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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300150010-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 30, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

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April 30, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
8797
would we then be justified in unilateral We shall not strengthen the image of and the nations joined with them in the
action? the United States in Latin America collective defense of their freedom; and
Let the record be clear that it is my whenever we turn our back on a constitu- Whereas the United states is assisting
opinion that we would be justified if- tional system, the peoples of southeast Asia to protect
and oily if-we believed that the secur- I said we should not recognize an their freedom and has no territorial, mil-
y itary or political area,
ity of the _ United States was directly military junta unless we get some condi-
but desires only that theses In that
should
threatened by such a Communist take- tions precedent, by way of commitment, be left in peace to work out their own dest -
over. I want to know what the group that is nies in their own way: Now, therefore, be
That is the Cuban case all over, so far now asking for support proposes to do it
as the missile situation is concerned, about returning the Dominican Repub- Resolved by the Senate and House of
President Kennedy acted unilaterally in lic to a constitutioanl system providing entin Representatives thae United, es the
f
that situation, in that there was no for elections.
formal agreement at the time he acted Is it merely a caretaker government minato approves and supports om ander
on the part of our allies in Latin Amer- for an interim urnation of the President, as commander
period of time until the in Chief, to take all necessary measures to
iea, but there was an informal under- Congress of the Dominican Republic can repel any armed attack against the forces
standing. There was immediately a full put its constitutional processes to work of the United States and to prevent further
'briefing of our allies in the Western again? It is perfectly obvious that what aggression.
Hemisphere, as to why the President we are being asked to do is to recognize SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital
found it necessary from the standpoint a group of militarists who have taken to its national interest and to world peace
of the security of our country to take over a government by force. Wessin sy and ecurity maintenance southeast interAsia. Co national peace
the action which he did. Everyone Wessin was the leader then, and he is with the Co stitutiofthe United States
knows what the aftermath was; namely, now. I said, also that I thought all we and the Charter of the United Nations and
complete understanding. Not only that, were doing was buying trouble for our- in accordance with its obligations under
we had the acceptance of that act on the selves. We have certainly found it. the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
part of the United States to protect its That does not mean that I shall sup- Treaty, the United States is, therefore, pre-
own security
which is not removed fr
,
om port a revolution bd i th
aryoyne Do
us by the OAS Charter-or the United minican Republic until I know at least
Nations Charter, for that matter, what its intent is. There is no doubt
I hope that the hypothetical points that since we have recognized it the
I have just outlined will not develop. Dominican Government has been ruled
Many disagree with me in the position by a military group. It is their right to
I took, but I thought it was a great mis- revolt. It is very easy, when a group
take for the United States to recognize of freemen revolt against military tyr-
the military junta in the Dominican Re- anny, for many ' to put the label of
public. "Communists" on them.
Remember that when the President I have not the slightest idea how many,
invited a group of us to a Cabinet meet- if any, Communists are involved. I
ing for a briefing on the situation, mine would not be surprised if there were not
wa
th
all necessary steps, including the use of
armed force, to assist any member of pro-
tocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty requestiong assistance in
defense of its freedom.
SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when
the President shall determine that the
peace and security of the area is reasonably
assured by international conditions created
by action of the United Nations or other-
wise, except that it may be terminated
earlier by concurrent resolution of the
Congress.
s a lone dissent in the group. I some. However, my words today should Mr. MORSE. Madam President, in
stated at that meeting that I feared rec- be phrased in syllables of caution. Let spite of some of the statements I heard
ognition of the military junta would be us be careful not to prejudge what may today from my colleagues in the Foreign
interpreted in many places-including be a good faith attempt' on the part of Relations Committee, which I believe
the Dominican Republic-as a rejection freemen to overthrow a form of totali- can fairly part Sato to the sweep a and nd breadth
on the part of the United States of con- tarianism which has plagued this little on their I voted against the
stitutionalism in the Dominican Repub- country for many years. resolution the resolution, eus ed against the
lie. I further stated then, and reiterated readadtthon because of its sweep, and
on the floor of the Senate immediately breadth, as the material which, , without
thereafter, that I held no special brief IETNA taking the time to read it, I shall put into
for Bosch, and did not know the facts ~
the
_RD shortly will sh
Gr Md
aam President, theow.
about the allegations concerning him, discussion day in the Senate and in My argument Of August 6 and 7 em-
but that I knew he was President consti- the Foreign Relations Committee about ph sight over and over again that I
tutionally. the Dominican Republic led into a dis- thought the resolution was entirely too country
hadt e
e
t o
oif gug
or
tun cal ea for his su ces t take cusson o South Vietnam. I shall beae sufficient ent checks on the part of
office. I said was a ucae mistake for brief about it. However, a Congress.
the Unit s States was
recognize and assist oe good deal of this discussion today has The first resolving clause reads:
the military junta in open defiance of been around the meaning of the joint That the Congress a
thet conntry tution t system; thd ran e f resolution which Congress passed on Au- the det of the Pproves and support-
gust 7 with only 2 dissenting votes, those manderein Chief, t to take all necessary me s-
tion ought to be that the next man in of the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUEN- ures to repel any armed attack against the
line should take office; and that the Con- IN(;] and the senior Senator from Ore- forces of the United States and to prevent
gress of the Dominican Republic should goo further a
be.
be. defended and should be allowed to egression.
out ltd constitutional and should allowed I ask unanimous consent that the joint The words "to prevent further aggres-
I said in that Cabinet meeting and resolution may be printed at this point in sion" are obsolutely undefined as to time,
later an the that of the Senate that if we my remarks.
did not follow e tthat course t tat There being no abjection, the joint aggess on.the source of said alleged
Would not oi of course action of was ordered to be printed in So also are the words "take all neces-
ould can inviting nand would gsc in the we the RECORD, as follows:
D Republic defined.
y into Whereas naval units of the Communist uny measures" totally unlimited and
the hands of military juntas elsewhere regime in Vietnam, in violation of the prin- sin hat is
in Latin America. ciples of the Charter of the United Nations That is rather broad.
The reco
d i
r
s perfectly clear tht tht
aa is exactly what is happening and what
has happened in other places, and will
continue to happen, so long as the Unit-
ed States follows, as it does intermittent-
ly, a course of action in respect to aiding
governments which come into being
through military overthrow.
No. 77-12
and of international law, have deliberately Section 2 reads:
and repeatedly attacked United States na- SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital
val vessels lawfully present in international to its national interest and to world peace
waters, and have thereby created a serious the maintenance of international peace and
threat to international peace; and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with
Whereas these attacks are part of a delib- the Constitution of the United States and
erate and systematic campaign of aggression the Charter of the United Nations and in
that the Communist regime in North Viet- accordance with its obligations under the
nam has been waging against its neighbors Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the
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8798 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE April 30, 1965
United States is, therefore, prepared, as the able steps to confine the war to South Viet-
President determines. nam.
Does the Senator think there is any danger
How can we have a fuller sweep and a in this resolution that we may be surrender-
broader vesting of power, or an attempt ing to General Khanh'S position our attitude
to do it? I held then, and I hold now, as to where the war should be fought?
that of course Congress did not have Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think there is any
the power to vest such power in the danger of that. There is, of course, a danger
President under the Constitution. Sin- in this whole area, and there has been for
10 years. It is dangerous. The policy of our
Cere men disagree. I continue to read Government not to expand the war still
from the resolution: holds. That is not inconsistent with any
to take all necessary steps, including the response to attacks on our vessels on the high
use of armed force, to assist any member or seas where they have a right to be.
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collec- Mr. MCGOVERN. I agree.
tive Defense Treaty requesting assistance in Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think the policy
defense of its freedom. that the war be confined to South Vietnam
has changed. I think it is still the policy.
Section 3 of the joint resolution reads: I think it is the correct one. What causes
SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when difficulty is the fact that this is a new type
the President shall determine that the peace of war. It is not a war in the orthodox sense.
andsecurity of the area is reasonably assured This is subversion, inspired and conducted
by international conditions created by action through infiltration of supplies and men by a
of the United Nations or otherwise, except neighboring country without a declaration
that it maybe terminated earlier by concur- of war. It does not fit the pattern of the
rent resolution of the Congress. traditional way we think of war. It is, nev-
special-
modernized
i
,
on, a
ertheless, aggress
In some of the discussions today, some ized kind of aggression, brought to a high
of my colleagues held that the joint degree of perfection by the leader of the
who es
e-tun
T
M
fng of large American armies in Vietnam or
in China.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is nothing in the
resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it.
I agree with the Senator that that is the last
thing we would want to do. However, the
language of the resolution would not prevent
it. It would authorize whatever the Com-
mander in Chief feels is necessary. It does
not restrain the Executive from doing it.
Whether or not that should ever be done is a
matter of wisdom under the circumstances
that exist at the particular time it is con-
templated. This kind of question should
more properly be addressed to the chairman
of the Armed Services Committee. Speak-
ing for my own committee, everyone I have
heard has said that the last thing we want
to do is to become involved in a land war
in Asia; that our power is sea and air, and
that this is what we hope will deter the Chi-
nese Communists and the North Vietnamese
from spreading the war. That is what is
'contemplated. The resolution does not pro-
hibit that, or any other kind of activity.
Mr. BREWSTER. I thank the distinguished
chairman.
Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, will the Sena-
tor yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
g,
s
ao
resolution never contemplated giving Chinese Communists,
the President of the United States the tablished the basic theory of how to conduct Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, first I say to
authority to bomb North Vietnam, that this type of warfare. the distinguished Senator from Arkansas that
they never gave to the President the It is difficult to adjust our concepts to I approve the action that has been taken, and
authority to send many thousands of warfare of this kind. I think it is just as I approve this resolution. On the matter
savage and as much in violation of interna- which was the subject of the colloquy be-
men into southeast Asia. tional good behavior and law as is an overt tween the chairman of the Foreign Relations
That discussion among my colleagues invasion by troops. I tried to make this Committee and the distinguished Senator
in the committee arose because of the point in my remarks. North Vietnam has from Louisiana, can we not associate our
expressed concern on their part that the been an aggressor against South Vietnam; presence in the Gulf of Tonkin to a degree
news tickers today had carried some and I do not think so merely because of the with our own interpretation of our obliga-
articles to the effect that we were about testimony in the past 2 or 3 days. Over sev- tions under the SEATO Treaty?
eral years, we have received testimony about Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. I made mention of
more divisions into southeast what the North Vietnamese were doing in it. That is a further responsibility that we
two to send
he
ment or the Pentagon. I also say most
respectfully that that does not mean
that it will not happen, because all too
frequently in connection with the South
Vietnamese operations we have been
confronted with accomplished facts,
even though we were led to believe that
rumors that certain things were about
to take place were unfounded.
However, I shall continue, until I have
proved to the contrary, to assume that
the divisions ar'e not being sent, until
the Government tells us that they are.
In the debate on the joint resolution,
the Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, the Senator from Arkansas
[Mr. FULBRIGHT], acting really as the
Senator in charge of the bill-therefore
his comments are of great importance in
subsequent determination of what the
intent of the Senate was, at. least when
it adopted the resolution-answered a
considerable number of questions. I
wish to quote his responses to a few. On
August 6, 1964, in colloquy with the
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FuL-
BRIGHT], the Senator from South Da-
kota [Mr. MCGOVERN] said:
Mr. MCGOVERN. I should like to put one
other question to the Senator. Over the past
few days, possibly the past 2 or 3 weeks, there
have been statements in the press quoting
General Khanh, the South Vietnamese lead from Arkansas the following question: it into a major war.
b
y
er, as saying that the war had to be won
carrying it to North Vietnam. Almost simul- Mr. BREWSTER. I had the opportunity to Later the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr.
taneously our administration leaders have see warfare not so very far from this area, and NELSON I was concerned about what the
been quoted as saying that the only way the it was very mean. I would look with great resolution meant. He said:
war can be won is by taking on the guerrillas dismay on a situation involving the landing
say ddiitio aI
in South Vietnam, and that our policy is not of large land
one rmiesnois the continthere ent of
questions. NELSON. first I wish l to of
of extending the war to the north; quite Asia. So my q
to the contrary, that the victory must be had anything in the resolution which would au- did not suggest that by the use of hind-
in the south and that we will take all reason- thorize or recommend or approve the land- sight I would now conclude that the inter-
Laos and to a much higher degree in South undertook in alining ourselves with other
Vietnam. countries in trying to bring peace and sta-
They had two major ways of approaching bility into this area. That was another obli-
South Vietnam, one by sea, and one by gation, which we undertook. It fortifies our
ground. The sea approach was the easiest right or responsibility for being in the Gulf
way to supply the Mekong Delta. So we of Tonkin.
helped the South Vietnam Government try Mr. MORTON. I believe the action taken by
to interrupt the transfer of men and supplies the President helps to avoid any miscalcula-
to the Mekong Delta. Junks were built up tion on the part of either and North Vietna-
for that purpose. The boats that may have mese or the Chinese Communists. I believe
struck at the coastal areas of North Vietnam the joint resolution gives that policy further
may have bene supplied by us. We have been strength. In my opinion, the three major
helping South Vietnam arm itself. I do not wars in which we have been involved in this
know about the specific boats. century have come about by miscalculation
I personally think this is a perfectly legi- on the part of the aggressor.
timate and proper way to defend oneself i believe Congress should speak loud and
from the kind of aggression South Vietnam clear and make it plain to any would-be ag-
has been subjected to for many years. gressor that we intend to stand here. 11
Mr. McGovERN. I am inclined to agree with we make that clear, we will avoid war, and
the Senate. I did not want my remarks to not have to land vast land armies on the
be interpreted as prejudicing the case for shores of Asia. In that connection I share
aid-- the apprehension of my friend the Senator
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to try to clarify from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER].
the situation. It is difficult and confusing. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has put it
Mr. McGovERN. There have been references very clearly. I interpret the joint resolution
in the press to the effect that General Khanh in the same way. This action is limited, but
was in political trouble and that one way very sharp. It is the best action that I
he thought he could get out of it was to can think of to deter an escalation or en-
divert attention from failure in the conduct largement of the war. If we did not take
of the war in the south to some kind of such action, it might spread further. If we
strike in the north, presumably largely un- went further, and ruthlessly bombed Hanoi
derwritten by the United States. It was and other places we would be guilty of bad
because of my concern with that possibility judgment, both on humanitarian grounds
that I raised these questions. and on policy grounds, because then we
ire further retaliation.
l
i
nsp
y
I thank the Senator for yielding. would certain
This situation has been handled in the
Subsequently the Senator from Mary- best way possible under the circumstances,
land [Mr. BREWSTER] asked the Senator so as to calm the situation, and not escalate
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April 30, 196vCONGRESSIONAL RECORD -. SENATE
8799
vention in 1954 was wrong. I do not know, be briefed on Vietnam, it may well be
I Understand the necessity for the United there were to be any action by military Statessince it is the leader of.the free world, that the language of the Senator from forces on the part of either the Nationalist to do ,.all it ran in furtherance of the pro- Arkansas means that the President Chinese Government or ourselves in the
tection of the Idea. of furtherance
and indepen- consult with Congress formally in case willwestern Pacific, the two countries would
ence, and .that, to do so, we must make gam- a
major change in present policy be- consult with each other, and that any such
tiles. We shall lose some; we shall win some. comes necessary. I believe that is the action would be taken only after mutual
I believe the public is slow to recognize that only kind of consultation that would agreement.
we have vast responsibilities, and they ex- have any significant importance. IaimilarI am protection wondeowritten whether into the there a any
pect us to win every gamble that we take. stress this la security
I do not expect that. And I do not now rise language
or because it will bear arrangements that we have with reference
here to criticize the original decision. upon a recommendation OT & suggestion to South Vietnam. Is that kind of prot prot
But I am, concerned about the Congress that I shall make before I finish, in view tion, for example, Written into the S TO
EATO
appearing to tell the executive branch and of the concern that I have heard ex- agreement, or in any of the notes which
the public that we would endorse a complete pressed by a considerable number of have been exchanged between our Govern-
change in our mission. That would concern Senators today in respect to the joint ments, so that we would not, in effect, be
me. resolution for which they voted last surrendering control of our actions in South-
Mr. PuLBRIGHT. I do not interpret the joint August. east Asia to the Government of South Viet-
;esolution in that way at all. It strikes me, nom?
As I understand it, that the joint resolution me, The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Mr. FU EiIIT. I do not believe we are sur-
quite consistent with our existing mission COOPER] said later: rendering control to them. Under the
and our understanding of what we have been We have confidence in the President and in SEATO Treaty, as I recall it, we take our own
doing in South Vietnam for the last 10 years. his good judgment. But I believe we have actions according to our constitutional
Mr. NErsox. Did I correctly understand the obligation of understanding fully that processes. I do not believe that we have sur-
the Senator from Arkansas to say a while ago there is a distinction between defending our rendered control of our actions. However,
that the language of the resolution is aimed forces, and taking offensive measures in as a practical matter our influence upon the
at the problem of further aggression against South Vietnam which could lead progressive- Government of South Vietnam is a matter of
our ships and our naval facilities? ly to a thi
d w
r
orld war.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is the logical
way to interpret the language. It makes That was not the only time the Sen-
reference to. the, armed attack against the ator from Kentucky made an Observa-
forces of, the United States which has just tion with this meannig. That happens
taken place, and to prevention of further ag- to be a point that I emphasized, as will
gression against our forces. Then the joint be seen from the material I shall 'place
resolution passes on to our obligations under in the RECORD, based upon the long
the treaty, which involves other countries. speech of opposition I made to the joint
I believe also that it is implicit, it not ex-
Ph resolution. My opinion is that many
cit, in the next section that the intent is
to prevent the continuing aggression that Senators apparently, from what they
now exists against South Vietnam. say now, at least, thought they were vot-
Mr. NELSON. If the Senator would permit, ing for a joint resolution that would re -
I should like to ask a few brief additional sult in the President Coming to Con-
questions. I could not hear colloquy be- gress to get support. and Verification for
tween the Senator from Arkansas and the an escalation policy.
Senator from Louisiana. In relation to in-
ternational boundary waters, can the Sena- But, said the Senator from Arkansas
tor tell me what distance offshore we recog- [Mr. FULBRIGHT], in response to the Sen-
nize in respect to North Vietnam and Red ator from Kentucky:
China? The question concerns the kind of actions
Then they engaged in a colloquy con- taken in this instance. I think the Presi-
action accom
cerning the 12-mile theory and the 3- plish dent the took obj
ective that the is de Senator rd fro to m Ken-
-
mile theory. -
Later in the debate, the Senator from to make acl clear. stated. I join Inithe Senator's hope
Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] made a com- that all-out war can be avoided.
ment:
Yes, warfare today is different. Time is of Madam President, I 'ask unanimous
the essence. Bud the power consent to have printed at this point in
.President in section . 2 is grea provided the the RECORD the colloquy between the
Mr. -PUL'BRIGHT. This provision is intended Senator from- South Dakota [Mr. Mc-
to give clearance to the President to use his GOVERN]. and the Senator from Arkansas
discretion. We all hope and believe that the [Mr. FULBRIGHT], which occurred imme-
a,-___ ____ .. .. . . - __
President will not use thi
s
now
relations between our Ambassador and Gen-
eral Khanh. We consult daily, I believe,
with regard to the conduct of our mut
l
ua
affairs in that area. To give a short- answer,
I know of no exchange of notes, or anything
of that kind. I do not recall any testimony
on the precise point the senator has brought
up.
Mr. MCGOVERN. What I am getting at is,
suppose the Government of South Vietnam,
for whatever reason, should decide to launch
a major military attack on North Vietnam,
would we be obligated in any kind of ar-
rangement we have with South Vietnam?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. We have no obliga-
tion to follow through with a situation
which we believe to be unwise, Stupid, or
silly. We could disavow it and withdraw
and have nothing to do with it. We have
no treaty agreement or any other agreement
that I know of that binds us to follow
through with that.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The southeast Asia treaty
provides specifically that it is applicable only
when aggressions are committed against
members of the treaty, and is not applica-
ble should members of the treaty commit
aggressions against countries other than
those who are members of the treaty. That
is written into the treaty.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe that it also ap-
plies only to aggression from Communist
countries.
Mr. MORSE. It covers the protocol coun-
tries.
~~~.~?.?.. w,s uoti It member of
is accustomed to consulting with inat he
Joint just read, and which appears on page the Senate at the time, and I know that the
Chiefs accustomed
Staff and wsul congressional the lead- 17826 of the RECORD. Senator from Arkansas knows infinitely more
era. But he does not have to do that. There being no objection, the resolution was a
Form
y
pproved about it than I pp, but when the Congress earl
t
Mr. COOPER. I understand, and believe that was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, that approval a that
the President will use this vast power with as follows: re 1955, I believe that the approval eoo the
judgment, resolution was secured partly because of the
Mr. FuLERICxT. He intends to do it, and Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, will the exchange of notes which had taken place
he has done it. Senator yield for one question? months before, in which both Nationalist
Mr. COOPER. I do not wish to take more Mr. FULBRIGHT. I shall yield for one ques- China and the United States agreed that
time now, because the not wish to to a more tion; then I shall yield the floor, neither country would undertake any kind
of military action in the Pacific e basis
from Georgia wishes to speak, and I want Mr. McGovERx. The Senator may recall making ng it a joint action. It is on the
s
to hear him, that about 10 years ago, on December 2, that m assurance that t t resolu-
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have no doubt that the 1954' the United States signed with the Na- ti a ap oved. that the Formosa rose to
President will So that is why I rose to
consult with tionalist Chinese Government a mutual de- ask was ston.
a
a major Chan a in Congress in case fense treaty. In effect, we committed our- ask my question.
ge policy becomes
necessary. selves to join defense for security interests Mr. FULBRIGHT. I know of no such ex-
in the western Pacific, changes in this case.
At that, time the Senator from Ark- Shortly after that agreement was signed, Mr. McGovERN. I thank the Senator.
ansas did not outline what he meant by there was a considerable amount of anxiety Mr. MORSE. Madam President, on
believing that the President would con- expressed in the United States that perhaps August 7, the debate continued. With-
sult with Congress. The President has we in effect had surrendered control of our
consulted with leaders of Congress. On foreign policy in that part of the world to unt mous con time to read it, I a occasions he has afforded an op- the Nationalist Chinese. Partly to offset
two unanimous consent that such parts of
two occasions
of
to every Member of the Senate, that anxiety, there was an exchange of notes my speech of August 7, 1964, as I shall
p6rt I believe a miem e of the Sy has between Secretary Dulles and the Nationalist designate, in opposition to the joint res-
been Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which olution, be printed - at this point in the And given to Members of the House, to the two gentlemen agreed in effect that if RECORD,.
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8800
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE April 30, 1965
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
It is easy, understandable, and natural in
a time of high national emotion, in a time of
strong patriotic fervor, to say, "Give 'em the
works." It is also true that In such an hour
of high national emotion and hysteria, we
who sit in seats of responsibility, so far as
the legislative process is concerned, can say,
Let us wait. Let us first analyze the situa-
tion on the facts, and then vote the authority
that is needed to protect the country. Sin-
cere and honest men can differ as to the pro-
cedural form that the grant of such author-
ity shall take."
In 1955 and again In 1957 the senior Sena-
tor from Oregon took the position, as he does
In the instance of this resolution, that the
Middle East resolution and the Formosa res-
olutton would be grants of authority to the
President to exercise power which would
amount to predated declarations of war.
That should not be done. It is not necessary.
All the world knows that any country that
attacks the United States will be met imme-
diately with the exercise of the inherent
power of the President, under the Constitu-
tion, to defend the Republic. All the world
knows that if any country continues an at=
tack upon this country, the President will
come before this body and quickly, as the
great Roosevelt did after Pearl Harbor, in
1941, obtain from Congress a declaration of
war. What more is needed?
A constitutional principle is Involved. It
is dangerous to give to any President an un-
checked power, after the passage of a joint
resolution, to make war. Consider the pro-
cedural complications that could develop if
Congress decried that the President was mak-
ing serious mistakes in the conduct of a per-
sonal war for it would be a Presidential war
at that point. How would the President be
stopped ? He could not be stopped. Consider
what would happen to this Republic if we
got into that kind of conflict with the Pres-
ident in carrying out the joint resolution.
But, say some, see what the end of section
3 provides:
"This resolution shall expire when the
President shall determine that the peace and
security of the area is reasonably assured by
international conditions created by action of
the United Nations or otherwise, except that
it may be terminated earlier by concurrent
resolution of the Congress."
That would create a nice mess, would it
not? That would be a nice portrait of the
United States to paint before the eyes of
the world. What havoc of disunity that
kind of procedure would encompass.
What is wrong with letting the Constitu-
tion operate as written by our constitutional
fathers? Why this indirect amendment of
the Constitution? There are senators, for
whom I have deep affection, who become a
little shaken, in our private conversations,
when I say, "What you are really seeking
to do is to get around the amending process
of the Constitution. In effect, you are try-
ing to get around article 1, section 8, by
amending the Constitution by way of a joint
resolution."
I do not believe we ought to establish any
snore precedents of this kind. I do not ac-
cept the argument that because we have
made two mistakes in the past-we made no
mistake in connection with the Cuban reso-
11Ition; and I shall speak on that later-be-
cause we made mistakes in the Formosa and
the Middle East joint resolutions, we can
make another one. Even a repetition of mis-
takes does not -create a legal right in the
President. I do not believe it is good legis-
Iattve process to repeat mistakes. We ought
to stop making them.
In effect, this joint resolution constitutes
an amendment of article I, section 8, of the
Constitution, in that it would give the Pres-
ident, in practice and effect, the power to
make war in the absence of a declaration of
war. It is also important to demonstrate to
the world, including the free nations, that
the Constitution of the United States is not
an instrument to be tinkered with; that the
Constitution is a precious, sacred document,
so far as our form of government Is con-
cerned, and is not subject to subversion in
the legislative process. We should never miss
an opportunity to demonstrate this prin-
ciple to the totalitarian nations of the world.
We should never forget that under Fascist
or Communist regimes there are no rights
and liberties of the person.
It is proposed, by this joint resolution,
to subvert the Constitution. We are en-
gaging in a subterfuge, so far as article I,
section 8, is concerned. We should not do
that. We should not in any resolution tinker
with the Constitution in respect to the pow-
ers and prerogatives of the President, and
the limitations upon such powers and pre-
rogatives.
Going back to section i of the resolution,
I assert again that In the language "to take
all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack against the forces of the United
States," there is no question about the in-
herent power of the President to do so with-
out a resolution.
I have stated that If this proposed grant
of power implies that the right of the Pres-
ident of the United States to take all the
necessary measures to "repel any armed at-
tack against the forces of the United
States"-which former Secretary of State
Dulles and Admiral Radford asked for in
1954--includes the authority to commit an
act of aggression before an act of aggres-
sion is committed against the United States,
on the basis of the theory of a preventive
war, that is a dangerous doctrine. It can-
not possibly be reconciled with the Consti-
tution; nor can it be reconciled with sound
national policy.
There is no question that the meaning
of the next four words on line 6 of page
2 clearly authorize-"to prevent further ag-
gression."
That is when the whole realm of judg-
ment upon the part of the President of the
United States comes into play. That is when
we substitute the President for article I,
section 8 of the Constitution. That is when
we say to the President, "You can go be-
yond acts of immediate self-defense of the
Republic. You do not have to come to the
Congress, as Franklin Roosevelt did after
Pearl Harbor, and ask for a declaration of
war. You can proceed in the exercise of
your judgment to prevent further aggres-
sion."
The uninformed, unenlightened editor of
the Washington Post who wrote that stupid
editorial in this morning's paper has not
the slightest conception of the meaning of
those words. If he had, he would not have
written in his editorial :
"There is no substance in Senator MoasE's
charge that the resolution amounts to a
'predated declaration of war.' "
That is exactly what those words mean.
It is incontrovertible. The President would
not have to come and ask for a declaration
of war. He would be given sanction by Con-
gress to make war without a declaration of
war. It will be noted that I do not say "the
authority," for the authority cannot be
granted by Congress. Congress cannot
amend the Constitution in this way. This
does not conform to the amendment proc-
esses of the Constitution. It is proposed
that Congress sanction the action of the
President in making war, if in his judgment,
he thinks making war is necessary to prevent
further aggression. I shall come to that
point later. But that is why I said last night
that so many want to turn away from the
most delicate question involved in the de-
bate. That is why I said last night-and
shall discuss it at greater length today-that
the President and our country were quite
right In meeting the attack on the destroyers
last Tuesday night. But, in my judgment,
that did not empower him, under the right
of self-defense, to try to proceed beyond pro-
tecting those ships, and strike the mainland
of North Vietnam. In my judgment, that
constituted an act of war-not an act of self-
defense.
Mr. President, at that point, under our
treaty commitments, our allegations in re-
gard to the absolutely inexcusable and illegal
attack on our ships on the high seas by the
North Vietnamese forces should have been
taken immediately to the United Nations.
As to that attack we had an unassailable
case. They attacked us on the high seas and
we responded in self-defense.
We were clearly within our International
law rights. Unfortunately we did not stop
there. We then went beyond our rights of
self-defense and proceeded to bomb the
mainland of North Vietnam.
We either support a rule of law procedure
or we ignore it. We ignored it. We had an
irrefutable case of violation of international
law by North Vietnam in connection with
their attack on our ships. We would have
a hard time, under international law, sup-
porting our subsequent attack on North
Vietnam in the absence of a declaration of
war. There will be those who will say that
that is cutting the line pretty fine. Never-
theless, the difference is between acting
within the Constitution and acting outside,
of it. It is the difference between staying
within our rights of self-defense and pro-?
ceeding to turn ourselves into an aggressive
warmaking power.
No one despises, hates, and repudiates
more than does the senior Senator from Ore..
gon, communism, Communist regimes, in-
cluding North Vietnam, Red China, Cuba,
Red Russia, and all of the rest. But I do
not propose to allow my hatred, my detesta-
tion, my complete disgust with the police
state methods of a Communist regime to
cause me to give support to a proposal to go
outside the constitutional guarantees of our
system of government. I want to keep my
Government in an impregnable position, so
that we can go before any international tri-
bunal and establish our case, and not have
thrown back in our teeth a showing to estab-
lish a series of allegations In regard to the
exercise of power and military might on the
part of the United States that takes us out-
side the framework of international law.
There is no doubt that the language, "1-,o
prevent further aggression," rouses all. the
objections that I made in 1955 to the For-
mosa resolution. This proposal seeks to vest
in the President of the United States the
power to carry on a so-called preventive war.
By preventive war, we mean making a war
against another country' because it is as-
sumed that that country is about to make
war, or contemplates making war, against
the United States. Such authority is not to
be found in the Constitution. The Congress
cannot give such'authority to the President
of the United States as far as the Constitu-
tion is concerned. It can sanction the ex-?
ercise of the authority but the exercise of
the authority would still be just as much
outside the Constitution as though the Pres..
ident acted without the joint resolution. The
joint resolution could never make legal the
exercise of such authority by the President
of the United States.
That is not the only place in the resolu-
tion in which we would give to the President
a preventive war authority. I refer the Sen-
ate to section 2, line 7, which provides--
"SEc. 2. The United States regards as vital
to its national interest and to world peace
the maintenance of international peace and
security In southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution-"
It has been agreed, by way of an amend-
ment to the joint resolution, that that
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April 30, 1965 CQNGRESSTQNAL. RECORD.. SENATE
means. the Constitution of the United
States-"and the Charter of the United Na-
tions and in accordance with its obligations
under the,Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, the United States is, therefore, pre-
pared, as the President determines, to take
all necessary steps, including the use of
armed force, to assist any member or proto-
col state of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty requesting assistance in de-
fense of its freedom,"
Mr. President, that is an awful power to
give to a President. If the Washington Post
does not think that that is a predated dec-
laration of, war, the editor ought to start
asking himself some questions about certain
hypothetical situations. .
Shall we allow any President of the United
States to decide, wth no check-that is, no
check for immediate application-to take all
necessary steps, including the use of armed
force, to assist any member or protocol state
of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty requesting aesistance in defense of
its freedom?
We had better pause long enough to take
a look at the. nature of some of the coun-
tries involved, because many of the coun-
tries are not free countries. Many of those
countries are totalitarian countries. Many
of those countries are dictatorships. It is
wishful thinking to assume that it would be
safe to give the President of the United
States unchecked authority to proceed to
use American boys in defense of those coun-
tries on the basis of claims that acts of ag-
gression are being committed against them by
some other. country, without a congressional
check. Have we reached the point in Ameri-
can foreign policy where we are going to
permit the President to send American boys
to their death in the defense of military
dictatorships, monarchies, and Fascist re-
gimes around the world with which we have
entered into treaty obligations involving
mutual.security, no matter what the provoca.
tion and no matter what wrongs they may
have committed that cause an attack upon
them? Are we going to do that without a
check .of Congress by way of a declaration
of war? What are we thinking of? What
time factor would justify such precipitate
action?
Mr. President, this Senator will never vote
to send an American boy to his death any-
where in the world under any such language
as is, contained in that part of the joint
resolution. It is of utmost importance that
we surround that language with a congres-
sional check. And there is none.
One. could say, as I said a few moments
ago, "But, Mr. Senator, the Congress can
terminate this authority by a concurrent
resolution,"
I have, already pointed out the kind of
hassle that such a situation would create,
and the kind of disunity that such action
would produce. The American people
should be protected from a possible abuse of
the authority. So long as abuse of a pro-
cedure is possible, the procedure should be
modified to prevent the possibility of the
abuse.
Mr. President, that is why it is so impor-
tant that we hold any President-I care not
who be is-to article I, section 8, of the Con-
stitution in the carrying out of mutual secu-
rity agreements. We should hold him to the
approval of the. Congress before the fact and
not after the fact.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. QRVENING. I wish the Senator would
discuss what seems to me the obvious esca-
lation of the war by the authority granted
in section 2 of the joint resolution-"To
assist any member or protocol state of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty."
Mr. MORSE. I was about to do so.
Mr. GRUENING. Hitherto we have been
dealing wholly with South Vietnam. The
President has stated his purpose, which is
quite evident-not to extend the war..
In the section to which I referred we are
including a number of additional nations
into which we could send our Armed Forces.
The joint. resolution would extend the pro-
spective war all over southeast Asia, would
it not?
Mr. MORSE. It certainly would, with no
check on it.
Mr. GRUENING. In other words, in effect,
the Congress would authorize an escalation
of the war to Thailand, Laos, Cambodia,
North Vietnam, South Vietnam-and what
else?
Mr. MORSE. Pakistan.
Mr. GRUENING. I have in my possession,
which I intend to present when the foreign
aid bill comes before the Senate, a statement
from a high official of Pakistan indicating
that his government has no intention of
using the nearly $1 billion in military aid
that we have given to Pakistan to help out
our cause because it is needed in their pro-
spective difficulties with India.
Mr. MORSE. The Foreign Minister of Paki-
stan in effect made that statement in Wash-
ington, D.C., when he addressed the Press
Club not so many weeks ago. He was asked
by a newspaperman at the meeting to state
whether or not Pakistan could be counted
upon to be of assistance in southeast Asia.
He said, "No."
He gave his reason. His reason was
Pakistan's involvement with India. Pakistan
has no intention of responding to any calls
to SEATO members.
I yield further.
Mr. GRUENING. It seems to me that the
joint resolution presents an unlimited au-
thorization for war anywhere in southeast
Asia, Including Pakistan, which is really not
in southeast Asia, but which Is in south cen-
tral Asia, and it seems to me a very danger-
ous, unwarranted, and unprecedented action.
Mr. MORSE. Do not forget, Pakistan is a
member of SEATO; its obligations to South
Vietnam are the same as ours.
Mr. GRUENING. Yes; but, it has shown no
disposition whatever to carry out its obliga-
tions under that treaty.
Mr. MORSE. That is correct; but, she being
a SEATO member, we would be obligated to
go to her assistance.
Mr. GRUENING. This resolution, in effect,
is an authorization which would be the
equivalent of a declaration of war by the
Congress. Would it not be?
Mr. MORSE. I think so.
Mr. GRUENING. That is one thing I am very
apprehensive about. If we should get into
an all-out war, which I fear may happen,
this resolution would be considered the au-
thorization by the Congress to so proceed.
Would it not?
Mr. MORSE. That is correct.
Mr. GRUENING. I expressed my views on it
yesterday. I do not at all criticize the Presi-
dent-in fact, I think the President was cor-
rect-for repelling the assault, whatever may
be the background, on American vessels and
destroying the attackers. I approve of that
action, but the resolution goes far beyond
such action, which apparently precipitated
the request by the President for such a reso-
lution, and covers the whole of southeast
Asia area. I distinctly disagree with the ad-
ministration policy.
As I have stated repeatedly, this was a
policy which the President inherited, and
from which I hoped he would disengage him-
self. He inherited it from the Eisenhower
administration, from John Foster Dulles,
when we picked up the fiasco the French had
engaged in with the loss of over 100,000
young lives. We contributed vast sums of
money to that operation. It was obviously
a .failure.
8801
Now we have escalated it, as could be fore-
seen, and as I in fact did foretell, and as the
Senator from Oregon foretold, into an all-out
war in southeast Asia. Regrettably, the end
is not yet. I am extremely fearful about the
situation,
This is a moment when patriotic passions
are aroused, and it seems indicated that we
should do whatever the President asks.
It is very painful for those of us who
disagree with the policy. I felt it was wrong
in the beginning. and have repeatedly stated
for 5 months that I thought it was wrong,
and that we should continue to try to find a
peaceful solution; that we should take the
issue to the United Nations and seek a cease-
fire, It is, as I have said, painful not to sup-
port the President, but I cannot do so in good
conscience under the blanket terms of this
resolution.
Mr. MORSE. As the Senator knows, last
night it was impossible for him, because
of a previous appointment, to be present
when I paid my high respects to him for his
courage, statesmanship, and leadership in
this matter for many months past. I said
last night that the Senator from Alaska had
put the issue squarely.
Now, in a very few moments, the Senator
from Alaska has summarized succinctly the
major points of the address I have been
making on the floor of the Senate the last
hour and 16 minutes. I wish to formalize
those points before I come to the next major
issue which I shall discuss in my speech.
What I have said expresses my views as to
the power that would be granted to the Presi-
dent in the resolution. It is what I have
called an undated declaration of war. I sum-
marize the points as follows:
First, the unlimited language of the resolu-
tion would authorize acts of war without
specifying countries, places, or times. That
language cannot be reconciled with article I,
section 8 of the Constitution. It amounts,
in fact as well as in law, to a predated decla-
ration of war.
Next, as I said last night, we have armed
forces in South Vietnam, some 20,000, or
more, apparently, with the number increas-
ing by planeload after planeload.
Senators can bemoan and warn against a
land war in Asia, but the resolution would
put the United States in the middle of the
Vietnam civil war, which is basically a land
war.
Under the resolution Congress would give
to the President of the United States great
authority, without coming to the Congress
and obtaining approval by way of declaration
of war, to carry on a land war in South Viet-
nam. The choice is left up to him.
As I said last night, the interesting thing
is that South Vietnam, with a population
of 15 million, and an armed force of 400,000
to 450,000 men, has been unable, through all
the years of the holocaust in South Vietnam,
to put down a Vietcong force of a maximum
of 35,000 men. The Pentagon and the State
Department, in testifying before the com-
mittee, say the number probably does not
exceed 25,000. We have to have more than
20,000 American boys over there to die in
whatever numbers they are killed, in an at-
tempt to win that war. And for whom?
Mr. President, the leaders of this Govern-
ment keep talking about freedom in South
Vietnam. There is not one iota of freedom
in South Vietnam, for the South Vietnamese
people, by and large, do not know what the
word means. I quoted in a speech the day
before yesterday, a letter I received from
a Republican Member of Congress, in full
support of the position I have taken on this
issue. I paraphrase it, although the quota-
tion is already-in the RECORD. He said that
the average man of North or South Vietnam
would not know what democracy looked like
if he met it on the main Street of Saigon.
The difference betweenthefr,governments is
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88302 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
like the difference between tweedledum and
tweedlelee. But both are interested in the
next bowl of rice.
That is why this Senator has been pleading
for years, in connection with foreign policy,
that the great need of the United States in
the field of foreign policy is to export eco-
nomic freedom and to stop exporting mili-
tary aid, for our military aid makes Commu-
nists. Prepare the seedbeds of economic
freedom for the masses of the people of any
country and we prepare for the growth of
freedom. Unless the people are first eco-
nomically free, they cannot be politically
free; and, what is more important, they will
never understand political freedom until
they are first economically free.
There is great danger now that Congress
will give to the President-.of the United
States power to carry on whatever type of
war he wishes to wage in. southeast Asia.
That is why I said, in answer to an argu-
ment that was made on the floor of the Sen-
ate yesterday, apparently some colleagues are
laboring under the illusion that perhaps the
resolution would reduce the danger of fight-
ing a land war in Asia. There is not a word
In the resolution that has any bearing on
the subject. To the contrary, the broad,
sweeping, sanction of power-note my lan-
guage, because it cannot be done legally -
the broad, arbitrary, sweeping power Con-
gress is sanctioning for the President would
in no way stop him from sending as many
American boys as he wants to send into
South Vietnamese to make war.
As the Senator from Alaska has said over
and over again, and as I have joined him in
saying, all South Vietnam is not worth the
life of a single American boy; and the killing
of a single American boy in South Vietnam
is an unjustified killing. It ought to stop.
It is not going to stop until we turn our
warmaking policy into a peacekeeping policy.
It Is not going to stop until we insist that
our alleged allies In SEATO come In with
as many divisions of peacekeeping units as
are'fteeessary to keep the belligerents apart.
It is not going to stop until the United Na-
tions, under the procedures of international
law, can come in and keep the peace and set
up whatever controls are needed, by way of
United Nations trusteeships if necessary, to
bring that war to an end. '
This result will not be achieved by uni-
lateral military action. It makes me sad to
have to say it, but I am satisfied that history
will, record this horrendous mistake of the
United States in its false assumption in the
gloat 1964 that it could supplant in South
VIOU1944 military control by Asiatics with
military control by the United States.
We could never win such a war. We might
win military victory after military victory.
If we did not stop the escalation, we would
kilt millions of people, because the escala-
tton, step by step; `would lead to all-out
bombing of North Vietnam and Red Chinese
cities. When we were through, we should
have `'killed millions and won military vic-
tory after military- victory, but we should
still have lost the war.
The United States can never dominate
and control Asia, with 800 minion people in
china alone. That kind of war would create
a hatred for the United States and for the
white mangenerally that would persist for
centuries. bominating Asia, after destroy-
ing her cities and killing her millions by
bombings-that is the danger that we are
walking into-would not make the white
man supreme in Asia, but only hated.
We know what the floods of human his-
tory 4o. Eventually the white man will be
engulfed in that Asiatic flood and drowned.
Mr. MORSE. Madam President: I
shall comment on only a point or two
by way of quotation ; then I shall sum-
marize my. position, because It bears on
some of the conversations I have had
today with other Senators who appar-
ently, in some instances, thought they
were voting for a joint resolution that
was free of the very objections that I
raised to it in my speech opposing it
last year. For example, I said:
So I am concerned about the resolution in
respect to its giving to the President what I
honestly and sincerely believe is an uncon-
stitutional power-that is, the power to make
war without a declaration of war. It feeds a
political trend in this country that needs to
be checked. For sometime past in this Re-
public we have been moving in the direction
of a government by executive supremacy.
It is very interesting to listen to the argu-
ments that one hears for extending and ex-
panding the power of the White House. It is
extremely important--and I speak soberly
and out of a depth of great sincerity-that
we never grant a single power to any Presi-
dent, I care not who he is, that in any way
cannot be reconciled with that precious
fundamental foundation of our Republic;
namely, a system of three coordinate and
coequal branches of government.
It is dangerous to the freedoms and liber-
ties of the American people to vest in any
President, at any time, under any circum-
stances, power that exceeds the constitu-
tional concept of three coordinate and co-
equal branches of government.
Then I discussed at length and in some
detail my view of the joint resolution,
saying that it did give to the President
broad, sweeping power to make war.
I do not see how one can read the
joint resolution and reach any other
conclusion. Yet, I listened to a colleague
on the Committee on Foreign Relations
say to a high official of this Government
who interpreted the resolution as giving
the broad power that I was objecting to
last year: "If I thought that I was voting
for that power, I would have voted
against the resolution with WAYNE
MORSE, not for it. That is not what I
voted for."
I am afraid he did, may I say to the
Senators who, in effect, have said, "I
did not vote for a resolution that would
authorize the President to send thou-
sands upon thousands of American
troops into Vietnam or into southeast
Asia." That is what concerns them to-
day. I do not believe any Senator knows
tonight how many thousands of Ameri-
can soldiers we now have in southeast
Asia and how many thousands more may
be on the way.
This has been on interesting day in
the Senate. I have listened to many ex-
pressions of hindsight on the part of
some of my colleagues who are disturbed
about the rapid escalation of the war
in North Vietnam and who did not be-
lieve when they voted for this resolu-
tion that they were voting to empower
the President of the United States, with-
out a declaration'of war, to bomb North
Vietnam.
I believe that they did vote for it.
I did my best to get them to see that that
was what they were voting for. I do not
know how one could have been more ex-
plicit than I was.
Apparently they shared the feeling
that was sincerely held by the chair
man of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee and eloquently expressed by him,
which was contrary to the views ex-
pressed by the Senator from Alaska [Mr.
April 30, 1965
GRITENINGI and the senior Senator from
Oregon.
The sad fact is that they voted for
a blank cheek and now that the num-
bers are being filled in all the American
people are going to suffer.
(At this point Mr. HART took the chair
as Presiding Officer.)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, earlier
this afternoon I said that the Foreign
Relations Committee now has an obliga-
tion to proceed with some consideration
on the Joint resolution that was passed
last August. I have heard enough
doubts expressed today as to what this
resolution means that I think the Ameri-
can people are entitled to have the
thought of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee clarified, or try to.
Section 3 reads:
This resolution shall expire when the Presi-
dent shall determine that the peace and
security of the area is reasonably assured by
international conditions created by action
of the United Nations or otherwise, except
that it'may be terminated earlier by concur-
rent resolution of the Congress.
Congress of course reserved the right
to terminate it. There is also a clear Im-
plication that they reserved the right to
modify it-and I think it is time for
members of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee-the resolution came from the
Foreign Relations Committee--to form-
ally and officially raise this question and
give the Senate at least an. opportunity to
.decide whether it wants to reaffirm its
position of last August, or declare war,
or terminate the power that it thought
it could give to the President, but which,
in the opinion of the senior Senator from
Oregon, it could not possibly delegate to
the President.
Since last August 7, both the Presi-
dent and Congress have been engaged
in a clearly unconstitutional course of
action. We cannot delegate this power
to the President. The President under
the Constitution has no authority to ex-
ercise the power. However, we have
been confronted with a type of legal
anomaly such that If Congress and the
President really usurp power or act out-,
side the law in this interesting field of
the law, we know of no procedure that
can get the question to the U.S. Supreme
Court for review and determination.
I say, good naturedly and respectfully,
and out of love and affection for my col-
leagues who have been so disturbed
today about whether or not they are go-
ing along with the policy that they did
not think they voted for last August, that
they owe it to themselves, to the Senate,
and to the American people to formally,
as members of the Foreign Relations
Committee, bring that resolution back
to the floor of the Senate for reaffirma-
tion, for extermination by way of repeal,
or, if they really want to fight a war
with the lives of American boys, live up
to article I of section 8 of the Constitu-
tion and introduce a resolution declaring
war.
I wonder why they do not do that. It
is interesting to speculate on that ques-
tion. I wonder if Congress dares declare
war against any country in southeast
Asia.
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April 430, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
If it is going to fight a war, it ought to
declare it.
I wonder if the Members of this Con-
gress-at least some-might have a slight
feeling that perhaps the American people
would not approve of a formal declara-
tion of war. I wonder if they have a
lurking suspicion that would put upon
them and this Government for the first
time the obligation of telling the Ameri-
can people all the facts about America's
course of action in southeast Asia.
I am satisfied that if we could only get
all the facts before the American people
about the outlawry of the United States
in southeast Asia, the American people
would repudiate both the White House
and the Congress.
I wish my colleagues who are so dis-
turbed today would now proceed to act
on their hindsights. I know the old ra-
tionalization-"The fat is in the fire. It
is too late. There is nothing we can do
about it.,'
We had better do something about it.
Mr. President, we had better do what we
can to give greater assurance than we are
at the present time that mankind is go-
ing to be saved from a holocaust that
could very well start in Asia.
I was a little amused today to learn
that the Secretary of State is not opposed
to debate. He is not opposed to the ex-
pression of criticisms, of opposition. Yet
the record he made leaves the impression
that he wishes people would not debate
and would not express opposition. The
Secretary of State cannot have freedom
of speech and censorship at the same
time. I want him to know there is going
to be freedom of speech as long as we
remain free in this country. But, of
course, if there is a declaration of war,
there will be many restrictions on free-
dom. That is inevitable. But until there
is a declaration of war, it is of vital im-
portance, despite the disgraceful speech
the Secretary of State made several
nights ago, which I criticized on the floor
of the Senate. It means only one thing
if he was speaking for the administra-
tion-and I have no doubt he was--the
less discussion we have in this country
about America's shocking course of action
in making war unilaterally in Asia, the
better this administration will like it.
But there are a good many of us who
are not going to oblige them, for the
people are entitled to know, as best we
can inform them.
I hope the remarks I have made here
today will convince some of my colleagues
on the Foreign Relations Committee and
some of my colleagues in the Senate who
are not on the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee to give careful consideration to a
review of all the possible implications of
the most unfortunate resolution the Con-
gress passed last August 7, which has
created such an ugly image of the United
States around the world.
Even some of our best friends do not
like. our war breath. They like to turn
away from it. They find it impossible to
break their association with us at this
time: So they continue to give us words
of encouragement, and they themselves
walk out on their obligations, by their
signatures to the United Nations Charter,
of calling for the application of existing
peaceful procedures for the settlement of
disputes that threaten peace.
Let me say to my Canadian friends
who have criticized me in recent days
because I have criticized the Prime Min-
ister of Canada, Mr. Pearson-and I re-
peat my criticism this afternoon-that
Canada clearly is obligated under the
United Nations Charter to have laid this
threat to the peace to mankind before
the United Nations. I say to the Prime
Minister of Great Britain that his de-
pendence upon the United States in sta-
bilizing the British pound does not jus-
tify Great Britain in not calling the
United States to an accounting, along
with our Communist opponents, under
the procedures of the United Nations
Charter.
I say to the Prime Minister of Italy,
who was feted in Washington, that when'
he gets back to Italy I hope his govern-
ment will live up to its obligations result-
ing from its signature, to the United Na-
tions Charter and ask for an interna-
tional conference on the war in Asia
under the auspices of the United Nations,
with the United Nations representative
sitting at the head of the table and the
combatants, including the United States,
on the two sides of that table-the United
States and South Vietnam on one side
and the Vietcong and the North Viet-
namese on the other-because at the
present time, in spite of all the acts of a
provocateur of which the United States
is guilty, Red China is not in the war yet.
May God prevent her from ever coming
in.
But I think she will if we continue our
course of action, for we are going to give
her no alternative.
The only hope, as I see it, is an inter-
national conference for negotiations, not
bilateral in nature, for we cannot have
those any more, but a trilateral negotia-
tion, a tripartite negotiation, a negotia-
tion with the two opposing forces, of
which the United States and South Viet-
nam happen, to be one, but in the middle
and as chairman, so-called, of the con-
ference, officially selected representatives
of noncombatants. That is the honor-
able way.
There is nothing dishonorable about
that, Mr. President. It is a hopeful way.
It calls for our alleged friends in other
countries coming to realize that if the
world is thrown into a major holocaust
as a result of this war, they cannot
escape their fair share of responsibility
for letting it happen.
It is hoped, of course, that a military
victory may be a face saver for the United
States. It is hoped to have a victory by
sending increasing thousands of Amer-
icans trained in jungle fighting-and
they have been in training for many
months past. There has been a design to
escalate the war by the Secretary of De-
fense, Mr. McNamara, by the Ambas-
sador to South Vietnam, Mr. Taylor, by
the Bundys at the White House and the
State Department, by the Secretary of
State himself. The plan for escalating
the war has been in operation, behind the
scenes, for many months.
I say to the American people, "Do not
let them pull the diplomatic wool over
8803
your eyes. You are entitled to know the
facts."
Of course, we may win great military
victories, yet lose the war. The United
States continues its program of acting as
a provocateur in Asia, which is the chief
role of the United States in the war up
to the present time, to provoke and pro-
voke and provoke to get North Vietnam
to act, which we did.
For many months the testimony by
leading witnesses of the Johnson admin-
istration before the Committee on For-
eign Relations was that North Vietnam
was not in the war in any numbers what-
soever, that 80 percent to 90 percent of
the fighting personel in South Vietnam
were South Vietnamese. For months and
months those witnesses from the Penta-
gon and State Department testified that
they had not been able to detect a single
cadre of North Vietnamese. Then
came Tonkin Bay, where we provided
cover for small naval vessels of the South
Vietnamese, completely equipped by the
United States, in violation of the Geneva
accords. Those vessels bombed two
North Vietnamese islands 3 to 6 miles
from the mainland of North Viet-
nam, with our destroyers on the high seas
but in a position of cover and constant
radio communication with Saigon, which
was fully informed of every mile of the
voyage of the bombing ships.
We were attacked on the high seas,
and we therefore had a right to respond
to the attack, although we provoked it.
Then, with the second bombing, we were
still on the high seas and had every right
to respond to it. But, we had no right
under international law to bomb the
mainland of North Vietnam. When we
did, under orders of the President of the
United States, we became a clear aggres-
sor against North Vietnam.
I do not know why anyone is so sur-
prised that following that act of aggres-
sion there then was a definite' speedup
of North Vietnamese activity in the war.
That is what we expected. Of course,
our duty-after we attacked the North
Vietnamese torpedo boats, which we had
a right to do in national self-defense-
was to lay the violations of international
law immediately before the United Na-
tions Security Council.
There is nothing in international law
which authorizes a country in such a
situation to proceed to make war on ter-
ritory of a country which has violated
international law on the high seas.
Many times I have stated in the past
year and half-and repeat tonight-that
I am perfectly satisfied that the real ob-
jective of the preventive war crowd in
the Pentagon and the State Department
is to bomb the nuclear installations of
Red China. That is what they are after.
They know well that, when they do, they
will bring Red China into the war.
No Senator can deny what I now as-
sert, that when Red China starts to move
on the ground, the plan will be to send
over several hundred thousand American
boys to the mainland of Asia.
Authority after authority-who have
forgotten more about Asia than the
President's advisers will ever know-
have pointed out that those boys will
come back to the United States in. tens
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8804
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE April 30' 1965
of thousands of coffins in the years that
it will take for us eventually to get out of
China.
That is the horrendous picture which
faces the people of the United States,
That is why I repeat-and it is not pleas-
ant to do so-that the President of the
United States owes it to the American
people to recommend either a declara-
tion of war against whatever countries
he proposes to fight a war, or to go back
and put into practice the great American
ideal-in regard to which we led the
world for years, but now have sullied
that record-that we are ready to sub-
stitute the procedures of the rule of law
for America's jungle law and the law of
America's claw in Asia.
Mr. President, that is our obligation.
It still is not too late, but it is growing
later. There is still time, but not too
much. Mr. President, you and I know
that when those tens of thousands of
American boys reach Asia, there will not
be much time to talk about preventing
war. There will not be much time, then,
nor will it be appropriate if we are in
a massive war, to talk about proposing
the substitution of the rule of law for
war. Then, we shall be completely In the
hands of our friends. Then, our only
way to get out will be for our friends
to do what they should have done more
than a year ago, when the seriousness of
the situation became obvious to the
world: They should have called for sub-
mission of this dirty war to procedures
which exist for the settlement of dis-
putes which threaten the peace of man-
kind.
Mr. President, it is fine for the Presi-
dent to say that he is for unconditional
discussion. It sounds good. But, who is
going to conduct it? What will its for-
mat be? Has the State Department
actually advised him that it is within
the realm of reality that the United
States can say to North Vietnam and
China that we have not even indicated
a willingness to deal with the other side
of the civil war in South Vietnam, which
happens to be in a majority, controlling
not only a majority of the land but also
a majority of the people? Too many
people in this country seem to believe
that Saigon is South Vietnam. It is a
very small part of South Vietnam.
That happens to be the headquarters
of the American'puppets who have denied
freedom to the South Vietnamese people
ever isnce the Geneva accords were
signed on the part of those who par-
ticipated in the conference.
No, Mr. President, we cannot have un-
conditional discussions now on a bilat-
eral basis. We. can have unconditional
discussions only if we have a sharing
and directing in those negotiations on
the part of official representatives of
noncombatants. That is why the senior
Senator from Oregon has pleaded for a
year and a half from this desk, and will
continue to plead, until there is a decla-
ration of war, that my country take ad-
vantage of one of the greatest opportu-
nities and obligations that destiny has
placed upon its shoulders, to recognize
before it Is too late that our present
course of action means a holocaust, un-
less for a time North Vietnam and China
may give the appearance of capitulat-
ing because we shall have wreaked mili-
tary devastation upon them in the
months ahead.
However, let us not be fooled by the
appearance of a capitulation. If we con-
tinue this course of action we shall have
earned the hatred not only of North
Vietnam and Red China, but also of all
Asians for a thousand years or more. If
we refresh our memory on what has
happened to other nations in the course
of the history of men who came to feel
that they were powerful enough to domi-
nate any people who did not do their
bidding, we learn that those countries
ultimately fell because of the vengence
and hatred of the millions that they
came to dominate. Finally in this in-
stance they will become more powerful
as a weapon for destruction than Amer-
ica's hydrogen bombs.
Many do not like to hear me talk
about our acting on the basis of moral
values. They seem to think that when
we get into a war, morality goes out. I
believe that any country that follows a
course of action such as my country is
following today, which cannot possibly
be squared with morality, will ultimately
lose, no matter how many military vic-
tories it wins.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF
RESOLUTION
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on behalf
of the junior Senator from Maryland
IMr. TYnixGsl, I ask unanimous consent
that his name be added as a cosponsor
of the resolution (S. Res. 102) to dis-
approve Reorganization Plan No. 1.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ADJOURNMENT
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in ac-
cordance with the previous order, I move
that the Senate stand in adjournment
until 12 o'clock noon on Monday next.
The motion was agreed to; and (at 5
o'clock and 55 minutes p.m.) the Senate
adjourned, under the previous order,
until Monday, May 3, 1965, at 12 o'clock
meridian.
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the
Senate April 30, 1965:
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
The following candidates for personnel ac-
tion in the Regular Corps of the Public
Health Service subject to qualifications there-
for as provided by law and regulations:
I. For appointment:
To be senior surgeon
Paul D. Pedersen
To be senior assistant surgeons
Alan I. Levenson
Amos C. Lewis
To be senior assistant sanitarian
William P. Wollschiager
II. For permanent promotion:
To be assistant pharmacist
Douglas O. Sharp
CONFIRMATIONS
Executive nominations confirmed by
the Senate April 30, 1965:
U.S. AIR FORCE
The following-named officers for appoint-
ment In the Regular Air Force, to the grades
indicated, under the provisions of chapter
835, title 10, of the United States Code:
To be mayor generals
Maj. Gen. James C. McGehee, 1746A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Thomas E. Moore, 1804A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Francis C. Gideon, 1993A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. John N. Ewbank, Jr., 1S81A
(brigadier general, Regular Air Force), U.S.
Air Force.
Maj. Gen. George B. Greene, Jr., 1716A
(brigadier general, Regular Air Force), 1Y.S.
Air Force.
Maj. Gen. Melvin F. McNickle, 1891A (brig-
adier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Reginald J. Clizbe, 2004A (brig-
adier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Robert N. Smith, 3783A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Selmon W. Wells, 3991A (briga.
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Jack J. Catton, 4719A (brigadier
general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air Force.
Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Kinney, 1661A
(brigadier general, Regular Air Force), U.S.
Air Force.
Maj. Gen. William W. Veal, 1902A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Eugene B. LeBeilly, 1920A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Gilbert L. Meyers, 1958A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem II, 2025A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force).
Maj. Gen. Rollen H. Anthis, 2053A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force. ?
Maj. Gen. Joseph A. Cunningham, 2054A
(brigadier general, Regular Rtr Force), U.S.
Air Force.
Maj, Gen. John B. McPherson, 2068A
(brigadier general, Regular Air Force), U.S.
Air Force.
Maj. Gen. Gerald F. Keeling, 3827A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. John B. Henry, Jr., 4129A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. John W. O'Neill, 4155A (briga.
dier general, Regular Air Force), V.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund, 4170A (briga-
dier general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air
Force.
Maj. Gen. Jamie Gough, 4511A (brigadier
general, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air Force.
Maj. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, 8981A
(brigadier general, Regular Air Force), U.S.
Air Force.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth E. Pletcher, 19136A.
(brigadier general, Regular Air Force, Medi-
cal), U.S. Air Force.
To be brigadier general
Brig. Gen. Emmett M. Tally, Jr., 1312A
(colonel, Regular Air Force), U.S. Air Force.
Brig. Gen. Linscott A. Hall, 1342A (colonel,
Regular Air Force), U.S. Air Force.
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