SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000100140001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1956
• Content Type: OPEN

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIA.R,Y
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
JUNE 8, 11, AND 29, 1956
PART 29
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
72723 WASHINGTON : 1957
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COMMITTEE ON THE J'JDICIARY
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Missies ppl, Chairman
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee 'ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina ' WILMA VI LANG ER, North Dakota
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., Missouri ,WILLIA VI B. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
PRICE DANIEL, Texas EEVEREIT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming HERMAN WELKER, Idaho
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMIN [STRATTON OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, MississIppi, Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUF, V. WATKINS, Utah
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Ja., Missouri HERMAN WELKER, Idaho
PRICE DANIEL, Texas JOHN M &RSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
ROBERT MORRIS, Chief 0 Junsel
WILLIAM A. RUSHER, Administrative Counsel
BENJAMIN MANDEL, Director of Research
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CONTENTS
Witness:
Seweryn, Bialer 1551
III
Page
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1956
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF TIIE COMMITTEE ON THEJpDICIARY
}V askington, b. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess at 10: 30 a. m., in room
457, Senate Office Building, Senator John Marshall Butler presiding.
Present: Senator Butler.
Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher,
administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and F.
W. Schroeder, chief investigator.
Senator BUTLER. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. MORRIS. Will Mr. Bialer and Mr. Jan Karski come forward,
please?
Mr. Karski, will you stand first, please?
Senator BUTLER. Will you raise your right hand?
Do you solemnly swear that you will interpret to the witness the
questions directed to him and you will truly interpret the answers given
by the witness to the best of your ability, so help you God?
MT. KARSKI. I do.
Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name and address to the
reporter?
Mr. KARSKL My name is Jan Karski, professor, Georgetown
University.
Mr. MORRIS. That is in Washington, D. C.?
Mr. JAN KARSKI. Washington, D. C.
Mr. Momus. Mr. Bialer, will you stand, please?
Senator BUTLER. Do you solemnly swear in the presence of Almighty
God that the evidence you are about to give to this subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth?
(The oath was interpreted to the witness.)
(The witness spoke in Polish.)
The INTERPRETER. I do.
Senator BUTLER. The witness is sworn. Counsel will proceed.
TESTIMONY OP SEWERYN BIALER, WASHINGTON, D. C., AS
INTERPRETED BY JAN KARSKI
Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name and address to the
reporter?
The INTERPRETER. Seweryn Bialer.
1551
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1552 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. MORRIS. And you reside now in Washington, D. C., do you not?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. When did come to the United States?
The INTERPRETER. May the 4th, 1956.
Mr. MORRIS. Were you an official of the Polish Communist Govern-
ment?
The INTERPRETER. Until 1951, I was employed by the Polish Govern-
ment, in Poland. After 1951, I was assigned to the Polish Communist
Party.
Mr. Moms. And when did you leave the Polish Communist Party?
The INTERPRETER. The 31st of January 1956.
Mr. MORRIS. What happened on that c ccasion ?
The INTERPRETER. I passed from East Berlin to West Berlin on that
day.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you at that time defect from the Polish Communist
Government?
The INTERPRETER. I left Poland in the middle of January. I went
to East Berlin and then I left East Berlii for the West. And I was a
member of the official Polish delegation to East Berlin.
Senator BUTLER. Will you ask him what his duties were with the
Polish Government?
The INTERPRETER. Until 1951 I had hading political positions in
the Polish militia.
Mr. Moms. Will you tell us what they were?
The INTERPRETER. My last position was the Chief of the Political
Division of the Headquarters of the Polish Militia.
Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us why you made your decision to defect
on January 31, 1956?
The INTERPRETER. I came to a firm conclusion that all this that I
was doing for the long 15 years was unjust, bad, and I wanted to
break relations with all this.
Mr. Moms. You say it was unjust and bad?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Was there anything more you would like to tell us about
your decision to defect?
The INTERPRETER. I would tell you the re are four main reasons for
my decision. The first one is the political reason. I came to a conclu-
sion, on the basis as an eyewitness, that the Communist system is con-
trary to all rules of democracy. The second reason was an economic
reason. From the economic point of view, I could see that the system
is contrary to economic justice.
There was also a moral reason. Communist morality is contrary to
human nature, and I came to that conclusion.
And then came also ideological reasons. I saw that the Communist
theory and Communist practice do not go together, that the practice
defies the theory, and I saw it.
It means that the theory does not agree with the facts.
Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could tell us, Mr. Bialer, whether those
are the four elements that prompted you to defect.
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Monras. I wonder if you would teL us what positions you had
in the Polish Communist Party dating down to January 31, 1956.
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The INTERPRETER. I was employed by the Central Committee of the
Polish Communist Party in the propaganda division.
In that propaganda division I was one of the chiefs of the anti-
Western and anti-American propaganda.
I was also a lecturer for the Central Committee.
I was the first secretary in the party organization to the two most
important Communist schools in Poland.
I was also an ideological adviser to the official leading Communist
paper in Poland, the People's Tribune.
I also contributed to other papers in Poland.
I was also a professor of the Institute of Social Sciences at the
Central Committee of the Communist Party., and also I worked as
a research worker in the Institute of Economic Sciences of the Polish
Academy of Science.
Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us briefly how you carried
on the campaign of propaganda against the West, and particularly
against the United States.
The INTERPRETER. There were many ways. The first one: I wrote
articles on different subjects. Secondly, I delivered very, very many
lectures in Poland. Thousands of people were listening to me.
Then I was the author of instructions to the party workers, how
should they carry on anti-American and anti-Western propaganda in
Poland.
From time to time I had meetings with the Communists from other
countries behind the Iron Curtain. We exchanged views, and also I
would give them advice as to how carry on this type of propaganda.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Bialer, have you prepared a summary of your
experiences in Poland for the purposes of givmg advice on the psycho-
logical warfare campaign for the Free Europe Committee?
The INTERPRETER. You have in mind, sir, this document you have in
your hand?
Mr. MORRIS. Yes; The Declaration of a Former Communist.
The INTERPRETER. I wrote it in Polish.
Mr. MORRIS. You wrote it in Polish?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. And it has been translated into English?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, Sir.
Mr. MoRms. And you prepared this particularly on psychological
warfare; is that right?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. I see. Did you do that on behalf of the Free Europe
Committee?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
May I smoke?
Mr. MORRIS. Pardon?
The INTERPRETER. May I smoke?
Mr. MORRIS. Yes, by all means.
And this was prepared, then, during the month of May, was it
not?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moult's. Since you arrived in the United States?
Now, are all the statements in there truthful statements?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
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1554 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE 'UNITED STATES
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in the record of
this subcommittee this paper entitled 'The Declaration of a Former
Communist," with the identification made by the witness, written for
the purpose he has described here this morning. i
I would like that to go into our record n its entirety, Senator.
Senator BUTLER. It will be made a part of the record.
Mr. MORRIS. And there is, Senator, as you will notice a biographical
sketch which composes the firstl page of this declaration.
Senator BUTLER. That will be made a part of the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 286," and
reads as follows:)
EXHIBIT No. 286
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF SEWERYN BIALER
Born: November 3, 1926.
1942: joined the underground anti-Nazi Communist organization in Lodz.
July 1044-May 1945: inmate of Auschwitz at d Friedland concentration camps.
May 1945-June 1951:
Chief of the Political Department of the training center of the Citizens'
Militia at Slupsk.
Chief of the Political Department of the Central Command of the Citizens'
Militia in Warsaw.
Other executive political positions in the Citizens' Militia.
June 1951?January 31, 1956:
A Party activist of the Central Committee of the PZPR.
Worked in the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the
PZPR.
Lecturer of the Central Committee of the PZPR.
Secretary of the Party Committee in the Institute of Social Sciences and the
Higher School of Marxism-Leninism affilirted with the Central Committee
of the PZPR.
Ideological advisor to Trybuna Ludu, the Ceneral Party organ.
Editor of Zeszyty Teoretyczno-Polityczn e.
Contributor to Nowe Drogi, Trybuna, Lulu, Ekonomista, and other Party
and professional publications.
Research scholar for the School of Economic Sciences, affiliated with the
Polish Academy of Sciences.
Coauthor of Party training textbook and other Party publications.
Member of the delegation of the Central Committee of the PZPR to
Moscow, Leningrad, East Berlin, and other cities.
Delegate from Poland to the Youth Congress in Bucharest.
Holder of a number of high Polish decora dons and orders of merit.
??????.Melf100
THE DECLARATION OF A FORMITi COMMUNIST
At the end of January last when I was breaking with Communism once and
for all, and crossing the border into West Berlin, I knew that I was wiping out
my past life. I took this step with my eyes open, however, after carefully
deliberating for several months.
I was 15 in 1942 when I enrolled in the Communist underground organization
in Lodz. I was trained by the Party and trained others to be loyal to it. Sev-
eral thousand PZPR activists in Warsaw, Lodz, Wroclaw, Bydgoszcz, Kielce,
and other cities know me from the lectures and briefings I held as a lecturer
appointed by the Central Committee of the P Arty. Readers of Party publi-
cations also know me well from my articles. My colleagues at the Social Science
Institute and the Central Committee's school of Marxism-Leninism?where I was
Secretary of the Party authorities?also know ne well. I am known to Party
members from various other institutions and ucholarly positions, as well as
propaganda posts with which I was associated. I owe all of these people an
explanation: Why did I break with the Party? Why did I stop believing in
Communism?
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The Communist system Is Antidemocratic
They know perfectly well that I did not escape to the West to secnre a job or
to make a career because all this was secured for me by the Party, and open to
me in Poland.
Shortly after the war, at the age of 19, I became head of the Political Depart-
ment at the Citizens' Militia Training Center and after that I advanced swiftly.
When I was leaving Poland, I belonged to the Central Committee Party aktiv
and the Party leadership had complete trust in me. As a result of the duties
I was charged with and the posts I occupied, I had access to materials, facts,
and documents which are often inaccessible to the majority of Party activists,
not to speak of the rank and file and the general public. As a result, I could
gradually acquaint myself with the truth and more and more discover the
fraudulence and the evil. For a very long time I thought that poverty, waste,
terror, and falsehood were the inevitable price every revolution has to pay for
progress. Having been for many years active in the Party I was thoroughly
familiar with its working methods, its system of government, and I arrived at
the conclusion that it was an antidemocratic system which could not exist with-
out poverty, waste, and falsehood.
The Dictator Died but the Dictatorship Remains
Why did this change of attitude toward Communism take place in me during
the last, post-Stalin period? Because I saw them with a particular intensity
and became convinced that the evil connected with Communism does not arise
from individual mistakes, but from the Communist system itself. The dictator's
death had to bring about certain changes in the shape of the dictatorship, both
in Russia and in the captive countries. However, as I learned from the experi-
ence of the past three years in Poland, that did not mean the disappearance of
the dictatorship itself. The Membership of the Politburo has changed, and per-
haps will continue to change, but its omnipotence has remained, as has the
symbol of its power and dictatorship, the First Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee, Edward Ochab, who took Bierut's place after his death, and is notorious
for the brutal Stalinist methods he uses.
I was particularly struck by the fact that the same people who blamed Stalin
and Beria for everything bad simultaneously practiced the use of the same
Stalinist and Beria-like methods as much as they could. What is more, when
it is deemed necessary, they restore these methods, fighting openly and secretly
against any pronounced attempts at the democratization of Party and national
life.
I shall give you at least one example. At the end of 1952, at the Politburo
office, I was shown a letter which the Presidium of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union had written to Soviet Party activists explaining the way Berta
had been liquidated. One of the reasons for the Beria purge was his alleged
attempt to get into contact with Tito and the Yugoslav Party. A year later,
the same Khrushchev who had signed the above-mentioned letter to the Party
activists, went to Belgrade to win Marshal Tito over and to ask his forgiveness,
making Beria responsible then for Tito's excommunication. It told me that
Khrushchev and company were lighting for power against their antagonists by
the same methods Stalin had used, though externally their methods might seem
different. I also ascertained irrefutably that the Party leadership continued to
disclose and condemn only those crimes and dark pages of Communist history
which could not be kept secret, or which had to be disclosed because it was
necessary for the leadership. They continued to treat the rank and file of the
Party, not to mention the people at large, as an object of their rule, and to
suppress the truth about the ninny internal events in the Party, and most of the
problems discussed by its leaders. How can one explain otherwise the
paradoxical fact that the resolutions of the III Plenum were not published,
though the Plenum was allegedly an epoch-making event aimed at the
democratization and gradual revelation of Party activities in Poland?
The Party Leadership Fears the Progress of the Thaw
As an activist and employee of the Central Committee, I took part in the
debates in the Central Party &cam I had access to many documents and I know
the way comrades from the Politburo tried to smother and suppress the so-called
"thaw" because they were panic-stricken by its results. I also know what a
farce Rokzanski and his comrades' trial was. I know how passionately Berman,
Bierut, Ochab, and others shielded, as long as they could, Beria's successors in
72723-57?pt. 29-2
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Poland--Radkiewicz, for example?and how they tried to make them suffer as
little as possible.
For several years I was particularly closely ccnnected with the ideological work
of the Party. In this work I was in touch with the leading Marxists in Russia
and the Soviet bloc countries. I devoted many years to the study of Marxist-
Leninist ideology and finally concluded that in the Communist version of it, real
freedom of scientific research is impossible. The repudiation of some of the
theoretical theses formulated by Stalin by the present Russian Communist leaders
does not change anything because the head of the Party continues to be the
highest and virtually infallible scientific oracle in all matters of economics,
philosophy, history, agronomy, and many other branches of knowledge. ( Stalin's
place has now been taken by that noteworthy personality, from the intellectual
and scholarly point of view, Nikita I Sergeyevitch Khrushchev, called Nikita
Kukuruznik by the Party activists themselves.)
The fact that in 1955, long after the old tyrant's death, during the rule of the
new and allegedly democratic party authorities in Russia, a ban was placed on
discussion of the main problem of economic policy, I mean the problem of the
relation between development of heavy industrial production and consumer
goods production, in Russia and all the captive countries. Fearing that we might
discuss these problems, we, the workers of the Party's ideological front and
Intellectual activists, were instructed to limit ourselves to writing essays which
would merely explain the official Party line on the priority development of
heavy industry.
Facts Are Against Communism'
One of my Party assignments was to prepa?Te guidances for the propaganda
policy aimed at the West. I had, therefore, access to materials, facts, and statis-
tics which are carefully kept secret from the Party and the general public. On
the basis of those materials I became convinced that both Communist theory
and practice are false because they are conttadicted by the facts. They are
contradicted by the improvement of the situation of the working classes in the
West, and by the poverty in the Communist cot ntries. Taking part in the work
of various institutions and in various scholarly posts, I was able to acquaint
myself with the methods of falsification, embellishment, and suppression of data
and statistics concerning the standard of living in Poland, and with the methods
of garbling Western statistics for Communist propaganda purposes.
Step by step I learned the truth and lost faith in Communism. I had to lie,
pretend, and play a double game. Finally, I arrived at the conclusion that I
was unable to live that way any longer, that 1: was better to erase 15 years of
wasted life than to continue to live without faith that what I was doing was
right.
These are the reasons I broke with Communism. That is why I gave up bril-
liant prospects in the Party and took the decisive step which was so difficult
for personal reasons. That is why I crossed the Western border, so that I
could freely and openly tell what I know about the facts the Communist leader-
ship tries to suppress, so that I can tell what I know about Communist theory
and practice.
? ? ?
BERTA'S CASE
In March 1953, greatly impressed by Stalin': death, I listened together with
other Party members to the speeches that Berk Malenkov, and Molotov gave in
Moscow's Red Square. They all spoke of the in lexible unity of the Party leader-
ship and promised to guard that leadership unity constantly. I believed them
then and listened to their speeches with great emotion.
However, before four months had elapsed, [ was taken aback by the com-
munique about Beria's arrest and next about his purge. The official explanation
In the press filled me with serious doubts.
In the autumn of 1953, at the office of the PZPR Politburo, I was given a secret
letter from the Soviet Party Presidium to the Party aktiv in Russia. The letter
explained the reasons that made Beria's purge necessary. Besides myself, some
other chosen members of the Central Party (citify were allowed to read the
letter. Afterwards, it was probably return to the PZPR Politburo's safe where
it probably still lies under Ochab's vigilant eye.
I read this letter with great interest. I had no illusions whatsoever as to
Beria's role as Security Police chief. On the other hand, I realized that many
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official reasons for his liquidation had been invented and did not apply exalt-
sively to him. That's why I was curious about whether in a letter reserved for
a small group of the most trusted comrades I would find some explanation for
my doubts. However, the contents of the letter, instead of dispelling my doubts,
increased them even further. The letter repeated many of the charges I knew
from the communique in the newspapers. Thus, Beria was accused of having
transformed the security apparatus into an organ independent of the Party.
There was also the same charge about Beria's mistakes in his nationalities policy,
especially with respect to the small nations in the Soviet Union. Even the absurd
charge about Beria's having been a spy and an imperialist agent, recruited in
1918, was repeated.
Beria Surrounds Other Politburo Members with Spies
In addition to those well-known charges, there were other accusations. Thus,
Beria was accused of using the security apparatus in the struggle for power
within the Soviet Politburo. I remember that this charge was corroborated,
among other things, by the fact that Beria had seized control of the Kremlin
guards and with their help had organized surveillance and wiretapping of the
conversations of the other Politburo members. The second fact quoted in the let-
ter was even more typical. It was maintained that when one of the Politburo
members was leaving for Lwow, Berta summoned the head of the NKVD in Lwow
and ordered him to put the member under surveillance in Lwow. When the head
of the Lwow NKVD expressed his surprise that such an order could be issued
about a Politburo member, Beria reminded him what refusal to execute his order
would entail, and said?I remember the phrase very clearly: "If you don't carry
out my orders, I shall crush you into labor camp dust." In spite of that, the
NKVD agent from Lwow was so shocked that he immediately called upon other
Politburo members to tell them about Beria's order.
Other charges in the letter referred to economic matters. They were very
numerous and I want to mention them here only briefly. Among other things,
Beria was accused of having hampered the development of agriculture by his
influence in the Politburo. Besides, Beria was also accused of having consistently?
hindered the policy of raising the standard of living of the working classes by
opposing any lowering of prices.
The Amoral Profile of Beria
The Soviet Politburo letter also said that Beria was a moral degenerate in his
private life. As proof, the following facts were listed. It was maintained that
Beria had a special apartment in Moscow where he organized erotic orgies in
selected company. On his orders, specially chosen women were brought from
the Moscow prisons. According to the letter, these women were later liquidated
in labor camps. Beria also forced other women he liked to take part in those
orgies. When he grew bored with them, they were arrested and sent to special
labor camps.
The letter also said that Beria had appropriated authorship of the book called
The History of the Bolshevik Organization in Transcaucasia, whose authors he
had shot. According to the letter, the book contained many historical falsehoods
which exaggerated Beria's role. This charge was particularly interesting to me
because Beria's book was one of the official manuals of the history of the Bolshe-
vik Party used in the Party training which I myself had organized in Poland.
Nor did the list of charges end there. The letter maintained that Beria had
persecuted the family of the dead Party leader Ordjonikidze because he had been
one of the first to suspect Beria and to mistrust him. After Ordjonikidze's death,
Beria transferred his hatred to his family, persecuting and destroying it.
Who Performed the Murders in Leningrad?
From the letter on Beria I also learned for the first time officially about the so-
called Leningrad Affair. The Politburo accused Beria of having conducted a
policy of liquidation of people devoted and loyal to the Communist Party simply
because they were devoted and loyal. The "Leningrad Affair" was an example
where in a series of secret trials, the flower of the political aktiv of Leningrad was
liquidated. According to the letter, the material evidence in those trials had been
fabricated by Beria.
It is very possible that Berta was actually one of the men who organized the
Leningrad trials. But I understood the perfidy of this accusation only later, in
February 1955, when I read another Politburo letter explaining Malenkov's dis-
missal. In that letter, I found, among other things, a charge that Malenliov was
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also responsible for the organization of the Leningrad trials. I then came to the
conclusion that Khrushchev, aiming at seizure of power in the Party, had adopted
the tactics of removing his rivals one by one. As long as it was necessary, he,
together with Malenkov, accused Beria of stagbig the Leningrad trials. Eighteen
months later, when Malenkov's turn came, Khr ishchey made him coresponsible.
Beria Wanted, but Khrushchev Went . . .
The most perfidious charges in the letter, against the background of the present
Party line, were the charges that the proof cf Beria's work as an imperialist
agent was in his attempts after Stalin's death to get In touch with Tito and the
Yugoslav Party. According to the Politburo letter, the Yugoslav Party was a
fascist and anti-Soviet Party. I even remember a certain detail in connection
with that charge. Berta was accused of having tried to make direct telephone
contact with Belgrade for private talks with the Yugoslav leaders. The question
was about reopening a direct telephone line which had been cut off between the
Kremlin and Belgrade after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform.
The perfidy of this charge appeared to me only much later. When Khrushchev
went to Belgrade and when the new Politburo policy toward Yugoslavia was an-
nounce& I remembered that part of the letter which had accused Beria of trying
to establish relations with a fascist and anti-Soviet Yugoslav Party. On one
hand, Khrushchev blamed Beria for having broken off relations with Tito and
Yugoslavia and, on the other, he accused him and indicted him for having at-
tempted to reestablish those relations.
At the end of the letter, the Soviet Politburo asked the question: "Why was
Berta so rapidly unmasked after Stalin's death?" The letter gave the following
answer: the Soviet Politburo could unmask him so soon because Beria became
domineering and reckless after Stalin's death. lie made careless moves and thus
enabled the Politburo to unmask him as an imperialist agent. In this way the
Soviet Politburo gave one to understand that before Stalin's death It had not
known of Beria's criminal activities, but it had discovered them only in the
past two or three months and therefore was not responsible for Beria's past
activities.
Further the letter explained that in investigating Beria's hostile activities
and in its fight against him, the Politburo had to be very careful since any rash
step would have aroused his suspicions., While being aware of Beria's criminal
activities, the Politburo had to pretend that It did not suspect him of anything.
Because of this, it had to accept certain of Berin's moves though it did not agree
with them. The letter gives as an example thE question of the policy line pre-
ceding the Berlin riots in June 1953. In it, th o Soviet Politburo declared that
the policy imposed by Bella on the Soviet authorities in East Germany, and on
the political leadership of the German Democratic Republic, which resulted in
the June riots, was false. The Soviet Politburo was aware of the fact that the
policy being conducted in East Germany was 12 error, but could not oppose it
because it did not want Berta to guess that he was suspected of being a spy.
Khrushchev Uses Stalin's and Beria's Methods
Such were the contents of the secret letter of the Presidium of the CPSU to the
political aktiv in Russia. This letter was one of the documents which helped
to evaluate the situation properly. Not immediately, of course, but later, when
I compared other Khrushchev moves with the letter's charges about Beria, I
became profoundly convinced that both the secret trial and the fabrication of
certain of the charges in Beria's purge were typical of the methods both Stalin
and Berta had applied. And the responsibility for those methods could not be
fixed only on Beria or Stalin. After the letter about Malenkov, after Khrush-
chers visit to Belgrade, and after the July Plen am last year, it became clear to
me that in large measure Khrushchev was fighting for power with the same
methods as Berta and Stalin had used. I also ci me to the conclusion that there
was no difference between the trials organized by Stalin and Berta, and Beria's
trial, insofar as trumping up charges or in the methods of conducting the trial
Itself.
?
MALENICOV FORCED To RESIGN: KIIRITSF/CIEEV DEGRADES MALENBOV
After Beria's purge the next step in the power 8truggle inside the Soviet Polit-
buro was Malenkov's forced resignation. Before it happened we had a period
of awakened hopes. After the Beria affair, some changes were introduced into
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the Party leadership system. The question of the improvement of the standard of
living was considered the most important task. I must state that in 1954 I
myself and a considerable number of the Party activists really believed that the
power struggle in the Soviet Politburo was over. We believed that after Beria's
removal, the highest Soviet leadership was united.
Yet, in February 1955, the news of Malenkov's removal came like a thunder-
clap. It shocked the entire Party aktiv: we knew immediately that the struggle
in the Politburo continued. We were indignant at the way in which Malenkov
had been removed, rather like a schoolboy, and not like the Premier of a great
country which was considered as a model democracy. Finally, we thought that
the official reasons for Malenkov's dimissal in which we were asked to believe,
and which we were asked to tell others, were ridiculous.
Bierut and Ochab Said Only One Thing: Obey the Moscow Politburo
We turned for an answer to our doubt to the PZPR leadership, to Bierut, Ber-
man, and Ochab. They had only one answer for us, however: we must trust the
Soviet Party Presidium completely. Moreover, they attempted to cut short all
discussion of the subject. I remember, for example, that in February 1955, at
one of the Party meetings at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Party
Committee, I was sitting next to Berman and expressed my doubts about Malen-
kov's resignation. Berman answered with phrases about full confidence, and
greatly agitated cut off further discussion.
When, shortly thereafter, at the Politburo office, I was given a Soviet Commu-
nist Party Presidium letter to the Soviet Party alctiv, concerning Malenkov this
time, I wondered whether I would find an answer there to the questions that
haunted me?and I found it.
Because up to today, the reasons for Malenkov's removal have not been given
to the Russian people, or to the Party, or to the Polish people, I would like to
tell about the contents of that letter. These are the reasons mentioned in the
confidential letter, not those given in the press, which were so absurd that no
one could believe them. I shall enumerate them one by one.
The Main Emphasis Was Not Farming and the Farmer's Life, but Power "
The first charge concerned Malenkov's responsibility for serious errors in his
farm policy. This accusation was already known to me from Malenkov's state-
ment explaining his resignation. In the Soviet Politburo letter the charge was
amplified. It was said that Malenkov was in charge of farm policy. The state
of farming in the Soviet Union was alarming, and Malenkov was chiefly respon-
sible for this state of affairs.
When I read those charges, the following questions came to my mind. First,
if Malenkov were responsible for the farm crisis, what could we say about
Khrushchev who had for many years been Party Secretary in the Ukraine,
the granary of the Soviet Union? Secondly, if Malenkov knew so little about
agriculture, what could be said about his successor, Bulganin, who, as I learned
from his biography, had never had anything to do with farming? Thirdly, if
Malenkov were little acquainted with agriculture, he knew even less about electric
power stations, and yet in spite of it, he had been appointed minister of electric
power stations. Finally, the first steps which, in the opinion of Khrushchev
and the entire Politburo, were to change the farm situation completely had already
been taken under Malenkov. Therefore, it was not Malenkov who was preventing
implementation of agrarian reforms. Consequently, the question of farming
was not involved. My suspicion was subsequently confirmed when, in spite of
Malenkov's resignation, no really new resolutions on farm questions were
announced.
What also struck me was that Beria was also accused of being responsible
for the farm crisis. This coincidence of charges being brought against Berth.
and Malenkov became even more striking when I read the rest of the letter. I
shall write of it later in connection with the coresponsibility for the "Leningrad
Affair."
Light Industry?No!
Before coming to that matter, I should like to mention other charges brought
against Malenkov in the Soviet Politburo's confidential letter. Attention was
drawn to the danger caused by Malenkov's policy to the regular development
of the People's Democracies. This charge was formulated cautiously, and like
the entire letter, briefly. Such a policy, as conducted by Malenkov, could bring
about a decrease of economic effort in the People's Democracies. I understood
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then immediately what it was all about. At that time, there was great interest
in the Polish Party in the developments in Hungary after Imre Nagy had come
to power. During that period, Hungary abandoned the principle of stressing
heavy industry at any price and by any means. Not only I, but many other
people, saw in it a great relief for the Hungarian people. During this period,
pressure was brought to bear on the Party leadership in Poland by the aktiv
to follow the Hungarian example more resolutely in establishing the relation
between heavy industry and consumer goods production so that the standard of
living could be raised.
This pressure was firmly resisted by the Party leadership. They were at
that time greatly displeased by the Hungarian comrades who were making the
situation in Poland more difficult. I remember especially well that Szyr was
furious when some of the activists maintained that Hungarian economic policy
was more sensible than Polish.
Shortly after Malenkov's removal, even before I had occasion to read the
Soviet Politburo's letter, I learned about Imre Nagy's dismissal and that is why,
when I read in the letter than Malenkov had been accused of endangering the
orderly development of the People's Democracies, I understood how this charge
was justified from the Soviet Politburo viewpoint. Malenkov had, in fact, con-
ducted a policy which might have brought some measure of relief in the economic
situations of the captive countries. In the long run, however, this would mean an
increase in the independence of those countries and with such a policy, Khrush-
chev and the rest of the Politburo could not agree. Besides, during Rhrushchey's
stay in Poland in the spring of 1955, I could personally ascertain it from listening
to his very aggressive and unpublished speeches.
The next charge in the letter concerned Malenkov's incorrect attitude toward
developing heavy industry, which was closely connected with what I have said
before. When I read the Soviet Politburo's letUer, I was struck by the fact that
Malenkov was actually accused of deviation from Stalinism, for one of Stalin's
fundamental economic principles was priority of heavy industry and maintenance
of a steady difference of tempo between heavy industrial and consumer goods
industry development. The simple conclusion occurred to me that whatever is
convenient in Stalinism to the present Party leadership will, without fail, be
maintained. I also remember that during that time there were numerous dis-
cussions of economic policy, of the ratio between heavy industry and consumer
goods industry, in the Party, and after Malenl:ov's dismissal, these discussions
were severely forbidden.
And so Malenkov's Turn Came. Who Next?
Finally, there was yet another charge which gave me much to think about in
that confidential letter. The Soviet Politburo accused Malenkov of a concilia-
tory attitude toward Beria and of coresponsibility for the "Leningrad trials."
The charge was formulated as follows: during the period of struggle against
Beria, Malenkov adopted a conciliatory attitude toward him and was, moreover,
coresponsible for the "Leningrad Affair." I noted immediately that this charge
was identical with one of the charges made against Beria, though formulated in
a less emphatic way, the charges on which the purge of I3eria had been based.
Yet, I thought, Malenkov had been Khrushchey's aide when Belga was purged.
Still another question occurred to me. Why wasn't Malenkov accused of it in
those days. The answer was clear enough. Malenkov was indispensable in the
fight against Beria, and his turn had not yet come.
In this way the "Leningrad Affair" and the crisis in agriculture were exploited
by Khrushchev twice in order to rid himself of his two most important rivals.
This tested method of removal was applied 135 Khrushchev, as I was to learn
later, with great success. When Molotov was removed in July, I remembered
that at the same session of the Supreme Soviet at which Malenkov had been
forced to resign, Molotov had given a speech on foreign policy. In that speech,
he had expressed the same views on the Yugo-nay problem as those for which
he was later severely criticized at the July Plenum. He had also then formulated
the same thesis with respect to the stage of development of communism in Russia
which he was publicly asked to withdraw.
But Molotov's mistakes were tolerated by Khrushchev at that time. The reason
was obvious: Molotov's help was necessary to force Malenkov's resignation. In
February, Molotov was still indispensable to Khrushchev, as Malenkov had been
Indispensable during the purge of Berta in July 1953. Molotov's turn came at
the July Plenum last year. . . .
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How KIIRUSFICHEV CARRIED OUT MOLOTOV'S POLITICAL DEMOTION
The third step in Khrushchev's showdown with his Politburo rival was to
remove Molotov from all influence on political affairs in the Party leadership.
This took place last July at the Plenum. How did it come about?
In July 1955 the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held.
The materials connected with the Plenum filled the Soviet and Polish press
for several days; they were the subject of discussions and official training in
the PZPR. The subject discussed at the Plenum, at least what one could judge
from the materials, was the question of introducing new technical methods into
Soviet industry. Bulganin made a speech. I remember I considered a positive
thing that all the speeches of the participants had been published, a rare thing
at Russian plena and even at Polish ones. The discussion was not secret and
in many cases was very lively.
True, I found it odd that in view of such important events in the international
arena as Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to Belgrade, the Austrian problem,
and the Geneva Conference, no foreign policy problems were discussed at the
Plenum. However, I did not attach great importance to it. It did not occur
to me that so early after Malenkov's removal, new personal showdowns were in
the making. Besides, it was a period of intensification of the "thaw" in Poland,
and these problems occupied my attention completely.
Three months passed and the questions connected with the July Plenum were
slowly forgotten. The problems of the Plenum ceased to be discussed at train-
ing centers. But in October Bierut suddenly called a meeting of the members
of the Central Committee, and a part of the Central Party alotiv. When we
gathered on the 6th floor of the building of the Central Committee, Bierut got
up and told us that the July Plenum besides its public part had had a secret
and unpublished part. In a short talk Bierut informed us of some of the matters
which had been discussed in the secret part of the July Plenum. Our meeting
was strictly confidential. I remember Bierut told us that we could not make
notes.
Bierut's brief information was later passed on, even more briefly, to certain
groups of the Party aktiv in Warsaw, and Jerzy Morawski reported on the
secret part of the Plenum to the lecturers of the Central Committee. For my
part, I made a report on those matters to Party schools and again it was under-
stood that no notes could be taken. Also, attendance at the meeting was closely
checked on the basis of a list and Party identity cards. No questions or dis-
cussion were permitted; in short, the material was treated as strictly confi-
dential. But it all became clear to me when I read a stenographic record of the
secret part of the Plenum.
A few days after the meeting with Bierut in the Politburo office, they gave me
the full stenographic record of the July Plenum to read. It was the only copy
sent to Poland for the use of the Polish Politburo. Only a very small number
of the members of the Party aktiv were permitted to read it. The record was
very long. The Plenum had lasted 8 days and some of the speeches several
hours, so I shall only deal with some of the problems discussed at the Plenum.
The Third Step in the Career of the Collective Leadership: Khrushchev
What was the chief subject of the secret part of the July Plenum? After
reading the record carefully I saw that it concerned itself chiefly with the show-
down between Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet Politburo on one hand,
and Molotov on the other. The secret part of the July Plenum was, therefore,
the third step in clearing the way for the so-called collective leadership, therefore.
for Khrushchev.
What was the platform of this showdown? The Yugoslav issue. The prob-
lem of the attitude of the Soviet Communist Party toward Marshal Tito and the
Yugoslav Party. But it would not be fair to restrict the discussion to Tito'
case. The fact is that the question of Yugoslav relations was only a point of
departure for a long discussion of political and economic problems. I shall
enumerate only the most important ones.
A good deal of space was given to a discussion of coexistence with the
capitalist countries, to the problem of political relations between the Russian
Party and the Parties of the People's Democracies, to the problem of diplomatic
relations with the People's Democracies. The question of the underdeveloped
countries was also discussed, and the attitude toward Socialist Parties in the
West, and the attitude toward Stalinism. However, the most important subject,
and the basis for the showdown with Molotov, was the Yugoslav problem.
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What follows is based on the shorthand minutes af the secret part of the Plenum
about the showdown itself.
In February, at the Supreme Soviet meeting, Molotov's attitude had already
been different from the line taken toward the Yugoslav problem by Khrushchev
and most of the other Politburo members, and this became clear to me, and to
the majority of the Political akar when we heard of the Khrushchev-Bulganin
visit to Belgrade. In February, however, Khrushchev did not attack Molotov
because he needed him in the showdown with Malenkov. This is proved by
the fact that the Soviet Politburo permitted his official address to the Supreme
Soviet to express views which opposed, those o-! the majority of the Politburo.
Yet there is no doubt that the texts of such speeches are scrupulously ap-
proved by the Politburo, and primarily by the First Party Secretary before
they are made.
From the stenographic record of the secret part of the Plenum, it seemed
that preparations for Molotov's removal began immediately after Malenkov's
resignation. In the spring of last year, the Politburo held a meeting at which
Molotov was criticized as Minister of Foreign Affairs for his attitude toward
the Yugoslav problem and several other international problems. Molotov was
accused of having hampered the reestablishing of Soviet-Yugoslav relations by
all means.
Khrushchev and Molotov Battle Over Tito
Before the Khrushchev and Bulganin departure for Belgrade, the Politburo
held another meeting at which Molotov opponed the visit. Molotov was for
reestablishing international relations with .!Cugoslavia but, for ideological
reasons, resisted reestablishment of Party relations with the Yugoslav Com-
munist Party. What he had in mind was not only Khrushchev and Bul-
ganin's visit to Belgrade but also the character of their visit.
These facts were given by Khrushchev in his opening speech to the secret
part of the July Plenum. As a result of Politburo discussions, Khrushchev
continued, Molotov still had not changed his attitude. The disagreement found
its expression in the adoption of two Politburo resolutions. In one, the ma-
jority of the Politburo recognizes the necessity of the Belgrade visit and the
necessity of attempting to reconstitute inter-Party relations with Yugoslavia.
In the second resolution, Molotov's attitude was described, appraised by Khrush-
ehey and the rest of the Politburo, and a dee' sion was taken to put it up for
discussion at the earliest Plenum of the CC of the CPSU.
At the July Plenum, Khrushchev once again charged Molotov with having
prevented the reestablishment of international relations with Yugoslavia, and
denounced his attitude on this issue as both erroneous and against the Party
line.
Molotov Battles And.
The stenographic record showed that Molo--ov addressed the meeting after
Khrushchev's speech and explained his viewpoint. However, in the discussion
which followed and lasted for several days, the Plenum of the CC declared itself
against Molotov's position. In addition to -Chrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan,
Kaganovich, Susslov, and Shepilov criticized Molotov severely. The discussion
was accompanied by a series of personal skirmishes, abusive remarks flowed
freely, and time and again speeches were interrupted. This was particularly
true of Molotov's speech.
I shall give an example. When Molotov was explaining his viewpoint that
Party problems should not be discussed with Tito because Tito was anti-Soviet
and his views far removed from Communism Ind rather close to those of anti-
Communists, Khrushchev interrupted him, shouting: "But in 1939 jou could talk
to Ribbentrop!" Incidentally, it oceurred to me while I was reading the
minutes that the comparison to Ribbentrop was not very flattering for Tito.
* * * and Capitulates
As a result of the violent discussion,: Molotov made a short declaration toward
the end of the secret meeting, occupying not more than one page of the shorthand
minutes, in which in an extremely formal manner, he listed Khrushchev's charges
and admitted that they were well founded. Ile also said that he yielded to the
Central Committee's view of the Yugoslav problem. His declaration was so
formal that I had no doubt when I read it that it was only Molotov's attempt
to save what still could be saved. It was an attempt to take away from
Khrushchev all the arguments which could be ased for Molotov's dismissal.
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An Allegedly "Impersonal" Encounter
The shorthand minutes showed that the discussion was full of Khrushchev's
personal remarks about Molotov. Khrushchev therefore devoted a great deal
of space in his closing speech to assurances that there was no question of a
personal misunderstanding between him and Molotov. Personally, he said he
had nothing against Molotov: his sole concern was Party matters. These
assurances were so numerous that I understood them to mean their opposite.
Besides, even in his closing comments, Khrushchev could not resist making a
personal remark leveled at Molotov. He said, and I remember that passage
extremely well, "Vyacheslav Mikhailovitch, all this is your wife's fault. It
would be much better for you if you didn't listen to her. She pushes you and
makes you ambitious. She is your evil spirit."
Such was the general outline of the showdown with Molotov at the secret
session of the Plenum last July.
? ?
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO POLAND IS NOT A DIPLOMAT BTJT A PROCONSUL
The stenographic of the secret part of the Plenum of the CC of the CPSIT
also contained many matters which pertained to Poland and Polish-Soviet rela-
tions. The question of the real role of the Soviet Ambassadors to Poland,
particularly Popov and Lebediev, confirmed a state of affairs I had suspected
for a long time. The Soviet ambassador in Poland was more a proconsul inter-
fering in the internal affairs of the country than the diplomatic representative
of a friendly nation. He does not take into account either the feelings of the
people, or the Party leaders' ambitions. There is, of course, nothing new in this.
What is new is that it was described in this manner at a. Central Committee
meeting in Moscow with Khrushchev and Kaganovitch there.
How was it that the question of the behavior of the Soviet Ambassadors to
Poland was discussed at the secret meeting of the July Plenum? It so happened
that Molotov's activity as Minister of Foreign Affairs had already been exam-
ined, and in order to substantiate their criticism of him, Khrushchev, Kagano-
vitch, and others cited facts which either directly or indirectly discredited him.
Among other things, the activities of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland emerged.
Long before I read the shorthand minutes of the July Plenum, I heard rumors
and sometimes even full details which threw light on the real role of the Soviet
ambassadors to Poland. Besides, I was in personal contact with other Soviet
inspectors in Poland. Thus, I often met Professor Alexandrov, ideological tutor
of some of the Polish training schools, Comrade Nietchkina, guardian of the
Polish philosophers, Professor Kuznainov, who occasionally came from Moscow
to inspect the Polish economists and their work, Comrade Pankratova, member
of the Central Committee in Moscow and patron of Polish historians, and many
others. On the basis of these contacts and seeing their condescending attitude
toward Poles, I could easily imagine how the Soviet ambassador, whose rank
was much higher, behaved. But it is quite a different thing to imagine things
and to find a confirmation of one's suspicions in Khrushchev's or Kaganovitch's
speeches, and the stepnographic minutes of the July Plenum secret session
confirmed them amply.
Kaganovitch Admits that Popov Liked to Give Orders
At the Plenum Kaganovitch criticized Molotov's activities as Foreign Minister
and, among other things, appraised the Soviet ambassador's work in Poland.
Kaganovitch maintained that Popov's behavior was simply inexcusable. What
was this inexcusable behavior? According to the report, Popov thought he was
fully entitled to issue orders to the Comrades in the leadership of the Polish
Party. He grossly interfered in Polish internal affairs. Kaganovitch said that
Popov was intriguing among the Polish Party leaders and inciting them one
against the other. Moreover, Popov spoke disparagingly, in the presence of
Polish comrades, of the Polish Party leadership. Such behavior on the part of a
Soviet Ambassador to Poland, Kaganovitch said, was inadmissible.
While I read the above criticisms of the Soviet Ambassador's hehavior by
Kaganovitch, I involuntarily asked myself the following questions: First, Popov
became ambassador to Poland in June 1953 and remained at his post until March
1954. He was, therefore, Ambassador after Stalin's death, after Beria's purge,
and when Khrushchev was made First Party Secretary, and came to Warsaw on
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several occasions. It is hard to believe that th 3 Soviet leadership was unaware
of Popov's behavior, yet in spite of this his activities in Warsaw were tolerated.
Second, I wondered how meek the PZPIt Politburo was if it had tolerated
Popov's actions for so long. This same Popov was not even a member of the
Central Committee of the CPSU. They even tolerated him when they were no
longer obliged to listen to Stalin's orders.
But the criticism of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland made at the July Plenum
was not limited to Popov only. In his closing speech at the secret session of the
Plenum, Khrushchev violently attacked another Soviet ambassador to Poland,
Lebiediev.
Khrushchev Admits That Lebiediev and Popov Are Like Twins
Commenting on Lebiediev's activities, Khrusi chev used the same expressions
as Kaganovitch did about Popov. Among other things, Khrushchev maintained
that Lebiediev took it upon himself to be a leader of political life in Poland, and
used to summon the highest Polish Party dignitaries to the Soviet Embassy and
tell them what to do. In addition, Khrushchev accused Liebiediev of having
written a book on Poland which had already beet sent to be printed, but its publi-
cation was stopped at the last moment. Had it been published it would have done
irreparable damage to Polish-Soviet relations. Lebiediev had stated in his book,
among other things, that the bulk of the Polish intelligentsia was fascist.
Nor was that all, for Khrushchev also said that Lebiediev formulated a funda-
mentally erroneous thesis that the Polish Workers Party had been set up as a
result of the Soviet offensive on the eastern fro at, and as a result of the great
Russian victories. And yet, Khrushchev said, the roots of this Party were in
the Polish people's independent struggle.
In the light of the stenographic record of the CO's secret session in Moscow,
it is easy to understand why Khrushchev considered the appearance of Lebiediev's
book a disaster. The theses contained in it woule have discredited the Soviets in
the Polish readers' eyes.
After criticizing the book, Khrushchev returned to Lebiediev's activities in
Poland, emphasizing that Lebiediev's constant interference in Polish domestic
matters was revolting and inexcusable. Khrushchev several times pointed out
that such behavior was inconsistent with the ir structions of the Soviet Party
leadership. Khrushchev supported this statement with a quotation from the
Russian Party's CO resolution which forbade ambassadors to interfere in the
domestic matters of the People's Democracies. What struck me was the fact that
Lebiediev had been Soviet Ambassador to Poland for seven years and therefore
had not been complying with CC decisions for some time. In addition, Khru-
shchev also hinted that this type of harmful activity was connected with the past
and with Beria's times.
For Breaking Party Resolutions: the Order of Lenin
This violent Khrushchev criticism of Lebiediev was made at the Plenum in
July of last year. The minutes of the speech reached Poland in October, but
almost simultaneously a Moscow Pravda communique reached Warsaw about
Lebiediev having been awarded the Order of Lenin. It so happened that I read
that issue of Pravda and the minutes of the Khruahchev speech during the same
week. Which was I to believe? The Khrushchev who had criticized Lebiediev's
conduct as Soviet Ambassador to Poland so violently, or the Khrushchev who had
awarded him the highest Soviet decoration for :neritorious achievements and
services rendered to the Soviet fatherland? Who was I to believe the Khrush-
chev who accused Lebiediev of violating the Central Committee resolutions or the
Khrushchev who considered Lebiediev to be a suitable man for the post of Soviet
Ambassador to Finland?
?
?
MIKOYAN ON THE "BROTHERLY 150VIET Am"
One of the most interesting problems discussed at the secret session of the
July Plenum in Moscow was the problem of eccnomic relations between the
Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Miltoyan devoted a good deal of
space to that problem in his speech. I read those passages with a good deal of
interest because I had written a series of articles on those relations for Party
and economic publications. One of my articles, published in Trybuna Ludu, was
reprinted in the Cominform paper, For A Lasting Peace, for a People's Democ-
racy. Why do I speak of that now? Because I had closely followed the Party
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line in my articles, yet when I read Mikoyan's speech I saw that everything
I had written in those articles was simply a lie. Of course I knew many facts
which proved that the Soviet Union was taking advantage of many privileges in
its economic relations with Poland, but only after reading Mikoyan's speech did
I realize that economic discrimination was applied to all of the captive countries.
Mikoyan denounced these discriminatory measures and plainly implied that
It was not exceptional but the general rule. What was this general economic
discrimination with regard to the captive countries? I shall mention some of
the examples I found in the stenographic record of the secret session of the
July Plenum.
Joint Stock Companies for Exploitation, Not For Help
The problem Mikoyan discussed particularly extensively was that of the
so-called mixed companies' activities. Mixed companies were commercial or
Industrial enterprises set up by the Soviets in almost all the captive countries.
In such a company there are two partners : the Soviet Union and the People's
Democracy in which the company operates. According to the statutes of these
companies, there is complete equality between the two partners.
In all the variety of forms of so-called Soviet brotherly help extended to the
People's Democracies, the mixed companies always set up as an example of the
Soviet Union's sacrifices for its younger brothers. The Romanian Premier
Gheorghlu-Dej once said that mixed companies were the most efficacious and
profitable form of Soviet brotherly aid offered to the countries building socialism.
The mixed companies were given in ideological training as an example of pro-
letarian internationalism. This was the official Party and ideological line. How-
ever, at the secret session of the July Plenum, Mikoyan said that the mixed
companies were the most conspicuous form of Russian interference in the domes-
tic economic affairs of the People's Democracies. They were, in Mikoyan's
opinion, a sign of Soviet nationalism, a form of exploitation of weaker countries
by the U. S. S. R., and they had become an example of economic exploitation of
the People's Democracies which is why they had to be dissolved.
Chinese Communists Slap Moscow's Pace
But the mixed companies were dissolved not only because they were Incon-
sistent with the principle of proletarian internationalism. And Mikoyan him-
self admitted it. Here is a passage of the shorthand minutes which I remember
particularly well: "Did we need those mixed companies?" Mikoyan asked.
"Were we very happy when our Comrade Mao Tse-tung put our nose out of joint
by refusing to allow similar companies to be established in China? Shouldn't
we draw a lesson from past mistakes and dissolve those companies?"
Mikoyan then explained in detail how the Soviet nose had been put out of
joint by Mao Tse-tung. This even took place after Stalin's death when the
Soviet Union proposed founding such mixed companies to China, for the product-
tion of tropical fruits in China which would then export a certain quantity of
them to Russia. Mao Tse-tung did not agree to the offer and proposed instead
that China export tropical fruits on a normal commercial basis. Thus, Mao
gave a very eloquent appraisal of the mixed companies' activities from the point
of view of Chinese interests.
The Negro Did the Job and Was Sent Away With Praise
In my opinion, these experiences explain why it was decided to wind up the
mixed companies. However, while Mao was putting the Soviet nose out of
joint about mixed companies in China, mixed companies in the European People's
Democracies continued to be a symbol of Soviet brotherly aid. In December
1954 I was in Moscow and heard a certain Meinshikov read his paper on Mixed
Companies, Symbol of Soviet Brotherly Aid Offered to the People's Democracies,
to a Conference of Social Sciences at the Soviet Central Party Committee. As
we know, most of the mixed companies have been dissolved, but some of them
still exist. Secondly, what struck me particularly when I read the minutes of
the secret session was that the dissolution of the companies was not in the least
explained by the arguments given by Mikoyan to the secret session of the July
Plenum.
On the contrary, in the communique announcing their dissolution, I read that
they had played a very important role in the development of the People's Democ-
racies, that they had been a symbol of the brotherly Soviet aid offered to these
countries, that they had been dissolved merely because their task had been
completed. The Soviet dictators of the mixed companies received the highest
decorations from the countries la which they had operated. That is why I was
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amazed at the fantastic hypocrisy of the Soviet Party leaders, and their unwill-
ingness to tell the truth, when I saw the minutes of Mikoyan's speech. In prac-
tice, I saw one of the aspects of the alleged open sincerity of the political life
in the new post-Stalin era.
Soviet Experts Are Arrogant and Overpaid
In another passage of the record of the secret session, Mikoyan also gave a
fair assessment of the behavior of the Soviet experts and delegates in the People's
Democracies. The work of our experts abroad, Mikoyan said, necessitates a
good deal of tact and modesty. In no case can we hurt the feelings of the local
population. But in practice, Mikoyan said, our experts have constantly violated
this rule. They have been patronizing and arrogE nt. They thought that every-
body could learn from them, and that they had nothing to learn. In this way
they often did a disservice to the cause of friendship between the Soviet Union
and the People's Democracies. Mikoyan also admitted that the excessively
high salaries of Soviet specialists were a source of discontent among local workers
and employees.
Mikoyan devoted a great deal of space to Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations.
He admitted that the breaking of the trade agreement with Yugoslavia in 1949
was a violation of international law, and there were many other instances, on a
larger and smaller scale, of breaking trade agreements. Indeed, they were
imperialistic moves, Mikoyan said.
Principles Are Principles: But Business Is Business
When I read this exceptionally frank statement of Mikoyan's I remembered
several cases of unilateral breaking of trade agreements with Poland by the
Soviet Union. I know, for example, that in the past few years, the Soviets broke
the agreement on supplying wheat and cotton for Poland, and besides, the Soviet
Union never paid any indemnity. Poland, on the other hand, was forced hastily
to look for new sources of grain and cotton suppl-es on the Western markets.
From the minutes of the secret session, it emerged clearly that Mikoyan had
violently condemned all discriminatory practices :9ncerning the People's Democ-
racies. Last January I could ascertain how sincere this condemnation of past
mistakes was. I was told that Mikoyan had delivered an address at the Con-
ference of Mutual Economic Aid which had been Yield last December in Budapest.
There, the Polish delegation proposed, quite Justifiably after all, that the export
of Polish coal and farm products to the Soviet Union and the other People's
Democracies, should be decreased. The Polish delegation also called attention
to the necessity of increasing exports of machines because this was the only way
to improve Poland's difficult economic situation.
In a long speech, Mikoyan said, among other things, that Poland's traditional
exports were coal and farm produce and that she should continue to export them.
I wonder how Mikoyan would have described this sort of economic aid last July?
WHAT Is POLAND TO THE SOVIET POLITBURO?
As I have mentioned several times, the secret session of the July Plenum was
primarily a scene for the battle between Molotov and the rest of the Politburo.
As usual in such battles, there was plenty of violent discussion and mutual
recrimination, and we know that in the heat of argument, matters about which
one normally remains silent reveal themselves That is precisely what hap-
pened in the course of those discussions.
It began with Khrushchev attacking Molotov because the latter did not fully
appreciate the damages that had arisen from the break with Marshal Tito and
from the subsequent history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. This accusation
seemed to have hurt Molotov a great deal. He violently defended his policies
and in his reply to Khrushchev's attacks, Polish affairs were brought suddenly
to the surface. In his comments on Poland, Molotov revealed the truth about
Soviet leaders' attitudes toward the People's Democracies.
I quote here briefly some of the arguments Molotov used as I remember them
from reading the stenographic report of that sec ret session.
Molotov began with an appraisal of the situation which preceded the break
with Yugoslavia. Indeed, he said, we made a grave error here. Why? Be-
cause without having exhausted all the possibilities for conciliation, we brought
about a break with Yugoslavia so sharply. I admit, he went on, that this error
in our policy caused many disadvantageous complications. Can the blame for
this, however, be put on Beria and Beriaism?
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I must admit that I read this last sentence with great emotion. Was it Molo-
tov's intention, I thought, to blame the break with Tito on Berta, and also on
Stalin and his other collaborators? But Molotov had something quite different
in mind. No, he said, to blame Berle and only Beria for breaking with Yugo-
slavia would have been a great error and untrue for an equal share of guilt
belongs to Yugoslavia and Marshal Tito. At that time, Tito's behavior was
provocative and anti-Soviet. If we had not then adopted the strong and definite
stand we took, he continued, we would have been confronted with grave compli-
cations in the other People's Democracies.
And that is how Polish affairs came to the surface. I read and did not believe
my own eyes.
Poland is So Many and So Many Divisions . . .
Let us take Poland as an example, Molotov continued. Which is more impor-
tant to use, Poland or Yugoslavia? Poland has 10 million people more than
Yugoslavia and Poland can mobilize 10 divisions more than Yugoslavia. And
we know only too well that not everything was right with the Polish Army at
the time of our conflict with Tito. There was, as we remember, Gomulka, in
Poland. If we had not taken a strong stand in Yugoslavia's case, Molotov
explained, who knows what would have happened in Poland? Poland would
have wavered and gone Yugoslavia's way. That is why, Molotov stated, our
sharp and definite reaction in the Yugoslav affair was perfectly justified, for
it prevented a still greater disaster.
However, we must admit, Molotov said, that our tactics were not always
proper. The best proof of that is the fact that we failed to repair our position
in Yugoslavia; hence, the conclusion that the policy we followed was false.
I must say that I read this part of Molotov's speech with great irritation.
Molotov was altogether cynical. Is that, I thought, the way a Soviet Foreign
Minister and Moscow Politburo member treats the friendly People's Democracies?
Is Poland for him merely the equivalent of so many people and so much cannon
fodder? For only in this sense was Poland more valuable to him than Yugo-
slavia. What should we think of our own Party line with respect to Soviet
policy, I thought, a policy which allegedly treats large and small nations
equally? Wasn't this cynical statement of Molotov's, the acting chief of Soviet
foreign policy, a proof that the Soviet Union was quite ready to sell out a smaller
ally for the price of gaining a stronger one, one who has at its disposal a larger
number of divisions?
While reading Molotov's statement I was further struck by the fact thet?
as he put it?Soviet policy with respect to Yugoslavia was wrong because it
failed to bring the anticipated results. Is it true, I thought, that even in deal-
ings with the People's Democracies, Molotov considers all methods, including
provocations, permissible provided they bring the expected results?
All Wolves Howl the Same
I was particularly indignant about the fact that Molotov was justifying this
policy of threat and blackmail even after Stalin's death. Even in the post-
Stalinist period, Moscow's policy of table pounding with respect to Poland and
the other People's Democracies was still justified.
I have already written that Molotov's speech made me indignant. I had
naively supposed that in the other Politburo members' speeches, particularly in
that of First Party Secretary Khrushchev, I would find unequivocal condemna-
tion of Molotov's stand. When I finished the stenographic record, I saw that my
Illusions were naive.
Certainly Khrushchev and other Politburo members attacked Molotov sharply,
but their views were merely the other side of the same coin. Their attitudes
toward the People's Democracies were similar to Molotov's; they differed from
him only in their estimate of the situation. As an example, let us take Khru-
shchev's final speech. He argued against Molotov's thesis that in the
Yugoslav case the policy was basically justified even if errors in it had taken
place, for it prevented Titoist outbreaks in the other People's Democracies.
Thus, Khrushchev said exactly the same thing as Molotov, except perhaps that
he saw a different danger in the Yugoslav example.
What was the difference between them? Molotov saw the danger in the
absence of harsh policies toward Tito: he maintained that without such policies,
other countries would follow in Yugoslavia's footsteps. On the other hand,
Khrushchev maintained that the danger lay in making policy too harsh and
this would result in pushing other People's Democracies on the Yugoslav road,
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and this might have happened particularly after Stalin's death. Not with so
much as a single word did he object to Molotov's contemptuous treatment of the
People's Democracies.
I understood then that Molotov, Khrushchev, and Mikoyan were in perfect
agreement as to the basic role of the People's Democracies. The difference lay
only in the degree of advantage that a policy would bring to the Soviet Union.
Was it to be a line of compromise and ignoring of ideological deviations, as
Khrushchev and Mikoyan wanted, or was it to be the older policy advocated by
Molotov? But all of them?Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Molotov treated the
People's Democracies with equal contempt. The only difference was that the
estimate by the first two was more realistic.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Bialer, did you have a mission at any time
to go to Moscow?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, Sir.
In November and December, 1954, I was the Assistant Chief of the
official delegation of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist
Party to the party authorities in Moscow.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, while you were in Moscow, were you able to meet
any of the top leaders of the Soviet Union?
The INTERPRETER. My most important task was rather to get in
touch with the propaganda agencies in Moscow and Leningrad con-
nected with the Russian Communist Party.
Naturally, in this capacity I met different, what you would call
important people both in the Soviet Union as well as in Poland.
But as far as le relations and the state of affairs in the Russian
Communist Party are concerned, among the leadership of the Russian
Communist Party, I know this from the official secret instructions
which were sent from Moscow to Warsaw, and thus I got acquainted
with most of them.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall a visit that Mr. Khrushchev made to
Warsaw in April of 1955?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir ? I recall this very well, indeed.
Mr. Moms. Did Khrushchev address the Communist Party work-
ers in Warsaw in 1955?
The INTERPRETER. Khrushchev, after his arrival in Poland, first
had a meeting with a large body of the workers in Novahuta. His
second meeting in Poland was in Warsaw with the Central Committee
and the active of the Polish Communist Party in Warsaw. I was
present at both meetings.
Mr. Mcanus. Now, will you describe the makeup of the audience
that attended this second meeting at which Khrushchev spoke?
The INTERPRETER. We called it the active of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party in Poland. This means the most active, im-
portant members of the Communist Party.
Mr. MORRIS. What was the number?
The INTERPRETER. No more than 200 people, rather much less.
Mr. MORRIS. Much less than 200 people.
Now, will you tell us what Khrushchev said to that particular group
of Polish Communists?
This is now April 1955, is it not?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
First, both of his speeches were very aggressive.
I drew a conclusion that the aim of his speech was to maintain an
offensive spirit among the party workers.
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First, he started his speech by saying that the heavy industry and
the armaments must be maintained at all cost.
Mr. MORRIS. Heavy industry and armaments must be maintained
at all cost?
The INTERPRETER. At all cost.
For instance, I remember such a detail. He said:
It is true that you do not have good ladies' hats. It is true that there is
probably not enough food in Poland. But you must remember, we must have,
first of all, heavy industry. The more steel we produce for the Soviet bloc, the
more sleepless nights Mr. Dulles will have in Washington.
Mr. MORRIS. "Mr. Dulles will have in Washington"?
The INTERPRETER. In Washington. Literally, he said, "He turns in
his bed when he learns about it."
Again, the most provocative incident in his speech against the
Western World was the following, and again I quote almost his words
since I remember them so well:
"We are discussing coexistence, but, of course, we must realize that
we cannot coexist eternally, for a long time. One of us must go to
his grave."
Mr. MORRIS. Meaning the free world and the United States on the
one hand, and the Polish nation on the other?
The INTERPRETER. On the one hand the United States, the Western
World; on the other hand, the Soviet bloc. One of us must go one
day to his grave.
[Continuing:] "We do not want to go to the grave.
"They," meaning Americans and the westerners, "they do not want
to go to their grave, either.
"So what can be done?
"We must push them to their grave."
This was the general tone of his speech.
Certainly we could recognize immediately the difference between
his tone when he was speaking for the newspapers or conferences
and when he was speaking to us at that meeting.
Mr. MORRIS. There was a difference in his tone?
The INTERPRETER. There was a difference, a basic difference, in his
tone. And, of course, the text, too.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, when you described that conversation to us,
did Khrushchev use precisely the same emphasis that you have given
us, or is that your estimate of Khrushchev's speech?
The INTERPRETER. Of course, there is a possibility that I misquoted
1 or 2 words. Basically I quoted him, since they were so important and
I remembered them, and they were fixed in my memory.
In addition, of course, his speech was put on a tape and then I had
the opportunity to listen to the tape again; so I remember this very
well.
I heard it after the Geneva Conference.
Mr. Moms. Now, as an active propagandist, did you deal with the
concept of coexistence?
The INTERPRETER. This was one of the most important matters to
which I attended.
For instance, after the first Geneva Conference, I was sent to many
provincial towns where I met the active of the local Communist
Party, discussing the situation.
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I authored several instructions, several papers, for the party workers
in this matter.
And, of course, there were organized for me several discussions in
which I would pass, orally, my advices and instructions.
Mr. MORRIS. What is the concept of coexistence? Is it used as a
weapon in Communist warfare?
The INTERPRETER. I would summarize this in such a way: Our most
important task with regard to the coexistence business was to con-
vince and to show to the people that the concept of coexistence is not a
withdrawal on the part of the Soviet bloc, but an offensive.
Mr. MORRIS. You say it is not a withdrawal?
The INTERPRETER. Withdrawal?
Mr. MORRIS. But an offensive?
The INTERPRETER. But an offensive of the Soviet bloc.
This was necessary, because in the first period of the so-called
coexistence, even the high membership of the Communist Party some-
times misunderstood the meaning of the Soviet policy.
This is why we were forced to organize a very large campaign all
over Poland in order to straighten them out and to explain to them the
real meaning of the coexistence campaign.
Senator BUTLER. In other words, this is just another twist in the
devious road of the Communist Party to world domination?
The INTERPRETER. Basically, yes, sir, with this difference, that this
is so important in the Communist strategy that I would call it, rather,
basic strategy.
I would place it in a category of basic strategy, since one of the main
purposes is to isolate the United States from the political, economic,
and ideological point of view, in the world, and this, of course, is very
important.
Senator BUTLER. In your opinion, is it equally important as the dis-
solution of the Comintern?
The INTERPRETER. I would say that the dissolution of the COM-
intern?
Mr. BIALER. Cominform.
The INTERPRETER. Cominform?is one of the expressions of this iso-
lation campaign against the United States.
Senator BUTLER. In other words, it is part of the general policy?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; part of a very large political program.
Mr. MORRIS. And would you say, Mr. Bialer, it was your purpose
as an active propagandist to instruct the workers as to the meaning of
this new strategy, particularly with respect to that aspect of it which
indicated that it was not a withdrawal, but rather an offensive measure?
The INTERPRETER. Yes. This was one of my most important tasks.
We considered it as the most important job at that time. There was,
for instance, a saying, a joke, circulated among the party members:
"It is true that we do not want any more revolution because the West-
erners will settle it themselves."
Mr. MORRIS. Now, how did the Geneva Conference of 1955 fit into
this framework?
The INTERPRETER. As far 118 I conceived, on the basis of my observa-
tions as a propagandist in Poland, that Conference indeed was a point
of issue for our propaganda, for all this coexistence campaign which
I described for.
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Not only in Poland, but also in the Russian Communist Party, in
the Soviet Union, everywhere, this Conference was presented as a
great Soviet victory. And may I tell you that my conviction is that
the masses believed it.
Mr. MORRIS. The Polish masses and the people in the Communist
countries believed it?
The INTERPRETER. This is my opinion.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know anything about Khrushchev's ma-
nipulations of Beria, Malenkov, and Molotov?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; I can speak about these matters on the basis
of three secret documents which I knew and which deal with this
matter.
The first document was a letter, a secret letter of the Central Com-
mittee of the Russian Communist Party, dealing with the matter of
the Beria incident.
The second document was a letter of the leadership of the Russian
Communist Party dealing with the dismissal of Malenkov.
And the third document is a secret official stenogram, minutes, of
the plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party,
which took place in July 1955.
Mr. Mouins. Now, you went into these three episodes in this declara-
tion that you prepared, did you not?
The INTERPRETER. Partly.
Mr. Mona's. Now, will you succinctly, as briefly as possible, tell us
about those three documents with respect to the question?
The INTERPRETER. First, these 3 documents describe the 3 basic stages
in the personnel changes in the Soviet leadership.
The first will be liquidation of Beria, the second, dismissal of Malen-
kov, and the third, the alienation from the leadership of Molotov.
In the first letter, the reasons for the liquidation of Beria were given.
In addition to those accusations which were made public in the press,
there were also other accusations unknown to the party.
For instance?and this comes to my mind in view of the present
visit of Marshal Tito in Moscow?one of the important accusations
against Beria, secret accusations, was the following:
The accusation was such: The best proof that Beria was engaged
in espionage activities directed against the Soviet Union was his
suggestion, after the death of Stalin, to reestablish relations with
Tito.
Mr. Momas. You mean that accusations were made against Beria
because he sought to reestablish contact with Tito?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
For instance, I remember there was a very particular accusation
that Beria wanted to establish a special telephone line between Moscow
and Belgrade in order to be in touch with Tito.
In addition to those accusations which I enumerated in the docu-
ment you mentioned, there was given also the method by which Beria
was liquidated.
For instance, there was a paragraph I remember that a political
bureau of the party could not reveal for some time its suspicions con-
cerning Beria. So they had to approve even erroneous decisions of
Beria for a certain period of time.
And one of the examples was the German affair.
72723-57?pt. 29-4
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For instance, the Soviet policy toward Eastern Germany in 1953
which resulted in the Berlin revolt of June 1953, was initiated by
Beria. The political bureau of the Russian Communist Party real-
ized it. They didn't want to stop Beria's policy, so that he would
not realize that they suspected him.
There is also, I remember now, another paragraph in that document
which will probably interest you in view of the present de-Staliniza-
tion campaign.
And this paragraph consisted: There was a question:
How was it possible that we, the leadership of the Russian Communist Party,
were able to liquidate Beria in such a short time after Stalin died, in only
3 months?
The whole idea of this argument was to prove that as long as Stalin
lived, the leadership of the party did not know the true activities of
Beria.
The final phase of this argument was that Beria became careless,
and because he became so careless and also impudent, convinced of
his power, we could discover his activities against the people.
I want to remind you that at that time Beria was liquidated with
the help of Malenkov, who was against him.
In February 1955, kalenkov's turn came.
The most characteristic aspect of the second document dealing with
Malenkov's affair is that very many accusations directed against Beria
had been repeated now with regard to Malenkov.
Of course, this is one of the aspects of the Soviet tactics. Those
accusations were not revealed at the time of the liquidation of Beria,
but the leadership waited for Malenkov's help to liquiate Beria, and
then they liquidated Malenkov with the same accusations.
For instance, an accusation concerning the agricultural crises was
repeated with regard to Beria and then also with regard to Malenkov.
The main accusation against Malenkov was that he underestimated
the importance of building the heavy industry.
It was maintained that such a policy of underestimating heavy in-
dustry was to become dangerous for the people's democracies.
This was in connection with Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of
Hungary, who was following the same Malenkov line in Hungary.
Malenkov was also indicted for coresponsibility in the Leningrad
trials.
The Leningrad trials lasted several years, and in those trials several
thousands of very active Communists were liquidated.
It was on that occasion of the dismissal of Malenkov that Shepilov,
the present Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union? appeared.
At that time, it was Shepilov who was directing the whole anti-
Malenkov campaign.
I think that one could say that probably the present appointment
of Shepilov is a kind of reward for his services in the dismissal of
Malenkov.
During the same session which decided the dismissal of Malenkov,
the Molotov affair started.
Again, the same method was applied as with regard to Malenkov.
Molotov was accused of a nonconformist speech which he delivered
at the time of Malenkov's dismissal. He was not accussed at the time
of the Malenkov dismissal because he was helpful at the time. He was
accused of this several months later.
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Around 6 weeks after the dismissal of Malenkov, Molotov's incident
took place.
At that time, the secret meeting of the Presidium of the Russian
Communist Party took place, and the discussion concerned the rela-
tions with Yugoslavia.
At that meeting Molotov announced himself against the reestablish-
ment of relations with Yugoslavia, relations government-to-govern-
ment.
He was criticized at that meeting and then at the time when Khrush-
chey and Bulganin left for Belgrade to visit Tito, he agreed, of course,
with their policy, meaning to reestablish the official relations between
the two governments.
However, although Molotov agreed to a reestablishment of the offi-
cial international relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,
he did not approve of Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit, and he did
not approve of a reestablishment of party relationship between the
Russian Communist Party and Tito's Communist Party.
However, he was outvoted. The decision was taken that Khru-
shchev and Bulganin should go to Yugoslavia, and the decision was
taken that Molotov's disapproval should be discussed in July of the
same year at the next meeting of the Presidium of the Communist
Party.
And indeed, in July 1955, the meeting took place and the central
committee of the Communist Party officially condemned Molotov's
position.
In addition to this matter, several other important matters were
discussed at that meeting.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you cover those in this declaration?
The INTERPRETER. The minutes of the July meeting of the central
committee took more than 100 pages, and, of course, I couldn't cover
them in this document.
Mr. MoRais. Does it cover the general area?
The INTERPRETER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, are there any more points that you want to make
with respect to my general question at this time?
Mr. Bialer, I realize it is a vast subject. There are some aspects of
intelligence Which directly relate to the work of the Internal Security
Subcommittee. If you think that you have made a fairly represent-
ative statement in response to the question, we might go to these other
subjects.
The INTERPRETER. I hope that perhaps at another occasion I will
have an opportunity to speak about this document, which is very in-
teresting. So probably at the present moment I shall not continue.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to make some statements about it now, by
way of concluding that last aspect of your testimony?
The INTERPRETER. I would like to add that there was also a very long
and important discussion concerning Austria at that meeting.
Molotov proposed the Soviet withdrawal from Austria.
Now, the argument against his position, the argument taken by
IChruslichev,. was that the Soviet withdrawal from Austria will not
cost the Soviet Union anything; it will be without any importance,
anyway.
This kind of withdrawal would not weaken the Soviet Union from
any point of view, from any practical point of view.
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It would not weaken the Soviet Union.
That is all for the moment as far as this matter is concerned.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, in your work in the Communist Party of Poland,
did you come to know anything about espionage or military intelli-
gence that was carried out by the Polish Communist leaders?
The INTERPRETER. You mean, against the United States?
Mr. MORRIS. Against the United States.
The INTERPRETER. Yes, I know certain facts. Are you interested?
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know any Polish military intelligence agents
who came to the United States?
The INTERPRETER. I know two such cases.
The first case concerned Colonel Melchior.
Mr. MORRIS. Who was Colonel Melchior?
The INTERPRETER. He is one of the most outstanding and respected
employees of the Polish military intelligence.
I have known him personally for the fast 10 years.
In 1949, we were working together and then at that time in 1949 he
passed to the strictly military intelligence activities.
He was appointed as the Polish vice consul in New York City.
Mr. Moms. Now, was that a cover for his activities, or was that his
real role?
The INTERPRETER. Well, sir, I will answer this way: Colonel Mel-
chior is on such a level and he is considered as such an outstanding
member of the military intelligence in Poland, and so well known in
Poland, that if lie were appointed as the Ambassador to the United
States, it would not be too much of a distinction.
So since he was only vice consul, which is not such a high position,
it was evident that this was only a cover for his other activities.
Senator BUTLER. That was not the question. The question was
whether he was using his position as a cover for his real activities.
The INTERPRETER. Yes, I am sure of it, that this was only a cover
for his activities concerning military intelligence.
Senator BUTLER. And espionage?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
I see as, for instance, one of the indications, that after his return to
Poland, he went directly to military intelligence and is working in
the same department he was workingin at the moment he left Poland.
I saw him in December 1955, exactly in that capacity.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, did he use the name of Melchior, or did he go
by any other name?
The INTERPRETER. No, sir. His true name was Melon, but the name
which he is using for years is Melchior, the first one.
Mr. MORRIS. Row, what was the other example of espionage in the
United States?
The INTERPRETER. The second case, well known to me, was sending
to the United States an officer of the Polish military intelligence,
Samuel Ehrlich.
I have known him also for very many years.
In 1950-51, there were rumors spread on purpose that he was leav-
ing for Moscow for a special school in the field of intelligence.
So he disappeared from Poland.
In reality, as I learned later, he did not go to Moscow at that time.
He was sent to the United States and he was assigned to look for a job,
and he received a position at one of the American universities.
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He went to one of the American universities.
Mr. Mourns. And do you know that he had an espionage assignment
at the time?
The INTERPRETER. I am certain of it. He was and he is presently
a captain in the Polish military intelligence. I saw him before I left
Poland, in Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, you do know what that man looks like; do you
not?
The INTERPRETER. Very, very exactly, I know.
Mr. MORRIS. And if we show you some pictures, you might be able
to tell us who he is?
The INTERPRETER. Surely.
Mr. MORRIS. You do not know whether he used the name of Samuel
Ehrlich when he was teaching at one of the American universities.
The INTERPRETER. He was not a professor at that university. He
was at the university, and, of course, I would recognize him.
When I said that he was at the university, I did not mean that he
was a professor. He was a student at the university, in order to have
an official coverage for his activities in this country. He is not an old
man.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, how is the Polish intelligence organized?
The INTERPRETER. I couldn't give you exact information on this
subject. This is a very specialized subject.
Mr. MORRIS. And your field is propaganda and not intelligence?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; mostly political propaganda.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you know any of the American Communists
who left the United States and returned to Poland, their native
Poland?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; several cases.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Arski?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; I know him.
Mr. MORRIS. Is that Stefan Arski?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Stefan Arski used to be one of the
people on the Polish desk of the Office of War Information in the
United States.
What was Stefan Arski doing?
The INTERPRETER. Mr. Stefan Arski is presently in Poland. He
is a journalist, and one of the most violently antiwestern and anti-
American journalists. He specializes in American affairs, and he
contributes mostly to the People's Tribune, an official organ of the
Communist Party in Poland.
He wrote several books which we used as a kind of basis for our
anti-American propaganda.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel here has the testimony
before the Kersten Committee, the House committee that investigated
the Katyn Forest massacre, and Mr. Arski of the Office of War Infor-
mation figured in that inquiry.
I wonder if we might put that testimony before that committee
about Mr. Arski into the record.
Senator BUTLER. It will be so ordered.
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(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 287" and reads
as follows:)
EXHIBIT No. 287
Excerpt from the Katyn Forest massacre, hearings before the Select Committee
To Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the
Ka tyn Forest Massacre, 82d Congress, 2d session on investigation of the mur-
der of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia,
part 7. November 11, 1952 (p. 1993)
Mr. MAcHaowIcz (Representative Thaddeus M. Machrowicz of Michigan).
Did you know a Stefan Arski, alias Arthur Salman?
Mr. DAvis (Elmer Davis, wartime director of the Office of War Information).
No.
Mr. MAcHnowicz. For your information, he was also employed by the Office of
War Informa tion in 1945. He is now in Warsaw, Poland, and is editor in chief
of the Communist paper Robotnik, which means the Worker, the most outspoken
anti-American organ in Warsaw. He at that time was also an employee of the
Office of War Information. You have no recollection of him?
Mr. DAVIS. No.
Mr. MACHROWITZ. You have no recollection of either Ambassador Ciechanowski
or Congressman Lesinski warning you about the fact that these three persons
were known Communists, and were in the employ of the Office of War Informa-
tion?
Mr. DAVIS. I don't remember that Mr. Lesinski ever warned me about any-
thing. Mr. Ciechanowski, perhaps by his excessive number of warnings, made
me forget which particular ones he especially spoke about.
Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would it refresh your recollection if I told you that you
told Ambassador Ciechanowski to keep away from that matter?
Mr. Davis. I don't know, " *
Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you know Irving; Potash?
Mr. Chairman, Irving Potash was convicted under the Smith Act
and ordered deported to Poland in 1955.
What is Mr. Potash doing in Poland?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, I know him. I spent with Irving Potash,
formerly a member of the political bureau of the Polish Communist
Party, of the American Communist Party?I spent with him 2 weeks
at the International Communist House, Holiday House, in Zakopane,
in Poland. This was March 1955.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, what is Potash's job in Poland?
The INTERPRETER. The most characteristic factor concerning this
man is that he was not used in Poland for the propaganda work, and
he disappeared in Poland altogether.
He disappeared. He is no more.
I remember those 2 weeks I spent with him. At that time he was
very m,uch emotionally broken, affected. He suffered very much
seeing the reality in Poland.
He had no idea before how bad things are in Poland.
Particularly he was impressed by the unfriendly attitude of the
Polish people, the Polish masses, toward the Polish Communist Party.
In any case, the fact that a man of this caliber was not used in
Poland in a propaganda way, this is a very exceptional case, and rather
indicates that unpleasant things happened to him.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Henrik Podolski ?
Mr. Chairman, Henrik Podolski was the former editor-in-chief of
Glos Ludowy, a Polish Communist paper in Detroit.
The INTERPRETER. Yes, I know Henrik Podolski.
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Henrik Podolski has two main assignments presently in Poland.
The first one is to work in the campaign of repatriation of the Polish
emigres, postwar emigres in the West, and the second, to instruct the
American paper, People's Voice, in Detroit.
Mr. MORRIS. You mean, he is still running the Detroit newspaper?
The INTERPRETER. This paper receives strict instructions from
Poland, and he is the man who is sending them.
I met him several times in connection with his work in the propa-
ganda division and foreign affairs division of the central committee
of the Polish Communist Party.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have many other such instances, at
least some other instances such as that, together with a great deal of
other material, and if you say, Senator, we do have to stop now, I
think we will have to resume again on Monday.
Senator BUTLER. Yes. We will adjourn now and recess until
Monday.
I would like to say this for the record, that the testimony of Mr.
Bialer this morning, with its importance to the work of the Internal
Security Subcommittee and the understanding of recent world events,
indicates the great usefulness of defectors. This testimony shows very
convincingly that there are important people behind the Iron Curtain
who want to join the free world. When these people come over to us,
they bring important intelligence information.
In this way, we can learn the real meaning of the Communist
strategy of world conquest.
But more important, their defection impresses on the world the
great vulnerability of the Communist world?the fact that these people
are kept in bondage. All our agencies as well as the Congress should
do everything possible to encourage more defections.
I want to thank you, Mr. Bialer, for coming here. We will stand
in recess until Monday morning.
Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the Judiciary Committee meets Monday
morning. Suppose we make it 2 o'clock in the afternoon on Monday?
Senator BUTLER. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock Monday
afternoon, at which time we will ask you to return, Mr. Bialer.
Mr. MORRIS. Will you return at 2 o'clock, Mr. Bialer?
The INTERPRETER. I want to thank you, sir, for the opportunity
which you gave me to come to this committee and to give this
testimony.
Mr. Moms. And we are grateful to you, Mr. Bialer.
Senator BUTLER. Thank you, sir.
(Whereupon, at 11: 55 a. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene
at 2p. m., Monday, June 11, 1956.)
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? MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1956
UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND
OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY,
? Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., in room 318,
Senate Office Building, Senator James 0. Eastland (chairman) pre-
siding.
Present: Senator Eastland.
Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William Rusher, admin-
istrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.
Chairman EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, both the witness, Mr. Bialer, and the
interpreter have been sworn. It is a continued hearing.
Chairman EASTLAND. Proceed.
TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN DIALER, AS INTERPRETED BY
JAN KARSKI?Resumed
Mr. MORRIS. Senator, in connection with the aspects of the testimony
of Mr. Bialer on internal security, we had at the last session men-
tioned the case of Samuel Ehrlich, who was an important intelli-
dense espionage personality in Poland, who was sent to the United
tates with the knowledge of the witness. He came here under the
rover of a student at an American university.
We also had the case of Colonel Melchior, who was the Polish vice
consul in New York, and Mr. Bialer has testified that, even though
he was appearing as a vice consul in New York, he was actually one of
the top military espionage people in Poland.
We had discussed the case of Irving Potash, who is now in Poland.
We had the case of Stefan Arski, who was one of the officials of our
own Office of War Information, who is one of the people in Poland
directing anti-American propaganda against the United States.
We had the case of Mr. Podolski who is now, according to the tes-
timony of Mr. Bialer, directing a Detroit newspaper from 'Warsaw.
Now, we have some more cases like that, Senator. I would like
to go into those at the beginning of this hearing.
Chairman EASTLAND. Proceed.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a Mr. Kalescki ?
The INTERPRETER. Michael Kalescki.
72723-57?pt. 29--5,
1579
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Mr. MORRIS. Michael Kalescki. What is Michael Kalescki doing
flow?
The INTERPRETER. He arrived in Poland in the summer of 1955.
Mr. MORRIS. From the United States?
The INTERPRETER. From the United States. Yes. He was working
in the United States, in the United Nations Organization, and he
arrived in Poland in the summer of 1955.
Presently he occupies a position of personal economic ambassador to
the virtual economic dictator of Poland, Mine.
Mr. MoRms. What is he doing? You say he is an economic adviser ?
The INTERPRETER. A personal economic adviser.
Mr. MORRIS. To the?
The INTERPRETER. To the virtual economic dictator in Poland,
named Mine. In addition, he is also charged with studies concerning
the economic situation in the United States and in other parts of the
world.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, what is George Siskind doing?
George Siskind, Senator, was an American Communist who was
prosecuted under the Smith Act and has been deported to Poland.
The INTERPRETER. Presently, he is working in the Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, which is attached to the Polish Foreign Ministry.
And again in this institute, he is charged with American affairs.
I would like to stress here that Siskind is particularly active pres-
ently in Poland in the field of anti-American propaganda.
The second question which I would like to stress here is this: As you
know, recently there were discussions in Poland concerning relaxation
of the propaganda and also a tendency to disclose more truth about
the Western World to the Polish people. Siskind was one of those
men who did not want it.
Recently, for instance, he published an article in this year, the cur-
rent year, an article in a Communist paper, New Roads, in which he
attacked America with fantastic lies.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do we have anything in the record to show
what position Mr. George Siskind had with the American Commu-
nrst Party?
Mr. MANDEL. He was a member of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and a teacher at its national training school.
Mr. MORRIS. In the United States?
Mr. MANDEL. In the United States.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you know Mr. Katz-Suchy ?
The INTERPRETER. I have known him very well indeed. I worked
with him for a while.
Mr. Monms. And you say you have known him very well?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, SIT.
Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what he has been doing in Poland?
The INTERPRETER. First, he is director of that Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs which I mentioned before, where Siskind is working;
and, as you know, he is also a Polish delegate to the United Nations, to
different conferences of the United Nations.
At the return of Katz-Suchy to Poland from the United States,
where he was a guest of the United States, it was exploited by him
and by the party for violent anti-American propaganda.
I must say that he was doing it in a very primitive, obvious way.
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I would like to add here, lately I could observe some changes in him.
For instance, in December 1955 I took part in a certain discussion in
the party where Katz-Suchy was also present.
The discussion concerned peaceful coexistence, and there Katz-
Suchy made an observation that he doubted personally if the United
States really wanted a, war.
For this he was criticized very much by other participants in the
discussion.
Mr. MORRIS. What was that last answer? I am sorry, sir.
The INTERPRETER. For this he was criticized by other participants
in the discussion.
Mr. MORRIS. I see.
Is there anything more he wants to say about Mr. Katz-Suchy ?
The INTERPRETER. At the present, I would prefer not to say more.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about the Soviet truce team
in Korea, the Polish truce team making up the neutral commission
in Korea?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; I have certain information from the high-
est sources.
The first one, for instance: The Chairman of the Polish Truce
Commission in Korea, General Morsky, was my subordinate in the
party before he left for Korea.
For instance, the Polish commissions for Korea and for Vietnam
received a special fund in order to get collaborators from other nations,
for instance, Swiss people, or Canadians, or others.
In this respect, 1 would like to say, for instance, how well it was
organized. In the summer of 1955, a special officer of the Polish
military intelligence, Major Chylinski, left for Vietnam in order to
check, or supervise, this kind of activity.
He left in order to check how the work of getting agents from
among the Swiss, Canadian or French commissions was going on.
Mr. MORRIS. Let me see if I understand that, now. You say that
Mr. Bialer says that special funds were allocated by the Polish Com-
munist Government so that these funds could be used to recruit and
to get agents in other delegations who would help the Polish team?
The INTERPRETER. Yes.
Chairman EASTLAND. Now, wait a minute. He said he had that
information from the highest sources. Who are those sources?
The INTERPRETER. As I told you, Senator, the first source of infor-
mation was General Morsky, the chairman of the Polish team in
Korea, who was my subordinate in the party. The second source of '
information was General Krzenien, his predecessor in Korea. The
third source of information was General Grosz, the chairman of
the Polish team in the neutral commission in Cambodia.
But the most reliable information certainly was that from Major
Chylinski, who was sent to Vietnam to supervise this action of recruit-
ing agents.
I had also other sources of information which I would prefer to
give you at some other occasion.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, was this an intelligence
The INTERPRETER. I have in mind closed-door.
Mr. MORRIS. I see. Was this an intelligence operation?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Have you other--
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The INTERPRETER. He was formerly adjutant of the chief of the
Polish military intelligence, General Komar.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wonder if you would give us same more ex-
amples as to how this operation was conducted.
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
There was one other means. There is a special instruction and
funds for the Polish member of the Polish team to give loans, even to
impose financial loans to the members of other commissions to have
them in hand.
Mr. MORRIS. Let me see if I understand that. You mean there was a
money grant made so that people on the Polish team could make money
loans to people on the other neutral teams?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, Sir. And one other instance: Usually Polish
members have vodka, a certain amount of vodka which they distribute
in order to get social relations with them and to have occasion to speak
to them and to get them as agents, to have social relations as often as
possible with them.
What is probably more important is this: Any derogatory informa-
tion about anyone from any other commission is very meticulously col-
lected and immediately sent to Warsaw and eventually used in the
future.
Another factor, for instance: The Polish teams in South as well as
North Korea are in closest touch with the central committee of the
Communist Party in North Korea.
In this respect, numerous meetings of the central committee of the
North Korean Communist Party were held. Members of the Polish
teams would be there, and they would receive advice from the central
committee of the North Korean Communist Party.
Mr. MORRIS. You mean the North Korean Communists would be ad-
vising the members of the so-called Polish neutral team?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other such instances, Mr. Bialer ? Do
you know of any other such instances?
Tho INTERPRETER. I know this problem well. So I think probably it
would be better, sir, if you would ask me specific questions. I don't
know what you have in mind.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, a news dispatch in today's Washington
Daily News, for instance, says that:
Allied forces in South Korea are gradually being disarmed by the creeping obso-
lescence of their weapons compared with the illegally modernized Communist
forces in North Korea, high American officials charged today.
If the United States, the Republic of Korea, and other allies continue to abide
by the 1953 truce restrictions much longer, their forces in Korea will be com-
pletely outdone by the Communists, these sources warn.
Now, do you know that the Communists in North Korea are building
up their forces against the American forces and the U. N. forces in
South Korea?
The INTERPRETER. Of course' I couldn't tell you to what degree the
armaments in North Korea could be dangerous to South Korea or our
allies. But I can only say that there is a strict collaboration between
the Polish teams in the truce commission and the North Korean Com-
munist Party.
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And these armaments are taking place and the Polish teams are
doing everything in their power to cover those armaments before
the world public opinion.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know what currency makes up these
special funds? Is it American currency or what currency?
The INTERPRETER. Not in Polish currency, but in different western
currencies.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, do you know what Oscar Lange is doing
now?
Oscar Lange, Mr. Chairman, was formerly an American citizen,
who sometime late in the war and shortly after the war went over
to Soviet Poland.
The INTERPRETER. I know him very well. Oscar Lange holds a very
high position in the present Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, I believe he passes as a Socialist. Is he a
Socialist?
The INTERPRETER. He is a member of the central committee of the
Polish Communist Party.
He is a member of the state council in Poland and altogether he
is a very high official in Poland. Presently he is out of Poland.
Presently he is in India performing a task of an economic adviser
to the Indian Government. He spent a certain time in India also last
year, and there he was helping the Indian Government form their
economic plan.
Naturally, he represents the interests not only of the Polish Com-
munists but of all the Soviet bloc in India.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Bialer, we have been taking testimony in
the Internal Security Subcommittee for the last 6 or 8 weeks on
the repatriation campaign.
Have you had any experience with the Polish repatriation
campaign?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; I have certain information in this repect.
First, as far as the aim of repatriation is concerned, it is in the main
an economic one. Repatriation has an aim, particularly political
goals. They charge that repatriation is important from the internal
and from the international point of view.
The party in Poland wants first of all the repatriation of the Polish
intellectuals.
So far they consider in Warsaw that no great achievements took
place as far as the return of intellectuals is concerned.
They are interested particularly in repatriation of those who left
Poland after the war and went to the West. They wanted them to
come back. For instance, the Polish sailors. There were several
Polish sailors on the ship Labor, and they asked for asylum in the
T7nited States.
Some of them returned to Poland and then they were used in Poland
for a very serious propaganda campaign.
Particularly I would like to stress that they want back those who
left Poland after the war, in order to use them for propaganda.
They do not care so much for the so-called old emigrees.
As far as the methods are concerned, there is a special radio station
called Kraj, The Country. There are also leaflets which are being
sent out. This concerned the so-called old emigration, those people
who left Poland before the Second World War.
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This kind of propaganda from Kraj, from leaflets, from the old
emigration, exaggerates so much that even they go further than the
official Communist propaganda, because they believe that the old
emigrees would believe it.
As far as the new emigration is concerned, meaning the emigration
of the Second World War and after the Second World War, there were
mainly four methods used.
Mr. MORRIS. These are the four steps in their repatriation campaign?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; in working on them.
First of all, as far as the new emigration is concerned, the personal
contacts play a very important role. So first they received individual
letters from their families.
Mr. MoRilis. Now, did you personally engage in this repatriation
campaign?
The INTERPRETER. These activities were carried on by the foreign
section of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party. I
collaborated closely with that section.
MT. MORRIS. I see.
And you say the first means of getting people to repatriate is by
personal contact, letters, and personal discussions?
The INTERPRETER. Yes. Altogether, personal contacts, they stress
them very much.
So the first step, the first method, is those letters from their families.
Here I want to say that those letters are genuine letters. They are
really written by the families. Of course, they were enforced by the
party.
Mr. MORRIS. They were enforced?
The INTERPRETER. They were enforced.
Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the people had to write them?
The INTERPRETER. Yes. They were not written of their own initia-
tive. They were ordered to write them.
It was organized; the whole campaign.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, what is the second point?
The INTERPRETER. The second method is promises:
If you return to Poland, you will have a better job and you will make more
money and you will have more opportunities than you have in the country in
which you are living presently.
The third method is an appeal to ambition, to vanity, to a desire of
a personal glory:
If you return to Poland, you will be famous; you will have opportunities to
speak to the people.
The fourth method is simply blackmail, sheer blackmail.
Mr. Momus. Will you explain that?
The INTERPRETER. So here in this respect I would like to draw your
attention to one thing. Before, the blackmail was a direct blackmail.
A man would come to a prospective returnee and tell him, "If you do
not return, we will say about you this and this." Now, this direct
blackmail is not carried on anymore. More subtle methods are being
used.
So now they learned not to speak so directly. So a man from the
Embassy, for instance, would approach such a Polish emigrant and
he will tell him, "We advise you to come back, Comrade. Remember,
you have a family over there. You want them to be happy." They
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do not finish their threat; this in order that it cannot be proved that
they blackmailed the man.
Naturally, a man who is from Poland, even if the conversation is not
finished, understands very well what the other man wants to tell him.
But legally, naturally, he cannot prove that he was blackmailed.
Mr. MORRIS. Were you in Poland when the Polish seamen returned
last October?
The INTERPRETER. Who?
Mr. Monms. The Polish seamen who redefected, returned?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir. I was in Poland.
Mr. Momus. Would you tell us something about that?
The INTERPRETER. So far as those sailors, or seamen, were concerned,
exactly these kinds of methods were used with regard to them.
Mr. MORRIS. And was that much of a propaganda victory for the
Communists in Warsaw?
The INTERPRETER. I think that they are very successful in this kind
of propaganda activities.
Mr. MORRIS. Was that particular one a success?
The INTERPRETER. Yes. It was a very great success and I doubt if
all of you realize it in this country.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know, a few years ago two Russian flyers,
a man named Barsov and a man named Pirogov, both defected. In
the course of time one of them, Barsov, redefected. Now, we have
heard from Mr. Petrov, in Australia, that Mr. Barsov was executed in
the Soviet Union after he redefected. Do you know anything about
that?
The INTERPRETER. No; I don't know anything about this fact. But
I know something about another fact of the same nature.
Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what that was?
The INTERPRETER. This concerns a certain Polish private who tried
to go abroad who was caught and who was killed in Poland.
'kr. MORRIS. He was killed when his escape failed?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; after he tried to escape.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have not been able to get any verifi-
cation of the information which Mr. Petrov has given, namely, that he
had heard that Barsov had been executed after he went back to Russia.
If so, it is an important fact for us to establish, Senator.
Would you tell us about the propaganda that was being made in
Poland from sources in the United States such as the labor-research
group and the output of the United Electrical and Radio Machine
Workers in the United States?
The INTERPRETER. These two organizations which you mentioned,
sir, they are fundamental, they are basic sources of anti-American
propaganda, not only in Poland but all over the Soviet bloc.
If you are interested, I could give you countless instances in which
statistics, for instance, of these two organizaitons are being used over
there in an anti-American propaganda campaign.
For instance materials prepared by the United Electrical Workers
are mimeographed. They were sent to Poland; they were discussed
at the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, and they
were recommended then to different agencies for use in order to falsify
life in America.
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I would like to indicate why the material of these two organizations
is so important in Poland.
The party in Poland realized that many people in Poland do not
believe them any more.
Then the party distributes the material prepared by these two
organizations, saying, "You know, this is American material, pre-
pared in America, written by Americans. We have nothing to do
with it in this case." Of course, people believe it.
For instance, I remember there were discussions with Soviet officers,
party workers and others, and in these discussions very often when
the factual material given by the Soviet propaganda was challenged,
the Soviets would say again "Here we have material which is coming
from the United States. You cannot put this in doubt." We quote
it. And naturally, they close the mouth of anybody who does not
believe their propaganda.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify for the record the Labor
Research Association?
Mr. MANDEL. It has been cited by Attorney General Tom Clark
on December 4, 1947. It is known as a direct auxiliary of the Com-
munist Party. It publishes labor fact books and economic releases
for the Communist press, and it is headed by two leading Communists,
Grace Hutchins and Robert Dunn.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you describe it as a direct auxiliary of
the Communist Party. They do not bill themselves as such, though,
do they?
Mr. MANDEL. NO; they do not.
Mr. Moiaurs. They do not acknowledge that they are a Communist
source ? do they?
Mr. MANDEL. They do not.
Mr. MORRIS. Has he finished
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir. I explained to him what you were
saying.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wondered, were you in Poland when Swiatlow's
defection and subsequent broadcasts were beamed to Poland?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; I was in Poland at this time.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Swiatlow at all before he defected?
The INTERPRETER. No; I never met him.
Mr. MORRIS. What was the effect of his defection in Poland?
The INTREPETER. In this respect, first, it is very obvious to me that
one could not say that Swiatlow's defection was a cause for all personal
changes which are taking place in Poland now.
But naturally, his defection contributed to these changes very lately.
The first importance of Swiatlow's defection was that the party and
the Government had been forced to reveal very many details concern-
ing those men they liquidated later which otherwise they would not
be forced to reveal.
In addition, all this which American radios different stations from
abroad, all this information supplied on Swiatlow's material, of course,
they opened the eyes of many people in Poland concerning the real
nature of the Communist Government in Poland.
In this respect, for instance, I remember such an interesting detail:
The foreign radio is beamed generally in Warsaw. But you can
listen to it in the suburbs of Warsaw. At the time of Swiatlow's
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broadcasts to Poland, there were literally huge crowds of people who
were trying to get to the suburban houses evidently to listen on the
radio to what Swiatlow was saying.
Swiatlow's defection and the broadcasts he was giving here caused
great nervousness amonff. the governmental and party officials.
Could I assure you that if Bierut were ill and had heart trouble at
that time, no doubt one of the causes of his heart trouble was Swiatlow.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall the visit of Boris Polevoj to the United
States ? He had a group of political writers. I think it was the
summer of 1955.
The INTERPRETER. There were several things which are interesting
in respect to Polevoj and Bierazkow?there are several things which
I would like to mention. They gave interviews here in the United
States. The nature of those interviews was such that they were not
published in Poland. They were not allowed to be published in
Mr. MORRIS. You mean, what they said over here?
The INTERPRETER. Was not allowed to be published in Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. Why was that? Was it so obviously false?
The INTERPRETER. The reason why those interviews could not be
published in Poland was this: Polevoj gave so many lies concerning
the life behind the Iron Curtain that if his lies would be reprinted in
Poland, evidently not only would nobody believe in it, but this would
result in a contrary opinion. The public opinion would learn how
the Polish and the Soviet regimes are misguiding the Western World.
For instance, I remember such a case: Polevoj's interview was mime-
ographed and distributed among i the members of the central com-
mittee of the Communist Party n the district of Cracow, and this
was distributed only among the party workers. When the party
authorities in Warsaw learned about it, they criticized very much the
decision of the party organization in Cracow. They criticized the
activities of the director of propaganda of the Communist Party in
Cracow.
It was the first case in which an interview of a Communist given
abroad, outside of the Soviet bloc, was banned within the Soviet bloc.
Chairman EASTLAND. We will take the rest of it in executive session.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, Senator Eastland has to terminate the hear-
ing at this particular time. He has asked if we would continue on to
take the testimony in executive session later on this afternoon, and.
then put that executive session testimony in the public record at some
date later in the week.
Chairman EASTLAND. Mr. Bialer, we will take the rest of your testi-
mony in executive session. It will later be released.
I want to thank you, sir. I think your testimony points up the
importance of defectors and how helpful they are to our Government.
They are something that we should certainly encourage.
(Whereupon, at 2: 55 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene
in room 319 at 3 : 05 p.m.)
Mr. MORRIS. This is a continuation.
Mr. Bialer, do you know anything about schools of international
communism?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
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Mr. Monars. Would you tell us about it?
The INTERPRETER. I Will tell you you about those schools I know
personally.
There is a school in the suburbs of East Berlin where they train
Communist workers for Western Germany.
This is a very secret school, guarded by the police. Nobody has
any access to it.
The school had been organized in the woods, and it is completely
unavailable to any kind of public.
I lectured at that school in 1955; in June 1955.
The subject of the education in that school is, first, how to carry
on Communist activities in the West; then also other things like mili-
tary training included.
In respect to the military training, I remember, for instance, in
1955 that there were special courses on how to get into the Army in
Western Germany. There were classes, lectures, on how to get into
and work with the Western German Army.
Those who lecture in that school are both Communists from the
Western part of Germany, and of course, Communists from East
Germany.
The second school?
Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of that first school?
The INTERPRETER. This was a secret school without any name.
This was a school just for the party apparatus in Eastern Germany,
for the party members from West Germany trained in that school.
The second school I was acquainted with personally was a higher
school, a party school in Moscow.
The school is housed in the same building where, before, the
Comintern was operating, the schools of the Comintern.
At that school, which is mainly for the Soviet Communists, there
are also special groups consisting of Western Communists, of the
Communists outside of the Soviet bloc.
There are classes where there are German, East and West German,
Communists, French, and others, Polish, Czechoslovak, German, East
and West.
As far as Western Communists are concerned, there are not as many
of them and they form special classes for them, and also, from the
conspirAional point of view, probably it would not be good to have
large clases for them.
This is why this kind of Communists in the West, they are dis-
tributed under false names among other groups in the groups of the
Russian Communists.
Mr. MORRIS. And where was this second group held?
The INTERPRETER. In MOSCOW.
Mr. Mom's. In what building?
The INTERPRETER. I don't remember the street; in the building where
formerly the Comintern schools were operating.
The fact that in that building there is this particular school is public
knowledge. Of course, people do not know what happens there.
The fact of the existence of the school is publicly known.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know about the case of Herman Field?
The INTERPRETER. Well, I would like to give you some information
about what the party people were saying after Herman Field was
released.
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So first, the second man in importance at that time in the Communist
Party, Berman, was saying that Herman Field was a naive, innocent
man, that he was arrested unjustly.
Mr. MORRIS. Unjustly from the Communist point of view?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; that he was not guilty; that he was naive,
and not guilty.
Mr. Mona's. "Guilt" in this case being spying for the Americans?
The INTERPRETER. Yes.
The second version concerning Herman Field was being spread in
more narrow party circles, and it was spread by Ochab, the present
first secretary of the Polish Communist Party.
And his version was such that the crimes committed by the previous
administration were of such magnitude that not only innocent people
could have been arrested but also that people who were guilty, their
affairs were so mixed up, so confused, that they had to be released.
Mr. Mown& Did you ever see Herman Field?
The INTERPRETER. NO, sir; only pictures.
But I met his wife at some friends' before he was arrested.
Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?
The INTERPRETER. Most probably?it is difficult to remember?it
was 1948.
I saw her in the house of a certain George Durac and his wife. It
was in the suburbs of Warsaw, called Zoliborz.
By the way, the wife of that,Durac was later arrested and spent sev-
eral years in jail because of her connections with Herman Field.
She was a secretary to Berman, and she contacted Field and Berman.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you know anything about the Katyn Forest
massacre?
The INTERPRETER. Yes.
There were very few people, actives of the Polish Communist Party,
who wouldn't believe that the Russians did it.
Their opinion, nevertheless, was divided, of those who believed the
Russians did it, and it was divided following two lines: Some of them
were say that the Russians were right doing it; others were saying that
the Russians were wrong having done it.
Mr. MORRIS. But they all agreed that the Russians did it?
The INTERPRETER. But all agreed that the Russians did it.
But I must stress until I left Poland, no efforts were seen to reveal
it or to declare that the Russians did it. On the contrary, if anyone
would make such statements openly, the party would immediately
suppress the statement.
Mr. MORRIS. Where were you at that time? That was in 1940, was
it not?
The INTERPRETER. Katyn, 1940. I was in Poland at that time.
Mr. MORRIS. And you know nothing about it personally?
Mr. BIALER. No.
Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us something about the fall of Molotov
and the rise of Shepilov ?
The INTERPRETER. First, Molotov fell, not in June 1956, but rather
in July 1955.
In July 1955 there was a _plenum of the central committee, and at
that plenum practically Molotov was separated from any important
work of the party.
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Mr. Momus. How do you know that?
The INrEaruETER. I know it from the minutes of that particular
plenum, which was sent to the party in Poland, to the political bureau
of the Polish Communist Party.
As it was indicated by the party at that time, the main reason for
Molotov's downfall was his disagreement with the Soviet policy with
regard to Yugoslavia.
There were also other reasons as given by the party why Molotov
had to go. Of course, the most important reason was, among others,
the personal struggle for power within the party.
Mr. MORRIS. When you say that Molotov 's position with respect to
Yugoslavia was the reason, what was his position with respect to
Yugoslavia?
The INTERPRETER. I mean that Molotov did not approve of estab-
lishing party relations with Yugoslavia.
He was saying that the Yugoslavian Party was not a Communist
Party and consequently there was no sense to establishing relations.
Khrushchev did not agree with Molotov. He agreed with him as
to the nature of the Yugoslavian Communist Party, but his argument
was that if we do not establish relations with them, we will be unable
to get them into the Soviet bloc.
Mr. Mourns. Now, do you know to what extent the absorption of
Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc, to what extent that has taken
place?
The INTERPRETER. Throughout the last year there were efforts being
made for establishing relations between different countries of the
Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia.
In order to get this rapprochement, for instance, orders were given
in the Polish Communist ?"arty against any criticism of Tito.
Mr. MORRIS. You mean the Polish Communist Party was forbidden
to criticize Tito?
The INTERPRETER. To criticize Tito.
Mr. Moult's. In what year was this, now?
The INTERPRETER. In 1955.
I have in mind public criticism of Tito.
As far as the actual state of affairs was concerned, it was different.
I ran across 2 members of the Polish delegation, 2 chairmen of the
Polish delegations to Yugoslavia. The name of one was Wolynsky,
and the second one was Wolpe.
After their return to Poland, openly they restrained themselves
from any criticism of Tito and Yugoslavia.
At the same time, there was a meeting of the active of the Polish
Central Committee, and at that meeting the same two men were criti-
cizing very sharply Yugoslavia and Tito.
The same applies to the economic state of affairs in Yugoslavia. In
general, I would say the policy was such:
"Tito is a friend; Tito is an enemy."
Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Tito no longer represents Titoism?
The INTERPRETER. No. This means that Tito, as the chief of state,
and Yugoslavia, as a country, the Soviet Union wants to get them
into collaboration but the system which is prevailing in Yugoslavia,
they do not want collaboration,
have this system in other satellite countries.
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Until I left Poland, this border separating the Soviet communism
and Yugoslavian type communism was still not passed. And as far
as I remember, this border is the limit of the so-called political thaw
in Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. I did not understand that last.
The INTERPRETER. This distinction between the Communist Party
in the Communist bloc and the system prevailing now in Yugoslavia,
the distinction between these two, this is the limit of the so-called
thaw.
Mr. MORRIS. That is, the. limit of the thaw?
The INTERPRETER. The limit of the thaw.
Mr. MoRms. Now, what then is your interpretation of Tito's recent
visit to Moscow, currently?
The INTERPRETER. Before I answer your question, sir, I would like
to say this:
At that meeting in July 1955 I remember Mikoyan at a certain mo-
ment told Molotov:
At the present not only do we hope to bring Tito to our Soviet bloc; we are
sure we will get him.
I think that this was not achieved yet.
So the last visit of- Tito in Moscow in a way is a payment for the
Soviet benevolence, for the downgrading of Stalin, for the last stage
of the Soviet policy.
But as far as I know, still Yugoslavia did not become a Soviet sat-
ellite. It is still independent.
Mr. Mamas. That will be all at this time.
(Whereupon, at 3: 50 p. in., the subcommittee adjourned.)
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FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1956
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE
M JUDICIARY,
Washington,
COMMITTEE ON THE
ashington, D. 0.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2: 05 p. m. in room
P-63, United States Capitol, Senator Herman Welker presiding.
Present: Senator Welker.
Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel, Benjamin Mandel, re-
search director; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel.
Senator WELKER. The hearing will come to order. The first witness
will be sworn.
Mr. MORRIS. Will you swear, Dr. Karski, please, before swearing the
witness.
Senator WELKER. You will be sworn as the interpreter.
Do you solemnly swear that you will take the questions propounded
to you by the committee in English and correctly translate them into
the Polish language to the witness and his answers in the Polish
language to you will then be interpreted by you truthfully and hon-
estly in the English language to the subcommittee, so help you God?
MT. KARSKI. I do.
Senator WELKER. Mr. Bialer, do you solemnly swear that the testi-
mony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. BIALER.i I do.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer has testified previously before the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee. He has been recalled today because
of the revolt that took place at Poznan yesterday. He is trying to
determine for this public record whether there are any implications or
aspects of the uprising in Poznan may have a bearing on our internal
security in the United States.
I wonder if you would repeat for the record, very briefly, Mr. Bialer,
the 2 or 3 top positions you held in the Polish Communist Party in
the Polish Government before defecting to the United States on Janu-
ary 31 of this year?
TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN DIALER, AS INTERPRETED BY
DR. JAN KARSKI
The INTERPRETER. I was a functionary of the Central Committee of
the Polish Communist Party. I was one of the leaders of the anti-
1593
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'Western propaganda in Poland. I was the first secretary of the party
organization in the highest ideological party schools in Poland. I was
an ideological adviser to the party central organ, People's Tribune;
and I held several other positions in the ideological sector of political
life.
Mr. MORRIS. I think you toldus once before, Mr. Bialer, that you
were one of a group of three top propagandists in charge of anti-
American and anti-Western propaganda.
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with, are you conversant with the
revolt that took place in Poznan in the last few days?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; I know what was given by the press.
Mr. Moruus. How much of the situation in and about Poznan and
Warsaw generally are you conversant with, with respect to this par-
ticular uprising?
The INTERPRETER. Could you give me, sir, a few minutes so I could
give my evaluation of the recent happenings in Poland?
Mr. MORRIS. Yes; that is what we would very much like to have.
The INTERPRETER. The last 3 years were being called all over in
Poland as the period of the thaw. In that period, really, certain
liberalization of the Communist terror was taking place.
Mr. MORRIS. You say there was a liberalization of the Polish Com-
munist terror taking place?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir ? it was a liberalization of the life in
Poland and liberalization of the Communist mass terror in Poland.
Mr. Momirs. This is as of what time?
The INTERPRETER. That period after the death of Stalin, the begin-
ning was after the liquidation of Beria. The first period, from 1953
until the end of 1954, I would call it a period of the thaw in baby
clothes.
Mr. MORRIS. I didn't understand that.
The INTERPRETER. Period of the thaw in those baby clothes.
Senator WELKER. Let's do a retake on that one.
Mr. MORRIS. The Senator didn't understand it either, sir.
The INTERPRETER. It was the period of the liberalization of the life
in Poland in its primitive first original stage.
The second period was from the end of 1954 until the time I left
Poland?and I would call that period the medium stage, when the
thaw was spreading all over Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. What was spreading over?
The INTERPRETER. The thaw. The liberalization of Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. Thaw. That is an expression Mr. Bialer has used pre-
viously in which he refers to the relaxation of the terror on the part
of the Polish Communists.
You have referred that from the period, from 1951 until the time
you left Poland, which was on January 31, 1956, that this was the
intermediate stage, this was where the thaw was beginning to show?
The INTERPRETER. Spreading; yes. The present stage of that re-
laxation period I would call it a stage of a stormy period.
Mr. MORRIS.- This is the third period of relaxation.
The INTERPRETER. The present one.
Mr. Moms. You describe that as a stormy period.
The INTERPRETER. Stormy period; yes.
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I was asking myself a question and I am sure that others in Poland
were asking themselves that question, "What is the origin of that so-
called relaxation in Poland?" There is only one answer, which I
could prove by hundreds of facts. Some of those facts concern the
highest party authorities.
The short answer is such, the essence of the present period of the
so-called liberalization is unprecedented in this history of commu-
nism, pressure exercised by the Communists themselves on the party
leadership for more relaxation and secondly the pressure?
Mr. Moms. See if we understand the first one?
The essence of this relaxation is the unprecedented demand for
liberalization, on the part of the Communists themselves against the
Party leaders?
The INTERPRETER. Yes sir. That is the first one. The second as-
pect is the pressure of the nation, of the people, on the government
for the same purpose.
Mr. Moan's. And the second aspect of it is the people themselves,
as opposed to the Communists, are also exerting pressure on the
Polish leaders for a liberalization?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
I would like to give you some facts concerning such a matter, how
the leadership of the party was opposing the pressure for liberaliza-
tion, and how the leadership of the parry was forced to cede step by
step to liberalize the life.
Mr. MORRIS. This now, if I may understand your testimony, is fact-
ual. This is from your own personal experience with the Polish
Communists?
The INTERPRETER. It is; I said, on the basis of my personal ex-
periences, experiences particularly in the last 3 years. I was taking
part in these activities.
Mr. MORRIS. You say that, on the basis of this experience, there was
opposition, on the part of the party leaders, to pressure for liberaliza-
tion?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moanis. And you are going to tell us about this opposition on
the part of the party leaders to the liberalization?
- The INTERPRETER. Naturally, this problem is a very complex one,
and I tried to write and elaborate on it and several pages took place.
I will try to be as concise as possible.
I will give you the first example. The Minister of Security and
the main oppressor in Poland, Radkiewicz, R-a-d-k-i-e-w-i-c-z.
Mr. MORRIS. That is R-a-d-k-i-e-w-i-c-z ?
The INTERPRETER. That's right.
Mr. MORRIS. He was the Minister of
The INTERPRETER. Of Security.
As at the beginning of 1954, after the crimes committed by the
Security became known, an enormous pressure by the party member-
ships, as well as by the people as a whole, was being exercised. The
pressure was that Radkiewicz had to go.
Mr. MORRIS. He was eliminated?
The INTERPRETER. The pressure was to eliminate him.
Mr. MORRIS. Yes.
The INTERPRETER. Until the end of 1954, at all party meetings, and
I know since I participated in those meetings, the party leadership
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was opposing such demands; was opposing even a discussion on this
problem.
At the very end of 1954, under the pressure even of the activists of
the Communist Party, the leadership was forced to dismiss Radkie-
wicz as a Minister of Security and to demote him to a post of a
Minister of Agriculture.
Mr. MORRIS. May I repeat that again.
As a result of the pressure exerted on the party leaders, including
the pressure on the part of the leading activists of the party, the party
leaders were forced to depose Radkiewicz and give him the assignment
of the Minister of Agriculture?
The INTERPRETER. That's right.
Mr. MORRIS. When was he deposed?
The INTERPRETER. The very end of 1954.
However, even after that dismissal from the position of Minister of
Security to the position of Minister of Agriculture, still he retained
his position as a member of the Politburo of the Polish Communist
Party.
Mr. MORRIS. And even in his position as Minister of Agriculture,
he retained his position as a member of the Politburo?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
After that event, the pressure within the party to eliminate Rad-
kiewicz from the Politburo was continuing. I participated in several
party meetings where the party membership was demanding openly a
final elimination of Radkiewicz from any post.
Mr. Moult's. Now you participated in Communist Party meetings
where the rank and file of the party continued their pressure to have
Radkiewicz?his membership in the Politburo taken away from him?
The INTERPRETER. That is correct.
Again, I want to stress at that period the leadership of the party,
Bierut, g-i-e-r-u-t ; Berman, B-e-r-m-a-n ; and Ochab, 0-c-h-a-b, were
doing their best to preserve Radkiewicz and to preserve his influence.
Nevertheless, the summer of 1955 came, and at the secret meeting of
the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, Radkiewicz,
supposedly on his own initiative, resigned from his post.
Mr. Momus. May I recapitulate. In spite of the pressure on the
part of the three top leaders of the Polish party, Bierut, Berman, and
Ochab, despite the fact that they wanted him to remain on in the
summer of 1955, at a secret meeting, a secret Communist meeting,
Radkiewicz offered his resignation?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Senator WELKER. I am going to get to a little more current events.
You are aware, are you, of the revolt going on in Poland as of this
moment at Poznan?
The INTERPRETER. I was giving you certain facts in order to make
a background for the present happenings.
Senator WELKER. I understand that.
Will you answer my question? You are aware of that revolt going
on now?
The INTERPRETER. Naturally, I possess only information which I
received from the American press. I do not have any other direct
information.
Senator WELKER. I think we are all working from what we have
read in the press.
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Now, based upon your experience in the Communist Party, did you
expect the Polish people to arise and have a revolution as early as of
this date?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; I was expecting them to a great extent, and
in addition, too, I consider that they are a logical outcome of the pre-
vious development of the situation in Poland.
Senator WELKER. There is no question in your mind but what the
people in Poland are God-fearing, freedom-loving people and want
their freedom restored to them?
The INTERPRETER. I have no doubt, sir, of any kind to this question.
Senator WELKER. What significance do you attach to the press re-
lease that the Polish people in their uprising were crying, "We want
bread; bread." Does that mean that they were hungry, that the Com-
munist Party was not feeding them?
The INTERPRETER. Yes; they were claiming the amelioration of the
economic situation in Poland, their standard of living which is pres-
ently extremely low in Poland, tragically low.
Senator WELKER. Tragically low?
The INTERPRETER. Tragically low.
Senator WELKER. And the Communists work the Poles very hard,
do they?
The INTERPRETER. The workers in Poland work extremely hard un-
der orders of the party, I was making certain statistics while in Poland.
The standard of living of the Polish workers, according to my re-
search, is 31/2 times lower than the standard of living of the workers
in Germany?Western Germany.
Mr. Mom's. The standard of living is 31/2 times lower than the
standard of living of workers in Western Germany?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
However, I would like to draw your attention, sir, that what is
i
happening n Poznan should not be considered only as an economic
activity. The background is economic. However, every activity of
this kind in a Communist-controlled state has political aspirations in
view, and are being suppressed as political opposition.
Senator WELKER. Now, they are seeking freedom. Isn't that
correct?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Senator WELKER. I notice in the afternoon edition of a prominent
Washington newspaper that the Warsaw radio announced that 38
people were killed and 270 wounded in this well-organized revolt at
Poznan.
Do you assume for a moment, sir, that this uprising has ended as
of now, or do you think that it will still be brewing and last for years
to come until they get their freedom?
The INTERPRETER. I believe that it is very possible that riots of this
kind, although on a smaller scale, will be repeated in other localities.
However, I believe that riots to such an extent will not be repeated in
the immediate future.
Senator WELKER. That last answer was?I didn't get that.
The INTERPRETER. That riots so serious as those in Poznan, on a
mass scale, will not be repeated elsewhere.
Mr. MORRIS. You say there will be some other riots, but not of the
extent of this one.
The INTERPRETER. Yes.
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Senator WELKER. And that is because the people of Poland have
nothinc, but their fists to fight with in the form of arms. Is that it?
The ''INTERPRETER. Yes sir; first of all because the Polish nation
from the times of the end of the war' had no possibilities to express
their will in any way. They couldn't vote, and they have no other
technical way to express their-will.
Senator WELKER. And of course they have little to look forward
to when they, with their hands, have to combat tanks of the size you
see here in the picture of the newspaper I am showing you, huge
tanks which are shooting down those people which are uprising.
The INTERPRETER. Yes, this is the reason.
Senator WELKER. Now, directing your attention to the newspaper
which I am sending you, Mr. Witness, the second picture after the
picture of the tanks and the people, I am asking you whether or not
there is any significance to the flag that is flying over the people,
which would appear to the Senator from Idaho to be of rather serious
concern. Is there any significance to that flag flying there?
Mr. KARSKI. May I read the caption to him?
Senator WELKER. Go right ahead, Doctor.
The INTERPRETER. The Polish flag has two colors, white and red,
the national Polish flag. It looks to me that this flag has also some
two- colors, and it looks like white and some blood stain which prob-
ably symbolizes to them the national_flao..
Mr. Momus. When you say the Poesh national flag, do you mean
the national flag of the current government of Poland or the previous
government?
The INTERPRETER. The previous government has the same flag, ex-
cept the same flag as the flag before the war. But nevertheless, for
the Polish nation, the white and the red color symbolizes the Polish
national color and symbolizes the freedom of Poland.
Senator WELKER. Now, based upon your experience as a former
Communist agent in Poland, based upon the knowledge you have
learned from the press, is it a safe assumption that what is going on
in Poland yesterday and today?and .we hope forever, without the
loss of life and injury to those patriots?would it be safe to say that
other freedom-loving satellite countries have the same unrest and
same freedom urge that the Poles are evidencing now? i -
The INTERPRETER. Before I left Poland, I was n touch with other
nations behind the Iron Curtain, and I came to the conclusion that the
desire for freedom is the same although that campaign for achieving
more liberalization was carried on in Poland on a larger scale than
in other satellite-countries.
Mr. MORRIS. You say the desire for liberalization and the willing-
ness to express pressure to bring about liberalization was stronger in
Poland than it wasin the other satellite countries, even though%ased
on your travels in the other satellite countries, you did recognize
there was this desire for liberalization and this unrest?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.
Senator WELKER. I have one concluding question, Doctor, that you
might interpret to the witness-.
f will ask you if it isn't a fact that the Polish freedom-loving people
who have suffered, some-killed, some wounded and some very unhappy,
and those who have been in this revolt as they call it?had they had
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the arms or the armaments or the tools to work with?I will ask you
if it isn't a fact that they would have turned against the Communist
and shot him dead wherever they saw him in Poland?
The INTERPRETER. Well, I couldn't tell you, of course, if they were
armed or not in this particular riot in Poznan, since I have no way
to know, but I can tell you,. on the basis of my personal experience,
that Polish Communist polce do not hesitate to kill people in this
kind of riot anywhere.
Senator WELKER. I think we have misunderstood each other. I am
referring now to this fact, would the Polish people who have been
revolting against this tyranny?would they have any reluctance to
shoot down the Communists and the secret police had they had the
arms to do it with?
The INTERPRETER. In the present situation, where there is no democ-
racy and no rights' and where the governmental control over the
people is extended to all walks of life?first of all, there is no possi-
bility that the people would get arms. It is physically impossible.
Senator WELKER. I understand that, but mine was a hypothetical
question based upon the fact if they could get arms, would they use
them?
The INTERPRETER. If they had arms I firmly believe that the great
part of the Polish nation, most of le Polish nation, would fight
against the regime.
Mr. MORRIS. You believe that if they did have arms a great part
of the Polish people, in fact most of the Polish people, would take
up arms against the Polish Communist leaders?
The INTERPRETER. Yes. I mean the part greater than that those
who support communism.
Mr. MORRIS. It is the majority.
The INTERPRETER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, I wonder if you could tell us what hap-
pened after the secret meeting in 1955 when the pressure became so
great that Mr. Radkiewicz had to resign from the membership in the
Politburo in the Polish Communist Party?
The INTERPRETER. May I draw your attention, sir, that Radkiewicz
resigned from his position in the middle of 1955, but the party leader-
ship withheld that information from the people and from the party
membership. I am sure that even today, the people in Poland and
the party membership do not know that he was dismissed as early
as in the middle of 1955.
Senator WELKER. I think that would be a rather wholesome thing
to broadcast to the people of Poland, don't you, that he was forced
to resign in the middle of the summer of 1955?
The INTERPRETER. I tried my best, sir, exactly to do this.
Mr. MORRIS. Then' does that complete the background or do you
have more aspects of this background leading up to the interpretation
of the present situation?
The INTERPRETER. From those examples which I gave you, and I
have hundreds of other examples, the main point is that the Polish
nation and the party membership are continuously exercising a pres-
sure for more liberalization. The party leadership is and was opposing
that pressure and only being forced to accept the principle that more
liberalization should be introduced.
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The Poznan riot was one of many efforts on the part of the Polish
workers to attain, to force the party to bring more liberalization and
higher standards of living, and a change in the national position in
Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. Your interpretations, Mr. Bialer, that the ever-extend-
ing pressure for liberalization, which you have described in great
detail through the years, has been the direct cause or contributing
cause to the present uprising?
The INTERPRETER. Yes, I am deeply convinced that it was so.
Mr. MORRIS. Does the fact that the Polish national flag was un-
furled during the course of this demonstration indicate to you that
the uprising was political in content rather than the demand for food?
The INTERPRETER. Those riots basically were political, although, I
repeat, under a Communist regime, economic demands and economic
situation is a result of the political Communist rule.
Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if I might ask this question?is there any
possibility that this revolt may have been falsely stimulated by the
Communist leaders in order to bring out any underground resistance
that may exist in the Communist regime?
The INTERPRETER. I don't believe, sir, in this. The price which the
regime is paying for these riots, and the price is the loss of authority
in Poland and the revelation before the whole world how terrible the
situation is in Poland?the price is so great that they wouldn't be
willing to pay it.
Mr. ltiomas. The answer is the price is so great?in other words: a
revelation to the whole world how bad the situation is in Communist
Poland and the fact that there is so much resentment against the
regime?that the price would not be worth the effort. You do not
believe in that?
The INTERPRETER. Absolutely, I do not believe it.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe the Warsaw radio would announce that
the revolt was of such proportions-38 killed and 270 wounded?if
the revolt were not serious?
The INTERPRETER. The fact that Warsaw admits that 38 people
were killed and 270 wounded indicates to me, on the basis of m37 knowl-
edge of the Communist methods, that even the expression "serious"
is too mild; too delicate. It means that this was a bloody battle which
was waged in Poznan.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything of a revolt that took place be-
tween the Polish people and the Soviet occupation forces in a town
Szczecin in 1951? I believe that is the Polish for Stettin, is it not?
The INTERPRETER. Yes sir; I have knowledge about it.
Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly what happened at that time?
The INTERPRETER. In 1951, a Soviet officer shot a Polish lady. This
provoked an outstanding part of the Polish population in Stettin, an
outrage and outbreak, which was being hidden by the Communist
regime for many years. As a result, there were outbreaks in Stettin;
there were public demonstrations, and naturally, as a consequence,
reprisals on the part of the regime. All of them were being concealed
from the Polish people. However I would like to stress here that at
that time2 it was much easier for the regime to curb those riots because
the security organs were much stronger than they are today.
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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, could you tell us what you feel the United
States policies should be now, with respect to this expressed desire on
the part of the Polish people to gain the liberation of control.
The INTERPRETER. First of all, SlT, I believe that the most important
thing in this field is this: Let the American people convince the Polish
people that they first sympathize with them, and secondly, that the
Americans will never reconcile themselves with the loss of freedom
in Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. Let the American people know that they sympathize
with the Polish people and that they will never reconcile themselves
to the loss of freedom on the part of the polish people.
The INTERPRETER. Let the Polish people know it.
Mr. MORRIS. Let the Polish people know that the Americans sym-
pathize with their feeling that they will never reconcile themselves to
the loss of their freedom?
The INTERPRETER. I want to stress very, very strongly this fact. The
Polish Communist Party and the Polish Communist regime are doing
everything possible to silence the Western World and the Americans
not to let them?to stop them?saying the truth about the situation
in Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. The Communist leaders are doing everythina6 possible
in order to cause the leaders of the West and the people of the West not
to express themselves on these subjects.
The INTERPRETER. Yes, to such a degree that I would put it in such
a slogan it amounts to this: The Communist leaders in Poland are say-
ing to the Western World, very smartly, very cleverly, "Don't you
criticize us in your radios and we will not jam your broadcasts."
Mr. MORRIS. Should we continue to criticize them?
The INTERPRETER. Naturally, if we stop the campaign of criticizing
them and revealing the truth, this would mean a great help to them
in their oppression of the Polish people.
Mr. MORRIS. And therefore, a policy which would cause us to
soften our criticism of the Polish overlords would be a bad policy for
us to pursue?
The INTERPRETER. I think that such a policy would be a very terrible
policy as far as the Polish people are concerned, and in consequence
would be a bad policy for the United States.
Senator WELKER. Now, Mr. Witness, and Doctor, we thank you
very much for your testimony here today. We are now going to con-
clude this phase of the hearing. It may be necessary that we reopen a
hearing at a later date.
The acting chairman wants to recognize the fact that the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United
States Senate is honored indeed to have today as its guest, Arthur Bliss
Lane, former Ambassador to Poland and his lovely wife. As all of us
know, Arthus Bliss Lane wrote the famous book, I Saw Poland Be-
trayed. There has come to my attention a press release this great man
gave when he heard of the activities on the part of the oppressed
people of Poland. I am going to read that into the record, if it is
all right with you, Mr. Lane.
MT. LANE. Yes, sir.
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Senator WELKFR. I quote Arthur Bliss Lane in a statement he made
yesterday:
The reports which have come over the radio today regarding the riots in
Poznan, the largest city In what used to be German Poland, are highly significant.
The fact that the Polish official radio confirms these reports emphasizes the
seriousness of the situation. This courageous action in Poznan may quite prob-
ably be followed by other acts of patriotic violence against Communist despotism
not only in Poland but in other captive nations as well.
Probably the Poles have taken advantage of the recent dramatic changes in
the Soviet Union and the criticism of Khrushchev by foreign Communist parties
which surely have been communicated to the various captive states, including
Poland. The spirit of liberty of the Poles, which never in history has been
completely quenched, has finally burst forth in a brave, although perhaps for the
moment futile, attempt at liberation from their Communist masters who have
been under the heel of Moscow since the puppet Lublin government was formed
in Poland under Stalin's direction on July 21, 1944. Rokossovsky, the Minister
of Defense, formerly a marshal in the Soviet Army, who was appointed to his
present position by Stalin, will undoubtedly put down the insurrection with
customary Communist cruelty.
But regardless of the inevitable loss of life, the attempt is all to the good.
We did not gain our independence without Washington having been willing to
risk his life as well as those of his men.
I do not place any credence in the relationship of this uprising to the recent
visit of Tito to Moscow. I am not as naive as some persons in this country
who hold to the fallacious theory that Tito represents a different type of com-
munism of the Trotskyist or Bukharin school. All forms of communism are the
same. They are aimed at the destruction of all we hold dear: democracy,
religion, and liberty, and specifically the overthrow of the United States.
Therefore, all Americans should hall this bold revolution. It is in the interest
of the liberation of Eastern Europe and of the security of the United States.
God bless the Polish people.
Arthur Bliss Lane that was a profound statement made by you yes-
terday. On behalf of Chairman Eastland and the entire subcommittee
and its staff, we want to thank you for permitting us to use that as
part of the record in this hearing, which is a hearing following one
of the crucial things in the history of the modern world.
Mr. Moms. We may have a staff session with Mr. Bialer and if we
learn anything at that staff session, we can put it in the public record.
Mr. BIALER (through the interpreter). May I add just one sentence,
sir?
Senator WELKER. Yes.
The INTERPRETER. Could I tell you, I would symbolize what is hap-
pening now in Poland in such a way: There is a legend in Poland
about a witch who liberated certain forces and then was unable to
control them any more. This is what is happening in Poland. The
Communist regime liberated certain forces in Poland to speak, and
now it looks they can't control them any more.
Senator WELKER. Thank you very much.
The committee now stands adjourned.
(Whereupon., at 2: 55 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)
(The following letters from Chairman Eastland to Attorney Gen-
eral Herbert 13rownell, Jr., were ordered into the record at a meeting
of the subcommittee on June 21:)
JUNE 8, 1956.
Hon. HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr.,
Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice,
Washington 25, D. C.
DEAR Mn. ATTORNEY GENERAL: On June 8 the Senate Internal Security Sub-
committee heard the testimony of Seweryn Bialer, who was until recently a
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leading activist and propagandist for the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Poland. He testified with regard to a wide range of subjects, including
the activities of one Henry l'odolski. His testimony concerning Podolski follows:
"Mr. Mocuus. Do you know Henry Podolski?
"Mr. MORRIS (turning to the chairman). Mr. Chairman, Henry Podolski was
the former editor in chief of Glos Ludowy, a Polish-Communist paper published
in Detroit.
WITNESS (through interpreter). Yes; I know Henry Podolski, Henry
Podolski has two main assignments presently in Poland. The first one is to
work in the campaign of repatriation of the Polish emigres, postwar emigres,
In the West, and the second, to instruct the American paper People's Voice in
Detroit.
"Mr. MORRIS. You mean he is still running the Detroit newspaper?
"WITNESS (through interpreter). This paper receives strict instructions from
Poland, and he is the man who is sending them."
According to our records Glos Ludowy (People's Voice) is a Polish language
newspaper, published weekly at 5858 Chene Street, Detroit, Mich. It is the
official organ of the PoIonia Society of the International Workers Order, which
has been cited by the Attorney General as "one of the strongest Communist
organizations." Henry Podolski was formerly its editor in chief. Throughout
its existence Glos Ludowy has never failed to follow the line of the ComrRunist
Party, as a study of its issues will show.
In the light of this testimony, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
feels that a new problem has been posed which we present to you for such action
as may in your judgment be warranted: namely, the existence in this country
of a publication conducted under the proven direction of an agent of the Com-
munist Government of Poland.
Sincerely,
(Signed) JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommitee.
JUNE 18, 1956.
Hon. HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr.,
Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I write this letter to ask your assistance in a
matter that constitutes a serious present threat to the internal security of the
United States.
Seweryn Bleier, who was a leading Polish Communist until his defection a
few months ago, recently told the Internal Security Subcommittee that propa-
ganda prepared by the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union
in the United States is the most effective propaganda device being used today
by the Polish Communist leaders against their people. This propaganda is
directed against America, and is further being used to keep the Polish people in
bondage.
Two of the leaders of this union have been James Matles and James Lustig.
Both have been demonstrated to be Communists and both are the subject of
denaturalization proceedings I believe that your, office filed denaturalization
suits against them on February 13, 1952, and on December 16, 1952, respectively.
Since that time apparently nothing has been done to enable the immigration
authorities to follow up on their deportation proceedings.
There is also the ease of Constantine Radzi, who our record shows has been
a member of the control or disciplinary committee of the Communist Party.
Radzi was observed watching one of our hearings in New York in 1952, and
was subpenaed to testify. In that case, both the Immigration Service and the
Department of Justice acted expeditiously and filed a denaturalization proceed-
ing on December 17, 1952, against Radzi. Since that time apparently nothing
has been done on this case. Radzi is not even on bail, and is pursuing his work
of undermining our Government without molestation.
I further call your attention to the case of Louis Weinstock, against whom
suit was filed on January 22, 1953, and to the cases of almost a score of other
Communists who are still engaged in trying to destroy our way of life.
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May we have your assurance that the Department of Justice is taking all
possible steps to expedite the denaturalization and deportation of the named
Individuals, and of others in the same position?
With kindest regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,
( Signed) JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.
(An exchange of letters between Chairman Eastland and Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles, together with a letter to Senator Walter
F. George, and a cable message to which reference is made were ordered
into the record at a subcommittee meeting on July 18, 1956. The text
of these documents follows:)
JULY 5, 1956.
Hon. JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Enclosed herewith, for your information, is a copy of a
cable which Robert Morris, chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcom-
mittee, has received from Hon. William C. Wentworth, member of the Australian
Parliament and member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. I am
also enclosing a copy of my letter of today's date to Hon. Walter F. George as
chairman of the Foreign Relation's Committee, transmitting a copy of this cable
to him with the request that it be brought to the attention of his commitee.
Sincerely yours,
( Signed) JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.
JULY 5, 1956.
HOD. WALTER F. GEORGE,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Honorable William C. Wentworth, Member of the
Australian Parliament and member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, has transmitted the enclosed cable to Robert Morris, chief counsel of
the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Inasmuch as it bears on matters
related to our foreign policy, I am transmitting herewith a copy of this cable,
with the request that you place it before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The Australian Parliamentary Affairs Committee is made up of 13 members.
The fact that 12 of these members have signed the within cable would indicate
that their sentiments represent committee thinking.
Very sincerely yours,
[S] JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.
[Telegram]
JULY 3, 1956.
ROBERT MORRIS,
Chief Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington:
Twelve members of Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, including my-
self, have signed the following statement for press statement begins the massacres
and mass arrest in Poznan show that Poland is still a police state whose people
are kept in subjection to totalitarian terror.
Public comment from Communist leaders in other Soviet satellites to the
effect that the Polish uprising proved the need for greater party vigilance is
at least an indication that this is still the normal method of government through-
out the Communist world.
The new leaders in the Kremlin now profess penitence for the misdeeds of
the criminal Stalin. It should be remembered that Stalin's greatest crimes
were committed not against the Russian people but against neighboring free
people, particularly Poland, who were enslaved by force of Russian arms and
have been kept in subjection by violence and electoral fraud.
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The Kremlin confessions regarding Stalin's activities constitute new evidence
justifying the reopening of the Polish case of 1945.
Surely there is some international organization which will support the prin-
ciple of free and properly supervised elections in Poland.
The Poznan uprising proves?if any further proof were needed?that there
are still Poles who are willing to sacrifice their lives for their nation.
The free world should not sit on the sideline while the unctuously penitent men
In the Kremlin proceed to repeat Stalin's crimes of 1945 and apply the jackboot
to Poland once again.
We must protest against Communist methods and develop our protest into an
effective demand for free elections in Poland.
Meanwhile the press and radio of the world should not relax its efforts to
expose the administrative and judicial terror being employed against the Polish
people.
We should demand the fullest and most factual account of the happening,
and if press correspondents are denied freedom of movement in Poland and
freedom of access to the accused, the world should know about it and protest
accordingly.
The methods adopted by the Communist authorities in Poznan throw a lurid
light on the insincerity of the Kremlin much advertised change of heart.
WEN TWORTH SY.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 12, 1956.
Hon. JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
United States Senate.
DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND : Thank you very much for your letter of July 5,
enclosing a copy of a cable sent by 12 members of the Australian Parliamentary
Affairs Committee, as well as a copy of your letter to Senator George.
Both of these enclosures will be called to the attention of appropriate officers
in the Department.
Sincerely yours,
/5/ ROBERT C. HILL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).
(The following letter from Chairman Eastland to Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles and a reply from Theodore C. Streibert,
Director of the United States Information Agency, were ordered into
the record at the subcommittee meeting on July 18, 156:)
JuLy 2,1956.
Hon. JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On June 29, 1956, Seweryn Bialer testified before the
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in connection with the recent riots in
Poznan, Poland. As you know, Mr. Bleier was, until January 31 of this year,
a member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, specializing
in anti-Western and anti-American propaganda.
Enclosed herewith, for your information, is a copy of the transcript of Mr.
Bialer's testimony, setting forth important evidence concerning recent events
In Poland. As his testimony shows, the Polish Communist leaders have been
forced to permit a certain liberalization of conditions; and it is this, he states,
which unleashed the forces that caused the Poznan uprising.
I particularly call your atttention to the following colloquy near the close
of Mr. Bialer's testimony (pp. 3413-3415) :
"Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, could you tell us what you feel the United States
policies would be now with respect to this expressed desire on the part of the
Polish people to gain their liberation from control?
"Mr. BIALER. First of all, sir, I believe that the most important thing in
this field is this: Let the American people convince the Polish people first that
they sympathize with them; and secondly, that the Americans will never
reconcile themselves with the loss of freedom in Poland.
"Mr. MORRIS. Let the American people know that they sympathize with the
Polish people and that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of freedom
on the part of the Polish people?
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"Mr. DIALER. Let the Polish people know it.
"Mr. MORRIS. Let the Polish people know that the Americans sympathize
with their feeling that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of their
freedom?
"Mr. BIALER. I want to stress very, very strongly this fact. The Polish
Communist Party and the Polish Communist regime are doing everything pos-
sible to silence the Western world and the Americans, not to let them?to
stop them?saying the truth about the situation in Poland.
"Mr. MORRIS. The Communist leaders are doing everything possible in order
to cause the leaders of the West and the people of the West not to express
themselves on these subjects?
"Mr. BIALEs. Yes; to such a degree that I would put it in such a slogan?it
amounts to this: The Communist leaders in Poland are saying to the Western
world, very smartly, very cleverly, 'Don't you criticize us in your radios and
we will not jam your broadcasts.'
"Mr. MORRIS. Should we continue to criticize them?
"Mr. BIALER. Naturally, if we stop the campaign of criticizing them and
revealing the truth, this would mean a? great help to them in their oppression
of the Polish people.
"Mr. Moss's. And therefore, that is?a policy which would cause us to soften
our criticism of the Polish overlords would be a bad policy for us to pursue?
"Mr. BIALER. I think that such a policy would be a very terrible policy as far
as the Polish people are concerned, and in consequence would be a bad policy
for the United States."
I have taken the liberty of setting forth this particular portion of Mr. Bialer's
testimony, because I believe it sheds important light upon an issue of policy
concerning which there has been a great deal of debate in recent months.
On all sides we hear it said nowadays, that America should take the lead in
relaxing international tensions, as a means of promoting the goal of world peace.
To this end, it has been suggested that the United States should modify the
tone of its broadcasts to the captive nations of Eastern Europe, to avoid giving
any possible offense to the Communist overlords of those areas. Mr. Bialer's
testimony serves to emphasize how ill-advised such a course would be, and what
dreadful consequences it might have, both for the Polish people and for the
United States.
I therefore express the hope, Mr. Secretary, that nothing will deter this coun-
try from speaking with fearless candor to the oppressed populations behind the
Iron Curtain. Only from us can they hear the truth, and only the truth can
make them free.
Sincerely yours,
JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.
JULY 11, 1956.
DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND : Thank you for sending me a copy of the letter which
you sent to the Secretary of State on July 2, 1956, concerning part of Seweryn
Bialer's testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. As you
may know, the United States Information Agency has made extensive use of
Interviews with Mr. Bialer.
With regard to the colloquy in which Mr. Bialer advised the American people
to convince the Polish people that Americans sympathize with them and will
never reconcile themselves to loss of freedom in Poland, I can assure you that
the Agency endeavors to exploit all suitable opportunities to emphasize these
points. The following are typical of the numerous applicable statements that
are being broadcast to Iron Curtain countries:
"* * * May 3 is the day on which this country and the people of Poland renew
a mutual faith in freedom, and in the strong bonds of friendship and common
purpose which unite us across all the barriers the Iron Curtain imposes"?
Department of State statement on Polish Constitution Day.
"* * * The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been, is and, until
success is achieved, will continue to be a major goal of United States foreign
policy"?White House statement.
"* * * We believe that all free peoples will be watching the situation closely to
see whether or not the Polish people will be allowed a government which will
remedy the grievances which have brought them to a breaking point"?Depart-
went of State statement on the Poznan demonstrations.
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Since your letter to the Secretary of State also mentions the Poznan uprising,
I think you would be interested in knowing that the Agency's treatment of this
subject highlights sympathetic reaction from the United States and elsewhere.
Our treatment has also been drawing upon the heavy flow of eyewitness
accounts, news reports, and commentaries that (1) show the uprising as a
manifestation of legitimate grievances arising from conditions that are typical
of East European regimes, (2) interpret the uprising as an act of desperation
stemming from privations while the U. S. S. R. and the satellites are making
grandiose offers of aid to nonbloc countries, (3) offer more evidence that the
satellite regimes constitute dictatorial minority rule, and (4) again underline
the importance of permitting all people to enjoy the right to live under govern-
ments of their own choosing.
I believe these lines, which are being applied to a familiar current develop-
ment, accord fully with the points brought out in the aforementioned colloquy.
I can also assure you that the policy of the Agency calls for a consistent,
vigorous presentation of the truth to the captive peoples of Eastern Europe.
This policy will continue. The determinant factors in the tone and content of
the Agency's output to these peoples are the attainment of national policy
objectives of the United States and the means considered most likely to be pro-
ductive for this purpose.
Sincerely yours,
THEODORE C. STREIRERT, Director.
(The following article by Jay Lovestone, published in the AFL-CIO
American Federationist of August 1956, was ordered into the public
record:)
CAN COMMUNIST PARTIES BE "INDEPENDENT FROM MOSCOW"
(By Jay Lovestone,1 executive secretary, free trade union committee, AFL?CIO)
There is very little that is spontaneous or genuine about the June 24, 1956,
statement by Communist Party of the United States declaring its "independence
from Moscow." This is a synthetic declaration ordered by Moscow. Under
instructions of Moscow, the British, Italian, and French Communist Parties and
Europe's No. 1 fellow traveler, Pietro Nenni, have also made such declarations.
Other Communist Parties have since then done likewise.
Quite naturally, one is tempted to ask: How can Moscow order supposedly
Independent parties functioning in other countries what to do? And why should
MOFCOW resort to such a weird way of doing things?
These questions appear baffling to many in the free world because they tend
to apply to Communist Parties the yardsticks and standards they employ in
judging organizations which are political parties in the democratic sense of the
word.
No Communist Party is a political party in this sense. It is, therefore, neces-
sary, first of all, to examine the particular nature, the specific character, the
peculiar features that distinguish the Communist Parties from other political
parties in the free world.
The overriding and overwhelming preeminence of the Russian section of the
international Communist movement has always been accepted by all other Com-
munist Parties and their fellow travelers. This is understandable. After all,
the Russian Communists, led by Lenin, were the first to triumph in their revolu-
tion. This victory, the progress achieved in Soviet consolidation, and the Krem-
lin's increasingly important role in the international area have given the Russian
Communists immeasurable authority and prestige among Communists and their
followers throughout the world.
For these reasons it has become almost second nature for Communists outside
of the Soviet Union to echo and copy everything which the clique that happens
to be dominant in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union says or does. For
years, Communist parties everywhere have oriented themselves and behaved
as auxiliaries of the already victorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Secondly, the dominant leader, or the ruling clique, of the Soviet Communist
Party, at any particular moment, has always insisted on, and exploited, such
Jay Lovestone was formerly secretary of the Communist Party in the United States.
In 1929 he was expelled for fighting against Stalinism and has since then become one of
the leading fighters against communism of every hue and stripe.
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behavior of the Communist parties outside the Soviet borders for its own fac-
tional advantage and interests. As Russian Communist factional struggles
became more violent and destructive, as inner party groups were defeated and
annihilated, as the base of leadership in the Soviet Communist Party narrowed,
this exploitation of the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union for enhanc-
ing the Kremlin's ruling clique interests became established Comintern practice
and policy.
Thus, in 1929, the leadership of the American Communist Party, which had
the overwhelming support of the organization in the United States, was purged
by Stalin himself. This Russian purge of the organization in the United States
came primarily because these leaders were suspected of being sympathetic to
Bukharin, then the principal ideological opponent of Stalin.
After Stalin thus drove thousands of members out of the Communist Party
of the United States, he went on to foist upon it a general secretary and other
leaders who were his supine henchmen. The latter hastened to bail all the
programs Stalin subsequently launched against his opponents in the Soviet
Communist Party and throughout the Comintern. The other sections of the
Comintern lost no time in imitating and copying the hooliganism of Stalin by
mass party expulsions and drastic purges.
After years of devastating faction struggles inside the Soviet Communist
Party, it became a party of robots?a party of total political automation. Only
Stalin and the small clique of yes-men around him counted. Stalin fully under-
stood what this robotization meant for the functioning, future behavior, and
inner life of the Soviet Communist Party. That is why he had the 17th Party
Congress (March 1939) abolish the mass purge. Once ideological differences,
discussions, and groups were no longer possible inside the Soviet Communist
Party, the mass purge of hundreds of thousands of Communist Party members
and millions of so-called kulaks was entirely unnecessary.
Thus had the mass purge "outlived its historical usefulness." It had even
begun to engulf Stalin's closest collaborators and to threaten the very physical
existence of the Communist Party.
Under conditions in which narrow cliques or power-mad individuals replaced
Ideological groups, the rulers of the Bolshevik Party found it necessary to have a
different sort of purge?the purge of picked and strategically placed followers of
a particularly ambitious individual leader whom Stalin or his immediate en-
tourage feared. This is the difference between the Khrushchev purge of Beria
and his henchmen and Stalin's mass purges of numerous ideological supporters of
Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin in the Bolshevik ranks.
Between Bukharin and Stalin and between Trotsky and Stalin there were very
Important political and ideogolical differences. But between Khrushchev and
Malenkov or Molotov and between Khrushchev and Beria there were no serious
ideological differences. Theirs was primarily a clash over the amassing of
power?actually a stage in the conflict over who is to succeed Stalin as the
omnipotent and omniscient party dictator.
This is the inevitable logic of internal organization development in all totali-
tarian parties. This is especially true for a Communist Party which directs an
ironclad dictatorship over the people in every walk of life and human endeavor.
In this connection, it is necessary to note that, under the very cover of paying
continuous and loud lipservice to the principle of collective party leadership,
Stalin grabbed total power for himself. While proclaiming loyalty to this "prin-
ciple," Stalin eliminated physically every potential political opponent of his,
everyone who might conceivably be able to have an idea of his own or demonstrate
sufficient courage to work and fight for his convictions.
Today Khrushchev is following faithfully this Stalin pattern of elimination of
leaders and gradual concentration of power in his own hands. Here we have the
key to the political demotion and humiliation of Malenkov and Molotov and the
most recent "retirement" of Kaganovich from active life in the Soviet Party and
Government. Here we have the why and wherefore of Khrushchev's ordering
the execution of Beria and his closest colleagues.
While this transformation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was
going on, the other Communist parties were also being changed in their composi-
tion and character, in their anatomy and physiology, In their structure and func-
tioning. They also became parties of blind and mechanical followers. They also
hardly attracted any critical-minded individuals.
They became primarily paramilitary outfits organized to execute Kremlin
commands and to make shifts of Communist Party line quickly and with least
loss of members, regardless of how sharp the turn was.
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Only Communist Parties thus molded could weather as they did the shift
brought into painful relief by the Stalin-Hitler pact and the present anti-Stalin
campaign. Only organizations hammered into such shape and malleability could
hail the Stalin-Hitler pact which led to World War II as a great service to
world peace. This explains why and how the Communist Parties throughout
the world?which had for years boasted about their militant antifascism?could
commend Nazi Germany as a force for peace and condemn the allied democracies
as warmongers and aggressors.
In the same spirit and for the same reason, the Communists in the United
States and other democracies tried to sabotage armament production. They
sought to help the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis with which their Soviet "paradise"
was then pact-bound. This is what the Communists did?until Hitler forced
Stalin to change his line by attacking him.
This process of political automation which has been going on for years inside
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was mechanically and rigidly carried
over by Stalin into all other Communist Parties. The Communist Party of
every country was transformed completely into a puppet outfit slavishly and
mechanically supporting all Soviet foreign and domestic policies.
Thus were the internal cliques, intrigues, and conflicts afflicting the Soviet
Communist Party mechanically transplanted into and automatically reflected
inside every other Communist Party. Every non-Russian party leadership was
soon turned into a rubberstamp of the dominant ruler of the Communist Party
outside the Soviet Union, of the international Communist movement as a whole.
When Stalin decided during World War II to liquidate the Comintern, the
very ones who were its top functionaries and-titular leaders did not know about
the Kremlin ukase ordering the end of their organization. They learned about
the "demise" only after they had read its "death" notice in Pravda.
In view of this total political automation, it was not so difficult for the very
ones whom Stalin had put into the "leadership" of the various Communist parties
to denounce him as a murderer, sex pervert, and arsonist?once the clique con-
trolling the Soviet Communist Party turned on Stalin. The "leaderships" of
the other Communist parties almost automatically and with very few exceptions
followed the same course of denouncing Stalin, whom they had for many years
sycophantically hailed as a supergod.
This fantastic turnabout and repudiation of themselves was not very difficult
for those with years of experience in echoing, aping, and supporting the policies
and maneuvers of whoever happened to rule the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union at any moment.
It is very instructive to note that all the Communist parties outside of the
Soviet Union not only fell in line with the denunciations of Stalin as a demon.
They fell in line with equal precision in supporting the entire international
strategical and tactical line laid down for world communism by the 20th Congress
(co-existence, united and popular fronts, different roads to "socialism," etc.).
This habit of automatic reflection of Soviet Communist Party life and regimen
has become a cardinal characteristic, sort of second nature, for Communist or-
ganizations throughout the world.
It is this inherent feature of Communist (Leninist-Stalinist) organizational
structure and functioning that accounts for the speed, skill, and shamelessness
with which the Communist parties outside the U. S. S. H.?the puppets and
dependents of the present Kremlin regime?are now carrying out the instructions
from Moscow to proclaim their "Independence" from Moscow.
The very manner, the very timing, the whole International sequence and chorus
of this proclamation of "Independence" only demonstrate anew the brazennes
and cynicism of the real rulers of world communism. The very occasion for and
manner of these Communist parties proclaiming their "independence from
Moscow" provide crushing confirmation of how hopelessly dependent these or-
ganizations are on whatever clique happens to be dominant in the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union.
Obviously, their dependence has taken on a sort of "new look." However
different the countenance of this dependence may appear, its contents are essen-
tially unchanged.
The "declaration of independence" is not so new. After all, once the
Comintern was declared dissolved, every Communist Party was "on its own"
and, therefore, "independent." The relations between every Communist party
and Moscow?under such circumstances?could be only bilateral. This is ex-
actly the relationship that the latest Communist Party of the United States
declaration proposes to have with the Soviet Communist Party and other Cora-
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munist parties. Other Communist parties have already followed with the same
proposal.
Here we must note that several Comintern officers, who have since broken with
Moscow, have disclosed that, in spite of the formal dissolution of the Comin-
tern, an international Communist organization did continue to function under
the direction of the Kremlin. So history will repeat itself after the more re-
cent dissolution of the Oominform, which covered only a limited area.
Contradictory? Confusing? Weird? Well, let Lenin himself explain this
"mystery," this flexibility and duplicity of Communist tactics, this readiness on
the part of Communists to turn somersault, to lie, to resort to all sorts of frauds,
to wallow in the mud in order to build their most cherished instrument?the party
which is their engine of subversion and destruction of democracy.
Said Lenin:
"It is necessary to be able to * * * agree to any and every sacrifice, and even?
if need be?to resort to all sorts of stratagems, maneuvers and illegal methods
to evasion and subterfuge in order to penetrate the trade unions, to remain in
them and to carry on Communist work in them at all costs. * * * Of course, in
Western Europe, which is particularly saturated with inveterate legalist, consti-
tutionalist, bourgeois-democratic prejudices, it is more difficult to carry on such
work. But it can and must be carried on, and carried on systematically." (Left
Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, pp. 95-96.)
Soviet imperialist interests and the interests of the present dominant clique
in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union demand that the peoples of the
Soviet Empire should believe that there is something really new and better about
the post-Stalin regime. These interests demand that the outside world, the non-
Soviet world, particularly the Western democracies and the labor movements
of the free world, should believe that the Soviet "new look" is something genu-
inely different, something truly new and better.
Why is this so? Stalin's domestic and foreign policies had already exhausted
their usefulness even before the 19th Soviet Communist Party Congress, held
in October 1952. Stalin himself had begun to recognize that his political and
his organization technique had run their course both at home and abroad. Such
recognition by Stalin was reflected in the decisions of the 19th Party Congress.
The roots of the present Khrushchev strategy and tactics and the basis of
the current Soviet domestic and foreign policies are to be found in the line laid
down by Stalin himself at and for the 19th Soviet Communist Party Congress.
What is really new in the U. S. S. R. since this congress is that the Khrushchev
leadership?which was created by Stalin?is now trying to avoid all blame and
condemnation by the Soviet peoples and the outside world for the disastrous
moral, political, and economic consequences of Stalinism.
The Khrushchev leadership continues to be loyal to the fundamental political
and organization principles of Leninism-Stalinism--that is, to totalitarian com-
munism and its goal of world domination. But the Krushchev leadership is
realistic enough to know that it must rely on new methods and different tactics
in order to revitalize and improve the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
which is its engine of total power over the economic, military, political, and
cultural life of the Soviet Empire.
No one should seek to deny or even belittle the significance of the changes
which they are making inside the U. S. S. R. and throughout the international
Communist movement. But these changes are being made by Khrushchev and
his clique solely to strengthen their grip on the Soviet Communist Party, to
bolster the position of the Soviet Union in the current critical international
situation.
These changes aim to modernize and streamline the machinery of the world
Communist movement so as to enable it to carry out all the more effectively the
new line of the 20th Communist Congress?the line of greater infiltration and
penetration, more extensive subversion and the conquest of the free trade unions,
social democratic parties, and other labor organizations in the free world.
Significant as these changes are, they do not prove that Khrushchev and his
collected leadership are moving toward liberalism and taking steps which will
lead even slowly yet surely to the replacement of aggressive Communist total-
itarian dictatorship with a democratic system of government dedicated to living
In peace with all other nations.
Khrushchev and his aids realize that the new times call for a new approach.
They realize that the new tasks demand that Communist parties drop their old
methods of work, break with their former practically open avowal of loyal sub-
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servience to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Gov-
ernment which it controls. Here we have one of the principal reasons for the
maneuver of pretended and pretentious "independence from Moscow" now being
made by all Communist parties.
But it would be a mistake to consider this formal and noisy disavowal of
dependence on and subservience to Moscow as only a maneuver?as merely formal
compliance with orders from Moscow. It is all that, but it is also much more.
Even more important than the Moscow-dictated maneuver itself is the reason
for the Kremlin making it at this time. In this instance, the why of the action
is even more important than the significant action itself.
The Khrushchev leadership is compelled to make this sweeping maneuver in
the ranks of world communism for basically the same reason which impelled
it to resort to the denigration of Stalin. The Kremlin ruling clique is trying
to preserve the essence and substance of Stalinism within the U. S. S. R. and
throughout world communism, while seeking to blur or disown its crudest and
most obviously repulsive features.
Decades of bestiality, political depravity, moral degradation and human
enslavement have revealed the hideous nature of Soviet and world communism,
its degrading organization and its reprehensible methods of functioning. These
dark decades have produced a soil fertile for the seeds of disintegration of inter-
national communism as an ideology, as a universal philosophy, as a Weltan-
scl" ming.
Khrushchev and his aids are fully aware of this. They are trying to check
this trend toward the disintegration of communism as an ideology of enchant-
ment or an avenue of escape by making certain superficial and surface changes
in their methods of rule and leadership, in their strategy and tactics, in their
control of the Communist parties outside the U. S. S. R. They are doing this
In order to preserve and promote the overriding aim of communism which, under
Khrushchev no less than under Lenin or Stalin, remains the conquest of the
world and its transformation along the lines of the Soviet pattern.
We cannot warn too strongly against confusing the moral and political cor-
rosion of communism as an ideology with the corrosion of the Communist dic-
tatorship as a political power system. The two are related. But they are not
identical. There are elements of serious disintegration in communism as an
ideology. But, at this moment, there are no important signs of disintegration
of communism as a political power system within the Soviet Union or in any of
its satellites.
The ruthlessness and dispatch with which the Warsaw puppet regime recently
crushed the revolt of the Poznan workers for bread and freedom show that Mos-
cow continues to control the machinery of the world Communist conspiracy.
Moscow continues to inspire, direct, and finance this worldwide subversive con-
spiracy and fifth-column apparatus.
But in this control Moscow is bound to face new and serious complications
and difficulties. We must never forget that, though all Communists and Com-
munist parties continue to owe their first loyalty to the Soviet dictatorship, they
are, especially in the Western democracies, also subjected to the influence of other
forces.
The effects of Communist ideological disintegration cannot be helpful to the
Communist political power system. However, the Communist power system can
be used effectively to counteract the manifestations of ideological disintegration.
Khrushchev is now using very effectively his giant political power system for
this purpose. In this the top boss of Soviet and world communism has been great-
ly helped by two factors: (1) the failure of the free world to exploit the moral
and political bankruptcy of communism as an ideology, and (2) the readiness of
too many in the free world to swallow the Soviet "new look," hook, line and sinker.
The move to have each Communist party publicly proclaim its "independence"
from Moscow is calculated to eradicate, or at least to halt, the trend toward
the disintegration of communism as an ideology. It is easier for a robotized
Communist outfit which proclaims its being "free from Russian control" to serve
the interests of Soviet foreign policy and enhance the prestige of the Kremlin
rulers than for an outfit that can be easily labeled "made in Moscow."
To prove their "independence," all Communist parties will, henceforth, be
permitted, upon specific instructions from their masters in Moscow, to "differ"
from and "criticize" certain particular Soviet actions. This move seeks also to
allay the discontent and the dismay which undoubtedly existed in the various
Communist parties, especially after the Khrushchev revelations about Stalin.
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However, as long as their parties are Leninist, Communist, they will never
disavow the basic aims of communism. They will never oppose or even question
the fundamental interests and basic line of the totalitarian Soviet Government.
They will never dilute their essential primacy of loyalty to the Soviet ruling
party and its dominant clique.
Moscow is taking a calculated risk in this audacious maneuver. Some "com-
rades" in the free world will fall by the wayside. The recruiting of new members
will certainly be slowed down in this area. For a while? recruitment may even
be brought to a grinding halt. But since the Communist Party is essentially
a paramilitary cadre organization, it can afford such a halt for a period of
time.
Through this new "Independence from Moscow" line, the Kremlin aims to facil-
itate the Communist development of united and popular front strategy and tac-
tics. Through these tactics Moscow's Communists hope to gain new and fresh
recruits from Socialist, labor, and liberal ranks.
Moscow is sure that the winning of such recruits and the success of the popular
front policy will soon again bring Communists into the cabinets of western
governments. Moscow is confident that the "independent" Communist parties
will find it easier at least to lead these governments toward much less suspicion
or even to far greater faith in the Khrushchev regime.
The naive attitude of French Foreign Minister Pineau toward the Khrushchev
regime now at the helm of Soviet imperialism, the loose talk in Washington and
London about Moscow's readiness to remove the sources and causes of world
tension, the deliberate weakening of NATO and their own military forces by
some western powers all confirm the marked success which the Kremlin has
already had in hoodwinking western statesmanship. The latter has, unfortu-
nately, shown a terrific capacity for wishful thinking.
To permit the various foreign appendages of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union to tak about or, in a limited sense, even to act their "independence"
from Moscow is a very small price for the Kremlin to pay?if, in return, it should
be able to plant its fifth columnists and dupes in important posts in western
democratic and neutralist governments.
Indeed, this is a very small price to pay for making it easier for the Com-
munist parties and their followers to soften and undermine the will and the
determination of the free world to reject and resist the basic aims of Soviet
communism?the fundamental, aggressive, totalitarian aims which have not
been dropped or even modified in the least.
In this light, it is not hard to understand the sudden "moral" awakening of
Nenni?leader of the pro-Soviet Italian Socialist Party?about political degrada-
tion in the Soviet Union. In this light, it is easy to understand Nenni's dissatis-
faction with the way the Kremlin has of late been mauling Stalin, who had been
his guide, guardian, and benefactor for years. But the world has still to hear
a single word from Nenni as to when he will break his pact of common action
with Khrushchev's agency in Italy?the Communist Party headed by Togliatti.
We have yet to hear from Nenni, from Foster (titular head of the Communist
Party in the United States), from Togliatti, from the French Communist boss
Thorez and from the Chinese Mao Tse-tung a demand that the Kremlin should
correct and atone for the crimes it perpetrated under Stalin's guidance against
the captive peoples of Europe and Asia.
We have yet to hear from these servants of the Kremlin a single word of re-
pudiation and condemnation of the germ warfare charges leveled by the Moscow-
Peiping Axis against the United States.
Of course, if and when Khrushchev should press a button and give the Com-
munist Party automatons in the United States the order to do so, his fifth column
in our country will surely respond. Only then will the Daily Worker have enough
"independence" to denounce as a Stalinist fraud the Moscow-Peiping germ war-
fare charges against our country.
As long as this world Communist regime and relationships continue, all talk
about the Communist Party in the United States or any other Communist Party
being independent from Moscow is just plain nonsense. As long as these parties
remain Communist in aim and character, they will continue to function as de-
pendents, as auxiliaries, as agencies of their parent body, the Communist Party
of "Holy Mother Russia."
Only when such organizations or individuals disown and break with the princi-
ples and practices of totalitarian communism, only when they are no longer
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1613
Communists, only when they fight actively against the pernicious Communist evil
can they stop being instruments of Moscow in intent or content, in aim or
action.
It might be said that the Tito experience proves that there can be going Com-
munist concerns which are independent of Moscow. It is rather significant that,
today, Moscow is especially interested in promoting this illusion. Why? Because
Tito has a very important role to perform for Moscow In advancing the Soviet's
new line of penetration and subversion of the Social Democrats, neutralists, and
even some bona fide free trade-union organizations.
Let us look into this Tito myth a bit farther. It took nearly a billion dollars
worth of American military aid?plus untold other western aid, comfort, and
confidence?to keep the Tito Communist regime alive. Tito's Communist dic-
tatorship could never have survived without this unstinting "capitalist" generos-
ity. Moreover, as soon as Moscow began to change its tactics?not its principles
and aims?Tito began a sweeping rapprochement with the Soviet Government in
the arena of international diplomacy and also with the Communist Party and the
Soviet political police apparatus.
Obviously, Yugoslavia cannot dominate or direct the Soviet Union's foreign
or domestic course. Khrushchev may have formally apologized to Tito for
"Stalin's crimes :" but, in return, Tito has actually and actively alined himself
with the Khrushchev regime in support of all its important foreign policies and
in hailing the Soviet "new look."
These foreign policies aim to preserve the loot seized?under Stalin's leader-
ship?for Soviet imperialism. These Soviet foreign policies seek to promote
the drive for Communist world domination. The hub of a Communist world
empire would be Moscow, not Belgrade. Its hero, or its fuehrer, would be a
Khrushchev, not a Tito.
In view of all these changes and bewildering maneuvers by the Soviet rulers
of world communism, it is very important to keep in mind that neither Lenin,
nor Stalin, nor Khrushchev is individually or collectively solely to blame for
the inhuman savagery, the moral degradation, and the physical and intellectual
enslavement suffered by countless millions behind the Iron Curtain.
Of course, no one should seek to absolve these criminals and paranoids of any
guilt for their bestial crimes. But as criminals they are the products, the most
powerful specimens and most noxious weeds, of communism as a totalitarian
system and ideology. Stalin and the present Khrushchev leadership which he
created and trained are certainly criminal desperadoes. But the Communist
system which breeds and rears such criminal types as the rulers and leaders of
its society is even more horribly criminal.
Lenins and Stalins may come and go. Khrushchevs may rise and fall. But
as long as the Communist system continues, new and perhaps more dangerous
and even more depraved criminals are bound to take their place in perpetrating
the blackest crimes against the Soviet peoples and all humanity.
Those in the United States or anywhere else who continue to have faith in
dictatorship, in totalitarianism, in the Soviet Union as an historically progres-
sive and humanely beneficial system, in the fundamental aims of communism, can
never be truly independent of Moscow?either as individuals or as organized
bodies and parties.
As long as these people or parties remain loyal to the basic aims of Soviet
communism or continue to place their faith in the principles of totalitarian
communism, they cannot be anything else but apostles, agents, and agencies of
totalitarian dictatorship?instruments of deceit, brutality, and aggression.
No matter how loudly or how often such individuals or organizations may
shout about their "independence from Moscow," they will remain prisoners of a
horrible power and a morally degrading faith whose seat and center, whose head
and heart are in Moscow.
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INDEX
NoTE.?The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance
to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organiza-
tion in this index.
A
AFL-CIO American Federationist (article published in August 1956 issue
by Jay Lovestone, entitled "Can Communist Parties Be 'Independent
From Moscow' 9" ) 1607
America 1580, 1585, 1586, 1603
American/s 1569, 1532, 1583, 1586, 1589, 1601, 1605, 1006
American affairs in Institute of International Affairs in Poland 1580
American military aid to Tito 1613
American press on Poznan revolt 1596
Anti-American propaganda 1553, 1580,1594, 1605
Polish direction of 1579
United Electrical and Radio Machine Workers source of 1585
Anti-Nazi Communist organization 1554
Anti-Western propaganda 1553, 1605
In Poland 1593, 1594
American University (Samuel Ehrlich student at) 1579
Arski, Stefan (official of U. S. Office of War Information) 1575, 1576
Directing anti-American propaganda in Poland 1579
Auschwitz concentration camp 1554
Australia 1585
Australian Parliament 1604
Australian Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee 1604, 1605
Austria 1573
Page
Barsov (Russian flyer defected and redefected, executed In Soviet Union) _ 1585
Belgrade 1571, 1573, 1613
Derma 1571, 1572, 1594, 1608
Beria's case, excerpts of The Declaration of a Former Communist 1554
Berlin 1572
East and West Berlin 1552
East Berlin 1588
Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis 1609
Berman (second man in importance in Communist Party) 1589
Leader of Communist Party in Poland 1596
Bialer, Seweryn 1593,1504, 1602, 1603,1605, 1606
Testimony of 1551-1602
Resides in Washington, D. C 1552
Came to United States May 4, 1956 1552
With Polish Government in Poland until 1951 1352
Left Polish Communist Party January 31, 1956 1552
Chief of Political Division of Headquarters of Polish Militia 1552
Defected from Communist Party because of?
(1) Communism contrary to democracy 1552
(2) Contrary to economic justice 1552
(3) Morality contrary to human nature 1552
(4) Communist practice defies the theory 1552
Biographical data of 1554
Biera7kow (interviews in United States not allowed to be published In
Poland) 1587
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Bierut 1587
Leader of Communist Party in Poland 1596
Bolshevik 1608
Brownell, Herbert, Jr., Attorney General:
Letters from Senator Eastland 1602-1604
Bukharin 1602, 1608
Butler, Senator John Marshall 1551
0
Cambodia, neutral commission in 1581
Can Communist Parties Be "Independent From Moscow"? (article pub-
lished in AFL-CIO American Federationist of August 1953 by Jay
Lovestone) 1607-1613
Canadian Truce Commission in Vietnam 1581
Chylinski, Major (special officer of the Polish military intelligence; sent
to Vietnam to supervise recruiting agents) 1581
Citizens' Militia 1554
Clark, Tom, Attorney General (cited Labor Research Association on De-
cember 4, 1947) 1586
Cominform 1570, 1610
Comintern 1570, 1588, 1608-1610
Communism, Yugoslavian 1591
Communist/s 1553, 1570-1572,
1575, 1577, 1586, 1589, 1597-1602, 1604, 1606, 1609, 1611-1613
American Communist 1580
Communist forces in North Korea 1582
Communist propaganda 1584
Communist propaganda victory 1585
First interview of Communist given outside Soviet bloc 1587
Polish Communists 1594, 1595, 1603
Politburo of Polish Communists 1596
Soviet Communists 1591, 1607, 1608
Soviet and Western Communists 1588
Communist Party 1568-1570, 1591, 1597
American 1576, 1607, 1608, 1612
British 1607
Central Committee of 1587
Central Committee of American 1580
Central Committee of North Korean 1582
Central Committee of Polish 1553, 1583, 1590, 1605
Repatriation campaign 1584
Resignation of Radkiewicz from 1596
United Electrical Workers' material used by 1585
Central Committee of Russian 1571
French 1607
"Independent" 1612
Italian 1607, 1612
Poland 1574-1577, 1589, 1590, 1593, 1606
Effort to silence Western World 1601
In North Korea 1582
Positions held by S. Maier 1554
Resignation of Radkiewicz from Politburo of 1599
Russian/Soviet 1568, 1571, 1573, 1608-1611
17th Soviet Communist Party Congress (March 1939) 1608
19th Soviet Communist Party Congress (October 1952) 1610
Presidium of 1573
Tito/Yugoslavian 1573, 1590
Communist system 1552
Congress 1577
Cracow 1587
Czechoslovakia 1588
Daily Worker 1612
Davis, Elmer 1576
Declaration of a Former Communist, The, by Seweryn Bailer 1554-1568
De-Stalinization campaign 1572
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INDEX III
Detroit: Page
Direction of a Detroit newspaper from Warsaw 1579
Glos Ludowy, a Polish-Communist paper published in Detroit 1603
Dulles, John Foster 1569
Letters to Dulles from Senator Eastland 1604-1606
Dunn, Robert (head of Labor Research Association) 1586
Durac, George 1589
Eastland, Senator James 0 1579
Letters to Attorney General Brownell 1602-1604
Letters to Secretary of State Dulles 1604-1606
Letter to Senator Eastland from Robert C. Hill, Assistant Secretary of
State 1605
Ehrlich, Samuel (captain in Polish military intelligence) 1574
Student at American University 1579
Embassy (how Polish emigrant is approached by) 1584
English language 1553, 1593
Europe:
Eastern 1602, 1606, 1607
Western 1610
Exhibit No. 286?The Declaration of a Former Communist, by S. Bailer 1554-
1568
Exhibit No. 287?Excerpts from Katyn Forest massacre hearings re Stefan
Arski 1576
Fellow travelers 1607
Field, Herman 1588, 1589
Foster (titular head of Communist Party in the United States) 1612
Free Europe Committee 1553
French 1588
French Truce Commission in Vietnam 1581
Friedland concentration camp 1554
Geneva Conference of 1955 1569-1571
George, Senator Walter F. (letter from Senator Eastland to Senator
George) 1604, 1605
Germ warfare (Moscow-Peiping charges against United States) 1612
Germany:
Eastern 1572, 1588
German Poland 1602
Western (standard of living) 1597
Glos Ludowy (People's Voice), Polish-Communist paper published in
Detroit, Mich 1576, 1603
Editor, Henry Podolski 1603
Address, 5858 Chene Street, Detroit, Mich 1603
Grosz, General (chairman of Polish truce team. in the neutral commission
in Cambodia) 1581
Source of information for S. Bialer 1581
Hill, Robert C. (assistant Secretary of State) , letter to Senator Eastland
from Hill 1605
Hitler ( Stalin-Hitler pact) 1609
"Holy Mother Russia" 1612
How Khrushchev Carried Out Molotov's Political Demotion, excerpt of The
Declaration of a Former Communist 1561
Hungary 1572
Hutchins, Grace (head of Labor Research Association) 1586
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Page
I Saw Poland Betrayed, by Arthur Bliss Lane 1601
Immigration Service 1603
India 1583
Indian Government 1583
Institute of Economic Sciences of Polish Academy of Science 1553
institute of International Affairs (attached to Polish Foreign Ministry)_... 1580
Institute of Social Sciences in Poland 1553
International Communist House, Holiday House, Zakopane, Poland 1576
Iron Curtain 1553, 1577, 1598, 1606
Polevoj's lies about life behind 1587
Italian Socialist Party 1612
Justice, Department of 1603, 1604
Kaganovich 1608
Kalescki, Michael (personal economic ambassador to economic dictator of
Poland, Mine) 1579, 1580
Karski, Dr. San 1551, 1579, 1593
Professor, Geogetown University 1551
Interpreter for Seweryn Bialer 1551
Katyn Forest massacre 1575, 1589
Katz-Suchy, Mr 1580, 1581
Director of Institute of International Affairs 1580
Polish delegate to conferences of the United Nations 1580
Kersten committee 1575
Khrushchev 1568, 1569, 1571, 1573, 1608, 1610-1613
Did not agree with Molotov 1590
Foreign Communist Parties' criticism of 1602
Komar, General (chief of the Polish military intelligence) 1582
Korea:
Neutral commission in Korea 1581
North and South Korea 1582
Kraj (The Country) (special radio station in Poland) 1583, 1584
Kremlin 1604, 1605, 1607-1612
Krzenien, General (former chairman of the Polish truce team in Korea) __ 1581
Source of information for S. Bialer 1581
Kulaks 1608
Labor (Polish sailors on ship asked for asylum in United States) 1583
Labor Research Association (cited by Attorney General Tom Clark on
December 4, 1947) 1586
Lane, Arthur Bliss (former Ambassador to Poland) 1601
Author of I Saw Poland Betrayed 1601
Statement re Poznan riot 1602
Lange, Oscar 1583
Formerly American citizen 1583
Member of Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party 1583
Adviser to the Indian Government on economic matters 1583
Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, by Lenin (quote from) 1610
Lenin 1607, 1611-1613
Leninist-Stalinist 1609, 1610
Quote from Left Tying Communism, an Infantile Disorder 1610
Leningrad 1568, 1572
Lodz 1554
Lovestone, Jay 1607
Article by Lovestone published in AFL?CIO American Federationist of
August 1956 entitled "Can Communist Parties be 'Independent
From Moscow'?" 1607-1613
Lubin government (puppet government in Poland, formed under Stalin's
direction July 21, 1944) 1602
Lustig, James (leader of United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers
Union) 1603
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INDEX V
Page
Malenkov 1571-1573, 1608
Malenkov Forced to Resign: Khrushchev Degrades Malenkov, excerpt of
The Declaration of a Former Communist 1558
Mandel, Benjamin 1551, 1579, 1580, 1580, 1593
Mao Tse-tung 1612
Matles, James (leader of United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers
Union) 1603
Melchior, Colonel (former Polish vice consul in New York City) 1574
One of top military espionage people in Poland 1579
Melon (Col. Melchior) 1574
Mikoyan 1591
Mikoyan on the "Brotherly Soviet Aid," excerpt from The Declaration of
a Former Communist 1564
Mine (economic dictator of Poland) 1580
Minister of Defense in Poland (Rokossovsky) 1602
Minister of Security in Poland (Radkiewicz) 1595, 1596
Molotov 1571-1573, 1591, 1608
Fall 1589
Reason for fall was disagreement with Soviet policy regarding
Yugoslavia 1590
Morris, Robert 1551, 1579, 1593
Letter to Robert Morris from Wentworth, member of Australian
Parliament 1604, 1605
Morsky, General (chairman of the Polish Truce Commission in Korea)__ 1581
Moscow 1568, 1571, 1574, 1588, 1602, 1607, 1609-1611, 1613
Moscow-Peiping Axis and germ warfare charges against United
States 1612
Visit of Tito 1591
N
Nagy, Imre 1572
NATO 1612
Nazi Germany 1609
Nenni, Pietro 1607, 1612
Europe's No. 1 fellow traveler 1607
Leader of pro-Soviet Italian Socialist Party 1612
New Roads (Communist paper) 1580
New York 1579
Novahuta 1568
0
Ochab (leader of Communist Party in Poland) 1589, 1596
Office of War Information:
Polish desk 1575
S. Arski former official of 1579
? Peaceful coexistence 1581
Peiping (Moscow-Peiping germ warfare charges against United States) 1612
People's Tribune (official organ of Communist Party in Poland)____ 1575, 1594
People's Voice (Glos Ludowy) (Polish-Communist paper published in
Detroit) 1577, 1603
Editor, Henry Podolski 1003
Address, 5858 Chene Street, Detroit, Mich 1603
Petrov, Mr 1585
Pineau. French Foreign Minister 1612
Pirogon (Russian flyer who defected) 1585
Plenum (of central committee separated from important work of party
in July 1955) 1589
Podolski, Henrik (Henry), editor in chief of Glos Ludowy, a Polish-Com-
munist paper in Detroit 1576, 1577, 1579, 1603
Poland 1552,
1553, 1568-1571, 1575-1577, 1579, 1580, 1583-1587, 1589-1591,
1594-1500, 1601, 1002, 1601-1006.
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Page
Polevoj, Boris (interviews in United States not allowed to be published
in Poland) 1587
Polish 1588, 1595, 1597, 1602, 1604, 1605
Communist Government 1552, 1581, 1586, 1603
Efforts to silence Western World 1601
Communist police 1599
Constitution Day (May 3) statement by Department of State 1606
Currency 1583
Delegate to the United Nations 1580
Delegation to Yugoslavia 1590
Emigrant approached, by Embassy 1584
Foreign Ministry 1580
Government 1593
Intellectuals, repatriation of 1583
Lady shot by Soviet officer in 1951 1600
Language 1553
Military intelligence 1581, 1582
National flag 1598, 1600
Private escaped, caught and killed in Poland 1585
Repatriation campaign 1583
tailors/seamen 1583, 1585
Truce Commission for Vietnam 1581
Truce team in Korea 1581, 1582
PoIonia Society of International Workers Order (cited by Attorney General
as "one of the strongest Communist organizations") 1603
Politburo, of the Polish Communist Party 1596
Resignation of Radkiewiez from 1599
Potash, Irving 1576, 1579
Poznan 1593, 1594, 1596, 1597, 1599, 1600, 1602, 1604-1607, 1611
Pravda 1609
PZPR, Central Committee of the 1554
Radio Machine Workers 1603
Importance of 1586
Source of anti-American propaganda in Soviet bloc 1585
Radkiewiez (Minister of Security in Poland) 1595
Demotion to Minister of Agriculture 1596
Resignation from Politburo in the Polish Communist Party 1599
Raszi, Constantine (member, control committee of Communist Party) 1603
Subpenaed to testify before Senate Internal Security Subcommittee 1603
Immigration Service and Department of Justice filed denaturalization
proceedings on December 17, 1952, against Radzi 1603
Rokossovsky (Minister of Defense in Poland, former marshal in Soviet
Army) 1602
Rusher, William A 1551, 1570, 1593
Russian/s 1604, 1607, 1608, 1611
Flyers 1585
Responsible for Katyn Forest massacre 1589
S
Schools of international communism 1587, 1588
'Schroeder, F. W 1551
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1604
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee 1583, 1593, 1601-1605
Senate Judiciary Committee 1601
Shepilov, Foreign Minister of Soviet Union 1572, 1589
Siskind, George 1580
American Communist 1580
Prosecuted under Smith Act and deported to Poland 1580
Working in Institute of International Affairs attached to Polish For-
eign Ministry 1580
Active in anti-American propaganda 1580
Published article in New Roads 1580
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INDEX VII
Page
Slupsk 1554
Smith Act 1576, 1580
Social Democrats 1613
Socialist 1583
Soviet 1569-1572, 1583, 1585, 1587, 1588, 1591, 1600, 1604, 1609, 1610
Army 1610
Government 1608, 1611-1613
Party 1608
Policy regarding Yugoslavia 1590
Propaganda 1586
Truce team in Korea 1581
Soviet Ambassador to Poland Is Not a Diplomat but a Proconsul, The, ex-
cerpt of The Declaration of a Former Communist 1563
Soviet Union 1568, 1571, 1573, 1574, 1585, 1590, 1602, 1607-1611, 1613
Stalin 1571, 1591, 1594, 1604, 1605, 1608
Anti-Stalin campaign 1572, 1609
Direction to form puppet Lublin government in Poland on July 21,
1944 1602
Khrushchev apologized to Tito for "Stalin's crimes" 1613
Leninism-Stalinism 1609, 1610
Post-Stalin regime 1610
Stalin-Hitler pact 1609
State, Department of 1606
Stettin (Szczecin) (revolt between Soviet occupation forces and people
of Stettin) 1600
Streibert, Theodore C. (Director of USIA) 1605
Letter to Senator Eastland from 1606, 1607
Swiatlow 1587
Defection and effect of in Poland 1586
Swiss Truce Commission in Vietnam 1581
Szczecin (Stettin) (revolt between Soviet occupation forces and people
of Szczecin) 1600
Thorez (French Communist boss) 1612
Tito, Marshal 1571, 1573, 1613
Orders to Polish Communist Party against any criticism of Tito 1590
Visit to Moscow 1591, 1602
Titoism 1590
Togliatti (leader of Communist Party in Italy) 1612
Trotsky 1608
Trotskyist 1602
United Electrical Workers 1603
Source of anti-American propaganda in Soviet bloc 1585
Importance of 1586
United Nations Organization 1580, 1582
United States 1552,
1553, 1569, 1570, 1574, 1575, 1579-1583, 1585-1587, 1593, 1601-1603,
1605-1609,1612, 1613.
United States Government 1587
United States Information Agency 1605-1607
U. S. S. It. 1607, 1609-1611
Warsaw 1554,
1568, 1579, 1582, 1583, 1585-1587, 1589, 1594, 1597, 1600, 1611
Washington Daily News (news dispatch quoted) 1582
Washington, D. C 1551, 1552, 1569
Weinstock, Louis (Attorney General Brownell filed suit against Wein-
stock on January 22, 1953) 1603
Welker, Senator Herman 1593
Weltanschauung 1611
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VIII INDEX
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Wentworth, William C 1604
Member of the Australian Parliament and member of the Parliamen-
tary Foreign Affairs Committee 1604
Telegram to Robert Morris from Wentworth 1605
West 1583, 1588
Western democracies 1610, 1611
Western World 1569, 1587, 1606
Effort of Polish Communist Party to silence 1601
Poland relaxation of propaganda and disclose more truth about 1580
What Is Poland to the Soviet Politburo? excerpt from The Declaration
of a Former Communist 1566
White House 1606
Witch, Polish legend about 1602
Wolpe (one chairman of Polish delegation to Yugoslavia) 1590
Wolynsky (one chairman of Polish delegation to Yugoslavia) 1590
World War II 1609
Polish emigration before 1583
Polish emigration during and after 1584
Yugoslavia 1573, 1591, 1013
Soviet policy toward 1590
Yugoslavian Party 1390
Zinoviev 1608
Zoliborz (suburb of Warsaw) 1589
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