THE RIGHT KIND OF 'INVOLVEMENT'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100770080-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: April 25, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

prict-/ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100770080-6
6? ???
EUGENE, OREGON
P REG/STER-GUARD
E. 36,017
S. 36,049
APR 2 5 196t
,The Right Kind'of Involvement'
Still unclear is the extent of Ameri-
can participation in the storm,y...,eonts
ilk Cuba. If the American government
-
,
did more than just cheer the rebels on?
and apparently it did do more?then
how much more? Atio1000104044?444,
,ca
C jotib
izeiis have been unaware over th4
f months of any government partiapa-.
tion in plans to get *I of Castro. At
;this point we don't eVen know what it
jis that we don't know. yet we ought to ?
know if we, and O u r sods, may be called
;upon to visit Cuba.
But one essential thing We. do kritk ?
We do know that whatever has been
jthe extent of American involvement in
?the Cuban situation, it has been less
*great than that of the Soviet Unidn.
W American equipment, from what we:
read, is less in evidence than is Russian
equipment. The American ;hand,. which
may have been in Cuban affairs, has
been in less deeply than the Russian
hand., President Kennedy, whom the
Russians accuse of talking: tough, has,
not spoken as trucu4ritlyilas the Rus-
sians.
This trip to the brink, like other:arid
similar trips, could,mean War, a war- We
don't want. However, we think it.,.rpOre
likely that it will result in liontAhing
similar to an earlier attempt *file This-'
iians to extend world connnuri.igm. Right
after World War II, Western E'fikope
was ripe for communism. Poverty, dis-
ease, hopelessness, despair were the lot
of the French, the Greeks, the ltalialis
and the West Germans. Strong Com-
munist parties, encouraged by Moscow,
grew stronger. Yet, 15 years after the
war, France, . Greece, Italy and West
Germany are still non-CoMmuniSt. Why?
The difference was the Marshall Plan,
a scheme that pulled the rug out from
under the Communists.
Given the opportunity to reach the
higher living standard that had seemed
so impossible, the countries of Western
EuKope had no need to resort to com-
munism. They responded heartily to the
American offer of assistance. Commu-
nise', shorn of its greatest appeal, made
no further inroads in that area.
Communism still has an appeal in
Latin America. The. standard of living
in that region is low, in some areas as
low as the standard that wai imposed
upon Western Europe by war. There
is hopelessness, too, as peasants and
w'kers despair ever of freeing them-
selyes from the dead hand of tradition,
froTh' debt, from almost certain servi-
tude. Communism offers help, help that
is needed so sorely that communism's
dreadful price is hardly considered.
? That's how Castro came to power. It
wasi-not only because he was stronger.
_
His, secret lay in ,the? reason he was
stinger. He. was stronger because the
Cuban people, among the best off of
Latin AineAans, wanted something bet-
ter than 't* mind hope for under the
old regime.
It may.l.'pje too late now to pull the
rug from-Ther Castro. But it is not too
late to anticipate other 4Castros in other
Latin American nations?and there will
bothers as -14ing as the hopelessness
ttEon which demagogue feed is there
-to .nourish them. A garshall Plan for
Lin America, often 'talked about, has
riqer really had much popular support
,in this country. If the Cuban fiasco
serves no other purpose, it may spur
us on to export hope. Hope, in the guise
of aid, costs money; but it doesn't cost
as much money as a week of a first-class
war.
Americans, we think, once they are
mindful of the need for a positive pro-
gram in Latin America, will applaud
such a plan, even as now they question
and wonder what's been going on in a
land to which we did not offer this_hope. .
_
npriassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100770080-6
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