LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRESIDENT DIEUM, OCTOBER 26, 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300140026-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: September 1, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

21700 Approved For 11ppt~,114 ~~q ORD r67B00446R000300140026-6
(7NA' REC - HOUSE September 1, 1965
Will contribute effectively toward an inde- turbed by the assault on your country. Our the South, to defeat American power, and
pendent Vietnam endowed with a strong indignation has mounted as the deliberate to extend the Asiatic dominion -
of oommu
government. Such a government would, I savagery of the Communist program of as. nism.
hope, be so responsive to the nationalist as- sassination, kidnaping, and wanton violence
pirations of its people, so enlightened in pur- became clear
The stakes in Vietnam
.
pose and effective in performance, that it Your letter underlines what our own in-
will be respected both at home and abroad formation has convincingly shown-that the
and discourage any who might wish to im- campaign of force and terror now being
pose a foreign ideology on your free people. waged against your people and your Govern-
Sincerely, ment is supported and directed from the
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRESI- have thus violated the provisions of the
DENT DIEM, OCTOBER 26, 1960 Geneva accords designed to insure peace in
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: My countrymen and I Vietnam and to which they bound them-
are proud to convey our good wishes to you selves in 1954.
and to the citizens of Vietnam on the fifth At that time, the United States, although
anniversary of the birth of the Republic of not a party to the accords, declared that it
Vietnam. "would view any renewal of the aggression
We have watched the courage and daring in violation of the agreements with grave
with which you and the Vietnamese people concern and as seriously threatening inter-
attained independence in a Situation so peri- national peace and security." We continue
lous that many thought it hopeless. We to maintain that view.
have admired the rapidity with which chaos In accordance with that declaration, and
yielded to order and progress replaced de- In response to your request, we are prepared
span. to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect
During the years of your independence it its people and to preserve its independence.
has been refreshing for us to observe how We shall promptly increase our assistance to
clearly the Government and the citizens of your defense effort as well as help relieve the
Vietnam have faced the fact that the great- destruction of the floods which you describe.
est danger to their independence was com- I have already given the orders to get these
munism. You and your countrymen have programs underway.
used your strength well in accepting the dou- The United States, like the Republic of
ble challenge of building your country and Vietnam, remains devoted to the cause of
resisting Communist Imperialism. In 5 peace and our primary purpose Is to help
short years since the founding of the Re- your people maintain their independence. If
public, the Vietnamese people have developed the Communist authorities in North Vietnam
their country in almost every sector. I was will stop their campaign to destroy the Re-
particularly impressed by one example. I public of Vietnam, the measures we are tak-
am Informed that last year over 1,200,000 ing to assist your defense efforts will no
Vietnamese Children were able to go to ele- longer be necessary. We shall seek to per-
mentary school; three times as many as were suade the Communists to give up their at-
enrolled 5 years earlier. This is certainly tempts of force and subversion. In any case,
a heartening development for Vietnam's fu- we are confident that the Vietnamese people
ture. At the same time Vietnam's ability to will preserve their independence and gain the
defend itself from the Communists has peace and prosperity for which they have
grown Immeasurably since its successful sought so hard and so long. -
stru
l
t
b
gg
e
o
ecome an independent republic.
Vietnam's very success as well as Its poten-
tial Wealth and Its strategic location have led
the Communists of Hanoi, goaded by the
bitterness of their failure to enslave all
Vietnam, to use increasing violence in their
attempts to destroy your country's freedom.
This grave threat, added to the strains and
fatigues of the long struggle to achieve and
strengthen Independence, must be a burden
that would cause moments of tension and
concern in almost any human heart. Yet
from long observation I sense how deeply
the Vietnamese value their country's inde-
pendence and strength and I know how well
you used your boldness when you led your
countrymen in winning it. I also know that
your determination has been a vital factor
in guarding that Independence while stead-
ily advancing the economic development of
your country. I am confident that these
same qualities of determination and boldness
will meet the renewed threat as well as the
needs and desires of your countrymen for
further progress on all fronts.
Although the main responsibility for
guarding that independence will always, as
It has in the past, belong to the Vietnamese
people and their government, I want to as-
sure you that for so long as our strength
can be useful, the United States will con-
tinue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet
hopeful struggle ahead.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO PRESIDENT
DIEM, DECEMBER 14, 1961
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your
recent letter in which you described so
cogently the dangerous condition caused by
North Vietnam's efforts to take over your
country. The situation In your embattled
country is well known to me and to the
American people. We have been deeply dis-
JOHN F. KENNEDY.
TOWARD PEACE WITH HONOR
(Press conference statement by the Presi-
dent, the White House, July 28, 1965)
Not long ago I received a letter from a
woman in the Midwest. She wrote:
"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my humble way
I am writing to you about the crisis in Viet-
nam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam,
My husband served in World War II. Our
country was at war, but now, this time, it is
just something I don't understand. Why?"
I have tried to answer that question a
dozen times and more in practically every
State in this Union. I discussed it fully in
Baltimore in April, in Washington In May, in
San Francisco in June. Let me again, now,
discuss It here in the East Room of the
White House.
Why must young Americans, born into a
land exultant with hope and golden with
promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in
such a remote and distant place?
The answer, like the war itself, Is not an
easy one. But it echoes clearly from the
painful lessons of half a century. Three
times in my lifetime, in two world wars and
in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands
to fight for freedom. We have learned at a
tefrible and brutal cost that retreat does not
bring safety, and weakness does not bring
peace.
The nature of the war
It Is this lesson that has brought us to
Vietnam. This is a different kind of war.
There are no marching armies or solemn dec-
larations. Some sitizens of South Vietnam,
at times with understandable grievances,
have joined in the attack on their own gov-
ernment. But we must not let this mask the
central fact that this is really war. It is
guided by North Vietnam and spurred by
Communist China. Its goal is to conquer
And there are great stakes in the balance.
Most of the non-Communist nations of
Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist
the growing might and grasping ambition
of Asian communism. Our power, therefore,
is a vital shield. If we are driven from the
field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever
again have the same confidence in American
promise, or in American protection. in each
land the forces of independence would be
considerably weakened. And an Asia so
threatened by Communist domination would
imperil the security of the United States
Itself.
We did not choose to be the guardians at
the gate, but there is no one else.
Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring
peace. We learned from Hitler at Munich
that success only feeds the appetite of ag-
gression. The battle would be renewed in
one country and then another, bringing with
it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict.
Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one
of the most solemn pledges of the American
Nation. Three Presidents-President Eisen-
hower, President Kennedy, and your present
President-over 11 years, have committed
themselves and have promised to help defend
the small and valiant nation.
Strengthened by that promise, the people
of South Vietnam have fought for many long
years. Thousands of them have died. Thou-
sands more have been crippled and scarred
by war. We cannot now dishonor our word
or abandon our commitment or leave those
who believed us and who trusted us to the
terror and repression and murder that would
follow.
This,, then, my fellow Americans, Is why
we are in Vietnam.
Increased effort to halt aggression
What are our goals in that war-stained
land?
First: We Intend to convince the Commu-
nists that we cannot be defeated by force
of arms or by superior power. They are not
easily convinced. In recent months they
have greatly increased their fighting forces,
their attacks, and the number of Incidents.
I have asked the commanding general, Gen-
eral Westmoreland, what more he needs to
meet this mounting aggression. He has told
me. We will meet his needs.
I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air
Mobile Division and certain other forces
which will raise our fighting strength from
75,000 to 125,000 men almost Immediately.
Additional forces will be needed later, and
they will be sent as requested. This will
.
make it necessary to increase our active
fighting forces by raising the monthly draft
call from 17,000 over a period of time, to
35,000 per month, and stepping up our cam-
paign for voluntary enlistments.
After this past week of deliberations, I have
concluded that it is not essential to order
Reserve units into service now. If that ne-
cessity should later be Indicated, I will give
the matter most careful consideration. And
I will give the country adequate notice be-
fore taking such action, but only after full
preparations.
We have also discussed with the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam lately the steps that
they will take to substantially increase their
own effort-both on the battlefield and to-
ward reform and progress in the villages.
Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new
program to be tested upon his return to that
area.
I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secre-
tary McNamara to be available immediately
to the Congress to review with the appro-
priate congressional committees our plan in
these areas. I have asked them to be avail-
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 ?? 41VJJ
September 1, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
Wsy Vl't?TNAM? device to cover a French surrender or a face-
curnstustanalces s othe r than tharzthans who parole under entered color FoRswoRD saving device to cover a Communist retire-
ment. or The first alternative is too serious in
became refugees after entry into the My FELLOW AMEnsCANS: Once again in its broad strategic implications for us and
United States. man's age-old struggle for a better life and for you to be acceptable. "' * *
The immigration bill which the House a world of peace, the wisdom, courag Somehow we must contrive to bring about
passed on August 25 will not provide for compassion of the American people are being the second alternative. The preliminary lines
the adjustment of status of Cuban refu- put to the test. This is the meaning of the of our thinking were sketched out by
tragic conflict in Vietnam. Foster [Dulles] in his speech last Monday
gees. In meeting the present challenge, it is night when he said that under the conditions
There are over 250,000 Cuban refugees essential that our people seek understanddng to today the imposition on southeast Asia
in this country. It is estimated that 60,- and that our leaders speak with candor. of the political system of Communist Rus-
000 to 70,000 of them are living in New I have therefore directed that this report sia and its Chinese Communists ally, by what-
York City. In the interests of humanity to the American people be compiled and ever means, would be a grave threat to the
we cannot ignore this problem any long- widely distributed. In its pages you will find whole free community, and that in our view
er. It is one which money alone will not statements on Vietnam by three leaders of this possibility should now be met by united
your Government-by your President, your action and not passively accepted, * *
solve. Secretary of State, and your Secretary of De- I believe that the best way to put teeth in
I have prepared this bill so that the fense. this concept and to bring; greater moral and
adjustment of status will be voluntary; These statements were prepared for differ- material resources to the support of the
no one will be penalized if he does not entaudiences, and they reflect the differing French effort is through the establishment
wish to change his situation. But this responsibilities of each speaker. The con- of a new, ad hoc grouping or coalition com-
bill says to each refugee, "You have come gressional testimony has been edited to avoid posed of nations which have a vital concern
here as a refugee; whether you consider undue repetition and to incorporate the in the checking of Communist expansion in
sense of the discussions that ensued. the area. I have in mind, in addition to our
this stay temporary or permanent is a Together, they construct a clear definition two countries, France, the Associated States,
decision for you to make; as a country, of America's role in the Vietnam conflict: the Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the
the United States is prepared to help you dangers and hopes that Vietnam holds for all Philippines. The U.S. Government would ex-
in every way possible, whatever your free men, the fullness and limits of our na- pect to play its full part in such a coali-
decision." tional objectives in a war we did not seek, tion. * *
This bill is addressed to an economic the constant effort on our part to bring this The important thing is that the coalition.
and social problem, not a political prob- war we do not desire to a quick and honor- must be strong and it must be willing to
able end. join the fight if necessary. I do not en-
fem. LYNDON B. JOHNSON. visage the need of any appreciable ground
The bill contains special provisions for AuGVST 20, 1965. forces on your or our part. * * *
children in order that families may be THE ROOTS OF COMMITMENT If I may refer again to history; we failed
kept together in case a child in a family historic documents that follow, two to halt Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler by not
applying for permanent residence might In the acting in unity and in time. That marked
American Presidents define and affirm the the beginning of many years of stark tragedy
be found excludable under certain pro- commitment of the United States to the and desperate peril. May it not be that our
nations have learned something from that
visions of the Immigration and Na- people of South Vietnam,
tionality Act. In letters to Prime Minister Churchill in lesson?
Mr. Speaker, I hope that this bill will 1954 and to President Diem in 1954 and 1960. With warm regard?
receive prompt action by the Congress. President Eisenhower describes the issues at Ix~.
The Cuban refugees deserve the oppor- stake and pledges United States assistance to LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISEN HOWER TO
tunny to parti'.oipate aaSS, germane t resi- South Vietnam's resistance t0 subversion nd PRESIDENT DIEM, OCTOBER 1, 1954
~~ And in December 1961 President Kennedy DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following
dents in the free societiy to wh they aggression.
with hope haV'~ fled. reaffirms that pledge. with great interest the course of develop-
e?+- in Vietnam. particularly since the
--
WIIX VIP livtalri 4, 1954
Vietnam. have caused grave concern regard-
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under (From Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Mandate for ing the future of a country temporarily di.-
previous order of the House, the gentle- change, 1953-56." New York, 1963) vided by an artificial military grouping,
man from California [Mr. COHELANI is DEAR WnvsTON: I am sure * * * you are weakened by a long and. exhausting war and
recognized for 5 minutes. following with the deepest interest and anx- faced with enemies without and by their
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, one of lety the daily reports of the gallant fight subversive collaborators within,
the most comprehensive and thoughtful being put up by the French at Dien Bien Your recent requests for aid to assist in
statements of this country's policy and Phu. Today, the situation there does not the formidable project of the movement of
seem hopeless. several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese
this country's hopes for Vietnam is set But regardless of the outcome of this par- citizens away from areas which are passing
forth in a recent publication of the ad- titular battle, I fear that the French can- under a, de facto rule and political ideology
ministration entitled "Why Vietnam." not alone see the thing through, this despite which they abhor, are 'being fulfilled. I am
This document includes letters from the very substantial assistance in money and glad that the United States is able to assist
President Eisenhower and President materiel that we are giving them. It is no in this humanitarian effort. in-
ve been
and Kennedy which document the nature of solution olseir simply its.urge A dthethFrench
do not see peWeityour aid to Vietnam toe mormeans
effeco
s emMore important, President it tit through and Indochina passes into the tive and to make a greater contribution to
our commitment.
contains concise statements by y President hands of the Communists the Ultimate effect the welfare and stability of the Government
Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and on our and your global strategic position of Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing
Secretary of Defense McNamara which with the consequent shift in the power ratios the American Ambassador to Vietnam to ex-
speak directly to the steps that have throughout Asia and the Pacific could be dis- amine with you in your capacity as Chief of
been taken to resist aggression, to our astrous and, I know, unacceptable to you and Government, how an intelligent program of aid
your
directly
ven
ions and efforts achieve settlement, and to me. * * * is has led us to the haxd con-
n continuing
that the situation in southeast Asia mentic an servelto assist Viet am in its pres-
thpress- requires us urgently to take serious and far- ent hour of trial, provided that your govern-
t e "third peaceful
wthe "thirface of the war"-the and to
reaching decisions. ment is prepared to give assurances as to the
ing requirement to deal with the deep Geneva is less than 4 weeks away. There standards of performance it would be able to
and underlying problems confronting the the possibility of the Communists driving a maintain in the event such aid were supplied.
people of Vietnam. wedge between us will, given the state of The purpose of this offer is to assist the , be
m
than Govern
eater
Infinitel
and Mr. Speaker, I of a this document atiBerlin.FIa an understand thegvery natural mentaintaining a strong, viable state, caps le of
news a transcript broadcast adca last CBS week called special desire of the French to seek an end to this resisting attempted subversion or aggression
ews program war which has been bleeding them for 8 through military means. The Government
"Vietnam Perspective: Winning the years. But our painstaking search for a way of the United States expects that this aid will
Peace." I include them for they speak out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us be met by performance on the part of the
pointedly to so many "of the questions to the conclusion that there is no negotiated Government of Vietnam in undertaking
cefforts,
that are asked by thoughtful and con-
itsolution of the Indochina s essence would not be either problem which in
face-saving combined reforms. o w continuing
corned Americans.
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- HOUSE September 1, 1965
Had all these crossed the line at once-as heralded "Communist paradise." These al- During 1962 and 1963, Hanoi continued to
the North Koreans did in invading South most certainly were the factors which led increase its assistance to the Vietcong. In
Korea 15 years ago-no body in the free Hanoi to organize and launch the assault response, President Kennedy and later Pres-
world could have doubted that the assault on the south. ident Johnson increased our aid.
on Vietnam was an aggression. That the I beg leave to quote from a statement I Hanoi kept on escalating the war through-
dividing line between North and South Viet- made at a press conference on May 4, 1961: out 1964. And the Vietcong intensified its
nam was intended to be temporary does not "Since late in 1959 organized Communist drafting and training of men in the areas it
make the attack any less of an aggression. activity in the form of guerrilla raids against controls.
The dividing line in Korea also was intended army and security units of the Government Last August, you will recall, North Viet-
to be temporary. of Vietnam, terrorist acts against local ofd- namese forces attacked American destroyers
If there is ever to be peace in this world, cials and civilians, and other subversive ac- in international waters. That attack was
aggression must cease. We as a nation are tivities in the Republic of Vietnam have in.. met by appropriate air response against
committed to peace and the rule of law. We creased to levels unprecedented since the North Vietnamese naval installations. And
recognize also the harsh reality that our se- Geneva agreements of 1954. During this pe- Congress, by a combined vote of 504 to 2,
curity is involved. riod the organized armed strength of the passed a resolution expressing its support for
We are committed to oppose aggression not Vietcong, the Communist apparatus oper- actions by the Executive "including the use
only through the United Nations Charter but ating in the Republic of Vietnam, has grown of armed force" to meet aggression in south-
through many defensive alliances. We have from about 3,000 to over 12,000 personnel. east Asia, including specifically aggression
42 allies, not counting the Republic of Viet- This armed strength has been supplemented against South Vietnam. The resolution and
nam. And many other nations know that 'by an increase in the numbers of political the congressional debate specifically envis-
their security depends upon us. - Our power and propaganda agents in the area. aged that, subject to continuing congres-
and our readiness to use it to assist others "During 1960 alone, Communist armed sional consultation, the Armed Forces of the
to resist aggression, the integrity of our units and terrorists assassinated or kidnaped United States might be committed in the
commitment, these are the bulwarks of peace over 3,000 local officials, military personnel, defense of South Vietnam in any way that
in the world. and civilians. Their activities took the form seemed necessary, including employment in
If we were to fail in Vietnam, serious con- of armed attacks against isolated garrisons, combat.
sequences would ensue. Our adversaries attacks on newly established townships, am- In summary, our commitment in Vietnam
would be encouraged to take greater risks bushes on roads and canals, destruction of has been set forth in the Southeast Asia
elsewhere. At the same time, the confidence bridges, and well-planned sabotage against Treaty, which was almost unanimously ap-
which our allies and other free nations now public works and communication lines. Be- proved by the U.S. Senate; the pledges made
have in our commitments would be seriously cause of Communist guerrilla activity 200 ele- with bipartisan support by three successive
impaired. mentary schools had to be closed at various Presidents of the United States; the assist-
The commitment times, affecting over 25,000 students and 8Q0 ance programs approved annually, beginning
Let us be clear about our commitment in teachers. in 1955, by bipartisan majorities in both
Vietnam. This upsurge of Communist guerrilla ac- Houses of Congress; the declarations which
It began with the Southeast Asia Treaty, tivity apparently stemmed from a decision we joined our SEATO and ANZUS allies in
which was negotiated and signed after the `made in May 1959 by the Central Committee making at their Ministerial Council Meetings
Geneva agreements and the cease- flee in of the Communist Party of North Vietnam in 1964 and 1965; the joint congressional res-
I eneva na re e4and was the sbr the which called for the reunification of Vietnam olution of August 1964, which was approved
U.S. enate by a vote of was approved y the all `appropriate means.' In July of the by a combined vote of 504 to 2.
.S. That tprotects 2 i in February against Corny same year the Central Committee was reor- Our commitment is to assist the Govern-
1955. chat treaty rey not only its mm- ganized and charged with intelligence duties ment and people of South Vietnam to repel
any munist ghe three non ly its members emb sta but and the liberation of South Vietnam. In this aggression, thus preserving their free-
retrospect this decision to step up guerrilla
growing out of former French Indochina dom. This commitment is to the South
which asks fpr protection, activity was made to reverse the remarkable Vietnamese as a nation and people. It has
L in
c s 1954 President Eisenhower, with success which the Government of the Repub- continued through various changes of gov-
bipartisan support, decided to extend aid to lit of Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh ernrnent, just as our commitments to our
South Vietnam, both economic aid and aid Diem had achieved in consolidating its politi- NATO allies remain unaltered by changes in
South training its armed fonos. His purpose, cal position and in attaining significant eco- government.
as he said, was to "assist the Government nomic recovery in the 5 years between 1954
Continued escalation of the aggression b
of Vietnam in developing and 1959. d
and maintaining "Remarkably coincidental with the re- the other side the military required f nses of
a strong, viable state, capable of resisting newed Communist activity in Laos, the Com- South tVet strengthening , the military defenses of
attempted subversion or aggression through munist Party of North Vietnam at its Third can Vietnam. peWhether rsonnel will still more will
military means." Congress on September 10, 1960, adopted a can military personnel will be needed will
Vietnam became a republic in 1955, was resolution which declared that the Vietnam- depend on events, especially on whether the
recognized as an independent nation by 86 ese resolution has as a major strategic task other side continues to escalate the aggres-
nations initially, and is so recognized by more sion. As the President has made plain, we
than 50 today. the liberation of the south from the `rule of will provide the South Vietnamese with
Beginning in 1955, the Congress has each U.S. lmperailists and their henchmen.' This whatever assistance may be necessary to en-
resolution called for the direct overthrow of
year approved overall economic and military the Government of the Republic of Viet- sure that the aggression against them
assistance programs in which the continua- effectively repelled-that is, to make good on
n
tion of major aid to South Vietnam has been nam, our commitment.
specifically considered. Next door to South, Vietnam, Laos was ?H? _.,_,,,,,,, _r - ____ -...
made remarkable economic and social prog- The active agent of attack on both was Com- As President Johnson and his predecessors
ress-what some observers described as a munist North Vietnam, with the backing of have repeatedly emphasized, our objective
"miracle." Peiping and Moscow. In the case of Laos, we in southeast Asia is peace-a peace in which
Nearly a million refugees from the north were able to negotiate an agreement in 1964 the various peoples of the area can manage
were settled. These were the stouthearted that it should be neutral and that all foreign their own affairs in their own ways and ad-
people of whom the late Dr. Tom Dooley military personnel should be withdrawn. dress themselves to economic and social
wrote so eloquently in his first book, "Deliver We complied with that agreement. But Progress.
Us From Evil," and who led him to devote North Vietnam never did. In gross violation We seek no bases or special position for the
the rest of his all-too-brief life to helping of its pledge, it left armed units in Laos and United States. We do not seek to destroy or
the people of Vietnam and Laos. continued to use Laos as a corridor to infil- overturn the Communist regimes in Hanoi
.A land-reform program was launched. A trate arms and trained men into South and Peiping. We ask only that they cease
comprehensive system of agricultural credit Vietnam. their aggressions, that they leave their
was set up. Thousands of new schools and There was no new agreement, even on neighbors alone.
more than 3,500 village health stations were paper, on Vietnam. Late in 1961, President Repeatedly, we and others have sought to
built. Rail transportation was restored and Kennedy therefore increased our assistance achieve a peaceful settlement of the war in
roads were. repaired and improved. South to the Republic of Vietnam. During that Vietnam.
Vietnam not only fed itself but resumed year, the infiltration of arms and military We have had many talks with the Soviet
rice exports. Production of rubber and sugar personnel from the north continued to authorities over a period of more than 4
rose sharply. New industries were started. increase. To cope with that escalation, Pres- years. But their influence in Hanoi appears
Per capita income rose by 20 percent. ident Kennedy decided to send more Ameri- to be limited. Recently, when approached,
By contrast, North Vietnam suffered a drop can military personnel-to assist with logis- their response has been, in substance: You
of 10 percent in food production and dis- tics and transportation and communications have come to the wrong address-nobody has
appointments in industrial production. as well as with training and as advisers to authorized us to negotiate. Talk to Hanoi.
In 1954, Hanoi almost certainly had ex- South Vietnamese forces in the field. Like- We have had a long series of talks with the
petted to take over South Vietnam within a wise, we expanded our economic assistance Chinese Communists in Warsaw. Although
few years. But by 1959 its hopes had with- and technical advice, particularly with a view Peiping is more cautious in action than in
ered and the south was far outstripping the to improving living conditions in the villages. word, it is unbending in its hostility to us
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September 1, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL R
of Congress.
Secretary McNamara, in addition; will ask
the Senate Appropriations Committee to add
a limited amount to present legislation to
help meet part of his new cost until a sup-
plemental measure Is ready and hearings can
be held when the Congress assembles In
January.
In the meantime, we will use the authority
contained in the present Defense appropri-
ations bill now to transfer funds, in addition
to the additional money that we will request.
These steps, like our actions in the past,
are carefully measured to do what must be
done to bring an end to aggression and a
peaceful settlement. We do not want an
expanding struggle with consequences that
no one can foresee. Nor will we bluster or
bully or flaunt our power.
But we will not surrender. And we will
not retreat.
For behind our American pledge lies the
determination?, and resources of all of the
American Nation,
Toward a peaceful solution
Second, once the Communists know, as we
know, that a violent solution is impossible.
then a peaceful solution is Inevitable. itVe
are ready now, as we have always been, to
move from the battlefield to the conference
table. I have stated publicly, and many
ttrnes, America's willingness to begin uncon-
ditional discussions with any government at
any place at any time. Fifteen efforts have
been made to start these discussions, with
the help of 40 nations throughout the world.
But there has been no answer.
But we are going to continue to persist,
if persist we must, until death and desola-
tion have led to the same conference table
where others could now join us at a much
smaller cost.
I have spoken many times of our objectives
in Vietnam. So has the Government of
South Vietnam. Hanoi has set forth its own
proposal. We are ready to discuss their pro-
posals and our proposals and any proposals
of any government whose people may be af-
fected. For we fear the meeting room no
more than we fear the battlefield.
The United Nations
In this pursuit we welcome, and we ask
for, the concern and the assistance of any
nation and all nations. If the United Na-
tions and its officials-or any one of its 114
members-can, by deed or word, private ini-?
tiative or public action, bring us nearer an
honorable peace, then they will have the
support and the gratitude of the United
States of America.
I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go
to New York today and to present imme-
diately to Secretary-General U Thant a letter
from me requesting` that all of the resources,
energy, and Immense prestige of the United
Nations be employed to find ways to halt
aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam.
I made a similar request at San Francisco a
few weeks ago.
Free choice for Vietnam
We do not seek the destruction of any
government, nor do we covet a foot of any
territory. But we insist, and we w ll always
insist, that the people of South Vietnam
shall have the right of choice, the right to
shape their own destiny in free elections in
the south, or throughout all Vietnam under
International supervision. And they shall
not have any government imposed upon
them by force and terror so long as we can
prevent it.
This was the purpose of the 1954 agree-
ments which the Communists have now
cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those
agreements was tragically weak, its purposes
still guide our action.
As battle rages, we Will continue as best
we can to help the good people of South
Vietnam enrich the condition of their life-
to feed the hungry, to tend the sick-teach
the young, shelter the homeless, and help
the farmer to increase his crops, and the
worker to find a job.
Progress in human welfare
It is an ancient, but still terrible, irony
that while many leaders of men create divi-
sion in pursuit of grand ambitions, the chil-
dren of man are united in the simple elusive
desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding
toil.
As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I
hope that one day we can help all the people
of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black
has made great progress since my appearance
in Baltimore in that direction, not as the
price of peace-for we are ready always to
bear a more painful cost-but rather as a
part of our obligations of justice toward our
fellow man.
The difficulty of decision
Let me also add a personal note. I do not
find it easy to send the flower of our youth,
our finest young men, into battle. I have
spoken to you today of the divisions and the
forces. and the battalions and the units. But
I know them all, every one. I have seen them
in a thousand streets, In a hundred towns, in
every State In this Union-working and
laughing, building, and filled with hope and
life. I think that I know, too, how their
mothers weep and how their families sorrow.
This is the most agonizing and the most
painful duty of your President.
A nation which builds
There is something else, too. When I was
young, poverty was so common that we didn't
know it had a name. Education was some-
thing you had to fight for. And water was
life itself. I have now been In public life
35 years, more than three decades, and in
each of those 35 years I have seen good men,
and wise leaders, struggle to bring the
blessings Of this land to all of our people.
Now I am the President. It is now my op-
portunity to help every child get an educa-
tion, to help every Negro and every American
citizen have an equal opportunity, to help
every family get a decent home and to help
bring healing to the sick and dignity to the
old.
As I have said before, that is what I have
lived for. That is what I have wanted all
my life. And I do not want to see all those
hopes and all those dreams of so many peo-
ple for so many years now drowned in the
wasteful ravages of war. I am goingto do all
I can to see that that never happens.
But I also know, as a realistic public
servant, that as long as there are men who
hate and destroy we must have the courage
to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have
built, all that we hope to build, all of our
dreams for freedom-all swept away on the
flood of conquest.
So this too shall not happen; we will stand
in Vietnam.
THE TASKS OF DIPLOMACY
(Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
before the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, August 3, 1965)
As the President has said, "there are great
stakes in the balance" in Vietnam today.
Let us be clear about those stakes. With
its archipelagos, southeast Asia contains rich
natural resources and some 200 million peo-
ple. Geographically, it has great strategic
importance--it dominates the gateway be-
tween the Pacific and Indian Oceans and
flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side,
and Australia and New Zealand on the other.
The loss of southeast Asia to the Commu-
nists would constitute a serious shift in the
21701
balance of power against the Interests of the
free world. And the loss of South Vietnam
would make the defense of the rest of south-
east Asia much more costly and difficult.
That is why the SEATO Council has said
that the defeat of the aggression against
South Vietnam is "essential" to the security
of southeast Asia.
But much more is at stake than preserving
the Independence of the peoples of southeast
Asia and preventing the vast resources of
that area from being swallowed by those hos-
tile to freedom.
The test
The war in Vietnam is a test of a technique
of aggression; what the Communists, in their
upside-down language, can wars of national
liberation. They use the term to describe
any effort by Communists short of large-
scale war, to destroy by force any non-Com-
munist government. Thus the leaders of the
Communist terrorists in such an independ.
ent democracy as Venezuela are described as
leaders of a fight for "national liberation."
And a recent editorial in Pravda said that
"the upsurge of the national liberation move-
ment in Latin American countries has been
to a great extent a result of the activities
of Communist Parties."
Communist leaders know, as the rest of the
world knows, that thermonuclear war would
be ruinous. They know that large-scale in-
vasions, such as that launched in Korea 15
years ago, would bring great risks and heavy
penalties. So, they have resorted to semi-
concealed, aggression through the infiltration
of arms and trained military personnel across
national frontiers. And the Asian Commu-
nists themselves regard the war in Vietnam.
as a critical test of that technique. Recent-
ly General Giap, leader of North Vietnam's
army, said:
"If the special warfare that the U.S. Im-
perialists are testing in South Vietnam is
overcome, then It can be defeated everywhere
in the world."
In southeast Asia, the Communists already
have publicly designated Thailand as the
next target. And if the aggression against
South Vietnam were permitted to succeed,
the forces of militant communism every-
where would be vastly heartened and we
could expect to see a series of so-called wars
of liberation in Asia, Latin America, and
Africa.
International law does not restrict internal
revolution. But It does restrict what third
powers may lawfully do in sending arms and
men to bring about insurrection. What
North Vietnam is doing in South Vietnam
flouts not only the Geneva Accords of 1954
and 1962 but general international law.
The assault on the Republic of Vietnam is,
beyond question, an aggression. It was or-
ganized and has been directed by North
Vietnam, with the backing of Communist
China. The cadres of guerrilla fighters, sabo-
turs, and assassins who form the backbone
of the Vietcong were specially trained in the
North. Initially, many of them were men of
South Vietnamese birth who had fought with
the Viet Minh against the French and gone
North In their military units after Vietnam
was divided in 1954. But that reservoir was
gradually exhausted. During 1964 and since,
most of the military men infiltrated from
the North have been natives of North Viet-
nam. And near the end of last year they
began to include complete units of the regu-
lar North Vietnamese army. In addition to
trained men and political and military direc-
tion, the North has supplied arms and am-
munition in increasing quantities-in con-
siderable part of Chinese manufacture.
Between 1959 and the end of 1964, 40,000
trained military personnel came down from
the North into South Vietnam, by conserve.-
tive estimate. More have come this year.
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and plainly opposed to any negotiated settle-
ment in Vietnam,
There have been repeated contacts with
Hanoi. Many channels are open. And
many have volunteered to use them. But so
far there has been no indication that Hanoi
is seriously interested in peace on any terms
except those which would assure a Commu-
nist takeover of South Vietnam.
We and others have sought to open the
way for conferences on the neighboring
states of Laos and Cambodia, where progress
toward peace might be reflected in Vietnam.
These approaches have been blocked by
Hanoi and Peiping.
The United Kingdom, as cochairman of the
Geneva confe ences, has repeatedly sought a
path to a settlement-first by working to-
ward a new Geneva Conference, then by a,
visit by a senior British statesman. Both
efforts were blocked by the Communists-
and neither Hanoi nor Peiping would even
receive the senior British statesman.
In April, President Johnson offered uncon-
ditional discussions with the governments
concerned. Hanoi and Peiping called this
offer a "hoax."
Seventeen nonalined nations appealed for
a peaceful solution, by negotiations with-
out preconditions. We accepted the pro-
posal. Hanoi and Red China rejected it with
scorn calling some of its authors "monsters
and freaks,".
The President- of India made a construc-
tive proposal for an end to hostilities and
an Afro-Asian patrol force. We welcomed
this proposal with interest and hope. Hanoi-
and Peiping rejected it as a betrayal.
. In May, the United States and South Viet-
nam suspended air attacks on North Viet-
nam. This action was made known to the
other side to see if there would be a response
in kind. But Hanoi denounced the pause as
"a wornout trick" and Peiping denounced
it as a "Bwindle." Some say the pause was
not long enough. But we knew the nega-
tive reaction from the other side before we
resumed. And we had paused previously for
more than 4 years while thousands of armed
men Invaded the south and killed thousands
of South Vietnamese,. Including women and
children, and deliberately destroyed school-
houses and playgrounds and hospitals and
health. centers and, other facilities. that the
South Vietnamese had built to improve their
lives and give their children a chance for a
better education and better health.
In late June, the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers established a mission of four of
their members to explore with all parties con-
cerned the possibilities for a conference
leading to a just and lasting peace. Hanoi
and Peiping made It plain that they would
not receive the mission.
Mr. Harold Davies,, a member of the British
Parliament, went to Hanoi with the, approval
of Prime Minister Wilson. But the high of-
ficials there would not even talk with him.
And the lower-ranking officials who did talk
with him made it clear that Hanoi was not
yet interested in negotiations, that it was
intent on a total victory in South Vietnam.
As Prime Minister Wilson reported to the
House of Commons, Mr. Davies met with a
con%'iction among the North Vietnamese that
their prospects of victory were too imminent
for them to forsake the battlefield for the
conference table.
We and others have made repeated efforts
at discussions through the United Nations.
In the Security Council, after the August at-
tacks In, the gulf of Tonkin,,. we supported a
Soviet roposal that the Government of
North Vietnam be invited to come to the
Security Council. But Hanoi refused.
In April, Secretary. General U Thant con-
sidered visits to Hanoi and Peiping to ex-
plore the possibilities of peace. But both
those Communists regimes made it plain that
they did not regard the United Nations as
competent to deal with that matter.
The President's San Francisco speech in
June requested help from the United Na-
tions' membership at large in getting peace
talks started.
In late July the President sent our new
Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J.
Goldberg, to New York with a letter to
Secretary General U Thant requesting that
all the resources, energy and immense pres-
tige of the United Nations be employed to
find ways to halt aggression and to brirrg
peace in Vietnam. The Secretary General has
already accepted this assignment.
We sent a letter to the Security Council
calling attention to the special responsibil-
ity in this regard of the Security Council
and of the nations which happen to be mem-
bers of the Council. We have considered
from time to time placing the matter formal-
ly before the Security Council. But we have
been advised by many nations-and by many
individuals-who are trying to help to
achieve a peaceful settlement that to force
debate and a vote in the Security Council
might tend to harden positions and make
useful explorations and discussions even
more difficult.
President Johnson has publicly invited
any and all members of the United Nations
to do all they can to bring about a peaceful
settlement.
By these moves the United States has in-
tended to engage the serious attention and
efforts of the United Nations as an Institu-
tion, and its members as signatories of its
charter, in getting the Communists to talk
rather than fight-while continuing with
determination an increasing effort to demon-
strate that Hanoi and the Vietcong cannot
settle the issue on the battlefield.
We have not only placed the Vietnam issue
before the United Nations, but believe that
we have done so in the most constructive
ways.
The conditions for peace
What are the essential conditions for peace
in South Vietnam?
In late June, the Foreign Minister of South
Vietnam set forth the fundamental princi-
ples of a "just and enduring peace." In
summary, those principles are:
An end to aggression and subversion.
Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and
shape for itself its own destiny "in con-
formity with democratic principles and with-
out any foreign interference from whatever
sources."
As soon as aggression has ceased, the end-
ing of the military measures now necessary
by the Government of South Vietnam and
the nations that have come to its aid to de-
fend South Vietnam; and the removal of
foreign military forces from South Vietnam.
And effective guarantees for the freedom of
the people of South Vietnam.
We endorse those principles. In essence,
they would constitute a return to the basic
purpose of the Geneva accords of 1954.
Whether they require reaffirmation of those
accords or new agreements embodying these
essential points, but with provision in either
case for more effective international ma-
chinery and guarantees, could be determined
in discussions and negotiations.
Once the basic paints set forth by ebuth
Vietnam's Foreign Minister were achieved,
future relations between North Vietnam and
South Vietnam could be worked out by
peaceful means. And this would include the
question of a free decision by the people of
North and South Vietnam on the matter of
reunification.
When the aggression has ceased and the
freedom of South Vietnam is assured by other
means, we will withdraw our forces. Three
Presidents of the United States have said
many times that we want no permanent bases
and no special position there. Our military
forces are there because of the North Viet-
namese aggression against South Vietnam
and for no other reason. When the men and
arms infiltrated by the North are withdrawn
and Hanoi ceases its support and guidance
of the war in the South, whatever remains
in the form of indigenous dissent is a matter
for the South Vietnamese themselves. As for
South Vietnamese fighting in the Vietcong or
under its control or influence, they must In
time be integrated into their national soci-
ety. But that is a process which must be
brought about by the people of South Viet-
nam, not by foreign diplomats.
Apart from the search for a solution in
Vietnam itself, the U.S. Government has
hoped that discussions could be held on the
problems concerning Cambodia and Laos.
We supported the proposal of Prince Siha-
nouk for a conference on Cambodia, to be
attended by the governments that partici-
pated in the 1954 conference, and noted the
joint statement of the Soviet Union'and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in April, to
the effect that both favored the convening
of conferences on Cambodia and Laos. Sub-
sequently, however, Hanoi appeared to draw
back and to Impose conditions at variance
with the Cambodian proposal.
We look beyond a just and enduring peace
for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, to the
day when Peiping will be ready to join in a
general settlement in the Far East-a gen-
eral settlement that would remove the threat
of aggression and make it possible for all the
peoples of the area to devote themselves to
economic and social progress.
Several of the nations of Asia are densely
populated. And high rates of population
growth make it difficult for them to increase
per capita incomes. The solution to these
problems cannot be found through external
aggression. They must be achieved inter-
nally within each nation.
As President Johnson has said, the United
States stands ready to assist and support co-
operative programs for economic develop-
ment in Asia. Already we are making avail-
able additional funds for the development of
the Mekong Valley. And we are taking the
lead in organizing an Asian Development
Bank, which we hope will be supported by
all the major industrialized nations, includ-
ing the Soviet Union. We would welcome
membership by North Vietnam, when it has
ceased its aggression.
Those are our objectives-peace and a
better life for all who are willing to live at
peace with their neighbors.
The present path
I turn now to the specific actions we are
taking to convince Hanoi that it will not suc-
ceed and that it must move toward a peace-
ful solution.
Secretary McNamara is appearing before
the appropriate committees of the Congress
to discuss the military situation within
South Vietnam in detail. In essence, our
present view is that it is crucial to turn the
tide in the south, and that for this purpose
it is necessary to send substantial numbers
of additional American forces.
The primary responsibility for defeating
the Vietcong will remain, however, with the
South Vietnamese. They have some 545,000
men in military and paramilitary forces. De-
spite losses, every branch of the armed forces
of South Vietnam has more men under arms
than it had S months ago. And they are
making systematic efforts to increase their
forces still further. The primary missions
of American ground forces are to secure the
airbases used by the South Vietnamese and
ourselves and to provide a strategic reserve,
thus releasing South Vietnamese troops for
offensive actions against the Vietcong. In
securing the airbases and related military
installations, American forces are pushing
out into the countryside to prevent build-
ups for surprise attacks. And they may be
used in emergencies to help the South Viet-
namese in combat. But the main task of
rooting out the Vietcong will continue to be
the responsibility of the South Vietnamese.
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Approved F C ND-I URNS?~gg 1W ~1 E P6~ i6R0003OO1 Goer 1, 1965
And we have seen no sign that they are The Vietcong has assassinated thousands of We went to the aid of Turkey and Greece.
about to try to shift that responsibility to local officals-and health workers and We joined in organizing the European re-
us, On the contrary, the presence of in- schoolteachers and others who were helping covery program and in forming the North
creasing numbers of American combat troops to improve the life of the people of the Atlantic Alliance.
seems to have stimulated greater efforts on countryside. In the last year and a half, it We and our allies have defended the free-
the part of the fighting men of South Viet- has killed, wounded, or kidnapped 2,291 vil- dom of West Berlin.
nam. lage officials and 22,146 other civilians- We and 15 other nations joined in repel-
At the same time, on the military side, we these on top of its thousands of earlier ling the aggression in Korea.
shall maintain, with the South Vietnamese, victims. We have joined defensive alliances with
our program of limited air attacks on mill- Despite the risks to themselves and their many other nations and have helped them to
tary targets in North Vietnam. This pro- families, Vietnamese have continued to come strengthen their defensive military forces.
gram is a part of the total strategy. We had forward to fill these posts. And in the last We supported the United Nations in its
never expected that air attacks on North 6 years, no political dissenter of any con- efforts to preserve the independence of the
Vietnam alone would bring Hanoi to a quick sequence has gone over to the Vietcong. Congo.
decision to cease its aggression. Hanoi has The Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects, the We insisted that the Soviet Union with-
been committed to its aggression too long Cambodians (of which there are about a draw strategic weapons from Cuba.
and too deeply to turn around overnight. million in South Vietnam), the Montag- Had we not done these things-and
It must be convinced that it faces not only nards-all the principal elements in South others-the enemies of freedom, would now
continuing, and perhaps increased, pressure Vietnamese political life except the Viet- control much of the World and be in a posi-
on the north itself, but also that it simply cong itself, which is a very small minority- tion to destroy us or at least to sap our
cannot win in the south., remain overwhelmingly anti-Communist. strength by economic strangulation.
The air attacks on the North have also had The'suggestion that Ho Chi Minh probably For the same basic reasons that we took
specific military effects in reducing the scale could win a free election in South Vietnam is all those other measures to deter or to repel
of increased infiltration from the North. directly contrary to all the evidence we have. aggression, we are determined, to assist the
Finally, they are important as a warning And we have a great deal of evidence, for people of South Vietnam to defeat this ag-
to all concerned that there are no longer we have Americans-in twos and threes and gression.
sanctuaries for aggression. fours and sixes-in the countryside in all In his last public utterance, recorded only
It has been suggested in some quarters parts of Vietnam. In years past Ho Chi half an hour before his death, a great and
that Hanoi would be more disposed to move Minh was a hero throughout Vietnam. For beloved American, Adlai Stevenson said:
to negotiations and to cease its aggression if be had led the fight against the Japanese "There has been a great deal of pressure
we stopped bombing the North. We do not and then against the French. But his glam- on me in the United States from many
rule out the possibility of another and longer our began to fade when he set up a Commu- sources to take a position-a public posi-
pause in bombing, but the question re- nist police state in the North-and the tion-inconsistent with that of my Govern-
asains-and We have repeatedly asked it: South, by contrast, made great progress un- ment. Actually, I don't agree with those
What would happen from the North in re- der a non-Communist nationalist govern- protestants. My hope in Vietnam is that re-
sponse? Would Hanoi withdraw the 325th ment. Today the North Vietnamese regime sistance there may establish the fact that
Division of the Regular Army, which is now is badly discredited. We find the South Viet- changes in Asia are not to be precipitated
deployed in South Vietnam and across the namese in the countryside ready to cooperate by Ioutside fowith'the President, that "once
line in Laos? Would it take home the other with their own government when they can
men it has infiltrated into the South? do so with reasonable hope of not being the Communists know, as we know, that a
Would it sto sending arms and ammuni- assassinated by the Vietcong the next night. violent solution is impossible, then a peace-
p g At the present time, somewhat more than ful solution is inevitable."
Lion into South Vietnam? Would the cam- 60 percent of the people of Vietnam live in The great bulwark of peace for all free-
paign of out ease? sesassination abe sabotage to find the areas under control of their government. men-and therefore of peace for the millions
out w cease? We have b een were to sus- Another 25 percent live in areas under shift- ruled by the adversaries of freedom-has
out our would happen if North. werto save in control. And about 25 percent live in been, and is today, the power of the United
Pend our bombing
to the even a areas under varying degrees of Vietcong Con- States and our readiness to use that power,
hot been able le to get t an answer er n or r e even trol. But even where it succeeds in imposing in cooperation with other free nations to
hint. taxes, drafting recruits, and commandeering deter or to defeat aggression, and to help
Thary who complain about air Vietnam on labor, the Vietcong has not usually been able other free nations to go forward economi-
had manifested, would to organize the area. We have a good deal cally, socially, and politically.
carry more targets weight in if they North'
would , appropriate te concern oo of evidence that Vietcong tax exactions and We have had to cope with a long series of
about the manifest infiltrations now, appro e terrorism have increasingly alienated the dangerous crises caused by the aggressive ap-
high rate of military activity from the North, the villagers. And one of the problems with petites of others. But we are a great na-
and s- which the South Vietnamese Government tion and people. I am confident that we will
and ruthless min of terror the South,
and the the sassination which is being g conducted in the he and we have to deal is the large scale exodus meet this test, as we have met others.
South under ni and with from the Central Highlands to the coastal
South und the direction of f Hanoi and TASKS OF DEFENSE
its active support. areas of refugees from the Vietcong. (Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S.
The situation in South Vietnam It is of the greatest significance that, de- McNamara, before the Defense Subcom-
spite many years of harsh war, despite the mittee of the Senate Appropriations Com-
Let me now underline just a few points political instability of the central govern- mittee, August 4, 1965)
about the political and economic situation ment, and despite division of their country
in South Vietnam. For we know well that, since 1954, the people of South Vietnam fight The issue in Vietnam is essentially the
while security is fundamental to turning the on with uncommon determination. There is same as it was in 1954 when President Eisen-
tide, it remains vital to do all we can on the no evidence among politicians, the bureauc- hoover said:
political and economic fronts. - racy, the military, the major religious groups, "I think it is no longer necessary to enter
All of us have been concerned, of course, the youth, or even the peasantry of a desire into a long argument or exposition to show
by the difficulties of the South Vietnamese for peace at any price. They all oppose sur- the importance to the United States of
in developing an effective and stable govern- render or accommodation on a basis which Indochina and of the struggle going on there.
Inent. But this failure should not astonish would lead to a Communist takeover. The No matter how the struggle may have started,
us. South Vietnam is a highly plural society will to resist the aggression from the North it has long since become one of the testing
striving to find its political feet under very has survived through periods of great stress places between a free form of government
adverse conditions. Other nations-new and remains strong. and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to
and old-with fewer difficulties and unmo- have the greatest significance for us, and
The central objective of our foreign policy
:tested by determined aggressors have done is a peaceful community of nations, each free possibly for a long time into the future.
no better. South Vietnam emerged from the to choose Its own institutions but cooperat- "We have here a sort of cork in the bottle,
'F'rench Indochina war with many political ing with one another to promote their mu- the bottle being the great area that includes
:factions, most of which were firmly anti- tual welfare. It is the kind of world order Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, all of the sur-
Communist, Despite several significant ins- envisaged in the opening sections of the rounding areas of Asia with its hundreds of
tial successes in establishing a degree of po- United Nations Charter. But there have been millions of people. " * "
litical harmony, the government of President and still are important forces in the world The nature of the conflict
Diem could not maintain a lasting unity which seek a different goal-which deny the What is at stake in Vietnam today is the
among the many factions. The recent shift- right of free choice, which seek to expand ability of the free world to block Comme.x-
ing and r argelying of Vietnamese Govern- their influence and empires by every means nist armed aggression and prevent the
ments is largely the continuing search for including force. loss of all of southeast Asia, a loss which
political unity and a viable regime which can
overcome these long-evident political diva- The bulwark of peace in its ultimate consequences could drasti-
sions. In defense of peace and freedom and the sally alter the strategic situation in Asia
And we should not forget that the destruc- right of free choice: and the Pacific to the grave deteriment of our
tion of the fabric of government at all levels We and others insisted that the Soviets own security and that of our allies. While
has been a primary objective of the Vietcong. withdraw theirforces from Iran. 15 years ago, in Korea, Communist aggres-
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 September Y, 1g proved Fot&fqS;Q&R1A1ip@ P67.FM 6R000300140026-6 21705
siOn took the form of an overt armed attack, the Chinese Communists' position is correct ney through Laos last December, from one to
today in South Vietnam, it has taken the and they will have made a giant step forward three regiments of a North Vietnamese regu-
form of a large-scale intensive guerrilla in their efforts to seize control of the world lar division, the 325th Division of the North
operation. Communist movement. Vietnamese Army, have deployed into the
The covert nature of this aggression, which Furthermore, such a success would greatly Central Highlands of South Vietnam for
characterized the earlier years of the struggle increase the prestige of Communist China combat alongside the Vietcong.
in South Vietnam, has now all but been among the nonalined nations and strength- Thus, despite all its reasons for secrecy,
stripped away. The control of the Vietcong en the position of their followers everywhere, Hanoi's desire for decisive results this sum-
effort by the regime in Hanoi, supported and In that event we would then have to be mer has forced it to reveal its hand even
incited by Communist China, has become prepared to cope with the same kind of more openly.
increasingly apparent. aggression in other parts of the world wher- The United States during the last 4 years
The struggle there has enormous implica- ever the existing governments are weak and has steadily increased its help to the people
tions for the security of the United States the social structures fragmented. If Com- of South Vietnam in an effort to counter
and the free world, and for that matter, the munist armed aggression is not stopped in this ever-increasing scale of Communist
Soviet Union as well. The North Vietnamese Vietnam, as it was in Korea, the confidence aggression. These efforts achieved some
and the Chinese Communists have chosen to of small nations in America's pledges of sup- measure of success during 1962. The South
make South Vietnam the test case for their port will be weakened and many of them, Vietnamese forces in that year made good
particular version of the so-called wars of in widely separated areas of the world, will progress in suppressing the Vietcong insur-
national liberation. The extent to which feel unsafe. rection. t violence should be used in overthrowing Thus, the stakes in South Vietnam are far Although 19cof coat bdeaths suffered
over the
non-Communist governments has been one greater than the loss of one small country forces in .by 11 percent
of the most bitterly contested issues between to communism. Its loss would be a most 1961 level (from about 4,000 to 4,460), Viet-
the Chinese and the Soviet Communists. serious setback to the cause of freedom and cong combat deaths increased by 72 percent
Although the former Chairman, Mr. Khru- would greatly complicate the task of prevent- (from about 12,000 to 21,000). Weapons lost
shchev, fully endorsed wars of national lib- ing the further spread of militant Asian com- by the South Vietnamese fell from 5,900 in
eration as the preferred means of extending munism. And, if that spread is not halted, 1961 to 5,200 in 1962, while the number lost
the sway of communism, he cautioned that our strategic position in the world will be by the Vietcong rose from 2,750 to 4,050. The
"this does not not necessarily mean that the weakened and our national security directly Government's new strategic hamlet program
transition to socialism will everywhere and endangered. was just getting underway and was showing
in all cases be linked with armed uprising Conditions leading to the present situation promise. The economy was growing and the
and civil war. * *` * Revolution by peaceful in South Vietnam Government seemed firmly in control.
means accords with the interests of the work- Therefore, in early 1963, I was able to say:
Essential to a proper understanding of the ?* * * victory over the Vietcong will most
lug class and the masses." present situation in South Vietnam is a likely take many years. But now, as a result
The Chinese Communists, however, insist recognition of the fact that the so-called of the operations of the last year, there is a
that: insurgency there is planned, directed, con- new feeling of confidence, not only on the
"Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the trolled, and supported from Hanoi. part of the Government of South Vietnam
revolutionary struggles of the people. The True, there is a small dissident minority in but also among the populace, that victory is
transition from capitalism to socialism In South Vietnam, but the government could possible."
any oouiitry can only be brought about cope with it if It were not directed and sup- But at the same time I also cautioned:
through proletarian revolution and the dic- plied from the outside. As early as 1960, at "We are not unmindful of the fact that
tatorship of the proletariat in that coup- the Third Congress of the North Vietnamese the pressure on South Vietnam may well
try. * * * The vanguard of the proletariat Communist Party, both Ho Chi Minh and continue through infiltration via the Laos
will remain unconquerable in all circum- General Giap spoke of the need to "step up" corridor. Nor are we unmindful of the pos-
stances only if it masters all forms of strug- the "revolution In the South." In March sibility that the Communists, sensing defeat
gle-peaceful and armed, open and secret, 1963 the party organ Hoc Tap stated that the in their covert efforts, might resort to overt
legal and illegal, parliamentary struggle and authorities in South Vietnam "are well aware aggression from North Vietnam. Obviously,
mass struggle, and so forth." (Letter to the that North Vietnam is the firm base for the this latter contingency could require a
Central Committee of the Communist Party southern revolution and the point on which greater direct participation by the United
of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963.) it .leans, and that our party is the steady and States. The survival of an independent
Their preference for violence was even experienced vanguard unit of the working government in South Vietnam is so impor-
more emphatically expressed in an article in class and people and is the brain and factor tant to the security of all southeast Asia and
the Peiping People's Daily of March 31, 1964: that decides all victories of the revolution." to the free world that we must be prepared
"It is advantageous from the point of Through most of the past decade the North to take all necessary measures within our
view of tactics to refer to the desire for Vietnamese Government denied and went to capability to prevent a Communist victory."
peaceful transition, but it would be inappro- great efforts to conceal the scale of its per- Unfortunately, the caution voiced in early
priate to emphasize the possibility of peace- sonnel and materiel support, in addition to 1963 proved to be well founded. Late in
ful transition. * * * the proletarian party direction and encouragement, to the Viet- 1963, the Communists stepped up their ef-
must never substitute parliamentary strug- tong. forts, and the military situation began to
gle for proletarian revolution or entertain It had strong reasons to do so. The North deteriorate. The Diem government came
the illusion that the transition to socialism Vietnamese regime had no wish to force upon under increasing Internal pressures, and in
can be achieved through the parliamentary the attention of the world its massive and November it was overthrown. As I reported
road. Violent revolution is a universal law persistent violations of its Geneva pledges in February 1964:
of proletarian revolution. To realize the of 1954 and 1962 regarding noninterference "The Vietcong was quick to take advantage
transition to socialism, the proletariat must in South Vietnam and Laos. of the growing opposition to the Diem gov-
wage armed struggle, smash the old state However, in building up the Vietcong ernment and the period of uncertainty fol-
machine and establish the dictatorship of forces for a decisive challenge, the authors- lowing its overthrow, Vietcong activities
the proletariat. * * *" ties in North Vietnam have increasingly g
"Political power," the article quotes Mao dropped the disguises that gave their earlier were already increasing in September and
Tse-tung as saying, "grows out of the barrel continued to increase at an accelerated rate
support a clandestine character, in October and November, particularly in the
of a gun." Through 1963, the bulk of the arms infil-
Throughout the world we see the fruits delta area. And I must report that they
trated from the North were old French and have made considerable progress since the
of these and i__ Vietn- partic American acquired prior to 1954 in
larly, we see the effects of the Chinese Com- Indochina and Korea. Following the coup, the lack of stability
munists' more militant stance and their Now, the flow of weapons from North Viet-
hatred of the free world. They make no nam consist almost entirely of the latest In the central government and the rapid
secret of the fact that Vietnam is the test arms acquired from Communist China; and turnover of key personnel, particularly senior
case, and neither does the regime In Hanoi. the flow is large enough to have entirely re- military commanders, began to be reflected
in combat operations and throughout the
h
e
General Glap, head of the North Vietnamese equipped the main force units, despite t
Army, recently said that "South Vietnam is capture this year by government forces of entire fabric of the political and economic
the model of the national liberation move- thousands of these weapons and millions of structure. And, in 1964, the Communists
ment of our time. * * * If the special war- rounds of the new ammimition. greatly increased the scope and tempo of
fare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in Likewise, through 1963, nearly all the per- their subersive efforts. Larger scale at-
South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be sonnel infiltrating through Laos, trained and tacks became more frequent and the flow of
defeated everywhere in the world." And, equipped in the North and ordered South, men and supplies from the north expanded.
Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, were former southerners. The incidence of terrorism and sabotage rose
pointed out that "The experience of our But in the last 18 months, the great ma- rapidly and the pressure on the civilan pop-
compatriots in South Vietnam attracts the jority of the infiltrators-more than 10,000 ulation was intensified.
attention of the world, especially the peoples of them-have been ethnic northerners, The deteriorating military situation was
of South America. mostly draftees .ordered into the People's clearly reflected in the statistics. South
,It is clear that a Communist success in Army of Vietnam for duty In the South. Vietnamese combat deaths rose from 5,650 in
South Vietnam would be taken as proof that And it now appears that, starting their jour- 1963 to 7,450 in 1964 and the number of
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WNGEESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 1, 1965
weapons lost from 8,250, to 14,100. In con-
trast, Vietcong combat deaths dropped from
20,600 to 16,80d and, considering the
stepped-up tempo of activity, they expert-,
enced only a very modest rise in the rate of
weapons lost (from 5,400 to 5,900).
At various times in recent months, I have
called attention to the continued buildun
of Communist forces in South Vietnam. I
pointed out that although these forces had
not been committed to combbat, in any sig-
nificant degree, they probably would be after
the start of the monsoon season. It is now
clear that these forces are being committed
In increasing numbers and that the Com-
munists have decided to make an all-out
attempt to bring down the Government of
South Vietnam.
The entire economic and social structure
is under attack. Bridges, railroads, and high-
ways are being destroyed and' interdicted-
Agricultural products are being barred from
the cities. Electric powerplants and com-
munication lines are being sabotaged.
Whole villages are being burned and their
population driven away, increasing the
refugees burden on the South Vietnamese
Government.
In addition to the continued infiltration of
increasing numbers of individuals and the
acceleration of the flow of modern equip-
ment and supplies organized units of the
North Vietnamese Army have been Identified
in South Vietnam. We now estimate the
hard core Vietcong strength at some 70,000
men, including a recently reported increase
In the number of combat battalions. In ad-
dition, they have some 90,000 to 100,000 ir-
regulars and some 30,000 in their political
cadres; i.e., tax collectors, propagandists,
etc. We have also identified at least three
battalions of the regular North Vietnamese
Army, and there are probably considerably
more.
At the same time the Government of
South Vietnam has found it increasingly dif-
ficult to make a commensurate Increase in
the size of its own forces, which now stand at
about 545,000 men, including the regional
and local defense forces but excluding the
national police.
Combat deaths on both sides have been
mounting-for the South Vietnamese from
an average of 143 men a week in 1964, to
about 270 a weep for the 4-week period end-
In g July 24 this year. Vietcong losses have
gone from 322 a week last year to about 680
a week for the 4-week period ending July 24.
Most important, the ratio of South Viet-
namese to Vietcong strength has seriously
declined in the last 6 or 7 months from about
5 to 1 to about 3 'or 31/2 to 1; the ratio of
combat battalions is substantially less. This
is far too low a ratio for a guerrilla war even
though the greater mobility and firepower
provided to the South Vietnamese forces by
the united States help to offset that dis-
advantage.
The South Vietnamese forces have to de-
fend hundreds of cities, towns, and hamlets
while the Vietcong are free to choose the
time and place of their attack. As a result,
the South Vietnamese are stretched thin in
defensive positions, leaving only a small cen-
tral reserve for offensive action against the
Vietcong, while the latter are left free to con-
centrate their forces and throw them against
selected targets. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the Vietcong retains most of the
initiative.
Even so, we may not as yet have seen the
full weight of the Communist attack. Pres-
ently, the situation is particularly acute in
the northern part of the country where the
Communists have mobilized large military
forces which pose a threat to the entire
region and its major cities and towns. Our
ail' attack may have helped to keep, these
forces off balance but the threat remains
and it Is very real.
Clearly, the time has come when the people
of South Vietnam need more help from us
and other nations if they are to retain their
freedom and Independence.
We have already responded to that need
with some 75,000 U.S, military personnel,
including some combat units. This number
will be raised to 125,000 almost immediately
with the deployment of the Air Mobile Divi-
sion and certain other forces. But, more
help will be needed in the months ahead and
additional U.S. combat forces will be required
to back lap the hard-pressed Army of South
Vietnam. Two other nations have provided
combat fbrces-Australia and New Zealand.
We hope that by the end of this year others
will join them. In this regard, the Koreans
have just recently approved a combat divi-
sion for deployment to Vietnam, which is
scheduled to arrive this fall.
Role of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam
As I noted earlier, the central reserve of
the South Vietnamese Army has been seri-
ously depleted in recent months. The prin-
cipal role of U.S. ground combat forces will
be to supplement this reserve in support of
the frontline forces of the South Vietnamese
Army. The indigenous paramilitary forces
will deal with the pacification of areas cleared
of organized Vietcong and North Vietnamese
units, a role more appropriate for them than
for our forces.
The Government of South Vietnam's
strategy, with which we concur, is to achieve
the Initiative, to expand gradually its area of
control by breaking up major concentrations
of enemy forces, using to the maximum our
preponderance of airpower, both land and
sea based. The number of fixed-wing attack
sorties by U.S. aircraft in South Vietnam
will increase manifold by the end of year.
Armed helicopter sorties will also increase
dramatically over the same period, and ex-
tension use will be made of heavy artillery,
both land based and sea based. At the same
time our air and naval forces will continue
to interdict the Vietcong supplies line from
North Vietnam, both land and sea.
Although our tactics have changed, our
objective remains the same.
We have no desire to widen the war. We
have no desire to overthrow the North Viet-
nameseregime, seize its territory or achieve
the unification of North and South Vietnam
by force of arms. We have no need for per-
manent military bases in South Vietnam or
for special privileges of any kind.
What we are seeking through the planned
military buildup Is to block the Vietcong
offensive. to give the people of South Viet-
nam and their armed forces some relief from
the unrelenting Communist pressures-to
give them time to strengthen their govern-
ment, to reestablish law and order, and to
revive their economic life which has been
seriously disrupted by Vietcong harassment
and attack in recent months. We have no
Illusions that success will be achieved
quickly, but we are confident that it will be
achieved much more surely by the plan I
have outlined.
Increases in U.S. military forces
Fortunately, we have greatly Increased the
strength and readiness of our Military Estab-
lishment since 1961, particularly in the kinds
of forces which we now require In southeast
Asia. The Active Army has been expanded
from 11 to 16 combat ready divisions.
Twenty thousand men have been added to
the Marine Corps to allow them to fill out
their combat structure and at the same time
facilitate the mobilization of the Marine
Corps Reserve. The tactical fighter squad-
rons of the Air Force have been increased by
51 percent. Our airlift capability has more
than doubled. Special forces trained to deal
with insurgency threats have been multiplied
elevenfold. General ship construction and
conversion has been doubled.
During this same period, procurement for
the expanded force has been increased
greatly: Air Force tactical aircraft--from
$360 million in 1961 to about $1.1 billion in
the original fiscal year 1996 budget; Navy air-
craft--from $1.8 billion to $2.2 billion; Army
helicopters-from 286 aircraft to over 1,000.
Procurement of ordnance, vehicles and re-
lated equipment was increased about 150
percent in the fiscal years 1982-64 period,
compared with the proceeding 3 years. The
tonnage of modern nonnuclear air-to-ground.
ordnance in stock tripled between fiscal year
1961 and fiscal year 1965. In brief, the Mili-
tary Establishment of the United States, to-
day, is in far better shape thanIt ever has
been in peacetime to face whatever tasks,
may lie ahead.
Nevertheless, some further increases in.
forces, military personnel, production, and.
construction will be required if we are to
deploy additional forces to southeast Asia.
and provide for combat consumption while
at the same time, maintaining our capabili-
ties to deal with crises elsewhere in the world,
To offset the deployments now planned to
southeast Asia, and provide some additional
forces for possible new deployments, we pro-
pose to increase the presently authorized.
force levels. These increases will be of three
types: (I) Additional units for the Active
Forces, over and above those reflected in the
January budget; (2) military personnel aug-
mentations for presently authorized units in
the Active Forces to man new bases, to han-
dle the larger logistics workload, etc.; and
(3) additional personnel and extra training
for selected Reserve component units to in-
crease their readiness for quick deployment.
We believe we can achieve this buildup with-
out calling up the Reserves or ordering the
involuntary extension of tours,, except as al-
ready authorized by law for the Department
of the Navy. Even here the extension of of-
ficer tours will be on a selective basis and
extensions for enlisted men will be limited,
in general, to not more than 4 months.
The program I have outlined here today
and the $1.7 billion amendment to the fiscal
year 1966 Defense appropriation bill now be-
fore the committee will, in the collective
judgment of my principal military and ci-
vilian. advisers and myself, provide the men,
materiel, and facilities required to fulfill the
President's pledge to meet the mounting ag-
gression in South Vietnam, while at the same
time maintaining the forces required to meet
commitments elsewhere in the world.
THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN NEED
(Address by the President to the Association
of American Editorial Cartoonists, the
White House, May 13, 1965)
The' third face of the war
The war in Vietnam has many faces.
There is the face of armed conflict-of ter-
ror and gunfire--of bomb-heavy planes and
campaign-weary soldiers. * * *
The second face of war in Vietnam is the
quest for a political solution-the face of
diplomacy and politics-of the ambitions and
the interest of other nations. * * *
The third face of war in Vietnam Is, at
once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It
is the face of human need. It is the un-
tended sick, the hungry family, and the il-
literate child. It is men and women, many
without shelter, with rags for clothing, strug-
gling for survival in a very rich and a very
fertile land.
It is the most Important battle of all in
which we are engaged.
For a :nation cannot be built by armed
power or by political agreement. It will rest
on the expectation by individual men and
women that their future will be better than
their past.
It is not enough to just fight against some-
thing. People must fight for something, and
the people of South Vietnam must know that
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after the long, brutal journey through the Like most developing countries, South We intend to continue, and we intend to
dark tunnel of conflict there breaks the light Vietnam's economy rests on agriculture. increase our help to Vietnam.
of a happier day. And only if this is so can Unlike many, it has large uncrowded areas Nor can anyone doubt the determination
they be expected to sustain the enduring will of very rich and very fertile land. Because of the South Vietnamese themselves. They
for continued strife. Only in this way can of this, it is one of the great rice bowls of have lost more than 12,000 of their men since
longrun stability and peace come to their the entire world. With our help, since 1954, I became your President a little over a year
land. South Vietnam has already doubled its rice ago.
And there is another, more profound rea- production, providing food for the people as But progress does not come from invest-
son. In Vietnam communism seeks to really well as providing a vital export for that ment alone, or plans on a desk, or even the
impose its will by force of arms. But we nation. directives and the orders that we approve
would be deeply mistaken to think that this We have put our American farm know- here in Washington. It takes men. Men
was the only weapon. Here, as other places how to work on other crops. This year, for must take the seed to the farmer. Men
in the world, they speak to restless people- instance, several hundred million cuttings must teach the use of fertilizer. Men must
people rising to shatter the old ways which of a new variety of sweet potato, that prom- help in harvest. Men must build the schools,
have imprisoned hope-people fiercely and ices a sixfold increase in yield will be dis- and men must instruct the students. Men
justly reaching for the material fruits from tributed to these Vietnamese farmers. Corn must carry medicine Into the jungle, and
the tree of modern knowledge. output should rise from 25,000 tons in 1962 treat the sick, and shelter the homeless. And
It is this desire, and not simply lust for to 100,000 tons by 1966. Pig production has men-brave, tireless, filled with love for their
conquest, which moves many of the individ- ' more than doubled since 1955. Many animal fellows-are doing this today. They are
ual fighting men that we must now, sadly, diseases have been eliminated entirely. doing it through the long, hot, danger-filled
ll
h
e
ca
t
e
nemy.
It is, therefore, our task to show that free-
dom from the control of other nations offers
the surest road to progress, that history and
experience testify to this truth. But it is not
enough to call upon reason or point to ex-
amples. We must show it through action
and we must show it through accomplish-
ment, and even were there no war-either
hot or cold-we would always be active In
humanity's search for progress.
This task is commanded to 'us by the
moral values of our civilization, and it rests
on the inescapable nature of the world that
we have now entered. For in that world, as
long as we can foresee, every threat to man's
welfare will be a threat to the welfare of our
own people. Those who live in the emerging
community of nations will ignore the perils
of their neighbors at the risk of their own
prospects.
Cooperative development in southeast Asia
This Is true not only for Vietnam but for
every part of the developing world. This is
why, on your behalf, I recently proposed a
massive, cooperative development effort for
all of southeast Asia. I named the respected
leader, Eugene Black, as my personal repre-
sentative to inaugurate our participation in
these programs.
Since that time rapid progress has been
made, I am glad to report. Mr. Black has
met with the top officials of the United Na-
tions on several occasions. He has talked to
other interested parties. He has found in-
creasing enthusiasm. The United Nations is
already setting up new mechanisms to help
carry forward the work of development.
In addition, the United States is now pre-
pared to participate in, and to support, an
Asian Development Bank, to carry out and
help finance the economic progress in that
area of the world and the development that
we desire to see in that area of the world.
So this morning I call on every other in-
dustrialized nation, including the Soviet
Union, to help create a better life for all of
the people of southeast Asia.
Surely, surely, the works of peace can
bring men together in a common effort to
abandon forever the works of war.
But, as South Vietnam is the central place
of conflict, it Is also a. principal focus for
our work to increase the well-being of
people.
It Is that effort in South Vietnam, of which
I think we are too little informed, which I
want to relate to you this morning.
Strengthening Vietnam's economy
We began in 1954, when Vietnam became
independent, before the war between the
north and the south. Since that time we
Vietnamese village. In a country of more The fullest glory must go, also, to those
than 16 million people with a life expectancy South Vietnamese that are laboring and dy-
of only 35 years, there are only 200 civilian ing for their own people and their own na-
doctors. If the Vietnamese had doctors in tion. In hospitals and schools, along the
the same ratio as the United States has doe- rice fields and the roads, they continue to
tors, they would have not the 200 that they labor, never knowing when death or terror
do have but they would have more than
5,000 doctors.
We have helped vaccinate, already, over 7
million people against cholera, and millions
more against other diseases. Hundreds of
thousands of Vietnamese can now receive
treatment in the more than 12,000 hamlet
health stations that America has built and
has stocked. New clinics and surgical suites
are scattered throughout the entire country:
and the medical school that we are now
helping to build will graduate as many doc-
tors in a single year as now serve the entire
civilian population of South Vietnam.
Education is the keystone of future devel-
opment in Vietnam. It takes trained people
to man the factories, to conduct the admin-
istration, and to form the human founda-
tion for an advancing nation. More than
a quarter million young Vietnamese can now
learn in more than 4,000 classrooms that
America has helped to build in the last
years; and 2,000 more schools are going to
be built by us in the next 12 months. The
number of students in vocational schools
has gone up four times. Enrollment was
300,000 in 1955, when we first entered there
and started helping with our program. To-
day it is more than 1,500,000. The 8 million
textbooks that we have supplied to Viet-
namese children will rise to more than 15
million by 1967.
Agriculture is the foundation. Health,
education, and housing are the urgent hu-
man needs. But industrial development is
the great pathway to their future.
When Vietnam was divided, most of the
industry was in the North. The South was
barren of manufacturing and the founda-
tions for industry. Today more than 700
new or rehabilitated factories-textile mills
and cement plants, electronics and plastics-
are changing the entire face of that nation.
New roads and communications, railroad
equipment, and electric generators are a
spreading base on which the new industry
can, and is, growing.
Progress in the midst of war
may strike.
How incredible it is that there are a few
who still say that the South Vietnamese do
not want to continue the struggle. They
are sacrificing and they are dying by the
thousands. Their patient valor in the heavy
presence of personal physical danger should
be a helpful lesson to those of us who, here
in America, only have to read about it, or
hear about it on the television or radio.
We have our own heroes who labor at the
works of peace in the midst of war. They
toil unarmed and out of uniform. They
know the humanity of their concern does not
exempt them from the horrors of conflict, yet
they go on from day to day. They bring
food to the hungry over there. They supply
the sick with necessary medicine. They help
the farmer with his crops, families to find
clean water, villages to receive the healing
miracles of electricity. These are Americans
who have joined our AID program, and we
welcome others to their ranks.
A call for aid
For most Americans this an easy war. Men
fight and men suffer and men die, as they
always do in war. But the lives of most of
us, at least those of us in this room and those
listening to me this morning, are untroubled.
Prosperity rises, -abundance increases, the
Nation flourishes.
I will report to the Cabinet when I leave
this room that we are in the 51st month of
continued- prosperity, the longest peacetime
prosperity for America since our country was
founded. Yet our entire future is at stake.
What a difference it would make if we
could only call upon a small fraction of our
unmatched private resources-businesses and
unions, agricultural groups and builders-if
we could call them to the task of peaceful
progress in Vietnam. With such a spirit of
patriotic sacrifice we might well strike an
irresistible blow for freedom there and for
freedom throughout the world.
I therefore hope that every person within
the sound of my voice in this country this
morning will look for ways-and those citi-
All this progress goes on, and it is going to tens of other nations who believe in human-
continue to go on, under circumstances of ity as we do, I hope that they will find ways
staggering adversity. to help progress in South Vietnam.
Communist terrorists have made aid pro- This, then, Is the third face of our struggle
grams that we 9,dminister a very special tar- in Vietnam. It was there-the illiterate, the
get of their attack. They fear them, because hungry, the sick-before this war began. It
agricultural stations are being destroyed and will be there when peace comes to us-and
medical centers are being burned. More than so will we-not with soldiers and planes, not
100 Vietnamese malaria fighters are dead, with bombs and bullets, but with all the
Our own AID officials have been wounded wondrous weapons of peace in the 20th
and kidnaped
These are not
st th
t
t
.
ju
e acc
- cen
ury.
nam. And despite the ravages of war, we dents of war. They are a part of a deliberate And then, perhaps, together all of the
have made steady, continuing gains. We campaign, in the words of the Communists, people of the world can share that gracious
have concentrated on food and health and "to cut the fingers off the hands of the Gov- task with all the people of Vietnam, North
education and housing and industry. ernment." and South alike.
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`21708 CONGRESSIONAL RECO1tb - HOUSE ep ember 1, 1965
VIETNAM PEnssECiTVE: "WINNING THE PEACE" powerfuly negative. No later than a week shows that we want peace and not war and
(CBS News Special Report as broadcast over ago, in an interview with the correspondent that all of our effort in this postwar period
the CBS television network, August 23, of the French newspaper Le Monde, Ho of has been directed to that end. Well, now,
1965) Hanoi made it very plain that they were not in South Vietnam, the cessation of outside
Rusk, prepared to negotiate except on terms of all aggression, the cessation of this infiltration
Paxticlpants; Secretary of State Dean h power to the Communists. I believe it to be from the north is certainly fundamental be-
U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, Presi- true that military success of the kind which cause that would make it possible for Amer-
dential Assistant McGeorge Bundy. we have seen in recent days does help us than forces to come home. We should like
Reporters: CBS News United Nations Car- bring nearer the day when there will be ef- to see full performance on all sides of the
respondent Richard C. Hottelet, CBS News fective negotiation. military clauses of the 19:14 agreements. We
Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb, CBS Mr. HOTTELET. It also reinforces the ques- have said. repeatedly, time after time, that
News White House Correspondent Harry Rea- tion that some people have asked of whether as far as the United States is concerned, we
saner. you ought to negotiate at all, or whether, if have no Interest in military bases or a perm-
ANNouNcER. This is the third of four spe- you find the tables turning" your way, if you anent military presence in southeast Asia.
clal 1-hour broadcasts by CBS News, Vietnam -are gaining any kind of military ascendancy, Well, now, that is in accord with the 1954
Perspective. In the past 2 weeks, the new whether you shouldn't use that advantage, agreements and that should be one of the
decisions and the American military effort
in Vietnam were examined. Tonight, "Win-
ning the Peace."
The paths to a peaceful settlement in Viet-
nam will be discussed by three Government
officials. Now here is CBS News White House
Correspondent Harry Reasoner.
Mr. REASON R. Good evening. We're in the
John Quincy Adams Room of the State De-
partment in Washington for the third in our
series of programs with the U.S. policymakers
on Vietnam. Across from me are three dis-
tinguished officials whose task it is to pursue
perhaps the most difficult and illusive of our
objectives in Vietnam, the pursuit of peace.
We're happy to have back with us the Sec-
retary of State, Dean Rusk, who with the
President formulates our foreign policy and
who heads our diplomatic offensive in south-
east Asia.
This is our newly designated Ambassador
to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, who
is exploring the avenues of a peaceful set-
tlement in Vietnam through U.N. channels.
And this Is McGeorge Bundy, Special As-,
sistant to the President, who has played a key
role in the formulation of our policies In
Vietnam and who, a few weeks ago on this
network, defended the administration's posi-
tion with some professors who disagree
with it.
Seated with one are two CBS news col-
leagues, Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin
Kalb, who regularly covers the State Depart-
ment and who is just back from one of many
trips to Russia. And U.N. Correspondent
Richard C. Hottelet.
Gentlemen, I'd like to begin with a fairly
basic question. It's been quite a weekend
in Vietnam. We bombed close to China
again. We bombed for the first time some
targets that could be described as less di-
rectly military than before, and there is a
kind of new optimism about how the ground
fighting is going. Is this the moment? Is
this the time for negotiations? I'd like each
of you to reply to that briefly. Secretary
Rusk?
Mr. Ruses. Well, that depends on the other
side in their assessment of the situation.
We have been ready for a long time to make
peace in southeast Asia. Our problem is to
get the other side to the conference table.
We just don't know. The other side must
make that decision.
Mr. REASONER. Ambassador Goldberg?
Mr. GOLDBERG. I think any time is a good
time for negotiations. The only way to re-
solve conflict is to go to the bargaining table,
to use a term that I am very well familiar
with, and it seems to me that this is not
determined by the calendar, or even by the
course of military events. This is deter-
mined by the genuine desire of the parties
to the conflict to remove the problem from
the battlefield to the bargaining table. So
for me, any time is a good time to negotiate.
Mr. REnsonaR. Mr. Bundy?
Mr. BUNDY. Well, it's certainly true that it
is our position that now is a good time to
negotiate. We have had that view for many
.months, have tried to make it clear in every
Way, public and private, at every level of dis-
course, from the President on down. It is
also true that the response from Hanoi, still
more from Peiping, has been consistently and
press it to checkmate Communist aggression, essential elements of a peaceful settlement.
which is the U.S. professed aim, not only Now as far as South Vietnam internally is
in Vietnam, but all through southeast Asia concerned, we have a deep commitment to
and Laos and in northeast Thailand and the simple notion of self-determination. In
Malaysia as well. In other words, why should the 1954 agreements, it was anticipated that
we negotiate, is the question. there would be elections, through secret
Mr. BUNDY. I think all of us would agree, elections-through secret ballot, and that the
and I know this to be the position of Presi- peoples of Vietnam, north and south, would
dent Johnson, that we are ready to negotiate have a chance to express their-their opin-
and that we are not disposed to take the view ions, and. we are prepared for elections in
that because the battle is going well we are South Vietnam to determine what the people
unwilling to talk about It. In our view, the of that country want in terms of their own
effort to end the aggression must continue, institutions.
while the aggression continues, but we are And then the question of reunification.
prepared for discussion and for negotiation which has been troublesome over the years.
at any time. Again, it is instinctive with the United States
Mn KALB. There is in the air right now in to say, What do the people want? What do
Washington something which has not been the people want? And there again, to find
here before, at least in the past couple of out in North Vietnam and South Vietnam.
months, and that is a wispy kind of feeling what the people themselves really want on
that maybe there is some optimism here and this matter is Important. Now, this isn't
some grounds for optimism. I'd like to ask very simple. And it doesn't mean that both
you, Mr. Secretary, what are the grounds for are going to want reunification. The people
optimism? What is the evidence that gives in the north would want reunification only
rise tothis sense? if there were a Communist reigme through-
Mr. Russ:. Well, I think the fact that Pres- out the country. The people in the south
Ident Johnson has made it very clear that don't want reunification on that basis, but
we are not going to be pushed out of South it is for the people of Vietnam to decide that
Vietnam and that we shall meet our commit- at-such time as they have a chance to ex-
ments to South Vietnam has made a big press their views freely on that point. So
difference to this situation, I think also what we are talking about here are the sim-
the fact that International opinion is not pie elements of a settlement which were
supporting the effort of Hanoi to take over reached basically in 1954, and again in 1962
South Vietnam makes 'a difference, because in the Laotian agreements.
I think they were hoping at one time that Mr. HOTTELE'r. Mr. Goldberg, you sit at
there would be a buildup of international probably the most sensitive listening post in
opinion that might cause. the United States the world. Do you get any indication from
to change its attitude toward our commit- the--your colleagues at the United Nations
ment. that the other side has gotten this message
Mr. GOLDBERG. Gentlemen, may I make an of-that we are not too frightenend to fight,
observation on the Secretary's statement? not too stupidto talk?
New to diplomacy, I have been reading in Mr. GOLDBERG. Not yet. Not yet in all can-
diplomacy. Talleyrand made a statement dor. We have to persevere with patience,
about the Vienna Congressin which he said and experience, and hope. Our message Is
that the great powers there assembled were loud and clear. The signal that the Secre-
too frightened to fight and too stupid to tary has referred to on occasion, saying that
agree. And I think in a very simple measure, negotiations will take place when you hear
we can say of American foreign policy In a signal, has been made by the United States.
this situation, that It Is clear from what the Our President has stated publicly to the
President has said, from what the Secretary world that we are prepared to sit down fa
of State has said, Mr. Bundy said in his unconditional negotiat;'.ons, discussing the
teach-ins, that the United States very deft- points that Hanoi has made, discussing the
nitely is not too frightened to fight. That points we have made and to arrive at a
has been demonstrated. durable settlement, a durable settlement. I
Mr. Rusx. Let me come back, Mr. Kalb, am hopeful-I am hopeful-and I continue
If I may, to Mr. Bundy's reference to the in- in this hope that we will get a similar signal
terview-in Le Monde-Ho Chi Minh on from the other side. It's very simple to
August 14. He seemed to be saying there make that signal. The President did it at
that a precondition for peace is the with- Baltimore. He did it on, other occasions. He
drawal of American forces. Well, under the has done it since. He armed me with a let-
circumstances, this is quite an unrealistic ter to the Secretary General when we said
point of view, because those forces are there very plainly that we are ready to negotiate
solely because of the intervention of out- unconditionally all problems and to negoti-
side forces from Hanoi in South Vietnam. ate on the basis of their position and our po-
Now one would suppose that peace requires sition, and I think we are looking for a signal
that there be a withdrawal of those North from the other side.
Vietnamese forces that have penetrated into Mr. REASONER. Mr. Secretary, I think that
South Vietnam. If you don't like the word there's some confusion in this country about
"withdrawal," you can. use the word "rede- these 1954 agreements which are mentioned
ployment," but it is that infiltration which is so often. For instance, I don't know how
solely responsible for the presence of Amer- many Americans realize it's an agreement
lean combat forces in South Vietnam. that we didn't sign. Does-could you out-
Now, obviously, we and others have been line why we did not sign that and if we
giving a good deal of thought to the basis would sign a similar agreement now?
on which peace can. be achieved. I think the Mr. Rusx. Well, we did not formally sign
entire record of the United States since 1945 those agreements, but Gen. Bedell Smith,
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 September 1, 19" roved For~el WPt?yP8R%1J4R ff67]R
who was then Under Secretary of State, made
a statement at the time which in effect em-
braced those agreements on behalf of the
United States, and said that any attempt to
violate those agreements by force would be
looked upon by the United States as a threat
to the peace. So that we do believe that the
1954 agreements, in their essential princi-
ples, do provide a basis for peace in south-
east Asia. What we do not believe is that
the settlement of 1954 can be upset by force
by any party.
- Mr. REASONER. Mr. Bundy, for reasons
which you've explained, and the President
.has explained, the war in Vietnam has got-
ten bigger. Our participation in it has ixn-
creased. How do we know that it won't con-
tinue to escalate until eventually we have
World War III? Is there some kind of a
tacit understanding on how far both sides
go?
Mr. BUNDY. I know of no tacit understand-
ing, Mr. Reasoner, but I think it is fair to
say that all parties-and all those con-
cerned-are aware of the danger of enlarge-
ment of the conflict. We certainly are on
our side. We have lived with crises large
and small over a 20-year period now-in
Berlin, in Greece, in Korea, in Cuba, and
elsewhere-and I think Americans can be
proud of the care and the prudence and the
restraint which their Government has shown
in this generation of effort. Under the lead-
ership of President Johnson-a man of peace
if there ever was one-we are conducting our
affairs in that tradition and with that pur-
pose of restraint. We believe that there is
a similar recognition-although not always a
similar recognition of the rights of others-
there is a similar recognition of the hazards
of any great enlargement of the conflict on
the part of the parties interested on the other
side. We cannot be sure of what they will
do. We can be sure, and we must be ac-
countable for what we do, and that is why
our entire effort has been directed at things
related specifically to what is being done to
and in South Vietnam. That's what we are
concerned with; not the fate of any other
regime elsewhere; not the safety or security
of any larger power nearby which we do not
threaten. We are concerned with the ful-
fillment of our obligations in South Viet-
nam, a limited objective, and the nature of
those limitations we've made just as clear
as we know how.
Mr. KALB. Mr. Bundy, could you convince
us, and thereby provide us with the evi-
dence that leads you to feel that the Amer-
ican bombing of North Vietnam is specifical-
ly related to acts of terrorism In South Viet-
nam, and that this will convince the Viet-
cong operations in South Vietnam that they
must stop what they're doing?
Mr. BUNDY. No, the bombing in North Viet-
nam is not-I would not relate it specifically
and directly to any one action in South Viet-
nam, but to the campaign in South Viet-
nam and to the program pursued by Hanoi
against South Vietnam it is related and re-
lated most directly. The targets are military
targets: military lines of communication,
military barracks, military depots. There has
been no miscellaneous bombing of any old
target in North Vietnam or anywhere so far
as we can avoid it. The targets have been di-
rectly related to a campaign of infiltration, a
campaign of military control, and a campaign
of organized terror where the heartbeat of
that campaign is in Hanoi.
Mr. HoTTELET, Getting back to China, I've
heard the assumption expressed that China
will not intervene directly in Vietnam as long
as the regime-the Communist regime of
North Vietnam-is not in danger of being
overthrown, and as long as there Is no mas-
sive incursion of American power on the
ground. Is this, in fact, an assumption that
guides your policy?
No. 161-11
Mr. Rusx. Well, I think we are at some
hazard in trying to think like the'members of
the Politburo in Peiping. It is my impres-
sion that the Communist. world does not
want ageneral war over southeast Asia. Un-
fortunately, some of them want southeast
Asia. Therefore, we cannot be completely
sure at the end of the trail which desire on
their part will predominate. But, the au-
thorities in Peiping must know that they
have undertaken to support an effort in
South Vietnam right up against an American
commitment of which they were fully in-
formed. Therefore, they must recognize
that there are very large hazards if they
themselves elect to pursue this by direct in-
tervention. Now we, therefore, have been
acting with a combination of firmness and
prudence in an effort to keep wide open the
doors of peaceful settlement. This has char-
acterized American policy in all of these post-
war crises to which Mr. McGeorge Bundy re-
ferred, and we would hope very much that
the time will come when it will be recog-
nized on the other side that pushing this
matter militarily is not worth the risk at the
end of the trail, and therefore, that they
will bring this to the conference table for
settlement.
Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, there are a num-
ber of people in Washington who study the
China problem who believe that, on the con-
trary, it is precisely a war in southeast Asia
that the Chinese want. It is precisely the
bogging down of an enormous number of
American troops in southeast Asia that the
Chinese want, both for internal political
reasons as well as a justification of their po-
sition in terms of their quarrel with the Rus-
sians. What evidence can you provide that,
indeed, the Chinese-I'm not talking about
the Russians now-do not really want this
kind of-of a larger and deeper American in-
volvement, even running the risk of war with
America?
Mr. RUSK. Well, one can only judge by their
actions thus far and by impressions one gets
from those who have been in touch with
Peiping. There is a comment going around
in the Communist world these days that Pei-
ping is prepared to fight to the last Vietna-
mese. There is a certain caution and pru-
dence in their action, more so than in their
words, but when you analyze these matters
from the point of view of basic national
interest, objectively in terms of what can be
at the root of their thinking, I myself can-
not believe that it is a rational idea that the
principal powers involved in this business
could look with favor upon the outbreak of
a general war. It doesn't make sense from
anyone's point of view.
Now, that means that it is important to do
what we can, not to let events take control;
to try to keep some sort of control over the
situation so that contacts among the capi-
tals might have a change to find a way to a
peaceful settlement. And that is one of the
reasons why, one of the principal reasons why
President Johnson has tried to act with the
combination of the firmness and prudence
that he believes the situation requires.
Mr. BUNDY. Could I pick up from what the
Secretary said for one moment and say that,
in the first place, that nothing is more im-
portant than the maintenance of prudence
and of effective control of our own operations
by our own Government. That's the mean-
ing of the insistent, direct surveillance which
the President maintains over major military
decisions, and specifically, over decisions
which affect military action against North
Vietnam. This is a matter which he keeps
under his own control by the consent and
with the support of the senior military com-
manders concerned.
And just one more point. Obviously, the
Chinese would be delighted to have us mis-
manage our affairs in South Vietnam and in
ffR000300140026-6
21709
southeast Asia so that we got more and more
engaged in something less and less success-
ful. It is our object and our purpose and
our responsibility to do a better job than
that, and to do that job within the limits of
prudence, restraint, and decency which we
are trying to follow.
Mr. GOLDBERG. Could I summarize Ameri-
can policy in this area by quoting an ancient
Greek wise man, Polybius, who said that "the
purpose of war"-and I would describe it in
terms of our attitude toward Hanoi-"is not
to annihilate the enemy, but to get him to
mend his ways." And this, in fact, is what
we have been attempting to do, prevent ag-
gression, and this has been made clear time
and time again. We-the President said, my
distinguished predecessor at the United Na-
tions said, we don't covet any territory, we
don't seek to establish any military bases;
we are acting the way we do to stop aggres-
sion. And when you move only to stop ag-
gression, not to promote aggression, I think
the dangers of a general war are minimized.
Mr. KALB. Mr. Ambassador, the-everything
that you said is certainly true, and this is
precisely what the administration is saying.
At the same time, people said in the Chinese
capital, who have to view it from the point
of view of their national interest-you can
say that we're not building bases around
China, but when the Chinese leaders look out
at the map, they can see the presence of
American military forces from one end of the
Chinese border to the other. When you
bomb, as we did today, to within 31 miles of
the Chinese border, people responsible for
Chinese national security probably would
look with some great concern about that. I
am trying to understand what makes you feel
that they're not that deeply concerned, or
that they don't feel that bombing 31 miles
on this side of the border might not lead to
31 miles on the other side of the border.
Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr. Kalb, for a very simple
reason: because we have stated as a matter
of direct public policy to the world, a com-
mitment which America has made to every-
body, that if aggression ceases from the
north, our activities in South Vietnam will
likewise cease. This Is a pretty broad state-
ment, quite different from statements that
were made by other powers at other points
in the history of South and North Vietnam.
Mr. HOTTELE'. There was a time in the Ko-
rean war after the cessation of fire, and
before the armistice was signed, when-as
President Eisenhower revealed not long ago-
he got tired of waiting for the Chinese to
sign the armistice and threatened or prom-
ised to use all American power, including
nuclear power, against the Chinese. He said
they got the message and they came to the
conference table. Can you envisage any
similar circumstances in Vietnam?
Mr. Rusx. Well, I think we'll have to let
that question ride for the future. There al-
ready was a negotiation going on at that
time, and the problem was to bring it to a
final conclusion. In a major sense, the fight-
ing had already been brought to a conclusion
by the earlier discussions of the cease-fire.
We may get to a point where a cease-fire gets
to be the crucial element there in Vietnam.
Mr. Kalb, if I could return to your point
just for a second. I don't believe that ideo-
logical differences are as profound as to
cause Peiping to be concerned about what
they see around their borders when they
know that we would come home if Hanoi
would leave South Vietnam alone, and that
we would not have bases or troops in south-
east Asia if these countries could live in
peace. Now they can pretend, given their
ideological commitments, that they somehow
are afraid that we have in mind a major
attack on China. There's nothing in the
record to show that. Nothing in the conduct
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE epternbei- 1,
of the last 15 or lO years to give any support
to that idea.
Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, you are suggest-
ing then that the American confrontation-
if I can use that large word--in southeast
Asia is really the United States and North
Vietnam and not the broader confrontation
of the United States and Communist China?
Mr. Rusic. Well, I think, in the first in-
stance, it is clear that what Hanoi is doing
is our principal problem and explains why
we're in South Vietnam with military forces,
so that we're not Involved in a confrontation,
the purpose of which, on our side, is to
destroy the regime in Peiping. We have two
divisions in Korea because among other
things, several hundred thousand Chinese
came into the Korean war in 195Q-51 and
this posed a problem of the security of South
Korea. But throughout this, postwar period
force has been initiated by the other side.
The free world has had to meet that force
with determination, but the free world has
also met it with the kind of prudence and
restraint that keeps open the doors of peace-
ful. settlement. And all I would say on that
to our colleagues in Peiping, If they want to
test whether or not the United States is
aggressive, then let them live at peace with
t>,eir neighbors and they would find out that
the United States is not aggressive with re-
spect to mainland China.
Mr. KALB. We're talking In a kind of a
shorthand, though, sir. Isn't it more direct
in some way at this stage, given the dimen-
sion of the danger, to have a more direct link
of communication with the Chinese Com-
munists? I'm aware of the Warsaw conver-
sations, but we've had enormous political dif-
ferences with the Russians; we've been able
to establish a hot line to Moscow. What
about some kind of line directly to Peiping?
Air. Rvsic. Well, I think we've had more
discussions with Peiping over the last 10
years on more important suBJects than has
any government that recognizes Peiping, with
the possible exception of Moscow. Our prob-
lem with Peiping is not communication. Our
problem is that when we have talks with
them, they begin by saying that there can
be no improvement in the situation until we
are prepared to surrender Formosa to the
mainland, and that means turning over '11
million people against their will to Peiping,
and we make it clear that this is not possi-
ble, and I must confess, the conversation
gets to be implacable and harsh and takes
Well-known lines as represented in the pub-
lic statements of the two sides.
Mr. BhwDY. Going by their own conversa-
tions, Mr. Kalb, and their own-what they
say to journalists, the few and rare ones
whom they receive, the Peiping government
itself has said over and over again, framing
the matter in its own terms, that what is at
issue in Vietnam is fundamentally a matter
for the Vietnamese people to decide. This
is exactly what we think. We believe that
the center of this question is in what is be-
ing done to and in South Vietnam. It is not
in Peiping, except as they may be engaged
in support and assistance to those who are
attempting to destroy a given society and re-
place, it with one fashioned in their own
image. And I bellieve the people in Peiping
know that, and I believe they understand
clearly that it is only by their action and
by their decision that there can be the kind
of enlargement which would involve direct
danger to them.
Mr. REASONER. This question has come up
several times about letting the people of
Vietnam decide what, they want to do. Is
this, indeed, the case, or is it a case, as in
other U.S. policy, where there are limitations,
where there are certain options denied them?
Suppose South Vietnam decided that it
wished to make a separate peace. Would we
accept it?
Mr. BUNDY. Well, I think when you asked
that question earlier to Ambassador Taylor
he said that he just didn't think that was a
realistic possibility. My own judgment is,
onthe basis of one short visit and innumer-
able reports and a great many discussions
with others .who have been there much
longer, that there is no problem, from our
side, of Confidence In the ability of the people
of South Vietnam, given a free choice and
conditions of reasonable peace, to frame their
own future in ways with which we would be
happy to live; that it is an unreal question
to suppose that they would freely choose to
cast their lot with the Communists.
Mr. REASONER. Nevertheless-
Mr. BUNDY. There 1s a great deal of-
Mr. REASONER. It is not an unreal question,
to this extent: that, some intelligence esti-
mates this spring indicated this would be a
possibility. Now, if-even if it is unlikely-
Mr. BuNDY. I am not aware of those--
Mr. REASONER. It must be something we
consider.
Mr. BUNDY. Intelligence estimates, Mr.
Reasoner. Really not-
Mr. REASONER. Well, then put it on a purely
hypothetical basis. To think through the
unthinkable, what would be our attitude?
Would we accept it?
Mr. BUNDY. Well, let me put it the other
way around, and say that the United States
is obviously not in a position to make the
kind of effort and to make the kind of sacri-
fioes which we are making if there were not
effort and, sacrifice by the people and Gov-
ernment of the country to which we are giv-
ing assistance. There is that kind of effort.
There is that kind of sacrifice. Our atten-
tion focuses most naturally upon the battles
in which Americans are heavily engaged, and
we feel, most naturally, American casual-
ties. But the rate of casualties and the rate
of effort is running many times to one on the
Vietnamese side as between us.
Mr.. HoTrELEr. Are there any points on
which the peace aims of the United States
and the Government of South Vietnam do
not coincide?
Mr. BUNDY. Well, there's a constant prob-
lem of discussion over the exact ways in
which we would state our peace aims, but
the current situation is that-and the Sec-
retary can speak to this better than I can-
that the Foreign Minister of the Government
of South Vietnam, and the Secretary him-
self, have made closely parallel statements
about our peace alms.
Mr. REASONER. I don't mean to be offen-
sive, and I certainly recognize your right to
decline to answer this question, but in Santo
Domingo we retained a possibility of a veto
over a government. This was clear. This
denied certain options to people in the way
of self-determination. Do we retain similar
veto over possible decisions out of Vietnam?
Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Reasoner, you're talking
about an island I love. I was down there.
And the point that I think needs to be made
is rather that these two situations are closely
parallel. Our action there, first to save lives,
then to prevent a particular kind of Com-
munist hazard, has developed into an action
designed precisely to give a reasonable op-
portunity for the people of the Dominican
Republic to make their own choice about the
kind of government and the kind of society
they want to have. Now, a small island in
the Caribbean, and a newly independent
country operating within international
agreements which somewhat affect its inter-
national position on the other side of the
world-these are two very different situa-
tions, but my own belief is that the funda-
mental purposes of the United States in both
areas can be defined in the same broad terms.
Mr. Rus#c. Mr. Reasoner, there's a very deep
commitment of the American people to the
simple notion that governments derive their
just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned, and we have not seen a government, a
Communist government, brought to power
by the free election of its own people. Now,
1965
we have overwhelming evidence from all sec-
tions, sectors, areas, groups, in South Viet-
nam that they do not want what Hanoi is
offering to them in South Vietnam. There-
fore, I do not believe that we. need fear,
from the point of view of freedom, that we
need to fear what the effect would be of
genuinely free elections among the people
of South Vietnam. I've heard some people
who were not. I think, in a very good posi-
tion to know the details, speculate that 80
percent of the people in South Vietnam
would elect Ho Chi Minh or accept Hanoi if
they had a free election. That just doesn't
fit any of the evidence that we have about
the attitude of these people.
Mr. REASONER. I was thinking not so much
of elections as of a coup which would put
into power, without reference to the people-
as essentially the present government is,
without reference to a majority of the peo-
ple; it's not established that way yet; they
don't know how, Ambassador Lodge says-
but if they had a government which wanted
to make peace, do we retain veto power over
that peace?
Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Reasoner, the couprnak-
ing power, to put it in those terms, does rest,
as Ambassador Taylor was suggesting last
week, primarily with the military. There's
no hint of this in the military. The people
underestimate the degree of the commit-
ment of all factions, not the Communists, to
a non-Communist solution in South Viet-
nam. One of the principal Buddhist leaders
said to one of our people the other day
on a point that comes up occasionally with
respect to negotiation, that he hoped very
much that we would not give any interna-
tional diplomatic' recognition to the Viet-
cong. The Vietcong did not represent the
South Vietnamese people, but only an agen-
cy of the Communists in the north. This
is a-there are divisions and difficulties,
many, varied and fascinating, among the
non-Communist forces in South Vietnam,
but not on this issue.
Mr. HoTrELET. The Vietcong has been
treated as a monolithic force, which is
really not human, because human beings
are different and even if they are bound by
a discipline or bemused by an ideology, they
do have their own antecedents and they do
have their own tastes. How much is being
done now and what will be done more in
the future to-to insert a wedge into the
differences that must exist inside this
theoretically monolithic Vietcong-the na-
tionalists, the patriots, the people who are
just peasants wanting to live a life of their
own?
Mr. RUSK. Well, there are various elements
in the National Liberation Front. I think
it is true that not all of them are Commu-
nists, although the Communists have, in
even recent weeks, declared that they are
the dominant factor and they must them-
selves be the ones to give the orders. I
think there may also be some tensions be-
tween some of the southerners and some of
the northerners within the Liberation Front.
But basically, they are united on the notion
that the program of Liberation Front must
be 'accepted as a solution for South Viet-
nam and that the Liberation Front itself
must have a dominant role in the govern-
ment there, regardless of the fact that
this is not the wishes of the overwhelming
majority of 14 million South Vietnamese.
Mr. GOLDBERG. May I add a word in this
connection? I was looking at the Geneva
agreement last night. The Geneva agree-
ment, despite what is said. in Hanoi, did not
contemplate, nor does it say anything about
a coalition. government in which the Libera-
tion Front would occupy the dominant role
that Hanoi would like to accord it. The
Geneva agreement says that "the Vietnamese
people, north and south, should enjoy funda-
mental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic
institutions"-I am reading-"established as
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a result of free, general elections by secret
ballot." Now, its very interesting to see
the contrast in positions. When we talk
about returning to the essentials of the
Geneva agreement,/which Hanoi says it
wants and which we say we subscribe to, we
rely upon the fact that there shall be self-
determination. Hanoi relies upon the fact
that they should take over the government
in their image before there are free elec-
tiens. Well, we all have had a bit of his-
tory in this since the war. I don't recall
after that has been done elsewhere that
there have been any free elections. Now,
surely the acid test is whether you are will-
ing to subscribe to the principle of free
elections. That, we have said, we are ready
to subscribe to. If we are ready to subscribe
to it, it must reflect a considerable degree of
confidence-confidence which is lacking on
the other side.
Mr. BUNDY. To put it another way, the
Geneva Conference included as a partici-
pant the State of Vietnam. The current
position from Hanoi is that there is no ques-
tion of Saigon authorities. This is the very
language of He Chi Minh, so what they wish
to do is to foreclose the question of choice
by the establishment as the only authentic
representative, again his own language, their
agent, controlled from within by a clearly
Communist party, the Vietcong.
Mr. RusK. And without elections.
Mr. KALE. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned
before that--or Mr. Bundy did actually-that
you and the Foreign Minister of South Viet-
nam have come out with statements that
are rather similar as to.what both countries
want in South Vietnam, We have yet to
hear what the Prime Minister of South Viet-
nam actually wants and there have been
stories that there are possible differences
already even in this early period of Ambassa-
dor Lodge's return, of differences between the
two; the Prime Minister was not there when
the Ambassador arrived. Do you feel, sir,
that negotiations as we have been discussing
them is in any way realistic, or possible,
given the possibility of continued political
instability in South Vietnam or the con-
tinued absence of statements from the new
South Vietnamese governments that aline
themselves with us?
Mr. RUSK. Oh, I think the political in=
stability in South Vietnam is itself directly
related to violence in the countryside and
the conditions of the war. During the Greek
guerrilla operations, for example, there were
sonhe eight Greek governments in the period
of some 15 months of guerrilla operations. It
isn't easy to sustain an orderly government
based upon elections throughout the coun-
tryside when thousands of local officials are
being assassinated or kidnaped and when
the normal processes of the economy are in-
terrupted by sabotage of routes of com-
munication, so that there is a connection be-
tween the political possibilities of what we
would call a democratic and constitutional
government and peace throughout the coun-
try. I have no doubt that-that the South
Vietnamese themselves would move toward a
government rooted in popular support and
that this could be easily demonstrated if the
conditions of peace made it possible for them
to proceed on that basis. A few weeks ago,
as you will recall, they did have provincial
elections, for a large number of those who
were eligible to vote did in fact register, over
two thirds, and that some 73 percent of those
who were registered did in fact vote, even
though the Vietcong were opposing those
provincial elections. There are multiple
candidates. From our point of view, they
were free elections and we can be-I think,
take some confidence in the fact that if given
a chance, if given some possibility of peace,
these people in South Vietnam would know
how to establish a government and base it
upon, popular support and get on with the
main job which would be their first choice.
Mr. KALE. And yet, sir, the Prime Minister
of the country, the air commodore, has ex-
pressed his impatience publicly with the
politicians in South Vietnam. He's even ex-
pressed a certain admiration for dictators of
the past. Do we really have a sense that
this is the kind of 'government that we can
go to the conference table with?
Mr. Rusx. Oh, I think that we can go to
the conference table with the Government
of South Vietnam.. I think that their war
aims and our war aims are basically the same
and that if the country can get some peace,
then there can be a rapid development of
their political, economic, and social institu-
tions in the direction which would cause all
of us to applaud them and give them full
support.
Mr. HOTTELET. You don't say, sir, that the
war aims are identical. What are the points
of difference?
Mr. Rusx. Well, perhaps I could say "iden-
tical" as far as my present knowledge is
concerned. I'm not aware of any signifi-
cant difference in the war aims of our two
countries. The central thing, gentlemen, the
central thing is that the aggression from the
north, the infiltration of men and arms from
the north, must be stopped and the South
Vietnamese be allowed to work out their own
problems themselves without the use of force
from the outside. Now, this is the major,
central, overriding point. The details a}e
incidental to that central point and on that
there's no difference between us and Saigon.
Mr. GOLDBERG. Can I phrase-rephrase the
Secretary's remark in a simple way? I was
writing it down as he said it. If we look at
the public record, and the public record is
not unimportant in this area, the goal of
Hanoi policy as recently expressed is to
wage a 20-year war to impose a Communist
regime on South Vietnam. The goal of
American and South Vietnamese policy is
to determine their own destiny, by demo-
cratic means under conditions of peace.
Mr. RUSK. I think an examination of H~-
noi's, Peiping's, broadcasts in the last several
months will indicate that they were leaning
rather heavily on three points: one, that
they could score a military success in South
Vietnam-we know that will be denied,to
them; second, that international opinion
somehow will build up in such a way as to
put sufficient pressure on the United States
to cause us to change our commitment to
South Vietnam-we know that that will not
occur. And, third, that divisions inside the
United States will cause us to change our
view of this matter-we don't believe that
will occur. Therefore, Hanoi, I think, must
face the fact that three essential pillars in
their policy are weak pillars and, therefore,
we would hope very much that they would
realize that this matter must be brought to
some conclusion.
Now, I don't want to exaggerate the role
of public discussion and public debate.
You'll recall, for example, that the Greek
guerrilla problem was not settled in debate.
At a certain stage the guerillas simply began
to wither away. You'll recall that the Berlin
blockade was not lifted through a debate in
the Security Council. It was done through
private contacts ahead of. time by-between
the Soviet Union and the United States.
Similarly, the Korean war was not settled
in a debate-in the United Nations. It was
setled by contacts among the parties. And,
therefore, we believe that we're in a period
where the real views of the various parties
need to be explored by channels that are
available, in order to see whether the basis
for a peace exists. I've indicated myself
earlier in this program what seemed to us to
be the main lines of a peaceful settlement
as far as we're concerned. There are many
details which, can't. be. elaborated, because
we're not at a negotiating table. But I do
believe that it is important for us to pursue
the quiet diplomacy, whether in the United
Nations or in other respects, because it is
in that way that we shall, I think, get the
key signals at some stage that might bring
this to the conference table.
Mr. HOTTELET. But can one not hasten
this process somewhat? Can one not ripen
the quiet diplomacy by creating circum-
stances in which the other side will find it,
necessary to come to the conference table, by,
for instance, dramatizing a desire to return
to Geneva, or perhaps some dramatic, sub-
stantive but dramatic, approach by Presi-
dent Johnson-a summit conference on this
problem, which I think everyone recognizes
is a most serious problem?
Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr, Hottelet, how more
dramatic can the, President of the United
States be? He made a public declaration
about this in Baltimore, "unconditional dis-
cussions," and then some critics said that
the President did not mean "negotiations."
So then in the letter that he sent down
with me to the Secretary General of the
United Nations, he used the word "negoti-
ations" to put at rest this thing that people
were talking about. Following which, we
sent a letter to the Security Council, in which
we said, "We call upon anyone, any member,
not only of the Security Council, but of the
United Nations, to participate with us in
this effort."
The 17 nonalined nations made a pro-
posal. We said that they would form the
basis for a negotiation. And then-I can't
go through all of the 15 efforts that were
made. Mr. Davies went to Hanoi. We said
that we welcomed that initiative. The
Commonwealth ministers made a declaration.
We said we welcomed that initiative. Mr.
Nkrumah has indicated some interest; we
did not discourage it.
I personally feel that you never denigrate
any party nor a great nation by indicating
a desire for peaceful resolution of a con-
flict. The President has done this. He's
gone all out for this purpose.
Mr. HOTTELET. The purpose of my ques-
tion, Mr. Goldberg, was to ask whether one
could not do more than just indicate a
willingness to accept, indicate acquiescence-
Mr. BUNDY. Well, we have done that, Mr,
Hottelet, in the specific case that you men-
tioned. It seems to me that the fact is, and
it's very clear, really, and increasingly rec-
ognized around the world, we are uncondi-
tionally ready for negotiations; we are un-
conditionally ready to return to Geneva if
others are; we are unconditionally ready for
the good offices of the United Nations in any
way that they can be made effective; we are
unconditionally ready to meet with all inter-
ested governments and go to work on this
problem, and we have said so in every sharp
and flat, and the President is fond of saying,
in every State of the Union. And I believe
the message has been heard.
Mr. KALB. Mr. Bundy, at one time there
was an unadvertised pause in the bombing
of North Vietnam. I wonder, sir, if the
administration might not-in following up
Dick's line of questioning-might not con-
sider that an advertised or unadvertised ef-
fort along these same lines might not be
contemplated, because the leaders in Hanoi-
and you keep making reference to the other
side-have certain things that they must go
on, .too-
Mr. BUNDY. Well-
Mr. KALB. In addition to public statements,
they have the fact that they are being
bombed.
Mr. BUNDY. You talked about this matter
in this series a couple of weeks ago, and I
think the Secretary then made the point
that at the time of the unannounced pause
there was information about its existence,
was, in fact, conveyed to the governments
most concerned, and in the first instance, to
the government in Hanoi. They were in no
doubt that this was happening. They were
in no doubt that we would be watching to
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 1, 1965
see whether,there was any response or any
secondary action.
Anytime that we thought that there was
a promise of action and response in terms
of the reduction of the activities which had
made this trouble, there would be no hesita-
tion in the United States about making ap-
propriate adjustments in our own military
activity.
Mr. Rusx. Yes, I'd like to assure you that
we have not been negligent in our business,
and that -hardly a week goes by that. the
other side doesn't have a chance to indicate
what else would happen if the bombing
ceased.
Now, I said in our earlier program that we
would be willing to consider cessation of
the bombing if it were a step toward peace.
Now that remains open, that possibility.
But what else would happen? Would the
825th North Vietnamese Division go hone?
Would there be a cessation of the bombing in
South Vietnam, where it's occurring all the
time among the South Vietnamese and
against our own forces?
In other words, the target here Is peace,
and all of these incidental aspects of it
ought to be fitted into a movement toward
a genuine, permanent, peaceful settlement
of this situation.
Mr. REASONER. There's a:question here I'd
like to address to Mr. Bundy. If, as we seem
to feel, that we have some years ahead of us,
or some weeks or months or possibly years,
making South Vietnam strong, waiting for
a signal, what happens to the war In the
meantime? It seems to get a little bigger
all the time. Our participation seems to get
stronger. Is there a limit to that?
Mr. Bvrmy. Well, our actions there-and
'this is a point which r think, Secretary
McNamara spelled out with some care a
couple of weeks ago on this program--our
9etions there have been essentially actions
in 'response and in reply, and what has en-
larged the war has been the increasing com-
mitment directed from, supplied by and
coming from, very often and increasingly,
coming from North Vietnam into South
Vietnam, Our own forcea,are there because
of actions which have been necessary in
response. That is why we feel so strongly
that the question here as to whether it's
going to get worse or better, the question
as to when it will come to the peace table,
As one In which one has to think about more
than just the U.S. position.
Our determination is to assist and support
a people who are defending themselves
against an effort to make them a Communist
power-part of a Communist power. That
effort has been the effort which seemed nec-
basary, and appropriate at each stage, and
only that much. We are not in a position
to say to our countrymen in this country
when that will end. We think that the
American people understand why they are
there, why these sacrifices are necessary.
We hope that it will not grow larger, the
conflict in South Vietnam. We will do what
we can to limit it. But we cannot be un-
willing and unready to do our, part.
Mr. HOTTELET. Looking `ahead to the per-
,=anent peace settlement,' you have stressed
your adherence to the essentials of the
Geneva Agreement and you have stressed
the need for self-determination. When the
United States refrained from signing the
Geneva Agreement, Bedell Smith also sug-
gested that free elections should be super-
vised by the United Nations. Do you see a
role for the United Nations in making cer-
tain that any future Geneva Agreement on
Vietnam is actually honored by those
recitals?
Mr. Rusx, Yes, I would hope that the
United Nations could play_ an important part
in connection with any settlement. But that
would depend upon the attitude of all the
parties, including Hanoi and Peiping, and
thus far, both of those capitals'; have rather
pushed aside and rejected participation by
the United Nations. But if there could be
organized an international inspection force,
a police force, to supervise a peaceful settle-
ment, if there could be a strong effort to
build upon the capability of the United
Nations to bring about economic and social
development in the area, then I think there's
a very Important role for the United Nations
in connection with the making and keeping
of the peace, and I would hgpe very much
that-the other parties would make it possible
for the United Nations to play that kind of
role.
Mr. GOLDBERG. Before we leave this subject,
may I make an observation on what Mr.
Bundy just said. We are not the ones that
are talking about a war that lasts 10 or 20
years. Ho Chi Minh has been talking about
that. We are talking about a peace that
should be negotiated here and now. Here
and now.
Mr. BUNDY. That's a very important point.
I'd like to just make one comment in finish-
ing up on that. We don't know when, but
the sooner the better, and weare absolutely
sure that it is the orderto all of us from our
President, from our Nation's President, that
we shall never be second, never be slow,
never be without energy and imagination in
trying to find ways of bringing a peaceful
and decent settlement to this contest.
Mr. Rusx. Mr. Reasoner, it seems to me
that each citizen in the United States has a
special obligation in thinking about such a
problem as South Vietnam. I think it really
Isn't enough just to worry about it and be
concerned about it and be anxious about
the future. Of course, all of us are concerned
about it and anxious about the future. But
each citizen might consider what he would
do if he were the President of the United
States, facing the choices faced by the Presi-
dent of the United States, to enter into the
-full agony of the question, what does the
United States do in this situation? And I
have no dpubt that if each one of us should
look very hard at the nature of the aggres-
sion, at the nature of the American com-
mitment, the importance of the integrity of
the American commitment, at the many ef-
forts made to find a peaceful settlement,
that the citizen would, thinking of himself
as President for the moment, would con-
clude that we have to make good on our
commitment, but at the same time we have
to explore every possibility for a peaceful
settlement. And that is what President
Johnson is doing,
Mr. REASONER. Gentlemen, I'd like to thank
you very much for coming, as we leave some
millions of citizens considering what they
would do if they were the President of the
United States. You may have spoiled a lot
of people's sleep, Mr. Secretary.
Thus far in our four-part series on Viet-
nam, we have examined the critical decisions
that our country faces, the questions of how
we can win the war there; and tonight, how
we can win the peace. Two weeks from to-
night, on September 6, in the conclusion of
Vietnam Perspective, we shall take a close
look at what kind of a war it is we're fight-
Ing there. Teams of CBS news correspond-
ents and camera crews will 111m a single day
of combat at different locations to bring you,
in color, Vietnam Perspective: "A Day of
War." This is Harry Reasoner. Good night.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Michigan [Mr. TODD] is recog-
nized for 30 minutes.
[Mr. TODD addressed the House. His
remarks will appear hereafter in the
Appendix.]
-(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr.
CLEVENGER) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, the
Members of this Congress and the Presi-
dent of this country can be proud of the
record of the 1st session of the 89th Con-
gress; we are not through yet, but what
we have accomplished in the first 8
months of 1965 will long be remembered.
President Johnson well deserves the
plaudits extended in the following birth-
day editorial which appeared in the Au-
gust 27, 1965, edition of the New York
Journal-American:
HAPPY DAY FOR L.B.J.
Doubtless there will be a cake and candles
today as President Johnson observes his 57th
birthday. It occurs to us that quite a large
cake would be needed if each candle repre-
sented an achievement by L.B.J. in the not-
quite 2 years he has been in office.
The President's domestic legislative accom-
plishments have astounded experts and fasci-
nated the public, especially since many of
them in. the recent past were issues of fierce
and seemingly insoluable controversy.
To name some of the big ones in this ses-
sion of Congress alone:
Education, which extends benefits indi-
rectly to pupils in Catholic and other non-
profit private schools.
Medicare.
Voting Rights Act.
Creating a new Cabinet-rank Department
of Housing and Urban Development.
War on poverty bill and aid to Appalachia,
related but legislatively separate.
Water pollution control.
Presidential continuity.
Omnibus housing bill.
Excise tax reductions.
On the international scene, the President's
policy in Vietnam has the support of a great
majority of the people and most leaders of
both parties.
Mr. Johnson has every reason, when he
blows out those candles, to blow with gusto
and satisfaction. Many happy returns, Mr.
President.
STATEMENT OF HON. ABRAHAM J.
MULTER IN SUPPORT OF H.R. 1128,
TO PROVIDE BENEFITS FOR VET-
ERANS OF SERVICE AFTER JAN-
UARY 31, 1955
(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr.
CLEVENGER) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, on
August 31, 1965, I submitted the following
statement to the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs in support of my bill H.R. 1128,
which would provide educational and
other benefits to those of our citizens who
served in the Armed Forces after January
31, 1955:
STATEMENT OF HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER TO
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AF-
FAILS IN SUPPORT OF H.R. 1128, To PROVIDE
EDUCATION AND OTHER BENEFITS FOR VET-
ERANS OF SERVICE AFTER JANUARY :31, 1965
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportu-
nity to make this statement to your commit-
tee in support of my bill, H.R. 1128, which
would provide vocational rehabilitation,
education and training, and loan guaranty
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September 1, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
sociation, of Fort Lauderdale, and, the
vice president of the National League of
Insured Savings Associations, of Wash-
ington, D.C. Mr. Greep has spent much
time in Venezuela working with the
Agency for International Development
on the savings and loan program.
According to the Caracas Daily Jour-
nal, the present homebuilding boom in
Venezuela is due to the private home
financing made available by the new sav-
ings and loan associations recently es-
tablished in Latin America. In just a
few short years, the introduction of sav-
ings and loan associations has had a
major impact on Latin America. It is
my hope that the Congress soon will take
additional steps to accelerate this highly
worthwhile program by enacting legisla-
tion to establish an International Home
Loan Bank which would channel limited
funds from savings associations in the
United States in the form of "seed cap-
ital" investments in these newly organ-
ized, locally owned and managed savings
institutions in the underdeveloped areas
of the world.
The above-mentioned article follows:
SAVINGS AND LOANS
(By Alvaro Arratz)
Venezuela's construction industry is rid-
ing in the crest of a honebuilding boom.
Industry leaders say it surpasses even the
gold dust days of the mid-1950's, when
Venezuela leapt from its colonial structure
to the futuristic skyline it has today. In
the first 10 months of last year, investments
in private construction totaled 530 million
bolivars-the highest amount in any year
except 1959-and experts were predicting an
alltime record would be reached by De-
cember.
This year, the boom has, if anything,
gained greater momentum, spilling from
Caracas' narrow valleys to fill whole new
areas with houses, buildings, and schools. A
leading firm in the horizontal property field
recently estimated 4,000 new apartments
would go up by 1966.
THE ROLE OF SAVINGS AND LOAN
Builders say a major factor in producing
this boom is the rapid growth of the savings
and loans system. Thousands of Vene-
zuelans who see in it an opportunity to build
their own homes, have made the system the
fastest growing financing plan in the coun-
try. According to builders, this is because
It places a private home within the reach
of many who could not afford it otherwise.
And this, say the builders, is the reason
homebuilding prospects are so encouraging.
While new in Venezuela, the savings and
loans system's 'ancest'ry goes back to the
industrial revolution days of England's 18th
century. English immigrants brought the
system to the United States in 1831, where
it grew rapidly. By the turn of the cen-
tury, the system's total assets in the United
States reached $579 million. Thirty-one
years later, this figure had grown to $6,400
million.
Today the savings and loan system in the
United States consists of 6,000 private asso-
ciations with capital assets above $100,000
million. Eloquent testimony of its impor-
tance to the American construction industry
'is the fact one of two homes built in the
United States are financed through a savings
and loans association.
ADOPTION IN 1961
Venezuela adopted the system in 1961
through two presidential decrees. These de-
crees created the central savings and loans
office the Savings 'and loans commies-
sion-the agencies which regulate the func-
tioning of the system in Venezuela.
The Savings and Loans Commission is in
charge of establishing the norms of opera-
tion for savings and loans companies in
Venezuela, as well as of approving creation
of these companies. It is the highest au-
thority on savings and loans in the country,
and through its decisions the system is de-
veloped and expanded. It is made up of
seven principal and seven alternate mem-
bers, chosen by the President from leading
figures in the construction industry and
government.
The central savings and loans office is the
technical and administrative body of the sys-
tem. Its job is to carry out the decisions
taken by the commission, to create new sav-
ings and loans companies, and to intervene
in them whenever necessary. The central
office also handles the legal work for _the
system. AID LOANS
Savings and loans began in Venezuela
with a Bs. 45 million fund provided by the
Agency for International Development (AID)
and Bs. 33 millions loaned by the Venezue-
lan Government. This capital was later ex-
panded by another government loan of Bs.
35 millions to a total of Bs. 113 millions. In
October 1962, the system consisted of only a
few companies with total savings of Bs. 1.64
million, and that year loans approved by the
system amounted to only Bs. 134,000.
Today, 21 savings and loans companies
with nearly Bs. 80 millions operate in the
country. As of March this year loans ap-
proved by these companies totaled Bs. 167
millions, and experts say real growth is just
beginning. GOVERNMENT BILL
In view of this extraordinary growth, the
Government has started work on a law to
"institutionalize" the savings and loans sys-
tem. The bill-now being studied in Con-
gress-aims to replace the central office and
commission and the norms of operations
with a solid legal structure.
The bill was introduced by Miraflores'
planning and coordinating office (Cordiplan)
with the plan of making a national auton-
omous institute of the savings and loans
system. Its principle objective is to create
national savings and loans bank to handle
the work presently being done by the two
government agencies.
But the bill has met with criticism from
business circles, which claims nationalizing
the system would greatly hinder its develop-
ment. Constructions industry leaders argue
that national institutes are inefficient and
inoperative. They point to the success sav-
ings and loans have had under private con-
trol and say it would never have been pos-
sible if the system were In government hands.
The construction chamber and the Ven-
ezuelan Federation of Savings & Loans As-
sociations have both announced their stand
publicly on several occasions.
FEDECAMARAS STAND
Recently the Chambers Federation (Fede-
camaras), Venezuela's most important busi-
ness organization added its weight to this
stand.
Fedecamaras President Concepcion Quijada
said making the savings and loans system a
national institute would deter savings since
"people have built up confidence in private
savings and loans bank, but only if this bank
was a private corporation.
Quijada said capital for the bank should
be mixed private-government, and not 100
percent government as planned in the bill.
He also said the bank's board of directors
should have at least two representatives of
private savings and loans associations, and
one representative of the construction
industry.
According to the Government bill, all seven
members of the board of directors will be
appointed by the President of the Republics
and of these, none may be a director of a
savings and loans association.
21721
COPEI PROPOSAL
While debate of these differences was still
going on, a second savings and loans bill was
introduced by the Social Christian Party
(Cope') .
The Copei bill follows closely the stand
adopted by business leaders, inasmuch as it
plans the savings and loans bank as a private
corporation, but allows some representation
of private savings and loans associations, and
accord that capital for the bank will be 25
percent private.
Until now, neither Fedecamaras nor the
construction chamber has announced that
they will support Copei's bill. While the
bill meets nearly all the requirements these
bodies have asked for, Copei's congressional
strength gives little hope that the bill might
be passed over the three Amplia base parties,
who support the Cordiplan bill.
Some observers have said private enter-
prise would rather seek a compromise with
the Amplia base parties than support a bill
introduced by the opposition.
What Fedeoamaras and private business
will decide is not easy to predict. But it is
clear that this decision will vitally affect
the future development of the savings and
loans system and the construction industry,
and through them, the nation's economy.
For this reason, the business world's
attention is focused on the deliberations and
negotiations Fedecamaras is holding on this
matter, and also on the possible willingness
of the Government to compromise with pri-
vate enterprise in a joint effort to econom-
ically develop Venezuela,
(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr.
CLEVENGER) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
[Mr. PEPPER'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the Appendix. ]
A BILL TO PROVIDE INSURANCE
PROTECTION FOR ACTIVE DUTY
SERVICEMEN
(Mr. EVERETT (at the request of Mr.
CLEVENGER) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Speaker, the In-
surance Subcommittee of the Committee
on Veterans' Affairs has been working for
several weeks on legislation which would
provide insurance coverage for members
of the Armed Forces who are on active
duty.
Survivors of members of the Armed
Forces who lose their lives on active duty
are protected by the dependency and in-
demnity compensation program for serv-
ice-connected death. This program be-
came effective in 1957 and is designed
to give continuing protection to the wife,
children, and dependent parents of serv-
icemen who lose their lives from serv-
ice-connected causes.
The dependency and indemnity com-
pensation program does not extend to
single men whose parents are nonde-
pendent. It is the purpose of the bill
which I am introducing to make avail-
able insurance coverage to single men
with nondependent parents. This cov-
erage would also be available to service-
men with wives, children, and dependent
parents in addition to the protection
which they now receive under the de-
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p ~l~QGxFS OINAL RECORD - HOUSE September Y, 1965
and
Y i
d
n
em111ty compensation The question and answer results fol-
Program.
TZ Ie bill which I am introducing is low: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
the result of conferences with officials of Do you favor:
the Veterans' Administration and De- 1. Our actions and policies in Vietnam and
tense Department, Veterans' Administra- Dominican Republic? Yes, 61 percent; no,
lion insurance experts and insurance ex- 26 percent; undecided, 14 percent.
perts from the private companies. This 2. The two-price or class I base for dairy
bill is Patterned closely after the group farmers, to allow them to cooperate volun-taril insurance program now available to Fed- amans? bYesg 44 llper enttlyno,tiline with
oral employees. It would provide for a undecided, 45 percent;
program of group life insurance which 3. Extension of percent. Area Redevelopment
would be administered by the Veterans' Administration, to help communities with
Admini
t
ti
s
ra
on and underwritten by high unemployment to attract new business?
private insurance companies. The plan 15 es, 65 percent; no, 20 percent; undecided,
l
wou
d be voluntary; however, members
of the Armed Forces would be required
to sign a statement in writing re
i
mov
ng
themselves from the program if they do
not desire to participate. Members of
the Armed Forces being separated would
be given a Period of 31 days after separa-
tion during which insurance could be
converted and continued with one of
the Participating companies. The pre-
lniums would be established by the Ad-
ministrator of Veterans' Affairs based
on actuarial estimates. However, ten-
'tative estimates supplied the Insurance
$uboommitte indicate. that this insur-
ance would be available at a rate of
about 25 to. 35 cents per thousand per
month.
The U.S. Government would bear the
extrahazardous cast of war deaths guider
this program just as it did.in the U.S.
Government life insurance and national
percent.
4. Continuation of the present wheat cer-
tificate plan for wheat farmers? Yes, 14
percent; no, 39 percent; undecided, 47 per-
cent..
5. Federal help to local communities in
constructing needed sewer lines or water
systems? Yes, 67 percent; no, 24 percent;
undecided, 9 percent.
6. President Johnson's proposal to combat
crime by putting limitations on the impor-
tation and mail order shipment of firearms?
Yes, 65 percent; no, 30 percent; undecided,
5 percent.
7. Adoption of a constitutional amendment
allowing States with a two-house legislature
to apportion one house on the basis of fac-
tors other than population, as is done with
the U.S. Senate? Yes, 56 percent; no, 19
percent; undecided, 25 percent.
8. Spending some $30 million to construct
two flood control dams at Davenport Center
in Delaware County and on the Genegantslet
Creek in Chenango County without waiting
for the results of a comprehensive survey of
n? er o+~smr Yes, 11 percent; no, 75 percent;
The Insurance Subcommittee has undecided, 14 percent.
scheduled hearings on this legislation 9. The admin.iStrati_on's voting rights bill,
fOr September 8, 1965, with the hope to enforce the 15th amendment in places
that a satisfactory program can be de- like Selma, Ala., and elsewhere? Yes, 64
veloped and Passed before the end of Percent; no, 19 percent; undecided, 17 per-
this session. cent.
fem. 10. Federal funds for college scholarships
n
s
CONGRESSMAN STRATTON AN-
NOUNCE-81 RESULT$ OF 1965 CON-
GRESSIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE IN
35TH DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
(Mr. STRATTON (at the request of
Mr. CLEVENGER) was granted permission
to extend his remarks at this point in the
3taeoiui and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker I am
happy to bring to the attention of my
colleagues the results of my 1965 con-
gressional questionnaire. I should point
out that this upstate New York district
has a party enrollment which favors the
Repubhca~i Party by a margin of nearly
2 4 to 1 although President Johnson
carried the district last year by more
than 50,000 votes. It will be apparent
from the figures below, the people I have
the honor to represent, on the basis of
their replies to this questionnaire, still
strongly support the President, his hand-
ling our foreign policy and in gen-
eriil his domestic legislative program. I
believe these results will be of great in-
terest to Members of the House. I might
slao add, Mr. Speaker, that basically this
'the same congressional. district which
was representedprior to 1962 for a per-
led of 40 years by our distinguished
former .colleague from Auburn, Hon.
,John Taber.
e
gy and deserving students? Yes, 72
percent; no, 21 percent; undecided, 7 per-
cent.
11. Federal help in developing and dis-
York Sscarce water tate's continuing idrought combat
New
67 percent; no, 22 percent; undecided 11 per-
cent.
12. Amending our present immigration
laws to base immigration quotas on edu.ca-
tion, skill, and family relationship rarther
than national origins? Yes, 67 percent; no,
17 percent; undecided, 16 percent.
13. Generally speaking, do you approve of
President Johnson's handling of his job
since taking office? YaT,, 64 percent; no, 18
percent; undecided, 18 itercent
FOREIGN B HfPf'ERS REFUSE
SAIGON-BOUND U.S. GOODS
(Mr. ROGERS of Florida (at the re-
quest of Mr. CLEVENGER) was granted
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker,
the Greek crew of the freighter
Stam.atios S. Embiricos has refused a
$10,000 bonus in addition to wages to sail
10,000 tons of U.S. Army supplies from
Long Beach, Calif. to South Vietnam.
The Army cargo was previously offered
to a Mexican-flag ship, which also re-
fused to transport the urgently needed
war materiel.
The cargo is now scheduled to be ship-
ped sometime around September 8
aboard the American-flag freighter Bay
State.
Why should the Greek crew balk at
doing this job for the United States?
Greek-flag ships have received a total of
$360,000 from the United States for haul-
ing U.S. cargoes to South Vietnam since
the beginning of January of this year.
Furthermore, in case there is any
doubt as to the willingness of Greek
ships to call in the Vietnam area, 15
Greek vessels have hauled goods into
North Vietnam since the beginning of
this year.
Mr. Speaker, this incident illustrates
the vital need for a strong American mer-
chant shipping industry. The U.S. Gov-
ernment must not depend on the whims
and temperament of foreign shipping in-
terests. We need our own ship, to
handle defense needs in time of national
emergency.
If the American shipping industry de-
clines any more, and it now handles less
than 10 percent of the total traffic of
goods flowing through U.S. ports, this
Nation may one day find itself land-
locked when it needs to sealift goods to
a war zone.
I urge that the U.S. Government be
first to "ship American."
OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CANADA
(Mr. DINGELL (at the request of Mr.
CLEVENGER) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr.. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, in re-
cent years the traditional tranquillity of
our relationships with Canada has been
seriously disturbed by Canadian concern
over her heavy deficit with the United
States in automotive trade. Some
methods employed by Canada to reduce
her automotive trade imbalance have
threatened to trigger a retaliatory se-
quence that could have grown into a
mutually disastrous trade war between
the world's greatest commercial partners.
Thanks to imaginative leadership on
both sides of the border, such folly has
not been permitted to occur. Instead,
calm and reasonable negotiations have
resulted in the Automotive Products
Trade Agreement we are considerin
g
here.
I support, without reservation, the bill
before us which would implement the
agreement and provide for effective
assistance to those firms and workers
who may find it necessary to make
adjustments.
While some Of the initial adjustments
may be difficult, the longer range conse-
cluences of this trade agreement are
stronger automotive industries, greater
automotive employment, and more value
for car customers in both countries.
Considering the tremendous impact
the automotive industry has on the econ-
omy of our Nation-about one-sixth of
the U.S. gross national product is de-
rived from spending on automotive
transportation-the direct benefits of ex-
panding the total North American auto-
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September 1, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
21733
LONG] and myself, I introduce, for ap- Where there have been no such assets,' The United States of America-this
Gen and dying in Vietnam to pro-
propriate reference, a bill amend the no In this e latter has clabeen ss ofi cases, in which are fightigl
Mr. Bridge Act ask Mr. President, , I ask unanimous con- no assets exist from which payment can tect the free world from further Com-
sent that an editorial on this subject, be made, the Commission nonetheless munist encroachment upon freedom and
published in the St. Louis Post Dispatch determines the merits and the amounts liberty.
of August 17, 1965, be printed at this of the claims in order to decide and Yet a number of ships of free world
point in the RECORD. record the facts of each case and in nations continue to carry supplies to
The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will order to provide the Secretary of State North Vietnam. It may well be that
be received and appropriately referred; with an intelligent basis upon which to supplies carried to North Vietnam by
and, without objection, the editorial will negotiate with the expropriating power, free world vessels are predominantly
be printed in the RECORD. should it be determined prudent to do so. nonstrategic in nature. It may be that
The bill (S. 2483) to amend the Gen- Last year Congress expanded the juris- any loss of supplies from free world ships
eral Bridge Act of 1946 for the purpose diction of the Foreign Claims Settlement to North Vietnam could be replaced by
of maintaining existing bridge clear- Commission to include determination of Communist bloc vessels.
ances on navigable rivers and waterways the amount and the validity of claims by But I maintain, Mr. President, that
connecting with the sea, introduced by U.S. citizens against the Government of any supplies of any kind to a nation
Mr. SYMINGTON (for himself and Mr. Cuba which have arisen as a result of the making war on its neighbor contribute
LONG of Missouri), was received, read Castro Government's bad credit, expro- directly to the war effort and could result
twice by its title, and referred to the priation, and lawlessness against U.S. in the death of American and allied
Committee on Public Works. citizens. fighting men. I contend further, Mr.
The editorial presented by Mr. SYM- That legislation specifically provided President, that the burden of furnishing
INGTON is as follows: that it could not be construed as author- such supplies to an aggressor nation
[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, izing an appropriation for the purpose of should fall upon those in sympathy with
Aug. 17, 19651 paying these Cuban claims. the aggressor. No freedom-loving na-
BRIDGES, Nor BARRIERS I think the Cuban Claims Act was a tion should seek to profit from trade
The war over bridge clearances on the &is- wise piece of legislation. which could result in the death of boys
sissippi and Missouri Rivers has been going But I think the jurisdiction of the For- seeking to defend freedom.
on for more than 6 years now and still it is eign Claims Settlement Commission In the 18-month period between
being fought to a conclusion on a span-by- should also be extended to include claims January 1964 through June 1965 ships
span basis. Currently under debate are one of U.S. citizens against the Chinese Com- from the free world have carried 476
structure at Omaha which is being built and munist Government for expropriation, cargoes to North Vietnam. In the first
another at Kansas City for which a permit unpaid debts, and other unlawful injur- half of this year, ships from six free
has been issued. Both would still further ies. Therefore, I introduce, for appro- world nations have visited North Viet-
reduce the minimum clearances of feet namese ports a total of 75 times. The six
now w 400 infeet use. Foreign horizontal in existence otereign reference, Claims laims a bill Commission to hear, authed dee- the
es and
nations represented in this trade are the
on bridges bri vertical
As the Waterways Journal of St. Louis de- cide, and record these claims against the United Kingdom-which accounted for
clares editorially, this procedure "not only is day when Communist China can be about 60 percent of this traffic-Japan,
a needless expense for waterway interests, brought to the bar of international law Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, and
but there is always the danger that some pro- and justice. Lebanon.
posals will not be discovered until it is too
late." The result could be to foreclose the The bill I propose in no way changes Ironically, 24 of the very same ves-
waterways to some types of important freight the provisions of the Cuban Claims Act sels which have hauled cargoes to North
as has already been done on the highways and passed last year, except to allow the Vietnam have put in to American ports
the railroads by inadequate clearances. Min- Commission to adjudicate claims of U.S. no fewer than 75 times in the 18 months
imum clearances on these two principal riv- citizens against Communist China on the between January 1964 through June
ers should not be further reduced unless for same basis as claims against Cuba. 1965.
more compelling reasons than have yet been This bill, like the Cuban Claims Act, it seems inconceivable to me that the
short ed. on The the last country trans sppoorta ati ton sell its artery y cap- future will not involve or authorize any appro- United States should open its ports to
sho
able of carrying giant freight. priation of funds to pay these claims. vessels which may have earlier carried
But it will provide some remedy for cargoes to North Vietnam or may be
TO EXPAND THE JURISDICTION OF those of our citizens who have been vic- heading to North Vietnamese ports soon
THE FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLE- timized by the outlawry of Communist after putting in at American harbors.
China. It seems to me, Mr.. President, that
MENT COMMISSION TO INCLUDE The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will this Nation should not only prohibit
THE CLAIMS OF U.S. CITIZENS be received and appropriately referred. those individual ships from utilizing
AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA The bill (S. 2484) to amend title V of American ports, but should similarly
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in 1954 the International Claims Settlement Act penalize any vessel owned by a private
Congress established the Foreign Claims of 1949 to provide for the determination shipping interest which permits any
Settlement Commission to adjudicate of the amounts of claims of nationals of ship under its control to carry cargoes
claims by U.S. citizens against foreign the United States against the Chinese to or from North Vietnam.
countries which have seized their prop- Communist regime, introduced by Mr. The bill I am introducing today would
erty. DODD, was received, read twice by its title, do just that. From the time it becomes
During the past 15 years, the Foreign and referred to the ommittee on For- law, the proposal would prohibit the use
Claims Settlement Commission and its eign Relations. of American ports to the ships of any
private interest which allowed any of its
predecessors have made awards to claim- vessels to traffic with the North Viet-
ants from funds available as part of set- SANCTIONS AGAINST SHIPPING namese.
Bulgaria. . COMPANIES TRADING WITH This, it seems to me, is the very least
dement s with Poland, the United Rumania, and States by Yugo-
slaves, NORTH VIETNAM this Nation could do to punish those who
In other cases, where no settlement on
claims, has been reached between the Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I intro- continue to seek profits at the possible
United States and the expropriating na- duce, for appropriate reference, a bill cost of spilling American blood on Viet-
tion, Congress has empowered the Com- designed to discourage and bring sane- namese soil.
mission to determine the validity and tions against shipping companies The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will
amount of U'.S. citizens' claims against throughout the free world which persist be received and appropriately referred.
the expropriating country anyway, but in trading with North Vietnam. The bill (S. 2485) to amend the Mer-
payment of the claims has been made It is high time, Mr. President, that chant Marine Act, 1920, to prohibit
only from assets of the foreign govern- such companies realize the full extent transportation of articles to or from the
ment in, the possession of the United and implications of the situation in United States aboard certain foreign ves-
States. which we are engaged in Vietnarm sels, and for other purposes, introduced
No. 161-14
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 21734
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 1, 1965
by Mr. BAYH, was received, read twice by
its title, and referred to the Committee
on Commerce,
HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965--
AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENT NO` 429
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I submit
an amendment to section VII of the
Higher Education Act .of 1965 (H.R.
9567), which is scheduled to be con-
sidered by the Senate tomorrow.
The Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1965-Public Law,89-117.- estab-?
lished an interest rate ceiling on college
housing of 3 percent. My amendment
applies the same formula to loans made
under title III of the Higher Education.
Facilities Act of 1963-Pubjic Law 88-
204. The amendment is-effective after
enactment of the Higher Education Act.
Presently loans are charged an interest
rate of 37/8 percent; $120 million was
appropriated for these loans for the cur-
rent fiscal year.
My amendment therefore would
equalize the interest rate charged for
construction of classrooms and other
college facilities with that now charged
for dormitory rooms and college housing.
The Office of Education informs me that
it has no objection to the amendment.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The amend-
ment will be received, printed, and will
lie on the table.
AMENDMENT NO.. 430
Mr. MILLER submitted an amend-
ment, intended to be proposed by him,
to House bill 9567, the Higher Education
Act of 1965, which was ordered to lie on
the table and to be printed.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILKS
Mr: MOSS. Mr. President, at their
next printing, I ask unanimous consent
that the names ofthe following Senators
be added as cosponsors of the following
bills and resolution:
S. 1883, Mr. FANNIN.
S. 2430, Mr. FONG and Mr. INOUYE.
S. 2435, Mr. TYDINGS.
Senate Resolution 121, Mr. HARTKE and
Mr. MILLER.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent that at the next printing
of S. 2478, a bill to give consent to three
additional States to enter into a compact
for bus taxation proration and reciproc-
ity, the name of the Senator from Con-
necticut [Mr. RlslcoFF] be added as a
sponsor.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
CHANGE IN HEARING DATE ON
CRITICAL WATER PROBLEM
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, pre-
viously I had announced that the Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs
would hold a hearing on September 9 on
the critical water problem in the North-
east.
The date has been changed to Sep-
tember 8 due to an unavoidable conflict
in committee activity.
The hearing will be held in room 3110
of the New Senate Office Building, and it
is our purpose to hear Secretary of the
Interior Udall, serving in his capacity as
Chairman of the Water Resources Coun-
cil, who will inform the committee on
the current scope of Federal activity in
assisting the States which have suffered
due to the drought in the Northeast.
NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON SENATE
BILL 2049
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, as
chairman of the Subcommittee on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery, I wish
to announce that hearings will be held
by the subcommittee on S. 2049, a meas-
ure to realine the counties comprising
the territory of the U.S. district courts for
the eastern and western districts of Okla-
homa.
The hearings are scheduled for Sep-
tember 9 at 10 a.m. in room 6226 of the
New Senate Office Building. Any person
who wishes to testify or submit state-
ments pertaining to this measure should
contact the Subcommittee on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery.
ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTI-
CLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE
APPENDIX
On request, and by unanimous con-
sent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc.,
were ordered to be, printed in the Ap-
pendix, as follows:
By Mr. COTTON:
Editorial entitled "Twenty Years of Ecu-
menicism," dealing with the Cathedral of
the Pines at Rindge, N.H., which has ob-
served Its 20th anniversary.
THE SALE OF WHEAT AND THE BAL-
ANCE OF PAYMENTS
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, to-
day the United States has a vast surplus
stock of wheat.
Today the United States continues to
lose its already heavily diminished stock
of gold.
In that this Nation now has less than
$24 billion of gold, and owes abroad, pri-
marily to foreign central banks, over $28
billion of current liabilities redeemable
in gold, the problem is obvious.
One way to help solve the said prob-
lem would be to follow the precedent set
by many other countries of the free
world-Argentina, Australia, Canada,
France-and sell wheat for gold to cus-
tomers behind the Iron Curtain.
In that connection, I ask unanimous
consent to have printed at this point in
the RECORD an editorial entitled "Russian
Deals Brighten U.S. Wheat Outlook,"
published in the Kansas City Times of
August 17, 1965.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
RUSSIAN DEALS BRIGHTEN U.S. WHEAT
OurLOOK
The wheat market outlook in the United
States was made suddenly brighter by Cana-
dian and Argentine sales to the Soviet Union.
This is true even though the United States
was not included in the deals. This country
now stands as the only potential exporter of
wheat with a large surplus for sale.
We have no way of know whether Russia or
the satellites will want more wheat and
might be forced to come to the United States
for it. But if such should be the case, this
country should be in a position to sell if it
is considered expedient at the time. This
would require the elimination of the provi-
sion that half of any wheat sold to the So-
viet bloc must be carried in U.S. vessels which
charge freight rates higher than foreign ves-
sels. This single factor would cut the
United States out of the Russian cash mar-
ket. It does nothing whatever to prevent
the Soviets from buying wheat elsewhere.
But whether a single bushel is sold to the
Soviet bloc, the United States has a greater
opportunity than before to supply markets
any place else in the world.
It is axiomatic that any industry that has
an ample supply of its product on hand, im-
mediately available to be delivered to a cus-
tomer at a competitive price, is in a position.
to do business. That is the U.S. position to-
day. At this particular time we have an ad-
vantage over other exporting countries in the
world.
Canada has a lot of wheat, or will have
after this summer's harvest. But it appar-
ently has sold or has commitments to sell all
that it can deliver before next May. Aus-
tralia has ceased exporting wheat until it de-
termines what the winter harvest will be.
Currently, that country's wheat prospects
are not too promising. Argentina has ap-
parently sold to its limits its winter harvest.
The United States has harvested a big crop
to add to a substantial carryover.
Even before the big Russian purchases, the
dollar export market for U.S. wheat has been
good this summer, but additional sales have
been made to Western Europe and Japan in
the last few days. Wheat exports are larger
thus for this marketing year than the grain
trade had expected and are larger than at
this time last year. If demand from abroad
continues strong, U.S. sales should continue
to grow.
In 1963 the maritime unions and some ship
owners were successful In getting the ad-
ministration to invoke the rule requiring the
use of American ships to haul grain to Rus-
sian. Only by extra subsidy gimmicks was it
possible then for this country to make two
important sales. We submit, however, that
if a principle is involved in selling to Russia,
the principle is not altered by charging
higher freight rates. Actually, the effect is
to leave the Russian market open to all other
countries and the American vessels haul no
wheat.
Looking to the rest of the world, U.S. dollar
sales are handled by the private grain trade.
These are firms in the business of trading to
make money. The more they can sell, the
greater the profits. We have no suggestion
for a better system of stimulating trade. In
fact, in support of the free enterprise system
we might refer to the fact that Russia with
its controlled economy must buy wheat-it
was once an exporter. The United States
still is an exporter and by exporting it not
only strengthens its own economy but fur-
ther relieves the balance-of-payments prob-
lem which has by no means been solved.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
also ask unanimous consent that an edi-
torial entitled "Wheat Exports Lost,"
published in the Des MoinesRegister of
August 25, 1965, be printed at this point
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
VIETNAM: NARROWING THE ISSUES
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
fighting in Vietnam is unabated. Mili-
tary engagements intensify. Casualties
on all sides increase. The streams of
refugees rise. The extent of the devasta-
tion wrought is not known but it is ob-
viously immense. Indeed, the costs of
the heightened conflict in Vietnam al-
ready dwarf the billion-dollar develop-
ment program for the Mekong project in
southeast Asia which was suggested by
President Johnson in a speech in April
at Johns Hopkins University.
The President did not want it that way.
At Johns Hopkins, he stated emphatical-
ly his preference for peace. He has since
emphasized it at every opportunity. He
offered then, and he has offered again
and again, to enter into "unconditional
discussions," in an effort to bring the war
to an end. These appeals for negotia-
tion, unfortunately, have either been ig
nored, dismissed with derision, or other-
wise rejected. The efforts of various
intermediary nations to initiate negotia-
tions-efforts which have been endorsed
by the United States-have met a simi-
lar fate. These attempts, in short, have
all drawn a blank.
It might be concluded, therefore, that
Hanoi and the Vietcong have no interest
whatsoever in negotiating peace. As if to
reinforce this conclusion, Ho Chi Minh
has talked in terms of a 20-year war. It
would appear, then, that Hanoi is de-
termined to continue the military strug-
gle until the United States is driven into
'the sea. But the President has made
clear that we will not permit that to hap-
pen and it will not happen.
There the matter stands. Hanoi and
the Southern Liberation Front insist that
they will not desist from the struggle
and we will not yield. Is there, then, no
alternative but it trial by arms in the
3-, 5-, or 10-year conflict which is pro-
jected by some of our own officials or
the 20-year war which was mentioned by
Ho Chi Minh?
Hanoi has indeed talked of a 20-year
war. But from that same city there has
also come talk of the conditions on which
the war might end. Hanoi stated these
conditions for peace in a radio broadcast
on April 12, 1965, in response to the Pres-
ident's Johns Hopkins speech. The con-
ditions were underscored subsequently by
Peiping and by Moscow. From these an-
nouncements, it would appear that ne-
gotiations to end the conflict are feasible,
insofar as Hanoi is concerned, on the
basis of these four conditions.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that these conditions be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the condi-
tions were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
1. That the rights of the Vietnamese
people-peace, independence, sovereignty,
unity, territorial integrity-on the basis of
the Geneva agreements are recognized;
2. That the division of Vietnam into two
zones will continue, pending peaceful reuni-
fication and 'that there will be no foreign
military alliances, bases, or troop personnel
in connection with either zone;
3. That the internal affairs of South Viet-
nam will be determined by the South Viet-
namese people themselves alone in accord-
ance with the National Liberation Front
program and without any foreign inter-
ference;
4. That the peaceful 'reunification of Viet-
nam will be settled eventually by the
Vietnamese people themselves in both zones
and without foreign interference.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
cite these conditions which have been set
forth by Hanoi because it is important
that we do not assume that we are en-
gaged in Vietnam against a group or a
government which has no objective ex-
cept warfare for the sake of warfare.
On the contrary, it would appear that the
leaders in Hanoi and the Southern Lib-
eration Front and their allies in Peiping
and their supporters in Moscow have a
very clear idea of why they fight and, in
the four points to which I have referred,
of the conditions on which they will cease
fighting.
In a similar fashion, while some U.S.
officials have suggested, as noted, that
we are engaged in a 3-, 5-, or 10-year
war, the President has also spoken of
peace and the great desirability of re-
storing it as quickly as possible in Viet-
nam. There are conditions on which we,
too, would be prepared to see this conflict
terminated, although there may still be
confusion both at home and abroad as to
what these conditions may be.
To be sure, there have been pronounce-
ments from various sources and in gen-
eral terms, about ending aggression from
the north. There has been talk of aid-
ing the South Vietnamese Government as
long as our aid is sought. There have
been individual views of why we fight
expressed in the press, in Congress and
in the departments of the Government.
But with all due respect there could be
set forth, cohesively, even now, the basic
conditions which U.S. policy regards as
essential to peace in Vietnam. Such con-
ditions do exist. They can be distilled
from President Johnson's many state-
ments on Vietnam and other official pro-
nouncements. And it may be useful at
this time to set them forth, once again,
in cohesive form. A clarification on this
point may not only be helpful to public
understanding; it may also be a spur to
the initiation of negotiations.
In any event, the Communists have
not alone set forth the conditions for
peace in Vietnam. We have also done
so even though they may not be fully
understood. Given the degree of Amer-
ican involvement and sacrifice, we, too,
have the right and responsibility to de-
fine again and again as concisely and as
clearly as possible, the basic conditions
for peace in that nation, as we see them.
Indeed, it may be-and certainly, it is
to be hoped-that the clear juxtaposition
of the two sets of conditions for peace
may lead to the "unconditional discus-
sions" .which are properly and urgently
sought as a means of bringing this bitter
and brutal struggle to an end.
When the official statements of the
policy of the United States of the past
few months are examined, it would ap-
pear to me that these conditions for
peace in Vietnam have , already been
identified by the President and his prin-
21739
ciple spokesmen during the past few
months:
First. There must be a verified choice
by the people of South Vietnam of their
own government-a choice free of ter-
rorism, violence, and coercion from any
quarter. In this connection, the Presi-
dent clearly stated at Johns Hopkins:
We want nothing for ourselves-only that
the people of South Vietnam be allowed to
guide their own country in their own way.
Second. There can be a future for
South Vietnam either in independence
or as a part of a unified Vietnam on the
basis of a peaceful, free, and verified ex-
pression of the wish of the people in each
segment of that region and in general
accord with the Geneva agreements. In
a press conference on July 28, the Presi-
dent gave emphasis to this point when
he said :
We insist and we will always insist that
the people of South Vietnam shall have the
right of choice, the right to shape their own
destiny in free elections in the South, or
throughout all Vietnam under international
supervision.
Third. There shall be a withdrawal of
all foreign forces and bases throughout
Vietnam, north, and south, provided
peace can be reestablished and provided
the arrangements for peace include ade-
quate international guarantees of non-
interference, not only for Vietnam, but
for Laos and for Cambodia as well. This
point was underscored by Secretary Mc-
Namara on June 16 when he said:
The United States has no designs whatso-
ever on the territory or the resources of
southeast Asia or any country in it. Our
national interests do not require that we
introduce military bases for our forces in
southeast Asia. They don't require that the
states of southeast Asia become members of
Western military alliances. The ultimate
goal of our country, therefore, in southeast
Asia is to help maintain free and independ-
ent nations there in which the people can
develop politically, economically, and socially,
according to patterns of their own choosing,
and with the objective of becoming respon-
sible members of the world family of nations.
Further, we are parties to the Geneva
accord of 1962 which is designed to
achieve essentially these ends in Laos
and we have expressed our willingness
to join in a resumption of a Geneva con-
ference for the purpose of considering in-
ternational guarantees of the independ-
ence, integrity, and borders of the King-
dom of Cambodia.
To these three basic conditions of
peace, I would add two corollaries which
all of us must realize are obviously es-
sential if peace in Vietnam is to be
reached via the operations of negotiation
rather than through the exhaustion of
war.
I can say, on the basis of my confer-
ences with the President on this matter,
that the following two points have al-
ways reflected his viewpoint, and do so
now:
First. There needs to be provision for
a secure amnesty for those involved in
the struggle on all sides in Vietnam as
an essential block to an extension of the
barbarism and atrocities of the struggle
into the subsequent peace and, indeed,
as an essential of that peace. _
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 1, 1965
Second. There needs to be a willing-
ness to accept, on all sides, a cease-fire
and standfast throughout all Vietnam,
which might well coincide with the. ini-
tiation of negotiations.
President Johnson has,made it clear,
time and again, that we seek no larger
war. He has made It clear, time and
again, that we do not have any territo-
rial, or military, or other claim whatso-
ever in Vietnam. He has said, time and
again, that our only purpose is to help
the South Vietnamese people to secure
their own future, freefrom coercion. He
has said, time and again, that we are pre-
pared for unconditional discussions with
anyone, anywhere, to bring about peace.
From that policy, as it has been enun-
ciated and as it is quoted, It would seem
to me entirely valid to distill American
conditions for peace- along the lines
which have been enumerated.
To be sure, others may brush aside
these conditions, even as we tend to do
the same with respect to the conditions
which they have set forth. Hanoi may
reach, via an automatic reflex, the con-
clusion that these conditions, since they
originate in the United States, can only
mean domination of South Vietnam by
ourselves and those whom we support.
And, in all frankness, we are prone to a
converse conclusion, via the same reflex,
with respect to theconditions which are
suggested from Hanoi. The reflex of
mistrust and disbelief is understandable.
But unless the military conflict is to ex-
pand and to continue into the indefinite
future, whether it be 3, 5,10, or 20 years
of war, the degree of accuracy of these
automatic. reflexes must be tested in ne-
gotiations.
The high purpose of negotiations, if
they can be initiated, should be to see to
It that the conditions of peace wherever
they may originate come to mean In
fact and in detail the domination of the
Vietnamese people themselves over their
future. Beyond other considerations,
this conflict involves primarily their
country, their lives, their children. It is
the Vietnamese people, north and south,
who suffer most from its devastating and
tragic consequences. And in the end it
is they who should have the right to de-
termine the shape of the Nation in which
they live. That is where negotiations can
lead. That is where the President wants
them to lead. That is where they must
lead, if there is ever to be a valid peace
in Vietnam.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator has just made an historic and most
vital pronouncement.
1 .wish that every one, of the Senators
entitled to sit in tile. Chamber had been
here to bear it. We should constantly
reiterate, in terms that cannot conceiv-
ably be misunderstood anywhere on
earth, not only our willingness to, nego-
tiate, but also our willingness to negoti-
ate on fair conditions and the fact that
we are not opinionated.
The best thing that the Senator said,
and I know that he speaksmost authori-
tatively, is that we will look with an un-
prejudiced eye on suggestions and ideas,
no matter where they come from, once
we are at the table of peace-which is
the negotiating table.
I welcome the statement of the Senator
warmly. I think it should mean a great
deal tq.._the millions._ of people in our
country who thoroughly back what is
being done in that part of the world, but
who, at the same time, are unhappy
about the fact that we have to do it with
the resulting casualties in a time of rela-
tive peace in the world. This situation is
a tragic thing in the hearts of all
Americans.
I am grateful to the majority leader.
I hope that he will speak out again and
again and make It crystal clear, in the
highest forum of the land, in the hope
that America will remain not only strong
and unhrmpered by anything that has
occurred, but that we will also intelli-
gently and reasonably work toward and
implement a solution of the. problem In
the way in which the majority leader has
just suggested.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
thank the senior Senator from New York.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I congratu-
late the majority leader on his speech,
which so clearly defines the issues that
exist between us and the Communists in
southeast Asia.
I find myself nearly always in agree-
ment with the views, wisdom, and esti-
mates of the future expressed by our
majority leader.
I call the attention of the Senate to
the service which the Senator from Mon-
tana rendered in delivering his speech
sometime back when the talk of negotia-
tion was not. quite as much in vogue as it
is now, and in which he suggested that
we ought to give thought to reconven-
ing of the Geneva Conference under the
leadership of the cochairmen, the British
and the Soviets.
I believe that the speech which the
Senator made then has had a real im-
pact in determining our course. One may
use the. phrase that it was an effort to
descalate the conflict.
In this connection, I am among those
who completely support President John-
son in the thrust of his present foreign
policy in the Far East and, specifically,
in South Vietnam. However, I am also
among those who would oppose uni-
lateral escalation into the north, and in-
deed have some concern and doubt as, to
the effect of our course there. In gen-
eral, I find that President Johnson's pol-
icies reflect completely, to my mind, the
requirements of the situation and the ob-
jectives of our foreign, policy, which are
peace and freedom. I find myself in full,
100-percent support of those objectives.
We must realize, in the sense of his-
tory, that the Chinese and Vietnamese
under Communist leadership have used
time as the fourth dimension in the prac-
tice of warfare. They used it very suc-
cessfully in. their struggle against the
French in Vietnam in the past. It is
only when we accept the reality of time
as the fourth dimension of warfare and
are willing to face the prospects of a long
war and a long holding position that we
find the ground suddenly becomes more
fertile to talk of negotiations. Until we
reach that stage of willingness to accept
time as the fourth dimension in warfare,
our efforts to reach the?conference table
may lack success as seen from the frame-
work of history.
Our majority leader has knowledge of
the Far East and a sense of history there,
both beyond parallel in the Senate today.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
express my deepest thanks to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Rhode Island,
with-whom I had an opportunity to visit
South Vietnam and other, areas of south-
east Asia a few years ago, as a result of
which visit, we were able, along with the
Senator from Delaware [Mr._B000S], to
issue a report which I think would stand
up even today.
May I say, speaking for the President,
that no one is more interested concern-
ing,what is happening in Vietnam than
is the man-in the White House.
I do have, conferences with him one
way or the other almost every day. This
is the main topic of conversation. I
know how he feels about it. I know of
the many avenues that he has traveled
in his attempts to seek a way out of the
impasse in which we find ourselves.
Not only does it take up every waking
moment of his time, but a good bit of his
sleeping time as well. I think we are
extremely fortunate to have in the White
House a man who has this forward view,
a man who is interested in trying to
bring about a just settlement, a man who
has the welfare of the people at heart,
a man who has this responsibility to
shoulder and who is doing the best he
can, with all the wisdom he has, to bring
about a just and lasting conclusion to
the struggle in which we are engaged.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to
add to the splendid colloquy which has
just taken place with respect to Vietnam
that I share that solicitude and concern,
and I share what the Senator from
Rhode Island has had to say about es-
calation and the concern of the Ameri-
can people with respect to that. I have
urged speaking to the people through
Congress by means of a resolution simi-
lar to the resolution adopted in August
of last year, which is now obsolete.
These are manifestations of a dynamic
fredom and do not represent one with
a lessening of American determination
to proceed solidly.
It is very important that people in
Asia, and everywhere in the world,
should not misunderstand our country
because of its many representations that
it desires peace,. The determination of
this country stands unimpaired because
of our soul searching to find a means for
peace, in which the President has been
leading us. It should be understood that
nothing will stop us in our efforts to ar-
rive at a fair and just conclusion, but
that it is conditioned by the President's
determination. I hope very much that
these efforts are not misunderstood as in-
dicating an irresolution on our part. It
would be most unfortunate if those who
do not understand us made that impli-
cation.
So I welcome this historic statement
by the Senator from Montana [Mr.
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September 1, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
MANSFIELD]. It seems to me that what
the Senator has said should be said
often. Our willingness to negotiate
should be known and we should welcome
efforts and suggestions, no matter where
they come from, s to ow this grave
struggle may be brought to an end.
THE IMPORTANCE OF BACKING
AMERICA'S STAND IN VIETNAM
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, the
national commander in chief of the Vet-
erans of Foreign Wars of the United
States, Mr. John A. Jenkins, is a dis-
tinguished attorney in Birmingham, Ala.
He is also a close friend of many Mem-
bers of this Senate, including myself.
During his year as commander in chief
of the VFW, "Buck" Jenkins has worked
tirelessly in the interests of our Nation's
security. One of the reasons his opinions
are so eagerly sought on defense matters
is that he has personally visited many of
the trouble spots of the world.
"Buck" Jenkins was recently in South
Vietnam, where he visited our troops in
the forested highlands, the base at Da
Nang, and the beachhead at Chu Lai.
Commander Jenkins reported to his
fellow citizens in Birmingham a few days
ago when he addressed the Birmingham
Rotary Club.
Because he is so knowledgeable in the
matter, his observations as to why our
policy in Vietnam is correct are particu-
larly noteworthy. His address before the
Birmingham Rotary Club was the subject
of a fine editorial in the Birmingham
News on July 26, 1965.
In view of the importance of what
VFW Commander in Chief Jenkins said,
I ask unanimous consent to have the edi-
torial printed In the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Birmingham (Ala.) News]
BATTLE'S FOUGHT AT HOME, Too
The Importance of firm backing by the
American people of this country's stand in
Vietnam has been stated many times by
many people. Few have stated it more elo-
quently than John A. "Buck" Jenkins of
Birmingham, who is the national commander
in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
Addressing the Birmingham Rotary Club
last week, Jenkins did not indulge in empty
oratory for oratory's sake. He spoke directly
to the point: As leaders of the free world,
Americans cannot turn their backs on "the
problems and worries of the world," can't
"abrogate and forget these obligations and
responsibilities."
The fact is that if the United States of
America is . not willing and able to stand
in defense of freedom-however onerous the
burden seems-then the precarious thread
by which freedom hangs may be strained
to the breaking point by those who seek to
replace human liberty with state tyranny.
The U.S. Government recognizes this obli-
gation and in Vietnam is acting upon it.
For the United States to back out now,
Jenkins said, would be like "a general walk-
ing off and leaving his troops in the field."
For America 'to stay and do what is neces-
sary is impossible without the full backing,
in full understanding of what is involved,
of the American people.
The organization Jenkins heads is com-
posed of men who have a most direct stake
No. 161-15
in freedom's preservation: Those who liave
gone abroad to fight this country's battles
in its behalf.
There is a war being fought in Vietnam by
soldiers who are asked to bleed and die if
necessary. The war also must be fought on
the homefront through commitment of the
American people and readiness on their part
to make the kind of sacrifices which Buck
Jenkins reminded Rotarians are a concomit-
ant to preservation of freedom. The sacri-
fices we at home might be asked to make are
small in comparison with those asked of
our men in freedom's frontlines, but they
are not insignificant. They are just as im-
portant to ultimate victory.
REPORT ON THE U.S. PARTICIPA-
TION IN THE XXXII VENICE
BIENNALE 1964
.Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the
Venice Biennale has for 60 years been
an important international exhibition of
modern art. The 32d Venice Biennale of
1964 was particularly significant. For,
in the past, American artists had been
only sparsely represented, but at this
exhibition, the U.S. Government, acting
through the U.S. Information Agency,
sponsored and greatly enlarged the
American selection. Permission was
enthusiastically granted by the directors
of the festival to have created an annex
devoted exclusively to the works of
American artists " This had never be-
fore been done; yet, the American col-
lection was widely felt to be the highlight
of the entire show. Perhaps the most
significant occurrence was the awarding
of the International Grand Prize in
painting to an American, Robert
Rauschenberg; no American had ever
been so honored.
I have received a report from Alan, F.
Solomon, the U.S. Commissioner to the
32d Venice Biennale. Mr. Solomon
chose the American selection and also
directed its presentation. His report
presents his views as U.S. Commissioner
as to the significance of the festiv :leas
well as its implications for the future.
I ask unanimous consent that the
report be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the report
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
REPORT ON THE AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN
THE 32D VENICE BIENNALE 1964
It was without a doubt a happy historical
accident that the American Government,
through the USIA, took over the official
sponsorship of the American representation
for the Venice Blennale at precisely the
moment when Europe was ready to turn
with enthusiasm and sympathy to American
art, and to accept it as a major international
cultural force.
In the 60-year history -of the Biennale no
American painter had ever won the first
International Prize; through most of this
period art had been dominated by the
School of Paris, and its ascendency was ha-
bitually acknowledged in Venice and
elsewhere.
When I was given the chance to select this
exhibition I accepted with great excitement
because of the opportunity it clearly pro-
vided for introducing on a broad scale to an
already anticipatory European audience the
vitality and creative energy marking the
American, generation which has grown up
since the Second World War.
Those of us who were familiar with the
history of modern art and involved in con-
temporary developments already knew that
the School of Paris had declined since 1945,
after 150 years of predominance in world
art, and we knew that the only new progres-
sive impulse had come out of Americans,
commencing at about the same time. For
the first time in history, we had not one, but
two consecutive generations of artists who
were genuine innovators, and did not derive
indirectly from European precedents.
Even in more recent years, when American
art has been less provincial, our representa-
tion in Venice was limited by the small size
of the American Pavilion, originally built
under private auspices, and more recently
the property of the Museum of Modern Art
in New York.
In the light of the possibilities of an im-
posing American representation at the Bi-
ennale, I went to Venice in November 1963,
with Lois Bingham of USIA and Michael
Barjansky of USIS Rome. From the first,
we were greeted with a spirit of great en-
thusiasm and cooperation by the officials of
the Biennale, both because of the new fact
of U.S. Government participation, and be-
cause of the prospect of an exciting and
pathfinding American exhibition. (It should
be pointed out that the recent decline of
European art had been reflected in the Venice
Biennale, which was losing its traditional
reputation as a rallying point for modern art,
and about which there had already been
predictions of decline and actual demise.
This also accounted to a certain degree for
the official enthusiasm toward us.)
We asked the biennale for additional space
for our exhibition, but there was none avail-
able on the grounds. They accepted in prin-
ciple the idea of a precedent setting annex
outside the grounds to make a larger Ameri-
can exhibition possible, and showed us a
number of potential sites, including aban-
doned churches, the prison of the Doges, and
the gambling casino, which is empty during
the summer. For various reasons, none of
these was appropriate, and we finally ar-
ranged to use the empty American Consulate.
The preview week made the effect of the
American exhibition and its success abun-
dantly clear. We gave two preview parties,
partly under the auspices of the sponsoring
Jewish Museum, the first for the press and
the artists, and the second, under the
auspices of the Ambassador and Mrs. Rein-
hardt, for local officials and other guests.
In everyone's account, these occasions were
the high point of the week, in terms of public
enthusiasm and response.
Meanwhile the jury (two Italians, an Amer-
ican for the first time, a Brazilian, a Pole,
a Swiss, and a Dutch representative) met,
and as we were subsequently informed, from
the first felt the clear superiority of the
American contingent. They voted to give
the International Grand Prize in painting
to an American, Robert Rauschenberg.
The effect of the prize was extraordinary,
not only because it had gone to an American
for the first time, but also because it had
gone to an artist in his late thirties, and not,
as it usually did, to a much older man. Fur-
thermore, Rauschenberg was in midcareer,
and the prize implied an acknowledgement of
youth and not achievement in the past, as it
had previously. Young artists were pro-
foundly moved by this acknowledgement of
youth and fresh new directions. To others,
the prize (this one and the others granted
were, it seemed to me, closer to the con-
sensus of the international art audience
gathered in Venice at the time than any prev-
ious awards within recent memory) seemed
to mark the revitalization of the Venice
Biennale, and the restoration of its prestige
as an accurate mirror of present conditions.
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21742 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 1, 1965
There were, of course, others who were
displeased with the result. These included
the critics from the popular press, and he
members of the art community more com-
mitted to the old than to the new. Another
intense reaction came from the Frerich
critics; it was triggered by a public statement
I made to the effect that "it is acknowledged
on every hand that New York has replaced
Paris as the world art capital.." Although
this is a generally understood fact,- the re-
mark upset the French in the context of the
critical and official Indifference to their own
pavilion. After the biennale, the Paris press
was full of indignation, hysteria, and later,
soul searching about the situation in French
art. To me the high point of this hysteria
was the allegation in the newspaper Arts
that the Americans and the Communists
had conspired together against the French.
Quite without our intending it, the American
exhibition had the effect of making dramat-
ically apparent the end (temporarily at least)
of 150 years of 'French dominance of art.
In the Italian and other European press
there was an extraordinary response to the
American show, anid it received about 90 per-
cent of the blennale press coverage (the li-
ennale officials good naturedly objected
about this to me). There were extensive
color spreads in five or six major magazines,
and hundreds of columns of text and plc-
tures in the papers.
For the most part, the exhibition, while
it generated all this excitement, was mis-
understood by the press, which described the
biennale as a takeover of Europe by Ameri-
can pop art, despite the fact that neither I
nor any of the artists participating consider
their work to be pop art (I had made a point
of this in the selection of the exhibition).
This kind of reaction is understandable and
predictable, since new developments in art
have experienced similar problems for the
past 150 years, because It takes time for the
public to understand the unfamiliar new ob-
jectives of artists.
Since our exhibition was arranged to show
the major new Indigenous tendencies, the
peculiarly American spirit of the art is
wholly unfamiliar to the European audience,
and it therefore requires exposure to com-
pletely new experiences and modes of un-
derstanding, toward which I feel we took an
Important step on this occasion. The in-
tense press response and the public reaction
of, bewilderment bring to mind what hap-
pened in America just 50 years ago, when we
were shocked out of our provincial isola-
tion by the 1913 armory show In New York,
which opened our eyes to the 20th century
art of Europe and Paris in particular. I do
not feel that it would be Immodest to as-
sert that we have done for Europe in the
82d biennale what the armory show did for
Us.
On the other hand, the response of the in-
formed public, the professional critics and
artists was touching and impressive. Many
of them sought us out during the preview
week and later during the summer to ex-
press their astonishment at the vitality and
authority of the young Americans. For ex-
ample, Werner Haftmann, a distinguished
German scholar, told me it was the most Im-
pressive biennale exhibition he had ever
seen. Antonioni, the prizewinning Italian
filmmaker, became so enthusiastic that he
asked about working with several of our
artists, and subsequently invited Oldenburg
to design sets for a projected film.
Santoinaso, one of the best known of the
older Italian painters, who lives in Venice,
spent the summer proselytizing among vis-
itors for the new American art, which he
feels shows Europe the way out of its present
cultural dilemma, Music, a mature painter
from Yugoslavia, who was regarded as one of
the most important world artists in the
fifties, told me that his whole vision as an
artist had been altered in 30 seconds when
he first saw our exhibition. He had wintered
in Paris for 15 years, but his life there no
longer interested him; this year he is coming
to New York.
The Individuals I have mentioned all have
some direct experience of the 'United States,
and
which'nOartlthe ' ot exherIains hand, their ra_ o
both~nrt with ith and
art.
elsewhere in Europe where I visited during
the summer, Paris, London, Holland, I was
always approached by young artists who awe-
somely asked personal questions about our
artists, and then intensely pursued their
major preoccupation: How to get to New
York.
A number of individuals in government
played important parts in the project:' One
employee of USIS in Rome, an Italian named
Giordano Falzoni, made invaluable contri-
butions to our success, as sympatheic liaison
with the Italians, and as someone with un-
derstanding and experience of the American
situation. I would like to point out that the
energy and resourcefulness of USIS London,
which had nothing to do with the exhibition,
was most impressive; Francis Mason took ad-
vantage of the presence of the exhibition in
Europe to arrange an important show in
London for one of the artists, Jasper Johns.
One other ipdivtdual requires special men-
tion, Geoffry Groff-Smith, of VSIS Trieste,
who was enormously helpful with local ar-
rangements in Venice. Intelligent, dedicated
to his job, efficient and reliable, he is a man
whose value to its in Italy cannot be over-
estimated.
Apart from these Government people, I am
deeply obliged to the staff of The Jewish
Museum, New York, and to Mrs. Alice M.
Denney, of. Washington, D.C., for her impor-
tant contributions as assistant director of the
If Government support of the biennale
continues, and I earnestly believe it should,
since there is no more effective and dramatic
way of communicating to the Europeans the
level of our artistic activity, the problem of
an adequate pavilion must be confronted.
I believe it would be a serious error to be-
come involved in an annex again in Venice,
as the details of our experience make quite
clear.
We need a new pavilion, not simply be-
cause it would be desirable to have more
space, but also in the interest of our na-
tional image, and our concern for cultural
matters, since many smaller countries have
far more imposing structures. Beyond this,
the present space simply cannot serve to do
the job properly, considering the trouble
and expense involved.
On my own initiative I began exploring
the problem of a new pavilion a year ago. I
would be happy to communicate the infor-
mation I have gathered, about local site prob-
lems, local regulations, building conditions,
etc., to anyone interested in pursuing it. I
would like to point out that Philip Johnson,
one of America's most celebrated architects,
and an ardent advocate of the new American
art, has expressed to me his willingness to
volunteer his services for the design of a new
pavilion under appropriate circumstances.
By the measure of direct political expedi-
ency or the measure of popular antagonism
toward new developments in the arts it
would be easy to discount the importance
and the impact of the American exhibition
in the 32d Venice Biennale, apart from the
important evidence of the Rauschenberg
prize and the other less tangible effects I
have attempted to define. However, I feel
that the exhibition was one of the most im-
portant enterprises undertaken on the cul-
tural level by our Government in Europe
since the war.
I would like to say most emphatically that
I attribute this success not to my own in-
volvement, but to the courage and foresight
of Robert Sivard and Lois Bingham of the
Exhibits Division of USIA. Setting aside
their own personal prejudices, and fully
aware of the risks they might run, they un-
derstood, with a great deal of comprehension
of the present cultural situation, the impor-
tance of taking a bold and decisive position.
By- giving me complete esthetic freedom in
the exhibition, they have made possible an
affirmation of America's new leadership in
world art, the positive ramifications of which
will be felt for a long time to come.
ALAN R. SOLOMON,
V.S. Commissioner.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, as
in executive session, I report, from the
Committee on Post Office and Civil Serv-
ice, the nomination of Lawrence Fran-
cis O'Brien to be Postmaster General.
I ask unanimous consent for the im-
mediate consideration of the nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JoR-
DAN of Idaho in the chair). Is there
objection?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider executive business.
Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, the
Committee on Post Office and Civil Serv-
ice, by unanimous vote of those present
and those voting by proxy, this morning
voted to recommend the immediate con-
firmation of the nomination of Lawrence
F. O'Brien, of Massachusetts, to be Post-
master General.
Mr. O'Brien is well known to many
Members of the Senate. His nomination.
was approved without any opposition..
No witness testified in opposition to it.
The committee was unanimous in its de-
cision that the confirmation of the nomi-
nation should go forward forthwith.
Mr. O'Brien's dedication and public
service and knowledge of public affairs
are known to many of its.
POSTMASTER GENERAL
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
nomination will be stated by the clerk.
The legislative clerk read the nomi-
nation of Lawrence Francis O'Brien, of
Massachusetts, to be Postmaster General.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the present consideration of
the nomination?
Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, reserv-?
ing the right to object--and I shall not
object-as has been stated by the dis-
tinguished chairman of the Committee
on Post Office and Civil Service, Mr.
O'Brien appeared before the committee,
and after hearing and interrogation by
members of the committee, his nomina--
was unanimously approved.
As ranking minority member of the
committee, I am not only pleased by the
nomination, but I am most pleased that
the President submitted his nomination.
I have one more thing to mention. :i
hope the nomination of Mr. Gronouski
will be before the Senate for confirma-
tion, In order that the nomination may
be cleared without too much of a lapse
between. the time he was named and
action on his nomination.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, :i
wish to join the chairman of the com-
mittee and the ranking minority mem-
ber of the committee. There is not much
I can add, except to say that in my
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