shall be
permitted to cross the provisional military
demarcation line unless specifically author-
ized to do so by the Joint Commission.
Article 7
No person, military or civilian, shall be
permitted to enter the demilitarized zone ex-
cept persons concerned with the conduct of
civil administration and relief and persons
specifically authorized to enter by the Joint
Commission.
Article 8
Civil administration and relief in the de-
militarized zone on either side of the pro-
visional military demarcation line shall be
the responsibility of the commanders in
chief of the two parties in their respective
zones. The number of persons, military or
civilian, from each side who are permitted
to enter the demilitarized zone for the con-
duct of civil administration and relief shall
be determined by the respective command-
ers, but in no case shall the total number
authorized by either side exceed at any one
time a figure to be determined by the Trung
Gia Military Commission or by the Joint
Commission. The number of civil police and
the arms to be carried by them shall be deter-
mined by the Joint Commission. No one else
shall carry arms unless specifically authorized
to do so by the Joint Commission.
Article 9
Nothing contained in this chapter shall
be construed as limiting the complete free-
dom of movement, into, out of or within the
demilitarized zone, of the Joint Commission,
its joint-groups, the International Commis-
sion to be set up as indicated below, its in-
spection teams and any other persons, sup-
plies or equipment specifically authorized to
enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint
Commission. Freedom of movement shall be
permitted across the territory under the mili-
tary control of either side over any road or
waterway which has to be taken between
points within the demilitarized zone when
such points are not connected by roads or
waterways lying completely within the de-
militarized zone.
CHAPTER II-PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOV-
ERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT
AGREEMENT
Article 10
The commanders of the forces on each
side, on the one side the commander in chief
of the French Union forces in Indochina and
on the other side the commander in chief
of the People's Army of Vietnam, shall order
and enforce the complete cessation of all
hostilities in Vietnam by all armed forces
under their control, including all units and
personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.
Article 11
In accordance with the principle of a sim-
ultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina,
the cessation of hostilities shall be simul-
taneous throughout all parts of Vietnam, in
all areas of hostilities and for all the forces
of the two parties.
Taking into account the time effectively
required to transmit the cease-fire order
down to the lowest echelons of the combat-
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196,5 OONCRESSIONAL RECORD 'SENATE 3725
tired of killing other Vietnamese. After sev-
eral months of soul searching, he decided to
surrender to the authorities of the Republic
of Vietnam. He has volunteered to do any-
thing to serve the national cause yf South
'VO THOI
Sgt. Vo Thoi (Communist party alias Vo
Bien) was an assistant squad leader in the
Vietcong Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the
night of October 7, 1963, his unit attacked
An Tuong village in Binh Dinh Province.
After overrunning the village, Vo's company
was assigned to set up an ambush against
Republic of Vietnam troops rushing to de-
fend the village. In the ensuing fight, Vo
was seriously wounded. He was picked up
by local farmers and turned over to the au-
thorities.
Vo's life and experiences were similar to
those of thousands of Vietcong. Born in
Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went
through 5 years of school and then worked
on his parents' small farm. During the war
against the French, he joined the Viet Minh
forces. When the fighting ended, he was
transferred to North Vietnam with his unit,
the 210th Regiment. He remained in the
North Vietnamese Army until 1960 when. he
was sent to work on a state farm lu,Nghe An
Province. In September 1962, Vo was told he
must join the newly activated 22d Battalion.
All the members 4f the battalion came from
provinces in South Vietnam, from Quang Tri
to, Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary
battalion; two-thirds of its members were
cadre with ranks up to senior captains.
The group was put through an advanced
training course that lasted 6 months. It in-
cluded combat tactics for units from squad
to company and the techniques of guerrilla
and counterguerrilla fighting. There were
heavy doses of political indoctrination.
On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion was
ordered to move South. They were trans-
ported in trucks from Nghe An Province to
Doug Hoi in Quang Binh, just north of the
17th parallel. From there the unit was
moved westward to the Laotian border.
Then the more than 300 men began walking
to the south following mountain trails in
l,,aos and the Vietnam border area. 'they
marched by day, rested at night. Every
fifth day, they stopped at a way station for a
full day's rest. One company dropped off at
Thua Thien Province. Vo and the remainder
of the group marched on to Pleiku Province.
Two fully, armed companies from a neighbor-
ing province were assigned to the battalion.
The assignment given to the 'Tay Son Bat-
talion was to harass strategic hamlets in the
Hoaian district of Binh Dinh, to round up
cattle and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the
Government forces, and to recruit 'local
youth for service with the Vietcong.
NATIVES, TOO
Native North Vietnamese military personnel
The Communist authorities in Hanoi are
now assigning native North Vietnamese in
increasing numbers to join the Vietcong
forces in South Vietnam.
Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Prov-
ince in North Vietnam in 1936. He, was
captured by South Vietnamese forces on
May 5, 1964. He described himself as a mili-
tary security officer. He infiltrated into
South Vietnam in April 1964 with a group of
34 police and security officers from North
Vietnam.
Another,. native North Vietnamese captured
in the,$outh ,was V}eteong Private First Class
Vo Quyen. His home was in Nam Dihn Prov-
ince. He was a member of the 2d Battalion
of the North Vietnamese Army's 9th Regi-
ment. He said the entire battalion had
infiltrated into South Vietnam between
February and May last year. He was cap-
tured in an action in Quang Tri Province on
July 4. He told interrogators that the bulk
of his unit was composed of young draftees
from North Vietnam.
Le Pham Hung, also a private first class,
was captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Prov=
ince. He is a-native of Nam Dinh in North
Vietnam. He had been drafted for military
service in May 1963. His unit was the 324th
Division. His group, consisting solely of 90
North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into
South Vietnam in May 1964. He reported
that another company of North Vietnamese
entered the'south at the same time as his
unit.
A former member of the 90th Vietcong Bat-
talion reported that his unit had been rein-
forced by native North Vietnamese troops
earlier this year. Le Thua Phuong, an in-
formation cadre, surrendered to government
forces on April 23, 1964. He said that the
90th Battalion had received 80 North Viet-
namese replacements in February.
A medical technician named Hoang Thung
was captured in Thua Thien Province on
July 4, 1964. He said he had infiltrated into
the south in late 1963 with a group of 200
Vietcong, the majority of whom were ethnic
northerners, 120 of them draftees.
These reports destroy one more fiction
which the authorities in Hanoi have sought
so long to promote-that the fighting in the
south was a matter for the South Vietnamese.
They underline Hanoi's determination to
press its campaign of conquest with every
available resource.
INTELLIGENCE
The heart of the Vietcong intelligence or-
ganization is the central research bureau in
Hanoi. Communist agents are regularly dis-
patched from North Vietnam, sometimes for
brief assignments but often for long periods.
Many of these agents move into South Viet-
nam along the infiltration trails through
Laos, But others are carried by boats along
the coasts and landed at prearranged sites.
A special maritime infiltration group has
been developed in North Vietnam and its
operations are centered in Ha Tinh and
Quang Binh provinces just north of the 17th
parallel.
In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelli-
gence agent named Nguyen Viet Duong be-
gan training to infiltrate South Vietnam.
A native southerner, he had fought against
the French and had gone to North Vietnam
after the war ended. Selected for intelli-
gence work, he was assigned to the central
bureau in 1959.
After a period of intensive instruction in
radio transmission, coding and decoding, and
other skills of the intelligence trade, he was
given false identity papers and other sup-
plies and was transported to the South. His
principal task was to set up a cell of agents
to collect military information. He flew
from Hanoi to Dong Hot. From the latter
port, the maritime infiltration group took
him by boat to South Vietnam. That was
in August 1962.
In January 1963, Luong reported to Hanoi
that he had run into difficulties. His money
and papers had been lost and he had been
forced to take refuge with Vietcong contacts
in another province. Another agent was
selected to go to South Vietnam. One of his
assignments was to contact Duong, find out
details of what had happened to him, and
help Duong reestablish himself as a Vietcong
agent. The man selected for the task was
Senior Capt. Tran Van Tan of the central
intelligence organization.
Tan had already been picked to go to the
South to establish a clandestine Vietcong
communications center to maintain contact
with Hanoi. Helping Duong was one of his
secondary assignments. After intensive
preparations, Tan was ready to move to
South Vietnam in March. He was trans-
ferred to an embarkation base of the mari-
time infiltration group just north of the 17th
Parallel.
He was joined by three other Vietcong
agents and the captain' and three crewmen
of the boat that would take them south.
Each was given false identity papers to con-
form to their false names. They also were
provided with fishermen's permits, South
Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards or
military discharge papers. The boat captain
received a boat registration book, crew lists,
and several South Vietnamese permits to
conduct business. The agents had to be-
come familiar with simple boat procedures
so they could pass as fishermen.
The expedition left the embarkation port
on April 4. In addition to the four agents,
the boat carried six carefully sealed boxes.
These contained a generator, several radios,
some weapons, and a large supply of South
Vietnamese currency. They also carried some
chemicals and materials for making false
identification papers. Their destination was
a landing site on the coast of Phuoc Tuy
Province.
Soon after leaving North Vietnam, the
Vietcong boat encountered high winds and
rough seas. On April 7, the storm became
violent. The boat threatened to capsize.
Strong northeasterly winds forced it ever
closer to shore. Finally, the boat captain,
Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be
thrown overboard. This was done and the
boat then was beached. The eight men de-
cided to split up into pairs and try to make
contact with Vietcong forces. They buried
their false papers and set out. Six of the
eight were captured almost immediately by
authorities in Thua Thien Province. The
other two were taken several days later.
Student propaganda agents
The student population of South Vietnam
is an important target group for Vietcong
propagandists. These agents seek to win
adherents for the Communist cause among
young workers, students in high schools and
universities, and the younger officers and en-
listed men in the armed forces of the Re-
public of Vietnam.
Typical of the agents sent into South Viet-
nam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a
19-year-old native of the Vinh Linh district
In North Vietnam, just north of the demili-
tarized zone. He was a member of a Com-
munist Party youth group in his native vil-
lage. He was recruited for propaganda work
in the south in the fall of 1962. He was one
of 40 young persons enrolled in a special po-
litical training course given by the Commu-
nist Party in his district.
PHASE 1
The first phase of the training consisted of
political indoctrination.
Those who successfully completed the first
phase were selected for the second level of
training, the so-called technical training
phase. In this, the trainees were given their
mission in the south.
Vy was told he should infiltrate into South
Vietnam and there surrender to the authori-
ties, describing himself as a defector who was
"tired of the miserable life in the north."
He was to say he wanted to complete his
schooling which was impossible in the north.
He was told to ask to live with relatives in
the south so he could go to school. Once his
story was accepted and he was enrolled in a
school, he was to begin his work of propa-
gandizing other students.
He was assigned to work under an older
agent to whom he had to report regularly.
A third member of the team was a younger
man who was to assist Vy. The three were
to infiltrate into South Vietnam separately
and to meet here at a rendezvous point.
At first, Vy was to do no more than ob-
serve his fellow students carefully, collecting
biographical data on them and studying
their personalities and capabilities. He was
then to select those he thought might be
most influenced by Communist propaganda
and try to make friends with them.
THE TARGETS
Once he had selected targets, he was to
begin to influence them favorably toward
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 1
the north and to implant Communist prop-
aganda. Be was responsible then for bring-
ing into his organization those he had in-
fluenced effectively. These individuals were
to be given their own propaganda assign-
ments to work on other students.
Students who wanted to evade military
service in the Government forces were con-
si4ered prime targets. Where possible, Vy
was to help them get to North Vietnam. He
was also told to make contact with any stu-
dents who were suspected of Communist ac-
tivities. These, too, were to be helped to es-
cape to North Vietnam. Any useful informa-
tion concerning developments in the south or
military activities were to be reported
through his superior, Nguyen Van Phong.
In case he became suspect, he was either
to make his own way back to North Vietnam
or to go into the jungle and try to contact a
Vietcong unit.
Vy entered South Vietnam on January 2,
1963, by swimming across the Ben Hai River.
He encountered an elderly farmer who led
him to the local authorities in Hai Gu.
There he toldhis story but it was not be-
lieved. He then admitted his true mission.
THE SOURCE
When Hanoi launched the Vietcong cam-
paign of terror, violence and subversion in
earnest in 1959, the Communist forces relied
mainly on stocks of weapons and ammuni-
tion left over from the war against the
French. Supplies sent in from North Viet-
nam came largely from the same source. As
the military campaign progressed, the Viet-
cong depended heavily on weapons captured
from the armed forces in South Vietnam.
This remains an important source of weap-
ons and-ammunition for the Vietcong. But
as the pace of the war has quickened, re-
quirements for up-to-date arms and special
types of weapons have risen to a point
where the Vietcong cannot rely on captured
stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to
reequip its forces in the South with Com-
munist-produced weapons.
Large and increasing quantities of military
supplies are entering South Vietnam from
outside the country. The principal supply
point is North Vietnam which provides a
convenient channel for materiel that origi-
nates in Communist China and other Com-
munist countries.
An increasing number of weapons from
external Communist sources have been seized
in the south. These include such weapons
as 57 mm. and 75 mm. recoilless rifles, dual-
purpose machineguns, rocket launchers, large
mortars, and antitank mines.
A new family of Chinese Communist-
manufactured weapons has recently appeared
in Vietcong hands. These include the 7.62
semiautomatic carbine, 7.62 light machine-
gun, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weap-
ons and ammunition for them manufactured
in Communist China in 1962 were first, cap-
tured in December 1964, in Chuong Thien
Province. Similar weapons have since been
seized in each of the four corps areas of
South Vietnam. Also captured have been
Chinese Communist antitank grenade
launchers and ammunition made in China
in 1963.
CASE IN POINT
On February 16, 1965, an American heli-
copter pilot flying along the South Vietnam-
ese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was
a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity,
carefully camouflaged and moored just off-
shore along the coast of Phu Yen Province.
Fighter planes that approached the vessel
met machinegun fire from guns on the deck
of the ship and from the shore as well. A
Vietnamese air force strike was launched
against the vessel and Vietnamese Govern-
ment troops moved into the area. They
seized the ship after a bitter fight with the
Vietcong.
The ship, which had been sunk in shallow
water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms,
ammunition, and other supplies. Documents
found on the ship and on the bodies of sev-
eral Vietcong aboard identified the vessel as
having come from North Vietnam. A news-
paper in the cabin was from Haiphong, and
was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies
delivered by the ship-thousands of weapons
and more than a million rounds of ammuni-
tion-were almost all of Communist origin,
largely from Communist China and Czecho-
slovakia as well as North Vietnam. At least
100 tons of military supplies were discovered
near the ship.
A preliminary survey of the cache near
the sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the fol-
lowing supplies and weapons:
Approximately 1 million rounds of small
arms ammunition.
More than 1,000 stick grenades.
Five hundred pounds of TNT in prepared
charges.
Five hundred antitank grenades.
Two thousand rounds of 82-millimeter
mortar ammunition.
Five hundred rounds of 57-millimeter re-
coilless rifle ammunition.
More than 1,000 rounds of 75-millimeter
recoilless rifle ammunition.
One 57-millimeter recoilless rifle.
Two heavy machineguns.
Two thousand 7.95 Mauser rifles.
More than 100 7.62 carbines.
One thousand submachineguns.
Fifteen light machineguns.
Five hundred rifles.
Five hundred pounds of medical supplies
(with labels from North Vietnam, Com-
munist China, Czechoslovakia, East Ger-
many, Soviet Union, and other sources).
The ship was fairly new and had been
made in Communist China. Documents
aboard the ship included three North Viet-
namese nautical charts (one of the Haiphong
area and one of Hong Gay, both in North
Vietnam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of
South Vietnam). The military health rec-
ords of North Vietnamese soldiers were
found. The man had a political history
sheet showing he was a member of the 338th
Division of the North Vietnamese Army.
POWER LINES
Military affairs of the Vietcong are the re-
sponsibility of high command of the People's
Army of North Vietnam and the Ministry
of Defense, under close supervision from the
Lao Dong Party (North Vietnamese Com-
munist Party). These responsibilities in-
clude operational plans, assignments of in-
dividuals and regular units, training pro-
grams, infiltration of military personnel and
supplies, military communications, tactical
intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six
military regions are the same as those of
the Vietcong political organization * * *
The hard Core of the Vietcong military
organization is the full-time regular unit
usually based on a province or region. These
are well-trained and highly disciplined
guerilla fighters.
The size of the Vietcong regular forces
has grown steadily in recent years. For ex
ample, the Vietcong have five regimental
headquarters compared with two in 1961.
And the main Vietcong force is composed of
50 battalions, 50 percent more than before.
There are an estimated 139 Vietcong com-
panies. Hard-core Vietcong strength now is
estimated at more than 32,000 whereas it
was less than 20,000 in 1961.
Supporting the main force units of the
Vietcong are an estimated 60,000 to 80,000
part-time guerrillas. They are generally or-
ganized at the district level where there are
likely to be several companies of 50 or more
men each. These troops receive only half
pay which means they must work at least
part of the time to eke out a living.
THE CRA
Below the Irregular guerrilla forces of the
district are the part-time, village-based guer-
rillas. They are available for assignment by
higher headquarters and are used for har-
assment and sabotage. They are expected
to warn nearby Vietcong units of the ap-
proach of any force of the legal government.
They provide a pool for recruitment into
the Vietcong district forces. * * *
A key element in the Vietcong effort is an
elaborate organization in Hanoi called the
Central Research Agency (CRA-Cuc Nghien-
Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Ha-
noi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale,
the main focus of its operation is on South
Vietnam. The research agency is able to
draw on the intelligence capabilities of both
the Lao bong Party and the North Viet-
namese armed forces for information, per-
sonnel, and facilities.
The CRA reportedly operates under the
close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh him-
self. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi
government reportedly sit on its directing
committee, Including Premier Pham Van
Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and
Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. * * *
The headquarters of the CRA in Hanoi is
divided into six main sections, not includ-
Ing a special code unit. The six sections are
responsible for administration, cadres, com-
munications, espionage, research and train-
ing. * * *
CRA headquarters directs a number of
special centers for oversea operations. One
such center maintains intelligence channels
to oversea areas. It operates through spe-
cial units at Haiphong and at Hongey.
A second special center is responsible for
Vietcong intelligence operations in Cambodia
and Laos. A third center handles activities
along the "demarcation line," the border
with South Vietnam. The unit is based in
Vinh-Linh in southeast North Vietnam. This
center is responsible for sending agents and
supplies to the south by sea. * * *
Inside South. Vietnam, the Vietcong have
a large intelligence network. Some of its
units are responsible for receiving and send-
ing on agents arriving from the north. They
feed and give instructions to groups infil-
trating into South Vietnam. They take de-
livery of equipment and supplies received
from the north and relay them to Vietcong
units in the south.
Many Vietcong agents have been captured
in the city of Saigon. They have exposed the
extensive effort by the CRA to penetrate all
Republic of Vietnam government agencies,
foreign embassies, and other specialized
organizations. * * *
Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese
intelligence operation in support of the Viet-
cong is one of the most extensive of Its kind
in the world.
AND NOW
Today the war In Vietnam has reached
new levels of intensity. The elaborate effort
by the Communist regime in North Vietnam
to conquer the south has grown, not dimin-
ished. Military men, technicians, political
organizers, propagandists and secret agents
have been infiltrating into the Republic of
Vietnam from the north in growing num-
bers. The flow of Communist-supplied
Weapons, particularly those of large caliber,
has increased. Communications links with
Hanoi are extensive. Despite the heavy
casualties of 8 years of fighting, the hard-
core Vietcong force is considerably larger
now than it was at the end of 1961.
The government in Saigon has undertaken
vigorous action to meet the new threat. The
United States and other free countries have
increased their assistance to the Vietnamese
Government and people. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk visited Vietnam in 1964, and he
promised the Vietnamese: "We shall remain.
at your side until the aggression from the
north has been defeated, until it has been.
completely rooted out and this land enjoys
the peace which it deserves."
President Johnson has repeatedly stressed
that the U.S. goal is to see peace secured in
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l 96 Approved For Re,~
connect with one leading all the way to`the,
border of Communist China. The United
States is providing $10 million for this con-
troversial project.
Another $4 million is going to improve
Burma's inland waterways fleet. The United
States already has turned over 47 barges and
12 other vessels to the Burmese, with more,
coming.
An additional $4.8 million is for the ex-
pansion of the government's lumber industry.
With this aid, the Burmese have purchased
five sawmills and reequipped seven others.
To help launch a controversial land re-
form program, the United States is giving
Burma more than $3 million to develop its
land and water resources.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Feb. 26, 1965]
STATEMENT By RUSK ON U.S. POSITION IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
(Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued the
following prepared statement yesterday at his
news conference.)
1. The nations of southeast Asia have a
right to live in peace, free from aggression
directed against them from outside their
borders. This is not an empty theory, it is
a point of vital importance to the safety
and, indeed, the very existence of more than
a hundred smaller nations all over the world,
2. North Vietnam, In callous disregard of
the Agreements of 1954 and 1962, has directed
and supplied the essential military personnel
and arms for a systematic campaign of ter-
ror and guerrilla action aimed at the over-
throw of the Government of South Vietnam
and at the imposition by force of a Commu-
nist regime. The evidence of North Vietnam's
direct responsibility for this aggression has
been repeatedly presented by the Govern-
ment of Vietnam, the U.S. Government, and
the International Control Commission. A
full and up-to-date summary of the evidence
establishing, this responsibility will be avail-
able within a very few days.
3. The attitude of the United States to-
ward threats to the peace in southeast Asia
has been made clear many times and in the
most serious and formal ways:
(a) by the ratification of the Manila Pact
in February 1955, which includes South Viet-
nafn as a protocol state; (This treaty was
,approved by the Senate by a vote of 62 to 1.)
(b) by a decision of President Eisenhower
in 1954, set forth in a letter to the President
of South Vietnam: "The implications of the
agreement concerning Vietnam have caused
grave concern regarding the future of a coun-
try temporarily divided by an artificial mili-
tary grouping, weakened by a long and ex-
hausting, war and faced with enemies without
and by their subversive collaborators within.
"The purpose of this offer to assist the
Government of Vietnam in developing and
maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of
resisting attempted subversion or aggression
through military means."
(c) by the joint resolution of the Congress
of the United States, passed in August 1964
by a combined vote of 502 to 2, which stated,
among other things:
"That. the Congress approves and supports
the determination of the President, as Com-
mander in Chief, to take all necessary meas-
ures to repel any armed attack against the
forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression.
'The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the
ma4ntenance of international peace and se-
curity in southeast Asia.
"The United States is, therefore, prepared,
as the President determines, to take all nec-
essary steps, including the use of armed force,
to assist any member or protocol state of
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
requesting assistance in defense of its free-
dom,"
~O A 7B00300160032-7
3723
(d) by the statement, of President Johnson [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 26,
on the oocesipn of signing that joint resolu- 1965]
tion: NEGOTIATION?-U TISANT'S VIEW ON VIETNAM
"To any in southeast Asia who ask our help
in defending their freedom, we shall give it.
"In that region, there is nothing we covet,
nothing we seek-no territory, no military
position, no political ambition. Our one de-
sire-our one determination-is that the
people of southeast Asia be left in peace to
work out their destinies in their own way."
4. It has been stated over and over again
that the key to peace in southeast Asia is the
readiness of all those in that area to live at
peace and to leave their neighbors alone.
There is no mystery about that formulation;
those who are not leaving their neighbors
alone know exactly what it means. It is an
obligation under the 1954 Agreements, under
the 1962 Accords on Laos, and under general
International law. The Illegal Infiltration of
military personnel and arms cannot be de-
scribed as "leaving your neighbor alone."
5. There have been negotiated settlements
in southeast Asia, the most recent one as late
as 1962. Those several agreements were in-
tended' to establish peace in that area; com-
pliance with them by all concerned can
achieve that result.
6. Since the Geneva Conference. of 1962,
the United States has been in active and con-
tinuous consultation with other governments
about the danger created by aggression in
southeast Asia. It has been discussed in the
United Nations, in the SEATO and NATO
Councils, and on innumerable occasions di-
rectly with other governments through dip-
lomatic channels. We have had direct discus-
sions with almost every signatory of the
Agreements of 1954 and 1962. What is still
missing is any indication that Hanoi is pte-
pared to stop doing what it is doing against
its neighbors. The absence of this crucial
element affects the current discussion of
"negotiation." Political channels have been
and. are open and a considerable number of
governments are actively interested in keep-
ing them open to explore the possibilities of
a peaceful solution, But a negotiation aimed
at the acceptance or the confirmation of ag-
gression is not possible. A negotiation which
simply ends in bitterness and hostility merely
adds to the danger.
7. Let me remind you that on February 17
the President said:
"As I have said so many, many times, and
other Presidents ahead of me have said, our
purpose, our objective there is clear. That
purpose and that objective is to join in the
defense and protection of freedom of a brave
people who are under attack that is controlled
and that is directed from outside their
country.
"We have no ambition there for ourselves.
We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest.
We seek no wider war. But we must all un-
derstand that we will persist in the defense
of freedom, and our continuing actions will
be those which are justified and those that
are made necessary by the continuing aggres-
sion of others.
"These actions will be measured and fitting
and adequate. Our stamina and the stamina
of the American people is equal to the task."
Let me conclude by reaffirming, still once
more, that the central object of American
policy and action is peace in southeast Asia
and the safety of the independent states
in that region. Many of the peoples of that
area have been subjected to 25 years of tur-
moil and violence; they are entitled to peace.
We should much prefer to use our resources
as a part of an international effort to assist
the economic and social development of the
peoples of that area than to have them di-
verted into the harsh necessities of resisting
With a rarely matched twisting of the
truth, but at least with a certain insolent
candor, Secretary General U Thant of the
United Nations has now openly become an
apologist and propagandist for Communist
aggression in southeast Asia.
U Thant has now trumpeted as revealed
truth, and without hesitation or qualifica-
tion, the whole basic Communist line that
the war in South Vietnam was only a little
homegrown contest involving two sets of
local boys until dreadful old Uncle Sam in-
tervened to assist the anti-Communist gov-
ernment of that country. He has called
upon us to negotiate and to withdraw our-
selves as soon as possible.
In the process, he has rewritten 10 years
of history, annulling 10 years in which the
Communist government of North Vietnam
has undeniably and consistently directed and
supplied and commanded a tireless and
savage invasion of South Vietnam in endless
violation of agreements made in 1954 at just
such negotiations as are now being so pressed
upon us.
Thus, with U Thant's now unhidden re-
cruitment to them, those forces seeking to
blackmail or persuade the United States into
abandoning its commitments in South Viet-
nam and to cut and run are at last complete.
And what a pretty company they make for
any American to travel with.
Thant, the Soviet Union, and Charles de
Gaulle of France-this is the splendid trinity
that, whatever the intention in individual
cases, is taking actions to remove the Ameri-
can presence in Asia, to sully an American
effort against pillage and murder of signal
honor and decency, and to open all south-
east Asia to the faceless hordes of Commu-
nist China.
And it would all be done under definitions
that only Thant and the Communists can
understand: If Communist forces invade or
infiltrate a country, the resulting fighting is
only local and nobody is intruding anywhere.
If anti-Communist forces respond to an in-
dependent country's appeal for help against
marauders, then this is not only interven-
tion but also quite unacceptable interven-
tion.
Even the precious little band of Demo-
cratic Senators that has been crying for
weeks for negotiation-even though it Is per-
fectly plain that negotiation at this stage
would be outright surrender to aggression-
may find itself a bit unhappy with the in-
ternational associates it,now has.
When the Soviet Union pushes us toward
negotiation-again, at this stage, before we
could possibly negotiate from strength in
South Vietnam-is it really likely that this
would be in the interests of the United
States? When Charles de Gaulle of France
pushes us toward negotiation, is it really
likely that this would be in the interests
of the United States, considering that Charles
de Gaulle for years has been attempting to
break down American influence all over the
world?
Is it not odd that U Thant should feel
free to interfere in this matter anyhow, since
neither North Vietnam, the aggressor state
here, nor Communist China, its master, is
even a member of the organization for which
he speaks?
And does the Democratic splinter in the
Senate know that, according to word to me
from a distinguished allied Ambassador, it
has already succeeded in convincing the
diplomatic community here that the majority
party of this country is not behind the Presi-
dent in Vietnam? The fact that this esti-
mate is absurdly wrong and that a vast ma-
jority of both parties backs the President
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 1734
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CONGRESSI i'Ai; RECORD --SENATE March 1
does not cure,-.tlio measureless harm that.has
been done to American Interests by the
Democratic splinter.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 26,
1965]
RED AGGRESSOR: EVIDENCE AGAINST HANOI
(By Roscoe Drummond)
The United States is ready to submit to
the United Nations Security Council or any
other proper body, massive, and mounting
proof that the war in South Vietnam is
armed and directed from Hanoi.
The evidence is now fully prepared for use
by the Government at the right moment.
It rests on captured arms, captured docu-
ments, testimony of Communist defectors
and interrogation of North Vietnamese pris-
oners of war.
It proves that the aggression against South
Vietnam is inspired, commanded, controlled,
and supplied by the Communist regime in
Hanoi.
This evidence shows a systematic viola-
tion of the frontier that Hanoi agreed to
respect in the Geneva agreements-of 1954 and
In the Laotian agreement of 1962.
This evidence makes North Vietnam the
procuring force in the attempt to overthrow
the Government of South Vietnam and, in
the words of Under Secretary of State George
W. Ball, "the mainspring of the whole Viet-
cong effort."
Here is a good cross section of the infor-
mation that documents the role Hanoi has
played from the beginning:
Infiltration: From 1959 to 1964, Hanoi sent
19,000 military personnel across the border to
wage war against South Vietnam. This fig-
ure comes from cross-checked reports from
prisoners, defectors, and secret documents.
There is substantial information that 15,000
additional infiltrators entered South Viet-
nam during this period. In guerrilla warfare,
20,000 guerrillas can be equal to a regular
army of 200,000 to 300,000.
Vietcong leadership: Most officers, the key
cadres and the technicians for hard-core
Vietcong units operating in South Vietnam
are from North Vietnam.
Arms supplies: Large and increasing quan-
tities of weapons are entering from outside.
One captured Vietcong said that his entire
company had recently been supplied with
modern Chinese weapons. .A Vietcong arms
cahe contained recoilless rifles and ammuni-
tion, carbines, detonating fuses, 110 pounds
of TNT, fuses for mortar shells, and other
arms. Their identifiable sources were: North
Vietnam, Red China, East Germany, and
Hungary.
Another massive cache was seized last
week. Included in the capture were 1,000
Russian-made carbines, 900 Red Chinese
rifles, several hundred Soviet submachine-
guns, antiaircraft guns, recoilless rifles, and
grenades.
Supposedly the source of manufacture of
these weapons is to be obliterated. Cap-
tured documents reveal instructions from
Hanoi directing the infiltrators to remove
all markings from their munitions. The
infiltrators themselves start out from near
Hanoi in North Vietnamese uniforms and
change into South Vietnamese uniforms at
the frontier.
The admission: Hanoi has officially de-
clared that its army Is the instrument of
the class struggle to liberate South Viet-
nam. It has said that it Is the brain and
the factor that decides.
The thanks: The Vietcong have several
times thanked Hanoi for its armed support.
No deviation: The Vietcong Communists
have never once deviated from the Hanoi
party line.
This is the evidence that caused the three-
nation International Control Commission
(India, Canada, with Communist Poland dis-
senting) to report that "beyond any reason-
able doubt North Vietnam, has sent arms and
men into South Vietnam with the aim of
overthrowing the legal government."
This is the evidence that has caused the
United States to conclude that the Hanoi
regime is In full strategic control of every
action by the Vietcong and is providing the
major share of its equipment and supplies.
[From the Washington, D.C. Evening Star,
Feb. 27, 19651
PARTIAL TEXT OF THE U.S. WHITE PAPER ON
VIETNAM
(Following is a partial text of the State
Department's white paper on Vietnam.)
South Vietnam is fighting for its life
against a brutal campaign of terror and
armed attack inspired, directed, supplied
and controlled by the Communist regime
in Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been
going on for years, but recently the pace
has quickened and the threat has now be-
come acute.
The war in Vietnam is a new kind of war,
a fact as yet poorly understood in most parts
of the world. Much of the confusion that
prevails in the thinking of many people,
and even many governments, stems from
this basic misunderstanding. For in Viet-
nam, a totally new brand of aggression has
been loosed against an Independent people
who want to make their own way in peace
and freedom.
In Vietnam, a Communist government has
set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign
people in a neighboring state. And to
achieve its end, It has .used every resource
of its own government to carry out its care-
fully planned program of concealed aggres-
sion. North Vietnam's commitment to seize
control of the south is no less total than was
the commitment of the regime in North
Korea in 1950. But knowing the conse-
quences of the latter's undisguised attack,
the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately
to conceal their hand. They have failed,
and their aggression is as real as that of an
invading army.
This report is a summary of the massive
evidence of North Vietnamese aggression ob-
tained by the Government of South Vietnam.
This evidence has been jointly analyzed by
South Vietnamese and American experts.
THE EVIDENCE
The evidence shows that the hard core of
the Communist forces attacking South Viet-
nam were trained in the North and ordered
into the South by Hanoi. It shows that the
key leadership of the Vietcong, the officers
and much of the cadre, many of the tech-
nicians, political organizers and propagan-
dists have come from the North and operate
under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the
training of essential military personnel and
their infiltration into the South is directed
by the military high command in Hanoi.
The evidence shows that many of the
weapons and much of the ammunition and
other supplies used by the Vietcong have
been sent into South Vietnam from Hanoi.
In recent months, new types of weapons have
been introduced in the Vietcong Army for
which all ammunition must come from out-
side sources. Communist China and other
Communist states' ammunition have been
primarily channeled through North Vietnam.
The hard core of the Communist forces
attacking South Vietnam are men trained in
North Vietnam. They are ordered into the
South and remain under the military disci-
pline of the military command in Hanoi.
Special training camps operated by the North
Vietnamese Army give political and military
training to the infiltrators. Increasingly the
forces sent into the South are native North
Vietnamese who have never seen South Viet-
nam.
White paper text
The infiltration rate has been increasing.
Fron ,1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establish-
lag: its infiltration pipeline, at least 1,800
men and probably 2,700 more moved into
South Vietnam from the North. The flow
increased to a minimum of 3,700 In 1961 and
at least 5,400 in 1962. There was a modest
decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed infiltra-
tors, though later evidence is likely to raise
this figure.
MORE THAN 7,400 IN 1964
For 1964, the evidence is still Incomplete.
However, it already shows that a minimum
of 4,400 infiltrators entered the South and
more than 3,000 others probably were sent in.
There is usually a time lag between the
entry of infiltrating troops and the discovery
of clear evidence they have entered. This
fact plus collateral evidence of increased use
of the infiltration routes suggest strongly
that 1964 was probably the year of greatest
infiltration so far.
Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 Vietcong
officers, soldiers, and technicians are known
to have entered South Vietnam under orders
from Hanoi. Additional information indi-
cates that probably 17,000 more infiltrators
were dispatched to the South by the regime
in Hanoi during the past 6 years. It can
reasonably be assumed that still other in-
filtration groups have entered the South for
which there is no evidence yet available.
It is now estimated that the Vietcong
number approximately 35,000 so-called hard-
core forces, and another 60,000 to 80,000 local
forces. It is thus apparent that infiltrators
from the North-allowing for casualties-
make up the majority, and probably the
overwhelming porportion, of the so-called
hard-core Vietcong. Personnel from the
North, in short, are now and have always
been the backbone of the entire Vietcong
operation.
CASE HISTORIES
Following are individual case histories of
North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi.
regime into South Vietnam. They are only
an illustrative group. They show that the
leadership and specialized personnel for the
guerrilla war in South Vietnam consists in
large part of members of the North Vietnam
armed forces trained in the North and sub-,
ject to the command and discipline of Hanoi.
Dan was a Vietcong major, commander of
the 60th Battalion, Disillusioned with
fighting his countrymen and with commu-
nism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he
surrendered to the authorities in South Viet-
nam on February 11, 1963.
At the age of 15 he joined the revolu-
tionary army (Vietminh) and fought
against the French forces until 1954 when
the Geneva accords ended the Indochina
war. As a regular in the Vietminh forces,
he was moved to North Vietnam. He be-
came an officer in the so-called People's
Army.
In March 1962, Major Dan received orders
to prepare to move to South Vietnam. He
had been exposed to massive propaganda in.
the North which told of the destitution of
the peasants in the Souh and said that the
Americans had taken over the French role
of colonialists. He said later that an im-
portant reason for his decision to surrender
was that he discovered these propaganda
themes were lies. He found the peasants
more prosperous than the people In the
North. And he recognized quickly that he
was not fighting the Americans but his own
people.
With the women of his unit, Major Dan
left Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled
through the Laos corridor. His group joined
up with the Vietcong first regiment irn
Central Vietnam.
The 35-year-old major took part in 45 ac-
tions, and was wounded once in an unsuc-
cessful Vietcong attack on an outpost. As
time passed, be became increasingly discour-
aged by his experience as a troop commander
of the Vietcong. Most of all, he said, he was
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 1965 Approved For ReIORESSIONA. RECORD BOS46~RT0300160032-7 3721
derground had never received any out-
side help because the Burmese Govern-
ment had not itself asked for any outside
help in fighting the Communists. "Not
one precious American life has been lost
in Burma," he was quoted as saying.
"Not one precious American dollar has
been spent in Burma in the form of mili-
tary assistance in the last 17 years."
Is it not strange that Mr. U Thant
had no words of condemnation against
North Vietnam for its acts of aggression?
Why did he not condemn the violations
by North Vietnam of the Geneva pacts
of 1954 and 1962? Just because his own
government in Burma did not seek mili-
tary assistance from the United States,
does he deny the right under the SEATO
treaty, of South Vietnam to ask the
United States for help against Commu-
nist subversion? Does he deny that the
Communists in Burma, in South Viet-
nam, in Cuba, are controlled by Peiping
or the Kremlin? Do his statements
sound like those of a representative of
the United Nations, whose charter says:
We the peoples of the United Nations
[are] determined to establish conditions un-
der which justice and respect for the obli-
gations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be main-
tained.
And for these ends to practice tolerance
and live together in peace with one another
as good neighbors.
Does Mr. U Thant believe that North
Vietnam has been acting like a "good
neighbor"?
I invite attention that the Geneva
agreement of 1954 provided among other
things as follows:
Article 5. To avoid. any incidents which
might result in the. resumption of hostilities,
all military forces, supplies, and equipment
shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized
zone within 25 days of the present agree-
ment's entry into force.
Article 6. No person, military or civilian,
shall be permitted to cross the provisional
military demarcation line unless, specifically
authorized to do so by the Joint Commis-
sion.
Article 17, (a) With effect from the date
of entry into force of the present agree-
ment, the introduction into Vietnam of any
reinforcements in the form of all types
of arms, munitions, and other war material,
such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces
of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons
and armored vehicles, is prohibited.
I invite , attention that the Geneva
agreement of 1962 provided among other
things as follows:
The parties undertake that:
(a) they will not commit or participate
in any way in any act which might directly
or indirectly impair the sovereignty, inde-
pendence, neutrality,. unity or territorial in-
tegrity of the Kingdom of Laos; (b) they
will not resort to the use. or threat of force
or any other measure which might impair the
peace of the Kingdom of Loas; (c) they will
refrain from all direct or indircet interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of the Kingdom
of Laos; * * ? (i) they will not use the
territory of the Kingdom of Laos for inter-
ference in the internal, affairs of other
countries.
I note' from the World News Digest
that last July 8, Mr. U Thant proposed
reconvening the 1954 Geneva Confer-
ence to negotiate an end to the war in
Vietnam. What good does he think this
world do when North Vietnam has vio-
lated the Geneva accords of 1954 and
1962?
On last August 6, following a confer-
ence with President Johnson, Mr. U
Thant told reporters that he believed
the UN Security Council was currently
in no position to be "usefully employed
in a settlement" of the problem, being
hampered by the nature of the dispute
and by the fact that Hanoi is not a
member of the UN.
With respect to Mr. U Thant's state-
ment, "Not one precious American dol-
lar has been spent in Burma in the form
of military assistance in the last 17
years," I note from the February 24 is-
sue of the Davenport, Iowa, Times-
Democrat that the Allen and Scott Re-
port refers to a secret $9 million arms
program furnished by the United States
to Burma; and, I might add, for fiscal
year 1964 we furnished $1.5 million in
foreign aid of a nonmilitary nature.
I find Mr. U Thant's behavior one-
sided, prejudiced, ungrateful, superfi-
cial, and unrealistic. How can he com-
mand the trust and respect so necessary
for the performance of his duties? He
should resign.
Let me remind Senators that last Au-
gust 7, by a vote of 88 to 2, the Senate
passed the southeast Asia resolution,
following the retaliatory raids on North
Vietnamese PT boat bases ordered by
President Johnson as a result of attacks
on our destroyers in the Bay of Tonkin.
This resolution was approved without a
single negative vote in the House of
Representatives.
It states:
That the Congress approves and supports
the determination of the President, as Com-
mander in Chief, to take all necessary meas-
ures to repel any armed attack against the
forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression.
The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the
maintenance of international peace and se-
curity in southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution of the United States and
the Charter of the United Nations and in
accordance with its obligations under the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the
United States is, therefore, prepared, as the
President determines, to take' all necessary
steps, including the use of armed force, to
assist any member or protocol state of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re-
questing assistance in defense of its freedom.
I do not criticize the sincerity of my
two colleagues who voted against this
resolution; and their continued criticism
is completely consistent with their vote
at that time. But what I am wondering
about are the statements of some of
those Senators who voted for this resolu-
tion which, in light of the evidence,
hardly represent support for the Presi-
dent in his action to put a stop to Com-
munist aggression in South Vietnam. It
is these statements which might collec-
tively be interpreted by Hanoi as a "sign"
that the United States is not going to be
as steadfast in pursuing the President's
policy as we must be. We simply cannot
be inconsistent about this matter.
It will not do to contend that we are
following the wrong course of action just
because there are frequent changes in the
Government of South Vietnam. Our
previous policy of accommodation has
contributed to this. When we were asked
for help to stop Communist aggression,
it would be only natural that the South
Vietnamese expected that help to be ef-
fective,.. It was not effective, and one
cannot blame the people for becoming
disillusioned. Ambassador Taylor's in-
dication that the morale of the people
improved following our attacks on North
Vietnam bears out this point. These
people wish to be left alone, but if they
are not left alone by North Vietnam, and
if it appears that the United States is not
going to take sufficient action to put a
stop to it that the Vietcong will win, it is
understandable why a good many of
these troubled people would wish to be
on the side of the winner. Costly air-
strikes against the privileged sanctuary
of North Vietnam have been designed to
persuade Hanoi that we mean business,
and if aggression continues, more of the
same can be expected. Hanoi must be
persuaded that any gain from continued
aggression will be more than offset by
its losses. No one in the Pentagon whom
I know is saying that airstrikes against
guerrillas will stop them. But there are
other targets besides guerrillas. They
may have to be destroyed before the cost
of continued aggression is brought home
to the Communist regime in Hanoi.
In the final analysis, the war in Viet-
nam is a test of the wills of the people of
the United States and those of the Com-
munist world, particularly in Hanoi and
Peiping, as of the moment. The moral
fiber, the character, the patience of our
people to break the Communist will to
win in this area are involved. Ours is a
truly moral cause-completely in con-
sonance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles which have
caused millions of freedom-loving people
to turn to the United States for leader-
ship in the cause of peace with justice
and respect for the dignity of man. We
must not fail to provide this leadership.
Let me say, in behalf of our President,
that great leadership does not always
mean the most popular leadership.
What is important is the righteousness
of the cause and the perseverance of a
leader to see it through. Neville Cham-
berlain was, undoubtedly, popular for the
moment following the Munich agree-
ment. Winston Churchill was not always
popular, but he will go down in history
as the finest leader the world has known
in our time.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent'that the following be placed in the
RECORD :
Statement by Secretary of State Dean
Rusk on U.S. position in southeast Asia,
from the Washington Post of February
26, 1965.
Partial text of the U.S. white paper on
Vietnam, from the Washington Evening
Star for February 27.
"How Our Far Eastern Policy Led to
Vietnam," a recent speech by William P.
Bundy, published . in the Washington
Sunday Star for February 28.
An excerpt fpm the article written by
the distinguished columnist, William S.
White, entitled "Negotiation-U Thant's
View on Vietnam," from the Washington
Post of February 26.
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 9122
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C0N6AF,SSI0RAL AEd0A 5fNl' 'B March 1
An excerpt froth the' article written by Thant refused too say Whetlier'The had re- mental principles of the organization which
the distinguished columnist, Roscoe calved any response to his February 12 pub- he heads.
Drummond, entitled "Red Aggressor- lic appeal for preliminary consultations. The United Nations already has been
Evidenced Against Hanoi," from the The question had asked specifically whether robbed of much of its powers for keeping
Washington Post of February 26. he had heard from Peiping and Hanoi. the peace of the world by the recent actions
U.N. ROLELIMITED of Russia and her satellites. By creating an
An article written by Louis B. Fleming He said it is not likely that the United impasse in the U.N. through her refusal to
of the Los Angeles Times and published Nations Security Council can play a useful pay up on her past dues, the Soviets have
in the February 25 issue of the Wash- role in the dispute. The principal obstacle immobilized all of the organization's peace-
ington Post, entitled: "Thant Proposes is that "more than two parties directly con- keeping machinery. They have created a
Secret Peace Plan To End Vietnam War." cerned in the question are not members of situation in which the U.N. can move only
when they [the Soviets] agree to the action.
An article written by Columnists Allen this organization." He referred to Commu- That has left the U.N. with nothing but
and Scott and published in the Daven- nist China and the two Vietnams. its prestige as an instrument for maintaining
port Times-Democrat for February 24, The Secretary General used the example order around the world. And now that last
entitled "Arms Aid for Burma Is Ques- of his own country, Burma , to support his contention that Communist intervention in weapon has been blunted by Mr. Thant him-
tioned by Congress." South Vietnam came only as a response to self.
Remarks of NBC Correspondent David American intervention. Over the years the United Nations has been
Wills on "Three-Star Extra" program of He said the Burmese Communist under- operating under very difficult circumstances
February 25. ground had never received so much as a in a world under increasing threats from
Communist aggression. In this situation it
Comments of "Three-Star Extra" edi- single rifle from outside forces because the could have made some limited contribution
tor in chief, Ray Henle, on the same pro- Burmese Government had not itself asked to world peace through the maintenance of a
for help in fighting the Communists. posture of neutrality and fairness. By his
gram February 25. "Not one precious American life has been
Excerpt of Agreement on the Cessa- own words, Mr. Thant now appears to have
lost
tion of Hostilities in Vietnam, July 20, in Burma," Thant said. "Not one pre- disqualified himself as a spokesman for those
cfou American dollar has been spent in Bur-
principles. From now on he speaks as the
1954. ma in the form of military assistance in the neutralist with heavy leanings toward the
excerpt from the Declaration on the last 17 years." Communist world.
Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962. In the official text of the news conference, _
There being no objection, the material the word "precious" was eliminated from [From the Times-Democrat, Feb. 24, 1965]
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, both sentences. ARaa's Am FOR BURMA IS QUESTIONED IN
a8 follows: Thant also asserted that no arms had gone
from North Vietnam to South Vietnam be- CONGRESS
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 25, fore the American intervention after the WASuxuGTON.-Congressional probers are
19651 Geneva Conference. adding Burma to their growing list of for-
THANT PROPOSES SECRET PEACE PLAN To END eign aid programs they want President John-
VIETNAM WAR [From Three-Star Extra] son to review carefully.
(By Louis B. Fleming) PRESIDENT AUTHORIZES NO NEGOTIATIONS With the government of General Ne Win
UN rrzl NATIONS, N.Y.-Secretary Gen- The President has no sympathy for the moving closer to Communist China, members
eral U Thant has proposed a secret peace views of U.N. Secretary General Thant on of the House Foreign Affairs Committee area
plan to end the war in South Vietnam, he Vietnam. The White House says the Presi- questioning the wisdom of continuing a
told a news conference today. dent has not authorized, and is not con- secret $9 million arms program to that so-
He hinted that the proposal has gone to templating, any negotiations, nor are there cialist regime.
the Governments of Communist China and any proposals for negotiations before the The legislators, headed by Representative
North Vietnam, which are not members of President. H.R. GROSS,, Republican of Iowa, are de-
the United Nations, and confirmed that it Yesterday Secretary Thant said he had manding that the weapons be halted until
had been sent to President Johnson. sent concrete ideas and proposals to the the United States obtains a written guarantee
"Up to this moment, the results of these interested parties. The White House says from Burma that they won't be used against
consultations and discussions have not been nothing has been received. Mr. Thant is in the United States or to help Communist sub-
conclusive," he observed. effect offering himself as a go-between. But version in Thailand.
Thant was unusually critical of American yesterday Mr. Thant indicated his belief Although the State Department has re-
policy in southeast Asia during the news that American intervention is the whole fused to publish details of the Burma arms
conference. He suggested that there would cause of the trouble. aid program, its confidential documents show
have been no Communist intervention had As an example to others, he held up the it is very similar to the aid given neighbor-
the United States stayed out of South Viet- conduct of his own country, Burma, which ing Cambodia, which is now using the U.S.
nam, lives cautiously in the shadow of its aggres- arms to help the Communist Vietcong in
STABILITY CALLED NEED sive neighbor, Red China. Mr. Thant ob- South Vietnam.
He asserted that the American public does served that no precious American lives had Since Burma borders Thailand, now being
not know the facts, adding: "In times of been lost in Burma and no precious Amer- threatened by Peiping. Representative GROSS
war and of hostilities the first casualty is scan dollars had been spent in Burma-a and the other lawmakers want to make sure
truth." sneering comment that in itself makes him the mistake made in Cambodia won't be re-
But he emphasized for the first time that most unsuitable as a go-between. peated in Burma.
he was not advocating an immediate with- According to the committee's findings, the
Mr. Thant revealed his awareness that he United States has furnished General Ne
drawal of American troops from South Viet- had blundered by having the word "precious" Win's government more than $5 million in
nam. The troops could not be withdrawn deleted from the official U.N. transcript of arms and equipment to improve and
until stability had been established, he said, his news conference. Mr. Thant Implied In
strengthen its 46,000 paramilitary force.
tacitly rejecting Communist demands that this conference that the U.S. administrar Since the initiation of the secret arms deal
the troops be withdrawn as a precondition tion is not telling the truth about Vietnam in 1960, more than 1,000 motor vehicles and
for negotiations. to the American people; but to issue a de-
He warned that the chances for a settle- liberately inaccurate transcript of his own motorcycles, 1,700 bicycles and 50 small pa-
ment grow dimmer with each passing day, conference hardly qualifies Mr. Thant to trol craft have been turned over to the
adding that no one can be sure that nego- make any such criticism of others. Burmese troops.
tiations or a conference would succeed, "but As in the Cambodia aid program, a coun-
The situation as of today is that U.N. See- trywide communications systems was set up
it is worth trying." retary General Thant thinks the heart of the with U.S. equipment, linking all of Burma's
The Secretary General said he had sent Vietnam problem is to find a face-saving military forces with a central headquarters
"concrete ideas and proposals" to the inter- way for the United States to withdraw, while in Rangoon.
estedparties, but that "it would not be help- the President says the real task Is to get the Another $4 million worth of supplies are
ful at this stage to reveal even parts or Communists to stop their aggression. Be-
some features of the negotiations I have tween these two positions, there is no com- either en route or being programed for
conducted." mon ground. As Secretary of State Rusk said shipment to Burma this year. Its paramili-
He left the impression that he still favors: this afternoon, a negotiation aimed at the tary troops are being trained in the latest
An informal, secret dialogue between the acceptance or the confirmation of aggres- counterinsurgency methods both in the
principal parties as a preliminary to any lion is not possible. United States and at U.S. installations in the
formal meeting. He first put this idea for- It would appear that U.N. Secretary Gen- addition to this military athe
finance assistance, s General he
ward in a press statement February 12. eral Thant has delivered a very serious blow In
United States to helping this military
A reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Con- to the prestige and the effectiveness of the eWin's road to socialism with a number o
ference on Indochina, which would work out world organization. His comments on the W
the terms of a political settlement, presum- situation in Vietnam, on which you have major i 's economic to programs.
ably pointing to a nonalined status for South heard Mr. Wills' report, not only ignored the One of the largest is the construction of
Vietnam. He first specifically appealed for facts but put Mr. Thant in a position of bias a 132-mile, two-lane highway from Rangoon
such a conference last July. against the United States and the funda- to Mandalay. When finished, this road will
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 Roland Finston, biophysics; Richard Lee, blo- and contributions toward cost will be wel- involved to the extent of sustaining well
physics; Paul Milvy, biophysics; Allen C. comed and should be sent to: University 100,000 casualties in Korea, as I re-
Nadler, clinical investigation; Edmund O. Committee To Protest the War over
in Vietnam,
Rothschild, clinical Investigation; Martin Post Office Box 115, Woodside, New York, Call.
Sonenberg, clinical Investigation; Herbert 11377. The South Koreans are wonderful and
Weiss, biophysics; Louis Zeitz, biophysics. (Institutional affiliation for purposes of brave people, and fought very hard; but
State University of New York at Stony identification only.) the fact is that the South Vietnamese
Brool: Karl S. Bottigheimer, history; Hugh If you approve of this statement, we urge have borne a much heavier proportion
0. Cleland, history; Sallie S. Goldstein, Eng- you to reprint It, in whole or in part, in of the burden of the fighting and the
lish; Charles Hoffmann, economics; Norman other newspapers, and write or wire: Presi- dying in South Vietnam than the South
Leer, English; Ruth Misheloff, English; Mich- dent Lyndon B. Johnson, White House, Wash- Koreans did in Korea.
ael Parenti, political science; Joel Rosenthal, ington, D.C.
history. The record in South Vietnam shows Mr, Ronald Glassman, Institute of Technology: man, chairman; Dr.
James L. Myriam Miedzianogora, secretary; Dr. Stan- than the South Vietnamese people, on
Anderson, physics; Hugh W. Byfield, physics; ley Deutsch, cotreasurer; Miss Del Green- the basis of their military performance,
I. Richard Lapidus, physics; Arthur Layzer, blatt, co-treasurer. do support us.
physics; Kenneth C, Rogers, physics; George The Senator from Alaska also men-
Schmidt, physics; Snowden Taylor, physics; ExHrBrr 2 tioned the United Nations, and asked
George Yevick, physics. [From the New York Times, Feb. 2, 1965] Why we do not invite them in. I have
Yeshiva University: R. E. Behrends, M. NIXON'S TOTEM POLE wondered about that for a lon time. I
physics; Barbara Berger, educational psy- g
chology; William Block, psychology; Morris Looking at the present situation in South questioned the State Department for
N. Eagle, psychology; Melvin Feffer spychol- Vietnam, former Vice President Nixon insists several years, as to why the United Na-
ogy; David Finkelstein, physics; Joshua Fish- that the United States must "avoid being tions was not invited in. There is an
man, psychology; Gertrude Goldberg, educa- forced into negotiation when at the bottom excellent answer: There is no basis for
tional psychology; Allan C. Goldstein, psy- of the totem pole." Mr. Nixon's prescription the United Nations to settle this con-
chology; Herbert Goldstein, special educa- is to forget about negotiation and fight troversy unless the U.N. Is willing to
tion; Edmund W. Gordon, educational psy- harder, throwing into the battle everything recognize the invasion of South Vietnam
chology; Norman Gordan, psychology; Aaron "short of atomic weapons." Mr. Nixon does
Hershkowitz, psychology; Adelaide Jablon- not say so; but this policy, if followed single-
sky, by North Vietnam Communists. AggreS-
education; Shelly P. Koenigsberg, educa- mindedly, would turn a comparatively small Sion has come from outside the country,
tional psychology; Arthur Komar, physics; war into a much bigger one-one that would from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
Ruth Lesser, psychology; Boris Levinson, psy- involve an enormously expanded invest- Our Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stev-
chology; D. J. Newman, mathematics; Harry ment in American blood and resources. enson told the U.N. when he submitted
E. Rauch, mathematics; Irvin Rock, psychol- Apparently Mr. Nixon thinks we are at the our documented case proving this ag-
Ogy; William Spindel, chemistry; Paul C. bottom of the totem pole in South Vietnam gression that we will get all of our arma-
Whitworth, education; Doxey A. Wilkerson, because things have not been going too well ment out of South Vietnam when this
educational psychology. recently: because the people of South Viet-
Other institutions: Carl R. Baldwin, Hun- nam seem to be increasingly war weary; be- aggression from the north stops.
ter College; Carl Barus, Swarthmore College; cause the changes of government in Saigon Second, during the past week, the See-
Herbert Bassow, Fieldston School; Walter are abrupt and kaleidoscopic; because the retary General of the United Nations,
Bonime, New York Medical College; Richard Vietcong guerrillas seem to be able to pen- U Thant, has somewhat prejudiced the
S. Bowman, Cooper Union; Lewis Brandt, etrate easily into our lines; because our Viet- position of the United Nations so far as
Fairleigh Dickinson University; Emile Ca- nam allies do not seem to wish to fight as the Secretary General himself coming
pouya, New School for Social Research; Neil hard as we would like them to. into the action to arbitrate is concerned.
A. Chassman, Fieldston School; Carla Drije, These are discouraging factors. But to as- Third, the United Nations Assembly,
Bank Street College of Education; Stephen sume that they put the United States at the
Edelglass, Cooper Union; Bernard Elevitch, bottom of the totem pole is to look at that as everyone knows, is now paralyzed be-
Fairleigh Dickinson University; Hanna Pater- symbol from a mistaken angle. The United cause of its financial situation. It is
son, Downstate Medical Center; Jules Feiffer, States has an Immense concentration of unable to meet. At its only meeting this
Hall Syndicates; Dorothy Ferguson, Long Is- navar and air power close to the coast of year it took one vote on a procedural
land City High School; Doris Z. Fleischer, New southeast Asia. It is capable of expanding question and then adjourned until fall.
York Institute of Technology; Burton Good- that power many times over. This fact, with There is serious question as to whether
man, Queensborough Community College; the potential consequences it Implies, is well it will be able to act for the remainder of
Paul Goodman, Institute for Policy Studies; understood in North Vietnam. It is well un-
Robert Gwathmey, Cooper Union; Eleanor derstood in Moscow. It is well understood, t year,
Hakim, New School for Social Research; Rob- despite all talk of paper tigers, in Peiping. The Security Council is paralyzed by
ert Hodes, Mount Sinai, Hospital; Ralph And once we recognize how well it Is under- a Soviet veto.
Douglas Hyslop, Union Theological Seminary; stood, in all these and other places, we can Finally, any dispassionate, objective
Herbert C. Jackson, Union Theological Semi- take a more realistic view of who is where
nary; E. Roy John, New York Medical Col- on the totem pole. person would have to agree that the
lege; Marc Karson, Kingsborough Commu- The United States has amply proved, and United States is not In a position of
nity College; Anatole Norman Klein, Ben- Is continuing to prove, its ability and its de- strength in South Vietnam at the present
nington College; Eric Krystall, University of termination to stay in South Vietnam as long time. This is not the time to negotiate.
Michigan; Arnold Lieber, Hillside Hospital; as present circumstances require it to do This is not the time to bargain. Our
Donah B. Litauer, Jewish Child Care Associa- so. This is not the question which Secretary Position in South Vietnam is weak. We
tion; William Paul Livant, University of General Thant and President de Gaulle and should be realistic enough to realize that
Michigan, Edward Margolies, Staten Island other advocates of negotiation now wish to fact, and act upon that basis.
Community College; Arno J. Mayer, Prince- explore; they know the answer to this ques-
ton; June Nash, Yale University; John A. tion. What they wish to explore is whether Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I join
Nevin, Swarthmore College; K. H. Niebyl, New matters have not reached a point at which my colleagues in praising the fine state-
School for Social Research; Hans Rade- it will be possible to set up a system of ade- ment by, the Senator from Wisconsin.
4 macher, University of Pennsylvania; Ronald quate international guarantees to protect As he shall see from my statement, we
Radosh, Kingsborough Community College; South Vietnam against outside aggression. are in practical agreement on this sub-
Philip Rahv, Brandeis University; Richard M. There is every common sense reason why jeet.
Reinitz, Wayne State University; Alfred H. this possibility should be promptly and SOUTH VIETNAM-U THANT SHOULD Go
Rifkin, New York Medical College; Arthur J. thoroughly investigated. An agreement to
Samuels, Hunter College; Jane C. Schneider, do so would surrender nothing; it would open Mr. President, on February 17, Presi-
University of Michigan; Peter T. Schneider, up the possibility for determining whether dent Johnson stated very clearly and suc-
University of Michigan; Jack Stuart, Hunter the goal of effective neutralization of South cinctly our purpose and objective in
College; Paul M. Sweezy, Economist; Arthur Vietnam, now being sought by arms, could "South Vietnam, He said:
Vidich, New School for Social Research; An- be achieved by diplomacy. That purpose and that objective is to join
drews Wapping, Bard College; John Weiss, the defense and protection of the freedom
Wayne State University; Ken Wibecan, Har- mMr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, let of a brave people who are under attack that
per and now; H. I3 Wilson, Princeton; Robert reply briefly to the Senator from Is controlled and that is directed from out-
Wolfe, Harvard; J. S. Wolkenfeld, Kings- Alaska by saying that he is correct in side their country.
borough Communuity College. stating that the Korean situation is not We have no ambition there for ourselves.
This letter is being published as an ad- the same as that in South Vietnam. We We seek no wider war. But we must all un-
vertisement paid by the signers. Comments were deeply involved in Korea. We were derstand that we will persist in the defense
No. 38-12
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 3720.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
of freedom and our continuing actions will
be those which are justified and those that
are made necessary by the continuing aggres-
sion of others.
These actions will be measured, and fitting,
and adequate. Our stamina, and the stam-
ina of the American people, is equal to the
task.
On February 25, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk issued a prepared statement
amplifying the policy statement of the
President. The key points of this state-
ment are as follows:
1. The nations of southeast Asia have a
right to live in peace, free from aggression
directed against them from outside their
borders. This is a point of vital importance
to the safety and the very existence of a
hundred smaller nations all over the world.
2. North Vietnam, in callous disregard of
the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962, has
directed and supplied the essential military
personnel and arms for this aggression, aimed
at the imposition of a Communist regime by
force.
3. The position of the United States to-
ward threats to the peace in southeast Asia
has been made clear many times, going back
to 1954, when President Eisenhower wrote
to the President of South Vietnam that our
offer of assistance was to enable South Viet-
nam to maintain "a strong, viable state, ca-
pable of resisting attempted subversion of
aggression through military means."
4. The key to peace in southeast Asia has
been repeated over and over again. It is the
readiness of all in that area to live at peace
and to leave their neighbors alone. Those
who are not leaving their neighbors alone
know exactly what it means-the illegal in-
filtration of military personnel and arms
cannot be described as "leaving your neigh-
bor alone."
5 Compliance with the Geneva agree-
wary of the massive evidence estab-
lishing North Vietnam's responsibility
for the aggression against South Viet-
nam---evidence which has been pre-
sented to the International Control
Commission.
The "white paper" points out that the
war in Vietnam-and note that it uses the
word "war"-is a new kind of war; a
totally new brand of aggression against
an independent people who want to make
their own way in peace and freedom; that
a Communist government has set out
deliberately to conquer a sovereign peo-
ple in a neighboring state; that South
Vietnam is fighting for its life against a
brutal campaign of terror and armed
attack inspired, directed, supplied, and
controlled by the Communist regime in
Hanoi-an aggression which has been
going on for years.
The evidence shows that the hard core
of the Communist forces attacking South
Vietnam was trained in North Vietnam
and ordered into South Vietnam by Ha-
noi; that the key leadership of the Viet-
cong, the officers and much of the cadre,
many of the technicians, political orga-
nizers, and propagandists have come
from North Vietnam and operate under
Hanoi's direction; that the training of
essential military personnel and their in-
filtration into South Vietnam is directed
h command in Hanoi;
hi
ilit
g
ary
by the m
that many of the weapons and much of ment are steadfastly adhered to. They
the ammunition and other supplies used will continue to have my full support as
by the Vietcong have been sent into long as they follow this policy.
th' ant we may
o
war materiel from Communist China and
other Communist states has been chan-
neled through North Vietnam for the
Vietcong army.
The evidence shows that these attack-
ing forces remain under the military dis-
cipline of Hanoi after they enter South
Vietnam, and that increasingly the forces
sent into South Vietnam are native North
Vietnamese.
The infiltration rate has been as fol-
lows, and these are minimum figures:
Year : Minimum
1959-60--------------------------- 1,800
1961------------------------------- 3,700
1962------------------------------ 5,400
1963------------------------------- 4,200
1964------------------------------ 4,400
Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 Viet-
cong officers, soldiers, and technicians
are known to have entered South Viet-
really is not reasonably firm, it would be
misinterpreted by the Communists as a
sign of weakness. That is what has hap-
pened in Vietnam, and I am encouraged
that the State Department has faced up
to this fact. Whether or not the air
strikes on North Vietnam are indeed
fitted to the aggression by the Viet-
cong, only time will tell. I hope that
they are. I am concerned that Hanoi
may interpret this new policy of firmness
as merely an interlude in what has been
a policy of accommodation rather than
a change in the policy of accommoda-
tion. If Hanoi misreads the policy in-
tentions of our President and the Sec-
retary of State, things will get worse be-
fore they get better. More lives will be
lost-American as well as Vietnamese.
More devastation will come to North
Vietnam, and probably to Hanoi itself.
Concern is being expressed over the pos-
sibility that Red China will send troops
to North Vietnam and Laos for eventual
use against South Vietnam. I suggest
that this possibility will be in direct pro-
portion to our failure to continue a policy
of firmness, as distinguished from a
policy of accommodation. That is why
it is so important that not one sign of
a return to the unfortunate accom-
modation policy be shown; and it will
not be shown as long as the present policy
Ana while j, am on is p
trust that Peiping will understand that
the privileged sanctuary policy which
down with the bombs on Korean
North Vietnam.
I have not been particularly concerned
over the reaction in some capitals to our
change from a policy of accommoda-
tion to one of firmness. After all, there
has been general satisfaction to let the
United States and South Vietnam bear
almost all of the cost of repelling the
aggression by North Vietnam. Too many
of these capitals have long been follow-
ing a policy of accommodation, ex-
changing ambassadors with Red China,
failing to pay their obligations to the
United Nations, accepting our foreign
aid, and influencing our foreign policy.
Words like "peace," "negotiations," "set-
tlement " and "restraint" are expedients
which seem to blind them to the evidence
ments of 1954 and 1962 can establish peace.
6. What is still missing is any indication
that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it
is doing against its neighbors. The absence
of this crucial element affects the current
discussion of negotiation. A negotiation
aimed at the acceptance or the confirmation
of aggression is not possible.
I repeat here today what I have said
ever since our retaliatory air strikes
against North Vietnam. I fully support
President Johnson in his actions of firm-
ness, and I fully support his policy state-
ment of February 17 and the policy
statement of Secretary Rusk to which I
have just referred.
I would go a step further than
Indeed
,
the Secretary and say that not only
must Hanoi indicate that it is prepared
to stop what it is doing to its neighbors
in South Vietnam, but it must also bring
back the many thousands of guerrillas
and Infiltrators to North Vietnam, where
they belong, before negotiations begin.
This would not preclude a period of a
truce during which these people, along
with their war materiel, are pulled back
to North Vietnam. Perhaps this is im-
"
plied when the Secretary says that
ne- nam against Hanoi's open aggression," Lary Rusk's policy statement, Mr.
scon irmn aimed as the ac ggression is eptance not or tpos- he that further means for defense were Thant told a news conference that he
to I think clearly sible," but think it should be clearly agreed upon between the United States had proposed a secret peace plan to end
stated. Also, it should be made clear and South Vietnam, and that the air the war in South Vietnam. It was re-
that any period of a truce or cease-fire strikes against North Vietnam were made ported that he was unusually critical of
cannot be used as a ruse for the North as a "limited response fitted to the ag- American policy in southeast Asia and
Vietnamese to consolidate their positions gression that produced them." suggested that there would have been no
in South Vietnam-let alone improve I have been saying, ever since our Communist intervention had the United
them. Government permitted Premier Khru- States stayed out of South Vietnam, sup-
On February 27, the State Department shchev to renege on his agreement for porting his contention by using his own
issued a white paper on Vietnam set- onsite inspection in Cuba, that a policy of country, Burma, as an example. He
ting forth a full and up-to-date sum- "restraint" might sound good, but if it said that the Burmese Communist un-
nam under orders from Hanoi, and prob- of aggression and to their moral respon-
ably 17,000 more infiltraters were sent in. sibility in the family of nations to help
It is now estimated that the Vietcong put a stop to it. - We may hope that our
number 35,000, comprising the "hard clear and steadfast adherence to a policy
core" of all Communist forces in South of firmness will persuade them to our
Vietnam. cause.
Of particular interest is the statement What does concern me, however, is the
in the "white paper" that "Clearly the attitude and statements of Mr. U Thant,
restraint of the past was not provided Secretary General of the United Nations.
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE 3717
Hanson, classics; Frederick Harbison, eco-
nomics; Gilbert H. Harman, philosophy; C. G.
Hempel, Philosophy; Laurence B. Holland,
English; John B. Hughes, romance languages;
Edmund Keeley, English; Earl Kim, music;
Edmund L. King, romance languages; Arthur
C. Kirsch, English; Axel Kornfuehrer, his-
tory; Thomas Kuhn, history; Victor Lange,
German; Donald R. Larson, romance lan-
guages; Sue Larson, philosophy; Rensselaer
W. Lee, art and archaeology; Michael Lipsky,
politics; A. Walton Litz, English; Duane
Lockard, politics; L. H. Lockwood, music;
John Rupert Martin, art and archaeology;
Arno J. Mayer, history; Arthur Mendel,
music; Dimitri Mihalas, astrophysical sci-
ences; George Paul Mras, art and archaeol-
ogy; R. Nozick, philosophy; A. B. Pardee, bi-
ology; George Pepe, classics; George Pitcher,
philosophy; James K. Randall, music; L. I.
Rebhun, biology; Thomas P. Roche, Jr., Eng-
lish; Remington E. Rose II, English; Robert
Rosenblum, art and archaeology; Israel Ros-
enfield, politics; G. S. Rousseau, English;
Charles A. Ryskamp, English; Joseph
Schraibman, romance languages; John
Schrecker, history; Roger Sessions, music;
J. E. Seigel, history; Steve M. Slaby, engineer-
ing graphics; Philip Solomon, astrophysical
sciences; Kimberly Sparks, German; Stanley
Stein, history; Stephen P. Stich, philosophy;
John H. Strange, politics; Edward D. Sulli-
van, romance languages; George F. Thomas,
religion; Lawrence R. Thompson, English; A.
Richard Turner, art and archaeology; Jack A.
Vernon. psychology; A. N. Wahl, politics;
Peter S. Walch, art and archaeology; Michael
Waizer, politics; Sam Willis, romance lan-
guages; Franklin W. Young, religion; P.. R.
Zilsel, physics.
Princeton Theological Seminary: George S:
Hendry, theology; Cullen I. K. Story, Biblical
studies; Charles C. West, Christian ethics.
Rider College: C. C. Pratt, psychology;
Stephen Vuglen, economics.
Rutgers-The State University: Eliahu
Abrahams, physics; Robert F, Allen, director,
language laboratory; Samuel L. Bally, his-
tory; Howard Ball, political science; Saul
Barshay, physics; John E. Bebout, director,
urban studies center; F. Kenneth Berrien,
psychology; Gerald Bertin, romance lan-
guages; Paul Bertram, English; Werner W.
Boehm, dean, graduate school of social
work; Harry C. Bredemeier, urban studies
center; David J. Bredin, physics; Vernon Bry-
son, microbiology; John L. Cammett, his-
tory; Peter L. Carlton, psychology;' Sandi E.
Cliadakis,, history; Bertram D. Cohen, psy-
chology; George H. Collier, psychology;
Michael R. Curtis, political science; Michael
R. D'Amato, psychology; James E. Durkin,
Jr., psychology; Thomas R. Edwards, Jr.,
English; Richard M. Pouters, political sci-
ence; Paul Fussell, Jr., English; Ralph Gar-
ber, social work; Lloyd C. Gardner, history;
Bertram E. Oarskof, psychology; Joseph N.
Ginocchio, physics; Bernard G. Guerney, psy-
chology; Robert Gutman, sociology; Nelson
0. Hanawalt, psychology; Don F. Helsel, ur-
bail studies center; David J. M. Higgins,
English; Daniel F. Howard, English; Solomon
Leader, mathematics; Hannah Levin, psy-
chology; Donald J. Lewis, psychology; Peter
Lindenfeld, physics; Ernest. Lynton, physics;
Martin Manosevitz, psychology; Simon Marc-
son, sociology; David Markowitz,' physics;
John 0. McCormick, English; Donald C. Mell,
Jr., English; William G. Miller, archivist,
library; Carol Ann Millsom, psychology;
Edith D. Neimark, psychology; Gerald Pom-
per, political science; David Popenoe, urban
studies center; Donald H. Riddle, Eagleton
Institute of Politics; Glorianne Robbi, Eagle-
ton Institute of Politics; Allen B. Robbins,
physics; Amelie 0. Rorty, philosophy; Claire
Rosenfigld, English; William A. Rust, Jr., po-
litical science; Anne Saxon, English; Frank
R. Scarpitti, sociology; Norman E. Spear, psy-
chology; Marshall Stanley, urban studies
center; Charles H. Stember, sociology; Sieg-
fried A. Streufert, psychology; Warren I.
busman, history; Frank Tachau, political
science; Paul Tillett, Eagleton Institute of
Politics; Jackson Toby, sociology; Jack Un-
dank, romance languages; Rudolph J. Ve-
coli, history; David R. Weimer, English; Vir-
ginia P. Whitney, urban studies center; Sey-
mour T. Zenchelsky, chemistry.
Rockefeller Institute: Lawrence Eisenberg,
electronics; Rollin D. Hotchkiss, genetics;
Dorothy Lane, Alexander Mauro, biophysics;
Richard Novick, genetics; Priscilla J. Ortiz,
genetics; Muriel Roger, genetics; Paul Rosen,
electronics; Robert L. Schoenfeld, electronics;
Norton D. Zinder, genetics.
Simmons College: Ina M. Granara, chem-
istry; Henry J. Halko, history; Edith F. Hel-
man, Spanish; Lawrence L. Langer, English;
Ruth S. Leonard, library science; Samuel T.
Leverich, mathematics; Manfred Klein, Ger-
man; William M. Manly, English; Carroll F.
Miles, government; George W. Nitchie, Eng-
lish; John A. Timm, chemistry; Roy M. Tol-
lefson, government; Wylie Sypher, English;
Robert C. Vernon, physics; Marion I. Walter,
mathematics (plus eight signers last week).
Swarthmore College: Monroe Beardsley,
philosophy; Thompson Bradley, modern lan-
guages; Alburt Roseberg, natural science;
Jerome A. Schaffer, philosophy.
Syracuse University: Norman Balabanian,
electrical engineering; Elias Balbinder, micro-
biology; David H. Bennett, American studies;
Peter G. and Margot Bergmann, physics;
Joshua Goldberg, physics; N. Horwitz,
physics; Gordon Kent, electrical engineering;
H. Richard Levy, biochemistry; Rajendra P.
Nanavati, electrical engineering; Bernard
Silverman, electrical engineering; Ralph
Slepecky, microbiology; Edward P. Stabler,
electrical engineering; Ralph Swalm, indus-
trial engineering.
Tufts Univesity: Louis Geller, medical
school; Charles E. Magraw, medical school
(plus 31 signers February 16).
University of Pennsylvania: Lee Benson,
history; Derk Bodde, oriental studies; Walter
Bonner, Johnson Foundation; Herbert Callen,
physics; Max I. Caspari, physics; Alan Cassels,
history; Hilary Conroy, history; Paul David-
off, city planning; Allan R. Day, chemistry;
Helen C. Davies, microbiology; Thomas J.
Davy, Fels Institute; Elizabeth Flower, phi-
losophy; Sherman Frankel, physics; Harold S.
Ginsberg, microbiology; Sol. H. Goodgal,
microbiology; Joseph S. Gotz, microbiology;
Britton Harris, city planning; Walter P.
Hempfiing, Johnson Foundation; Henry Hiz,
linguistics; Arthur Kowalsky, Johnson Foun-
dation; A. Klein, physics; Norman R. Klein-
man, microbiology; Fred Karush, micro-
biology; J. S. Leigh, Jr., Johnson Foundation;
Lawrence Levine, Fels Institute; Irma S.
Lustig, English; Morton Lustig, Fels Insti-
tute; John Marshall, anatomy; Anshell Mela-
med, Fels Institute; Albert S. Mildvan, John-
son Foundation; Grace Milgram, Institute for
Urban Studies; Dennis Palumbo, Fels Insti-
tute; Jean Platt, anatomy; Berton C. Press-
man, Johnson Foundation; Charles C. Price,
chemistry; Henry Primakoff, physics; W. A.
Rickett, oriental studies; Robert Rutman,
chemistry; Abraham M. Stein, chemistry; E.
Dale Saunders, oriental studies; Franklin C.
Southworth, South Asia regional studies;
C. W. Ufford, physics; Walter D. Wales,
physics; Roger H. Walmsley, physics; G. T.
Wood, physics.
Wellesley College: Sigmund Abeles, art;
Lillian Anderson, art; Allen Eister, sociology;
Barbara B. Green, political science; Eleanor
L. McLaughlin, history; Annemarie Shimony,
sociology; Owen S. Stratton, political science;
Kathryn Turner, history; W. Warren Wagar,
history (plus 4 signers February 16).
Others: Stringfellow Barr, writer and lec-
turer; Everett Gendler, Rabbi, Princeton;
Eric Kahler, writer and lecturer; Richard
Jeffrey, CCNY; Ashley Montagu, writer and
lecturer; Carol C. B. Savage, Ben Shahn,
artist; Ernest Young, Dartmouth.
(Institutional affiliation for purposes of
identification only.)
If you approve of this statement, write or
wire President Lyndon B. Johnson, White
House, Washington, D.C.
This open letter was published and signed
as an advertisement in the New York Times
of February 16, 1965, by some 400 faculty
members of universities and colleges of the
Greater Boston area. Because of the interest
and support it aroused, it was circulated
again, chiefly in the Philadelphia-Princeton-
New Brunswick area and is being republished
as an advertisement paid by the signers.
Comments and contributions toward cost
should be sent to Ad Hoc Committee for
Open Letter on Vietnam, 552 Ewing Street,
Princeton, N.J., Prof. Arno J. Mayer, chair-
man; Prof. Paul Tillett, treasurer.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 28, 19651
OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON
VIETNAM
We, as members of the academic com-
munity, feel impelled to raise publicly with
you, Mr. President, the question of our Gov-
ernment's present policy toward South Viet-
nam. We ask you to reconsider our present
course of action in view of the following
facts:
We are intervening unilaterally in support
of a succession of undemocratic regimes that
are opposed by a majority of the South Viet-
namese people.
We are waging an immoral and inhumane
war that has brought untold suffering to the
people of South Vietnam.
Our .recent air attacks on North Vietnam
intensify the danger that a local conflict will
develop into a major war.
It is maintained that the United States is
protecting a popularly supporter government
against foreign subversion. We maintain,
Mr. President, that the evidence available to
the Congress and to the public does not sup-
port this interpretation of the Vietnamese
conflict.
The fact is that the United States is main-
taining regimes which are not supported by
the bulk of the rural population. How else
explain a situation in which 35,000 Vietcong
regulars have been able to make increasing
gains against a Government army of over
200,000 men together with 23,000 American
"advisers"? The close-range attacks on Bien-
hoa and Pleiku indicate the lack of support
by neighboring villagers for the Saigon gov-
ernment.
What has our policy meant for the people
of South Vietnam? Only a small minority
of the people profits from the $600 million
in foreign aid we send annually to South
Vietnam. The peasantry of Vietnam has
been terrorized. The country, once one of
the most prosperous areas of southeast Asia,
is being devastated by the napalm bombing
of peasant villages, by the unbridled strafing
of the countryside by American-supplied air-
craft, by the detention and mass transfers
of the South Vietnamese people. Prisoners
are being tortured in South Vietnam. It
does not seem likely that this could be done
without the knowledge of American officials.
What effect has our policy had on U.S.
prestige abroad? By supporting dictatorial
military regimes in South Vietnam we have
undermined confidence in our professed be-
lief that nations should be allowed to develop
their own destinies free from outside inter-
ference. Although we pledged to respect the
Geneva accords of 1954, we have violated
those agreements by supplying troops and
weapons to South Vietnam. We have belied
our adherence to international law by re-
fusing to submit the dispute to an interna-
tional conference, such as the parties to the
Geneva accords or one of the bodies of the
United Nations.
Our justification for intervention in South
Vietnam _ has been that we are preventing
the spread of communism in southeast Asia.
The effect of our policy, however, has been
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 3718
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 1
to alienate both the neighboring countries
and our allies.
As recent events have shown, the longer
the war in South Vietnam continues, the
greater are the chances of escalation. Our
air and sea attacks upon North Vietnam have
not appreciably altered the situation in the
south, but they have succeeded in increasing
the danger of a major conflagration on the
continent of Asia and of nuclear war.
When 81 percent of the American people,
according to a recent Gallup poll, indicated
they were In favor of a conference with the
leaders of southeast Asia and China in an
effort to reach a peace agreement, must we
continue any longer along this dangerous
path?
Mr. President, we urge you to consider
another course of action:
We ask that you bring an end to the in-
vestment of American men and money in the
war in South Vietnam.
We ask you to seek a negotiated settle-
ment by every possible means in order to
create an independent, neutralized govern.
ment and to bring about the withdrawal of
U.S. troops.
We ask you to la the problem immediately
before an international body and to put an
end to our unilateral and illegal actions.
We urge you, Mr. President, to take im-
mediate action to end the war in South Viet-
nam. The longer we persist in our present
policy, the fewer will be the alternatives open
to us.
Adelphi University: Harold Allen, philoso-
phy; Stuart Astor, English; Wesley Camp,
history; Paul Crosser, economics Sydney
Davis, education; Robert Endleman, sociol-
ogy; Robert Ernst, history; Beatrice Freeman,
social work; David Gordon, sociology; Murray
Greene, philosophy; Philip Greene, English;
Harlon Joye, sociology; Stephen Klass, Eng-
lish; Donald Koster, English; Allen M. Krebs,
sociology; David Levin, history; Jerry March,
chemistry; Joan Martin, English; Ronald Mc-
Iiaffy, mathematics; Robert Pasotti, philoso-
phy; Robert Payton, mathematics; Eugene
Roth, English; Henry F. Smith, English; Vir-
ginia Terris, English; Alfred Vogel, chem-
istry; Argyrios Vourkas, sociology; Henry T.
Wilt, Greek and Latin; Cedric Winslow, Eng-
lish; Donald Wolf, English; Stephen Yeh,
sociology.
Albert Einstein College of Medicine: Bev-
erly Birns, psychiatry; Everett W. Bovard,
anatomy; Wagner H. Bridger, pyschlatry; N.
M. Buckley, physiology; Jean L. Cook, medi-
cine; Lewis M. Fraad, pediatrics; Sidney
Goldflscher, pathology; Eric Holtzman, path-
ology; Edward J. Hornick, psychiatry; Wil-
Ifam Obrinsky, pediatrics; Samuel M. Rosen,
medicine; - Bertram A. Lowy, biochemistry;
Mary Weitzman, anatomy; N. Henry Wil-
liams, medicine.
Brooklyn College: Harry Gracey, sociology;
Brijen Gupta, history; Paul Haberfleld,
chemistry; David Koulaek, psychology; Bar-
ton Meyers, psychology; Myriam Mf"edziano-
gora, philosophy; Rose Mukerji, education;
Heman L. Zieger, chemistry; Carl B. Zuck-
erman, psychology.
City College of New York: Bernard Bel-
lush, history; Nathan Berall, English; Gus-
tave Bischof, mechanical engineering; Dan-
iel Bronstein, philosophy; M. Vertner Brown,
physics; Mark Brunswick, music; Maurice
Cohen, philosophy; Ephraim Cross, romance
languages; Helen Davidson, education; Sid-
ney Ditzion, history; Abraham Edel, philoso-
phy; Sophie L. Elan, education; J. A. Ellas,
philosophy; Joseph A. Ellis, history; Ernest
Ferguson, physical education; Dorothy H.
Gampel, Psychology; Geoffrey J. Gibson,
philosophy; Daniel Greenberger, physics; Leo
Hamalain, English; Fritz Jahoda, music;
Florins Katz, education; Y. H. Kirkorian,
emeritus, philosophy; Edward Mack, English;
Irving Malin, English; Aaron Noland, history;
Stanley W. Page, history; George W. Phillips,
history; A. I. Rabin, psychology; Sidney M,
Rosenblatt, education; Aurel M. Seifert,
physics; Oscar Sherwin, English; Irwin Stark,
English; Samuel Sumberg, Germanic and
Slavic languages; Martin Tammy, philosophy;
Harry Tarter, philosophy; H. S. Thayer, phi-
losophy; Martin S. Tiersten, physics; Barbara
Watson, English; Phillip Wiener, philosophy;
Harold Wilensky, psychology; Bohdan Zawa-
dzki, psychology; Rose Zimbardo, English.
Columbia University: Alexander Alland,
Jr., anthropology; Hugh Amory, English; E.
Duncan Aswell, English; Bertram L. Bassuk,
architecture; Saevan Bercovitch, English;
Lipman Bers, mathematics; Rudolph Binion,
history; Robert Brustein, English; Justus
Buehler, philosophy; Sue Buckingham,
medicine; Jack Budowsky, dentistry; Arthur
C. Carr, medicine; Eloise E. Clark, zoology;
Jonathan H. Collett, English; Lambros
Comitas, philosophy; Mason Cooley, English;
Arnold Cooper, medicine; Stephen M. Corey,
Teachers College; Robert Cross, history;
Elizabeth Czoniczer, French; Leonardo C. De
Morelos, Spanish; H. M. Edwards, mathe-
matics; Alezander Erlich, economics; Arnitai
Etz oni, sociology; Samuel Finestone, social
work; James M. Fitch, architecture; David
Fitelson, English; Goodwin L. Foster, emeri-
tus, biochemistry; Marie L. Franciscus, oc-
cupational therapy; Morton H. Fried, an-
thropology; Herbert Gans, Institute of
Urban Studies; Willard Gaylin, medicine;
Percival Goodman, architecture; Frederic
Grab, English; Richard L. Greeman, French;
F. I. Gumbel, industrial engineering; Robert
W. Banning, English; Marvin Harris, anthro-
pology; Teru Hayashi, zoology; Amelia Hess,
anthropology; Charles H. Hinnant, English;
Terrence K. Hopkins, sociology; E. R. Kol-
chin, mathematics; Alexander Kouzmanoff,
architecture; Corliss Lamont, philosophy;
Serge Lang, mathematics; Robert F. Lynd,
professor emeritus; William Martin, soci-
ology; A. L. Mayer, mathematics; Peter Mc-
Hugh, sociology; Fabrizio Melano, English;
Seymour Meiman, engineering; Solomon
Miller, anthropology; Mary Mothersill, phi-
losophy; John Mundy, history; Jay Neuge-
boren, English; George Pappas, medicine;
Lawrence Pinkham, journalism; J. Herman
Randall, Jr., philosophy; John D. Rosenberg,
English; Leon S. Roudiez, French; Phillips
Salman, English; Mario G. Salvadori, civil
engineering; J. Schilt, astronomy; Paul
Schwaber, English; Arthur Schwartz, mathe-
matics; Jerome Schwartz, French; Morton D.
Schweitzer, epidemiology; Peter Shaw, Eng-
lish; William Silverman, medicine; Ernest
Simon, French; Susan Sontag, religion;
Robert Spitzer, medicine; Harold Stahmer,
religion; Michael Studdert-Kennedy, psy-
chology; Samuel Sutton, medicine; Mark
Van Doen, English; William Vickrey, eco-
nomics; Frederick E. Warburton, zoology;
Michael Wood, English; David Zipser,
zoology.
Cornell University: Douglas F. Dowd, eco-
nomics; Robert M. Durling, romance litera-
ture; Chandler Morse, economics; David E.
Novack, economics; Taylor Stoehr, English
literature; Harold Widom, mathematics.
Hofstra College: Adolf Anderson, New Col-
lege; Ethel Brook, modern languages; Fran-
ces Z. Kalman, educational foundations;
Shirley P. Langer, psychology; Harvey Levin,
economics; Mary Gilbert Ligon, education;
Broadus Mitchell, new college; Anne Morgen-
stern, education; Elie Siegmeister, music;
E. R. Stabler, mathematics; Ruth Stauffer,
English; Albert Tepper, music; Lynn Tur-
geon, economics; Murray Yanowitch, eco-
nomics; June Zaccone, economics.
Long Island University: Kenneth Bernard,
English; KennethBridenthal, history; George
Economou, English; Harry l'enson, English;
Leonard Fleischer, English; Frederic Jaher,
history; John McDermott, philosophy; Ed-
ward Pomerantz, English; Kenneth W. Scott,
English; Paul N. Siegel, English; Robert Vas
Dias, English.
New York University: Elaine Allen, medi-
cine; Michael Arens, physics; Sabert Bas-
escu, psychology; Marvin Belsky, medicine;
Joy Gould Boyum, English; Robert Burrowes,
government; Edwin Campbell, chemistry;
James Tracy Crown, government; Stanley
Deutsch, medicine; Eugenie Dubnau, medi-
cine; Dora Fisher, psychology; Emanuel
Fisher, medicine; H. H. Giles, social studies;
Mary A. Giles, education; Vincent Glinsky,
sculpture; Jacob Goodman, mathematics;
Martin Hamburger, guidance; George Kaufer,
psychology; Gerson T. Lesser, medicine; Leah
Levinger, psychology; Harvey Levy, medicine;
Evelyn Mauss, dentistry; L. Nirenberg, math-
ematics; Ruth Ochroch, psychology; Robert
Perlman, medicine; Morris Perlmutter, medi-
cine; Richard Pollack, mathematics; Fred-
erick L. Redefer, education; Albert Romasco,
history; Sanford Rosenzweig, dentistry; H.
Laurence Ross, sociology; Irving Sarnoff,
psychology; Ernest G. Schachtel, psychology;
Milton Schwebel, guidance; Martin Spencer,
sociology; Herbert A. Tonne, business educa-
tion; Gilbert M. Trachtman, educational psy-
chology; William G. Vander Kloot, medicine;
Louis Wicker, sociology; Pearl Zipser, read-
ing institute.
Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn: E.
Banks, chemistry; Judith S. Bellin, chem-
istry; Irving Cohen, chemistry; Sid Deutsch,
electrical engineering; Owen Fleischman,
physics; Marvin E. Gettleman, history; H. P.
Gregor, chemistry; Helmut Gruber, history;
Frederick C. Kreiling, history; Eleanor B. Lea-
cock, history; David Mermelstein, economics;
Carol Moodie, history; Gerald Oster, chem-
istry; R. F. Riley, chemistry; Paul E. Spoerri,
chemistry; J. Steigman, chemistry.
Pratt Institute: Joseph L. Cobitz, philoso-
phy; Robert B. Dennis, architecture; Frances
Esecover, architecture; Sibyl Moholy-Nagy,
architecture; Sidney M. Shelov, architecture;
Christopher D. Wadsworth, architecture; J.
Sherwood Weber, English.
Queens College: Kenneth T. Abrams, Eng-
lish; Arnold Bernstein, psychology; Ellen
Bindman, mathematics; Bell Gale Chevigny,
English; E. Richard Covert, student person-
nel; Jack Cypin, economics; M. Herbert Danz-
ger, sociology; Herbert Fremont, education;
Hilliard Gardiner, contemporary civilization;
L. Terrell Gardner, mathematics; Louis Gel-
ler, economics; Ronald Glassman, sociology;
Del Greenblatt, history; Alan Harwood, so-
ciology; Mark A. Haskell, economics; L.
Hochman, physics; Lawrence Kaplan, philos-
ophy; Joel Kauffman, economics; Lawrence
B. Kirschner, history; Benjamin Lapkin, edu-
cation.; Marvin Leiner, education; Thomas
M. Mongar, political science; James R. O'Con-
nell, history; Melvin Reichler, sociology;
Vera Reichler, political science; Edmund Rei-
ter, contemporary civilization; Sol Resnik,
political science; Anita Ross, education; Sel-
ma Sapir, education; Robert E. Savage, biol.
ogy; Edward Seltzer, philosophy; John B. P.
Shaffer, psychology; Sidney B. Simon, educa-
tion; Harvard Sitkoff, contemporary civiliza-
tion; Harry Sitomer, mathematics; Julia Sut-
ton, music; Frank A. Warren, III, history;
Frank White, philosophy; Elizabeth Friar
William, education; John S. Williams, sociol-
ogy; Michael Wreszin, history; Martin Zelin,
psychology; Burton Zwiebach, political
science.
Rutgers University: John M. Cammett, his-
tory; Eugene D. Genovese, history; John
Gorgol, management; Arnold M. Paul, his-
tory; B. P. Sonnenblick, zoology; Warren I.
Susman, history.
RockefellerInstitute:Erwin Fleissner, bio-
chemistry; Max Gottesman, biochemistry;
Fritz Lipmann; David Mauzerall; Philip
Siekevitz, cell biology.
Sarah Lawrence College: Robert Engler,
political science; Ira Glasser, mathematics;
Helen Merrell Lynd, prof. emeritus; Carl Re-
ask, social science; Harvey Swados, literature.
Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Re-
search: Aaron Bendich, biological chemistry;
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 19.65
other indication that there was no Hanoi
plot.
Secretary McNamara, one of the most level-
headed executives ever to boss the Pentagon,
was mousetrapped when he got out of his
sickbed to hold an emergency press con-
ference ,and defended the 'American forces as
victims of a "sneak attack." Obviously he
knew that some of the great military vic-
tories of American histgry have resulted
from sneak attacks, as when George Wash-
ington sneaked across the Delaware to sur-
prise carousing Hessians in Trenton. Mc-
NNmara also knew that his own men were
being trained in the art of the sneak attack
at the very time he held the news conference.
Only on a few occasions have American
troops telegraphed their attacks in advance,
as when General Pickett sent a Confederate
flag at the head of his troops in the famous
charge at Gettysburg-a charge, incidentally,
in which his defeat turned the tide of the
Those who were really mousetrapped as a
result of the Pleiku incident were not only
McNamara but President Johnson and,
momentarily, the State Department. Since
then Acting Secretary of State George Ball
has tried to restore some reason and sanity
to our mousetrapped thinking, which could
have precipitated nuclear world war.
What happened was that Ambassador Tay-
lor, an able but severely harassed man who
has seen his hitherto great prestige gradually
eroded in Vietnam, seized this opportunity
to recommend retaliatory raids. He sin-
cerely believed this. was a Hanoi plot. Ordi-
narily his recommendation might have been
discounted in Washington, but it happened
that McGeorge Bundy, White House adviser
on security matters, was in 'Saigon at pre-
WHITE HOUSE PRESSURED
Bundy's brother William is Assistant Sec-
retary of State for the Far East and has long
advocated a stronger hand in Vietnam, in-
cluding bombing the North. When
McGeorge Bundy, therefore, joined Taylor
in rushing back a premature, exaggerated
account of the Pleiku'raid, the White House
finally yielded to advice which the Bundy
brothers had been giving for some time and
which has now caused serious loss of Ameri-
can prestige, demonstrations against Amer-
ican embassies around the world, even in
pro-West counties and eroded the better un
derstanding Mr. Johnson had personally built
up with the new leaders in the Kremlin.
What the American public has a right to
expect is a congressional investigation or
the court-martial of American officers asleep
at Pleiku. The Pentagon alibi is that they
are highly trained men who are not sup-
posed to stand guard, which is correct. But
the fact remains that no one, not even South
Vietnamese, was on guard and, as a result,
approximately 100 wounded, and several mil-
lion dollars worth of planes destroyed.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 27,
1965]
UNITED STATES SHOULD GET OUT OF VIETNAM
(By Drew Pearson)
When Senator Dion RUSSELL of Georgia
visited the LBJ ranch, to confer on Vietnam,
right after the November elections, he re-
marked:
"We made a mistake in going in there, but
I can't figure any way to get out without
scaring the rest of the world."
There are a lot of reasons to support Sen-
ator RUSSELL as to why we should get out,
one ' bell}g that the longer we stay in the
stronger the Chinese become. For centuries
the Chinese were hated and feared in this
part of the world, Now It's the United States,
To understand, why, consult Father Hoa,
the strongly anti-Communist Catholic priest,
a Vietnamese, who says: -
her child. is burned by napalm? And how He is right. However, President Johnson has
can we claim to be for the people when we already promised the protection of the Amer-
burn their homes simply because their houses lean nuclear umbrella to these countries,
happen to be in Vietcong-controlled terri- and he could make this formal by a treaty
tory? similar to the NATO pledge of support in
Another reason we should get out of Viet- Europe. The nations most worried about
nam is because it has caused us to lose the Chinese encroachment-Thailand the Philip-
propaganda war abroad. pines, India-already have and can get more
Another reason supporting Senator RUSSELL American aid and support.
is the drain on the American dollar, as
pointed out by R. V. Roosa, the man in
charge of watching the dollar balance until
he recently retired as Under Secretary of the
Treasury.
Finally, there is the statement of Gen.
Maxwell Taylor, the sincere, harassed Amer-
ican Ambassador to South Vietnam: "Mili-
tary action outside the country, just as pure
military action inside the country, will not
win."
With all these factors supporting Senator
RUSSELL, the question is how we get out.
While I agree with the Senator from
Georgia that the answer is not easy, there
are certain factors putting President John-
son in a stronger position than his predeces-
sors.
As Vice President, for instance, he was
urging social reforms rather than military
support for President Diem at the very time
President Kennedy was beating the tomtoms
for all-out intervention.
Finally, the President knows as perhaps
no other man that the United States has
the power to destroy the world but not the
power to make it obey us. For the moment,
though not for long, he leads from a certain
amount of strength. His retaliation against
the north has put him in a stronger bargain-
ing position.
SOLUTION FOR VIETNAM
He has, therefore, the following alterna-
tives for getting out of the Indochinese
peninsula:
1. He can do what President de Gaulle did
in Algeria and pull American forces out with-
out any face-saving formulas, but simply by
admitting we made a mistake. When De
Gaulle did this he faced rebellion. in the
French army and was almost assassinated.
But France has been stronger, more prosper-
ous, more respected ever since De Gaulle stop-
ped the Algerian drain on French money
-and manpower.
2. The President can call for the fulfill-
ment of the pledge signed at Geneva In 1954
for an election on the unification of North
and South Vietnam. This election, was sup-
posed to be held in 18 months. It has not
been held because it was known that the
North Vietnamese would win, just as we
know that in any German election on uni-
fication the West Germans would win.
However, we can't demand an election in
Germany yet deny one in Indochina. And
even if the North Vietnamese do win, it
doesn't necessarily mean the area will line up
with the Chinese Communists. There's a lot
of Titoism in southeast Asia.
3. The President can tllrcyv the Vietna-
mese problem into the arms of the,United
Nations and thereby help to resuscitate that
gasping organization. A request that the
Assembly settle Vietnam while simultane-
ously demanding that only those nations
which have paid their dues can vote would
put the Russian and French nonpayers in
an extremely awkward position.
Once before when Russia absented itself
from the U.N. the Korean crisis came before
the Assembly. Russia doesn't want to make
that mistake again. Certainly, if so vital a
problem as Indochina came before the U.N.,
which we have always kept away from the
U.N. in the past, the Communist bloc na-
tions could not afford to be sitting on the
sidelines.
Senator RUSSELL has raised the question
of scaring the other nations of the Pacific
From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 28,
1965]
VIETNAM FALLACIES-JOHNSON INHERITED
SITUATION IN WHICH UNITED STATES IN-
STEAD OF FRANCE IS IN TROUBLE
(By Drew Pearson)
There are three important fallacies to be
considered regarding the Vietnam crisis
which President Johnson inherited.
1. We contend that we are in South Viet-
nam at the request of the popular govern-
ment, to protect freedom. This is pure
bunk. The government has changed so
often that no one can keep track of whether
Big Minh, Little Minh, or Minnie Mouse is
in, power. There have been 14 changes of
government since January 30, 1964, which
is an average of one government per month.
The government is of the military, by the
military, and for the military, and Vietna-
mese civilians have no illusions about it.
2. We believe that the best way to stop
Vietnamese fighting is by retaliatory raids
against the north. There are many indica-
tions that this also is pure bunk. First, the
North Vietnamese are led by Ho Chi Minh,
a tough guerrilla fighter who battled against
the French for 8 years and defeated the
cream of the French Army, totaling 380,000
men, backed by $4 billion of American
money. Ho now has an army of 270,000 men
and if he wants to move south our bombing
raids would never be able to halt him. His-
tory shows airplanes cannot find troops on
foot in the jungle.
However, it is highly doubtful that Ho
could call off the Vietcong war against us in
South Vietnam even if he wanted to. You
have to remember that the Vietcong were
part of the force that also fought for 8 years,
with implacable will, to get the French out
of Indochina, and we have merely substi-
tuted ourselves for the French. The Viet-
cong are equally determined today to get all
white men out.
After the French evacuated Indochina
under the terms of the 1954 Geneva agree-
ment, there were approximately 90,000 Viet
Minh pro-Communists guerrilla fighters left.
They became the Vietcong. Already tough
revolutionaries, they are now doubly effective
because they have seized new, modern Amer-
ican arms.
American intelligence shows that very few
of the Vietcong infiltrated down from the
North until last year. It is estimated that in
1964 between 4,000 and 5,000 men moved in.
Therefore, Ho Chi Minh would have little
control over them, even if he wanted to yell
"uncle" as a result of the U,S. retaliatory
raids.
Our intelligence also shows that the Viet-
cong is composed of about 35,000 hard-core
fighters, plus 65,000 militiamen-a total of
about 100,000. This is enough, given support
from the countryside, to engage in hit-and-
run operations indefinitely.
3. The United States has told our allies
privately that we are ready to negotiate a
settlement in Indochina but that we want
to negotiate from strength. Unfortunately,
the longer we remain in South Vietnam the
more our strength deteriorates.
When we had 1,000 American advisers in
Vietnam, as in the early days of the Eisen-
hower administration, we were probably
stronger than today. President Kennedy
''boosted the number of Americans to 20,000
and President Johnson has raised the total
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to 23,500, but we are in, a weaker position with whom are we allied In Vietnaml
to negotiate because today the Vietcong oc- Are our soldiers fighting side by side with
cupy about two-thirds of the country. troops of a representative and legitimate na-
The real problem of strength is the local tional government, or are we embroiled in
South Vietnamese Government, and the more defense of an unpopular minority in a fierce
the generals concentrate on their own per- and costly civil war? Our representatives
sonal ambition rather than the welfare of assure us that we and the Saigon govern-
the country, the weaker becomes our strength ment have the overwhelming support of the
to negotiate. Vietnamese people. How can this be so?
WHAT NEXT? On the same day that Mr. McNamara said
The above three points are the heart and sneak attacks upon our soldiers cannot be
soul of the Vietnamese problem. What, prevented, an American officer on the scene
therefore, are the alternatives facing the in Vietnam declared that "any of the people
United States? In The hamlet over there could have warned
They are: To place the matter before the us that the Vietcong were around, but they
United Nations Security Council, which has did not warn us." The weapons used against
never been given the Indochina problem in us are most often American weapons, cap-
the past; or to continue bombing farther and tured. from or surrendered by the South Viet-
farther north. namese Army. Mr. President, we submit that
In the latter event, the Communist world weak field intelligence in South Vietnam and
is in-an extremely strong position to retaliate a steady loss of workable weapons to the
in four widely separated areas: enemy, are deep symptoms of an unpopular
1. Ho Chi Minh can move his well-trained cause.
army from the north. Why are we fighting in Vietnam? Mr.
2. The Red Chinese could move in on the President, we think we understand why we
Islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which lie only went into Vietnam after the French with-
g and 12 miles respectively from their coast, drew. It was because this Nation hoped to
and take them fairly easily, since most of the encourage the development of a popular,
U.S. 7th Fleet is tied up in the Gulf of stable, and democratic government which
Tonkin. would help to lead all southeast Asia toward
3. The Chinese could accelerate hostilities lasting peace. Historical, political, social,
in Korea where South Korea is still protected religious, and sectional factors have pre-
only by a truce. vented this development. The original
4. If the Russians wanted to enter the assumptions are no longer valid. We have
picture they could exert a squeeze on Ber- become increasingly unwelcome everywhere
lin with another blockade, thus requiring the in southeast Asia. Our presence seems to
United States to divide its attention between deepen, rather than to relieve, the bitterness
Asia and Europe. and hostility of the people. It was only 10
These are some of the problems the State years ago that the Vietnamese defeated a
Department is beginning to pose for the French Army of nearly half a million men,
White House now that Secretary Rusk has Will the same battles occur again?
recovered from his Illness. Can we win in Vietnam? Mr. President, we
The alternative of putting the crisis be- know that our Nation has sufficient fire
fore the United Nations would put the Rus- powerto destroy the entire world. We also
sians in an extremely awkward position as to know that you do not wish to call upon this
whether they ought to use the veto. The awesome power. How can we possibly win
United Nations would probably call for a and yet prevent a widening of this conflict?
cease-fire and appoint a "'commission to How can we win in Vietnam with less than
study the situation. - 30,000 advisers when the French could not
The best long-range hope for the United will with an army of nearly half a million
States in Indochina Is Titoism. Ho Cho fighting both north and south of the present
Minh could be another Tito if we don't dividing frontier?
drive him into the hands of the Chinese as Is it worth the cost? The French defeat
we have been doing. It is important to re- in Indochina cost them 172,000 casualties,
member that the Thais, Vietnamese, and Yet, before their final bloody defeat at Dien-
Burmese have hated and feared the Chinese bienphu, the French generals and diplomats
for centuries. If given a chance for in- spoke with the same toughness and optim-
dependence they don't want to come under ism, the same assurances we now hear from
the domination of the Chinese dragon. our leaders.
These are nothappy alternatives, but this The French had overwhelming numbers
is the situation which the Johnson admin- and fire power but they lost in Vietnam be-
Istration has Inherited from 18 years of cause they lacked the support of the popula-
erosion. tion. Do we face the same prospect, or are
there facts which the public does not know
IFrom the New York Times, Mar. 1, 1965 j which show our situation to be clearly dif-
ferent?
AN OPEN LETTER TO Ps' ESIDENT JOHNSON ON
VIETNAM Mr. President, we are aware that you have
secret information which cannot be shared
Each day we hear fresh news from Viet- with us. But could such information com-
nam, news both strange and grim. We strike pletely refute the picture of events and the
by air in reprisal against North - Vietnam political insights provided to us by serious
because our soldiers, sent as armed techni- newespapermen who have been in the area
cians and advisers to an army which cannot for years?
yet guard them well, have been attacked in All we can see is a seemingly endless series
their barracks in the very heart of South of demonstrations and riots in Saigon and
Vietnam. We have widened the war-how Hue, of military coups, of threats and chal-
wide will it become? leges to the dignity of our Ambassador and
Fear of escalation of this undeclared war our other representatives by the very men we
against North Vietnam mounts with each seek to sustain in power.
sudden report of renewed violence. Unless We have lost the initiative in Vietnam. A
the situation is very different from what it few guerrillas can trigger American reactions
appears to be, we have lost the political that widen the war. The events of the past
initiative in Vietnam and are attempting to weeks are leading step by step along the path
substitute military actions for political ones. to war with China.
We face grave risks in Vietnam. Americans Would it not be both prudent and just to
have faced even graver risks for good and take the initiative toward peace in Vietnam?
high cause, Mr. President, but we must- first If we are not to widen the war beyond all
understand why we must take such risks. conscience, as reasonable men we must ini-
What are our goals In Vietnam? Are they tiate negotiations while there is still time.
just? Can they be accomplished? Are they Andover-Newton Theological School: Her-
truly worth what they are bound to cost in bert Gezork, ethics (plus four signers, Feb.
dollars and human lives? 16).
Boston University: Irwin E. Chase, psychi-
atry; William A. Hire, psychology; Francis
Johnson, chemistry; Philip E. Kubzansky,
psychology; Louis Lowy, social work; S. Jo-
seph Nemetz, medical school; Irwin I. Port-
ner, medical school; Henry N. Rosenberg,
medical school (plus 24 signers Feb. 16).
Brandeis University: Stanley Deser, phys-
ics;; Harry Rand, psychiatry (plus 55 sign-
ers, Feb. 16).
Bryn Mawr College: Warner Berthoff, Eng-
lish; Paul R. Brass, political science; T. R. S.
Broughton, Latin; Fredericka de Laguna, an-
thropology; R. B. De Boif, economics; Mary
Dunn, history; Alice F. Emerson, political
science; Rosalie Hoyt, physics; Mabel Lang,
Greek; Richard Lattimore, Greek; Gertrude
Leighton, political science; A. K. Michels,
Latin; Eleanor Pauker, Spanish; Robert Pat-
ten, English; Kyle Phillips, archeology; Eu-
gene Schneider, sociology; Laurence Staple-
ton, English.
Drexel Institute of Technology: Joel Bal-
sham, English; William Hollis, English; David
Holtz. English; Sol M. Kipnes, chemistry;
Samuel S. McNeary, mathematics; James A.
Richards, Jr., physics; Eugene J. Rosenbaum,
chemistry; Cecil O. Smith, Jr., history; J. W.
Smith, sociology; John A. Taylor, physics;
Stanley A. Wasson, history.
Haverford College: Edwin Bronner, his-
tory; Dean Burnham, political science; John
Cary, German; Aldo Caselli, Italian; Thomas
D'Andrea, psychology; William Davidon,
physics; Paul Desjardins, philosophy; Alfred
Diamant, political science; Irving Finger,
biology; Lewis Green, astronomy; Elizabeth
Green, biology; Theodore Hetzel, engineering;
Dietrich Kessler, biology; Lewis Kosman, phi-
losophy; Wallace MacCaffrey, history; Sidney
Perloe, psychology; Melvin Santer, biology;
Ralph Sargent, English; Alfred Satterthwaite,
English.
Harvard University: Sidney Alexander,
medical school; Daniel S. Bernstein, medical
school; Martin A. Berezin, medical school;
Donnell W. Boardman, medical school; Louis
8. Chase, medical school; Sidney Coleman,
physics; Lincoln H. Day, public health;
Daniel Deykin, medical school; Frank R. Er-
vin, medical school; Sanford Gifford, medical
school; Lester Grinspoon, medical school;
George Grosser, medical school; Calvin Lee-
man, medical school; Sidney Levin, medical
school; John E. Mack, medical school; Jack
H. Mendelson, medical school; David L. Ra-
bin, public health; Peter Reich, medical
school; Samuel Silverman, medical school;
Harold J. Stein, medical school; Myron Stock-
ing, medical school; Anna K. Wolff, medical
school; Stephan Thernstrom, history; Nor-
man E. Zinberg, medical school (plus 42
signers, February 16).
Institute for Advanced Study: Felix Gil-
bert, history; Harold Cherniss, classics.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
Nesmyth C. Ankeny, mathematics (plus 66
signers February 16).
Princeton University: Oakes Ames, physics;
Carlos-Baker, English; Elmer Beller, history;
G. E. Bentley, English; David Berlinsky, phi-
losophy; David Bien, history; Arthur L. Bige-
low, engineering graphics; Jerome Blum, his-
tory; R. Bon de Sousa Pernes, philosophy; E.
B. O. Borgerhoff, romance languages; Boruch
Brody, philosophy; G. E. Brown, physics;
Joseph Brown, school of architecture; Nich-
olas R. Clifford, history; W. R. Conner, clas-
sics; John I. Dalland, psychology; Willard
Dalrymple, M.D., university health services;
M. L. Diamond, religion; William S. Dix, li-
brarian; Martin Duberman, history; R. A.
Faulkner, politics; Joel Feinberg, philosophy;
George B. Field, astrophysical sciences; John
V. A. Fine, classics; Charles K. Fish, English;
Robert Freeman, music; Sam Glucksberg,
psychology; F. R. B. Godolphin, classics;
Ernest Gordon, dean, university chapel;
M. B. Gottlieb, astrophysical sciences; Claudio
Guillen, romance languages; Stirling Haig,
romance languages; Richard F. Hamilton,
sociology; W. F. Hanrieder, politics; John A.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-, SENATE 3713
surpassing the aid given by the North We believe that the best way to stop Viet- science. Some facts and implications are
Vietnamese, . The fact remains.xhat.there namese fighting is by retaliatory raids against clear, no matter how murky the general
is a civil war in South Vietnam, with the North. There are many indications that situation.
father fighting son and brother fighting this also is pure bunk. The first fact is that the United States
brother, The fact remains that the vast Third. Mr. Pearson notes: today does not have the backing of the
majority of the Vietcong-however much The United States has told our allies Vietnamese people in whose name it went
training they have received from the vately that we are ready to negotiate a settle
rl- Into Vietnam in the firsace and - is seeking to save today. The U.S. military
North Vietnamese-are from South Viet- ment in Indochina but that We want to forces have had to cope not just with secret
nam. negotiate from strength. Unfortunately, the agents from North Vietnam but with the
The "white paper" goes to elaborate longer we remain in South Vietnam the more growing opposition of the populace as a
pains to give the impression that we are our strength deteriorates, whole. In briefings or new U.S. t mosty
fighting a Korean-type war in South There has been speculation in the sonnel, the point is stressed that most Viet-
Vietnam. This is definitely not the case. newspapers about what the polls are cret a are members of tt either e Vietcong. with or ia-
In Korea we had the majority of the showing concerning popular support for tory bombings by the United States of North
South Koreans fighting alongeside Amer- an escalation of the war in South Viet- Vietnam targets do not meet the problem
ican fighting men, The majority of nam. Of course, part of the validity of represented by internal opposition within
South Vietnamese-however differently any poll lies in the manner in which the South Vietnam itself.
they may have felt when first our so- questions on the poll are asked. All I The second fact is that most of the mili-ent
and
American called advisers were sent to South know is that my mail runs over 300 to 1 So thgv etnm miitaryi forces has come
Vietnam-are not on our side fighting in favor of the position I have taken, neither from Communist China nor North
earnestly and fiercely for their freedom. that the Vietnam crisis should be taken Vietnam but from the United States. It is
And also, in Korea, it was the United Na- to the conference table before it esca- ludicrous to talk about bombing supply lines
tions forces with the troops of 11 other lates into a major or possibly a thermo- from North Vietnam as a means of shutting
nations side by side with ours against the nuclear war. off the flow. According to some estimates,
North Koreans-it was not, as it is in As further evidence of the feeling of up to 80 percent 'of the military equipment
Vietnam, Americans only and South what I believe to be the vast majority used by the Vietcong originates in the
Vietnamese against the South Viet- of the American people, two open letters United States. In largest part, it is either
namese Vietcong augmented by some to the President were published in the supposedly suped by the Vietcong t turned over by
loyal South Vietnamese. No one
North Vietnamese infiltrators. New York Times for February 28, 1965, knows how much of the equipment finds its
In the Saturday Review for February and March 1, 1965. These letters are way to Communist China. A Chinese official
27, 1965, Mr. Norman Cousins, in signed by faculty members from numer- interviewed in Peiping several months ago
his leading editorial entitled "Vietnam ous universities. said he was almost reluctant to see the
and the American Conscience," states: Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- Americans leave; they had contributed so
It is tragic that most of the debate over sent to have the editorial published in heavily to the Chinese arsenal.
Vietnam has vibrated between total war and the Saturday Review for February 27, The third fact is that the legal o
j
r is in-
-
total withdrawal. It is made to appear that ? tion invoked by the United States for its in-
total the editorial entitled Storm Sig- volvement in Vietnam has long since been
the only choice is between absolute victory nals Over Asia," from the New York nullified. Under the terms of the 1954
and absolute defeat. There is an alterna- Times for February 28, 1965, the articles Geneva Agreement, all foreign forces and
tive-If our main objective. is to promote the stability and security of the area. And by Mr. Drew Pearson, published in the military equipment were to stay out of Indo-
that alternative is to involve the United Na- Washington Post for February 26, 27, china. The United States came with miii-
tions, with all its limitations, to the fullest and 28, and the two open letters to Presi- tary force into Indochina, most notably in
possible extent. dent Johnson published in the New York Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand, declar-
Times of February 28 and March 1, 1965, ing it had done so at the request of the
I have been advocating that course of governments involved, which was not a viola-
aCtfon since I first, spoke on this tragic printed in the RECORD at the conclusion tion of the treaty. But nothing in the treaty
of my remarks. gave the United States the rinance
subject on March 10, 1964-almost a full ght t pate in
year ago, The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr, revolutionary movements or to parti cipate in
ThadangerOUS_course upon which we, INouYE in the chair). Without objec- undercover subversion. (In Laos in 1960 and
are now embarked in Vietnam was tion, it is so ordered. 1961, the United States financed and
(See exhibit 1.) equipped the effort of Gen. Phoumi Nosavan
pointed out in the New York Times on to overthrow the only elected government in
February 28 in an editorial entitled Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in the history of Laos. At the same time, the
"Storm Signals Over Asia," In which it its excellent editorial on February 27, United States continued to pay the salaries
stated:
1965, the New York Times ably points of loyalist forces and to furnish their sup-
_
Washington and Peiping are in bizarre out that if we undertake negotiations on plies. Thus the United States was in the
tendem as the only major capitals in the the situation in Vietnam at this point astonishing position of underwriting both
free or Communist wo;lds openly resistant we will not be negotiating from weak- tion sides a restored war. to Its t Eventually,
Its pre aoolu sitary
tat was restored seeking a negotiated settlement of the Hess, but from strength. 'AS the New status, but Only after many y thousands of
s of
Vietnamese conflict now. It is not too late York Times puts it: civilians were killed or became homeless.)
for the President to make it plain that the
United States The United States has an immense con- In South Vietnam, the inability of the
is ready to talk as well as centration of naval and air power close to Diem government to maintain the support
fight, and thus leave China isolated as the, the coast of southeast Asia. It is capable of of its own people constituted a severe drag
o
bstructo, of, any attempt to achieve a, expanding that power many times over. on the war effort. Eventually, the Diem
sound and enforcible neace-
In his article in the Washington Post it implies, is well understood in North Viet- assassinated. Later, Fredrick E. Nolting,
on February 28,.1965, entitled "Vietnam nam. It is well understood in Moscow. It Jr., former Ambassador t South Vietnam,
Fallacies," Mr. Drew Pearson noted, as I Is well understood, despite all talk of paper said the United States had been directly in-
have done repeatedly, that the crisis in tigers, in Peiping. Whether Premier Diem was
t
or was no
au-
Vietnam is one which President Johnson I ask unanimous consent that the edi- thoritarian and backward is beside the point;
inherited and which he should not have tonal published in the New York Times the American people have never given their
assumed. for February 27, 1965, entitled "Mr. Government a warrant to engage in sub-
Mr. Pearson notes three fallacies in Nixon's Totem_ Pole" be printed in the version or murder. since Diem regimes in
popular thinking about the situation in RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. South Vietnam have come and gone; which
Vietnam: The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- of them has enjoyed genuine legitimacy it is
difficult to say. In any case, what is the legal
First, He says: out objection, it is so ordered. basis for our presence now? Our presence
We contend that we are in South Vietnam (See exhibit 2.) was requested by a government no longer in
at the request of the popular government, EXHIBIT 1 existence, and one that our own ex-Ambas-
to protect freedom. This is pure bunk. The [From the Saturday Review] sador said we helped to overthrow.
government has changed so often that no The fourth fact is that our policy in Viet-
VIETNAM AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE
one can keep track of whether Big Minh, nam in particular and Asia in general has not
Little Minh, or Minnie Mouse is in power. Vietnam is profoundly complex, but it is been of a piece. Basically, an important ob-
not so complex as to defeat the American jective of our foreign policy is to keep the
Second. Mr. Pearson notes: intelligence or disable the American con- Soviet Union and Communist China from
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coming together in a unified and massive
ideological and military coalition. But our
policy in Vietnam is producing exactly the
effect we seek to avoid. Nothing that has
i. append since the original rupture between
the two major Communist powers has done
more to bring the Soviet Union and Commu-
nist China together again than recent Amer-
ican actions in Vietnam. The Communist
Chinese have long argued that the Russian
idea of coexistence was an anti-Marxist and
ant historical notion that could only be ad-
vanced by naive sentimentalists. They claim
war is inevitable because of the nature of
capitalism. As evidence, they assert that the
United States, despite its claim that it sought
only to promote the internal stability of
Indochina, was actually pursuing a war
against Asian peoples as an extension of the
very imperialism Asians had fought so hard
to expel. The Soviet Union, which is no less
concerned than the United States about Chi-
nese expansion throughout Asia, also has to
be concerned about its standing in the world
Communist community. It cannot allow it-
self to appear indifferent to military action
involving a member of that community.
Any expansion of the war by the United
States into North Vietnam would force the
Soviet Union to identify itself with North
Vietnam and thus with China. In any event,
in pursuit of one goal the United States ap-
pears to be losing a larger one. If the Com-
munist Chinese had deliberately set a trap
for the United Sttaes, they could not have
more effectively achieved the result they
sought.
The fifth fact is that American newsmen
have had a more difficult time in getting
unmanipulated news out of Vietnam than
out of almost any crisis center in recent
years. James Reston, associate editor of the
New York Times, testifying before a congres-
sional investigating committee in 1963, said
the news in Vietnam was being managed in
a way inconsistent with the traditions of this
society. In the past 2 years there has been
some improvement in news policy on Viet-
nam but the American public has yet to be
fully informed about the nature of the Amer-
ican involvement, the degree to which U.S.
arms have been sustaining the attackers, the
extent of the popular opposition, and the in-
ability of the South Vietnam Government to
mount an effective response against the
guerrillas.
The sixth fact is that President Johnson
has genuinely tried to keep the military lid
on in Vietnam, recognizing the ease with
which the hostilities could mushroom into a
general war; but he has been under extrava-
grant pressure, much of its political, to trans-
late American military power Into a dramatic
solution. The national frustration about
Vietnam has far exceeded the national com-
prehension of the problem, for much of which
the Government has only itself to blame. In
any event, there has been comparatively lit-
tle counterpressure in support of a policy of
restraint and an eventual nonmilitary set-
tlement-a failing that the American people
have It within their means to change when-
ever they wish to do so.
The United States is concerned, and prop-
erly so, that the loss of South Vietnam would
lead to grave consequences-territorial, polit-
ical, psychological-throughout Asia and in-
deed most of the world. Already, the fact
of developing atomic power in China has
made a deep impression on many nations
whose histories have pitted them against
Western outsiders. American policymakers
fear that United States withdrawal from
Vietnam or even a reluctance to press the
war would weaken or destroy the image of
the United States as a resolute, dependable,
and successful foe of aggressive communism
in the world. These are not illogical or non-
historical fears, but it Is equally logical and
historical to raise questions about the dam-
aged image of the United States that is em-
erging from the present actions in Vietnam.
There has been an outpouring of anti-Amer-
ican sentiment not just in Asia but through-
out the world-and it would be a mistake
to charge it all to Communist manipulation
or propaganda. Even among our friends in
France, Great Britain, and West Germany
there has been a sense of shock and outrage.
If we thought we were building prestige by
taking to the air and dropping bombs in
Vietnam, we have built strangely indeed.
It is tragic that most of the debate over
Vietnam has vibrated between total war and
total withdrawal. It is made to appear that
the only choice Is between absolute victory
and absolute defeat. There is an alterna-
tive-if our main objective is to promote the
stability and security of the area. And that
alternative is to Involve the United Nations,
with all its limitations, to the fullest pos-
sible extent. Any general war growing out
of the combustibles in Vietnam would bring
Catastrophe to most of the world's peoples.
On the principle of no extermination with
out representation, they have a right to ask
that they be consulted now, while there may
yet be time.
The situation in Vietnam is far more com-
plicated than it was in Korea, but no one
can say that no good can come out of a U.N.
effort similar to one existing in Korea.
Korea has had numerous truce violations and
difficulties, but because of the U.N., Korea at
least is not aflame today. Secretary General
U Thant has provided an opening for such
an effort by calling not just for restraint but
for "shifting the quest for a solution away
from the field of battle to the conference
table." To the extent that the United Na-
tions could be brought into this quest, the
chances for a constructive outcome will be
increased.
There are no easy answers to Vietnam.
But some answers may be less volatile and
more morally imaginative than others.
Moreover, at some time soon the United
States will have to recognize that a military
policy without a full ideological and social
program will not only fall short of its goal
but may actually boomerang. In any case,
the prospectfor finding a workable answer to
Vietnam will increase, not decrease; in direct
proportion to the unblocking of an Ameri-
can conscience and the activation of an
informed debate.-N.C.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 28, 1985]
STORM SIGNALS OVER ASIA
The 'Johnson administration seems to be
conditioning the American people for a
drastic expansion of our involvement in
Vietnam. The State Department's white
paper accuses North Vitnam of intensified ag-
gression and stresses that military efforts
aimed solely at the Vietcong guerrillas in the
south no longer suffice.
The logic of all this is that the United
States, which only last week moved from the
role of "adviser" to active and undisguised
combatant in South Vietnam, now feels free
to strike at will-whether by air, sea or
land-at any targets it chooses in North Viet-
nam. In the 3 tense weeks since the
Vietcong attack on Pleiku, American policy
has plunged dangerously beyond the one
enunciated then by the President and Secre-
tary McNamara of limiting ourselves to re-
taliatory action and shunning a wider war.
And what has happened to alter our policy?
The assertion that North Vietnam is a prin-
cipal supplier of men and munitions to the
Vietcong is certainly not new, nor is the
charge that the extent of its support is
increasing. Such activity by Hanoi consti-
tutes the sole reason for our being in South
Vietnam, and has since the United States
moved in the vacuum left by the French
withdrawal in 1954.
Apparently, the major new evidence of a
need for escalating the war, with all the
hazard that this entails, was provided by
the sinking in a South Vietnamese cove
earlier this month of a 100-ton cargo ship
loaded with Communist-made small arms
and ammunition. A ship of that size is not
much above the oriental junk class, The
standard Liberty or Victory ship of World
War II had a capacity of 7,150 to 7,650 tons.
Page after page of similarly minuscule de-
tail about Communist infiltration from the
north merely raise anew the question of
whether massive air strikes would accom-
plish anything except large-scale civilian
casualties in industrial centers and ports.
The question is made sharper by the ab-
sence of any stable government in Saigon
to fight or even to speak in the name of
the South Vietnamese people.
Communist China, the nation whose im-
perialist ambitions the world has most to
worry about, will be a clear gainer from the
ill timing and judgment of our warning to
North Vietnam. It comes just as the Soviet
Union is about to begin an international
meeting of Communist parties in Moscow-a
meeting originally called to pronounce Peip-
ing a renegade from Marxist-Leninism.
Washington is now doing precisely what that
most sophisticated of Kremlinologists,
George F. Kennan, former U.B. Ambassador
to Moscow, cautioned against in his Senate
testimony Friday: Forcing the Soviet Union
to come down on the side of Communist
China.
Washington and Peiping are in bizarre tan-
dem as the only major capitals in the free
or Communist worlds openly resistant to
seeking a negotiated settlement of the Viet-
namese conflict now. It is not too late for
the President to make it plain that the
United States is ready to talk as well as fight,
and thus leave China isolated as the ob-
structor of any attempt to achieve a sound
and enforcible peace.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Feb.26,10851
PLEIKU ATTACK NOT A HANOI PLOT
(By Drew Pearson)
Shortly after the Vietcong raid on Pleiku
that caused the United States to retaliate
with its first definite large-scale bombing
raids on North Vietnam, this column reported
that the United States had been mouse-
trapped and that the Pleiku attack was the
result of a Chinese or North Vietnamese
plot deliberately staged while Premier Kosy-
gin was visiting Hanoi.
More complete information, now available
from the battlefront, shows this column was
in error. The Vietcong attack was staged
by a bedraggled handful of 100 men, or half
a company, which was able to achieve success
only because of sheer stupidity and lack of
alertness by the Americans and the South
Vietnamese. The attackers had no idea that
they would be able to penetrate to the very
center of the American installation as they
did.
That it was no Hanoi-conceived plot is ob-
vious from the fact that Hanoi could not have
planned to have all South Vietnamese per-
sonnel and all Americans asleep.
A little band of Vietcong passed through
two villages before reaching Pleiku. The
South Vietnamese in the villages are sup-
posedly friendly to the United States but
they sounded no alarm. The attackers out
the barbed wire around Pleiku completely
undisturbed, and walked right into the cen-
ter of the installation to place bombs along-
side the barracks where Americans were
sleeping and alongside planes which were
completely unguarded. They retreated with-
out an American or a South Vietnamese
wounding a single one.
SUCCESS UNEXPECTED
There were some Vietcong casualties, but
only from their own mortar fire. Their com-
mander had never expected them to penetrate
so far inside, therefore aimed mortars into
the center of the American installation-an-
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aw0 AL REQC?R - SENATE
ammunition and other supplies used by the
Vietcong, have been sent from North to
South Vietnam
Seventh, the scale of infiltration of rpen
and arms, including regular units of the
Armed Forces of North Vietnam, has in-
creased appreciably in recent months.
Eighth, this entire pattern of activity by
the regime in Hanoi is in violation of gen-
eral principles of international law and the
Charter of the United Nations, and is in di-
rect violation of the Geneva accord of 1954.
Such a pattern of violation of the treaty ob-
ligations undertaken at Geneva was con-
firmed by a special report of the Interna-
tional. Control Commission in 1962 and it
has been greatly intensified since then.
These facts about the situation in Viet-
nam make it ,unmistakably clear that the
character of that conflict is an aggressive war
of conquest waged against a neighbor-and
makes nonsense of the cynical allegation
that this is simply an indigenous insurrec-
tion.
I request that you circulate copies of the
report, together with copies of this letter,
to the, delegations of all member states as a
Security Council document.
In making this Information available to
the Security Council, my Government wishes
to say once more that peace can be restored
quickly to Vietnam by a prompt and assured
cessation of aggression by Hanoi against the
Republic of Vietnam. In that event, my
Government-as it has said many times be-
fore, would be happy to withdraw its mili-
tary forces from the Republic of Vietnam
and turn promptly to an international effort
to assist the economic and social develop-
ment of southeast Asia.
In the meantime, my Government awaits
the first indication of any intent by the
Government in Hanoi to return to the ways
of peace and peaceful resolution of this in-
ternational conflict.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
should like to read to the Senate the con-
cluding sentences of Mr. Stevenson.
They are very brief; it seems to me they
state something which has not been ex-
pressed to the world:
In making this information available to
the Security Council, my Government wishes
to say once more that peace can be restored
quickly to Vietnam by a prompt and assured
cessation of aggression by Hanoi against the
Republic of Vietnam. In that event, my
Government-as it has said many times be-
fore, would be happy to withdraw its mili-
tary forces from the Republic of Vietnam
and turn promptly to an international effort
to assist the economic and social develop-
ment of southeast Asia.
.In the meantime, my Government awaits
the first indication of any intent by the
government in Hanoi to return to the ways
of peace and peaceful resolution of this in-
ternational conflict. .
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the
Mr. PROXMIRE.. I am happy to yield
to the distinguished Senator from Ne-
vada.
Mr. CANNON. I congratulate the
Senator from Wisconsin for a very fine
and excellent outline of our goals in
South Vietnam and what we have been
trying to do to assist the people of South
Vietnam.
Most important of all, the fact is that
all we desire is peace, an end to the fight-
ing and terror in South Vietnam, and the
preservation of the freedom of the South
Vietnamese people or any other people to
make their own determination as to the
kind of government under which they
wish to live. I agree with the distin-
guished Senator from Wisconsin that this
is no time to talk about negotiation, be-
cause even a discussion of the possibility
of negotiation leads our allies to believe
that we perhaps are getting into a
position of thinking about abandoning
them and to pull out of southeast Asia.
In my opinion, if we were to pull out of
South Vietnam and, in effect, turn over
all of southeast Asia to communism, it
would certainly constitute surrender.
I again congratulate the Senator for a
very fine outline and a very fine speech
on the subject.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished Senator from
Nevada very much. I deeply appreciate
his supporting statment.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PROXMIRE, I am happy to yield
to the distinguished Senator from Penn-
sylvania.
Mr. SCOTT. While I did not hear the
distinguished Senator from Wisconsin
deliver his speech, I have had an oppor-
tunity to read a considerable portion of
it. I commend the Senator from Wiscon-
sin, not only for his forthright approach,
but also the fact that he has clarified the
big question which people frequently ask.
That is, Why are we in South Vietnam?
The questitul has been asked of me by
any number of pepole. The Senator's
speech helps greatly to answer the ques-
tion. I have discussed the subject with
the President. I have had the benefit of
the most candid kind of briefing. For the
first time in my experience, the present
President of the United States not only
gave us,a briefing, but invited questions,
which he offered to answer himself. I
think this is better than the equivalent
of the British system, under which there
is a question period on the floor of Par-
liament. We were not only compli-
mented by that procedure, but we were
immensely helped, because we posed to
the President rather pointed questions
and we received answers with which I
found myself in agreement.
The President has made it perfectly
clear-and I am referring, now, not to
brieflings but to public statements-that
he intends to stay in North Vietnam until
our responsibilities and objectives have
been achieved.
As the Senator from Wisconsin him-
self has said in his speech, we seek
nothing of material advantage. We are
there at great sacrifice. Our future poli-
cies there must be not only to preserve
our commitment but to seek in every way
we can to reduce casualties. In my con-
sidered judgment-and I ask the Sena-
tor if he agrees with it-the surest Way
to reduce casualties in South Vietnam is
not to negotiate from weakness, which
is not. to say that we may in the future
be in a 'position to negotiate from
strength, should the aggressor at some
point sue for it. To negotiate from
weakness would merely transfer the war
from South Vietnam to Thailand, which
the CotnmunisttS hAve .alreally indicated
is next on their list, a country which has
been independent for a thousand years,
a country which has never been occupied
3,711
colonially. If Thailand goes and Burma
goes, and if India comes under the guns,
the question seems to me to be, When
do we stop running?
I do not believe the American people
are yet aware that if we withdraw from
southeast Asia, the Communists would
not give up a single objective, which is
to expand their empire-their material-
istic, imperialistic empire-to include all
of the islands, including the fifth largest
country in the world, Indonesia. If
that happened, the 7th Fleet would in
time retreat. We would be faced with
the loss of Okinawa. Under those cir-
cumstances, we would have to move our
fleet from the area of Formosa and would
cease to be a Pacific power. We would
then have left the world in a state of
the most dangerous imbalance in all his-
tory, certainly in all modern history. We
would then be forced back upon Guam,
as our farthest outpost, and the Hawai-
ian Islands.
The President has strongly indicated
that arguments urging that we withdraw
from Vietnam at a time when we are in
the worst possible position for negotia-
tion have increased, and the diplomatic
corps in Washington tell their nations
at home that the President does not have
the support of the Senate and the House
of Representatives. They are wrong, but
I know a number of those ambassadors,
and I am aware of what they are saying.
Does not the Senator from Wisconsin
agree that eventually we shall have to
come to a place where we shall have to
stop running and stand and face this ag-
gressor?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I agree wholeheart-
edly with the distinguished Senator from
Pennsylvania. Also, I am most grateful
to him, as I am sure the President i., for
his graceful reference to the President's
conferences and to his responding to
questions. I have also participated in
those conferences. They are most in-
formative and helpful.
The Senator from Pennsylvania is an
outstanding leader of the Republican
Party, and has been for many years. He
speaks in a completely bipartisan sense
when he says that we must recognize
that if we do not stand in South Vietnam,
we shall have to fight under worse con-
ditions, under conditions in which we will
have encouraged the Communists and on
territory closer to home. We shall have
to fight under conditions in which they
will have been strengthened. Our dan-
ger is increasingly this kind of subver-
sive operation. _ The Communists have
the opportunity to send infiltrators into
Vietnam according to the new Commu-
nist military strategy which Khrushchev
and his successors have said is to be the
wave of the future, so far as communism
is concerned. They may not rely on nu-
clear weapons; they will move with sub-
version, terror, and violence. If they can
achieve success in South Vietnam with
this, we shall be in terrible danger.
Mr. SCOTT. Does not the Senator
agree with me that certain things have
happened which may demand the care-
ful attention of the American people
generally, in that we are moving now de-
termined, at least, to improve our post-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March. 1
tion in South Vietnam? The most im-
portant thing that happened recently
was the decision to use our planes in
South Vietnam. Certainly this will save
lives. It will save the lives of the South
Vietnamese by protecting them from the
people who have terorrized them. Also,
by the use of new jet planes, we shall
more successfully make a response to the
rather damaging sorties of the enemy
than we have heretofore.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I agree. It is one
thing to have military power; it is some-
thing else to be willing to use it.
Mr. SCOTT. Exactly.
Mr. PROXMIRE. No matter how
great our power may be, if the enemy
thinks we are afraid to use it, that power
counts as nothing. The fact that we
have used it, used it in a limited way,
used it responsibly, and have not tried to
extend it in any broad way, but have
confined it to military targets, has, I be-
lieve, enhanced our position and greatly
strengthened the position of the South
Vietnamese.
Mr. SCOTT. I have spoken with mem-
bers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well
as with the President. Without any at-
tempt to quote them, except as they have
publicly confirmed some of the things
they have said, they have answered to
my satisfaction the common, rather un-
thinking statement that the South Viet-
namese people are not with us; that they
want us out of their country. Their
reply has been quite to the contrary.
I have said, for example, that some
have argued that the Vietnamese are a
good deal like the Laotian. The Lao-_
tian, it is argued, are like Ferdinand
the Bull. They want to smell the flow-
ers, have picnics, loll around the temples,
and do things of that kind. Whether
that be true of the Laotian or not-and
there is some evidence that some of that
trait exists-these informed and quali-
fied experts have said to me, first, that
the South Vietnamese have some excel-
lent fighting men, as do the North Viet-
namese; that there is a trait or a quality
of the Vietnamese which makes them
good fighting men.
In South Vietnam, hundreds of thou-
sands have escaped from communism,
have become refugees, have taken their
lives and their future in their hands to
defy communism, and are now living in
South Vietnam.
If we were to leave the country, we
would turn over to the Communists all of
those refugees who have "voted with
their feet," as the saying goes; who by
their actions have rendered themselves
vulnerable to total annihilation by an
enemy that knows that they are there.
So how can we consider abandoning a
nation which has opted for freedom, and
whose people, in my opinion, except to the
degree to which they have been terror-
ized in the fields, as just as anti-Com-
munist as we are, perhaps even more so?
I think the maxim prevails that the
closer one is to communism, the more he
dislikes the possibility of having to par-
ticipate in it. I well recall the large
numbers of Chinese and North Korean
soldiers who defected from the Panmun-
jom armistice Communists.
It seems to me that we are reading
the whole picture wrong in thinking that
the Vietnamese do not want to fight, be-
cause if we extrapolate, to use a State
Department word-and I also know how
to use "vis-a-vis"-the casualties sus-
tained in Vietnam, North and South, re-
lating their population to ours, would
compare with about 325,000 people in the
United States. That is more than the
number of casualties we sustained in the
Korean war.
It seems to me that not only would a
nation that has been willing to fight on
and on in the cause of freedom feel
abandoned; but the word would get
around through all of Asia and probably
pretty well through Europe that the
Americans are a "paper tiger"; that we
make high-sounding statements; that we
sign treaties, as we have with Thailand;
that we are strong on promises and talk;
but that whenever imperialism, that is
the Communist menace-really presses
us, we say we are no longer interested.
Mao Tse-tung has predicted the same
thing. He said to a correspondent not
long ago that the Americans will tire and
give up. That is obviously what they are
waiting for.
I commend the Senator again. I re-
gret that I have taken up so much time.
I thank the Senator for the opportunity
he has given me--as well as for the
excellence of his own statement-to show
that the loyal opposition Is a responsible
opposition.
I have not criticized the President in
this Congress in any way on any part of
his present foreign policy. As a matter
of fact, I have not yet criticized him for
any part of his domestic policy. But I
assume that in time I shall get around
to that.
I speak for every Republican Senator.
We support the President and uphold
him. We recognize that he has proceeded
with dignity and discretion. But, so far
as guaranteeing peace is concerned, we
have not only the freedom of South Viet-
nam to consider, but also the freedom of
this country. I think that freedom, like
peace, is indivisible.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished Senator from
Pennsylvania. I say once again that I
deeply appreciate his superlative ex-
pression of bipartisan support for the
President's position.
I know it makes a difference not only
to President Johnson, but also to our
forces in southeast Asia, that a leader of
the Republican Party, who has freely
criticized when he decides the policy is
incorrect, is supporting the President.
Senator SCOTT has demonstrated a
great capacity for constructive and posi-
tive criticism in the past. He is very
effective, sometimes too effective for our
comfort. But in this crisis, the great
spokesman and statesman for the Repub-
lican Party has expressed an unqualified
and all-out support for the President's
policy in South Vietnam.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I have heard the speech of the Sen-
ator from Wisconsin, and I have read all
of his prepared text. I congratulate the
Senator on a very excellent speech and a
very significant speech, particularly in
view of the fact that the speech is made
by the senior Senator from Wisconsin,
whom I know to be completely independ-
ent. He has not been satisfied to follow
anyone's leadership unless he thought it
to be right, and he has at times taken
that position at considerable cost to him-
self. He has not been willing to take
that lead if he thought it was in error.
His speech supporting the administra-
tion and the President on Vietnam is
especially significant in view of that fact.
I congratulate him.
The Senator from Wisconsin has
brought out a number of facts which I,
even as a member of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, was not completely
aware of.
I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for
his contribution. I believe his speech
will prove to be one of the most construc-
tive contributions to the debate over
Vietnam.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I appreciate what
the distinguished assistant majority
leader has said. It Is very encouraging
to hear him say that.
THE MESS IN VIETNAM-V
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I
congratulate the distinguished senior
Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE]
for his comprehensive, well organized,
well knit, sincere presentation in de-
fense of the course which the adminis-
tration has been pursuing to date. I
do not, as I have sought to make clear for
the past year, agree with it and with
him.
"What are our goals?" my able col-
league asks, and he answers, there are
three, and the first is "Peace. An end
to the fighting and terror in South Viet-
nam." Peace.
I recall the words of the prophet who
castigated those who cried "Peace, peace,
when there is no peace." I refer those
who cry "Peace, peace," and support the
extension and escalation of the unde-
clared war and of the fighting not mere-
ly in South Vietnam, but beyond, to the
fact that we have been in South Vietnam
militarily and financially, for 10 years.
We continue to cry "Peace, peace, when
there is no peace." I have for a year ad-
vocated a peaceful approach, a new ap-
proach, an effort at least which has never
been made to try to enlist the United
Nations and to wage peace at least as
vigorously as we have waged war.
Now, what has happened in the past
48 hours since the Senate adjourned on
Friday?
The State Department has issued a
"white paper" over the weekend. It
certainly adds no new facts to the al-
ready muddied waters of Vietnam.
Of course, North Vietnam is and has
been aiding the South Vietnamese Viet-
cong. That is nothing new. But the
fact does remain that we have been aid-
ing the South Vietnamese on a scale far
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 .Q65
II. Soviet origin
MP-82 rifle ------------------------- -------
Binh Dinh.
Launchhg cartridges________________________
dO
Do.
Mossin agant carbine (with automatic bayonet)______________
1
June 13,1963_______________
Bien Phong.
Do ---------------------------------------------------------
2
July 13,1963 -------------------
Long An.
Do--. ------------------------------
-------------------------
5
July 20, 1968 -------------------
Dinh Tuong.
D o----------------------------------------------------------
7
Sept. 8,1963___________________
Do.
Total -----------------------------------------------------
Rifles__ ---------------------------------------------------- ---
Oct. 6, 1963____________________
Long An.
Do-----------------------------------------------------?---
Oct. 19, 1963-_________________
Dinh Tuong.
Do------------------------- ----------------------------- ---
Nov. 6,1963 -------------------
Vinh Binh.
Do---------------- ------------ -----------------------------
Nov. 17,1963 ------------------
Dinh Tuong.
Do--------------------- ------------------------------------
Nov. 25,1963__________________
Han Nghia.
Do--
---------- ----------------------------------------------
Dcc. 6, 1963___________-__-____
Dinh Tuong.
-
Do_---------------------------------------------------------
Dec. 7,1963 --------------------
Phong Dinh.
Do----------- ----------------------------------------------
Dec. 12, 1963_________-________
Bien Tuong.
Do--------------------------------------------------- -------
Dec. 13, 1963__________________
An Xuyen.
Do------------- --------------------- --------- --------------
Dec. 16, 1963------------------
Rion Giang.
Do----------------------------------------------------------
----- do-------------------------
Ba Xuyen.
Do----------------------------------------------------------
---do-------------------------
An Xuyen.
Do-----------------------------------------------?----------
Dec. 17, 1963__________________
Phong Dinh.
Do----------------------------------------------------------
Dec. 20,1963__________________
Bien Hoe.
Do----------------------------------------------------????-
Dec. 21,1963___________________
Chuong Thien.
Do-------------?--------------------------------------------
Dec. 22,1963 ------------------
Dinh Tuong.
Total------- ---------------------------------------------
Automatic pistol ------------------------------------------------
1
Oct. 19, 1903-------------------
Phan Thiet.
Grenades-------------------------------------------------------
0
--------------------------------
Long An.
I
g
100, 00
Dec. 22 1963__________________
Dinh Tuong.
un (machine pistol)--------------------------------
I
S bmachine
2
Sept. 23, 1963__________________
Long Xuyen,
7.06-millimeter automatic pistol---------------------------------
K-50 submachinegun--------------------------------------------
Do----------------------------------------------------------
Do ------------------------------- --?.-------------------------
Do Do----------------------------------- ----------
Do-----------------------------------------------------
Do---------------------------------------------------------
Do ----------------------------------------- .... ---------
Do--------------------------- -------.. --
Do- --------------------------------------------------------
Do__ ----------- -----------------------------------
Do--^ _ ---------------------------------- ---------------------- ?--
,Do
Do-----
--- .. ----??-------- ? ---- - ------ ?, --- .. -
Total------------------------------------------------?-...
Rifles- ----------------------------------------------------------
Do ..........................................................
Do ---------------------------------------------------------
Do --------------------------------- ?--------------------?---
Do ----------------------------------------------------------
Do ..................................................
Do Do------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------
Total -?-- --------??? ......-
letachinegun cartridges__________________________________________
Grenade launcher __?? .................................--.--
8.6 antitank bazooka ------------------------------------- ----__
14,000
1
1
Ian. 2,1963____________________
Nov. 25, 1962------------------
Nov. 29,1962 ------------------
Apr. 24,1963 ------ -----------
May 9, 1963___________________
July 11,1963___________________
Aug. 31, 1963__________________
Sept. 8, 1963___________________
Sept. 16, 1963__________________
Oct. 17, 1963_______---________
Nov. 13,1963__________________
-----do-------------------------
Oct. 8, 1963--------------------
--------------------------------
Dec. 30,1963 ------------------
Dec. 26, 1963_ ------------
Dec. 17,1963 ------------
Sept. 10, 1963__________________
Oct. 19,1963 ------------------
Nov. 0, 1963_____________
Nov. 9, 1063_____________
Nov. 13, 1963__________________
Nov. 17, 1963__________________
Nov. 26, 1963__________________
Dec. 2,1963___________________
Dec. 21,1963__________________
Dec. 22, 1963__________________
July 14, 1963___________________
Dec. 22, 1963__________________
On person of Vietcong leader arrested at Phu Yen.
Quang Tin.
Phuoc Long.
Quang Ngai.
Quang Tin.
Operation Hau Giang,
Quang Ngat.
Dinh Tuong.
Long An.
Quang Nam.
Phu Yen.
At Hub.
Binh Dinh.
Operation Phaoe Binh Thang.
Bien Hoa.
Chuong Thien.
Long Xuyen.
An Xuyen,
Chuong Thien.
Ba Xuyen.
Chuong Thien.
Klan Giang.
Ba Xuyen.
Hau Nghia.
Phong Dinh.
Chuong Thien.
Dinh Tuong.
Long An.
Din Tuong.
IV. (a) Weapons and ammunition modified by the Regular Army of North Vietnam
3709
Type
Quantity
Date of capture
Place
Modified MAT-0 ----------------------------------------------
16
Nov. 25,1962 ------------------
Quang Tin.
Do------------------------------------------ ---------
2
Dec. 5, 1963------------------
Phu Bon.
Do----------------------------------------------------------
6
Nov.13, 1963------------------
Total--------------------------------------------- -------
24
--------------------------------
12.7-millimetermachinegun---- _---------------- _-----------
2
Nov. 24, 1963__________________
Operation at Due Hoa.
IV. (b) Material and equipment of North Vietnamese manufacture
Uniform---------------------------------------------------
Dec. 21, 1062 ------------------
Dee.
Phuoc Thanh.
Helmets --------------------------------------------------
10
Oct. 8-10,1963 -----------------
Klen Hoa.
Socks ---------
Dee. 21, 1962 ..................
Phuoc Thanh.
Sweaters (made in Ha Dong) ---------------------------
(l
--------------------------------
Do.
Belts {{matte in Hanoi) ____ ___________________
Do.
Mess SStss(made in Haiphong) ---------------
/
(1
Do.
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APPENDIX E
,PHOTOS OF CAPTURED VIETCONG WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION FROM EXTERNAL COMMUNIST
SOURCES
(See sec. II.)
The following are photographs of some of
the many weapons and the large stocks of
ammunition supplied to the Vietcong in
South Vietnam from external Communist
sources (not printed in the RECORD).
APPENDIX F
NORTH VIETNAMESES PASSPORTS AND TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS USED BY LIBERATION FRONT
OFFICIALS
(See sec. IV, A, 1.)
Huynh Van Nghia and Nguyen Van Tien
are officials of the "National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam." Though they pro.
fess to be citizens of South Vietnam, their
ties are with and their support comes from
North Vietnam and the Communist regime
in Hanoi. In 1963, when t:he two men
traveled abroad on front business, they
traveled as North Vietnamese with passports
and other documents issued by the Hanoi
regime.
. Photographs of these documents follow
(not printed in the RECORD).
APPENDIX G
THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (SOUTH)
_ AND THE LAO DONG PARTY (NORTH) ARE
ONE COMMUNIST PARTY
(See see. IV, A.)
In May 1962 a military force of the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam' captured a number of
Vietcong documents in Ba Xuyen Province.
One of these documents contained instruc-
tions from the provincial committee of the
Lao Dong Party (Communist Party) in Ba
Xuyen to the party's district committees con-
cerning formation of the new People's Revo-
lutionary Party (PRP).
Pertinentsections of the instruction, dated
December 7, 1961, follow:
"To D2 and K:
"In regard to the foundation of the People's
Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, the
creation of this party is only a matter of
strategy; it needs to be explained within the
party; and, to deceive the enemy, it is neces-
sary that the new party begiven the outward
appearance corresponding to a division of
the party (Lao Dong) into two and the foun-
dation of a new party, so that the enemy
cannot use it in his propaganda.
"Within the party, it is necessary to ex-
plain that the founding of the People's Revo-
lutionary Party has the purpose of isolating
the Americans and the Ngo Dinh Diem re-
gime:, and to counter their accusations of an
invasion of the South by the North. It is
means of supporting our sabotage of the
Geneva agreement, of advancing the plan of
invasion of the South, and at the same time
permitting the Front for Liberation of the
South to recruit new adherents, and to gain
the sympathy of nonalined countries in
southeast Asia.
"The People's Revolutionary Party has only
the appearance of an independent existence;
actually, our party is nothing but the Lao
Dong Party of Vietnam (Vietminh Commu-
nist Party), unified from North to South,
under the direction of the central executive
committee of the party, the chief of which
is President Ho. * * *
"During these explanations, take care to
keep this strictly secret, especially in South
Vietnam, so that the enemy does not perceive
our purpose. * * *
"Do-not put these explanations in party
bulletins."
Another party circular of the same date
said:
"The reasons for the change in the party's
name must be kept stricly secret. Accord-
ing to instructions of the Central Commit-
tee, one must not tell the people or party
sympathizers that the People's Revolutionary
Party and the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam
are one. One must not say that it is only a
tactic, because it would not be good for the
enemy to know."
A third party circular, dated December 8,
1961, said:
"Study the instructions so that you will
be able to execute them. In passing them to
D2V, D2, and K, be very careful that the
documents do not fall into enemy hands.
After D2N/C has passed to the sections, de-
stroy the written documents immediately."
The originals and translations of the above
documents were submitted to the Interna-
tional Control Commission by the Govern-
ment of Vietnam on May 30, 1962.1
In 1964 new rules and regulations were
promulgated for the People's Revolutionary
Patty. A copy of the new rules was captured
from the Vietcong in Chuong Thien Province
I For picture of captured documents and
text, see the white paper "Communist Viet-
minh Aggressive Policy," published by the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam,
Saigon, July 1962.
in November 1964. A photograph of the
captured document appears on the next page.
Key portions of the instructions said that
new rules and regulations had been ap-
proved for the PRP, "but the real nature of
those rules and regulations is that they still
are the rules and regulations of the Vietnam
Lao Dong Party (in North Vietnam)."
The instructions added: "* * * we should
realize that our country is one country, that
the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party
and the Vietnam Lao Dong Party are one
party. * * * There is nothing different be-
tween the two parties."
APPENDIX H
CHARTS OF THE VIETCONG ORGANIZATION,
NORTH AND SOUTH
(See sec. IV.)
Lines of control, political and military,
from the Hanoi regime to the Vietcong in
South Vietnam (charts, not printed in the
RECORD).
APPENDIX I
DETAIL ON VIETCONG TERRORISM
(See section V.)
The following table lists the Government
officials and other civilians killed, wounded,
or missing as a result of Vietcong terrorist
activities during 1964. Combat casualties
are not included:
Village, district, and other Government officials
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr. May June July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Killed_____________________________
47
34
49
30 25 31 45
36
46
48
21
24
Wounded__________________________
14
16
24
9 8 9 14
15
13
10
22
7
Kidnaped--------------------------
93
113
91
67 74 132 93
103
144
69
52
100
Total------------------------
154
163
164
106 107 172 152
154
203
127
95
131
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Lug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Killed_____________________________
111
110
138
115
105
110
181
103
132
100
66
88
Wounded--------------------------
146
174
239
218
163
173
194
122
203
90
94
154
Kidnaped--------------------------
694
590
1,531
647
727
483
964
834
778
477
200
498
Total ------------------------
951
874
1,908
980
995
766
1,339
1,059
1,113
667
360
740
The following table shows the number of
incidents of Vietcong terrorism, sabotage,
forced propaganda sessions, and armed at-
tacks during 1964:
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Attacks ------
223
417
203
220
176
140
184
113
118
83
60
96
1, 244
1,389
1, 632
1,738
1, 418
1, 390
2,123
1,773
1,938
1,790
1,391
1,719
Sabotage ---------------------------
129
201
168
1,69
217
176
286
315
482
480
247
318
Propaganda -__--------------------
174
271
167
157
140
162
224
173
178
197
109
128
Some of the consequences of Vietcong ter-
rorism are shown in the accompanying pho-
tographs (not printed in the RECORD).
LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL
(Signed by A. Stevenson)
(Circular No. 1589, dated February 27.)
For the information of members of the
Security Council, I am transmitting a spe-
cial report entitled "Aggression from the
North, the Record of North Vietnam's Cam-
paign To Conquer South Vietnam," which
my Government is making public today. It
presents evidence from which the following
conclusions are inescapable:
First, the subjugation by forces of the
Republic of Vietnam by the regime in north-
ern Vietnam is the formal, official policy of
that regime; this has been stated and con-
Armed publicly over the past 5 years.
Second, the war in Vietnam is directed
by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong
Party (Communist) which controls the gov-
ernment in northern Vietnam.
Third, the so-called Peoples Revolutionary
Party in the Republic of Vietnam is an inte-
gral part of the Lao Dong Party in North
Vietnam.
Fourth, the so-called Liberation Front for
South Vietnam is a subordinate unit of the
Central Office for South Vietnam, an integral
part of the governmental machinery in
Hanoi.
Fifth, the key leadership of the Vietcong-
officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence
agents, political organizers and propagan-
dists-has been trained, equipped and sup-
plied in the north and sent into the Republic
of Vietnam under Hanoi's military orders.
Sixth, most of the weapons, including new
types recently introduced, and most of the
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3707
The leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with armed attacks, directed against the Armed Date and place of birth : 1928, Can Tho
greater violence. They apparently inter- Forces and administration of the zone in the city (Phong Dinh).
preed, restraint as indicatipg lack of will. south. These acts are in violation of articles Rank and position in North Vietnam:
'T'heir efforts were pressed with greater vigor 10, 19, 24, and 27 of the agreement on the Senior sergeant, formerly squad leader in
and. armed attacks and Incidents of terror cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. charge of construction of barracks for 338th
multiplied. "In examining the complaints and the sup- Division. past was
not
-n +h `ar" documentary .. VC- position in South Vietnam: Squad
m providing athe dequatelyt for tthe defense of mater al Sentrhvl to part
gression. It was mutually agreed between
the Governments of the Republic of Viet-
nam and the United States that further
means for providing for South Vietnam's
defense were required. Therefore, air strikes
have been wage against some of the mili-
tary assembly points and supply bases from
which North Vietnam is, conducting its ag-
gression against the South. These strikes
constitute a limited response fitted to the
aggression that produced them.
Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt
its intervention in the South, or until effec-
tive steps are taken to maintain peace and
security in the area, the Governments of
South Vietnam and the United States will
continue necessary measures of defense
against the Communist armed aggression
coming from North Vietnam.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this report could
be multiplied many times with similar ex-
amples of the drive of the Hanoi regime
to extend. its rule over South Vietnam.
The record is conclusive. It establishes
beyond question that North Vietnam is carry-
ing out a carefully conceived, plan of ag-
gression against the South. It shows that
North Vietnam has intensified its efforts in
the years since it was condemned by the In-
ternational Control Commission. It proves
that Hanoi continues to press its systematic
program of armed aggression into South
Vietnam. This aggression violates- the
United Nations Charter. It is directly con-
rary to the Geneva Accords of 1954 and of
1962 to which North Vietnam is a party. It
shatters the peace of southeast Asia. It is a
fundamental threat to the freedom and se-
curity of South Vietnam.
conclusion that there is evidence to show Date entered South Vietnam: Accompa-
that the PAVN (people's army of Vietnam) vied Infiltration Group 15; departed April 4,
has allowed the zone in the north to be used 1962, arrived War Zone D early August 1962.
for inciting. encour
.,--
i
. -
------_
ting
D
ag
ng and
i
i
wcvav
t
es in the zone in the south,
aimed at the overthrow of the administration
in the south, The use of the zone in the
north for such activities is In violation of
articles 19, 24, and 27 of the agreement on
the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.
The ICC report then stated:
"The Commission accepts the conclusions
reached by the Legal Committee that- there
is sufficient evidence to show beyond reason-
able doubt that the PAVN has violated arti-
cles 10, 19, 24, and 27 in specific instances.
The Polish delegation dissents from these
conclusions. On the basis of the fuller re-
port, that is being prepared by the Legal
Committee covering all the allegations and
incidents, the Commission will take action
as appropriate in each individual case."
The full text of the ICC reports is con-
tained in a publication, "Special Reports to
the Cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on
Indochina" issued by the Bureau of Far
Eastern Affairs of the Department of State
on July 2, 1962.
APPENDIX B
INFILTRATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM
NORTH VIETNAM INTO SOUTH VIETNAM
(See sec. I, B.)
(Maps showing infiltration routes not
printed in the RECORD.)
APPENDIX C
DETAIL ON MILITARY INFILTRATION WITH CASE
STUDIES
The people of South Vietnam have ehosen (See sec. I, B, and C.)
to resist this threat. At their request, the The following table shows the scale of in-
United States has taken its place beside them filtration of military personnel from North
in their defensive struggle. Vietnam into the South since 1959. The
The United States seeks no territory, no confirmed list is based on information on
military bases, no favored, position. But we infiltration groups from at least two inde-
have learned the meaning of a ression a1e pendent sources.
gg -
where in the postwar world, and we have
met it.
the unltea States will be ready at once to
reduce its military involvement. But it will 1959_M-
not abandon friends who want to remain 1961______________
free, It will do what must be done to help 1962______________
them. The choice now between peace and 1963______________
continued and increasingly destructive con- 1964_--"""'-"'
1,800
3,750
5,400
4, 200
4:400
2,700
1,650
7,000
3,200
3,000
-flict is one for the authorities in Hanoi to Total __-____I 19,650 17,550
make.
APPENDIX A
FINDINGS OF , THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
COMMISSION
On June 2, 1962, the International Com-
mission for Supervision and Control in Viet-
nam (ICC) sent a special report to the Gov-
ernments of the United Kingdom and of the
Soviet Union in their role as cochairmen of
the Geneva Conference on Indochina. The
ICC is composed of delegates from India
(chairman), Canada, and Poland.
In its report the ICC noted the following
finding of the Commission's Legal Commit-
tee:
"Having examined the complaints and the
supporting material sent by the South Viet-
namese mission, the committee has come to
the conclusion that in specific instances
there is evidence to show that armed and
unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and
other supplies have been sent from the zone
in the north to the zone in the south with
the object of supporting, organizing, and
carrying out hostile activities, including
Rallied at Cau Song Be (bridge) post Sep-
tember 8, 1962, with 1 MAS 36.
Name: Le Van Quyen.
Alias: Ho Hai, Hong Thanh.
Date and place of birth: 1929, Tan Binh
Than village, Cho Gao district - (My Tho).
Rank and position in North Vietnam:
Lieutenant, formerly assigned to 388th Bri-
gade as Instructor on heavy weapons such as
57 mm. recoilless rifle and machinegun.
VC position in South Vietnam: Platoon
leader, 2d Platoon, 2d Company, Infiltration
Group 15.
Date entered South Vietnam: Accompa-
nied Infiltration Group 15; departed April 3,
1962, arrived Suoi Da (War Zone D) Septem-
ber 10, 1962.
Date, place, and circtmstance of defection:
Rallied at Hieu Liem district (Phuoc Thanh)
October 7, 1962.
Name: Nguyen Van Do.
Party name: Thanh Minh.
Infiltration alias: Nguyen Thuan.
Date and place of birth: 1923, Thuan Giao
village, Lai Thieu district (Binh Duong).
Rank and position in North Vietnam:
Senior captain (battalion commander) 1st
Battalion, 338th Brigade.
VC position in South Vietnam: Subject
was to be appointed commander of Phuoc
Tuy Province Main Force Battalion.
Date entered South Vietnam: Commander
of Infiltration Group H. 28; departed Xuan
Mai, Ha Dong (North Vietnam) July 4, 1963;
arrived Ban Me Thuot October 23, 1963.
Date, place, and circumstance of defec-
tion: Rallied at Ban Don post, Ban Me Thout,
October 23, 1963, while guiding Group H. 26
to Hai Yen Zone.
Name: Nguyen Thanh Phi.
Party name: Hung Phuong.
Infiltration alias: Nguyen Tu.
Date and place of birth: November 16,
1926, Thanh Van village, Thanh Chuong
district (Nghe An).
Rank and position in North Vietnam:
4,500
5,400
12,400
7,400
7,400
Brief case histories of typical Vietcong who
were sent into South Vietnam by the author-
ities in Hanoi follow:
Name: Le Van Thanh.
Alias: Huu Tam.
Date and place of birth: July 12, 1936, Hoa
Hao hamlet, Cat Tai village, Phu Cat dis-
trict (Binh Dinh).
Rank and position in North Vietnam:
Lieutenant, formerly platoon leader of signal
platoon of 3d Battalion, 90th Regiment,
324th Division.
VC position in South Vietnam: Platoon
leader of signal platoon of 95th Battalion, 2d
Regiment, 5th Inter-Region.
Date entered South Vietnam: Departed
November 27, 1961, arrived Do Xa station
early February 1962.
Date, place, and circumstance of defection:
Rallied to government at Nhon Loc post,
Nghia Hanh district (Quang Ngai), May 24,
1962.
Name: La Thanh.
Allias: Nguyen Ba Tong-La Giau.
vier, raospisal.
VC position in South Vietnam: Doctor,
health team leader, 5th Region base con-
struction group (Do Xa).
Date entered South Vietnam: March 1962.
Date, place, and circumstance of capture:
Captured by South Vietnamese armed forces
May 4, 1963, with one 12-millimeter Colt
pistol and five rounds.
Name: Le Van Net.
Party name: Le Hung Tien.
Infiltration alias: Le Na.
Date and place of birth: 1924, Tan Hiep
village, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong.
Rank and position in North Vietnam:
Discharged lieutenant, served in Co Dinh
chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) with grade of
senior sergeant.
VC position in South Vietnam: Senior ser-
geant, 6th Squad, 2d Platoon, Infiltration
Group H. 26.
Date entered South Vietnam: Late June
1963 with Infiltration Group H. 26.
Date, place, and circumstance of capture:
Captured November 16, 1963, by inhabitants
in strategic hamlet in Ban Me Thout (Dar-
lac) with one Communist Chinese rifle and 70
rounds.
Name: Van Cong Khanh.
Narty name: Pharr Tien.
Date and place of birth: 1924, An Hot vil-
lage, Chau T--, d'strict (Kien Hoa).
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Rank and position in North Vietnam:
Discharged and reassigned to Co Dinh ehrom-
its mine (Thanh Boa) as senior sergeant.
VC position in South Vietnam: Aspirant,
leader of 7th Squad, 3d Platoon, 608th Engi-
neer Company subordinate to Headquarters
Region 7.
Date entered South Vietnam: Accompan-
ied Group 49, infiltrated into South Vietnam,
March 1.8, 1982.
Date, place, and circumstance of capture:
captured November 23, 1962, in Bung Dia
hamlet.
Name : Nguyen Thanh Hoa.
Party name: Quoc.
Infiltration alias: Nguyen Quoc Trung.
Date and place of birth: 1917, Phong Coc
village, Ha Nam canton (Quang Yen).
Rank and position in North Vietnam: Cap-
tain, discharged and reassigned to Chi Ne
agricultural camp May 1957.
VC position in South Vietnam: Com-
mander, 4th Main Force Battalion.
75-millimeter recoilless rifle --------------------------------------
Do----------------------------------------------------------
Do-------- ^--------------------------------------------- ?--
67-millimeter recoilless gun---------------------.-----------------
Do----------------------------------------------------------
Do-------- --------------------------------------------------
Total------------- -------------------------?-------------
Shells for 75-millimeter gun (shells bear markings in Chinese
characters. On some shells, markings were scratched out and
replaced by "American" markings.)
Do----------------------?---------------- -----------
1 Sept. 10,1963------------------
1 Dec. 2-16,1963 ----------
I ------
Dec. 22, 1963------------------
Nov. 25, 1962__________________
Dec. 5, 1962--?_______________
Aug. 31,1963 ------------------
Dec. 22,1963 ------------------
--------------------------------
Shells for 57-millimeter gun-?---------------------??---------
49
Nov. 25,1982__________________
Do
---------------------------------------
8
Feb. 20, 1963 ------------------
----------------
Do
-----------------------------------?--
33
May 24,1983------------------
_-----------------
130
-------------------------------------
Aug. 31,1963-----------------
--------------------
Do
-----------------------------------------
Oct. 8, 1983--------------------
--------------?-
Do----------------------------------------------------------
58
Dec. 22, 1963------------------
Total-----------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------
80-millimeter mortar--------------------------------------------
Mar. 25, 1963------------------
------------------------------------------
60-millimeter mortar
Jan. 7,1963--------------------
---
Do-----------------?------?---------- --?--_-_----.--
Dec. 22, 1903------------------
Total-----------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------
An Xuyen Province.
Do.
Dinh Tuong.
Phuoc Chau in Quang Tin (1 gun and 7 gun carriages).
Phu Bon (1 gun carriage).
Province of Quang Ngai.
Date, place, and circumstance of capture:
Captured by South Vietnamese Rangers in
ambush (after being wounded) along with
one MAS 36, July 7, 1962. in Phuoc Long
Province.
APPENDIX D
LIST OF COMMUNIST WEAPONS CAPTURED IN
SouTH VIETNAM
(See sec. II.)
On January 29, 1964, the Government of
Vietnam submitted to the International
Control Commission a list of weapons and
other military equipment which had been
captured from the Vietcong. The weapons
and equipment came from Communist
sources outside South Vietnam and obvious-
ly had been introduced clandestinely into
the country in support of the Vietcong cam-
paign of conquest directed by Hanoi.
Phuoc Chan, Province of Quang Tin.
Vietcong attack on the post of Ben Boo (Tay Ninh).
On a Vietcong vessel on the Bassac River.
Quang Ngal.
Provincb of Bihn Dinh.
Dinh Tuong.
Province of Tay Ninh.
Phuoc Thanh.
Dinh Tuong.
Province of An Xuyen.
Dinh Tuong.
Shells for 60-millimeter mortar__________________________________
Do----------------------------------------------------------
Sept. 10, 1963 ------------------
Dec. 22, 1903-___.______________
Total-----------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------
90-millimeterbazooka__________---------------------------------
Caliber 27-millimeter rocket launcher ----------------------------
Dec. 22,1963-----------------
June 10, 1962---- --------------
Total -----------------------------------------------------
Caliber 7.92-millimeter model 08 Maxim machinegun------...___
Do---------------------------------??---------___---------
Sept. 10,1963________________
Dee.21, 1963------------------
Total-----------------------------------------------------
MP-82 rocket---------------------------------------------------
----------
Apr. 24, 1963______
TNT explosives (charges)_______________________________________
365
June 13,1062--------------- ---
Do
?------------------------?---------
43
Nov. 25, 1902-----------------
-----------?-
Do
-------`?--------------------------
29
May7,1963---------------?---
----------------------
Do--------------------------------------
140
Dec. 22, 1963------------------
Total-----------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------
hosphorous (kilograms)
Red
Apr. 19,1963------------------
-
p
------------------------------------
Potassium chlorate (tons)
September 1962_______________
---
Do
------------------------------------
Apr. 19, 1963__________________
----------------
Potassium chlorate (kilograms)----.-___________________________-
July 10-15,1963---------------
Total:
Tons-------------------------------------- -------------
Kilograms- ----------------------------------------
Cartridges for 7.92-millimeter maehinegun-_---___________________
Detonating fuses for 60-millimeter mortar shell------------------
Date entered South Vietnam: Accom-
panied Infiltration Group 52; departed Xuan
Mal, April 13, 1961, arrived about August
1961.
Date, place, and circumstance of capture:
Captured by South Vietnamese Armed
Isorces with 1 PA 38 (pistol) in Quon Long
(Dinh Tuong) August 1962.
Name: Tran van Khoa.
Alias: Tran Hong Hai.
Date and place of birth: 1935, Giong Gach
hamlet, An Hiep village, Ba Tri district,
Ben Tre Province (Kien Hoa).
Rank and position in North Vietnam:
Sergeant, formerly driver of Transportation
Group 3 of (Hanoi) Logistical Bureau.
VC position in South Vietnam: Member of
46th infiltration Company; cover designa-
tion V. 2 (infiltrated unit).
Date entered South Vietnam: Accompa-
nied the 46th Infiltration Company; de-
parted for South Vietnam, April 17, 1962.
1. Chinese Communist origin
100,000
160
Doc. 22, 1963------------------
-?--do- ----------------------
Do.
Provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Due.
Province of An Xuyen.
Chuong Thien.
Quang Ngaf.
Quang Due.
Phuoc Chau (Quang Tin).
Can The.
Dinh Tuong.
Province of Kien Phong.
On a Vietcong vessel at Phu Quoc.
Province of Kien Phong.
Phu Quoc.
Dinh Tuong.
Do.
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19.65 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.-- SENATE 3705
A. Political organization.
-Political direction and control of the Viet
cone 3s supplied by the Lao Dong Party," i.e.
the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh.
Party agents are responsible for indoctrina-
tion, recruitment, political training, propa-
ganda, anti-Government demonstrations,
and other activities of a political nature.
The considerable intelligence-gathering fa-
cilities of the party are also at the disposal
of the Vietcong.
Overall direction of the VC movement Is
the responsibility of the Central Committee
of the Lao Dome Party. Within the central
committee a special reunification depart-
ment has been established. This has replaced
the committee for supervision of the
south mentioned in intelligence reports 2
years ago. It lays down broad strategy for
the movement to conquer South Vietnam.
Until March 1662 there were two principal
administrative divisions in the VC structure
in the south? One was the interzone of
South; Central Vietnam (sometimes called
interzone 5); the other was the Nambo re-
gion. In a 1962 reorganization these were
merged into one, called the central office for
South Vietnam. The central' committee,
through its reunification' department, is-
sues dirctives to the ' central office,. which
e
translates them into specific orders for the
appropriate subordinate command.
Under the central office are six regional
units (V through IX) plus the special zone of
Saigon/Cholon/Gis' Dinh. A regional com-
mittee responsible to the central office directs
VC activities in each region: Each regional
committee has specialized units responsible
for liaison, propaganda, training, personnel,
subversive activities, espionage, military
bases, and the like.
Below each regional committee are simi-
16rly structured units at ' the province and
district levels. At the base of the Com-
munist pyramid are the individual party
cells, which may be organized on a geographic
base or within social or occupational groups.
The elaborateness of the party unit and the
extent to which it operates openly or under-
ground is determined mainly by the extent
of VC control over the area concerned.
1. The Liberation Front: The' National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
is the screen "behind which the Communists
carry out their program of 'conquest. It '1s
the creature of the Communist Government
In Hanoi. As noted above the 'Communist
Party in the North demanded establishment
of such a front 3 months before its forma-
tion was actually announced in December
1960. It was designed to create the illusion
that the Vietcong campaign of "subversion
was truly indigenous to South Vietnam
rather than an externally directed Commu-
from the North
Party in Hanoi?
Vietnamese. Communist
time guerrillas. They. are generally. orga
nized at the district level where there are
likely to be several companies of 50 or more
men each. These troops receive only half
pay, which means they must work at least
part of the time to eke out a living.
Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the
district are the part-time, village-based guer-
rillas.
They are available for assignment by higher
headquarters and are used for harassment
and sabotage. They are expected to warn
nearby VC units of the approach of any force
of the legal government. They provide a
pool for recruitment into the VC district
forces.
The record shows that many of the village
guerrillas are dragooned into service with
the Vietcong. Some are kidnapped; others
are threatened; still others join to prevent
their families from being harmed. Once in
the Vietcong net, many are reluctant to leave
for fear of punishment by the authorities or
reprisal by the Communists.
Lam Van Chuol is a typical example. He
was a member of the village civil defense
force in his home village in Kien Giang pro-
vince. In March 1960, he was kidnaped by
the Vietcong and kept a prisoner in the
highlands for 1 month. There he was sub-
jected to intense propaganda and indoc-
trination. He was returned to his village but
kept- under close observation and steady
pressure. Finally, he was convinced he must
join the VC. Later, he was transferred to
a Communist military unit In another pro-
vince. After learning of the Government's
open arms program, he decided to defect
from the VC. In May 1964, he walked into
a Government outpost and asked for protec-
tion.
Money to pay the regular VC units comes
from a variety of sources. . Funds are sent
from Hanoi. "Taxes" are extorted from the
local population. Landowners and planta-
tion operators often must pay a tribute to
the VC as the price for not having their lands
devastated. Similarly, transportation com-
panies have been forced to pay the VC or
face the threat of having their buses or boats
sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have
been kidnaped for ransom. The VC have
often stopped buses and taken the money
and valuables of all on board.
For the most part, the VC have concen-
trated their attention on individuals, iso-
lated or poorly defended outposts, and small
centers of population. They have mercilessly
killed or kidnaped thousand of village chiefs
and other local officials. But over the past
year the VC have moved into larger unit
operations. Their ability to operate on a
battalion level or larger has substantially
increased.
C. Intelligence organization
A key element in the Vietcong effort is an
elaborate organization in Hanoi called the
Central Research Agency (CRA) (Cue Nghi-
en-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles
Hanoi's Intellience effort on a worldwide
scale, the main focus of its operation is on
South Vietnam. This agency is able to draw
on the intelligence capabilities of both the
Lao Dong Party and the North Vietnamese
armed forces for information, personnel, and
facilities.
The CRA reportedly operates under the
close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh him-
self. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi
government reportedly sit on its directing
committee, including Premier Pham Van
Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and
Defense Minster Vo Nguyen Giap.
Considerable information on the organiza-
tion of the CRA has become available from
captured Vietcong agents and from the work
of intelligence agents of the Republic of
Vietnam. Much of this information cannot
be made public for security reasons, but it
is possible to describe the CRA organization
and its operations in broad outline. .
The front has won support primarily from
the Communist world. Its radio faithfully
repeats the propaganda themes of Hanoi and
Peiping. When its representatives travel
abroad, they do so with North Vietnamese
passports and sponsorship a The front's pro-
gram copies that of the Lao Dong Party in
North Vietnam:
In late 1961, in still another effort to con-
ceal the extent of Communist domination
of the front, the Communists announced
formation of a new Marxist -political unit,
the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP).
This mechanism provided a way to explain
the Communist presence In,the front while
at the same time making it appear that the
Communist voice. was only one of several
affiliated organizations In the front. The
MP itself clalip.ed direct descent from, the
original Indochinese Communist Party and
s Pictures of North' Vietnamese passports
and travel documeints used by front officials
'are in app. F. [Not printed in RECdRD.],
B. Military organization
Military affairs of the Vietcong are the
responsibility of high command of the Peo-
ple's Army of North Vietnam and the Min-
istry of Defense, under close supervision from
the Lao Dong Party. These responsibilities
include operational plans, assignments of
individuals and regular units, training pro-
grams, infiltration of military personnel and
supplies, military communications, tactical
intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six
military regions are the same as those of
the VC political organization.
The military structure of the Vietcong is
an integral part of the political machinery
that controlg every facet of VC activity in
South Vietnam under Hanoi's overall direc-
tion. Each political headquarters from the
central office down to the village has a mili-
tary component which controls day-to-day
military operations. Similarly,` each mili-
tary headquarters has a political element, an
individual or a small staff. This meshing
of political and military activity is designed
to insure the closest cooperation in support
of the total Communist mission. It also
gives assurance of political control over the
military.
Associated with the central office, believed
to be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a mili-
tary headquarters. Through this headquar-
ters, as well as through other channels, Hanoi
maintains direct contact with its principal
military units in the south.
In addition to its supervision of the gen-
eral military effort of the VC, the military
section of the central. office is believed to
have direct command of two regimental
headquarters and a number of security com-
panies.
The hard core of the VC military organiza-
tion is the full-time. regular unit usually
based on a province or region. These are
wall-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla
fighters. They follow a rigid training sched-
ule, that Is roughly two-thirds military and
one-third political In content. This com-
pares with the 50-50 proportion for district
}tits and the 70 percent political and 30
percent military content of the village guer-
rilla's training.
The size. of the Vietcong regular forces has
grown steadily in recent years. For exam-
ple, the Vietcong have five regimental head-
quarters compared with two in 1961. And
the main. VQ force is cQmposed of 50 battal-
ions, 60 percent more than before. There
are .au_estimated 139 _VC_-companies. Hard-
core VC strength now is estimated at about
35.000, whereas it was less than 20,000 in
1961,
The main force battalions are well armed
with a variety of effective weapons includ-
ing 75-millimeter recoilless rifles and 81-82-
millimeter mortars. _The companies and
smaller units are equally well equipped and
have 57-millimeter recoilless rifles and 60-
millimeter mortarsirk their inventory. It is
estimated that the Vietcong have at least
130 81-millimeter mortars and 300 60-milli-
meter mortars. Thereis no precise estimate
for the number of recoilless rifles In their
bands, but it is believed that most main
force units are equipped with them. In at
least one recent action the Vietcong em-
ployed a 75-millimeter pack howitzer. This
mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500
yards, will increase the Vietcong capabilities
to launch long-range attacks against many
stationary targets in the country.
Supporting the main force units of the
Vietcong are an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-
' z For evidence that the People's Revolu-
tionary Party in the south and the Com-
munist Lao Dong Party in the north are one
party, see app. G.
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 3706
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 1
The headquarters of the CRA in Hanoi is
divided into six main sections, not including
a special code unit. The six sections are re-
sponsible for administration, cadres, com-
munications, espionage, research, and train-
ing. Each section has units to handle the
specialized activities of its particular area of
responsibility. The research section, for ex-
ample, has subsections that handle political,
economic, and military affairs respectively.
CRA headquarters directs a number of
special centers for oversea operations. One
such center maintains intelligence channels
to oversea areas. It operates through spe-
cial units at Haiphong and at Hongay.
A second special center is responsible for
VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and
Laos. A third center handles activities along
the "demarcation line," the border with
South Vietnam. This unit, based in Vinh
Linh in southeast North Vietnam, is respon-
sible for sending agents and supplies to the
south by sea. It also cooperates with the
North Vietnamese army in planning and
carrying out infiltration. The CRA main-
tains intelligence bases in Laos and other
countries.
Inside South Vietnam the Vietcong have a
large intelligence network. Some of its units
are responsible for receiving and sending on
agents arriving from the North. They feed
and. give instructions to groups infiltrating
into South Vietnam. They take delivery of
equipment and supplies received from the
North and relay them to Vietcong units In
the south.
Many Vietcong agents have been captured
in Saigon. They have exposed the extensive
effort by the CRA to penetrate all Republic
of Vietnam Government agencies, foreign
embassies, and other specialized organiza-
tions. Party and military intelligence units
and agents work closely with the CRA.
Each of the main centers operating under
CRA headquarters has its own sections and
units designed to carry out its main func-
tions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible
for the main infiltration effort of the Viet-
cong, has separate sections for radio com-
munications, coding, documentation and
training, and liaison. It also has specialized
units for Infiltration through the moun-
tains, infiltration by sea, and "Illegal action"
In the mountain area.
The CRA maintains a large and expanding
radio communications network. Agents also
are used to carry messages, usually in secret
writing or memorized.
Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese
intelligence operation in support of the
Vietcong is one of the most extensive of its
kind in the world e
P. A, BRIEF HISTORY OF HANOI'S CAMPAIGN OF
AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM
While negotiating an end to the Indochina
war at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were
making plans to take over all former French
territory in southeast Asia. When Vietnam
was partitioned, thousands of carefully se-
lected party members were ordered to remain
in place in the south and keep their secret
apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's
cause. Arms and ammunition were stored
away for future use. Guerrilla fighters re-
joined their families to await the party's call.
Others withdrew to remote jungle and
mountain hideouts. The majority, an esti-
mated 90,000, were moved to North Vietnam.
Hanoi's original calculation was that all
of Vietnam would fall under its control with-
out resort to force. For this purpose, Com-
munist cadres were ordered to penetrate offi-
cial and nonofficial agencies, to propagandize
and sow confusion, and generally to use all
means short of open violence to aggravate
war-torn conditions and to weaken South
Vietnam's government and social fabric.
e Charts of the VC organizational structure
are in appendix if.
South, Vietnam's refusal to fall in with
Hanoi's scheme for peaceful takeover came
as a heavy blow to the Communists. Mean-
time, the Government had stepped up ef-
forts to blunt Vietcong subversion and to
expose Communist agents. Morale in the
Communist organization in the south
dropped sharply. Defections were numerous.
Among South Vietnamese, hope rose that
their nation could have a peaceful and inde-
pendent future, free of Communist domina-
tion. The country went to work. The years
after 1955 were a period of steady progress
and growing prosperity.
Food production levels of the prewar years
were reached and surpassed. While per cap-
ita food output was dropping 10 percent in
the north from 1956 to 1960, it rose 20 per-
cent in the south. By 1983 it had risen 30
percent, despite the disruption in the coun-
tryside caused by intensified Vietcong mili-
tary attacks and terrorism. The authorities
in the north admitted openly to continuing
annual failures to achieve food production
goals.
Production of textiles increased in the
south more that 20 percent in 1 year
(1958). In the same year, South Vietnam's
sugar crop increased more than 100 percent.
Despite North Vietnam's vastly larger indus-
trial complex, South Vietnam's per capita
gross national product in 1960 was estimated
at $110 a person while it was only $70 in the
North.
More than 900,000 refugees who had fled
from Communist rule in the North were suc-
cessfully settled in South Vietnam. An
agrarian reform program was instituted.
The elementary school population nearly
quadrupled between 1956 and 1960. And
so it went-a record of steady improvement
in the lives of the people. It was intolerable
for the rulers in Hanoi; under peaceful con-
ditions, the south was outstripping the
north. They were losing the battle of peace-
ful competition and decided to use violence
and terror to gain their ends.
After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and
expanded its covert political and military
machinery in the South. Defectors were
replaced by trained personnel from party
ranks in the north. Military units and polit-
ical cells were enlarged and were given new
leaders, equipment, and intensified training.
Recruitment was pushed. In short, Hanoi
andits forces in theSouth prepared to take
by force and violence what they had failed
to achieve by other means.
By 1958 the use of terror by the Vietcong
increased appreciably. It was used both to
win prestige and to back up demands for
support from the people, support that poli-
tical and propaganda appeals had failed to
produce. It was also designed to embarrass
the Government in Saigon and raise doubts
about its ability to maintain internal order
and to assure the personal security of its
people. From 1959 through 1961, the pace
of Vietcong terrorism and armed attacks ac-
celerated substantially.
The situation at the end of 1961 was so
grave that the Government of the Republic
of Vietnam asked the United States for in-
creased military assistance. That request
was met. Meantime, the program of stra-
tegic hamlets, designed to improve the peas-
ant's livelihood and give him some protec-
tion against Vietcong harassment and pres-
sure, was pushed energetically.
But the Vietcong did not stand still. To
meet the changing situation, they tightened
their organization and adopted new tactics,
with increasing emphasis on terrorism, sabo-
tage, and armed attacks by small groups.
They also introduced from the North tech-
nicians In fields such as armor and anti-
aircraft. Heavier weapons were sent in to the
regular guerrilla forces.
The military and insurgency situation was
complicated by a quite separate internal po-
litical struggle in South Vietnam, which led
in November 1963 to the removal of the
Diem government and its replacement with
a new one. Effective power was placed in
the hands of a Military Revolutionary Coun-
cil. There have been a number of changes in
the leadership and composition of the Gov-
ernment in Saigon in the ensuing period.
These internal developments and distrac-
tions gave the Vietcong an invaluable op-
portunity, and they took advantage of it.
Vietcong agents did what they could to en-
courage disaffection and to exploit demon-
strations in Saigon and elsewhere. In the
countryside the Communists consolidated
their hold over some areas and enlarged their
military and political apparatus by increased
infiltration. Increasingly they struck at re-
mote outposts and the most vulnerable of
the new strategic hamlets and expanded their
campaign of aggressive attacks, sabotage,
and terror.
Any official, worker, or establishment that
represents a service to the people by the Gov-
ernment in Saigon is fair game for the Viet-
cong. Schools have been among their favor-
ite targets. Through harassment, the mur-
der of teachers, and sabotage of buildings,
the Vietcong succeeded in closing hundreds
of schools and interrupting the education
of tens of thousands of youngsters.
Hospitals and medical clinics have often
been attacked as part of the anti-Govern-
ment campaign and also because such at-
tacks provide the Vietcong with needed med-
ical supplies. The Communists have en-
couraged people In rural areas to oppose the
Government's antimalaria teams, and some
of the workers have been killed. Village and
town offices, police stations, and agricultural
research stations are high on the list of pre-
ferred targets for the Vietcong.
In 1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet
chiefs and other Government officials were
killed outright by the Vietcong and 1,131
were kidnaped. More than 1,350 civilians
were killed in bombings and other acts of
sabotage. And at least 8,400 civilians were
kidnaped by the Vietcong e
Today the war in Vietnam has reached new
levels of intensity. The elaborate effort by
the Communist regime in North Vietnam to
conquer the South has grown, not dimin-
ished. Military men, technicians, political
organizers, propagandists, and secret agents
have been infiltrating into the Republic of
Vietnam from the north in growing num-
bers. The flow of Communist-supplied
weapons, particularly those of large caliber,
has increased. Communications links with
Hanoi are extensive. Despite the heavy
casualties of 8 years of fighting, the hard-
core VC force is considerably larger now than
it was at the end of 1961.
The Government in Saigon has undertaken
vigorous action to meet the new threat. The
United States and other free countries have
increased their assistance to the Vietnamese
Government and people. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk visited Vietnam in 1964, and he
promised the Vietnamese: "We shall remain
at your side until the aggression from the
north has been defeated, until it has been
completely rooted out and this land enjoys
the peace which it deserves."
President Johnson has repeatedly stressed
that the U.S. goal is to see peace secured in
southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that
will come only when aggressors leave their
neighbors in peace."
Though it has been apparent for years that
the regime in Hanoi was conducting a cam-
paign of conquest against South Vietnam,
the Government in Saigon and the Govern-
ment of the United States both hoped that
the danger could be met within South Viet-
nam itself. The hope that any widening of
the conflict might be avoided was stated
frequently.
s For additional details of VC terrorism,
see app. L .
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 1965 Approved For Relgb a ffi? ag '~ AfI RLB00g4f 8300160032-7
On April 7 the storm became violent. The These, too, were to be helped to escape to
boat tossed and threatened to capsize. North Vietnam. Any useful information
Strong northeasterly winds forced It ever concerning developments in the south or
closer to shore. Finally the boat captain, military activities were to be reported
Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be through his superior, Nguyen Van Phong.
thrown overboard. This was done, and the In case he became suspect, he was either
boat then was beached. de- to make his own wayback to North Vietnam
The eight men de
contact to split with up VC forces. pairs and try y-o make or to go into the jungle and try to contact
y buried their a VC unit.
false papers and set out. Six of the eight Vy entered South Vietnam on January 2,
were captured almost immediately by au- 1963, by swimming across the Ben Hai River.
thorities in Thua Thien Province, and the He encountered an elderly farmer who led
other two were taken several days later. him to the local authorities in Hai Gu.
2. Student,Propaganda Agents There he told his story but it was not be-
lieved. He then admitted his true mission.
tion of South Vietnam
The student popula is an important target group for VC propa-
gandists. These agents seek to win adher-
ents for the Communist cause among young
workers, students in high schools and uni-
versities, and the younger officers and en-
listed men in the armed forces of the Repub-
lic of Vietnam.
Typical of the agents sent Into South
Vietnam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy,
a 19-year-old- VC propagandist. He is a
native of the Vinh Linh District in North
Vietnam, just north of the demilitarized
zone. He Was a member of a Communist
party youth group in his native village. He
was recruited for propaganda work in the
south in the fall of 1962. He was one of 40
young persons enrolled in a special political
training course given by the Communist
Party in his district.
The first phase of the training consisted of
political indoctrination covering such sub-
jects as the advance of communism, the
North Vietnamese plan for winning control
of the country, the responsibility of youth
in furthering this plan, the war in the south,
and the need for propaganda supporting the
Liberation Front.
Those who successfully completed the first-
phase were selected for the second level of
training, the so-called technical training
phase. In this the trainees were given their
mission in the south. Vy was told he should
infiltrate into South Vietnam and there sur-
render to the authorities, describing himself
as a detector who was "tired of the miserable
life in the north." He was to say he wanted
to complete his schooling, which was impos-
slble in thg north. He was told to ask to
live with relatives in the south so he could
go to school. Once his story was accepted
and he Was enrolled in_a school, he was to
begin his work of propagandiizng other stu-
dente, ? He was' to wait for 3 or 4 months,
however, until he was no longer the subject
of local suspicion. He was assigned to work
under an older agent to whom he had to
report regularly.
A third member of the team was a younger
man who was to assist Vy. The three were
to ,inftitrate into South Vietnam separately
and to meet there at a rendezvous point.
At first Vy was to do no more than` to
observe his fellow students carefully, col-
lecting biographical data on them and study-
ing their personalities, capabilities, and as-
pirations. He was then to select those he
thought might be most influenced by Com-
munist propaganda and try to make friends
with them.
Once he had selected, targets, he was to
begin to influence them favorably toward the
north and to implant Communist propa-
ganda. He was responsible then for bringing
into his organization those he had influenced
effectively. These individuals were to be
given their own propaganda assignments to
work on other students.
Students who wanted to evade military
service in the Government forces were con-
sidered prime' targets. Where possible, 't 'y
was to help them get to North Vietnam. He
was also told to make contact with any stu-
dents who had been picked up by the author-
ities for suspected Communist activities.
No. 38-10
3.'Other Agents
The Communist authorities in North Viet-
nam send their agents into South Vietnam
by a wide variety of means. A few like
Nguyen Van Vy cross the demilitarized zone,
more infiltrate by sea, and still more along
the infiltration routes through Laos. But
there are other methods for entering South
Vietnam. VC espionage agent Tran Van
But attempted one such method.
But was a graduate of the espionage train-
ing school in Haiphong, North Vietnam. He
completed a special 6-month course in July
1962. The training included political In-
doctrination, but most of the time was spent
on such things as use of weapons, preparing
booby traps, and methods of sabotage. He
was also given instruction in methods for
enlisting help from hoodlums, draft dodgers,
and VC sympathizers. Once in South Viet-
nam, he was to organize a small unit for
sabotage and the collection of information.
On specific assignment by his superiors he
was to be ready to sabotage ships in Saigon
harbor and to blow up gasoline and oil stor-
age points and Vietnamese Army installa-
tions. He was told to be prepared to assas-
sinate Vietnamese officials and American per-
sonnel.
In September 1962 But was given his mis-
sion assignment. He was to hide aboard a
foreign ship. When discovered, he was to
claim to be a refugee who wanted to escape
to South Vietnam. He^was given an auto-
matic pistol with silencer, some explosive de-
vices, and a small knife that could Inject
poison into the body of a victim.
But stole aboard a foreign ship in Hai-
phong harbor. After 3 days at sea-when
he was sure the ship would not turn
around-Bui surrendered to the ship's cap.
tain. When the ship arrived in Bangkok,
But was turned over to the Thai authorities.
They in turn released him to the South Viet-
namese as he had requested. But In Saigon
his true mission was disclosed and he made
a full confession.
II, HANOI SUPPLIES WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND
OTHER WAR MATERIEL TO ITS FORCES IN THE
SOUTH -
When Hanoi launched the VC campaign of
terror, violence, and subversion in earnest
in 1959, the Communist forces relied mainly
on stocks of weapons and ammunition left
over from the war against the French. Sup-
plies sent in from North Vietnam came
largely from the same source. As the military
campaign progressed, the Vietcong depended
heavily on weapons captured from the Armed
Forces in South Vietnam. This remains an
important source of weapons and ammuni-
tions for the Vietcong. But as the pace of
the war has quickened, requirements for up-
to-date arms and special types of weapons
have risen to a point where the Vietcong can-
not rely on captured stocks. Hanoi has
undertaken a program to reequip its forces
in ' the south With Communist -produced
weapons.
Large and increasing quantities of mili-
tary supplies are entering South Vietnam
from outside the country. The principal
supply ' point is North Vietnam, which pro-
vides a convenient Channel for materiel that
3703
originates in Communist China and other
Communist countries.
An increasing number of weapons from
external Communist sources have been seized
in the south. These include such weapons
as 57-millimeter and 75-millimeter recoilless
rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket
launchers, large mortars, and antitank mines.
A new group of Chinese Communist-manu-
factured weapons has recently appeared in
VC hands. These include the 7.62 semiauto-
matic carbine, 7.62 light machinegun, and
the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and
ammunition for them, manufactured. in
Communist China in 1962, were first cap-
tured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien
Province. Similar weapons have since been
seized in each of the four corps areas of
South Vietnam. Also captured have been
Chinese Communist antitank grenade
launchers and ammunition made in China
in 1963.
One captured Vietcong told his captors
that his entire company had been supplied
recently with modern Chinese weapons. The
reequipping of VC units with a type of weap-
ons that require ammunition and parts from
outside South Vietnam indicates the growing
confidence of the authorities in Hanoi in the
effectiveness of their supply lines into the
south.
Incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's elabo-
rate program to supply its forces in the south
with weapons, ammunition, and other sup-
plies has accumulated over the years. Dra-
matic new proof was exposed just as this re-
port was being completed.
On February 16, 1965, an American heli-
copter pilot flying along the South Viet-
namese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It
was a..cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton
capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored
just offshore along the coast of Phu Yen
Province. Fighter planes that approached
the vessel met machinegun fire from guns on
the deck of the ship and from the shore
as well. A Vietnamese Air Force strike was
launched against the vessel, and Vietnamese
Government troops moved into the area.
They seized the ship after a bitter fight with
the Vietcong.
The ship, which had been sunk in shallow
water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms,
ammunition. and other supplies. Docu-
ments found on the ship and on the bodies
of several Vietcong aboard identified the ves-
sel as having come from North Vietnam. A
newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong
and was dated January 23, 1965. The sup-
plies delivered by the ship-thousands of
weapons and more than a million rounds of
ammunition-were almost all of Communist
origin, largely from Communist China and
Czechoslovakia, as well as North Vietnam.
At least 100 tons of military supplies were
discovered near the ship.
A preliminary survey of the cache near the
sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the follow-
ing supplies and weapons:
Approximately 1 million rounds of small-
arms ammunition; more than 1,000 stick
grenades; 500 pounds of TNT in prepared
charges; 2,000 rounds of 82-millimeter mortar
ammunition; 500 antitank grenades; 600
rounds of 57-millimeter recoilless rifle am-
munition; more than 1,000 rounds of 75-
millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; one
57-millimeter recoilless rifle; 2 heavy ma-
chlneguns; 2,000 -'7.-95 ldauser rifles; more
than 100, 7.62 carbines; 1,000 submachine-
guns; 15 light machineguns; 500 rifles; 500
pounds of medical supplies (with labels from
North Vietnam, Communist China, Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and
other sources).
The shlp'ivas `fairly new and had been
made in Communist China. Documents
aboard the ship included three North Viet-
namese nautical charts (one of the Hai-
phong area and one of Hong Gay, both in
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North Vietnam, and one of the Tra Vinh area
of South Vietnam). The military health
records of North Vietnamese soldiers were
found. One man had a political history sheet
showing he was a member of the 338th Di-
vision of the North Vietnamese Army. (See
app.. E.)
Also abroad the North Vietnamese ship
were: an instruction book for a Chinese
Communist navigational device; postcards
and letters to addresses in North Vietnam;
snapshots, including one of a group of men
in North Vietnamese Army uniforms under a
flag of the Hanoi government.
Members of the ICC and representatives of
the free press visited the sunken North Viet-
namese ship and viewed its cargo. The
incident itself underlined in the most drama-
tic form that Hanoi is behind the continuing
campaign of aggression aimed at conquer-_
ing South Vietnam. It made unmistakably
clear that what ishappening in South Viet-
nam is not an internal affair but part of a
large-scale carefully directed and supported
program of armed attack on a sovereign state
and a free people.
There have been previous seizures of large
stocks of ammunition and weapons and
other military supplies that could only
have come from Communist sources outside
South Vietnam. In December 1963, a Re-
public of Vietnam force attacked a VC
stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province south-
west of Saigon. A large cache of VC equip-
ment was-seized. Included in the captured
stocks were the following weapons and am-
munition, all of Chinese Communist manu-
facture:
One 9b-millimeter rocket launcher; 2 car-
bines (type 53); 120 rounds of 75-millimeter
recoilless rifle ammunition; 120 detonating
fuses for recoilless rifle ammunition; 14,000
rounds of 7.62 (type P) ammunition; 160,000
rounds of 7.62 carbine ammunition; 150 fuses
for mortar shells; 100,000 rounds of 7.92
Mauser-type ammunition; 110 pounds (ap-
proximate) of TNT; two 60-millimeter mor-
tars.
These weapons and ammunition are the
same as those used in the North Vietnamese
Army. Some of the 7.62-millimeter am-
munition was manufactured as recently as
1962.4
Materiel is sent into South Vietnam from
the North by a variety of methods--over-
land, by river and canal, and by sea. In one
instance Vietnamese troops discovered a
cache in which the 75-millimeter ammuni-
tion alone weighed approximately 11/2 tons.
It has been estimated that it would require
more than 150 porters to carry this quantity
of ammunition over rough terrain. How-
ever, a few sampans, each manned by a few
men, could transport it with little difficulty.
It is worth noting, in this connection, that
the delta where the cache of materiel was
seized has 460 miles of seacoast as well as
2,500 miles of canals navigable by large water-
craft and another 2,200 miles of canals over
which sampans can move easily. Much of
the transport of large stocks of ammunition
is undoubtedly waterborne for at least much
of its travel into South Vietnam.5
Large quantities of chemical components
for explosives have been sent into south
Vietnam for the Vietcong. During 1963
there were at least 15 incidents in which
boats, junks, or sampans were seized with
explosives aboard. More than 20 tons of
potassium chlorate or nitrate were captured.
4 On Jan. 29, 1964, the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam supplied the Inter-
national Control Commission with a list of
weapons, ammunition, and other equipment
of Communist origin captured in South Viet-
nam since June 1962. The list is summar-
ized in app. D.
B Photographs of additional Vietcong weap-
ons and ammunition of Communist origin
are contained in app. E.
All these cases were in the delta area, and
the majority were on or near the Mekong
River. Red phosphorus made in Communist
China has been among the chemicals cap-
tured from the Vietcong.
The Communists have shown extreme
sensitivity to exposure of the fact that war
material is going to the Vietcong from North
Vietnam, Communist China, and other Com-
munist countries. A secret document cap-
tured from a VC agent last year reflected
this sensitivity. The document was sent
from VC military headquarters in Bien Hoa
Province to subordinate units. It ordered
them to "pay special attention to the re-
moval of all the markings and letters on
weapons of all types currently employed
by units and agencies and manufactured by
friendly East European democratic countries
or by China." It said incriminating mark-
ing should be chiseled off "so that the enemy
cannot use it as a propaganda theme every
time he captures these weapons."
III. NORTH VIETNAM: BASE FOR CONQUEST OF
THE SOUTH
The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in
Hanoi in September 1960 set forth two tasks
for its members: "to carry out the socialist
revolution in North Vietnam" and "to lib-
erate South Vietnam."
The resolutions of the congress described
the effort to destroy the legal Government
in South Vietnam as follows: "The revolu-
tion in the South is a protracted, hard, and
complex process of struggle, combining many
forms of struggle of great activity and flexi-
bility, ranging from lower to higher, and
taking as its basis the building, consolida-
tion, and development of the revolutionary
power of the masses."
At the September meeting the Communist
leaders in the north called for formation of
"a broad national united front." Three
months later Hanoi announced creation of
the "Front for Liberation of the South."
This is the organization that Communist
propaganda now credits with guiding the
forces of subversion in the south; it is pic-
tured as an organization established and run
by the people in the south themselves. At
the 1960 Lao Dong Party Congress the tone
was different. Then, even before the front
existed, the Communist leaders were issuing
orders for the group that was being organized
behind the scenes In Hanoi. "This front
must rally"; "The aims of its struggle are";
"The front must carry out"-this is the way
Hanoi and the Communist Party addressed
the Liberation Front even before its found-
Ing.
The Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation;
it is neither independent nor southern, and
what it seeks is not liberation but subjuga-
tion of the south.
In his address to the Third Lao Dong Party
Congress, party and government leader Ho
Chi Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up
the Socialist revolution in the north and,
at the same time, to step up the national
democratic people's revolution in the south."
The year before, writing for Red Flag,
the Communist Party newspaper of Belgium,
Ho had said much the same thing: "We are
building socialism in Vietnam, but we are
building it in only one part of the country,
While in the other part we still have to direct
and bring to a close the middle-class demo-
cratic and antiimpertalist revolution."
In the same vein, the commander in chief
of the North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo
Nguyen Giap, spoke at the 1960 party con-
gress of the need to "step up the national
democratic people's revolution in the south."
Earlier in the year, writing for the Commu-
nist Party journal Hoc Tap in Hanoi, General
Glap described the north as "the revolution-
ary base for the whole country."
Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and
first secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even
more explicit when he talked at the party
congressabout the struggle in the south and
the party's role. After noting the difficulties
involved in overthrowing the existing order
in South Vietnam, Le Duan said: "Hence the
southern people's revolutionary struggle will
be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a
simple process but a complicated one, com-
bining many varied forms of struggle-from
elementary to advanced, legal and illegal-
and based on the building, consolidation, and
development of the revolutionary force of the
masses. In this process, we must constantly
intensify our solidarity and the organization
and education of the people of the south."
Another high official of the Hanoi regime,
Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ Hoc
Tap in April 1961, expressed confidence in the
success of the struggle to remove the legal
government in South Vietnam because:
"North Vietnam is being rapidly con-
solidated and strengthened, is providing good
support to the South Vietnamese revolution,
and is serving as a strong base for the strug-
gle for national reunification." -
He outlined the steps by which the Com-
munists expect to achieve control over all
Vietnam as follows: The Liberation Front
would destroy the present Government in the
south; a coalition government would be
established; this government would agree
with the North Vietnamese government in
Hanoi regarding national reunification un-
der one form or another. It takes little
imagination to understand the form that is
intended.
"Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though
South Vietnam will be liberated by nonpeace-
ful means, the party policy of achieving
peaceful national reunification is still cor-
rect."
The official government radio in Hanoi is
used both overtly and covertly to support
the Vietcong effort in South Vietnam. Cap-
tured agents have testified that the broad-
casts areused sometimes to send instructions
in veiled code to Vietcong representatives in
the south.
Hoc Tap stated frankly in March 1963:
"They [the authorities in South Vietnam]
are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm
base for the southern revolution and the
point on which it leans, and that our party
is the steady and experienced vanguard unit
of the working class and people and is the
brain and factor that decides all victories of
the revolution."
In April 1964 the Central Committee of the
Lao Dong Party issued a directive to all
party echelons. It stated: "When the forces
of the enemy and the plots of the enemy are
considered, it is realized that the cadres,
party members, and people in North Viet-
nam must ? * * increase their sense of re-
sponsibility in regard to the South Vietnam
revolution by giving positive and practical
support to South Vietnam in every field."
Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in a Hanoi
newspaper in May 1963, underlined the im-
portance of the role of the North Vietnamese
Army in Hanoi's plans to unify Vietnam un-
der Communist rule: "Our party set forth two
strategic tasks to be carried out at the same
time: to transform and build socialism in the
north and to struggle to unify the country.
Our army is an instrument of the class strug-
gle in carrying out these two strategic tasks."
IV. ORGANIZATION, DIRECTION, COMMAND, AND
CONTROL OF THE ATTACK ON SOUTH VIETNAM
ARE CENTERED IN HANOI
The VC military and political apparatus
in South Vietnam is an extension of an
elaborate military and political structure in
North Vietnam which directs and supplies
it with the tools for conquest. The Ho Chi
Minh regime has shown that it is ready to
allocate every resource that can be spared-
whether it be personnel, funds, or equip-
ment-to the cause of overthrowing the legit-
imate Government in South Vietnam and
of bringing all Vietnam under Communist
rule.
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Vo's life and experiences were similar to
those of thousands of Vietcong. Born In
Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went
through 5 years of school and then worked
on his parents' small farm. During the war
against the French he joined the Viet Minh
forces. When the fighting ended, he was
transferred to North Vietnam with his unit,
the 210th Regiment. He remained in the
North Vietnamese Army until 1960 when he
was sent to work on a state farm in Nghe An
Province. Vo said 3,000 men and women
worked on the farm, of whom 400 were sol-
diera. In September 1962 Vo was told he
must join the newly activated 22d Battalion.
All the members of the battalion came from
provinces in South Vietnam, from. Quang Tri
to Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary
battalion; two-thirds of its members were
cadre with ranks up to senior capitain.
The group was put through an advanced
training course that lasted 6 months. The
training program included combat tactics
for units from squad to company and the
techniques of guerrilla and counterguerrilla
fighting. There were heavy doses of politi-
cal indoctrination.
On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion re-
ceived orders to move south. They were
transported in trucks from Nghe An Province
to Dong Hoi in Quang Binh, just north of
the 17th parallel. From there the unit was
moved westward to the Lao border. Then
the more than 300 men began walking to
the south following mountain trails in Laos
and the Vietnam border area. They marched
by day, rested at night. Every fifth day
they stopped at a way station for a full day's
rest. One company dropped off at Thua
Thiem Province. Vo and the remainder of
the group marched on to Pleiku Province.
Two fully armed companies from a neighbor-
ing province were assigned to the battalion.
The assignment given to the battalion was
to harass strategic hamlets in the Hoai An
district of Binh Dinh, to round up cattle
and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the
Government forces, and to recruit local
youth for service with the' Vietcong.
3. Nguyen Thao
Nguyen Thao was a VC weapons tech-
nician. A native of Khanh Hao Province in
South Vietnam, he joined the Viet Minh in
1950. He worked at a secret arsenal manu-
faoturing weapons for use by the guerrilla
forces. He went to North Vietnam after the
Geneva. accords were signed in 1954. In
North Vietnam he attended a technical
school specializing in arms and manufacture.
He received special training in foreign small
arms and artillery.
At the end of 1962 he was ordered to Ha
Dong to attend a special course of political
training in preparation for infiltrating into
South Vietnam., On completion of the
training course e was assigned to a group
of 14 men who would move to the south to-
gether. Nguyen Thao said the group was
composed of four armament specialists, two
chemical engineers, and eight middle-level
technical cadre.
They left Ha Dong in March 1963, crossed
into Laos, and reached their destination in
the northern part of South Vietnam in May.
Nguyen Thao went to work at a secret VC
arsenal near the Quang Ngai border. Fifty
men, some local workers, manned the arsenal
weapons section. The group manufactured
mines and grenades for the VC units in the
area and repaired weapons.
Nguyen Thao said he soon realized from
talking with the local workers at the arsenal
that most of what he had heard in the North
about 'conditions in South Vietnam was
wrong. He said the Communists had de-
ctived, him.; Two months after his arrival at
the arsenal he decided to defect. He asked
permission to rejoin his family and to work
in a national defense factory and continue
his studies.
4. Nguyen Viet Le
This VC soldier was born in Quang Nam
Province in South Vietnam. He served with
the 305th Division of the Viet Minh and
moved to North Vietnam in 1954. In April
1961, Nguyen Viet Le and his unit, the 50th
Battalion, moved into Laos. He said the unit
remained in Laos for 2 months, during which
it fought in four battles alongside the
Pathet Lao. During these engagements one
of the battalion's four companies was badly
mauled and had to be returned to North
Vietnam.
The other three companies were assigned
to South Vietnam. They arrived in Quang
Ngai Province in the summer of 1961. For a
month they rested and waited for orders.
They took part in a major action against an
outpost of the Government of South Viet-
nam in September. Nguyen Viet Le was
captured during a battle in Quang Ngai
Province in April 1962.
5. Nguyen True
Corp. Nguyen True was born in 1933, the
son of a farmer in Phu Yen Province in
South Vietnam. From 1949 to 1954 he served
as a courier and then as a guerrilla fighter
with the Viet Minh. In early 1955 he board-
ed a Soviet ship and moved with his unit,
the 40th Battalion, to North Vietnam. He
remained in the army, but in 1959, bothered
by illness, he went to work on a state farm.
In August 1962 Nguyen True was notified
that he was back in the army and that he was
being sent to South Vietnam. He reported
to the Xuan Mai training center and under-
went 6 months of military and political re-
education. His unit was the newly activated
22d Battalion. The training course was com-
pleted in February 1963, but departure for
South Vietnam was delayed until April.
For infiltration purposes the battalion was
divided into two groups. On April 27, Ngu-
yen True and his group boarded trucks at
Xuan Mai. They went first to Vinh, then on
to Dong Hoi, and finally to the Laos-North
Vietnam border. There they doffed their
North Vietnamese army uniforms and put on
black peasants' clothing. The march to the
south began, sometimes in Lao territory,
sometimes in Vietnam. They passed through
Thua Thien Province, then Quang Nam,
Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, and finally to
their destination, Pleiku. Each day they had
a new guide, generally one of the mountain
people of the area.
Nguyen said that he and most of the troops
who were sent north after the Indochina
war wanted to.return to their homes and
rejoin their families. In August 1963 Nguyen
True was sent out on a foraging expedition
to find food for his unit. He took the oppor-
tunity to defect to Government forces at An
Tue in Binh Dinh Province.
6. Nguyen Cam
Cam is the son of a farmer in Quang Tin
Province. Born in 1929, he joined the Viet-
minh youth group in his home village in 1946.
In 1 year he became a guerrilla fighter. In
1954, as the Indochina war was drawing to a
close, he was 'serving with the Vietminh 20th
Battalion. In May 1955 he went to North
Vietnam with his unit.
Ill health caused his transfer to an agri-
cultural camp in 1958. By 1960 he was back
in uniform, serving in the 210th Regiment.
In May of that year he was assigned to a
small group that was to set up a metallurgi-
cal workshop. Early in 1961 he was sent to
a metallurgical class in Nghe An Province.
They were taught a simple form of cast iron
production, simple blast furnace construc-
tion, and similar skills. Their instructor was
an engineer from the Hanoi industrial de-
partment.
Their special course completed, Cam and
his group of 35 men prepared to go to South
Vietnam. They went by truck from their
training center at Nghe An to the Lao bor-
der. After 19 days marching through Laos,
they arrived in the vicinity of Tchepone.
There they waited for 3 days until food sup-
plies could be airdropped by a North Viet-
namese plane. Nineteen days of walking
took them to the Laos-South Vietnam bor-
der.
Delayed en route by illness, Cam finally
reached his destination in November 1961.
It was a secret VC iron foundry in Kontum
Province. Several iron one deposits were
nearby, and the hill people had long used
the iron to make knives and simple tools.
Cam's job was building kilns to smelt.the
ore. The Vietcong hoped to use the iron
for mines and grenades.
On August 4, 1963, Sergeant Cam went
to a nearby village to buy salt for his group.
On his return he found his comrades had
gone to one of their cultivated fields to
gather corn, and he joined them. The group
was interrupted at their work by a Viet-
namese ranger company. After a brief fight
Cam was taken prisoner.
7. Nguyen Hong Thai
Thai, 32 years old, was born and grew up
in Quang Nkai Province in South Vietnam.
After service with the Vietminh we was
moved to North Vietnam in 1954. After 3
years of military service he was assigned to
a military farm. In December 1961 he was
recalled to his former unit, the 305th Divi-
sion, and went to the special training camp
at Xuan Mai in preparation for fighting with
the Vietcong in South Vietnam..
Training began in January 1962 and
lasted for 4 months. The training group,
designated the 32d Battalion, was composed
of 650 men who came from various branches
of the North Vietnamese Army-engineers,
artillery, airborne, transport, marines, and
some factory workers and students. Three-
fourths of the training was military (guer-
rilla tactics, ambushes, sabotage, etc.) and
one-fourth was political. In the latter,
heavy emphasis was laid on the necessity
for armed seizure of power in the south.
Group 32 was divided into sections and
began infiltrating to the south on July 14,
1962. It moved in three groups. Thai said
it took his group more than 55 days to travel
from North Vietnam through Laos to Quang
Ngai Province in the south. He reported that
all the communications and liaison stations
on the route to South Vietnam are now op-
erated by the Army of North Vietnam. Soon
after his arrival in South Vietnam, That was
promoted to the rank of lieutenant. He was
made a platoon leader in the 20th Vietcong
Highland Battalion. In February 1963 the
unit moved from Quang Nam to Kontum
Province.
Combat conditions and the rigors of guer-
rilla life began to depress Thai. He said he
wanted only to rejoin his family and live in
peace. In September he asked and received
permission to visit his family in Quang Ngai.
When he got home, he surrendered to a South
Vietnamese Army post.
8. Dao Kien Lap
Lap is a civilian radio technician. He has
been a member of the Communist Party in
North Vietnam since 1955. In February 1963
he was selected for assignment to South
Vietnam where he was to work with the
Liberation Front. He infiltrated into South
Vietnam with a group of about 70 civilian
specialists. They included doctors, pharma-
cists, union organizers, radio specialists,
propagandists, and youth organizers. One of
the infiltrators in Dao's group was a man
named Binh, publisher of the newspaper
Labor of the Lao Dong Party. Another was
a member of the city soviet of Hanoi.
The specialists in Dao's group received 3
months of basic military training at Son
Tay, and then departed for the south in mid-
June. Their orders were to report to the
central office of the Vietcong in South Viet-
nam where they would be assigned accord-
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lag to their individual specialties. Dao and
Binh were to help run a radio station of the
Liberation Front.
They traveled through Laos and along the
Vietnam border. They had to atop for sev-
eral weeks In Quang Nam Province to recu-
perate from their travels. On October 1 they
were directed by guides to a VC station in
Ban Me Thuot.
Dao said he had by then decided to defect
to the government authorities in the south.
He set off with one companion, but they were
separated as they crossed a swiftly flowing
river. Dao gave himself up at a government
post in Ban Me Thuot on October 13, 1963.
9. Tran Ngoc Linh
Linh was a Vietcong senior sergeant,
leader of a reconnaissance platoon. He Is the
son of a middle-class farm family in Tay
Ninh Province. He served with the Viet
Minh against the French and moved to North
Vietnam in 1954. He spent the next 7 years
in the North Vietnamese Army. In Septem-
ber 1962 Linh was assigned to the Xuan Mai
training center at Ha Dong to prepare for
duty in South Vietnam. His group was given
a 4-month refresher course in infantry tac-
tics with emphasis on guerilla fighting. Then
he received 6 months of special training in
the use of machineguns against aircraft.
Antiaircraft training has become an increas-
ingly important part of the preparation of
North Vietnamese troops assigned to the
Vietcong.
Linh and about 120 others made up the
406th Infiltration Group commander by Sen-
ior Capt. Nguyen Van Do. They were divided
into four platoons. During the final 2 weeks
of preparation each member of the group
was issued new equipment-black, pajama-
like uniforms, a khaki uniform, a hammock,
mosquito netting, rubber sandals, and other
supplies, including two packets of medicine.
In the early morning hours of July 4, 1963,
his group started its journey from the Xuan
Mai training center outside Hanoi. The con-
voy of six Molotov trucks moved south along
Highway 21 to Nghe An Province and then
on to Quang Binh. On July 7 they arrived
at the final processing station near the Laos-
North Vietnam border. There they turned
in their North Vietnamese Array uniforms
as well as all personal papers and anything
else that might identify them as coming from
the north. But their departure for the south
was delayed for several weeks. In August
they set off through Laos.
Twice along the way Linh had to stop at
liaison stations because of illness. When the
infiltrators recovered from their illnesses,
they were formed into special groups to con-
tinue their penetration into South Vietnam.
Linh reported being delayed once for 8 days,
and the second time for 10 dflvs.
Finally, in the first week of November 1963,
Linh was sufficiently recovered to begin the
final leg of his journey to a VC center where
he was to be assigned to a combat unit. He
and three others who had been similarly de-
layed by attacks of malaria and other sickness
made up a group. They moved through the
jungles of Quang Due Province near the Cam-
bodian border. On the morning of Novem-
ber 9 they crossed the Srepok River. There
they ran into a unit of the South Vietnamese
Army. One of the infiltrators was killed,
Linh was taken prisoner, and the other two
Vietcong escaped.
These are typical Vietcong. There are
many other officers like Tran Quoc Dan, tech-
nicians like Nguyen Thao, and simple sol-
diers like Nguyen Truc. They were born in
South Vietnam, fought against the French,
and then went north and served in the army
of North Vietnam. They were ordered by the
Communist rulers in Hanoi to reenter South
Vietnam. Violating the Geneva accords of
1954 and 1962, they used the territory of
neighboring Laos to infiltrate into the South.
They are the means by which Communist
North Vietnam is carrying out its program
of conquest in South Vietnam .3
0. Infiltration of native North Vietnamese
The Communist authorities in Hanoi are
now assigning native North Vietnamese in
increasing numbers to join the VC forces
in South Vietnam. Heretofore, those in
charge of the infiltration effort have sought
to fill their quotas with soldiers and others
born in the south. The 90,000 troops that
moved from South Vietnam to the north
when the Geneva accords ended the Indo-
china War have provided an invaluable res-
ervoir for this purpose. Now, apparently,
that source is running dry. The casualty
rate has been high, and obviously many of
those who were in fighting trim 10 years
ago are no longer up to the rigors of guer-
rilla war.
In any case, reports of infiltration by na-
tive North Vietnamese in significant num-
bers have been received in Saigon for several
months. It is estimated that as many as
75 percent of the more than 4,400 Vietcong
who are known to have entered the south
in the first 8 months of 1964 were natives
of North Vietnam.
Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Prov-
ince in North Vietnam in 1936. He was cap-
tured by South Vietnamese forces on May 5,
1964. He described himself as a military
security officer. He infiltrated into South
Vietnam in April 1964 with a group of 34
police and security officers from the north.
Another native North Vietnamese captured
in the south was VC Pfc. Vo Quyen. His
home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was a
member of the 2d Battalion of the North
Vietnamese Army's 9th Regiment. He said
the entire battalion had infiltrated Into
South Vietnam between February and May
last year. He was captured in an action in
Quang Tri Province on July 4. He told in-
terrogators that the bulk of his unit was
composed of young draftees from North
Vietnam.
Le Pham Hung, also a private, first class,
was captured on July 7 in Thua Thien
Province. He is a native of Nam Dinh in
North Vietnam. Drafted for military service
in May 1963, he was in the 324th Division.
His group, consisting solely of 90 North
Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into South
Vietnam in May 1964. He reported that an-
other company of the North Vietnamese
entered the south at the same time as his
unit.
A former member of the 90th VC Battal-
ion reported that his unit had been rein-
forced by native North Vietnamese troops
earlier this year. Le Thus Phuong, an in-
formation cadre and a native of Quang Ngai
Province in the south, surrendered to Gov-
ernment forces on April 23, 1964. He said
that the 90th Battalion had received 80
North Vietnamese replacements in February.
A medical technician named Hoang Thung
was captured in Thus Thien Province on
July 4, 1964. He said he had infiltrated into
the south in late 1963 with a group of 200
Vietcong, the majority of whom were ethnic
northerners, 120 of them draftees.
These reports destroy one more fiction
which the authorities in Hanoi have sought
so long to promote-that the fighting in the
south was a matter for the South Viet-
namese. They underline Hanoi's determina-
tion to press its campaign of conquest with
every available resource.
D. Infiltration of Vietcong agents
No effort to subvert another nation as
elaborate as that being conducted by the
Ho Chi Minh regime against South Vietnam
can succeed without an intelligence-gather-
Ing organization. Recognizing this, the au-
thorities in Hanoi have developed an exten-
sive espionage effort. An essential part of
See app. C for additional details on mili-
tary infiltrators.
that effort is the regular assignment of secret
agents from the north to South Vietnam.
The heart of the VC intelligence organiza-
tion is the Central Research Agency in Hanoi.
(See sec. IV, C.) Communist agents are
regularly dispatched from North Vietnam,
sometimes for brief assignments but often
for long periods. Many of these agents move
into South Vietnam along the infiltration
trails through Laos; others are carried by
boats along the coasts and landed at pre-
arranged sites. A special maritime infiltra-
tion group has been developed in North Viet-
nam, with its operations centered in Ha
Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces just north
of the 17th parallel.
1. Maritime Infiltration
The following case illustrates the methods
of maritime infiltration of secret agents
used by the Communist regime of North
Vietnam.
In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelli-
gence agent named Nguyen Viet Duong be-
gan training to infiltrate South Vietnam. A
native southerner, he had fought against the
French and had gone to North Vietnam after
the war ended. Selected for intelligence
work, he was assigned to the Central Re-
search Agency in 1959.
After a period of intensive instruction in
radio transmission, coding and decoding, and
other skills of the intelligence trade, he was
given false identity papers and other sup-
plies and was transported to the south. His
principal task was to set up a cell of agents
to collect military information. He flew
from Hanoi to Dong Hot, and from there the
Maritime infiltration group took him by boat
to South Vietnam. That was in August 1962.
In January 1963 Duong reported to Hanoi
that he had run into difficulties. His money
and papers had been lost, and he had been
forced to take refuge with VC contacts in an-
other province. Another agent was selected
to go to South Vietnam. One of his assign-
ments was to contact Duong, find out details
of what happened to him, and help Duong
reestablish himself as a VC agent. The man
selected for the task was Senor Captain
Tran Van Tan of the Central Research
Agency.
Tan had already been picked to go to the
South to establish a clandestine VC commu-
nications center. Making contact with Du-
Ong was one of his secondary assignments.
After intensive preparations Tan was ready
to move to South Vietnam in March. He
was transferred to an embarkation base of
the maritime infiltration group just north
of the 17th parallel.
He was joined by three other VC agents
and the captain and three crewmen of the
boat that would take them south. All were
given false identity papers to conform to
their false names. They also were provided
with fishermen's permits, South Vietnamese
voting cards, and draft cards or military dis-
charge papers. The boat captain received a
boat registration book, crew lists, and sev-
eral South Vietnamese permits to conduct
business.
The agents and boatmen were given
cover stories to tell if captured. Each man
had to memorize not only the details of his
own story but the names and some details
about each of the others. The agents had
to become familiar with simple boat proce-
dures so they could pass as legitimate fisher-
men.
The expedition left the embarkation port
on April 4. In addition to the four agents
the boat carried six carefully sealed boxes
containing a generator, several radios, some
weapons, and a large supply of South Viet-
namese currency. They also carried some
chemicals and materials for making false
identification papers. Their destination was
a landing site on the coast of Phuoc Tuy
Province.
Soon after leaving North Vietnam the VC
boat encountered high winds and rough seas.
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The internal political divisions and above
all the inexperience in government of the
south itself.
Yet the balance sheet is by no means all
one sided.
Our advisory effort, on all fronts, has done
great things and, in the wide personal rela-
tionships involved, must stand almost unique
in the history of relations between an Asian
nation under fire and an outside Western
nation.
Although there are from time to time signs
of anti-American feeling, working relation-
ships at all levels remain close and friendly.
With our help, the Government has been
able to maintain economic stability and to
move to help areas secured from the Vietcong.
Our military effort and' our equipment,
supplied to the Vietnamese, have largely off-
set the unfavorable numerical ratio favoring
the Vietcong.
The Vietnamese military forces continue
to fight well. Our own military men consider
most of them as tough and brave as any in
the world, Though there have been military
reverses; there have also been significant vic-
tories-which sometimes do not make head-
lines. On the Military front, the Vietcong
is not capable of anything like a Dienbien-
phu.
Above all, the Vietnamese people are not
voting with their feet or their hearts for
communism.
As to our basic policy, the alternatives to
our present courses might be, on the one
hand, to withdraw or to negotiate on some
basis such as what is called neutralization,
or, on the other hand, for the Vietnamese
and ourselves to enlarge the war, bringing
pressure to persuade Hanoi, by force, that
the game they are playing is not worth it.
It is also suggested that the United Nations
might be of help. There may emerge pos-
sibilities for a U.N. role, but it is not clear
that the U.N., which has been unable to
carry through commitments such the Congo,
would be able to act effectively to deal with
this far more difficult situation in its present
form. And this has been the public judg-
ment of the U.N. Secretary General, W. U
Thant.
As to the basic alternative, so long as
South Vietnam is ready to carry on the fight,
withdrawal is unthinkable. A , negotiation
that produced a return to the essentials of
the 1954 accords and thus an independent
and secure South Vietnam would of course
be an answer, indeed the answer. But
negotiation would hardly be promising that
admitted communism to South Vietnam, that
did not.get.Hanoi out, or that exposed South
Vietnam and perhaps other countries of the
area to renewed Communist aggression at
will, with only nebulous or remote guaran-
tees.
As for enlarging our own actions, we can
not speak surely about the future-for the
aggressors themselves share the responsibility
for such eventualities. We have shown in
the Gulf of Tonkin that we can act, and
North Vietnam knows it, and knows its own
weaknesses But we seek no wider war, and
we must not suppose that there are quick or
easy answers in this direction.
The root of the problem, to repeat, is in
South Vietnam. We must persist in our ef-
forts there, with patience rather than
petulance, coolness rather than recklessness,
and with a continuing ability to separate the
real from the merely wished for.
As a great power, we are now and will
continue to find ourselves in situations where
we simply do not have easy choices, where
there simply are not immediate or ideal solu-
tions available, We cannot then allow our-
selves to yield to frustration, but must stick
to the job, doing all we can and doing it
better,
'I'l e- laiiona ' inf"erests that` have bi6kigiit
us into the Vietnam struggle are valid, and
they do not become less so just because the
going gets rough- and the end is not yet in
sight. President Johnson said in his state
of the Union message: "Our goal is peace in
southeast Asia. That will come only when
aggressors leave their neighbors in peace.
What is at stake is the cause of freedom. In
that cause, we shall never be found wanting."
AGGRESSION PROM THE NORTH-THE RECORD
OF NORTH VIETNAM'S CAMPAIGN To CONQUER
SOUTH VIETNAM
"Our purpose in Vietnam is to join in the
defense and protection of freedom of a brave
people who are under attack that is con-
trolled and that is directed from outside
their country." (President Lyndon B. John-
son, February 17, 1965.)
- INTRODUCTION
South Vietnam is fighting for its life
against a brutal campaign of terror and
armed attack inspired, directed, supplied,
and controlled by the Communist regime in
Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been
going on for years, but recently the pace
has quickened and the threat has now be-
come acute.
The war in Vietnam is a new kind of
war, a fact as yet poorly understood in most
parts of the world. Much of the confusion
that prevails in the thinking of many peo-
ple, and even many governments, stems from
this basic misunderstanding. For in Viet-
nam a totally new brand of aggression has
been loosed against an independent people
who want to make their own way in peace
and freedom.
Vietnam is not another Greece, where in-
digenous guerrilla forces used friendly
neighboring territory as a sanctuary.
Vietnam is n another Malaya, where
Communist guerrillas were, for the most
part, physically distinguishable from the
peaceful majority they sought to control.
Vietnam is not another Philippines, where
Communist guerrillas were physically sepa-
rated from the source of their moral and
physical support.
Above all, the war in Vietnam is not a
spontaneous and local rebellion against the
established government.
There are elements in the Communist
program of conquest directed against South
Vietnam common to each of the previous
areas of aggression and subversion. But
there is one fundamental difference. In
Vietnam a Communist government has set
out deliberately to conquer a sovereign peo-
ple in a neighboring state. And to achieve
Its end, it has used every resource of its
own government to carry out its carefully
planned program of concealed aggression.
North Vietnam's commitment to seize con-
trol of the South is no less total than was
the commitment of the regime in North
Korea in 1950. But knowing the conse-
quences of the latter's undisguised attack,
the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately
to conceal their hand. They have failed
and their aggression is as real as that of
an invading army.
This report is a summary of the massive
evidence of North Vietnamese aggression ob-
tained by the Government of South Viet-
nam. This evidence has been jointly ana-
lyzed by South Vietnamese and American ex-
perts.
The evidence shows that the hard core of
the Communist forces attacking South Viet-
nam were trained in the north and ordered
into the south by Hanoi. It shows that the
key leadership of the Vietcong (VC), the
officers and much of the cadre, many of the
technicians, political, organizers, and propa
grandists have come from the north and oper-
ate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that
the training of essential military personnel
and their infiltration "into"the"south is di-
rected by the military high command in
Hanoi. (See sec. I.)
The evidence shows that many of the
weapons and much of the ammunition and
other supplies used by the Vietcong have
been sent into South Vietnam from Hanoi.
In recent months new types of weapons have
been introduced in the VC army, for which
all ammunition must come from outside
sources. Communist China and other Com-
munist States have been the prime suppliers
of these weapons and ammunition, and they
have been channeled primarily through
North Vietnam. (See sec. II.)
The directing force behind the effort to
conquer South Vietnam is the Communist
Party in the north, the Lao Dong (Workers)
Party. As in every Communist State, the
party is an integral part of the regime itself.
North Vietnamese officials have expressed
their firm determination to absorb South
Vietnam into the Communist world. (See
sec. III.)
Through its central committee, which con-
trols the government of the north, the Lao
Dong Party directs the total political and
military effort of the Vietcong. The military
high command in the north trains the mili-
tary men and sends them into South Viet-
nam. The Central Research Agency, North
Vietnam's central intelligence organization,
directs the elaborate espionage and subver-
sion effort. The extensive political-military
organization in the north which directs the
Vietcong war effort is described in sec-
tion IV.
Under Hanoi's overall direction the Com-
munists have established an extensive ma-
chine for carrying on the war within South
Vietnam. The focal point is the Central
Office for South Vietnam with its political
and military subsections and other special-
ized agencies. A subordinate part of this
Central Office Is the Liberation Front for
South Vietnam. The front was formed at
Hanoi's order in 1960. Its principal func-
tion is to influence opinion abroad and to
create the false impression that the aggres-
sion in South Vietnam is an indigenous rebel-
lion against the established government.
(See sec. IV.)
For more than 10 years the people and the
Government of South Vietnam, exercising the
inherent right of self-defense, have fought
back against these efforts to extend Commu-
nist power south across the 17th parallel.
The United States has responded to the
appeals of the Government of the Republic
of Vietnam for help in this defense of the
freedom and independence of its land and its
people.
In 1961 the Department of State issued a
report called "A Threat to the Peace." It
described North Vietnam's program to seize
South Vietnam. The evidence in that report
had been presented by the Government of
the Republic of Vietnam to the International
Control Commission (ICC). A special re-
port by the ICC in June 1962 upheld the
validity of that evidence. The Commission
held that there was "sufficient evidence to
show beyond reasonable doubt" that North
Vietnam had sent arms and men into South
Vietnam to carry out subversion with the
aim of overthrowing the legal government
there. The ICC found the authorities in
Hanoi in specific violation of four provisions
of the Geneva accords of 19541
Since then, new and even more impressive
evidence of Hanoi's aggression has accumu-
lated. The Government of the United States
believes that evidence should be presented
to its own citizens and to the world. It. Is
important for freemen to know what has
been happening in Vietnam, and how, and
why. That is the purpose of this report.
1 For the text of pertinent sections of the
ICC report, see app. A.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 1
1. HANOI SUPPLIES THE KEY PERSONNEL FOR THE
ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM
The hard core of the Communist forces
attacking South Vietnam are men trained in
North Vietnam. They are ordered into the
south and remain under the military dis-
cipline of the military high command In
Hanoi. Special training camps operated by
the North Vietnamese Army gave political
and military training to the infiltrators. In-
creasingly the forces sent into the south are
native North Vietnamese who have never seen
South Vietnam. A special infiltration unit,
the 70th Transportation Group, is responsible
for moving men from North Vietnam into the
south via infiltration trails through Laos.
Another special unit, the maritime infiltra-
tion group, spends weapons and supplies
and agents by sea into the south.
The infiltration rate has been increasing.
From 1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establish-
ing its infiltration pipeline, at least 1,800
men, and possibly 2,700 more, moved into
South Vietnam from the north. The flow
incerased to a minimum of 3,700 in 1961 and
at least 5,400 in 1962. There was a modest
decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed infiltra-
tors, though later evidence is likely to raise
this figure.
For 1964 the evidence is still incomplete.
However, it already shows that a minimum
of 4,400 infiltrators entered the south, and
it is estimated more than 3,000 others were
sent in. -
There is usually a time lag between the
entry of infiltrating troops and the discovery
of clear evidence they have entered. This
fact, plus collateral evidence of Increased use
of the infiltration routes, suggests strongly
that 1964 was probably the year of greatest
infiltration so far.
Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 VC officers,
soldiers, and technicians are known to have
entered South Vietnam under orders from
Hanoi. Additional information indicates
that an estimated 17,000 more Infiltrators
were dispatched to the south by the regime
In Hanoi during the past 6 years. It can
reasonably be assumed that still other infil-
tration groups have entered the south for
which there is no evidence yet available,
To some the level of infiltration from the
north may seem modest in comparison with
the total size of the Armed Forces of the Re-
public of Vietnam. But one-for-one calcu-
lations are totally misleading In the kind of
warfare going on in Vietnam. First, a high
proportion of infiltrators from the north are
well-trained officers, cadres, and specialists.
Second, it has long been realized that in
guerrilla combat the burdens of defense are
vastly heavier than those of attack. In Ma-
laya, the Philippines, and elsewhere a ratio
of at least 10 to 1 in favor of the forces of
order was required to meet successfully the
threat, of the guerrillas hit-and-run tactics.
In the calculus of guerrilla warfare the
scale of North Vietnamese infiltration into
the south takes on a very different meaning.
For the infiltration of 5,000 guerrilla fighters
in a given year is the'equivalent of marching
perhaps 50,000 regular troops across the
border, in terms of the burden placed on the
defenders.
Above all, the number of proved and prob-
able infiltrators from the north should be
seen in relation to the size of the VC forces.
It Is now estimated that the Vietcong num-
ber approximately 35,000 so-called hard-core
forces, and another 60,000 to 80,000 local
forces. It- Is thus apparent that infiltrators
from the north-allowing for casualties-
make up the majority of the so-called hard-
core Vietcong: Personnel from the north,
in short, are now and have always been the
backbone of the entire VC operation.
It is true that many of the lower level ele-
ments of the VC forces are recruited within
South Vietnam. However; the thousands of
reported cases of VC kidnapings and terror-
ism make it abundantly clear that threats
and other pressures by the Vietcong play a
major part in such recruitment.
A. The infiltration process
The infiltration routes supply hard-core
units with most of their officers and non-
commissioned personnel. This source helps
fill the gaps left by battle casualties, illness,
and defection and insures continued control
by Hanoi. Also, as the nature of the conflict
has changed, North Vietnam has supplied
the Vietcong with technical specialists via
the infiltration routes. These have included
men trained in armor and ordnance, anti-
aircraft, and communications as well as med-
ical corpsmen and transport experts.
There is no single infiltration route from
the north to South Vietnam. But by far
the biggest percentage of infiltrators follow
the same general course. The principal
training center for North Vietnamese Army
men assigned to join the Vietcong has been
at Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Recently captured
Vietcong have also reported an infiltration
training camp at Thanh Hoa. After comple-
tion of their training course-which involves
political and propaganda work as well as
military subjects-infiltrating units are
moved to Vinh on the east coast. Many have
made stopovers at a staging area in Dong Hof
where additional training is conducted.
From there they go by truck to the Laos
border.
Then, usually after several days' rest, in-
filtrators move southward through Laos.
Generally they move along the Laos-South
Vietnam border. Responsibility for Infiltra-
tion from North Vietnam through Laos be-
longs to the 70th Transportation Group of
the North Vietnamese Army. After a time
the infiltration groups turn eastward, enter-
ing South Vietnam in Quang Nam, Quang
Tri. Thus Theen, Kontum, or another of
the border provinces.
The Communists have established regular
lanes for infiltration with way stations es-
tablished about 1 day's march apart. The
way stations axe equipped to quarter and
feed the Vietcong passing through. Infil-
trators who suffer from malaria or other ill-
nesses stay at the stations until they recover
sufficiently to join another passing group
moving south.
The map on page 4 not shown in RECORD]
shows the infiltration route from North Viet-
nam to the south followed by VC Sgt. Huynh
Van Tay and a group of North Vietnamese
Army officers and men in September 1963.
Tay was captured during an engagement in
Chuong Thien Province in April 1964.
Local guides lead the infiltration groups
along the secret trails. Generally they di-
rect the infiltrators from halfway between
two stations, through their own base sta-
tion, and on halfway to the next supply base.
Thus the guides are kept in ignorance of all
but their own way stations. Only group
leaders are permitted to talk with the guides
In order to preserve maximum security. The
men are discouraged from asking where they
are or where they are going.=
The same system of trails and guides used
along the Lao infiltration routes is used
within South Vietnam itself. Vietcong in-
filtrators may report directly to a reassign-
ment center in the highlands as soon as they
enter South Vietnam. But in the past year
or more some groups have moved down trails
in South Vietnam to provinces along the
Cambodian border and near Saigon before re-
ceiving their unit assignment. Within South
Vietnam infiltration and supplies are han-
dled by VC units such as the Nam Son Trans-
portation Group.
At the Laos border crossing point infil-
trators are reequipped. Their North Viet-
namese Army uniforms must be turned in.
5 For additional maps of the routes taken
by VC infiltrators Into South Vietnam, see
app. B.
They must give up' all personal papers, let-
ters, notebooks, and photographs that might
be incriminating. Document control over
the infiltrators has been tightened consider-
ably over the past 2 years. A number of
Vietnamese infiltrators have told of being
fitted out with Lao neutralist uniforms for
their passage through Laos.
Infiltration groups are usually issued a set
of black civilian pajama-like clothes, two
unmarked uniforms, rubber sandals, a
sweater, a hammock, mosquito netting, and
waterproof sheeting. They carry a 3- to 5-
day supply of food. A packet of medicines
and bandages is usually provided.
The size of infiltration groups varies
widely. Prisoners have mentioned units as
small as 5 men and as large as 500. Gen-
erally the groups number 40 to 50. When
they arrive in South Vietnam these groups
are usually split up and assigned to various
VC units as replacements, although some
have remained intact.
B. Military personnel
The following are individual case histories
of North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the
Hanoi regime into South Vietnam. They are
only an illustrative group. They show that
the leadership and specialized personnel for
the guerrilla war in South Vietnam consists
in large part of members of the North Viet-
nam armed forces, trained in the North and
subject to the command and discipline of
Hanoi.
1. Tran Quoc Dan
Dan was a VC major, commander of the
60th Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th
Group of the Thon-Kim Battalion). Disil-
lusioned with fighting his own countrymen
and with communism and the lies of the
Hanoi regime, he surrendered to the authori-
ties in South Vietnam on February 11, 1963.
At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary
army (Viet Minh) and fought against the
French forces until 1954 when the Geneva
accords ended the Indochina war. As a regu-
lar in the Viet Minh forces, he was moved to
North Vietnam. He became an officer in the
so-called people's army.
In March 1962 Major Dan received orders
to prepare to move to South Vietnam. He
had been exposed to massive propaganda in
the north which told of the destitution of the
peasants in the south and said that the
Americans had taken over the French role of
colonialists. He said later that an important
reason for his decision to surrender was that
he discovered these propaganda themes were
lies. He found the peasants more prosperous
than the people In the north. And he recog-
nized quickly that he was not fighting the
Americans but his own people.
With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan
left Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled
through the Laos corridor. His group joined
up with the Vietcong 1st Regiment in cen-
tral Vietnam.
The 35-year-old major took part in 45 ac-
tions and was wounded once in an unsuc-
cessful VC attack on an outpost. As time
passed he became increasingly discouraged
by his experience as a VC troop commander.
Most of all, he said, hewas tired of killing
other Vietnamese. After several months of
soul-searching he decided to surrender to
the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam.
He has volunteered to do "anything to serve
the national cause" of South Vietnam.
2. Vo Thoi
Sgt. Vo Thoi (Communist Party alias Vo
Bien) was an assistant squad leader in the
VC Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the night of
October 7, 1963, his unit attacked An Tuong
village in Binh Dinh Province. After over-
running the village, Vo's company was as-
signed to set up an ambush against Repub-
lic of Vietnam troops rushing to defend the
village. In the ensuing fight Vo was seri-
ously wounded. He was picked up by local
farmers and turned over to the authorities.
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GRESSTONAL` RECORD ..'SENATE :3.697
cost us at least $18 billion in direct expnn- and continuing support, on a status of,neu- tionalinterest and could be the source of a
set, and in the end-after Communist China trality. third world war.
had also intervened-restored an independ- 4. Laos, however, was less unified and was 3. To deal with these central problems, the
ent South Korea, although it left a unified left under the accords with a built-in and free nations of the area need the help of the
and free Korea to be worked out in the legalized Communist presence, a disrupted United States and of our major allies. Out-
future. and weak economy, and no military forces of numbered in
In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected significance. population and in military
three elements: forces by the Communist nations as they
A recognition that aggression of any sort Such was the situation President Eisen- are-by nearly 2 to 1 if you leave out India-
mA be met early and head on, or will hower and Secretary Dulles faced in 1954. the free nations of Asia cannot do the job
have to be met Tatar and head tougher Girl Two things were clear-that in the absence alone. We cannot do it for them, but we
bums t to be. et had relearned the lessons of external help communism was virtually have the resources and the military power to
of the es. We had Ethiopia, on the certain to take over the successor states of play a crucial role.
Rhinhend, Czechoslovakia, -Indochina and to move to the borders of 4. The peace and security of east and
A ready, ta defense line in Asia, Thailand and perhaps beyond, and that with southeast Asia are indivisible. If the Com-
statein terms that h an island perimeter, did France no longer ready to act, at least in munist powers success in aggression, they
not ddIn ter ly define sla dual perimeter, interests- South Vietnam, no power other than the will be encouraged, free nations discouraged,
that aquate
vital interests our be affected United States could move in to help fill the and the inevitable process of evolution to-
that those on the mainland of Asia. vacuum. ward moderation within the Communist
action understanding that, for the future, a Their decision, expressed In a series of ac- prevented themselves
rr poWe ha or perhaps
power vacuum dersta was that, for f the t agrees- tions starting in late 1954, was to move in to dynamics altogeth. We have militarist
the Sion, ust,be that tue an local onlitical, acs- help these countries. Besides South Vietnam dynamics of Hitlerite Germany and militarist
nomic, and military strength in being to and more modest efforts In Laos and Cam- Japan checked and defeated, and the West
make aggression unprofitable, but also that bodia, substantial assistance was begun to Germany and Japan of today emerge as re-
there re must be a demonstrated willingness Thailand. spatted major nations of the world. Thanks
of external The appropriations to NATO, our handling of the Cuban crisis,
major power both to assist and for these actions were and other actions, something like the same
to intervene if,xequired. voted by successive Congresses, and in 1954 process may be underway with Soviet Russia
3. Ier southeast, Asia, finally, there was a the Senate likewise ratified the southeast today.
third major flaw-the difficulty of liquidating Asia treaty, to which Thailand and the Phil- come Such a eventually for process the Cf mode n ration will
colonial regimes and replacing them by new ippines adhered, along with the United omt cannot come
and stable independent governments. The States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zea- if of they Asia it they are checked. It come
Philippines became independent and with land, and Pakistan. Although not signers of are future to any loss mof free uch, and per-
our help es Berne the ravages of war and the the treaty, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cam- s makes the future task that much, and per-m
Communist Huk rebellion, The British, who bodia could call on the SEATO members for much, immensely, , for how et came to
how
made them independent, were in the process So a commitment was made, with the su come involved t relates to Vietnam and how
of doing the same in Malaya even as they port of both political parties, that has guided a and that
purposes. Involvement
In simple our swider poyfor
joined with the Malayans in beating back our South t, a victor y in-
policy in southeast Asia for a decade now. the Communists in South Vietnam would in-
a 1a-year Communist subversive effort. In- It was not a commitment that envisaged a evitably make the neighboring states more
donesia was less well prepared; it gained its U.S. position of power in southeast Asia or susceptible to Communist pressure and more
Independence to, with our support, but with U.S. military bases there. We threatened no vulnerable to intensified subversion support-
scars that have continued to affect the other- one. Nor was it a commitment that substi- ed by military pressures. Aggression by wars
wise natural and healthy development of tuted U.S. responsibility for the basic respon- of national liberation would gain enhanced
Indonesian nationalism. sibility of the nations themselves for their prestige and power of intimidation through-
riench Indochina was the toughest case. own defense, political stability, and economic out the world, and many threatened nations
The French had thought in terms of a slow progress, It was a commitment to do what might well become less hopeful, less resilient,
evolution to an eventual status within some we could to help these nations attain and and their will to resist undermined, These
French union of states-a concept too leis- maintain the independence and security to are big stakes indeed.
urely to fit the. postwar mood of Asia. And which they were entitled, both for their own
militant Vietnamese nationalism had fallen sake and because we recognized that, like u
Let uff now wind the reel back South
tie leadership of dedicated. Communists. South Korea, southeast Asia was a key area Vietnam m in 1954 and trace the course of
to We all .know the result. Even with sub- of the mainland of Asia. If it fell to Commu- events to the present.
staTitial know the r, France was unable b- nist control, this would enormously add to From 1954 to 1959, great progress was
defeat the, ominunist-led.n was unable
move- the momentum and power of the expansion- made. In Ngo Dinh Diem, a stanchly na-
defea Despite last-minute promises move- ist Communist regimes in Communist China tionalist and anti-Communist leader was
Inent. epee, the struggle eviromi appeared and North Vietnam, and thus to the threat found. Against all odds, including the op-
as an.dence, t the struggle a colonial position. to the whole free world position In the position in 1954-55 of old-line military lead-
$y 1954, it coulto rv e Pacific.
d. only have been won, again, ere and religious groups, he took hold. tin-
by a major U.S. military commitment, and I have come at a statement of our policy in der his rule the nationalist feeling of the
perhaps not even then. The result was the the Far East by the route of history, for poi- newly formed country-which does differ to
settlement at Geneva. The accords reached icy is the fruit of history and experience, eel- a significant degree from the north-was
there were almost certainly the best achieve- dom of some abstract design from a drawing aroused, and it soon became and has re-
able, but they left a situation with many board. In essence, our policy derives from mained clear that, whatever the extent of
seeds of future trouble. Briefly: (1) the fact of the Communist nations of their attachment to particular governments
e North ure t,,, Asia and the'.. . _
developed- curing the war
against , the French an army well equipped
and highly skilled in both conventional and
subversive warfare. From the start, North
Vietnam planned and expected to take over
the south, and in-.due course Laos and Cam-
bodia, thinking that this would probably
happen b~yy sheer, decay under pressure, but
prepared to resort to, other means If needed.
2. south Vietnam had no effective or popu-
lar leadership to start with, was demoralized
and unprepared for self-government, and had
only the, remnants of the Vietnamese mili-
tary forces who had fought with the French.
'finder, the accords,. external military help
was limited to a few hundred advisers.
Apart from its natural self-sufficiency in
food, South Vieti am had few assets that
appeared to match those of the north in the
struggle that was sure to come.
3.,C~amborlia, was more hopeful in some
respects, more remote from North Vietnam,
With a leader in Prince Sihanouk, a strong
historical tradition, and the freedom to ac-
cept external assistance as she saw fit. From
the start Sihanouk insisted, with our full
t4u1 uV 1105 w1sn 50 de
Sion of that fact and these lessons to what ruled by communism or from Hanoi.
has happened in southeast Asia. On the economic and social front, educa-
It is possible to define our total policy in tion was vastly expanded, major land re-
Asia, as it has existed at least since 1954, in forms carried out, and the economy grew
quite simple terms. at a rapid rate, far outstripping what was
1. Our objectives are those of the free na_ happening under the Communist yoke in the
tions of the area-that they should develop north. Instead of decaying and dropping by
as they see fit, in peace and without outside default into Communism, South Vietnam
interference. We would hope that this de- able t t was in a fair way own becoming really
velopment will be in the direction of increas- o stand on its ono feet.
ingly democratic institutions, and that there majInor all this, the United n States played e
will be continued and expanded ties of part- helping e ole. On the military side we
nership and contact with ourselves and with from helped ra create a fairly decent army almst-
the
scratch, with a normal military assist-
the other nations of the free world
Yet
.
we
that Asia will develop as the leaders and ante advisory group of a few hundred men.
peoples of Asia wish it to develop, and we That army was never big enough to threaten
would not have it otherwise. the north, nor was it meant to be; it may
con-
2. Asia confronts two central problems: entional warfare and not to the handling of
the threat of Communist nations whose ob- a sophisticated guerrilla aggression.
jective is domination and enslavement, and Then, beginning roughly In 1959, two
enormous economic and political problems trends got underway that are still today at
that would exist in any case. If these two the heart of the problem.
problems cannot be solved over time, the First, the Diem government, instead of
Asia of the future will be the breeding steadily broadening its base and training key
ground of ever more direct threats to our na- groups for responsibility, began to narrow
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3698 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
it. More and more the regime became per. learning and experience as well. The Viet- side, and the pace of guerrilla and terrorist
sonal in character. Opposition parties, namese and we are still learning and chang- activity, even Saigon itself
today is critical,
which had previously been active in rela- ing today, and will go on doing so. So the political
tively free elections, were driven under- Under the advisory concept, the American and its resolution is central to turning the
ground, and there began a process of repres- strength in South Vietnam rose to 12,000 war around and restoring an independent
sion which, while never drastic b; the stand- by mid-1982 (eventually to the present 28,- and secure South Vietnam. That task must
ards we should apply to governments In new 000), and with our help the South Viet- essentially be done by the Vietnamese peo-
nations, much less by those of Communist namese began to reverse the slow tide of ple, under Vietnamese civilian and military
countries, nevertheless alienated increasing growing Communist gains. By the spring of leaders, all under a Government that unites
numbers of the all too small pool of trained 1963, things seemed to be on the upswing, the divergent political interest groups and
men capable of helping to govern effectively. not only in the judgment of senior Ameri- that gives orders that can be carried out.
Second, Hanoi went on the march. Seeing cans but in that of experienced observers Ihave dwelt at such is1ength on the e p that olitical
is
itself thwarted in both South Vietnam and from third countries. history, because it this
Laos, Hanoi began to send trained guerrillas Yet the unhappy tendencies of the Diem today in the headlines, as it is the greatest
into the south and increasing cadres to as- government had persisted, despite all the concern of our representatives in Saigon and
sist the Communist Pathet Lao forces in quiet advice we could give in favor of re- of the Vietnamese leaders themselves who
Laos. In South Vietnam there had been forms. The stubbornness and inflexibility must find the answer. (And may I pause
from the start thousands of agents and many which had been his great assets in the early here, apropos of the headlines, to say that
pockets of Communist influence left behind days after 1954 had now become serious I think the- American people are getting the
in the division of Vietnam, and as early as drawbacks. The Buddhist uprisings of the facts. We in government follow closely what
1957 a campaign of assassination of local of- spring of 1963 brought the political situa- is said in the newspapers and magazines,
ficials had begun that tallies on the map al- tion to the forefront again. Now Buddhism and on TV; part of our job is to see that
most; exactly with the areas under strong- as P. religion is not nearly as dominant in these media are properly informed and given
est Communist control today. In 1959, such South Vietnam as it is elsewhere in-southeast access to everything except for those few
activity was stepped up, guerrilla units Asia-Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. The details that are necessarily matters of secu-
formed. and the real campaign got under- adherents of Buddhism may not be even a rity in what is, after all, a war situation.
way. majority of South Vietnamese, and there are I think we are doing our job, and that the
That campaign Is sometimes referred to as significant Catholic and other groups as well media are doing theirs. The picture that you
a civil war. But let us not delude ourselves. as large numbers of adherents to older re- as thoughtful citizens get is in fact the
Discontent there may have been, and local ligious beliefs. Nonetheless, Buddhists are picture that we have, on all essential points.
recruiting by the Vietcong, largely through the most numerous faith, they are entitled to If that picture is complex or not entirely
intimidation. But the whole campaign fair treatment, and they had some case clear, believe me our picture is the same,
would never have been -possible without the against the Diem government for personal for that is the nature of the situation.)
direction, personnel, key materiel, and total discrimination, though little, according to The real point of the political history in
support coming from Hanoi, and without too the findings of a United Nations commission, South Vietnam is that it should cause us no
the strong moral support, and key materiel for true religious persecution. But these amazement and no despair. Was it not 7
when needed, provided by Peiping and, up grievances might have been met without seri- years between the end of the American Revo-
to 1962 at least, by the Soviet Union. Thou- ous trouble if they had not been fanned by lution and the making of a lasting constitu-
sands of highly trained men coming from the a small group of leaders who were and are, tion, even for a new nation which had united
north, along with the crucial items of equip- in fact, politically motivated. to fight a war and had centuries of British
ment and munitions-these have been from Unfortunately, the Diem government re- evolution toward democratic self-govern-
the start the mainspring of the Vietcong in- fused to compromise or to redress the areas ment behind it? And how many new na-
surgency. This has been all along a Com- of legitimate grievance, and in August sent tions in the world today have found lasting
munist subversive aggression, in total viola- the Army into the pagodas of Saigon and stability in a decade, especially where there
tion of tkie Geneva accords as well as general other cities, following up with a drastic com- had been little preparation under colonial-
principl of international behavior. paign of suppression against students and a ism, where the national historic tradition was
Indeed the true nature of the struggle has wide circle of political opponents. As a re- remote, and above all where a violent aggres-
been publicly stated many times by Hanoi suit, by late September-when I personally sor was striking constantly at the very fabric
itself, beginning with a 1960 Communist accompanied Secretary McNamara to Sai- of government? Take if you will one fact
Party Conference in North Vietnam which gon-it was clear that Diem and his brother, alone-that in the first 8 months of 1964 the
declared the policy of, as they put it, "liber- Nhu, had aroused wide popular opposition Vietcong assassinated more than 400 local
ating the south. and, perhaps most crucial, had alienated al- officials and kidnaped another 700-and try
By early 1961, South Vietnam was clearly in most to the breaking point the key trained in your mind to project what an equivalent
difficulty. President Johnson, then Vice elements within the government structure amount of gangsterism would do to govern-
President, visited the country in the spring, itself, both civilian and military. ment performance in this country, and then
and we stepped up our military supplies Although Ambassador Lodge continued to to project that effect in turn, onto the situ-
and tried to turn our training emphasis urge reforms that might still have saved the ation in a country such as South Vietnam.
increasingly to the guerrilla front. Then, government, Diem did not respond, and on So this is a tough war, and the Vietnamese
in the fall of 1961, a series of key assassina- November 1, 1983, he was overthrown, he and are a tough people to have stood up under it
Lions and raids on Government centers Nhu-most unfortunately-killed, and a new and to be holding their heads above water
brought South Vietnamese morale to a crit- military government installed by force. after 20 years of violence and uncertainty.
Ical point, Something more was needed. No one could then tell whether the new in
President Kennedy considered and rejected government would be better. Clearly, it had should we now, then, approach this
the sending of U.S. combat units to fight the to be military in the first instance, and the How shou
si Howes u Americans?
Vietcong. first military group, under General Minh,
Instead he responded to the request of the had considerable popular backing. Yet it Above all, we must stand firm and be pa-
South Vietnamese Government for American was ineffective and tended to throw out the tient. We never thought in 1961, or in 1954,
military advisers with Vietnamese units, and baby with the bath, replacing so many mili- that the task would be easy. North Vietnam
for Americans to furnish helicopter and air tary and provincial officials that the way was had certain advantages:
transport lift, combat air training, commune- opened for major Vietcong gains. Then in Experience and sophistication in every as
cations, and in. short every possible form of January General Khanh took control in a pect of subversion and political warfare;
assistance short of combat units. bloodless coup. He showed ability on the Dedicated and fanatic agents who for the
But the military effort was and is only military and economic front, but he, in turn, most part came from the south to fight the
one aspect of the struggle. The economic decided to turn over the government to civil- French and then returned to areas they knew
front was equally important, and a smaller ian leaders to be selected by consultation well;
but extraordinarily dedicated group of civil- among representatives of the key groups- An open corridor through Laos to keep up
supplies. In
ian Americans went into the dangerous the Buddhists, the Catholics, the military, the supply of guerrillas and s to
countryside, unarmed and often unescorted, labor, the religious sects, the various areas the past year, such infiltration has markedly
to help in the creation of the fortified ham- including the considerable body of refugees increased, and has included for the first time
the me
lets that soon became, and remain, a key from the north, past political groupings, and increaed, numbers of fn for
reg-
feature of strategy, and to bring to the vil- so on. signifi s Vietnamese trmbe s North Vietnam in Worth
lages the schools, fertilizer, wells, pigs, and The result was the present government un- Vier military units;
other improvements that meant so much and der Prime Minister Huong, a man of deter- A numerical ratio of guerrilla forces to Gov-
would serve to show the Government's con- mination and character, dedicated to fair-
cern for its people. ness to all groups. He Is wrestling today ernment forces that is well below the ratios
The basic strategy adopted in early 1962 essentially with the same kind of problems of 10 to 1, that have been found necessary
was sound, and was indeed in key respects that Diem faced and overcame in 1954, but for success in past guerrilla wars. There
the same as the strategy that prevailed in the far more difficult internal security are today in South Vietnam perhaps 85,000
against communism In Malaya, Greece, and crisis brought on by the Vietcong aggres- hard-core Vietcong fighters and another
the Philippines. It is a strategy that takes sion, which has been slowly extending the 60,000 to 80,000 local Vietcong forces, against
patience and local leadership, and that takes areas of Communist control in the country- roughly 400,000 military and paramilitary
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CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD - 3695
The real, division is not between thm. .subversion, bombings, and murders-is It has become clear that Hanoi has under-
who say get out of South Vietnam now hrnnaht fn an -i i... +s.., wr,...ai. i.a_+. +oi:e,. .. ____ _ _
?'+Y++._4iG{$V L' a4+V++, NU I,IiV.b C.. W,UQ, say ens
the war now by blasting Hanoi and all
of North Vietnam off the face of the
earth.. The realists are on. neither side
of this argument. The realists oppose
both solutions, The realistic policy is to
prepare to stay in South Vietnam for
years and years and years-no matter
how long it takes, to outlast the Com-
munists, to outeducate them, to outwork
them, to outserve them in the cause of
peace.
The difference is between those who
think we have done too much in South
Vietnam and the time has come to get
out or to mount a full-scale invasion of
the North and those who think we have
not done enough, and that we have to
broaden and deepen our commitments-
especially our economic and social com-
mitments in Vietnam.
Mr. President, if we are going to stop
Communists in South Vietnam or in
Cambodia or Burma or Malaysia or South
Korea or the Philippines, it is not going
to be' easy. Throughout our lifetime and
very likely throughout the lifetime of
our children there will be no end of strug-
gle and sacrifice, of danger and heavy
cost. Not because America wants war,
now or ever, in South Vietnam or any-
where else, but because the Communists
and especially the Red Chinese have
made it clear that they will use war to
achieve, their ends whenever it suits their
purpose and because we will oppose this
gradual Communist conquest in defense
of freedom.
. This world contest against communism
is a struggle we,are not sure to win. We
could lose. But certainly if we help this
independent country of South Vietnam
to maintain its independence, we en-
hance the prospect of freedom and of
peace surviving.
Which is better, Mr. President, to stay
and slug it out in stalemate in South
Vietnam or to give in, give up, retreat,
fall back, and have to slug it out else-
where in Asia against an encouraged
and victorious Communist enemy?
Does any Senator honestly think that
the Communists will stop with South
Vietnam, if we give it to them? Does
any Senator really think that such a
course will discourage the Communists
from continuing this successful course
until they have all of Asia and push on
from there?
And where, Mr. President, is the basis
for our negotiation now. What do the
Communists offer? Indeed, what will
they offer, when they are convinced they
are winning?
The plain and perhaps brutal truth,
particularly to those who have urged the
President to negotiate a settlement, is
that the Communist camp has given us
nothing to negotiate short of U.S. with-
drawal from South Vietnam which would
open the door to ,a takeover by the Hanoi
regime,,
This is an ultimatum, not a feeler to
begin negotiations
The sta
f
.
ge
or near- cuntiy Council,
nations will be set when the I have directed the orderly I have the honor to inform you of the
reign of
ith
w
drawal of American dependents from following acts which have further disturbed
terror-brought about by infiltration, South Vietnam, the peace in Vietnam,
what you will-brought about by the can installations, and against Americans
North will set the stage for talks that can who are in South Vietnam assisting the
b0 fruitful. people of that country to defend their free-
dom. We have no choice now but to clear
It seems clear that these conditions do the decks and make absolutely clear our
not now exist. So we must carry on with continued determination to back South Viet-
firmness and resolution.. We must meet nam in its fight to maintain its indepen-
force with force. We must show with dente.
patience and determination that we In addition to this action, I have ordered
mean to stay in Vietnam-not for a week, the deployment to South Vietnam of a Hawk
or month, but for 1 year or 2 years or 10 air defense dattdlion. Other reinforcements,
years, whatever is required to achieve our in units and individuals may follow.
goal and carry out our commitment. [From the Office of the White House Press
And above all, we must be willing to Secretary, Feb. 11, 1965]
take the military measures necessary to THE WHITE HousE.-On February 11, U.S.
drive home this determination to the air elements joined with the South Viet-
North Vietnamese and their Chinese namese Air Force in attacks against military
Communist overlords. This can only be facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi
done by making their aggressive ven-
tures into South Vietnam so painful and
so unprofitable as to be discouraging. If
broader airstrikes are required, they must
be made. If more determined ground
action to cut off infiltration appears nec-
essary, we must be willing to make the
sacrifice. If greater use of our superior
seapower will meet our needs, then so be
it.
It is my view and I believe the view of
the administration, that cries for nego-
tiation now have a very, very bad effect
on our South Vietnam allies and a highly
encouraging effect on the Vietcong.
Let us never forget that our goal is
peace. Peace is the clear aim of this
administration.
President Johnson's course is not the
course of massive full-scale war against
North Vietnam. And it is not the course
for the training and infiltration of Vietcong
personnel into South Vietnam.
These actions by the South Vietnamese
and United States Governments were in re-
sponse to further direct provocations by the
Hanoi regime.
Since February 8, a large number of South
Vietnamese and United States personnel have
been killed in an increased number or Viet-
cong ambushes and attacks. A district town
in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun, re-
sulting in further Vietnamese and United
States casualties. In Qui Nhon, Vietcong
terrorists in attack on an American military
billet murdered Americans and Vietnamese.
could only ratify a Communist victory. ments felt compelled to take the action de-
It is a harder and wiser course than gibed above.
either. It offers us the best prospect of [From the Office of the White House Press
peace and the best prospect of freedom. Secretary, Feb. 17, 1965]
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE NATIONAL
sent that several recent White House INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD AT THE
statements, Ambassador Stevenson's SHERATON-PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
February 8 letter to the President of the I should like to end this visit with you
Security Council, and a most cogent with a word on the very serious situation in
speech by Assistant Secretary of State Vietnam, which I know must be on the mind
for the Far East William Bundy, be of each of you.
printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD to- As I have said so many, many times, and
gether with the Department of State's other Presidents ahead of me have said, our
purpose, our objective there is clear. That
white paper-the statement on aggres-
sion from the north-the record of purpose and that objective is to join in the
North Vietnam's campaign to conquer peoples awho are under nd protection o attack freedom that a brave
onSouth Vietnam, omitting the ap- tolled and that is directed from utside their
pendix, and the excellent letter from country.
Adlai Stevenson delivering this white We have no ambition there for ourselves.
paper to the U.N. They state these We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest.
points-our commitment to peace, our We seek no wider war. But we must all
willingness to use whatever means are understand that we will persist in the de-
necessary to achieve it-with more elf- fense of freedom, and our continuing actions
will those which
tung
quence than I have mustered in this that are made are necessary b by jyjustified and
statement. cont continuing
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS aggrThese actions will be measured and ession of others.
In the chair). Is there objection? and adequate. Our stamina and the stami-
There being no objection, the material as of the American people is equal to the
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, task-
as follows: Thank you.
[From the Office of the White House Press LETTER D
ATED FEDRIIARY 7, 1966, FROM THE
Secretary, Feb. 7, 1965] PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED
STATEMENT 8Y THE PRESIDENT STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRES
in addition, there have been a number of
mining and other attacks on the railway in
South Vietnam as well as assassinations and
ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil
and military officials.
The U.S. Government has been in consul-
tation with the Government of South Viet-
nam on this continuation of aggressions and
outrages. While maintaining their desire to
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3696 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
In the early morning of February 7, Viet- We deeply regret that the Hanoi regime, types in the Far East, though only few direct
namese time, Vietcong forces carried out in its statement of August 8, 1964, which was contacts in southeast Asia apart from the
coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese circulated in security Council document individual Americans who had served over
air bases in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, on two S/5888, explicity denied the right of the decades as political advisers to the independ-
barracks installations in the Pleiku area, Security Council to examine this problem. ent Kingdom of Thailand.
turn.
and on a number of villages in the area of The disrespect of the Hanoi regime for the Events then took a that more the ominous us turn.
Thy Hoa and Nha Trang. Numerous casual- Ignited Nations adds to the concern which We a aware
military leaders to dominate all of
ties were inflicted, and at least one village any United Nations member state must feel Japanese became
was burned. about Hanoi's violation of the purposes and Asia were a threat not only to the specific
These attacks by the Vietcong, which op- principles of the United Nations Charter. Interests of ourselves and of other the whole Western na-
erates under the military orders of North Nevertheless, I would remind you, and but to
Indeed of the the peace
world. China, In which
Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi, were a con- through you other members of the Security
certed and politically timed effort to sharpen Council and of the United Nations, that our we had taken a lead in dismantling the 19th
and intensify the aggression at a moment mission in southeast Asia Is peace and that century system of foreign special privileges,
designed for broader effect in the field of our purpose is to insure respect for the peace was progressively threatened and large parts
international politics, and to test the will of settlement to which all concerned are overrun. We ourselves were finally attacked
the Republic of Vietnam and the United committed. at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. We
States to resist that aggression. We, therefore, reserve the right to bring responded to aggression by conducting with
The Government of the Republic of Viet- this matter to the Security Council if the our allies a major Pacific war that cost the
nam and the Government of the United situation warrants it. United States alone 272,700 casualties and
States immediately consulted and agreed In a statement issued this morning on over $100 billion.
that it was necessary to take prompt defen- behalf of President Johnson, the U.S. Gov- In the end Japanese militarism was de-
sive action. Accordingly, on the afternoon ernment once again emphasized that "we feated, and the way apparently cleared for an
of February 7, Vietnamese time, United seek no wider war. Whether or not this Asia of free and independent national states
States and South Vietnamese air elements course can be maintained lies with the North that would be progressively freed of colonial-
were directed to take joint action against Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situ- ism, that need threaten neither each other
certain military facilities in the southern ation remains the ' cessation of infiltration nor neighboring states, and that could tackle
area of North Vietnam. An attack was car- from North Vietnam and the clear indication in their own way the eternal problems of
ried through against Dong Hoi, which is a by the Hanoi regime that it Is prepared to building political and economic structures
military installation and one of the major cease aggression against its neighbors." that would satisfy the aspiration of their
staging areas for the infiltration of armed Our objective is a peaceful settlement. peoples.
cadres of North Vietnamese troops into This would require both the self-restraint of That kind of Far East was a pretty good
South Vietnam In violation of international the regime to the north and the presence of definition of our national interests then. It
law and of the Geneva accords of 1954. effective International peacekeeping ma- y. We cared about the
The Vietcong attacks of February 7 related chinery to make sure that promises are kept. is Far East, equally and valid id today.
today, because we know we care
directly to the central problem in Vietnam. This is our purpose. But we will not per- there-among peoples
That central problem is not one of a struggle mit the situation to be changed by terror that numbering what 33 happens percent of the -among s popula-
by one element of the population in South and violence and this is the meaning of our world'
tion, with great talent, past historic great-
Vietnam against the Government. There is, action this weekend. ness, and capacity-is bound to make a
rather, a pattern of military operations di- Accept, etc. E. STEVENSON. crucial difference whether there will be the
rested, staffed, and supplied in crucial re- ADLAI kind of world in which the common ideals of
spects from outside the country. Up to freedom can spread, nations live and work
34,000 armed and trained soldiers have in- AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND together without strife, and-most basic of
filtrated into South Vietnam from the north SOUTHEAST ASIA all-we ourselves, in the long run, survive as
since 1959. In addition, key items of equip- (Address by the Honorable William P. Bundy, the kind of nation we are determined to be.
ment, such as mortars of the type employed Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Our basic stake in the Far East is our stake
in the attacks of February 7, have come from Affairs, before the Washington Chamber of in a peaceful and secure world as distinct
North Vietnam. During 1964, the infiltration Commerce, Washington, Mo., Saturday, from a violent and chaotic one. But there
of men and equipment has increased sharply, January 23, 1965) were three great flaws in the 1945 picture
and virtually all of those now coming in are INTRODUCTION after the defeat of Japan.
natives of North Vietnam. When my old friend, Senator SYMINGTON, 1. In China, a civil war had been raging
Infiltration in such numbers can tat relayed your invitation to come here, I was since the 1920's between the Government, led
be labeled "indirect aggression" -though h that delighted to accept. I shall make only one by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Com-
a
form re witnessing in in is Viettnamnam l, today is a What sus- - partisan statement tonight, and that is to munist movement. After a brief and edgy
arc: say how fortunate you in Missouri are in your truce during the war against Japan, that
tafnedier set attack for more than. international 6 years across distinguished senior Senator. For the rest, I civil war was resumed in circumstances where
a frontier of the Security the Council, Council will agreement. re- would like to speak on the topic you have the Government had been gravely weakened.
Members in nciin Au- chosen-American Policy in South Vietnam We assisted that Government in every way
gullai 1196 964, aggression by the Hanoi noi , r regime- me and southeast Asia-totally without regard to possible. Mistakes may have been made, but
gust naval units of the partisanship. That topic and the issues it in the last analysis mainland China could
again Gulf Tonkin. . tthat t time td States in raises concern all concern us, as Americans. not have been saved from communism with-
scr Gibed ulf of these Tttack as part th of a of a pattern I shall talk, if I may, to three related sets out the commitment of major U.S. ground
scr includes the n armed of questions: and air forces to a second war on the
personnel to make the Infiltration of armed I How did we come to be in South Viet- Asian mainland. Faced with a concurrent
personnel nt of ake South war against the legitimate g nam? How does what we are doing there threat from Soviet Russia against Europe and
Government a m, the relate to our wider purposes in the world, to the Near East, we did not make-and per-
as terrorist gongs iin South Vietnam, the
Vietnam, ru- our specific purposes in Asia, and, in a word, lisps could not then have made-that com-
ment oat ion of local ofntiued as fighting instru- to our national interests? mitment. And there came to power on the
Laos of policy, the continu regimn II What has been the course of events in mainland, in the fall of 1949, a Communist
t n vi, in short, the Geneva to systematic agreements- Vietnam that has brought us to the present regime filled with hatred of the West, with
a ornts n, in short, violations deliberate systesituation? the vision of a potential dominant role for international and
geh by the Hanoi which III. What are the key problems, and what China, but imbued above all with a prima-
signed and dye which by an Hanoi whicde- h can we do to help in solving them and in tive Communist ideology in its most virulent
nd which by tenets of achieving our objectives? expansionist form.
cency, law, and civilized practice, is bound d 2. In Korea, a divided country stood un-
by their provisions. I easily, half free and half Communist. With
The Republic of Vietnam, and at its re- The first question requires a look at our military might sharply reduced after
quest the Government of the United States history. the war, as part of what may have been
and other governments, are resisting this Even when the Far East was much more an inevitable slackening of effort, we with-
systematic and continuing aggression. Since distant than it is today, we Americans had drew our forces and reduced our economic
reinforcement of the Vietcong by infiltra- deep concern for developments there. Amer- aid before there was in existence a strong
tors from North Vietnam is essential to this icans pioneered in trade and missionary ef- South d Korean defense capacity. With
continuing aggression, countermeasures to fort with China and in opening up Japan to Soviet backing North Korea attacked across
arrest such reinforcement from the outside Western influence. In 1898 we became In a the 38th parallel in June 1950. With the
are a justified measure of self-defense. sense a colonial power in the Philippines, but Soviets then absent from the U.N. Securi-
Mr. President, my Government is reporting began almost at once to prepare the way for ity Council, the U.N. was able to condemn
the measures which we have taken in ac- independence and self-government there- the aggression and to mount a U.N. effort
cordance with our public commitment to an independence promised by act of Congress to assist South Korea. The United States
assist the Republic of Vietnam against ag- in 1936 and achieved on schedule in 1946. played by far the greatest outside role in a
gression from the north. By the 1930's, we had wide interests of many conflict that brought 157,630 U.S. casualties,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3693
M 1?ROXMIRE. Mr. President, I Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I would there been any evidence that there is
thank the Senator from Wyoming. He like to associate myself with the remarks any intent on the part of our adversaries
has been'? an outstanding leader in sup- of the distinguished senator from Wis- to arrive at any kind of honorable and
port of the administration's position. consin, who has obviously given much dignified solution as a result of negotia-
He has an unusual understanding of the knowledgeable thought to the problem tions.
it
ti
n i
ua
s
o
n Vietnam and has taken a in Vietnam, and whose remarks on it
remarkably deep interest in our foreign will be most helpful in leading the peo-
affairs for many years. ple of this country toward a consensus
The points made by the Senator from in support of the actions now being taken
Wyoming are correct. I am delighted there by the President.
that he supports my position in this Further, it seems obvious to me that
matter. those who would make history must first
I stress the main point that I seek to study it. The United States is now mak-
make here. It is a partial answer to the ing history in its actions in South Viet-
senior Senator from New York; the fact nam. We are faced there with a new
th
t
ha
a
we
ve engaged in vast, far-reach-
ing, and successful efforts to help educa-
tion, health, transportation, and so forth
in South Vietnam. This assistance is
not the kind of thing that enrages or in-
furiates people. When they know that
they have worked with Americans who
helped them train thousands of teachers,
develop a pure water system, stop ma-
laria, and so forth, it seems to me that
this is an ingredient for support of their
position.
The important thing-and here we are
in agreement with the Vietnamese-is
not to let the problems in Saigon sap
our efforts in the deeper struggle against
the Communists. The two problems are,
of course, related. Victory over the Com-
munists is hard to achieve even with a
otrong central government. But let us
not fall into the Communist propaganda-
fed trap of thinking that a coup in Saigon
means the South Vietnamese people
would rather be governed by the Com-
munists in Hanoi.
This is a mistake which we make be-
cause there is a coup resulting from a
sharp difference of opinion among mili-
tary leaders, all of whom agree on vigor-
ously opposing the North Vietnamese and
Vietcong. Certainly it seems to me it is
not, a basis for assuming that our posi-
tion in South Vietnam is not supported
by the South Vietnamese.
It, would be the peak of irony if our
own` will were to weaken as a result of
South Vietnam's internal political prob-
lems, for this would deliver to the enemy
precisely what they desire. The Com-
munists' methods of conquest are politi-
cal as well as military. Whatever the
means, the result is the same, as far
as they are concerned: the takeover
of South Vietnam, a goal they have
sought-and we have opposed-for over
10 years.
If the Communists can take over in
type of Communist offensive of Infiltra-
tion, subversion, and guerrilla activities
supported externally. The long view of
the study of history indicates that ap-
peasement or withdrawal in the face of
aggression has never been conducive to
the establishment of a lasting peace.
As the Senator from Wisconsin has so
ably pointed out, in our dealings in Viet-
nam, we must again apply the principle
that unless we are willing, now, to take
the risks involved-and we are all cog-
nizant of the risks involved-in drawing
the line in South Vietnam, we shall have
to draw it somewhere. I, for one, would
like to see it drawn in South Vietnam,
rather than in Thailand, in Malaysia, in
the Philippines, in Hawaii, or in San
Francisco and Seattle.
For those who have questioned the
policy of this country, I believe that it
would be well for all Senators, as well as
for the people of this country, to recall
that Congress in Public Law 88-408, last
session, set forth, in speaking of the
attacks in South Vietnam :
Whereas these attacks are part of a de-
liberate and systematic campaign of aggres-
sion that the Communist regime in North
Vietnam has been waging against its neigh-
bors and the nations joined with them in the
collective defense of our freedom;
In the "Resolved" part of the resolu-
tion it is further stated:
The United States is, therefore, prepared
as the President determines to take all neces-
sary steps including the use of armed force
to assist any member or protocol state of the
Southeast Asia Defense Treaty requesting as-
sistance in defense of its freedom.
That is what we are doing. As to the
question that has been asked as to what
we will do in the future, the resolution
further states, in section 3:
This resolution shall expire when the
President shall determine that the peace and
security of the area is reasonably assured by
N
t
a
ions or otherwise, except
Buddhists seizing the Government, they that it may be terminated earlier by con-
will do it that way. And they are trying current resolution of the Congress.
to do it that way. If they can take over The peace in that troubled sector is
South Vietnam through a .succession of not secure. The President of the United
coups, and this discourages us and makes States is doing what must be done there.
us feel that South Vietnam is not in-
Mr. President, I com- no wider war. Over and over again, the
Mr. the JAVITS5. . Mr from Wisconsin on where, has stated that he will go any-
what I consider to be one of the finest when , there is any time, reasonable talk with anyone
contributions to an understanding of of peg ohope n or dis-
this problem ever made in this chamber. any kind ace peace ne ner it s dis-
this cussion. It is pes clear to us, , or it should be,
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, will the that negotiations can be fruitful only
Senator from Wisconsin yield? where, first, we have someone willing to
Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield negotiate. In my judgment, we do not
to the Senator from Oklahoma, have such a situation now. Nor_ has
Furthermore, there is no sense in nego-
tiation unless there is some reasonable
assurance that the people with whom
we negotiate toward an agreement will
carry out the agreement.
It is obvious from the study of the
history of that problem that all that is
necessary for peace to come to that trou-
bled area of the world is for the Commu-
nists in Hanoi and elsewhere to fulfill
the agreements they entered into 1954
and again 1962.
Therefore, for one, wish to uphold the
hand of the President of the United
States, who is the leader of the free
world. He has a full understanding of
the facts, which perhaps many of us
do not have, because he has the means
by which he can learn them. Further-
more, I am confident that he under-
stands the grave and serious meaning of
what is going on in southeast Asia as it
relates to the protection of this country's
interests and to the protection of the
peace and security of the world.
Therefore, I am happy to have the
opportunity to associate myself with the
remarks of the distinguished Senator
from Wisconsin, and to commend him
for the very lucid explanation of the
problem in that area and its history and
what needs to be done about it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Sena-
tor from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS] for a
remarkable statement, impromptu and
off the cuff, very thoughtful and well or-
ganized, and certainly most appropriate.
I deeply. a ppreciate his support in this
matter.
AMERICAN GOALS
What then are our goals? As I see it,
Mr. President, they are three in number:
First. Peace-an end to the fighting
and terror in South Vietnam.
Does anyone question that goal? Why
are we there? The only other reason
why countries engage in this kind of war
is that they want to annex territory, or
to gain some kind of economic advan-
tage. We do not want anything of that
kind. Does anyone believe that Presi-
dent Eisenhower, President Kennedy, or
President Johnson had any other objec-
tive at all except to achieve peace and
freedom, recognizing that if we do not
fight there we shall have to fight else-
where?
Second. Preservation of the freedom of
the South Vietnamese people to develop
according to their own wishes, free from
outside interference.
No one can say we are dominating the
Government of South Vietnam. If we
had dominated it, perhaps there would
not have been all the coups that have
taken place.
We have not attempted to dictate to
the Government. No one can charge us
with trying to interfere.
Third. An end to the spread of com-
munism by force in southeast Asia-a
program fostered and supported by Red
China and one which poses a serious
threat to our American security.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
And this, our own American security, This was not a case of all-out saturation pect on a controversial situation. The
is the final reason, a very practical and bombing. It was aimed at specific stag- vote was 88 to 2. The President is doing
the main reason, why we are expending ing areas and depots used by the Com- precisely what the resolution seeks to
this enormous amount of $2.5 billion over munists to reinforce and supply the Viet- do. Virtually every Senator subscribed
a period of years and losing hundreds of cong. And the message it carried to to that position.
American lives and endangering thou- Hanoi was clear: "Watch out, you're CONGRESSIONALPRR SOLUUTTION SUPPORTED
sands of American lives in the future. playing a dangerous game, and there are
NO PEACE IN WITHDRAWAL serious risks for you as well." How can we in the Senate now ask why
Mr. President, there are some who On Wednesday, February 24, it was we are in South Vietnam? The Senate
announced that since Thursday, Febru- resolution states it clearly. This is our
suggest thdr peace can be restored
Vietnam. I only ary 18, U.S. jet bombers have attacked determination--Republican and Demo-if we ask themdrawfrom South ? For the the Vietcong. The crews were indeed cratic, Liberal and Conservative. A vote
them-peace for whom? For solely American. Once again the objec- of 88 to 2 on any matter is pretty over-
So Vi
t the who have thus tive was military, strictly andexclusively whelming and in the case of Vietnam,
others southeas For
her st doCommu Asia subversion? Jet attacks are limited in du- it surely represented a resounding en-
fax the Communist ccommitted nration and in size. They are confined dorsement of President Johnson's poli-
by eaty States, which Is s f some to Vietcong, identifiable enemy concen- ties.
the reaty o come to the aid of of o the of trations, hostile foreign concentrations While we pursue these goals, we must
thd very whcountries
h will undoubtedly o that part part the of next within South Vietnam territory. continue to make clear, as President
world wich will u ? Indeed, we are more directly involved. Johnson has repeatedly stated, that our
target for this type c warfare? But once again the involvement is meas- fundamental purpose is peace. We seek
How to sn can peace be achieved? as the other It ured, restricted, military in its nature; no wider war.
can come es it is in just their soon as the make in my judgment, it is consonant What we seek in South Vietnam is no side it happen. it is a should nterest to make ke with our basic purpose of taking what- more than a peaceful settlement spelled
this appen. There soulbe no doubt on ever action we have to take-painful as out in the 1954 Geneva accords which
t point. Whether or not t the authors- it may be-to achieve the peace. guaranteed the independence and terri-
ee mHanoi actually m y order each tactical
ding Mr. President, it was helpful on the tonal integrity of South Vietnam. But
o o a it
that to a large extent they do-the key part of the distinguished Senator from this time we would like to see the accords
that n a large they have do--the Wyoming [Mr. SmrsoN] to ask, "Why supported by more effective enforcement
to brit tthat attack to an e end. the authority should we not move in all the way with machinery, to see that peace will stick.
to bring the organize, e. our military force? Why should we not These are the basic ingredients for an
They direct, supply, rn hvand e the t he end the war by using the full force of our end to the fighting.
s ppwe the halt it. Pea; Peace will have n Navy, Air Force, and Army, to end it?" It does not take a lot of diplomatic
power learn halt it. neighbors came when This gives us a chance to emphasize sophistication to understand our posi-
Iney ouch Vietnam, eave their Laos, and alone, that this is not the policy of the Presi- tion. It is logical; it is simple. Above
where. South Viin Laos, and else- dent of the United States, that this John- all, it is peaceful. Of course it means an
w son administration policy is a limited ef- end to the pattern of external aggression
conquest. fort to do all we can to achieve peace, carried on by the Hanoi regime from the
brought l is peace; theirs
Our goal eaxs of struggle
After the e conflicting about which will have to be a negotiated and time it came to power.
by these alms, have long compromised peace, because we will not CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS
sorted finally lly to to a means that has lonng take over North Vietnam. There long been refrained our disposal,
from disposal, but using. which we have RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR EBPANSION: NORTH e d an talk may Bbe a ut time talk to talk; all wars
to be fruitful
. for STRICTLY LIMITED U.S. MILITARY ACTION VIETNAM the other side must acknowledge the
I find it odd that the President should heavy responsibility that is theirs. They
It was hoped that the threat of air- stand accused of "expanding" the war. must show by their actions that they
strikes against North Vietnam would be This war was long since expanded-from want peace and will end the aggressive
sufficient to encourage sober thoughts in the north to the south. These airstrikes conduct that prevents it.
Hanoi. were undertaken, an the words of the It would be a grim mistake to move to
Mr. President, the distinguished Sena- White House statement, in response to
tor from Alaska has said, the mere pres- the Hanoi regime." the conference table before such indict-
ence of our 7th Fleet there indicates direct provocation by tions are present. Perhaps the worst
Responsibility for the provocations outcome of all would be a conference
our power and gives
s us a a strong position lies north of the 17th parallel. UP to that ended in failure. The war would
from which negotiate. But the pres- now, our efforts have been concentrated resume without even the glimmer of hope
ence of no nego s any mi litary power can gih side us n South Vietnam. Our actions of past thatthe possibility of peace talks always
knows that we have we the unless the ot that weeks have served to make those reason- offer.
power. hat grim fact, t is a sible for the war aware of the conse- This is a fact that has not been recog-
fact That is That a grim but use se but it t is a quences it could have for them if it con- nized by those who are pressing for nego-
There of life. tinues unabated. tiations.
There had been hints, many it themer On August 7, 1964, at the time of the We must be ready always to talk-but
north of parallel must insist that the conditions for
north the e 17 17thh para,arallel that a were under under incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin, the
consideration. The Communists who Senate by a vote of 88 to 2 adopted a talk are present. We cannot take part
rule North Vietnam knew that we had joint resolution with the stated purpose: in a conference that merely ratifies the
the airpower to inflict grave damage on "To promote the maintenance of inter- fruits of aggression.
them. But apparently the lesson had national peace and security in southeast Mr. President, we must be prepared to
not sunk in. Asia" look forward, not merely to many more
The scale and frequency of Commu- The resolution saw the attacks in the months, but to many more years, of
nist attacks in recent months continued Tonkin Gulf as "part of- a deliberate and hard service in South Vietnam, with
to increase. The rate of infiltration of systematic campaign of aggression that years of sacrifice and work and dangers
cadres from the North mounted ever the Communist regime in North Vietnam and loss of life, years in which we work
higher. The new boldness took the form has been waging against its neighbors" to assist the people of South Vietnam to
of attacks at American facilities. Our and stated, "That the Congress approves build a strong and independent country.
ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, the airfield and supports the determination of the This effort in South Vietnam, if we
at Bien Hoa, and, most recently, the at- President, as Commander in Chief, to continue it-and I hope and pray that
tack at Pleiku and the destruction of take all necessary measures to repel we do-will not be more popular in the
the barracks at Qui Nhon, where 23 any armed attack against the forces of future with the American people. It
Americans lost their lives. the United States and to prevent further will become less and less popular. It will
Faced with this escalation by the other aggression." take more and more patience. It will
side, the President ordered the measured What else has the President done? take more leadership and courage on the
response of U.S. airstrikes at Communist This was a resolution passed with as part of Senators and other leaders to
military facilities in North Vietnam. much unanimity as it is possible to ex- speak out to the American people.
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE. 3691
should not do that, and I agree with that
attitude..
Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the Senator
from Wisconsin for his learned discus-
sion, In the main I agree with his entire
speech, but I am in disagreement with
him on this particular point.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from Wyoming very
much.
We are there in response to the request
of a native, indigenous government seek-
ing to preserve itself against aggression.
We are not involved in Vietnam in pur-
suit of national military alms. Secretary
of State Dean Rusk recently pointed out
that in 1959 "no foreign nation had bases
or fighting forces in South Vietnam.
South Vietnam was not a member of any
alliance. If it was a threat to North Viet-
nam it was because its economy far out-
shone the vaunted Communist paradise
to the north."
. Much of this- progress represents the
fruits of. economic aid furnished by the
United . States. While there has been
much discussion of military aid we have
sent to South Vietnam, it is important
to recognize that our military, aid has
been defensive in nature. Our forces
there have been advisory. Until the
provocations of recent months, American
servicemen were engaged almost exclu-
sively in training and advisory posi-
tions.
When American forces participated in
any combat action, with the exception of
the limited air strikes, their efforts were
defensive. The air strikes themselves
were defensive in that they were designed
to deter further aggression, not to expand
the war.
Last night at the Leipzig Trade Fair
Soviet Premier Kosygin said:
I haven't read the American white book.
It cannot be a white book, but rather a black
book., The dirty acts of the Americans in
Vietnam cannot be put down in a white book.
Mr. President, disregarding the dirty
acts of the Soviet Union, with which his-
tory is replete ever since the Soviet has
been in power in Russia, what is the real
American story in Vietnam? Our record
is South Vietnam is a great record. Of
course, it has not been talked about by
Premier Kosygin, the Red Chinese, or the
Red North Vietnamese. But the tragedy
is that it has not been talked about
much by U.S. Senators either. It is a
peaceful record, an amazingly peaceful
record, for which, the only precedent is
the American, people's peaceful attempts
at international. assistance and our an-
swer to appeals from other nations in the
world since World War II.
SOLID U.S. RECORD OF PEACEFUL AID
A study of our record in South Viet-
nam shows clearly our peaceful inten-
tions-and more than intentions-a re-
markable working for peace.
Much of our effort there has been eco-
nomic and technical, to build the coun-
try's agricultural and industrial econo-
mies,
Our support in South Vietnam has
stressed education, health, and com-
munity development. Since 1962 alone
we have spent more than $228 million in
food-for-peace shipments to South Viet-
nam-and. Kosygin talks about a dirty
record and about a black book of Ameri-
can performance in South Vietnam.
During the same period, counting es-
timated expenditures for this year, our
economic aid will total $599,800,000. And
since 1955, again counting estimated ex-
penditures for 1965, we have committed
$2.8 billion in nonmilitary economic aid.
Compare that with the record of the
Soviet Union anywhere in the world.
This is a. record of generosity, a record
of help and peaceful, constructive
assistance.
What programs are these funds sup-
porting? Do they represent a threat to
the security of North Vietnam?
DETAILS OF U.S. AID
Illustrative of the social and economic
activities being implemented with United
States help are-
Introduction of improved varieties of
pigs and construction of improved pig-
pens. This is the kind of thing that
helps the peaceful agriculture economy
in South Vietnam.
. Teaching the primitive Montagnard
tribal people how to use water buffalo as
beasts of burden rather than as sacri-
ficial animals. The Montagnards are
people somewhat different from the rest
of the South Vietnamese. They are more
primitive people, and from all records
they have a deep affection, admiration
and gratitude to the American people.
They are also fine fighters.
Developing and helping build a variety
of simple, economical and practical de-
vices which will improve the life of rural
people, such as water wheels for irriga-
tion purposes.
Introduction of wooden windmills.
Introduction of cheap, locally made
hydrojet well drilling rigs.
Helping the Vietnamese to build simple
and inexpensive hamlet school buildings.
Assisting hamlet leaders in planning,
selection and mobilization of support for
self-help projects.
Training teachers in agricultural
methods.
When I said thousands of man-years,
I meant that'. Thousands of man-years
have been spent to help the economy of
South Vietnam. These teachers will
then form demonstration teams to teach
improved agricultural practices to peas-
ants.
. Introduction of fertilizer, which has
often doubled yields.
Introduction of improved varieties of
crops which are suited, to the climate and
soil, such as onions, sweetpotatoes, and
corn. That Is the American record. of
South Vietnam,
In addition to stimulating rural prog-
ress, the economic aid has laid the
groundwork for substantial economic,
educational and social progress in urban
areas.
U.S. EDUCATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Some of these achievements include-
Vocational education: This American
Nation of ours has built and equipped a
central polytechnic institution and three
secondary-level polytechnic schools in
South Vietnam. The United States has
reequipped six other vocational schools.
We have provided technical assistance
for nine rural 2-year trade schools. In
1955, there were only 1,700 students.
Now there are 7,000 students enrolled in
vocational schools receiving American
assistance in South Vietnam.
General education: America has
helped build four teacher-training
schools-one at Saigon, two in the prov-
inces and one designed for Montagnard
teachers. Americans are right now en-
gaged in helping train more than 2,000
prospective teachers in these schools.
We have helped build some 900 ham-
let classrooms since mid-1962. We
helped build 3,590 elementary class-
rooms and 282 secondary classrooms
earlier. Over 1,000 teachers have at-
tended a 90-day training course with
American help. We have helped train
over 4,000 teachers at vocational
workshops. Enrollment in elementary
schools has increased from 300,000 in
1955 to 1,400,000 in 1963. More than 3
million textbooks have been published.
That is the kind of record that Kosy-
gin calls a dirty record, best reflected in
a "black book."
U.S. HEALTH AID
Health: This American Nation of ours
in pursuit of a strong, peaceful South
Vietnam has helped establish and stock
12,500 villages and hamlets. Each sta-
tion has been staffed with a local person
trained with American help in first aid
and health courses. A malaria eradica-
tion program, financed by the United
States, has resulted in a drop in the
malaria incidence rate from 7.22 percent
in 1958 to .77 percent in 1962.
That was in only 51 years. In other
words, a 7 percent malaria incidence was
reduced to less than 1 percent, thanks to
an American-financed health program.
Public administration: With American
help the National Institute of Adminis-
tration, which will graduate some 350
qualified civil servants annually, has been
built and staffed. We have assisted in
establishing training centers for village
officials in 21 provincial centers.
U.S. INDUSTRIAL ASSISTANCE
Transportation: With American help
substantial progress has been made in all
areas of transportation. We have
helped build 272 miles of roads in South
Vietnam. A $7.7 million United States'
loan financed the purchase of equipment
for the Vietnam National Railway sys-
tem. American funds provided eight
dredges to keep water arteries open. We
financed a 10,000-foot jet runway at
Saigon airport.
Water supply: Americans helped to
drill more than 1,400 wells that will pro-
vide clean, fresh, sanitary water for
750,000 rural inhabitants. Thanks to
America, fresh water will be supplied to
some 500,000 urban dwellers through the
installation of water systems in 35 cities.
.Electric, power: In pursuit of an Inde-
pendent, peaceful South Vietnam, we
have helped provide the chief province
and district towns with the electric power
of 162 diesel generating units. We will
step up this program.
This is the kind of peaceful, strong
economy we are building in South Viet-
nam. The reason why the Communists
are invading is that they cannot afford
to. have another show window. for the
West, a window to show how people can
prosper when they have the kind of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE MarcA 1
peaceful, prosperous, growing economy
free of Communist domination.
A $12.7 million AID-American-loan
is being used to construct a 33,000 kilo-
watt powerplant In the Saigon metropol-
itan area. When the plant is completed
shortly it will be a boon to industrial
users who are now often dependent on
costly individual diesel generators.
Industry: About 13,000 workers are
employed in 50 new factories, built with
American aid. South Vietnam is now
largely self-sufficient in the spinning and
weaving of cotton textiles as a result of
this U.S. program.
Communications: We have helped
build a national network of seven major
radio stations. With American help 6,000
community listening centers were estab-
lished. A modern microwave telecom-
munications system is nearing comple-
tion, which will give Saigon telephone
connection with, the principal towns of
the Delta provinces.
What a brilliant and proud record of
constructive contributions to peace this
story of American services in South
Vietnam represents. We have devoted
ourselves unstintingly to education and
health, to the patient, peaceful develop-
ment essential to independence for this
country.
This is the story that has not been
told in the headlines of violence, murder,
coups, and retaliation in South Vietnam.
But this is the big American story.
V.S. PEACEFUL AID VS COMMUNIST _.TERROR
I detailed these programs to point out
that not one of them-not a single one-
can be in any way interpreted as pro-
viding a threat to the North Vietamese
Government or people. There should be
no doubt of this.
Let there be no doubt on another score.
The Communists in North Vietnam are
responsible for the aggression against
South Vietnam. They direct and supply
it; if they desire they can bring it to an
end. Recent evidence makes it clear
that a majority, possibly as much as
three-fourths, of hard-core Vietcong
strength in South Vietnam comes from
the north..
North, Vietnam provides nearly all the
more sopl7lsticated weaponry used by the
Vietcong, such as high-caliber guns, mor-
tars, and antiaircraft weapons. The evi-
dence is that the flow of men and equip-
ment from North Vietnam increased in
1954, and continues to increase.
Those who have been criticizing our
policy in South Vietnam are quick to
argue that, after all, the Americans have
installed more weaponry in South Viet-
nam than North Vietnam has sent in,
more than the Vietcong has supplied.
Of course we have. But what a differ-
ence: We are sending in our weaponry
to defend South Vietnam because its duly
constituted governments have asked us
to do so. The other side is supplying
theirs to subvert, dominate, overwhelm,
and control that country.
Along with the men and equipment
comes command and strategy, and the
basic training and guidance in the sordid
arts of guerrilla warfare. Hanoi's sup-
plies, direction, support and inspiration
are crucial to the continuation of the
Vietcong campaign against the south.
Faced with this kind of attack It Is
hardly surprising that the fledgling
country of South Vietnam has had its
share of problems. It ishard enough for
a new nation to govern successfully un-
der the best of conditions. Fighting a
counterinsurgency ware imposes enor-
mous additional burdens.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
The weakest part of the situation in
South Vietnam is its political instability.
This is a really vulnerable position. The
distinguished Senator from New York
is correct in asking the question.- It is a
question that is extremely difficult to
answer. How can we determine whether
the people of South Vietnam really sup-
port our position? But, of course, this
is what the Communists are working
toward.
One consequence of the difficulties has
been the chronic political instability of
the central government in Saigon. A
succession of coups has installed one gov-
ernment after another, creating an im-
pression that is both bewildering and dis-
turbing to those of us who are used to
having our governments assume office as
a result of elections, not coups-and
every 4 years, not eight times in 16
months.
This political instability is a serious
matter, both because it Interferes with
successful prosecution of the war against
the Vietcong and because it makes it
harder to build a better life for the peo-
ple of South Vietnam. We are doing
what we can to aid the cause of political
unity and stability in South Vietnam-
but this is an area in which we can play
only a limited role.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Wisconsin yield?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I am glad to yield.
Mr. McGEE. I commend the Senator
from Wisconsin for the focus of his com-
ments on Vietnam. So much informa-
tion is on the loose today that it seems
to me that an attempt is being made to
reduce the question to very simple
terms-to jump to the conclusion, for
example, that the people in South Viet-
nam do not approve of the government
in Saigon. Like the Senator from Wis-
consin, I share the view, first, that we
cannot know for certain. There is no
way we can measure in South Vietnam.
It is difficult enough to measure here,
sometimes; but as Winston Churchill
once reminded us, we are not conducting
a foreign policy with a thermometer in
one hand and a George Gallup poll in the
other. We have to take policy positions
because they are fundamental in the na-
tional interest.
I doubt very much whether the posi-
tion of the Montagnards, vis-a-vis the
United States, is not to operate their own
government.
The instability of the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment is a headache. Its uncertain-
ties create frustrations for us. But it
seems to me that that is not the major
criterion. The black marketeers and
the monarchy were headaches to us in
Greece. But that did not deter us from
holding off the Communists so that the
Greek people themselves could improve
their lot and improve their position.
I say that we ought to get our ducks
in the right kind of order, to borrow an
old cliche; that is, to put first things
first. The first thing is to keep the
forces from the north from forcibly in-
truding their influence and the impact.
of their force on the land to the south.
I suspect that the mistake we made, in
part, was in trying to equate Saigon with
Washington, in a political sense; trying
to imagine that because we have democ-
racy, the Vietnamese can have democ-
racy. They have only recently emerged
from generations of colonial domination
by one great power after another. On
the other hand., democracy is one of the
most difficult, sophisticated, and compli-
cated arts of government.
We have been working at it for nearly
200 years ourselves. We still have a lit-
tle way to go. We-tried to spoon-feed
democracy to the Germans, who were a
very sophisticated political people fol-
lowing World War I. The Weimar re-
gime went down the drain. Democracy
is something that one must learn. One
must grow up with it.
I submit that the ingredients for de-
mocracy will not be present in Vietnam
for a long time to come. Probably we
shall see in the Senator's lifetime, and
mine, little but a succession of one kind
of dictatorship after another, in that
part of the world.
While we do not like that, in compari-
son with our own experience, I thing it
is a fair substitute to achieve that kind
of success, to win them over to preserv-
ing their national independence.
I think the Senator has done well to
place stress on the importance of keeping
first things first.
I have been to Vietnam only twice.
Both times I was In the jungles, and in
the areas where the fighting was going
on. I was struck by the warm reception
and almost the worship that many of
these Montagnards have for the Ameri-
cans who are living with them, and help-
ing them meet their day-to-day prob-
lems. This is the kind of story that we
are not relating frequently enough. I
have talked to American boys who have
just come back from some of the Viet-
namese villages. They want to go back
again.
These are matters that are often omit-
ted for the sake of tradition and having
a contrast between "good guys" and "bad
guys," truth and falsehood, and peace
and war. Most of the story is impor-
tant in that area.
I hope the Senator will pursue, on
other fronts, the approach he has taken
in the Senate to stress what happens to
have gone right in Vietnam, what hap-
pens to have been on the constructive and
historical side of the picture in terms of
making improvement in Vietnam.
These people were not expected to last
beyond 1954, when they became inde-
pendent. They were given 12 months'
time, and then they were expected to
fold up. But here we are, nearly 11
years later. They are still going for-
ward, and I suspect from the kind of de-
termination that is theirs, and the kind
of determination that President Johnson
has manifested with regard to his own
policy position, that they will be there
for all time to come.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
purposes-has been directed toward our
peaceful goal of building a solid and
stable South Vietnam.
For years our Vietnam policy has been
carefully, and sometimes painfully, de-
signed, to avoid overt military action by
American soldiers. This has been-done
in spite of the most serious and con-
tinuous provocation.
Even following the Tonkin Gulf and
Pleiku incidents the President had con-
fined our retaliation in size. He has
limited it to military targets and he has
limited its duration and made it appro-
priate to the provocation.
These are not the reactions of a Presi-
dent or an administration interested in
extending the war, or of developing a big
war. It is the obvious reaction of an
administration deeply interested in se-
curing peace.' Above all, he has an-
nounced that the retaliation was for the
sole purpose of preventing further ag-
gression.
LONG RECORD OF NORTH VIETNAM AGGRESSION
To understand what is happening in
Vietnam-and what is at stake in the
whole of southeast Asia-it is necessary
to go back to the fundamentals of the
situation: to the history of Communist
efforts to capture South Vietnam and our
commitment to prevent this from hap-
pening.
The root of the problem is well known.
From the time of the Geneva Confer-
ence in 1954, the Communist authorities
in North Vietnam planned and expected
to take over the area south of the 17th
parallel. At first, they probably believed
South Vietnam would fall to them like
an overripe fruit, theirs for the pluck-
ing, as a result of failure to achieve in-
ternal. stability and unity in the South.
But their fond hopes were thwarted by
the progress achieved by South Vietnam
in the areas of political stability-this
was at the beginning-and economic de-
velopment.
In these fields, the South soon out-
stripped the North. From the first, it
was clear that whatever internal prob-
lems South Vietnam had, they were
united in their opposition to falling un-
der the Communist domination of Hanoi.
By 1956, South Vietnam had become a
self-governing republic and had assumed
its place in the family of nations.
Thwarted in their initial hopes of easy
conquest, the Communists undertook a
campaign of terror and subversion aimed
at undermining the South Vietnamese
Government and social structure. By
1959, a war of covert aggression was well
underway. Without openly declaring
war, the Hanoi government began to in-
filtrate guerrilla fighters and military
equipment from the north, supplement-
ing a base of loyal Communists who had
stayed behind and gone underground af-
ter the 1954 accords. Any thought that
this was a small effort which would soon
end was quickly shown to be false.
In this confusing situation, we cannot
argue-and I do not believe that any per-
son;. devoted to the administration has
argued-that all the invasion is from
outside. There are fifth columnists liv-
ing in South Vietnam. They, too, in-
elude a substantial and significant part
of the Vietnamese population.
9689
In 1960 and 1961, the situation in Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distin-
South Vietnam grew more critical. As guished Senator from Missouri, whom I
one measure of its seriousness-and of very greatly admire, not only. as one of
the character of the attack-aver 3,000 the outstanding experts in this country
civilians, in and out of government, were on our military position, but also as a
killed, and another 2,500 kidnaped in true statesman, who is an expert on our
those 2 years. foreign policy and on our foreign policy
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, position.
will the Senator from Wisconsin yield? The Senator from Missouri is one of
Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield the few Senators who have been Cabinet
to the Senator from Missouri. - officials. He is also a member of both
Mr. SYMINGTON. As usual, the Sen- the Armed Services and Foreign Rela-
ate is listening to a thoughtful and con- tions Committees, and has taken in in-
structive address by the distinguished formed and constructive position con-
Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] stantly in our foreign policy.
on one of the major problems facing this Mr. SYMINGTON. I am grateful for
country today.' the remarks of the Senator from Wis-
I am glad to note at the end of the consin.
Senator's remarks-which I had the COMMUNIST TERROR CAMPAIGN AGAINST
privilege of reading earlier-that he SKILLED, EDUCATED
mentions a speech made by the Assist- Mr. PROXMIRE. The Communists
ant Secretary of State for Far Eastern concentrated their attacks on the skilled
Affairs, William Bundy. That talk was and educated: teachers, doctors, engi-
made in a country town in my State. Al- neers, government officials. By this
though it was given considerable pub- method, they spread terror and severely
licity in the metropolitan newspapers, it damaged the nation's social fabric by
is also important that the problem be eliminating individuals crucial to the
disseminated throughout the country so functioning of civilized society. Infiltra-
that the American people will under- tion from the north increased.
stand the problem better than they do We must remember that this is a new
today. kind of war. This is an entirely different
I am impressed with some of facts and kind of situation than we have ever ex-
figures the Senator is giving today perienced in the past. It is not the kind
which, to be frank, I did not know. of clear-cut situation with which we are
I would ask the Senator inasmuch as accustomed to dealing in our military
he emphasizes the fact that the reason conflicts. It is very hard to find any his-
why we are in South Vietnam is that we torical precedents for the situation which
were asked to come in to help preserve confronts us here.
their freedom-what does the Senator People in many areas came under
believe would be our course of action if Communist control and had to provide
one of the many South Vietnamese gov- food and supplies for the guerrillas.
ernments-and I believe there have been It was obvious that the peacekeeping
13 or 14 since the death of Diem-sug- machinery created by the Geneva Con-
gested that it could handle the situation ference had failed. The United States
better if we left? had been assisting South Vietnam from
Mr. PROXMIRE. I may say to the the start, and at its urgent request in
distinguished Senator from Missouri 1961, our military and economic assist-
that one of the implications of his ques- ance was increased.
tion, which should be noted, is the fact But it is important to bear in mind
that not one of the 13 or 14 governments, that the basis of our presence was en-
some of which have had Buddhist rep- tirely different from that of the French.
resentation, and various kinds of rep- The French were in Vietnam seeking to
resentation, has requested us to leave reestablish a colonial empire.
South Vietnam. Many critics of our Vietnamese posi-
It is clear, of course, that there may tion have asked, If the French could not
be circumstances beyond our control stay, there with several hundred thou-
which would make it necessary for us to t troops, how can we expect to stay
leave. It is not inevitable, and it is not thnd here?
written in destiny, that we are sure to Mr. President, we are in South Viet-
win. Of course, if the South Vietnamese nam on an entirely different basis. The
Government were to ask us to leave our Vietnamese know that we do not intend
position would be seriously weakened. to exploit them, that we do not intend to
It would be tragic. However, what would use them to enrich our own country in
happen under those circumstances would any way. We are there to assist them
be a decision that the President would and to support them. We are just as far
have to make, considering all the factors from being a colonial power as any coun-
and considering what would be the atti- try could be.
tude of the people of South Vietnam and On the other hand, the infiltrators, the
the attitude of the armed forces. invaders from the north, are certainly
However, I believe it is significant that in the old tradition of the empire
the Senator's question implied that not builders,
one of these governments has asked us Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
to leave; in fact, they have all been anx- dent, will the Senator yield?
ious to have us stay there. Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield to the Sen-
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my friend ator from Louisiana.
from Wisconsin for the speech he is mak Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
ing. It is further clarifying some of the dent, I do not have the exact figures at
problems we face in Vietnam, and I also my fingertips, but I believe the RECORD
thank him for his kindness in yielding shows that there are about 600,000 Viet-
to me. ? namese troops fighting for South Viet-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 1
nam at this moment, compared with 26,-
000 Americans over there. Furthermore,
for every casualty we have suffered, the
South Vietnamese themselves have suf-
fered at least 10 casualties. Also, it
should be remembered, that for every
South Vietnamese soldier who has been
wounded or killed in combat, the South
Vietnamese soldiers have killed or
wounded two Vietcongs.
When some people say that the Viet-
namese are not fighting for their coun-
try, it seems to me that statement is dis-
proved by the ratio of their killing or
wounding two Vietcongs for every cas-
ualty that they suffer. To me that indi-
cates that the South Vietnamese are
doing a pretty good Job of fighting for
their country.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is
absolutely correct. I might point out,
also, that not only have the South Viet-
namese engaged In this very difficult war
for many years, but they have also suf-
fered the infiltration and Intimidation
and terror that is so remote from any
experience that we have ever had, in
which the mayors or the leaders of their
little hamlets are tortured and murdered,
and even the South Vietnamese children
of local officials are tortured and mur-
dered to break the continued will to re-
sist.
We must not lose sight of this kind of
terror, torture, and murder.
As the distinguished Senator from
Louisiana has said, the South Vietnamese
soldiers are fighting and are fighting well
and Inflicting more casualties on the in-
filtrators and invaders than they are
themselves suffering. That Is not the
conduct of people who are not willing to
support their friends and defend their
nation. This, I believe, is the real answer
to the question raised by the Senator
from New York [Mr. JAVITS].
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If our coun-
try should pull out, we would be running
out on hundreds of thousands of coura-
geous fighting men who are fighting on
our side, with the result that those peo-
ple would have no hope of being able to
continue their fight against the Com-
munist aggression.
Red China knows that it would con-
front the United States if it got into the
war. Does the Senator have any doubt
that Red China would be using every
method of subversion and infiltration
available to that country if they felt the
United States would stay completely out?
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator from
Louisiana raises an excellent point that
I had not thought of. If it were not for
our presence in South Vietnam, there is
no question that the rich ricefields of
South Vietnam and its potentially very
rich economy would induce the hungry
Chinese to move down, in view of their
philosophy that war should be an instru-
ment of foreign policy.
The Red Chinese have a very militant
kind of government, which would not
hesitate to do exactly what the Senator
has suggested, if it were not confronted
with the kind of language it understands,
and that is the language of real military
power.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I have had an opportunity to read
through the first part of the Senator's
speech, and I regret that -I have not had
an opportunity to read all of It. I agree
with the portion of the speech that I
have been able to read, and I am sure
that I would also agree with the Sena-
tor's entire presentation.
I should like to ask the Senator this
question. If we were to pull out and
start running, can the Senator tell me
where we are supposed to fight, in view
of the fact that we have been trusted
by people who have 600,000 men fighting
in this war, in behalf of a cause that is
very dear to our heart?
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator raises
a good point. It would be far better, in
my opinion, if the war were to end in a
stalemate in South Vietnam, or if it were
necessary for us to stay there 5'or 10 or
15 years, than to retreat and fight else-
where. If the Communists can win this
kind of war of intimidation and violence
and infiltration, they will not stop. Why
should they stop, when they will have
been rewarded? They will continue.
Our present policy of standing up to the
Communists is by far the best way to
achieve peace.
-Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If we pro-
ceed to limit ourselves to fighting the
war on the enemy's terms, after we have
suffered two or three hundred American
casualties, and then proceed to say the
price is too high and desert this friendly
government and put it in the position of
being forced to surrender the 600,000
well-armed troops into the hands of the
enemy, can the Senator from Wiscon-
sin tell me what the attitude of the
Communists would be the next time they
started to infiltrate a friendly nation?
Would they not say, "If we inflict a few
casualties on the Americans"-and they
have been relatively light casualties, if
we relate them to the kind of casualties
that we have been accustomed to suffer-
ing when we have decided to fight-
"they will lose their nerve and courage"?
Is it not true that the Communist doc-
trine is to take over the whole world,
including this country, and that that
doctrine, particulary on the part of the
Chinese Communists, which is voiced by
Hanoi, is that there must be no coexist-
ence, that they must stop at nothing un-
til they have taken over the whole world,
and that the sooner they do it the better?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I could not agree
more with the distinguished Senator
from Louisiana. These are dangerous
policies on our part, but any policies that
we could follow would be dangerous.
We are making a sacrifice. It is a ter-
rible thing when American men lose
their lives. The expense is very great.
But after all, considering the strength
and wealth of this country the burden is
on us in Vietnam is relatively light, not
heavy. If we must give in, if we cannot
win under those circumstances, light as
this burden is, If we have to complain of
a burden when we have tax cuts at
home, when our personal income has
never been higher, when the foreign aid
bill is being cut, and the defense budget
is being cut-if we cannot bear this kind
of burden, the Communists will not be
stopped. Of course, they will continue.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Wisconsin yield?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I am delighted to
yield to the Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. SIMPSON. I have had the ad-
vantage of reading the script of the
speech of the Senator from Wisconsin.
In the main, I agree with him whole-
heartedly. He has done his usually good
job. He is very articulate and persuasive.
One portion of his speech disturbs me,
and I should like to have the Senator
address himself to that portion. The
Senator stated:
Even following the Tonkin Gulf and Pleiku
incidents the President has confined our re-
taliation in size, limited it to military
targets, limited its duration and made it
appropriate to the provocation.
And above-all, he has announced that the
retaliation was for the sole purpose of pre-
venting further aggression.
Does the Senator believe that we can
only fight up to the strength of opposi-
tion and then lie by waiting for the
enemy to gain new strength? Let us
take the example of a prizefighter in the
ring. He does not merely retaliate in
kind. He pours on the heat and tries
to win the bout by his own force. In the
instance about which we are speaking, it
would be the full force of arms.
It seems to this cat-and-mouse busi-
ness is bad for America. If we are in a
war, why do we not conclude it? We
have the strength and power to do so.
Why do we not conclude it and restore
peace to South Vietnam, even at the risk
of a great loss to the North Vietcong?
Mr. PROXMIRE. The question of the
Senator from Wyoming is very helpful.
It is helpful because it defines what I
believe Is the position taken by the ad-
ministration under the circumstances
and the position taken by other people
who feel that we should undertake an all-
out effort and do whatever is necessary
in order to win, even if winning should
mean an invasion of North Vietnam-
and, in my judgment, it might very well
under those circumstances mean draw-
ing China in and being involved in a
major war on the continent. There are
many well-informed and able people like
the Senator from Wyoming who take
that position. I do not take that posi-
tion. It seems to me that is clearly not
the position at the present time of the
administration. The position of the ad-
ministration at the present time appears
to be that we are not trying to win un-
conditional surrender of North Vietnam,
let alone China or Russia. Many people
feel we should never have settled for the
qualified termination of hostilities that
we did in Korea, and that we should have
insisted on unconditional surrender in
Korea.
Others-and I think more wisely-
have felt that that was the only way we
could settle the problem without in-
volving ourselves in a catastrophic war
on the continent of Asia that would have
been endless or would have required our
use of nuclear weapons.
I am inclined to feel that the position
which the administration is taking in
South Vietnam is a halfway position
It is not a position that would go all out
and use all of our weapons, including our
nuclear weapons, and whatever else is
necessary, in order to win. The admin-
istration is taking a position that we
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1965
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
In sumplary, Mr. President, I would
like to commend the senior Senator
from New York for the questions which
he raised ten days ago because I have for
him the highest admiration and affection.
The Senator has made an effective con-
tribution to the debate on Vietnam.
I express the hope that he will elabo-
rate his thoughts, as I am sure he will,
and that he will shed further light on how
we may best go about finding the answers,
not only to the questions which he raises,
but also to the larger questions of a dura-
ble peace in Vietnam and southeast Asia,
as a whole
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield so that I may respond?
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President. I
shall yield, but I shall yield very briefly.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have
asked witnesses many questions in my
day. On' occasion, I have been asked
questions, and sometimes as a lawyer I
have said, "I am glad you asked me that
question."
I am very much reminded of that, as
the Senator has made a very well pre-
pared statement in response to a question
which I asked him,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
the Senator will yield briefly, these re-
marks were prepared a week ago Friday,
in response to. questions raised the pre-
ceding day by the Senator from New
York on this floor.
Mr. JAVITS. 'I thank, my colleague,
but I am prepared to deal with this
question. I should like to do so very
briefly.
I believe there are ways of finding out
about and reporting to the American
people the will to resist by the South
Vietnamese. We hear of more or less
sporadic attempts to resist in one area or
another in South Vietnam, but they are
quite diffused. We do not see an ac-
curate map of areas of resistance. I
think the President, or his spokesmen,,
could do something about locating these
areas, so it could be pointed out to the
American people just how much of this
country is really controlled by the Viet-
cong and what other areas are in control
of the South Vietnamese. Just how
much is there left of the strategic hamlet
,program, for ' example, which we have
supported with' a considerable amount
of money? This is a very important
question?
In addition, there is a large complex of
'activity to get us out which certain
:Buddhists have engaged in that affects
the results as far as the Americans are
concerned and as far as the South Viet- are concerned.
I believe a finding on the will to resist
in South Vietnam would be very con-
;vincing to me, and I think to the Ameri-
can people. I would credit the President
with the greatest good faith in respect to
such a finding so far as policy is con-
!cerned. The question of whether the
+South Vietnamese want the United
States in could very well be answered in
-much the same way by the degree to
which the country still remains in con-
trol of the South Vietnam people, as im-
sportant proof of their will to resist.
Some proof of their will to resist is what
remains to them in control. It deter-
,mines the question of what degree of
.cooperation the United States gives,
whatever may be the regime in power
at the moment. Considering the emana-
'tions of opinions, the great number of
correspondents who are there, and the
many visitors who come here and go
there, I think a window can be kept open
on the country. The central point of my
'remarks is that I affirm a need for a
finding of fact by the'President, based on
,his information.
The Senator from Montana has asked
what I would suggest we do if the South
Vietnamese people are behind the resist-
ance movement. If it is found that a
majority of the people are for resistance,
and that finding is made by the Presi-
dent, we would be .behind that finding.
If a majority of the people have lost the
will to resist, there is a serious question
as to how long the United States can
continue the struggle at this large cost
in money and cost in lives.
With respect to Asian allies giving help,
I did not mean that the President is not
trying. The President may be trying, but
Is the U.S. diplomatic machinery trying
enough, giving enough emphasis and
priority to this aspect? As long as the
President tries ardently that would be
fine. Essentially, my point was raised
not with respect to whether the Presi-
dent has tried, but with respect to the
actual efforts of our Asia and southeast
Asia allies. We are entitled to receive
from them more help than we are get-
ting.
Finally, on the question of negotia-
tion, the Senator from Montana had be-
fore him reference to my recent remarks.
Memory is always poorer than the words
themselves, but my desire and intention
was not to say if the Nation is willing
to negotiate, let it negotiate with dignity,
but rather, that we are ready to negoti-
ate at any time. If I did not say it, I
apologize to the Senator for that. I
think I used somewhere former President
Eisenhower's analogy that we should
walk the extra mile-provided our nego-
tiations are not in a frame of reference
which would sell out the South Vietnam-
ese people. I would like to see an an-
nouncement made, since there is such
confusion about our willingness to nego-
tiate. I have endeavored to indicate that
if the United States will negotiate, it
will be only on the understanding that
it was absolutely sure there are no sell-
outs of the hopes of the South Viet-
namese people.
That, it seems to me, represents a sum-
mation of my thinking in reply to the
Senator's questions.
I will accept his suggestion that I state
in greater detail my views on this matter,
but I thought I should reply to the Sena-
tor's questions at this time.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
yield 2 minutes to the Senator from
Oregon, without losing my right to the
floor.
3687
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I am
deeply sorry that I shall not be able to
remain in the chamber to hear the speech
of the Senator from Wisconsin. I find
myself in deep disagreement with him.
I shall have remarks to make on the sub-
ject later in the week. I am on my way
downtown to make a speech on the "white
paper,". which can be described as Swiss
cheese with holes in it made by the lips
of the administration people to the For-
eign Relations Committee who said time
and again that was a civil war fought by
South Vietnamese rebels largely with
equipment captured from the govern-
ment. Now we are excited because in
recent weeks the North Vietnamese are
going in on a big scale. Why should they
not go in?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that an editorial in the New York
Times of yesterday and Mr. Reston's col-
umn in the New York Times be inserted
at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
and article were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
STORM SIGNALS OVER ASIA
The Johnson administration seems to be
conditioning the American people for a dras-
tic expansion of our involvement in Viet-
nam. The State Department's white paper
accuses North Vietnam of intensified aggres-
sion and stresses that military efforts aimed
solely at the Vietcong guerrillas in the south
no longer suffice.
The logic of all this is that the United
States, which only last week moved from the
role of "adviser" to active and undisguised
combatant in South Vietnam, now feels free
to strike at will-whether by air, sea, or
land-at any targets it chooses in North Viet-
nam. In the 3 tense weeks since the Viet-
cong attack on Pleiku, American policy has
plunged dangerously beyond the one enun-
ciated then by the President and Secretary
McNamara of limiting ourselves to retalia-
tory action and shunning a wider war.
And what has happened to alter our policy?
The assertion that North Vietnam is a prin-
cipal supplier of men and munitions to the
Vietcong is certainly not new, nor is the
charge that the extent of its support is in-
creasing. Such activity by Hanoi constitutes
the sole reason for our being in South Viet-
nam, and has since the United States moved
into the vacuum left by the French with-
drawal in 1954.
Apparently, the major new evidence of a
need for escalating the war, with all the
hazard that this entails, was provided by the
sinking in a South Vietnamese cove earlier
this month of a 100-ton cargo ship loaded
with Communist-made small arms and am-
munition. A ship of that size is not much
above the oriental junk class. The standard
Liberty or Victory ship of World War II had a
capacity of 7,150 to 7,650 tons.
Page after page of similarly minuscule de-
tail about Communist infiltration from the
north merely raises anew the question of
whether massive air strikes would accom-
plish anything except large-scale civilian
casualties in industrial centers and ports.
The question is made sharper by the absence
of any stable government in Saigon to fight
or even to speak in the name of the South
Vietnamese people.
Communist China, the nation whose im-
perialist ambitions the world has most to
worry about, will be a clear gainer from the
ill timing and judgment of our warning to
North Vietnam.. It comes just as the Soviet
Union is about to begin an international
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meeting of Communist parties in Moscow-
a meeting originally called to pronounce Pei-
ping a renegade from Marxist-Leninism.
Washington is now doing precisely what that
most sophiscated of Kremlinologists, George
F. Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to Mos-
cow, cautioned against his Senate testimony
Friday: Forcing the Soviet Union to come
down on the side of Communist China.
Washington and Peiping are in bizarre
tandem as the only major capitals in the
free or Communist worlds openly resistant
to seeking a negotiated settlement of the
Vietnamese conflict now. It is not too late
for the President to make it plain that the
United States is ready to talk as well as fight,
and thus leave China isoalted as the ob-
structor of any attempt to achieve a sound
and enforcible peace.
WASHINGTON: PRESIDENT JOHNSON UNDER
PRESSURE
(By James Reston)
WASHINGTON, February 27.-President
Johnson Is making no excuses for anything
he has done in Vietnam, and is visibly irri-
tated with the critics of his policy.
He knows he is now up against the most
difficult policy decision of his life, and that
all the options open to him In Vietnam are
risky, but this is all the more reason, in his
view, for the country to back the President
and stop the critical chatter.
This Is not a new attitude on the part of
Lyndon Johnson. When he was majority
leader in the Senate, he often criticized Presi-
dent Eisenhower's domestic policies but in-
variably backed him without a murmur on
major foreign policy questions.
THE CONSOLING POLLS
Accordingly, his attitude toward Demo-
cratic Senators who have differed with him
publicly on Vietnam has not been to assume
that they are expressing what they believe to
be a better course of action, but to charge
them with letting him down-sometimes
merely to get themselves in the headlines.
He is particularly sensitive to charges that
he is not talking enough to the American
people about the complexities and risks of
the Vietnamese war. He carries around in
his pocket a series of private polls that pur-
port to show that the vast majority of the
people not only know what he Is doing but
approve what he is doing.
NO EAR FOR CRITICS
The mall coming into the congressional
and newspaper offices here does not support
his polls, but when anybody ventures to
mention this criticism, he insists that the
polls are right, the people understand his
problems better than the newspapers, and
besides, the Congress authorized the action
he has taken, with only two opposing votes.
Lyndon Johnson has gone through other
hard times in his career but nothing like
this. He sat in on the two Cuban crises with
President Kennedy, but he did not have pri-
mary responsibility for the decisions.
The decision to bomb the bases of the
Communist torpedo boats after their attack
on the American Navy was difficult for him
in only one respect. One of the bases was
very close to the Chinese Communist coast,
and in the end he gave the order to hit It.
But he was elaborately calm all through that
night of decision and, anyway, he felt he had
no honorable option but to retaliate.
His present situation is different. All his
opinions now seem unsatisfactory and even
dangerous. If he doesn't keep up the mili-
tary pressure on North Vietnam, his advisers
fear that his first attacks on North Vietnam
will seem a bluff. But if he does, every day
that passes raises the prospect that new
Colnmunits antiaircraft weapons and defen-
sive fighters will be added to the battle.
Usually he is at home with middle-of-the-
road policies, but the middle of this road is
full of dangers. lie does not want to talk
out on negotiationss because this might im-
pair the morale of the South Vietnamese,
and also because he feels it is difficult to
speak about negotiations without setting
conditions that nSght make negotiations all
the more difficult.
Johnson is a poker player and he knows
that the man who raises is always in a more
difficult position than the man who calls. In
Vietnam, it is Johnson who is raising, and
the stakes get higher in this game with every
succeeding play.
In recent days, he has spent a great deal
of his time defending his policies to groups
of Congressmen and newspapermen. He has,
indeed, been running a series of seminars,
with Secretary of Defense McNamara de-
fending the military policy, Secretary of
State Rusk defending the diplomatic process,
and Vice President HUMPHREY and himself
appealing for understanding and unity.
His faith in polls is astonishing, maybe be-
cause the polls were so accurate in predicting
the size of his own electoral victory last
November.
CHURCHILL'S ADVICE
"Nothing is more dangerous," Churchill
once said, "that to live in the tempermantel
atmosphere of a Gallup poll, always taking
one's pulse and taking one's temperature.
There is only one duty, only one safe course,
and that is to try to be-right and not to fear
to do or say what you believe to be right."
President Johnson is undoubtedly doing
that, but it is an agonizing problem for a
man who is not accustomed to losing and not
yet at ease with the devilish complexities of
foreign affairs.
Every American President since the war,
however, seems to have faced a frightful for-
eign policy decision early in his administra-
tion. For President Truman it was whether
to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. For
President Eisenhower it was whether to ex-
pand the war or negotiate a truce in Korea.
For Kennedy it Was the Bay of Pigs adven-
ture in Cuba. And for Johnson it is Viet-
nam.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
wholeheartedly support the President's
policy. I admire the restraint and per-
severance he has shown in carrying it
out.
The present policy offers the best
chance for us to achieve an enduring
peace in this enormously complex situa-
tion.
Mr. President, this policy has been
under serious attack lately.
In his statement as modified last week,
the Secretary General of the United
Nations, U Thant, charged that although
the American people are the best in-
formed in the world, he doubts that even
in the United States is it possible to re-
ceive fully balanced information on Viet-
nam. The Secretary General said that
Americans are not sufficiently aware, and
these are his exact words, "of the serious
risks and dangers implicit in a war course
without political efforts to bring the war
to an end."
Other Senators have seriously ques-
tioned our Vietnam policies. My visits
in recent weeks with hundreds of Wis-
consin people convince me that this pro-
test is widely shared by the American
people.
WHY ARE WE IN SOUTH VIETNAM?
Mr. President, why are we in South
Vietnam? Why are we pouring so much
of our taxpayer dollars into this remote,
far-off land? Why have we ordered
thousands of American soldiers to risk
their lives and, indeed, hundreds have
laid down their lives in this distant cor-
ner of Asia? Why?
Do we want South Vietnam or any part
of it?
The question is so ridiculous that even
the Chinese Communists have not ac-
cused us of it.
It is transparently clear that we have
no desire for any territorial aggrandize-
ment in any part of the world, certainly
not in remote southeast Asia.
Why, then, are we in South Vietnam at
such painful cost?
Do we seek any economic advantage
there?
Has anyone, even the North Vietnam-
ese or the Vietcong, accused us of eco-
nomic exploitation? Are we pursuing
dollar diplomacy?
The answer again is a resounding
"No."
From an economic standpoint, Amer-
ica would be far better off if there were
no Vietnam. We have poured literally
billions of dollars as well as the priceless
lives of some of our finest young men into
South Vietnam.
We will get nothing In return, not a
penny.
Mr. President, if any nation's hands
can be said to be clean, ours are clean in
South Vietnam.
We seek no power, no territory. We
want no money, no oil, no food, no re-
source of any kind in this distant nation.
Why, then, are we there? Why?
Why?
We are there for one very simple rea-
son, Mr. President. We were invited by
the Government of South Vietnam to
come. We were asked to help. So we did.
The Geneva accords formally recognized
South Vietnam as a nation. Its sover-
eignty is established by solemn agree-
ment, ratified by the principal powers of
the world.
That sovereignty has been challenged
by an invasion from outside its bound-
aries. Tl. e fact of aggression has been
proved beyond any doubt, repeatedly-
and of course, most recently, by the white
paper released over the weekend by the
State Department which documented the
facts in great detail and over a period of
time.
It has been proved over and over and
over again virtually every day for more
than 10 years now.
SINGLE AMERICAN MOTIVE: PEACE
But why should we, the U.S. Govern-
ment, become so involved? What is our
motive, if our hands are so clean, if we
desire no territory, no power, no eco-
nomic advantage? What do we want?
Mr. President, we want peace. Peace.
Our record proves that we want peace.
Every action we have taken has been
taken to prevent aggression and restore
peace. Every pound of food-and we
have sent millions of tons-every man-
hour of education in peaceful pursuits-
and we have poured in thousands of man-
years in such education-every dollar
spent to provide health facilities, build
schools, construct roads and improve
agriculture-and we have spent hun-
dreds of millions of dollars for these
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cations for space. We have slit into space
more "devices, more sophisticated in their
instrumentation, more versatile and varied
in their functions than Soviet spacecraft.
Even the superiority which they have claimed
in, rocket thrust will soon be overcome by
our Saturn vehicles.
We must continue an unrelenting pursuit
of knowledge and experience in the fields of
space. If this country, through complacency
or lack of foresight, permitted any other na-
tion to seize ascendancy in space, we would
be relegated to a secondary role not only in
the military area but also in the other prin-
cipal affairs of men.
Since the time of its founding 46 years ago,
the American Legion has devoted itself to
advancing the Nation's interests and its des-
tiny. Today, our destiny is manifest in the
space above us. The same sense of mission
that ignited our strong Nation's westward
expansion a century ago should now be
brought to bear in support of the President's
space objectives.
An imaginative and venturesome spirit
has always been our country's distinguishing
characteristic in its thrust to the summit of
world leadership. I am confident that it will
continue to inspire our people as wesur-
mount the cosmic challenge that lies ahead.
CLOSING BENEDICTION BY FATHER DANIEL E.
POWER, JR., OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON'S PRAYER
I now make it my earnest prayer, that God
would have you, and the State over which
you reside, in his holy protection, that he
would incline the hearts of the Citizens to
cultivate a spirit of subordination and obedi-
ence to Government, to entertain a brotherly
affection and love for one another, for their
fellow Citizens of the United States at large,
and particularly for their brethren who have
served in the Field, and finally, that he would
most graciously be pleased to dispose us all,
to do Justice, to love mercy, and to demean
ourselves with that Charity, humility and
pacific temper of mind, which the Character-
isticks of the Divine Author of our blessed
Religion, and without an humble imitation
of whose example in these things, we can
never hope to be a happy Nation.
Mr. MUNDT. All in all, Mr. President,
today's awards luncheon of the national
department of the American Legion was
a most impressive and significant occa-
sion. Surely, David Sarnoff's informa-
tive address provides us all with both a
challenge and a cause for confidence.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
is there further morning business?
Mr. JAVITS. I suggest the absence of
a quorum.
Mr, MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from New York withhold his
request? We are running short of time,
and the Senator from Wisconsin has a
lengthy speech to make.
Mr. JAVITS. I withhold my request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HAR-
Ris in the chair). Is there further
morning business? If not, morning busi-
ness 1s concluded.
Mr.,PROXMIRE obtained the floor;'
Mr. MANF`IELD. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?
Mr, PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I am
happy to yield to the majority leader,
with the understanding that I will not
lose my right to the floor.
WHITE PAPER ON VIETNAM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
State Department's white paper on Viet-
nam underscores what able American
journalists have been reporting for some
time: that there has been a new and
higher level of North Vietnamese mili-
tary involvement in the conflict in the
South. This is the second time that
the Department has seen fit to issue what
amounts to an official confirmation of
this kind. It will be recalled that in De-
cember, 1961, a white paper was issued
on the same subject. At that time, the
issuance coincided with a marked in-
crease in our indirect military and eco-
nomic aid to South Vietnam. The pres-
ent white paper coincides with still
another major-a geometric increase in
American aid.
In my judgment, the white paper does
not set forth a new policy. It confirms
the necessity uof what has been under-
taken to date by this Government. It
is anew explanation, not a new prescrip-
tion.
The paper helps to make clear why
this. Nation has been compelled to take
steps which it has taken in recent weeks,
if South Vietnam is not to be abandoned,
if the United States is to honor its com-
mitment to help the Vietnamese of the
south to retain a degree of choice in their
future. In that respect, it should satisfy
those who have been insisting that the
President should address an explanation
to the American people as to what is in-
volved in Vietnam. The President, so
far as I can see, is trying to keep a lid on
a dangerous volcano in southeast Asia.
He is not seeking to blow it off. Insofar
as information is concerned, we have had
the white paper, statements from Secre-
tary McNamara and Secretary Rusk,
Ambassador Stevenson, and many other
distinguished members of the adminis-
tration as to what we are doing, and why.
American press coverage of the situation
has been exceptionally extensive and well
informed. Insofar as our policies are
concerned, the President is receiving a
wealth of advice from his administration
and from Senators who have partici-
pated in the highly useful debate on Viet-
nam-and all of them may I say are to
be commended for participating.
The truth of the matter is that the
President has a policy in Vietnam, and
it is not expressed in any single action
or nonaction. He is trying to prevent a
great war in Asia, and he is trying at the
same time to meet a coimmitment to the
people of South Vietnam of many years
standing in a situation which changes
constantly. He seeks to aid the South
Vietnamese people to find a solution to
their difficulties, as did his two predeces-
sors in office. And he seeks a peace in
which freedom in that part of the world
will not become a dead letter. That is
all, even though it is a great deal.
The paper also emphasizes indirectly,
the need for an end to the jealous rival-
ries,`military, and others, which have led
to coup on coup in Saigon since the un-
fortunate and most deplorable assassi-
nation of President Ngo Dinh Diem. If
3685
we are to aid the people of South Viet-
nam in a situation such as is detailed in
the white paper, there must be a dedi-
cated and responsible leadership in South
Vietnam, through which they can be
aided, through which their choice, what-
ever it may be, can be expressed, and
their right to a choice defended.
This Nation-no nation can supply an
alien leadership where only an indigen-
ous leadership can suffice in this day and
age in Asia. Despite the serious inten-
sification of the military conflict, the
problem in all Vietnam is still primarily a
Vietnamese problem.
I thank the Senator from Wisconsin
for yielding.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I am
happy to have yielded to the majority
leader on this subject. My speech is on
the same subject. The majority leader
has discussed the white paper, which I
also intended to discuss.
President Johnson's Vietnam policy is
to restore peace and to help the South
Vietnamese defend their country from
subversion and attack by the Commu-
nists.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator, yield at this point? I wish to
say something about what the major-
ity leader has said.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. I hope to be in the
Chamber for all practical purposes
throughout the Senator's speech. I con-
sider him one of the most thoughtful
Members of the Senate. I want very
much to hear how he feels about this
subject.
I should like to say about the majority
leader's ,statement, just read, that it
raises a serious question, which is: Do
the Vietnamese people really want to
fight for freedom, and do they want us
there? We cannot hold plebiscites in
Vietnam; nonetheless, it is essential that
this question be before us, because I be-
lieve it is basic to every other question as
to whether we stay in South Vietnam or
not. I therefore express the hope that
the President and his spokesmen in Con-
gress, such as the majority leader, will
keep us apprised, so far as information
on this situation is. available to us which
ought to be made public. It is a subject
that is under constant review and is of
constant concern to the American people.
I have read the speech of the Sena-
tor from Wisconsin; and, of course, we
know the position of the majority leader.
I, too, have supported the President. I
do not go along with those who seek ne-
gotiation as a way to get out. We must
fight this problem through until there is
some result consonant with our objec-
tives. I know there are tragic losses, and
that we all must bear them. As the Sen-
ator feels, and as I know I do, we only
wish we could go there and do the job
ourselves. It would be so much easier
than standing here and saying that the
struggle must_go on. However, I feel that
essentially there is a majority in South
Vietnam who are interested in fighting
for freedom, and that they want us there.
I again address an appeal to the Pres-
ident. I do not do so to imply that he'is
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not taking action or will not do so. How-
ever, what the Senator from Montana has
said bears so heavily on the subject that
I hope we shall be kept, as far as pos-
sible, closely in touch with that aspect
of the matter.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield without losing his
right to the floor?
Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have been considering what the dis-
tinguished senior Senator from New
York said on Thursday, February 18,
at which time he raised similar ques-
tions which I think are entitled to an
answer.
One of those questions was, of course,
whether the President should take to
the airwaves to inform the American
people on the situation in Vietnam and
our policy with respect thereto. I have
stated since, and I reiterate, that in all
honesty I cannot see the need or desir-
ability for such a course of action and
statement at this time. But getting
down to specifics, if the Senator from
Wisconsin will allow me, I would recall
that on Thursday, 10 days ago, the dis-
tinguished Senator from New York [Mr.
JAVrTS] joined in a debate on the Viet-
namese situation.
As the Senator from New York knows,
I hold him in the highest esteem and I
have great respect and admiration for
his knowledge and judgment in ques-
tions of foreign relations. We have
from time to time engaged in colloquies
on certain subjects in this particular
field, and I have invariably emerged
from them with an enrichment of my
own understanding. So what I say is
not in criticism of the recent remarks
of the Senator. It is for purposes of
clarification.
The Senator will recall other collo-
quies which we had a year or so ago.
Unfortunately, I do not have the REC-
oRAS here covering these colloquies, but
they are in my office. When I sought to
examine certain premises and policies
with respect to Vietnam or southeast
Asia, the Senator's great concern was
not so much with what I was suggest-
ing, but rather with the possibility that
it might be misconstrued.
The Senator noted, as I recall, that my
remarks might erroneously be inter-
preted as an advocacy of a pullout or the
abandonment of solemn commitments.
With all due respect, I would suggest that
a similar misconstruction could be placed
on the remarks of the Senator in his
talk on February 18, although I per-
sonally didnot so interpret them. But,
lest there be any doubt that the Senator
from New York stands foursquare be-
hind the President, I would point out
that he did vote for the Vietnamese res-
olution on August 7, 1964, as he has
stated many times. Part of the resolu-
tion reads:
The Congress approves and supports the
determination of the President as Com-
mander in Chief to take all necessary meas-
ures to repel any armed attack against the
forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression.
As I said, the Senator from New York
voted-for that resolution. So there ought
to be no doubt that he supports fully
and completely the military actions
which the President has felt compelled
to take in Vietnam.
With that as background, I should
like to commend the Senator for raising
certain questions on February 18 with
respect to the present situation In Viet-
nam.
First, the Senator from New York
asked the President whether the ma-
jority of the people in South Vietnam
are determined to fight for their free-
dom. This is very pertinent indeed, for,
as President Johnson has said, our ob-
jective in South Vietnam is to help the
people of that country defend their free-
dom. May I say in all frankness that
the inability of their leaders to form a
stable government, as evidenced by at
least 13 coups, or attempted coups, in
less than 16 months, the last being about
2 weeks ago, is not a source of encourage-
ment.
I would say to the distinguished Sen-
ator from New York the hour now is late
for his question. I would ask him: How
do you find out now, while the American
forces are becoming the prime targets of
the Vietcong, whether the Vietnamese
people are determined to fight for their
freedom, especially when their leaders
compound the difficulty by their feuds
and struggles for prestige and power?
Do you take a Gallup poll? Do you have
a congressional investigation? This is a
very serious question. But how in the
present circumstances do you set out to,
answer It? And if the answer could be
obtained and if it were found that the
Vietnamese people are not determined
to fight for their freedom, what would
the Senator suggest that the President
do? Would he have the President nego-
tiate out, or simply pullout, or move in
further?
The Senator could make a great con-
tribution, I think, not only by raising
the questions, but also by exploring the
implications of the answers.
Second, the distinguished Senator
from New York asked whether the peo-
ple of South Vietnam actually want the
United States in their country. This,
too, is a vital question. But I would
most respectfully suggest that it is diffi-
cult to consider this question now, while
the guns are being fired at Americans,
and Americans are losing their lives in
increasing numbers. The time to have
examined this question with the dis-
passion that it warrants was months
ago.
But the Senator, as far as I can recall,
generally expressed the view in his col-
loquies with me a year ago that the ex-
amination of any such vital questions
would invariably introduce worldwide
doubts as to our steadfastness. How
much more would that be the case in the
present circumstances?
So I would say to the Senator with all
due respect that his question is likely to
remain rhetorical unless he can also
focus attention on it and suggest to the
President ways in which it can be in-
telligently answered while the fighting
Is In progress.
Third, the Senator from New York
asked whether the United States has
done everything possible to get our Asian
allies-Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Thailand, and so forth, to help
in the fighting. Here the answer` is
plain. Everything possible has been
tried as it was in 1954, when President
Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles were con-
fronted by a similar problem, as it was
in 1961, by the late President Kennedy,
with respect to a crisis in Laos at that
time. The response has been very
meager in so far as military assistance
to Vietnam is concerned.
So I would say to the Senator that If
he feels we must have significant inter-
national or Asian support as a condition
for remaining in Vietnam in a limited
conflict, there is little sign that it is go-
ing to materialize. In present circum-
stances, sacrifices of life and resources
insofar as they are borne by other than
Vietnamese are going to be continued to
be borne almost wholly by the United
States, as they have been for a long
time.
Finally, the distinguished Senator
from New York asked that if the United
States is willing to negotiate, will it nego-
tiate with dignity, and not at the expense
of the South Vietnamese people. The
phrasing of the question reveals an un-
certainty in the mind of the Senator,
which I must confess I do not understand,
and which I find somewhat disturbing.
I cannot imagine President Johnson,
or any President, entering into negotia-
tions other than with dignity and honor.
Did not President Truman negotiate with
dignity and honor in Korea? Did not
President Eisenhower, when he continued
these same negotiations which led to a
cease-fire, insist upon dignified and hon-
orable negotiations? Does the Senator
from New York really doubt that Presi-
dent Johnson, if he felt negotiations de-
sirable, would negotiate with any less
dignity and honor, or with less aware-
ness of the realities in the Vietnamese
situation?
I do not believe that the Senator from
New York thinks that the President
would repudiate our obligations to the
Vietnamese People. Who has suggested
that we should?
Certainly, the senior Senator from
Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] made clear in his
recent speech, for example, his support
of the President's military actions, as did
the Senator from New York. In his
argumentation in this Chamber a few
days ago, Senator CHURCH stated ex-
plicitly that, "Having made a solemn
commitment to Saigon, we intend to keep
it.,,
To suggest that negotiations be con-
sidered, is not to break a Commitment,
as the Senator from New York well
knows; in some situations, negotiations
may well be the best way to keep a com-
mitment. And despite the possibility of
misconstruction, I would say to the
Senator from New York that any sug-
gestions which he may have as to how
negotiations, both dignified and honor-
able, may be applied in this situation
to bring the bloodshed' to an end would
be welcomed.
I, for one, would urge him to make
such suggestions.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
in acreage has been made. In fact, the ,rec-
ommendation is for an increase in acreage
solneghat beyond that which the current ap-
propriation would purchase.
My plea to you, gentlemen, is to give us
the funds to make this acquisition immedi-
ately. The time is late. The city govern-
ment of Greensboro already has turned down
two rezoning requests for property adjacent
to the park in order to preserve the land for
purchase by the Park Service. In addition,
the city government of Greensboro recently
purchased five areas adjacent to the park
which was threatened for development. In
addition, the city of Greensboro has expressed
e willingness to purchase some additional
land adjacent to its own city park in order
to join up with land to be purchased by the
Federal Government in order to give a large
continuous park area surrounding the battle.
ground site.
Our individual citizens and our city gov-
ernment have exhibited their good faith and,
Indeed, have invested money in the prospect
that this park can be increased. The amount
contained in the budget request is, we feel,
a modest request, considering the greatness
of the need; but it is a vital request which,
if granted, can save this park from encroach-
ment, and eventual engulfment by undesir-
able commercial and industrial development.
= In addition, an enlarged park would given
the National Parks Service a better oppor-
tunity to tell the historic story of the Battle
of Guilford Courthouse. At the present
time, a road runs directly through the park;
and there is little room for a scenic drive or
for the re-creation of-sections that would
have been familiar with those in the battle.
With enlargement of the park, the en-
trances can be protected. The city of
Greensboro has plans for relocating the road
through the park to the north. A loop drive
through the battlefield area could then be
constructed; and as a long-range project, the
recreation of the village of Guilford Court-
house has been suggested. All of this would
give our citizens and those devoted to our
historic heritage everywhere a dramatization
of the brave deeds that took place during this
Battle of Guilford Courthouse..
We have been advised of the support of the
entire 11-man congressional delegation of
the State of, North Carolina, as well as our
2 Senators. We hope you gentlemen will
look with favor upon this budget request for
Guilford Courthouse National Military Park,
and help us to acquire this historic land
before it is lost to us forever.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity
to appear before you today.
Hon. Frances P. Bolton
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WILLIAM H, AYRES
Tuesday, February 9, 1965
Mr. AYRES. Mr. Speaker, we are
justifiably proud of the many distin-
guished sons that the State of Ohio has
furnished to these legislative halls. We
are equally proud of that eminent
daughter of our great State whose 25th
anniversary of service, I would call to
your attention.
The Honorable FRANCES P. BOLTON was
elected' at a special election to fill the
unexpired term of her late husband,
Chester WC. Bolton, and took her oath of
office on February 27, 1940. That most
able Member of this body served five
terms with great distinction.
I need not detail the entire legislative
career of the most competent gentle-
woman from Ohio. Her capability as a
Member of this House is fully recognized
by us all.
As senior ranking Republican member
of the Committee of the House on For-
eign Affairs, she has demonstrated that
she is indeed possessed with outstanding
diplomatic ability. Her capability in
this field has received recognition, not
only here in our country but throughout
the world. I am of the firm conviction
that the gentlewoman from Ohio [Mrs.
BOLTON] would be a most able Secretary
of State.
I know of no one who has a greater
knowledge of the complex problems of
the newly founded nations of the con-
tinent of Africa. She has studied these
with great diligence and has traveled in
that continent to improve her knowledge.
I need not speak of her personal at-
tributes. Here indeed is a most gracious
lady. I wish to here acknowledge the
aid and good advice that she gave me
when I first came to the House of Repre-
sentatives. Now 15 years later, I still
rely on her good judgment.
I would not have you think that she
has confined all of her activities to the
field of foreign affairs. Her great inter-
est has brought fine advances in the
fields of education and health. Her
great modesty prevents us from learning
of the many philanthropic things that
she has originated and continues to
support.
I have often heard it said that the gen-
tlewoman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON] is a
great inspiration to all of the women of
the world. Certainly she has shown that
women can be most successful in public
service. I do say that the Honorable
FRANCES P. BOLTON Is an inspiration to all
Americans, men and women alike.
Here is a truly great American.
Samuel Hughes Morgan
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF,
HON.. G. ELLIOTT HAGAN
OF GEORGIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, February 15, 1965
Mr. HAGAN of Georgia. Mr. Speaker,
frequently a single family, over several
generations, can make what is a vital
Contribution to an area and State. And
all too frequently the importance of this
contribution to the life and economy of
the area is overlooked. Recently, an
outstanding member of such a family in
my district passed on. On that occasion,
a noted Georgia editor wrote a tribute
which I would like to share with my col-
leagues.
SAMUEL HUGHES MORGAN
(By John L. Sutlive)
Regrettably, and all too young, another
member of the public-spirited Morgan fam-
ily of Effingham and Chatham Counties has
passed from the Georgia scene. lie was
A881
Samuel H. Morgan, whose recent death at
the age of 59 stopped a career that had fol-
lowed the pattern set by his forebears.
This is a pattern of service to God, to
country, to fellow men. The saga of the
Morgan family is inspiring. It runs back
into early American history and in the more
recent years has been carried on by the gen-
erations headed by the late Samuel H. Mor-
gan, the senior. Mr. Morgan and his chil-
dren had a tradition to live up to, and they
heeded unhesitatingly the call of character
and responsibility.
As is not unusual on a team, and we apply
that term to the Morgan family in Its best
sense, there are members whose works are
better known publicly than others, although
each member of the team makes his valuable
contribution to the whole. The senior Mr.
Morgan served well in several public areas-
his church, education, and the development
of Georgia's economy. His sons and daugh-
ter had the benefit and the inspiration of
sound paternal and maternal precept and
example and in discharging the obligations
of their generation they did not fail.
Samuel Hughes Morgan, who to countless
friends was simply and affectionately "Sam,"
was the youngest of the Morgan brothers.
As a lad he lived in the home place at Guy-
ton but, following his graduation from high
school there, spent most of his life in Savan-
nah, The interests that had long stirred the
family found active appreciation in him. He
had served on the Georgia Forestry Commis-
sion and quietly associated himself with
many altruistic community and Individual
efforts. His was the quiet way of service,
sincere and effective.
Sam Morgan was the last of his generation
in the family business, which now comes un-
der the guidance of the third generation of
kinsmen. If we were to sum up his philos-
ophy of life, It mould be to repeat his fre-
quent greeting: "What can I do to help
you?" The can be no finer motto.
Vietnam-White Paper
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON, HERBERT TENZER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 9, 1965
Mr. TENZER. Mr. Speaker, I have
introduced today a concurrent resolution
authorizing the publication as a House
Document, of the Department of State
white paper relating to North Vietnam's
campaign to conquer South Vietnam-
Department of State Publication No.
7839.
The document sets forth in clear and
concise form the case against North
Vietnam and the Communist aggression
to take control of South Vietnam, and
should be made available to those who
want to know the facts.
This weekend's mail brought many re-
quests from my constituents asking for
an explanation of our involvements in
southeast Asia. The Department of
State white paper sets forth the reasons
for our commitment to defend South
Vietnam-a commitment made in 1954.
If our foreign policy is to succeed it
must have not only bipartisan support,
but the support of our elected represen-
tatives and the American people. To
insure such, bipartisan support we must
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX March 1
make certain that the American people "brought down the house with cheers and
are aware of the underlying reasons and ovations."
the facts which justify this country's Alfonso Martinez Dominguez, leader of
Mexico's Chamber of Deputies; Senator Man-
commitments abroad. uel Tello, formerly Foreign Secretary and
The solution to the Vietnam conflict is onetime Ambassador to Washington, and
not offered by the Department of State other kingpins of the 24-member Mexican
in this white paper. It does not call for delegation to La Paz, all hailed WRIGHT'R
positive results of
unprovoked escalation of the war in then day discussion.
Vietnam or for withdrawal of U.S. Senator WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Ore-
servicemen. The white paper provides gon, and chairman of the Latin American
the facts and the proof of Communist Subcommittee of the Senate's Foreign Rela-
aggression so that our citizenry may be tions Committee, said the La Paz parley was
able to judge the advisability of our role the best of all the conferences held an-
in southeast Asia and the future Course nually since the interparliamentary as-
of our defense of freedom in that area of sembly started in Guadalajara In February
the globe. 1961.
I urge my colleagues to support the MORSE declared WRIGHT "wowed them" by
concurrent resolution so that this doCU- speaking Spanish at the Governor's dinner
and his report on social problems between
ment may be made available and distri- the United States and Mexico was a "fine
buted upon request. job." Senator ERNEST GRUENING, Democrat,
of Alaska, said WRIGHT'S work in the as-
sembly was "magnificent and his speech in
Spanish was one of the most eloquent I have
Jim Wright's Brand of Diplomacy Wins ever heard."
A shower of laurels also came from the
-Bravos
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GRAHAM PURCELL
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 1, 1965
Republican side.
Representative ALFHONzo BELL of Cali-
fornia said: "To put it in the vernacular,
Jim was the main star of our whole delega-
tion. We of the United States scored heavily
in improving and cementing our good rela-
tions with our Mexican neighbors. A sub-
stantial part of this was due to Representa-
tive WRIGHT'S warmth, friendliness, and hon-
esty in his statements."
Representative F. BRADFORD MORSE, of Mas-
Mr. PUHCELL. Mr. Speaker, I would sachusetts, declared WRIGHT'S performance
like to commend my friend, colleague, In the interparliamentary conference was a
and fellow Texan, the Honorable Jim "perfectly outstanding job."
WRIGFIT, for his outstanding work as a "I am not a member of Jim's party,"
MORSE added, of the U.S. delegation to the Paz) , "but his contribution ( M n-
recent Fifth Annual United States- bar ba made me mighty proud t a of Congress, and indeed, to be an Amemeri-
Mexico Interparliamentary Conference. can."
This was the third consecutive year in The report stressed the desire of both
which Mr. WRIGHT has been appointed United States and Mexican lawmakers to im-
by the Speaker as a delegate to this im- prove understanding and friendship and "a
portant yearly meeting between law- greatly expanded program of social, cultural,
makers of the United States and Mexico. and technical interchanges, an increasing
I think perhaps the best indication of flow of private tourism and the steady appli-
cation of statesmanship to the solution of
his effectiveness at the most recent con- the remaining problems which beset our
ference is the manner in whichhis per- common border."
formance was reported In the daily press. WRIGHT said both the United States and
I commend to my colleagues the follow- Mexico had only "scratched the surface" In
ing two articles-the first from the Fort educational interchanges and that greater
Worth Star-Telegram, the second from emphasis should be placed on increasing the
the fort Worth Press. number of students studying outside their
[From the Fgrt worth (Tex.) Star-Telegram own country, and a people-to-people gro-
- gram.
WRIGHT BRAND or DIPLOMACY WINS BRAVOS the Pan American Health Organization to
(By Larry Allen) speed up the eradication of diseases and their
LA PAZ, MrxIco.-Congressman JIM WRIGHT causes.
of Fort Worth stole the show at the Fifth On the question of a new United States-
United States-Mexico Interparliamentary Mexico pact to allow Mexican farmhands
Conference just concluded in this capital (braceros) to work in the United States, re-
city of the Baja (Lower) California territory. placing the one that expired last Decem-
WRIGHT captured acclaim not only by out- ber 31, WRIGHT'S committee advocated:
lining clear-cut proposals for further ce- Guarantees that wage rates shall not be dis-
menting the "never better" relations between ruptive of prevailing rates or job opportuni-
his country and Mexico, but also by saying ties among U.S. workers, and protection
what he thought in warm, precise words that against "discrimination, mistreatment, or
Mexican officials and lower California's citi- unjust exploitation of Mexican workers."
spoken in virtually flawless Spanish. (From the Fort Worth (Tex.) Press,
As a matter of fact, .his Mexican audiences Feb. 21, 19651
insisted WRIGHT'S Spanish was "perfect." FORT WORTH SOLON CREDrrED WITH AGREE-
He smilingly contended, however, he still has MENTS-WRIGHT DRAws PRAISE FOR WORK
much to learn before that adjective would IN MEXICO
be applicable.
Anyhow, WRIGHT, chosen from 24 U.S. Sen- (By Terrance W. McGarry)
ators and Representatives to say "thank you" LA PAZ., Mexico.-Even as a national news
to Gov. Bonifacio Salinas Leal and other magazine was speculating last week that
Mexican hosts for the dazzling reception ac- Fort Worth's Representative JIM WRIGHT
corded to the Washington contingent, did it may make a Senate bid next year, the young
so masterfully at a farewell dinner that he Congressman, began building a reputation as
an effective behind-the-scenes force at the
international level.
WRIGHT was one of the 21 U.S. Congress-
men who met with 25 Mexican Congressmen
in the fifth - interparliamentary conference
between the two nations in the Baja Cali-
fornia city of La Paz. -
The news magazine said two Democrats
in Texas see him as their -best bet to unseat
Republican JOHN TowER.
Congressmen from both countries said
privately he deserved a major share of the
credit for several of the agreements of the
two-nation conference.
Chief among them was the virtually unan-
imous consensus by the two delegations that
the bracero agreement should be renewed.
WRIGHT headed the American side on the
committee that discussed the bracero situa-
tion, and emerged as the spokesman for the
five-man coalition of border State Senators
and Representatives that pushed hard to get
that consensus.
The committee's final report, written by
WRIGHT, spoke optimistically of "any and
all future (bracero) agreements."
Before the conference began, the Mexican
delegation was reported to be preparing to
push for stiffer controls and more stringent
labor department supervision in any future
bracero agreement.
By the time it ended, both sides said the
Mexican delegates would willing back a re-
newal of the contract under its old terms.
WRIGHT's delivery of the committee re-
port to the concluding session of the con-
ference drew the loudest round of applause
of the evening. It took him several min-
utes to get back to his seat from the stage
as he worked his way through the delegates
waiting to congratulate him.
WRIGHT was picked to deliver the final
words of the U.S. delegation, a speech of ap-
preciation given by the Governor of southern
Baja California after the conference of .-
cially ended.
One of the things that impressed several
Mexican delegates was WRIGHT'S use of
Spanish occasionally outside the committee
sessions. (The sessions were conducted with
translators and the use of U.N.-style
earphones.)
"We know Mr. GONZALEZ and Mr. MoN-
TOYA (Representative HENRY GONZALEZ, Dem-
ocrat of Texas, and Senator JOSEPH MONTOYA,
Democrat, of New Mexico) both Mexican-
Americans, speak Spanish, but they learned
it at home, as children," said one Mexican
deputy. --
"But for Mr. WRIGHT to speak Spanish
means he must have taken the time and
trouble to study the language, and practice
it. This demonstrates a real desire to work
toward a closer understanding."
Hon. Frances P. Bolton
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
_HON. J. WILLIAM STANTON
or OHIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, February 25, 1965
Mr. STANTON. Mr. Speaker, it is
with great pleasure that I rise at this
time to extend my own personal congrat-
ulations and those of the 11th Congres-
sional District of Ohio to the Honorable
FRANCES P. BOLTON on the occasion of
the anniversary of her 25th year as a
Member of the -Congress of the. United
States.
It is most appropriate that the people
from the 11th Congressional District pay
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1965_,., CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENIMX A883
tribute to Mrs. BOLTON on this grand cc-
casion because most of the 11th Congres-
sional District as It is now constituted
w0s iyf presefited in Congress"2ryears ago
by this most gracious and most capable
Congresswoman.
.I believe, that it would .be of interest, to
my -fellow Members of Congress that,
with the exception of 6 years, members
of the Bolton family have represented
the county of take in Congress since
March 4, 1929.
My first recollection of the Honorable
Chester"C, Bolton was on the occasion
of a >i'lag Day, speech in the city of
Painesville some 33 years ago when I re-
member my father telling me that we
were going down to the city park so that
I might have an occasion to hear one
of the great leaders of our times, the
Honorable Chester C. Bolton, give the an-
nual Flag Day address.
It is with. great pleasure that I ex-
tend my warmest congratulations to
Mrs. BOLTON, with the hope that the Good
Lord, who has been so kind to her in the
past, will allow her to stay with us for
who are willing and prepared to haul down
the U.S. flag and put up foreign flags want
peace at any price.
The Vietnamese people, all but the profit-
eers of war, want peace. And it is probable
that the great majority of them want peace
at any price, They do not share either our
ideals or our ambitions for them.
The French, who have maintained busi-
ness, agricultural, and cultural interests in
Vietnam despite their defeat by the Vietminh
in 1954," want peace for their own practical
political and sentimental reasons, but they
hope to see and perhaps to influence a nego-
tiated peace. They are convinced that we
cannot, win a war that they failed to win
with 400,000 troops, at least half of them
French regulars.
The Chinese don't want peace in South
Vietnam. They want the United States to
get hurt. And they want to end up with
greater influence in southeast Asia than
to come to the United States and learn about
life here.
And please, Mr. President, stop asking
these people to invite you to see their great
land and people. Do not embarrass us.
Instead, help us by example to show our
respect to our heroic dead and to the fine
young men who are doing their duty, as they
have learned to do their duty, in battle even
today and tomorrow and in the days to come.
-A.G..
I especially like the magnificent idea
that we try leading the world by ex-
ample, in a manner at least as exemplary
as the young men fighting and dying for
us and for principle in the stinking
jungles of a far-off country about which
most Americans could care less.
'
We Do Not Envy President in Dilemma of
HON. BURT L. TALCOTT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 1, 1965
Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, to better
appreciate the dilemma of the admin-
istration in Vietnam, we all ought to
ponder the alternatives available to` us
now. One of the most "astute and
thoughtful dissertations on this subject
was, made in an editorial by Allen Grif-
fin, president of the Monterey Peninsula
Herald, dated February 18, 1965.
Under unanimous consent I insert
Colonel Griffin 's editorial at this place in
the RECORD:
WE Do NOT ENVY PRESIDENT IN DILEMMA OF
VIETNAM
What Is U.S. policy toward the war in Viet-
nam? The policy is as undeclared as the war
is.
It is entirely possible that between the
time this column is being written and the
time it is printed, the President of the United
States will c411 an unscheduled press con-
ference and announce U.S. policy toward
the war in South Vietnam, that has moved
over the border' to southern areas of North
Vietnam, causing worldwide repercussions.
Here to request clarification is French For-
eign Minister Couve de Murville. He is re-
questing information as to policy, that has so
far been denied the American people al-
though the American press has vigorously
pressed for a statement of policy.
Meanwhile, splendid American soldiers and
airmen are'befng lost in increasing numbers,
gallantly meeting the call of duty in a war
increasingly difficult for them to understand.
These meii are'tl a salt of our earth. They
will do their duty. They believe in their
country. But they are modern men, and
they have the right to know.
There is one thing certain: the American
people want peace. However, only those few
Moscow.
The Russians don't want peace in South Teenage Drinking in New York
Vietnam unless it can be arrived at through
humiliation of the United States. They are
shipping and delivering arms to bring down
American planes. They are providing aid
and comfort to our minor enemy, but they
and China are the major enemies.
Would any American not drunk or sick
with political ambition enjoy being President
of the United States under this condition?
We don' think so. How would any reader of
this newspaper like to make a choice of
possible decisions?
Here are some alternatives:
1. Escalate the war. Send American
doughboys or marines to guard our airbases
and installations. " Extend bombing in a
northerly direction, testing the will of the
minor enemy. Will that stop the Vietcong
ground attacks or slow them down? What's
your opinion?
2. Ask the" British again (as we did in
Korea) to plead with the Russians to act' as
intermediaries to bring about a cease-fire,
an armistice, and negotiations for peace. The
negotiations in `Korea have worked, so far.
Those made under the auspices of the Hon-
orable Averill Harriman in Laos did not work.
The arrangement dividing South and North
Vietnam also failed to work, but the blame
for that may be divided.
3. Escalate the war to the point that the
Chinese enter it In Vietnam and Korea; then
knock out the Chinese nuclear development
plants and other means they have to build
a nuclear capability, because within 5 or 6
years or less China and Russia will be able
to whipsaw the United States into a state of
perpetual tension, no matter how they hate
one another. But-when the first nuclear
bombs descend upon China, what will the
Russians do? They hate the Chinese, but
would the balloon go up?
4. Move up our war effort only to the point
where our men die trying to maintain a
status quo, not winning, not losing (any-
thing but their lives), while we wait for the
breaks. Time is on whose side?
5. Pull out through a means to be devised,
although this may mean the beginning of
another war of liberation in Thailand, in
which we would again be committed on an
even more difficult frontier, trying to save a
gentle people who have no love for war and
who have preserved themselves through the
generations by patient negotiations and
friendly wiles. Not a powerful, tough-fight-
ing ally such as the South Koreans were
under Syngman Rhee. And then, a stepup
of liberation in the Philippines, and so forth.
There is only one piece of advice we would
care to give President Johnson in the face
of these disturbing problems:
Please, Mr. President, for the sake of the
dignity of your office and of the American
people, stop asking the temporary rulers of
Russia, Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin or
his boss, Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev,
HON. FLORENCE P. DWYER
OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 1, 1965
Mrs. ' DWYER. Mr. Speaker, on
Thursday, February 25, 16 of our col-
leagues joined me in introducing iden-
tical concurrent resolutions expressing
the sense of the"Congress that New York
State should raise its minimum legal
drinking age from 18 to 21 in conformity
with the laws of all its neighboring
States-a highly significant display of
the concern with which the people we
represent view the harmful effects of
New York's teenage drinking law.
This weekend. we have received fur-
ther evidence of New York's irrespon-
sibility in the form of a report to the
Governor of Connecticut by the State's
teenage liquor law coordination commis-
sion based on a 2-year study of the teen-
age drinking problem in that State.
It is evident from a reading of the
story published this morning by the New
York Herold Tribune, which I include
herewith as a part of my remarks, that
the commission's study was thoroughly
and responsibly done. The commission
has recommended both a tightening of
Connecticut's own laws and, in self-de-
fense, an increase in New York's legal
drinking age.
New York's law, the commission pro-
tested, "acts as a magnet drawing teen-
agers into New York and acts as open in-
vitation and attractive nuisance."
The Herald Tribune story follows:
A CONCLUSION ON TEEN DRINKING PARENTS'
FAULT
HARTFORD, CoNN.-A special State commis-
sion that spent 2 years studying the problem
of teenage drinking has come up with a con-
clusion: Parents are mostly to blame for the
drinking practices of their children.
The teenage liquor law coordination com-
mission submitted its report to Gov. John N.
Dempsey over the weekend. Its key recom-
mendation to curb drinking among tenagers:
A law should be passed. .
The commission recommended that since
"Connecticut law does not forbid minors to
drink," but merely forbids adults to serve or
sell them liquor, the State needs a new law
making it illegal for minors "to knowingly
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX March 1
possess alcoholic beverages without parental
consent."
The effect of the proposed law would be
that parents could be brought into court, if
their children got into trouble while drink-
ing, to testify whether they had knowledge
of the drinking and approved of it.
The commission recommended that "all
adults, in the conduct of their business, their
affairs, and in their home life, recognize that
their (own) drinking practices influence to
a great degree teenagers in their imitation
of adult drinking."
The commission report continued: "Teen-
age drinking is learned experience where the
youngster is attempting to emulate the adult
to be accepted by his peers. If parents and
States differ widely in attitude toward uni-
form behavior in this regard, we cannot ex-
pect laws to be respected."
What can adults do to keep their children
on the wagon? "Adults, especially parents,
the commission said, "are urged to consider
carefully their drinking customs and prac-
tices and to engage responsibly in them in
light of their influence on minors."
As an "example of the kind of practice
that might well be discontinued," the com-
mission noted "the ;custom of serving chil-
dren simulated cocktails in bars, restaurants,
and homes."
The commission also took a swipe at New
York State for continuing to permit persons
18 to 21 years old to buy liquor legally in
bars and package stores.
"This law acts as a magnet drawing teen-
agers into New York and acts as open in-
vitation and attractive nuisance," the com-
mission report said.
Connecticut and New Jersey have long
urged New York to raise its minimum age
to 21, to match their own statutes, but the
New York Legislature has turned a deaf ear.
There are pressures from within and with-
out New York State, in the current session
of the legislature, to raise the drinking age,
and there are six bills on file to accomplish
this. But there seems little _.chance of the
legislation getting through.
New York's Governor Rockefeller, who has
opposed past, attempts to raise the drinking
age, claims that studies of teenage drinking
patterns across the country have shown
youngsters pick up the habit in their homes
at the average age of 14.
The Connecticut commission studying the
problem was obviously in agreement on that
point.
Drinking, the commission said, seems to be
an American social heritage, and children
get on to it at an early age."
The commission also dipped briefly into
the problem of narcotics addiction among
teenagers, indicating drinking is connected
with that problem.
It suggested that another commission be
set up to make another 2-year study-this
time on narcotics-since it found that some
teenagers "have gone to drugs for a greater
kick than is provided by alcohol.."
Need for an Inter-American Approach
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. DANTE B. FASCELL
OF FLORIDA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March .1, 1965
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, for more
than a decade following World War II a
succession of rapid-fire emergencies-
Greece, the Marshall plan, the Suez
situation, the Berlin airlift, Laos,
Lebanon, the Hungarian revolt, Quemoy
and Matsu, sputnik-riveted our atten-
tion on Europe, the Middle East and Asia.
In the process, developments in Latin
America were largely ignored by the news
media. At the same time, interest in
Latin America among our academic
community waned as more prestige be-
came attached to studies of other
regions.
Fortunately, the period of indifference
to our Latin American neighbors has
ended. Universities, foundations, and
Government agencies now are attaching
more importance to an understanding of
the vast region stretching from the Rio
Grande to the Straits of Magellan.
I am pleased to report that the
University of Miami is making a special
contribution to the effort to increase
inter-American comprehension. The
University of Miami has become the
headquarters for the Inter-American
Academy, a group founded to foster bet-
ter understanding and cooperation
through cultural exchange between dis-
tinguished scholars, teachers, writers,
and leaders of the Western Hemisphere.
The University has joined with the Inter-
American Academy in publishing the
Journal of Inter-American Studies, a
quarterly publication which includes
scholarly articles representing all phases
of inter-American affairs.
With volume VII, No. 1, dated January
1965, the Journal of Inter-American
Studies makes its debut in an attractive
new format for which the University of
Miami Press is to be commended. The
edition contains an article by Dr. Henry
King Stanford, president of the Univer-
sity of Miami, which sets forth the pur-
poses and goals of the Inter-American
Academy and Journal. According to Dr.
Stanford:
We have no choice but to see our futures
as inextricably joined. We have no choice
but to study each other and to learn from
each other. Even the very diversity that
exists among us can be understood only as
we pool our knowledge and research, only as
we study ourselves comparatively.
I strongly endorse Dr. Stanford's
views on the need for an inter-American
approach as well as recommend the
Journal of Inter-American Studies to all
serious observers of hemisphere develop-
ments.
Dr. Stanford's article follows:
TIME NEED FOR AN INTER-AMERICAN APPROACH
Fortunate good judgment led the founders
of the Journal of Inter-American Studies to
place major emphasis in their new enter-
prise of 6 years ago on the most neglected
aspect of studies related to the Western
Hemisphere: the Inter-American aspect.
North Americans at that time had long
been devoting scholarly attention to their
neighbors to the south. But generally their
study--sympathetic and understanding
though it was-was of one people looking at
other peoples through eyes that saw back-
grounds, outlooks, and problems essentially
different from their own. Thinking on the
part of the North Americans was in terms of
Latin American studies, Hispanic American
studies, or even South American studies.
Latin Americans viewed North Americans
as similarly alien to themselves and theirs.
One exception existed on both sides. From
the early 19th century the dream of a pan-
Americanism existed, and slowly studies and
activities emerged that focused on a special
sort of pan-American cooperation, or even an
assumed special affinity. But in all frank-
ness, much that was involved was either
highly artificial, or taken up with narrow In.
stitutional arrangements.
Perhaps even more striking has been the
lack of study by Latin American peoples of
each other. Writing in the April 1964 issue
of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Philip W. Quigg
pointed out that "there are some 30
North American correspondents in Mexico
City; none from other Latin American coun-
tries. There are at the very least a dozen
universities in the United States where one
can study the history, culture, politics, and
economics of Latin America in some depth;
there is no Latin American university offer-
ing more than the most superficial survey in
the same field. * * * Similarly, the average
cultivated Latin American will have made
several trips to the United States and to Eu-
rope, but none to other parts of Latin
America." 1
There can be no gainsaying that great di-
versity exists within the Americas. Certainly
the last thing that ' should be attempted
would be to cast this vast hemisphere, or
even Its various subregions, into a single
mold and direct study and research to a
search for uniformities.
Nevertheless, while Brazilians and Argen-
tinians differ greatly from each other, they
have much in common. If nothing else, they
share many of the same sorts of problems.
And the same goes for all of us. We should
all respect each other's individuality. But
only ignorance can come from an attitude
that provincially sets each of us off as quite
different from all others.
Beyond the impact of history and geogra-
phy, modern technology has squeezed us all
into a single small village. A disaster in a
Rio de Janeiro has its instant repercussions
in a New York. Buenos Aires is as close to
San Francisco as the instantaneous link
through a communications satellite. -
We have no choice but to see our futures
as inextricably joined, We have no
choice but to study each other and to learn
from each other. Even the very diversity
that exists among us can be understood only
as we pool our knowledge and research, only
as we study ourselves comparatively.
It is here the approach taken by the
founders of this journal looms so large.
These men sought a medium where the varied
intellectual resources of this hemisphere
could be brought to bear on problems and
matters of common importance and interest
to us all.
A similar objective marked the establish-
ment of the Inter-American Academy, of
which the Journal of Inter-American Studies
is the official organ. This body, which is still
in its infancy, aims to bring together in a
single grouping and on a continuing basis
representative leaders of thought and in-
tellectual life throughout the Americas.
The roster of members of the academy
gives assurance that as communications and
exchanges are developed among them, as
their intellectual powers are increasingly
pooled on matters of common moment in
this hemisphere, a significant forward step
will be taken toward meeting the pressing
need for greater inter-American knowledge
and understanding.
The headquarters of the Inter-American
Academy are now at the University of Miami,
and the university joins with the academy
in publishing the Journal of Inter-American
Studies.
The University of Miami is impressed by
the opportunity opened by its association
with the academy and the journal. The'
University of Miami since its founding ha=
looked upon its location at the gateway of the
Americas as thrusting upon it a special re-
sponsibility and a unique opportunity with
regard to hemispheric affairs. And within
1 Philip W. Quigg, "Latin America: A
Broad-Brush Appraisal," Foreign Affairs,
April 1964, p. 400.
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T 96.5. CQNGRESSIONAI,- R,ECOR.D_-, APPENDIX
A887
the Republican of somehow managed to Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington. The for our people; the "no party" would rather
retain control cf the Whit
H
d C
e
.
ress for the worst part of 70 years. yayuac- Ott Vito ttabtvtuu uetit
g
ears. So we Democrats must begin now to pre- than to make an investment in the youth of
lout, oY course, the Democratic Party did pare for the 1966 State, county, and con- this country by building classrooms and
rise again and with it rose the South to its gressional elections. You may be certain college facilities. No, my friends, the Re-
present position of eminence in our party. that our Republican friends will wage the publican Party won't dare speak about its
A: sort TerrieLyndon B. Johnson sits in campaign of their lives next year. record. Instead, it tries to confound and
the White House. Indeed the, battle for the House of Repre- confuse the American people by sermonizing
A southerner, RUSSELL LONG, holds, the sec- sentatives already has been joined. And, about "fiscal responsibility" and about how
onel nips,. important position of leadership frankly, there is no assurance that we will the big, bad Democrats are leading our Na-
in the U S SezW.te., be able to retain all or any of the 40 House tion down the road to insolvency and bank-
Southerners serve as chairmen of 25 of the
86 standing committees of Congress. North
Carolina Itself .represented in these august
ranks by no fewer than three, members. of
your excellent 4elegation.
The Secretary. of State is a native Georgian,
and until just recently, the Commerce De-
partment was directed by North Carolina's
gifted and able Luther Hodges.
Small wonder that it is said that our Gov-
ernment speaks with a southern accent. I
think I.ought to make it clear right now that
I am from southern Ohio.
I want to take this opportunity to ?.om-
mend your Congressman and my good friend,
BASIL WHITENER. He is one of the hardest
working and most respected Members of Con-
gress. I have watched with something ap-
proaching awe BASIL's determined campaign,
against long odds, to bring order out of the
chaos that threatens ..the textile industry.
As you well know, the textile industry is
being jeopardized by the almost unrestricted
importation of goods from cheap-labor coun-
tries across the sea. Congressman WHITENER
has been striving mightily to tighten up laws
that permit this condition to exist-a condi-
tion that has contributed, at least, to the loss
of more than a half million jobs in the do-
mestic textile industry since World War II.
T am glad to say that BASIL is making
progress to guarantee some needed protec-
tion to the American textile industry and to
the ;em$3ding tens of thousands of men an_ d
women who }earn their livelihood from it=
BASIL WHrrENER was instrumental last year
in the .passage of legislation that makes
Americapi,cotton:available to. .American mills
at the same price Americans were selling it
to textile manufacturers overseas.
Prior to enactment of t?his_, long overdue
legislation, our own mills were compelled to
pay 8 cents a pound more for cotton grown
in North, Carolina, for example, than it was
being sold to foreign producers._ In short,
the United States actually was ubsidizing
mills overseas, at the,. expense of our own
textile manufacturers and, employees. Hap-
pily, Congressman WHITENER was, able to
help correct this gross inequity .
I know that ,you in North Carolina are
well aware of BASIL WHITENER'S continuing
light to preserve the domestic textile indus-
try-which means so very much to theecon-
omy of the South.I just wanted you to
know that we, in other regions also recognize
that he is a Cann-do.,Congressman.
Now, we Democrats meet here tonight in
the warm afterglow of one of the most deci-
sive, one-sided election victories ever scored
by a political party in the United States. The
immensity of our victory has led some ex-
ixon, and, yes,
ports to write, off the Republican Party as Republicans in Congress say "no" to the of Goldwater and Miller. We have to carry
a dead or dying force. I beg to differ
needs of the farme
th
.
r;
ey say no to the need the message t thl
oe peope every day of the
The Republican Party was battered and for programs to help develop our natural year-and not just during the campaign
bruised; its choice of candidates was rebuffed resources, timberlands, and rivers and itself.
and rejected; its image was further tarnished. streams; the Republicans say "no" to ex- The attraction of our party is to the people
But the Republican Party is not dead; it is tending a helping hand to the elderly. They who really want a choice and not an echo-
not dying'.', And, in my judgment, the Demo- say "no" to housing the poor. In fact, the an echo of the shrill, frightened voices which
crafts Party could make no graver mistake Republican Party would be left speechless if have always feared and rejected new ideas,
than to ereg rddthe opposition party with the ors "no" was stricken from the which have always seemed to prefer stagna-
me Democratic Party is the only party for
financial resources; It still has dedicated sup- It seems that the "no party" would rather those Americans who are willing to face up to
porters, at least 27 million of . them; the have a balanced budget than a balanced diet the hard realities of the present and who
Republicans still control the governorship for the poverty stricken; the "no party" look to the future not with suspicion and de-
in such important "swing" States as New would rather reduce Federal spending with a spair, but with confidence and boundless
York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, meat ax than to increase job opportunities faith in the American way.
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a
e o
n--
usno press remains largely proRepublican
The overwhelming sweep we scored in No- So it is rather ironic that the most devas-
vember has tended to direct attention away tating depression in American history came
from the fact that results were so close in when the Republican Party held the White
more than 100 congressional districts that House and controlled the Nation's fiscal
the, switch of a relative, few votes would policies.
have drastically changed the outcome. It is rather ironic that the last three re-
I read in the newspapers just yesterday cessions in the United States came when the
that our old friend, Tricky Dickie Nixon, is Republican Party held the White House and
staking his efforts to regain control of the controlled the Nation's fiscal policies.
GOP on the 1966 congressional elections. He It is rather ironic that the Republican
is not to be taken lightly. Presidential administration in the 1950's
And I predict that the real battleground failed to balance its own Federal budget not
will be right here in North Carolina and in once, not twice, not three times, not four
the South. There is no doubt that the high times, but five times in the 8 years it was in
command of the Republican Party is schem- office. It is rather ironic that the national
ing. night and day to purge your Congress- debt increased by some $23 billion during the
men and . other Democratic officeholders. last Republican administration.
The Republicans are a bit heady if not down- It would seem that once in office, the Re-
right cocky about "operation takeover" in publican Party says "no" to its very own
the South. campaign promises.
This, operation was launched with a Now, what about the Republican-branded
vengeance in 1964, and enabled the GOP to fiscal insanity of the Democratic Party, of
pick up five congressional seats in Alabama, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations?
one each in Georgia and Mississippi, and to Here, briefly are some of the facts about
retain House seats it held in Florida, Vir- that:
ginia, and North Carolina. So I say again Under the leadership of first President
that "operation takeover" has got to be re- Kennedy and now Lyndon Johnson, the
garded seriously. It must be combated at United States is experiencing the greatest
every turn. and most extended wave of prosperity that
Voters, North and South, have always re- any nation has ever known.
sponded to our, cause, to the Democratic Our national economy has been booming
cause when we have,.taken . the time to lay now for 47 consecutive months. That's an
the Republican record before them. alltime record.
We are going to have to do the talking The gross national product-the business
about the GOP record-it is so sorry, so neg- of the Nation-has increased during the
ative that the Republicans themselves would Kennedy and Johnson years from $495 bil-
never dare to bring it up in public. lion to almost $700 billion. That's an all-
For the simple truth is that the Republi- time record.
can answer to the needs and aspirations Personal savings, the money that you and
of the American people is a constant, dog- I have put away for a rainy day, now exceed
matic "No." $100 billion. That's an altlime record.
Republicans in Congress said "No" to the During the 4 years of the Kennedy and
social security program when it was con- Johnson administrations net farm income
celved by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1935. Only has increased by an average of $900 million a
one Republican in the Senate voted that year. That is' not an alltime record-the
year against a motion to kill the Social Se- record was' set during the Truman adminis-
curity Act. Last year, 89 percent of the Re- tration. The reason farm income is not at
publicans in Congress said "No" to needed a record level now is that it nosedived. by
improvements in this essential program. $20 billion during the eight disastrous con-
The Democratic Party said "Yes." fused years of the Benson-Eisenhower re-
Republicans in Congress said "No" to cre= gime. But under the Democrats, our farmers
sting the Rural Electrification Administra- are again making real progress.
tion, which brought the wonders of elec- The plain truth is that the American peo-
tricity to millions of farm families and other ple have never had it better than they do
rural Americans. The Democratic Party today. Republicans can go on shedding
said "Yes." crocodile tears about the fiscal insanity of
Republicans in Congress said "no" in 1938 the Democratic Party-and our people will
to guaranteeing a minimum wage of 40 cents go right on laughing all the way to the bank.
an hour to the working man and woman of This is the factual story that we have got
America. And the GOP has been saying no, to carry to the people. We just cannot as-
no a hundred times no ever since. The sume that the voters will be continually
Democratic Party said yes-it says the la- aware of the record of the party of Harding
borer is worthy of his hiro
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX March 1
So let us go forth from this place and carry
the message of the Democratic Party to every
crossroad and branchhead in this great land
of ours. It is a message that all of us can
be proud of. It is a message that can be used
to keep the Republican Party in its accus-
tomed place-second place.
I have some spent little time tonight
roasting our Republican friends. I should
make it clear, however, that despite our dif-
ferences, I regard them as good, loyal, pa-
triotic Americans who are interested in sound
government and doing what, in their judg-
ment, is best for our country. It is just
that they weigh the role of government in an
entirely different scale than we Democrats
use. As Franklin Roosevelt so eloquently
said: "Governments can err, Presidents do
make mistakes, but the immortal Dante tells
us that Divine Justice weighs the sins of the
coldblooded and the sins of the warmhearted
in a different scale. Better the occasional
faults of government living in the spirit of
charity," F.D.R. went on to say, "Than the
omissions of a government frozen in the ice
of its own indifference."
Nobody has ever heard of a, coldblooded
donkey--or a warmblooded dinosaur, which
seems to be the symbol of the Grand Old
Party.
Now, If I may, a personal word of expla-
nation about my pursuing a political career.
I am an ordained Lutheran minister. Many
people have asked why a man of the cloth
would involve himself In the sweat and toil
and pragmatism of politics.
The answer to that question, perhaps, may
best be found in the parable of the Samar-
itan (St. Luke 10: 29-37) .
You will recall that a man fell in with the
thieves and they stripped him and left him
half dead by the side of the road. Coming
upon the unfortunate man, the priest and
the Levite passed him by. They had no time
to administer to the needs of their fellow
man. But the Samaritan came along and
did extend a helping hand to him. And
Jesus said, "Go, and do thou likewise."
It seems to me that the profession of pol-
itics and government affords us the greatest
opportunity to "Go, and do thou likewise,"
to lend a hand to the poor, and the forlorn,
to the sick and the halt. In short, to join
in the exciting and challenging task of help-
ing to build a better America.
objective
That Is m
.
y
That is the objective of our Democratic
Party.
What greater goal could man set for him-
self than to live by the teachings of the
Master?
In closing, I want to cite a poem that to
me points up the virtue of perseverance and
the evils of complacency. I hope that we
heed it always:
"Great nations rise and fall,
The people go from bondage to spiritual
faith,
From spiritual faith to great courage,
From courage to liberty,
From liberty to abundance,
From abundance to selfishness,
From selfishness to complacency,
From complacency to apathy,
And from apathy back again Into bondage."
u
e
V
V ENSION OF REMARKS
of
HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 1, 1965
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to
bring to the attention of my colleagues
an article by Drew Pearson which ap-
ik
Pl
peared in the Washington Post of Fri-
day, February 26. The following article
sheds light on the recent incident at
Pleiku in South Vietnam.
PLEIKU ATTACK NOT A HANOI PLOT
(By Drew Pearson)
Shortly after the Vietcong raid on Pleiku
that caused the United States to retaliate
with its first definite large-scale bombing
raids on North Vietnam, this column re-
ported that the United States had been
mousetrapped and that the Pleiku attack
was the result of a Chinese or North Viet-
namese plot deliberately staged while Pre-
mier Kosygin was visiting Hanoi.
More complete information, now available
from the battlefront, shows this column
was in error. The Vietcong attack was
staged by a bedraggled handful of 100 men,
or half a company, which was able to achieve
success only because of sheer stupidity and
lack of alertness by the Americans and the
South Vietnamese. The attackers had no
idea that they would he able to penetrate
to the very center of the American installa-
tion as they did.
That it was no Hanoi-conceived plot is
obvious from the fact that Hanoi could not
have planned to have all South Vietnamese
personnel and all Americans asleep.
A little band of Vietcong passed through
two villages before reaching Pleiku. The
South Vietnamese In the villages are sup-
posedly friendly to the United States but they
sounded no alarm. The attackers cut the
barbed wire around Pleiku completely un-
disturbed, and walked right Into the center
of the installation to place bombs alongside
the barracks where Americans were sleeping
and alongside planes which were completely
unguarded. They retreated without an
American or a South Vietnamese wounding a
single one.
SUCCESS UNEXPECTED
There were some Vietcong casualties, but
only from their own mortar fire. Their com-
mander had never expected them to pene-
trate so far inside, therefore aimed mortars
into the center of the American installa-
tion--another indication that there was no
Hanoi plot.
Secretary McNamara, one of the most level-
headed executives ever to boss the Pentagon,
was mousetrapped when he got out of his
sickbed to hold an emergency press con-
ference and defended the American forces
as victims of a sneak attack. Obviously he
knew that some of the great military vic-
tories of American history have resulted
from sneak attacks, as when George Wash-
ington sneaked across the Delaware to sur-
prise carousing Hessians in Trenton. Mc-
Namara also knew that his own men were
being trained in the art of the sneak attack
at the very time he had the news conference.
Only on a few occasions have American
troops telegraphed their attacks In advance,
as when General Pickett sent a Confederate
nag at the head of his troops in the famous
charge at Gettysburg-a charge, Incidentally,
in which his defeat turned the tide of the
Civil War.
Those who were really mousetrapped as a
result of the Pleiku incident were not only
McNamara but President Johnson and,
momentarily, the State Department. Singe
then, Acting Secretary of State George Ball
has tried to restore some reason and sanity
to our mousetrapped thinking, which could
have precipitated nuclear world war.
What happened was that Ambassador Tay-
lor, an able but severely harassed man who
has seen his hitherto great prestige gradually
eroded in Vietnam, seized this opportunity
to recommend retaliatory raids. He sincerely
believed this was a Hanoi plot. Ordinarily
his recommendation might have been dis-
counted in Washington, but it happened that
McGeorge Bundy, White House adviser on
security matters, was in Saigon at precisely
that time.
WHITE HOUSE PRESSURED
Bundy's brother William is Assistant Sec-
retary of State for the Far East and has long
advocated a stronger hand in Vietnam, In-
cluding bombing the north. When Mc-
George Bundy, therefore, joined Taylor in
rushing back a premature, exaggerated ac-
count of the Pleiku raid, the White House
finally yielded to advice which the Bundy
brothers had been giving for some time and
which has now caused serious loss of Ameri-
can prestige, demonstrations against Ameri-
can embassies around the world, even in pro-
West countries, and eroded the better under-
standing Mr. Johnson had personally built
up with the new leaders in the Kremlin.
What the American public has a right to
expect is a congressional investigation or the
court-martial of American officers asleep at
Pleiku. The Pentagon alibi is that they are
highly trained men who are not supposed to
stand guard, which is correct. But the fact
remains that no one, not even South Viet-
namese, was on guard and, as a result, ap-
proximately 100 wounded, and several mil-
lion dollars' wortla of planes destroyed.
Enlarge Guilford Courthouse National
Military Park
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. HORACE R. KORNEGAY
OF NORTH CAROLINA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 1, 1965
Mr. KORNEGAY. Mr. Speaker, this
morning I appeared before the Subcom-
mittee on the Department of the Interior
and Related Agencies of the House Ap-
propriations Committee to testify in be-
half of an item which would permit a
greatly needed acquisition of land to en-
large the Guilford Courthouse National
Military Park, located in my congres-
sional district and my home county of
Guilford.
I had hoped that Mr. Burke Davis, a
longtime resident of my congressional
district, and eminent historian, biog-
rapher, and novelist, could also testify
before the subcommittee in view of his
historical perspective on the importance
of the Guilford Courthouse National
Military Park and the great importance
of the Revolutionary battle fought there
in March 1781. Mr. Davis, however, who
now has an important connection with
Colonial Williamsburg, Inc., and who
presently resides in Williamsburg, Va.,
had an important engagement in New
York in connection with his duties and
was unable to appear. He prepared a
fine statement in support of the appro-
priation, however, and in view of its
historical Interest and the importance of
the subjects discussed, I should like to in-
sert it in the RECORD believing that it will
be of great interest to my colleagues.
Mr. Davis' statement follows:
The American Revolution was won in the
South, and the climax of the bitter running
campaign of 1781 came at Guilford Court-
house, on March 15. In a 2-hour battle, Lord
Cornwallis lost a quarter of his already weak-
ened army. His retreat from this point led
him to Yorktown.
Today, the southern campaign of the Rev-
olution is almost forgotten. The field of
Cowpens, S.C., is remote and neglected and
seldom seen by visitors. Sites of the fre-
quent clashes between the forces of Corn-
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