REMARKS OF COLONEL LAWRENCE K. WHITE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BEFORE THE 61ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100500001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1954
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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MUTb IR ? I 0 Wsu1'S?ta3n nM `s CE A=C Y
Before
The 61st Annual Conference
Of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police
liar Orleans, Louisiana
September 27, 1954
R1 P C& COMM TAW E1 CE K.
1. Introduction
In facing this distinguished audience I em reminded of the
Second Lieutenant at Fort fining, Georgia, a few years ago who
found himself explaining a demonstration of tank tactics and
pe ?%ormance to a sizeable group of General Officers. The terrain
was such that in order to observe the demonstration it was necessary
for the General Officer group, sitting on hastily erected bleachers,
to face into the sunlight. The Lieutenant, of coursed faced the
Generals with his back to the sunlight. He opened his presentation
by saying, "SirsE, I regret very much that in order for you to see
this demonstration it : been necessary to have you face this bright
sunlight, but I can assure you that the sun can't possibly blind
you as much as all of those stare I'm facing do ?:"
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As' one whose personal problem with the police to date consist
of settling two traffic violations for ovsrparking, one of vahich. I
aitaure you I shouldn't have been charged with, niy misgivings at
addressing such an impressive array of law enforcement officers
are comparable to that of the Second Lieutenant at Fort Henning.
I will add that I feel an extra misgiving or two because I am .here
today pinch-hitting for my boss, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of
Central Intelligence, who has been prevented from speaking because
of important commitments in Washington. Add to what I have said
the fact that my being here at all is something of a contradiction
in terms, since one of the fundamental tenets of intelligence work
is cultivation of the gentle art of listening, and you can appreciate
the apprehension in addressing such a large and impressive audience.
In Mr. Dulles' stead, then, I should like to tell you something
of the background and function of the National Intelligence Effort
and its place In the structure of the United States Government, while
making a few observations on possible similarities between the tech-
niques of law enforcement and those of intelligence that may highlight
certain basic resemblances between the ways in which each of us
conducts our business.
In the first place, law a orceumnt and intelligence have both
been the recipients of considerable publicity of one kind or another,
all of which bas bad the net effect of glamorizing the two occupational
fields, soetiw s almost to a point of embarrassment. There is nothing
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that writers enjoy more than the classic story of the chase,
whether it be after a dangerous criminal or a state secret.
Psychologists would probably point out that these writers were
merely catering to a fundamental human desire to reduce good
and evil to basic terms so that their conflict might more easily
be understood and the reader can readily identify himself with
either side. In this context, a Dillinger and a Mate Hari become
synonymous as representations of "bad. guya" while uniformed police,
detectives or intelligence agents in hot pursuit are manifestations
of the "good guys." However, both law enforcement and intelligence
function more efficiently by not publicizing their sources or
methods, even though all of the elements of a good mystery are
inherent in every action of either group. In fact, in our business
publicity can almost never enhance the chances of success of an
operation; nor is publicity after a successful operation more
beneficial. There are always sources and methods that may be dis-
closed which jeopardize other current or future operations, and I
am sure that you in your work must find these principles generally
sound also. In addition, the profession of intelligence is beset
by the magnetic attraction that the very word "intelligence" has
for the &'enera1 public. It aeems to me that the average person
immediately attaches a sinister meaning, with a strong cloak and
dragger flavor, to the very mention of "intelligence.' There is the
ganeral impression that anyone in intelligence, regardless of his
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position, has access to all, state secrets while they are "hot off
the griddle." As I am sure you know as well as I, when you've told
three people a "secret" it is sometimes anything but a secret.
Hence, we try to operate on a "need-to-know" principle which, with
perfection, would insure that each officer or employee received
only that classified information which he needed in order to do
his job. But all you have to do when your friends ask you about
the situation in the Par East, Bear East, or elsewhere, is to
smile and say, "I don't know and you are credited with really
having the inside dope. I've often thought that if I knew only
a fraction of what I was given credit for under these circumstances
Eqy service would certainly become invaluable. Glamor without
publicity is a little difficult to have. When viewed in this
context, there is little glamor in our business. Our work like
yours, is not done with mirrors, and the reward for a sterling
performance is usually anonymity and the self-satisfaction of a
job well done and known only to a few.
-Each of our fields depends in a large measure upon logical
deductions made from available facts, painstakingly researched.
Upon these facts and opinions conclusions are drawn, on the basis
of which positive action is taken. Nations, as far as their
posture toward other nations is concerned, are similar to individuals,
in that they should be well-informed, not only about their own
capabilities and weaknesses, but about those of their friends.
Likewise, once they know from what quarter possible danger can
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come, either overtly or through too great reliance upon acme
or all of their allies, they must be prepared to take steps
to circumvent diaaster. The steps that nations take to protect
themselves or to advance thkir interests in the world are
based, in large or small measure, upon the advice that they
receive from their intelligence advisors. Just as when you
consult a road map before driving from one place to another
where you may not have been before, so governments of the world
rely upon the advice and facilities of their intelligence
components in the formulation of their policies, foreign and
domestic, which may have an international impact.
From the days when men first devised methods of protecting
themselves from their enemies by means of shading armies, there
has been an intelligence function. The India scouts who rode
the Astern plains of the United States as outriders for the
cavalry were, in effect, intelligence agents whose job it was
to report on the location, strength, disposition, and probable
hostile intent of enemy forces. Their value was negated entirely
if they kept what they knew to themselves, were won over to the
enemy, or distorted it for personal or political reasons when
reporting to their commands. It was equally disastrous on
occasion when their advice went unheeded.
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the i tht n-'3.wi tyy mrhi,~ii , t:lg`c' ?v15 nt
are, advis from tbs beat a(yarteia avaailablo as to the wisdom of
adopting certain broad national policies that ax*, store to have exx
e 3aect on of er )j n amd in world councils. In toy ' a comple:xe
,tr ld, this advice does not confine itself solely to military
matters,, for w er certaln conditions, economic sanctionss, internal,
po`f .tics ? or cultural, upheaval may aecomp7 `eh rst force of
carmot do. 'Thus,, It my be jusit as Import-rot to known .bet the
ssoc.ial conditions or industrial productivity of country "A" are
.
as itg~iq trylt}yto/H{ novA, their milit /. Sot ntial.. lnntya.~.y{.igence is4~then
the han iden orj fo44 eyii policy . . . II that inst4 umtnt tho ~,y FItiich
nations ear eas their basic attitudes to r#. the rest of the world.
such poiir_ r s not be static; it must Visage or adjust as the need
dictates and the measure of its flexibility is often a function
of the efficiency with which the i antelli. n nce community operates
W. the clarity of they advice given the architects of for & policy.,
t rxsrioualy the, best advice is the which is the most comprehensive.,
objective, and tnr hful. :re is an c>yposite side to this matters
too ....leaders of nations must be willing to believe axed belie. in
their oyn intelligence producers, even when the advice they give or
the news they bring in not easy to avallov. Of course,, it goes without
saying that the intelligence producers must consistently came up with
rYelioble es ti tes of the situation in order to merit this confidence.
No country un ills to give credence to its own intelligence product
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can long advance itself in world councils during peacetime, or
preserve itself from disaster during war. For example, there is
abundant evidence that Adolf Hitler, when the tide of battle
was running set against the Third Reich (rye-ich), refused to
believe his own intelligence people because what they told him
was incompatible with his own delusions regarding the way the
war should have gone. No matter how distasteful it is, po2leym ere
must do all of their erring on the side of confidence in the
intelligence presented to them and to be veil-merited this
confidence must be born of a never-ending pursuit of all the
facts that can possibly be marshalled and presented in time
to be properly used.
I have dealt thusly in generalities about the matter of
national intelligence no that I might not the stage for a diescrip-
tion of what our national intelligence effort is and how it functions
in the United States. Until the establishment or the Central
Intelligence Group in l946, and until 1947 when the National
Security Act of that year gave form and substance to the Central
Intelligence Agency as it is now constituted, there was no such
thing as a centralized federal intelligence concept in the United
States Government. Policymakers relied upon the various separate
intelligence activities, most of which were located within the
structure of the military, and whose opinions often differed
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each from the other in significant respects. (We might veil
care such a situation to that which might exist if General
Motors continued to manufacture component parts for its auto-
mobiles without providing an assembly line to turn out the
finished product.) It was the desire of the President, expressed
through the Congress, to create a mechanism through which effective
collection of intelligence could be supplemented by a forum where
conflicts of opinion between intelligence activities could be
considered and resolved, where possible, prior to submission of
their materiall, to the architects of foreign policy. To meet this
need the Central Intelligence Agency was established as a truly
independent Agency, reporting through its Director to the National
Security Council where the President is the presidia officer.
CIA is not responsible to the Department of Defense, the Department
of State, or any other component of the government, nor are the
intelligence components of these agencies under the coed of the
Director of Centrall.. Intelligence. Hoover, the Director is responsible
for the coordination of the Government's national intelligence effort.
We like to refer to the intelligence components of all agencies as
the "intelligence coemnityr." We work very closely with one another.
Cure is a closely coordinated, common effort, the results of which
funnel through the Central Intelligence Agency to the National
Security Council which in our Nation's top advisory, board on matters
affecting the national security. Mr. Allen W. Dulles, our Director,
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briefs the President and the National Security Council regularly
awl. though upon request he my raced a course of action to
this body, the makes of foreign policy is not his function or
responsibility. CIA does not make the foreign policy of the
President and his policymaking associates any more than the chief
of police makes the decision an to the verdict that a judge and
jury will determine in a particular case. It is our job to
assemble the facts based upon careful, investigation, to anslyze
them and to present our estimates to the proper authorities for
whatever action is deemed appropriate. The Ingredients which
make up such an estimate are military, political, economic,
sociological, scientific, etc., all placed in proper perspective
?so as to present a balanced estimate. There are, of course,
Infrequent occasions when coMletee agreement cannot be reached.
We would have cause for concern, it gems to ma,, if this were
not the case. In such a case a dissent by any participating
intelligence cam
ponent is given a full presentation along with
the eat ate. We believe that an estimate, to be useful, must
be forthright, clear and concise, and that watered-down, least
common denominators of agreement must be avoided.
When you consider the sheer bulk of the material from which
intelligence opinions and estimates are drawn, the result is staggering.
In any one year Literally millions of separate pieces of intelligence
in the form of reports, publications, radio broadcasts, documents, and
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photographs find their vay into each of the rember a eencleFi of
what we have cow. to ce-11 the "intelligence city." bhw of
these are at odds with each other s others contain only particles
of useful infor ation. The process of reconciliation, revision,
cheer and rechecking, editing and paring down is trensndous, but
absolutely necessary to insure acceptable accuracy.
Take foreign radio broadcasts, for example. It is sigmiflecnt
that a foreign radio broadcasts a certain coventery. Of greater
significance is how many tines it was broadcast in a given period,
in that languages, and to what audiences. Was there aao r semblance
of truth in the' coe ntary? Was it slanted? .... And if so, how?
Was it slanted differently for different audiences, etc? I am
sure you can see that a coVarable analysis of other categories of
informtion that ?y go into an estimate makes this a rather delicate
process with plenty of margin for error. Or course, one never has
all of the information he would like available upon which to base
intelligence estimates . I would estimate, however, that perhaps
as much as eighty percent of the information available to us is
obtainable through perfectly open sources; the prsa8, publications
oi' all ssortss, educational institutions, industry, and individuals.
An additional ten percent my be obtainable through more difficult,
dangerous, and costly methods. The remaining ten percent of an
intelligence estimate is fina evaluation. Thiss, of coarse, is
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the most difficult aid where i:he greatest possibility of error
lies This is the unknown area which gets into the real of what
people ere actually thinking. If we imagined ourselves as Cormunist
estn tors for a nonent and think back to the situation shortly before
the entry of the U sited at,+tes into the Korean wa , l think that we
nd-88 it well be justified, frou the attitude of the Unite& States as
d astrated in my ways, that the United. States would not cotriit
its forces to defend. South Korea. Yet, we did exactly that and did
it very ex--elitiously when the Copy .unist forces. launched their invasion.
The kind of s! ti v- t'o e=ice. Intel li erxcp oi. :.Mich I have been
speaking in. connection with CIL's responsibilities must not be confused
with the internal intelligence, or counterintelligence, developed by
the Federal bureau. of Investigation, with whom CI has exceedingly
satisfactory relations, I ani pleased to say.
I should like tc emphasize to you as police officers that the
Central Intelligence Agency has no police, subpoena, law enf'orcer:ant
powers, or inteznal security functions. .'hose security forces that
CIA does have are concerned entirely with matters of physical security,
protection of classified sir. ormatl.on, and investigation of personnel
who ray be employed by us. In the performance of this letter task,
me-ny of you have come In contact with our representatives. I want to
add here that we are exceedingly grateful for the splendid assistance
which they have been given by the state and municipal authorities in
this country, without whose help, spontaneously offered., the work of
CIA would have been seriously hampered.
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Despite the similar;. ties between law erXora mint and intelligence
to which I have alluded, there remains one major poin of difference
bet- en the two fields, When a police force produces an exceptionally
brilliant piece of work, either in forestalling a felony or in appre-
hending a criminal, its su=esses are usually given ample recognition
by the press, as rightly they should. In the field of intell,igen vq
major successes remain such as long as they are not recognized. A
favorite tactic of the opposition is to attribute every internal
disorder., every failure on their part to "paid agents of aggressive.
Am rican .imperialism," or other leas charitable phrases. Through
this device the appositions hopes to smoke out an inadvertent admission
or denial from some recognized intelligence source in the Free World,
Like the police force that fails to locate a criminal at barge,,
the intelligence commmnity comes in for its share of public criticism
when evidence seams to point in the direction of an "intelligence
failure" in our country. -Even though the actual facts may be at
via -i.~ ., with this assuz ion, you learn to roll with the punch and
to accept the fact that you have only your personal sense of satits-
fatti on to show for a particular success in which you may have ptayed
a part. In a way, it Is analogous to being a baseball %V ire; you
may call, the plays as you see them for eight innings and cavrorycno an
both teams is satisfied, but cams a close play at the plate and you
ore a blind, degenerate robber to at least half of the audience sitting
two hundred yards amt in the bleachers,
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A gne&'~ %l has been written end said about the difficulty
of securing reliable inf'cairation from countries in the hard cue
of the Cc n aua ist orbit. I mike no bones about the relative diffi-
culties that do exist in obtaining information from a country where
the ez tiru population. Luria in :te w of its life,; and there every . caverrent
Is subject to rigid control and exhaustive examination, Not only is the
pt ical problem of getting accurate information extremely difficult,
but it is further complicated by the fact that in the most extreme
rzsss of authoritarian rule, such as in the Soviet Union, we see an
e ;the population that has been carefully trained to off on itself g
Not only are there secret pollee and paid Wormers, but through
perversions of what we in the Free World understand as the *ads of
ethiccs, fardlies spy and inform on their relatives, sows on their
fathers,, and with a zeal and conviction that is astonishing, Atd
it is even more astonishing when you consider that the popular @*n.
ception that "every Russian is a Communist' is doflnitQe y net trus:a
The met leaders have established complete control over their popula-,p
Lion of appro tely 220 million people with an actual Communist
Party membership of 7 Rion, or one person out of every 30 in the
co o And these 7 mlMon hard core Communist Party nranberu include
C uni ats serving in the armed forcos of the U=, At the hei&t
of its strength in the United States the actual members of the Case
Party numbered something less then use in 3,O0O
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Ho ,ever, numbers can be misleading. The Cwwunist technique
of infiltration has never depended on mss penetration,, but rather
upon a few highly ti-ainsd and dedicated operatives who " "
the movements of sympathetic indigenous personnels training them
over a long period of time, years in facts, making sure that these
people find their way to important posts in the military and the
government so that when the whistle blows, the inevitahie uprising
appears to have strong nationalistic overtones, at least initially,
and the control of the police, comanunications, the mi .itarys tranapar.
tation, and food supplies fall first into their hands. As a e in
point, i might mention the recent disclosures concerning the sizeable
Oast espionage ring uncovered in Iran ( ) this month with
the arrest and implication of more than 400 officers in the Iranian
(EEc R&H T) Amara many of them holding top government advisory and
international liaison posts. The interesting fact is that the ground.
work for this network was laid certainly 13 and possibly 20 years ago
by the Soviet Union, as a t03lanag erm investment." only in this case
using other people ? s currency.' Not only was the ring weU4si dden
enough to escape detection for so long a tithe, but it was also able
to survive the mass purge of the Tuddh (TWO EH) or Oft Party
ranks that took place after the overthrow of the ugh (MQ A,)Eit)
regime, and the reinstatement of the Shah, The potential of wash an
organization is obvious, The important thing for you,, as chiefs of
pia organizations, domestic and foreign, to remember in this context
is the old salting that "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty',"
and no coutarterespicntage mission is ever cot .etc finisho o
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This penetrate., divide and conquer mechanism of the Soviets
is used with devastating effect within their own borders, as I have
said, largely through a practical application of the "c rrot and the
stick" philosophy, wherein informing for the State is not only an
arts it Js a profession, rewarded by the necessities of life, and
where defections, either physical or philosophical are punished by
deprivation of the right to work, the right to travel, and the right
to "live in freedom in the glorious vorkers& paradise,," Instea3a a
long term lease in the Urals (YOUR) is often the only reward of
the defector, No wonder information is difficult to obtain under
conditions such as these,
Contrast this, if you wills with conditions existing in our own
country It has often seemed to me, as I have read the often surb
prisingly accurate information in our countiyD a newspapers and
periodic that the biggest job of a hostile intelligence force
would be to wide through the mass of what they can obtain through
the neumstandso Add to that the fact that freedom of the prow not
only means freedom of opinion but freedom to present whatever facts
the publication can locate and you can see how fruitful intelligence
gathering must be when the United States is the target. Several
months ago there appeared in a large metropolitan Sunday newspaper a
lengthy story on the installation of NIKE (ME Y) guided missile
stations around a large American city Not only was there an arresting
presentation of the construction methods being used,, but statistics
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(many of them educated guesses) regarding the effectiveness of
the stations against hostile aircraft, There wwo diagrwraatic
cross-sections of what the inside of a typical station would lcoe
likep the number of man who would man it, and actual photographs
of one of the construction sites and partially laid foundations,
As a load for the article, them was a map of the Washington area
with definite indications of where each installation was to be
situated, This information was available to each one of the more
than $g000 people in Washington who represent foreign governments,
and for the staggering sum of 6,200 the price of that Sunday?s edition,
I hesitate to say what an equal coverage of similar instsal,laticn in
a country ruled by Comm m would cost to obtain, were it? available,
bu ; you can be sure that it would be considerable, in term of money,
effort and grew hairsol)
As another ale, I alto an interesting periodical with which
I am sure you are all fami iaro Every year leading A can newspapers
publish as a reader service an annual reference volume usual3jv at,&
price of around one dollar a copy, Its hundreds of pages am literally
choked with solid sstatissti>s information'. not only about countries
other than our awm, but about our natural resources,, their magnitude,
location and utilisation, There are tables breaking down our cr.
centers of population, a hiatory- of our political development and
present Governmental organisation, descriptive articles about indua?
trial processes,, distribution of inccm, number., location and membex'c
ship of our schools and technical institut,esa biographies and what,
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have you; in short, the x-a,va ? . to from iihich f" inished intelligence is
made. This volume, were such avail' able on the Soviet Union containing
the sate high degree of reliability, uouid be worth countless hours
of painstaking reseaxch end considerable expenditure of money. You
con wager, with good odds, that such records in Russia do not find
their way to the newsaton&i
While at times it may seem. that we are too open about our
capabilities as a. nation, I hope that my remarks will not be construed
as advocating a policy of withholding information which should properly
be disseminated. Freedom of the press and the doctrine of a well-
informed citizenry are two of our great heritages which must be safe-
guarded. From another viewpoint, there is something vastly encouraging
about the way in which the Free World can chronicle its accomplishments
in the press and in volumes like the one to which I have just referred.
In n any ways, such evidence is an asset, for if our enemies know
exactly what they face in the way of industrial strength, physical
resources, moral determination and logistics problems) that in itself
may well be a major deterrent to any hostile act.
I have often thought that those in cor snd of our forces would
today, or in the foreseeable future (given much less information than
they had at Pearl harbor). take some very positive action. Your opinion
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an to whether Pearl Farber was a comma failure or an intelligence
failure, or both, is perhaps as good as mine. But it seems clear
to ilia that a "p l Hari " in the future is more likely to be
due to an inte:Llige;e failure. The very great responsibility for
insuring that the is no such failure is staggering. I believe
that our Goverment has very wisely set up the proper machinery and
despite the fact that this machinery is only about seven years old
in contrast to a ,her countries which have been in the business for
centuries, we believe it is working well, Machinery alone i s$ of
course, not the answr0 As in your work$ unless you have inf d$
dedicated? alert? Imaginative people you are not likely to succeed,
And on this score I think that you can also be reassured. In his
choice of Allen WQ Dulles as his Director of Central Intelligence,,
the President has selected, without question, one of the most uniquely
qualified citizens of our Country. Midw his great leaderships drives
and devotion to duty., and with the splendid and efficient cooperation
of all agencies of the "intelligence city" and with the continued
cooperation of police organizations like yyov in these United Staates,
I think that our country today has an intelligence service of which
you can j.y be proud.
I also believe that it is an exceedingly healthy sign that an
annual conferew-a such as this be 'conducted in a lovely city like
Now Orleans, where the conference h adgt terss need not be ringed with
troops and where the population does not have to close iron shutters
for fear of uprisings or disorders occasioned by your presence two
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Your business is not that of the Gestapo, Because none of you
represents blind authoritarian rule in the co ities from which
you come, becauso none of you is the "police ooamizar:e in your hope
town, the good citizens of your towns and cities will continue to
enjoy complete police protection in your absence. through cunt g
that they, the people, have vested in you as their representatives
and not their oppresses,
I wish you success in your deliberations at this canferen e,
and I went you to know what a distinct pleasure it has been to spy
to you today on babz2f of Mr, Allen W. lames and my colleagt in
Central Int&ligene Agency,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/08: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100500001-2