YEARS OF CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100240001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1957
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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CrieTISION Diviulon
YEARs OF CRISIS
Sunflal_pecombor_224 1957
47)0 - 3100 P.M..
AUNOUNCERI CBS. News invites you to spend the next hour
with Edward B. Murrow:and eight members of .broadcastingts most distinguished
staff of news correspondents. This is the ninth edition of 1VARS OF CRISIS
for Which CBS News has once again called in its correspondents from the
important news centers of the world.. Here now is Edward R. Narrow.
=ROW* Each year for nine years, CBS correspondents
have come home at about this time to try to cast up a sort of national
balance sheet. Met even ve.have always been right. We sat around here
a couple of years ago discussing whether the title of this program, Years
of crisis, was really appropriate. Well, this year, it may be inadequate,
because we CertainLy have no shortage of crises. However, we will now
attempt to unleaSh, a not too agonized reappraisal of where we stand as
the Now Year is about to begin Welcome home, gentlemen. I suggest,
that first of all, you answer for me a very simple question briefly as
possible, and that is, what in your area happened that was basic, that
was .pivotal, in the course of the last :year.. Letts Start with Howard IC.
Smith, who was for ten years our chief European correspondent, and is
now stationed in Washington. Upward.
sturs4 wouviAlmrope in 2957,, 'I mafraid that
neutralism became a -doctrine vith a future. .
=nowt Devid,Sehoenbrun based =Paris, spends a lot:
of time in North Africa.
SCHOENBRUNI I think the initiative in NATO passed out of
Americats bands into the bands of our allies.
MORROW: Alex Nendrick, from London,.
, KENDRICK* In Britain,, Ed, we look like the second-class
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YEARS OF CRISIS: 12/29/57
power that we have been saying the British look like.
NaRROW8 Winston Burdett, based on Rome, spends a' lot
of time in the Middle East.
EMMETT t In the Middle East, the Eisenhower Doctrine
collided with the iihrudichav Doctrine.
NURROWI Ernie Leiser, from West Germany.
=ISM: in mid-Europe, P4, this was the year that the
Soviets put a couple of satellites up into orbit and pulled the rest of
their satellites back into orbit.
NORROW2 Pete Kalischer, based on Tokyo, just back from
a trip through Southeast Asia,
KALISCIIER In 1957, Ed, was the year that Asian astrologers
cast their horoscopes by the light of two Russian moons.
NURROW: Dan Schorr, from lioscow,
SCHORR* In Russia, Ed, I think this was the year when,
a dangerous inferiority complex was replaced by a possibly more dangerous
superiority complex.
.11URROWs Eric Sevareid, chief of our Washington Bureau.
?SEVAREIDs Ed, / think this year Americans lost considera'bli
faith both in their fighting apparatus and in their high command.
MURROWs Wells, gentlemen, this is not a very optimistic
opening, / would say, but let's examine now a little - how did it happen,*
how did we get ourselves In this fix? Schoenbrun.
SCROENBRUNI The world's balance of power changed very
drastically this year. Russia outflanked us in the Middle East, out-
produced us militarily, and our country, unfortunately, became vulnerable
to atomic attack.
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11
TEARS OF CRISIS:
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sow, as all of you gentlemen know, this situation.
is very different from that which existed when NATO was first created
h4ck in 194 and it might be worthwhile looking backwards a little
briefly to find out how we got hero. Dank then, we had an atomic
monopoly and America was the Invulnerable fortress of democracy, living
pretty safely behind our wide ocean moats. Then everything began to
change at about that time. We had a highly successful foreign policy,
the Truman. Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the Russians couldntt attack
us, they didn't dare attack our allies because of fear of instant atomic
retaliation and I think we probably just fell asleep. We woke up pretty
rapidly however, Ed. In the Fall of 1949, the Soviets exploded an atom
bomb, in lp - a hydrogen bomb, and then this year for the first time
our one sale moats can now be spanned by missiles and our skies by
Sputniks. That whole situation was so very different - today for example.
? ,
that Ameriban leadership of SATO, which was once willingly given to us in
return fort our Proteetion, has n been challenged.
I4ORR0113 Row Id we lose it?
iscnolarrauzi weal, ,probably we lost it because we thought ,
that a baliinced budget was more important than a balance of power - and
a direct result of that was I flit* one of the most significant .facts
of this post-war era. President Eisenhower went to Paris as the first
American statesman seeking security for our country, instead of offering
it to our allies. We vent there, Ed, you were with me in Paris, we went
there to arm, to get missile bases. We were told instead to parley with
the Russians. Now, East-West talks were not on the agenda of the Imo
conference, not at least in the American plan., It was forced upon us.
We did not lead; we were led. Why did this happen? Well I think we
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SEARS OF CRISIS: 12/29/57
chanced or failed,to change with a changing world. And I think the man
who told us why it happened was President Eisenhower himself at that same
conference. He said we Ivo been guilty of false habits of thought. We
thought that the free system was inherently stronger at all times, and
in all fields, to the ?Communist system. We thought we didn't have to
work or pay for freedom. Gentlemen, I would suggest that this is what
it Ds brought us to, the brink of the gravest threat to our freedom in
our history.
? ,IvraRROWs Winston Burdett, how do you think we got into
this fix?
DIZIDETT:
Well, Ed, I think that it- the past year has
proven anything in rq area; the Middle East, it is that Something was
bandamentally wrong somewheire In our mid-East policy. he Eisenhower
Doctrine has not worked out. We wont ahead on the premise that we Could
sot. up some kind of Amoric4i protectorate over theleiiddle East by
. .
miii-
tary moans, that we could Tice anti-Communist allies of the Arab States ,
and in this way exclude the Russians from the area. Ite proposed to
extend the cold war .to the Arab world and we ignored both the inherent
weakness of the Arab States and the emotional backfire of Arab nationalism.
Lfe asked the Arabs to line up .on :our side,. :against 0.,(..6nd in
effect, we told thorn that they ten142 get economic aid.frOm us $4.:,they
did. And this antaged then. And trap, ,ti.ce, W,,..e..-::".0nVince41,thel4 :that
our only desire *was'?deminate....4,;hem Instead of lotting the Russians
' dominate them. In p'.?:a:etride, I thM.ak we made one fatal mistake.
failed to keep calm .4..,n;..a.erisis.;..;:tdrien the Syrian Loft-Wing rogine0:,:took
:" .??
over our 6th Fleet sail:ea out en,:pStentatiaus:'inanenvers. A special
?
=Vey from 'Washington:11ov out On emergency. mission.::. And this proved..
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to the Arabs that we were more alarmed by what happened in Syila than
they were and they took this as a sign of fear and weakness. They took
it also as attempted interference in their affairs and even friendly
Arab governments had to come out and disavow us publicly on the ground
that what happened in Syria was Syriats business. Itts'Irue of course
that we face many psychological ItaPdicaps in the Arab world that the
Russians dont have to face. Israel is the overriding issue of Arab
nationalism and the Arabs look on us as Israel's champion. The won...
? word 'imperialist' which both the Arabs and the Russians pin on us, still
has a high emotional content in that part of the world. But for this
reason, / think, we can't go on under-estimating the Arab capacity for
violent emotional reactions. Our 12andling of the Syrian crisis, .certain-
1Y, Convinced the Syrians that their deal with Russia was a great 'victory
? for Arab nationalism and independence and a' great defeat for noisy Western
diplomacy.
VITIRROW: Prom Pete Kalischer, as viewed from the Far East,
how do ,we look?
KALISCHER:? Well, when we lost our military pre eminence Ed,
cur bases there became more of a liability than an asset. ?Wetre net a
member of the faiiily in Asia, 'wore an alien Occidental nation and our
leadership there has always been based primarily on power. We beat the
Zapanese, Asia's first. team, during World. War II, We kept a an edge,
a military edge, thereafter, and then we lost -our atomic monopoly.
the first big crack came, in Or military reputation, when we didn't win
the 'Korean war decisively. This enormously enhanced Red Chines reputa-
tio? and it put us in, the position of not knowing exactly What to do.
tie didn't lick tem, we didntt join tem, and we certainly pretended more
or less that they 'weren't there. Now, this was supposed to isolate our
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NEARS OF CRISIS:
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isolate Red Red China from the rest of the non-Camauznist world, but ac-
tually, all it did was isolate us. It made the Araerican eagle look like
an ostrich. Now, Asians are perfectly willing to go along with an
eccentric eagle, as long as it is an eagle and it can lick anything In
the sir. Lit when the Spat/men went up, the Asians decided that our
military leadership had vanished.
=ROW: Mat did it feel like working in tb.e Far East
when you were not permitted to go to Communist China?
KALISCRER: Zell, sir, pretty much like a fool. / mean - we
sat there and watched our colleagues from Australia and Britain and Canada
and Zapan go in and out and we kept our noses pressed to the window.
IMIMOIJa Alright, let's find out from Dan Schorr what
the view is from Moscow. Dan.
SCHORR: The view, Ed, from the to of the Kremlin, where
I spent so much time in the past year, has been somewhat dim and clouded
though one thing has become clear. The Sputnik vilich has been mentioned
Before was a symbol, a very great symbol although not the complete sum
of what happened in Russiats devil Ines with the world this year. The
Sputnik and of course the missile that made it possible to launch these
two Sputniks, changed the power balance between Russia and the United
States, if not actually then at least In their own minds, but had effects
elsewhere as well. It had an effect on. their control of the satellites.
At the Kremlin Communist summit conference last month, the Sputnik was
used as a symbol to cow the satellites and get them back into orbit, as
Ernie Leiser mentioned. That they, in effect, hitched their wagon to
this satellite up in the sky and used it to cow their earthbound satel-
lites. And there Ire other effects in other areas. To the uncommitted
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nations they took this satellite and said 'we are now the country to VIMO
to for aid not the United States.' And even internally it had very im,
portant effects, because in a in a country like Russia,. which had two
purges in the past year, and Where Ithrudhchevls regime had a great many
other troubles. He vas able to use the Sputnik as a great attention
distracter. He was able to tell the people Montt look down here 'where
me have troubles with crops, with our industrial reorganization and one
thing or another, look up there in the sky and see our great achievements.,
=mow: Dan, did the Sputniks distract attention from
Marshal Zliukov s removal?
SCHOR: Well, In the first place there was .considerably
loss attention. given to Zhukvt's removal in Russia than in the United
,
States. But the second Sputnik, coming as it did the day after Zhukovis
complete ouster, completely erased any idea of Zhukov from the minds of
the Russians even if they were disposed to discuss anything quite as
dangerous as that, In effect, 'what Ihrushchev has begun practicing is
something that me might call Srutnilomanship and hets,practised it very
succosSfully. That tms Russia this past year.
=nous Well, Eric Sevareid, as viewed from 'Washington,
bow do me find ourselves in this position and posture?
SEVARBIDI Well, Ed, me all get obsessed with, government
and I'm not willing to blame government for everything that goes wrong
in afro? democratic representative type of society. But 'we have to
begin with government policy. It seems to me that waive seen over the
years here a kind of a. gradual, almost unconscious substitution of the
word for the deed. Nom, we have made rather binding verbal commitments
all over this globe without really providing the flexible military
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YEARS OF CRISIS:
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policy that would make them good in a pinch. I think we tve suffered from
a paralysis, at the base, a paralysis of both our military structure and
organization and our strategic thinking by reason of the Dulles massive
retaliation doctrine 'wedded to the Iii3.Son-liumphrey econ.amy42rst
I think people have quite obviously been lulled almost asleep over the
years with endless assurances of peace and prosperity and a normalcy
which we shall aertairly not see- in our generation: The strange thing
is that the government seems to have lulled itself with the same 5in6
of wishful non-thinking? Atter all, it was just this Spring that the
president was assuring us - an I tm, sure he believed this quite sincerely -
that NATO had never boon stronger, and this symmer - that we could have
a perfectly adequate defense for the 08-billion ceiling. It Was just
this August that Secretary Nilson actually reduced the .monoys for missile
development,' And all this in the teeth of what seems to most of us to
have boon very apparent Intelligence information available to them as ?
to everybody else. I have a feeling there has been a response here not
to objective facts enough but too much to subjective illuSions. For
example, that public opinion and the supply of Money in this Country
are fixed ceilings under which ..* determine really what Government
does instead of the other way around. And Diaybe more than; jUdi a tech-.
nological lag, maybe a considerable breakdown, at least for .a time, in
.** in the great art of leading a great people.
uUatOUs Well, gentlemen, we certainly have not a problem
but a vb.ole covey or clutch of problems. Letts see if we can define at
least one or two of them. Alex Xendrick, you've spent the last two or
three months studying the whole missile and weapons program, just how
serious is our technological lag?
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YEAR'S OF CRISIS: 12129,457
ICEITDRICKI Zi1442 AAeserious, Ed, as Dan Saban' made it
quite plain. The two Soviet Sputniks were not accidental, they were -
planned that way. They show Vast geience and technology and. perhaps
even in their educational sp.**, which backs up science and technology,
the Russians are our equal in some respects and perhaps even ahead of us.
Of course, in military terms - everybody' should know by now - that the two
Soviet Sputniks mean that the Russians can send a ballistic missile five
thousand miles from their country to our country In less than a half hour.
They can put a hydrogen warhead on this missile and It can cause wide-
spread. death and destruction. its true that they cant do this
accurately enough yet - and our experts tell Us that the Soviet ICBM
is not yet operational. But the potential is there. And strategy is
'measured in terms of potential. And strategically, possession of the
ICBM by the Russians would cancel out our strategic advantage, that is,
our advantage up to this point, on? long distance Air Force, SAC. Now,
its true that the Russians have a long distance air force too, their
SAC, but with our warning system and our defense system we would have
some protection against an attack by their long distance air force. If
they attacked us with missiles we wouldr.lt have that protection. Vow*
it ts also true that the missiles without a. defense - we can retaliate'
with SAC still. We can ?build up inter-continental missiles the vay they
are doing and the way we are doing and we may also be able to develop
anti-missile missiles. But this doesntt remove that potential / was
talking about, the potential that they have of In*Tring a direct strike
against our cities.
I4EMR011: Isn't it true also iaex, that they lead us in
intermediate range missiles?
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Emma Yes, they do s. in two respects, because they
are also building submarines :which will be able to fire missiles and.
those subma.rines can come rather close to our shores and. they can bring
American cities under attack from short range distances. rather than from
long range distances.
smorambals Alex,, they can also..cancel put. with their
311E1ts our European bases (inter.)
'fps
=WICK: lieu, exactly - what Ed said - they are ahead
of us in intermediate range missiles as wen and this gives them the pa-s
tential of attacking the cities of Western Europe, the cities of our
allies, as well as our OM cities.
SCIIONIMUITs That's what made them so nervous, at 'the' Paris
.summit conference and so reluctant to give us la,unching pads in Europe
itself.
?IMIDRICKs Our allies you mean.
exactra -mug: Yes.
Well, now gentlemen,, we went to Paris hoping
that we cold get permission from our allies to plant these 'intermediate
range missiles on their territory, but they seemed to be -somewhat reluctant.
,Leiser, as -viewed from G.ermanyt?iwhat do you think our chances. are :o
-getting -permission to place these missiles on the continent?
.? LEISERs, ? Iglu not so sure ie will, Ed.', :14 of course,
extracted in Paris an agreement in principle to put. those bases on :the
continent, but aetually in practice a good many of, our allies, only ware
? willing to have those _bases on .s.ogebody else's part of the continent.
The tiest German newspapers for example have been busily printing maps
to show that it really -doesn't Make much:sense to have the bases on
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German soil. They say that the only additional area brought into target
mice is a slice of 'tundra some place northeast of Leningrad. The idea
seems to be 'put the bases in Turkey or in Greece t any place but on our.
soil. Well, of course, this is quite a change :rom a couple of years
ago %then our allies were clamoring that we were depriving them of the
modern weapons that ;they needed to protect their territories. - Now for
the first time we we-ittAo. Paris and ye asked them to accept the mi.ssiles,
or at least give us ?the real estate to put them on in order to help protect
A:aerie= toil. An, actually, there ts another very remarkable change of
scene from my point of view, the man who seemed to focus the reluctance
to accept the missile was old lainrad Adenauer, who up to now has been
our most obedient airs I think, you might say... (inter.)
SCH9
oi ?
LEISER:
Unquestioning.
who has - spy (laughter) - anyhow, he car-
tainly has been a rook of support for the Dulles doctrine, of positions
of strength. Well, at this meeting* the Europeans and particularly the
Germans felt that he was the leader of opposition to Dulles. In fact, in
Bonn after the Paris conference, the ;joke was that the German national
anthem should be changed from "Deutschland Veber Alles" to ',Deutschland
?Ueber Dulles."
Well, it's true that Adenauer led the procession,
demaoling new parleys with tha Russians but he was almost ,trampled by our
other allies who were equally eager.
Howard Smith., one of the great advantages of
being a chief correspondent is that you can wander about anywhere you
like and you've been doing that for the last ten years, why don't you
stun up now the political repercussions of Sputnik?
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Wells I thirk the problem that Sputnik creates
for us outside our own borders has to be divided into two, the un.tom-'
Bitted world - about two-thirds of the worlds and the 'Western allied
nations. To take ,the =committed countries firsts we tire always suffered .
frost an advantage in dealing with them because Rulsia has no history in
Asia and .11frie4 and the Riddle East while the Western white man does.
Until recently,- most or these peoples were subjects of Western empires
aad so their resentment and suspiclon are fresh and sharp and so and
also they don't distinguish between 'Europeans, who live in Europe, and
Europeans, who over the centuries ham emigrated and call themselves
Americrms. We're all tlt 83gssk teva? So in arc?* competition for their
favor we're like a mile runner who's forced to start every raOe a quarter
pile behind the Russian oppanent. Wells now since Sputnik I think our
disadvantage has become greater because the main material aspiration
of these people is to industrialize their countrie's rk.lpidly and here
? they zee the ??? to thetas hopeful image of a country, Russia, almost as
der-'developed as they were a short while ago, is today able to beat
the most advanced Western white nation at putting an earth satellite
Into orbit, This is just bound to make them more receptive tap-
preaches from the Russians and less receptive to approaches from us.
jartROW: One of ?our major mis??? miscalculatio.uos
wasn't it, that we assumed that a batkward people oomid not skip tslhole
generations or eenturies in technological development and progress.
I think the floor is lit??? littered with
fragments of that ii... (laughter) ??? nous' in the (inter?) ???
sorry ???
SCHOMMUN's
Howard, wouldn't you agree that the Cairo
conference this week is a particular example of Russiats ,political and
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economic appeal to the uncommitted nations, that they now can at least
promise to export aid and technology to those (inter.)
SUITE: .Absolutely. I think its a perfect example
of the way they're trying to eloit Sputnik. But now about the Ifestern
European allied countries, the problemts somewliat different. They Ire not
so interested in the Sputnik as they are in the mighty missile that put
a half ton Sputnik in the air. An Alex Kendrick said - that implies that
Russia is now ahead of us in a new field of weapons whereby the Russians
can destroy Western Europe much more efficiently than ever before and
America is less able to protect Europe than ever before. This is almost
found to Induce then to start thinking in terms of possibly becoming
neutral in this battle - and I think that desire is increased by the
fact that the Russians have or will soon have this inter-continental
missile whereby they can hit America directly without even going over
Western Europe. This is abound to bring about the thought in Western
opt
Europe that perhaps they might (up) out of the next war and 4ust leave
it to the two giants. So, SI think the whole thing creates a trend
towards neutral.... (inter.)
Kr1011n as the of defense.
MURROIit Yes.
LE1SEat Well, Ed, I think that right now it makes them
op*
want to negotiate, not necessarily to (up) out, but to find some way to
negotiate out of the dilemma that they fool that they're in.
UMW: Well, Sevareid, since weir? talking about allies,
and having allies is a relatively new experience for us, they revzosont
a problem too, dontt they?
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SEITAREID: Yes, I% afraid Howard has stolen a little of
my proposed thunder here but (laughter) we talk all the time and the press
is full of talk about the allied crisis of cenfidence in us. You can tura
this around too. There tre? a let ot =Tried people. In Washington., about
their etintidence in' Europe. Lots of Asians, who used to criticize.'us for
concentrating too mumh, on military powc..,r, -JIM criticize .us for not con-
centratin,g enough and letting the RUssianS get 'ahead of. us. 'There are
Europeans who seen to want a doublv-standard alliances one that will
protect them, and also give them an out if necessary. The words in the
alliance, if they read its says in effects one for all and all for one.
We have not yet sought it out; some of then are.
ME:ROW: gentlomenk let's 'look briefly at the
immediate and crucial hazards that confront usk the things that represent
? an immediate danger. itendrick.,
Ed, from the military point "otws Vas: shazards
are very simple. They are the hazards. of sudden, death and with no place
to hide. Because even,thO\ugh it is fantastic to conceive of such a
thing, a Surprise attack by the Russians cannot be ruled out by our
military planners. Every military man must have that as .one of. the
-
possibilities 023, iliS drafting board. The possibility of athreaturisra,
?
let us say, iri the Tura:Ain, may not be a political factor. but it cer-
tainly must be reekoned.as ?litary factor .or a pessible:militarY'
factors Then -tiaras the second :type. of sudden death, let us- say eq.-.
didenta3. death.- Somebody will push: the 'wrong button and put.. us into
war. And then there's the possibility that ono ef our allies e'
inadvertently 6.? advertently start a scrape somewhere that would in-
volve us in Var. Those are the hazards that we face.
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NUMMI
viewed from Noscow?
SCHORR:
Dan Schorr, what's the immediate danger as
Well; I would tend to discount the Immediate
danger of any calculated surprise attack that Alex mentioned, but I go
along -with him on then possibility of adveaturism in Russia, but only
under certain conditions. Looking at it: from the Soviet internal point
of view, I think there is a possibility of a.dventurism arising if the
Squeeze is put too heavily on the present Ithrushohov regime, if they're
put into the kind of a corner vthere they feel it necessary to take certain
chances as a diversion. I think one
0.
eza,mple of that was the trumped
up crisis over Syria and Turkey, which happened to come around a time
they were having trouble over liarshal Zhukov. I think that kind of
danger does exist and perhapse might have to do something about it.
IltEROWI Sevarcid, whatts the immediate danger as you
view it from Washington?
SEVAREIDI Well, I. think the great thing is that this
government may not have grasped and may not help the people to grasp
the full implications of this profound crisis, which is going to go on
for a long time. .1 think there is another specific thing, Ed, relating
to economies. I don't iiritni if there'll he an economic depression, in
this country at all but we could do things that would produce overseas
some of the effects of a depression, that is, -? and, that concerns this
new Congress more than the Administration. We might even put ? up some
tariffs. We nay considerably cut the amount and scope of foreign aid
spending and technieal help and so on. This could have rather serious
effects and this would split the present foreign policy down the middle.
There was one witness, Ed, at a Rouse sub-committee last week on. this
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subject who said if we do this tthis is like asking one Siamese twin to
play the Noonlight Sonata on a ukelele while the other does a jailhoUse
rock withIltx..-nilya Lionroe., Yon can't yrm can't do it that way.
WflROU:ICallscher, what's the immediate hazard viewed
from the Far East?
KALISCIUlts The immediate hazard, of course, is the acci-
dental war, the adventurism which might occur say in the rormosa Straits
or in a divided Korea. nut X think really the great hazard is the fact
that weal lose the uncommitted nations like Japan and India to com-
munism. If me do we could lose the whole shooting match with a whimpe'r
not a bang. India mould tip the scales, I tin, out of sheer numbers,
360.m5llion people, Japan, because it's got the biggest industrial
complex in the Par East, and when you've got that tied up with Siberia
and China you have a very formidable complex indeed. And Japan is
particularly vulnerable because it's' in an export-or-die race for
survival. If we raise tariffs, if we cut down. J'apants free world
market through a recession, Japan must look elsewhere for trade. .And
I say that we very possibly we can create the biggest ringtailed economic.
and political crisis in Japan by creating that kind of a crisis.
NORM Leiser, what ts the view in Germany?
LRISMI Well, Japants not the only. place,. Ed, where a
depression could bring catastrophe. The Germans are seriously worried
about a danger of a depression and they think that the principal. likely
source of that danger might be the United States. A depression here
would infect all of the European economies. The democracy in West
Germany has been growing surprisingly strongly in the .4.. with its roots
in the fertile soil of prosperity. But if the economy went bust, I think
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?As
4.tat all the-6reats. about the future of democracy in West Germany vould have
rto. be oft!,
Schoeribruns :what Xs Vur view ..on the Immediate .
ard?
SOHOENBEVONs
I see' two shoed:, Mt .On?e saw at the Paris
conference . tegethers :that:lac:the state of :leadership of "tlup., 'WeStern
mad is extremely precarious. ?; Tho- liealth., of ther:AmericanIPresidents of
courses is', ISI pride-14)6.1T Owls. at: cencein:-. As tor the German Chandellors
heist I thinks 82i#yrosiiiold,-.next weeks .and-:the old French Premier
is not like3,7 to grOV -ca.& itcyffice.. If there:::vero.,:tv::::ohange,:of ?regime
Fritnost*, and;* Germatii:. that could z wreck NATO tenil- such a crisis indeed
. is ahead.* In i9&. France , is facing in the Algerian 'war a arias -that
1
could. - bring': abogt aight. or" a Leftoqing,- Oottp letat:?.: ;lows gentlemen,
dontt:holdTme..?to.:this?* I don't ea its going_-te:happen:'.:,-:37pr:.:- the first
times -howevers it is, .possible. ;.: And !Matto the .second :hazard,. the war in:
?,?Algeria-s,:wh.ich is spreading its flames throughout north:Africa and Which
tight well. provOko?.en-.anti-Christians: enti?Dastern- bloc from the :DardaN.
? miles- to ? Gibraltar:"-
--trortawa;. Ami?stipii.ott as viewed. trom. the Biddle.:-Basts
what ts the Immediatei'hatard:to:jil? --
33131=1"21 1l, there are?.immediate-haterdss
., ? ?
,almost every step," that :we:, take . there.. One Western diplomat in lordan
told *.te recently that the two worst calamities he could Imagine happening
would be the death of Icing Eussein and a revival of.. the ,ArabIsraeli
disputer over the Gulf of _Aqaba. 1114sein alone holds Jordan together
and his death would bring down the ?pro?ritigg,:tzfa govornment of t
Couatiril, Noiri, noboal4nOI;is: when or *tether :the Bent/4ns or .t4e-Saudi
Arabians a.re geing to tr.r.: tio 'close' :the aciaba GaITtoisraols ; :But lie
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do know that neither Nasser nor King Saud has forgotten that issue. it
they revive it we will be caught again right in the middle of an Arab-
Israeli dispute. There's always tb.e hazard ?or new outbreaks on the
borders of Israel. If there is serious trouble, even trouble short of
war, on the Israeli border with Jordan, it will not :be long before
jordan slides into chaos. Hussein woad find impossible
to keep the Syrian Army from rushing to 'his aid in the' name of Arab
unity... And in that event it seems certain that the Syrians. would not
get out again. Finally, there's the danger that if?Jerdan?falls, AITIMArt
will then become the base of operations for the,Dgyptians and the Syrians
against their next target; Iraq.
?17ot a very pleasing prospect,is it? Howard
Smith, what's the immediate hazard as you view it?
? SII=Ht -'tiell, with some reluctance, I must recall that
before we got' into the Sputnik cloud me were suffering from a black eye
called Little Reck. The ugly photographs a white mobs beating up Negroes
appeared on tb,e front page of almost every newspaper on earth and I don't
think the press abroad was very fair to tes. I don't think they noted the
fact that in fact we've teed? a great deal of progress on this problem
and I think 1:e still are. They- just noticed that the mob did this. And
in a world which we have to Court for our own survival and a world which
is two-thirds colored, I don't think we can afford any more Little Racks.
KURROWI ? Well, gentlemen, we've drawn up something of a
list of our liabilities and a rather formidable one it is, too., which
certainly leaves no room for complacency but after all our posture is
not prone, we have very considerable =sets and I think it might be
useful at this point to ,try to total up a few of the assets. Ilby don't
you start- Sehooribrusi? ?
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SCHOEITEMP: I think that one of our liabilities is still
our greatest asset and that is NATO. NATO is still the richest, strongest,
voluntary coalition of free nations in the world and that's' tut enormous
asset if we can hold it. NATO. conducts some two-thirds of the world I's
trade. Its mines produce More Coal than the rest of the world together.
Its furnaces pour more steel. Unfortunately, the rest of the world, the
Communist world, .is using more and thore of its steel to build rschools.
And, for example, although Russia has half as much steel is the United
States its turning out twice as many scientistt. That's a very real
danger to us. I think that our basic health is sound. I think our
assets are very great. The problem is how do we make the best use of
them.
MORROW: Kalischer.
KAMMER: Well, I think Japan, the ,innate conservatism
of Japan. in Asia is one of our biggest assets, because they-Ivo got a
high standard of living, which we helped them get, and they want to
keep it. Surprisingly enough, our big asset in India is Prime sinister
Nehru. Now, ,Americans often feel that Nehru is splitting hairs when
the Indian shotild be out splitting logs. But he is a working democrat
who wants to make a modified form of socialism work. I think we have
an aatet in South Vietnam, which is a little country, but symbolically
twenty-two Vietnamese offered to man the first American space rocket
once we got it up. And, finally, I think we've got an asset in the
fact that China, Red China, is feeling the pinch of paying for the
Soviet technical aid program.
MORROW:
in the Middle East?
MENET s
Winston Burdett, what are our assets as viewed
Well, Ed, I think we have one big immediate
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asset in in the Kiddie East, the United Nations, and that means two thingst
the personal diplomacy of Dag liammarskjold and the united Nations Emergency
Force, which stands guard at the mouth of the Gulf of A aba and in the Gaza
Strip. I tMnir that very few people realized last month that for a few
days at least, we were at the edge of something very deep Miring the
latest border dispute between 'Israel and Jordan. Dag liammarskaold flew
out there himself and by that diplomats on-the-scene thought must have
? been Seale Ida of wizardry, he cleared up the trouble. Nets an invaluable
asset. Also, thorets veri little attention given to the job done by the
UN Emergency Force. A year ago, I remember, the 1lsraeUs were saying.
that the UN would be Powerless in Gaza, it would not be able, they pre
-
dieted, it would be unable to curb Egyptian raids across the border into
,
Israel. And many diplomats and mem* correspondents, including me, were
almost equally pessimistic. So, I -think it's worth recording, a year
later that we were wrong and that the tome has been with every dollar, -
that's been spent on it.
N'ORROLT:? Of course, it doesntt have enough dollars for
its support at the moment because some nations have refused to pay their
appropriations. Dan Schorr, as viewed, from Moscow, what assets do we
have?
? SCHORR: I thin, Ed, the greatest asset that we have in
Russia is the growing desire of the Soviet people for something that I
would call normalcy ezeept that it is--not normal, at least for some kind
of a decent or better life =rimy. Forty years after the revolution, I
think the flaws a fanaticism have damped down and the people are just
in a state where they want something a little better and a little re-
laxation. I tbinIt they would like to bet as we are accused of being
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?
co.mplacent. They'd like their chance at complacency too*
nit.
this represents a pressure on. the regiMe.* ?Ur* One of the ,reatenzt.whar
.1thraehthev feels somewhat oversscemmittedlin promises of .4,14 to un
committed countries,: promises of aid. to :the ,Satellites. ''X think be es
.been forced to promise some. 44 to his own people . .404 ths.a:
represents a. pressure forreduction of the. arms burden*: It ?doesn't
. . _ .
:operate :as directly as 1.1,?? uould. In. this ,e0ortti7 The seat of ?Over'
remains in the Xrenain, they're awfully far from the people, but in-
, ,
directly it's increasing. And one of the reasons it's increasing is that
the people aren't so numb or daub any more* There's been a lot of educa-
tion* And the education that its taken to make Sputniks has also
produced a lot of thinking* And as the people think they _aren't pushed
around quite so easily any more. You feel it. You feel it as you travel
through Russia*
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munowi
,
Are you Suggesting that there might be a mite-.
ititioa of, the 'Sputnik makers sometime?
SCHORR: Well,: I don't want to play :with the -word revo
Iution, I wouldn't wait to suggest that this Ru.sala is going to go up.
in flames of 'revolution or counter.revolution very Soon.. I think in the ?
terms whicb you mean it revolution asa kind of a mental and spiritual
revolution - yea, I think that ti*. Sputnik 'yokel* don't like the. Oeanuuli t?
gobbledygook, I think they will rebel in their ova vay in time. .
MORROW: Leiser, what are our assets as viewed from
Germany?
1.1DISIUtt Well, in Central Europe F4., a Very strong asset ,
is a Germany .. at leaat a West Germany that for the first time in this
Century is not seeking military Or political adventure. The Russians may
as Dan has just said be lookt.ng ?ior a better life ...,the West Germans have
got it and they want to keep it. They have a Standard of living that IS
not beginning to approximate ours ,and they like it. They have an economic
tlay of life that is nou beginning to approximate ours and they like it.
Thay are not in a mood. to tintrar recklessly with events.
MORROW:, Kendrick, what are our assets as viewed from
London?
KENDRICK: From missile Ituul?
? 1113RROW: Missile land, alright. :
KEIMRICK: I'm with. Dave Schoenbrun in believing tb.at
a liability and even a hazard can also be an asset. Nov, missile warfare
is still in the future and potentially Soviet missile might could cancel
out ,our SAC forces but right now, we still possess the power of deterrents.
We have airbases at home:and overseas, we have _allies, we have a long
distance airforce, we have carrier fleets and all these, I think serve
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?I NO.Lilib.04.1.0 ?
??? I
-23-
to remind the Russians, that -whatever war may do to us, it webld be
suicidal for then. Nows this is a grim and a most horrible asset, but. it's
still art asset even though it may only be temporary.
MUErtOlit Dan Schorr, is there much 'wide spread fear of
war in the Soviet Union, would you say?
SCHORR: There is a great deal of fear of war in the
Soviet Union, It goes up and down. It reached a new peak just around the
time of the Turkish-Syrian crisis, Ah? they are constantly being told that
the Russian Government doesn't want war but constantly being told also that
we do, and they always interpret that in terms of the intentions of their
awn Government,
MORROW: Eric Sevareid, -why don't you sum up o.ur assets
as viewed from Washington.
SEVAREIDs Well Ed? ... since time and apace our co.equal,
so the scientists tell us, that with the loss of the, protecting oceans we
have lost the asset of time, but that's about all, I think. This country
is by no means a push over. We have everything else if we use it. We've
got the greatest industrial plant in the world and the greatest industrial
leaders. We have a wonderful pool of scientists and engineers if their
energies are channeled. We have unlimited money though we act as though-
we're almost broke half the time and I think we have a -world record a
generokkity and good will toward other parts of the world and of non
aggression, that honest men cannot really doubt. We have a President
that people will still most illingly follow if he cart summon the
personal strength and the personal will to give them the lead. We have
a great deal.
MORROW: Well gentlemen, ye have now at least tried to
lay out in general terms our liabilities and our assets. Now, 'let's go
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to the simple problem, something must be, done. What should us ,402
Kendrick.
KENDRICKs Bd., I thirsk the first thing to do and I don't
naan the only thing, but the first thing to do is to catch qpimith the
Russians in missiles. This may not change the fact that the Russians
still have or /All have the ability to bring our cities under their missiles,
but it might at least give us a stalemate in this field of intercontinental
missiles end certainly it mould do much to restore our confidence and our
psychology of leadership. And even though ve started five years behind the
Russians in the big mivsiles? a lot of people here believe that me can
catch up mith them in tuo or to and a half years, provided of course,
they don't step up their pace to much.
Bbm, another thing me must do is remember that
a missile* test is also a test of nerves and mo should not magnify the
natural misfires and normal failures that you get in testing. Thirdly,
I think me should lift the veil of atomic aecrecy that still exiats
betmoen this country and our allies, because only in this may can me
further instead of hindering =clear progress and anyway me don't have
secrets from the Russians.
But, moot of all, I think that me have to change
the climate in this country. I think me have to stop being anti-
intellectual, wive got to recognize that an egg that an egghead MY
be abetter inve tment then a blockhead. Remover, I mouldutt put all our egg
beads in one basket (LAUGUIvA) a basket of science, I thirer they should.
be spread around in the general field of education.
HURROW:
SCHORRt
Dan Schorr, vhat do you think we must do?
Well, I've been listening to Alex Kendrick, and
I'll admit that I'm comouhat depressed. Not so much by uhat he has said,
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as by the emphasis that it seems to indicate. Of eeeXee we have to try .94
(voice in background) 0** and your lucky, (LOOTER) although, I 4=4-
knov, maybe before these miseiles start to fly it would be luckier to be
in Moscow! Of course, we have to try to catch up Ifit# Russia ,in the field
of missilee that sort of goes almost without saying, but even if we do,
and I assume we can in proper time, . I'm not quite sure 'where that leaves
us and I think that it omits one opportunity that there is to find some
kind of a better and more real solution then just catching up and then
keeping pace in means a destruotion* Ton remember a year ago we discussed
just after the Hungarian rebellion, the possibilities that existed then
for e0X8 kind of a deal with Rusti& to use a crude term. They seemed to
be ready then for disengagement and had offered us some kind of.a zone *6*
deneutralixed zone in Europe extending five hundred miles both sides of
the Elba. They were then off balance and I think the terms for such a
deal were pretty good. Nov, they've subdued Hungary, again,. now they have
their Sputniks up in the sky' and the terms are less good, but / still think
there are possibilities for dealing with the Russians and for getting 130Me
kind of disengagement in Central Europe. The reason I think so, that the
pressures are still strong in Russia* I think they need very badly dis-
armament agreement, I think this vas indicated by the way only this past.
week Khrushchev announced a out in the armed forces manpower based on
nothing more substantial. then NATO's statement that we didn't vent to
' use force a statement that NATO had made many many times before. I
would like to see those opportunities explored. If not, I don't know
? what's going to happen. But even after veva explored those opportunities
and assuming - which I do not assume, that we could get some kind of
disengagement, then we really go in for the .long haul race - the big
competitive co-existance and there it seems to me, we have to catch up
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'with Russia in those fields of ecienci 'and education ,here at 'the Moment
they are ahead.. And .theres / just vent to make one brief, remark based
on observations recently in,talking to the Soviet professors arid science
students. Celan; homeS:-It seems to ime that many americans put to much
emphauls on the price. 4g attaehed. to catching up with Russia in. sciences
- . .
and it seems to me from dealing 'with them, looking at and listening to
Soviet scientists, that their Ilona.* the compensation that they gets haw
veil off they are ptirsonai4 isn't the rain point, The main point for
them is they have the laboratories and the facilities and the opportunity..
to do the kind of vurX they love to do and that this vork is valued in
their society,
8CROEN3RUNI Anil they have a status in their society.
SCHORR: Yet,. it Is status a sense of of role of
function 'which everybody values, partly this is I think, because science
is a kind of a(v/ho'ainy)vord in a'Communist states but I think science can
6td .
be a yenough 'word hero even ladle preserving _other tka:4.1y)thinge.
SOMME:Rh Irou'd say they were pro...egghead In other 'words?:
SCHORR: Yes, they are pro-eggheads,
StriTlit . I've heard it six141 that part of -the incentive
to being a scientist in Russia is the disincentive of being anything else
in Russia. (LOOTER)
SCHORR* There Is some trath. in that but I. don't Oink
it tells the vhole stery.,
MURROUt Smith? *filet do you think we must do and urgently?
SNIT& Veils 1 am certainly in agreement with thoee 'who
think that our diplomacy Ought to be much more affirmative where it has
been negative and Should, be more "nipple 'where its been rigid. In fact,
I don't think were going to keep our alliance with us unload it becomes
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more affirmative and supple, but ha,vinz said that I would Ii.ke to agree With.
Alex Kendrick that our top priority has to be making those new weapons. IA.
respect to getting a disarmament 'agreement Vve covered almost every disarm*
ament conference thee r has been and I think its going to be extremely
difficult without those weapons :This is a.,Very complicated thought, can
I pursue it a little
!MEOW:
SMITH:
Please dc.
The thing that most disarmament talks rum up
against and stop at is.., the fact that Russia has one built in advantage
over us I. she she ,can launch a surprise attack on us 'whereas we cannot
ialmok a surprise attack On Russia. ?Paassia can keep secret all the move-
ments it -takes to prepare a surprise attack but we cant. They would read
about movements in allou.r newspapers and hear it on the radio and possibly
see a little of it on television, so it's very hard for t1,0 to do it, Now
. any disarmament agreement row:liras a good degree of Inspection of each
Country to make 'sure the agreement is being kept, and it Russia agreed to
that she could no longer launch these surprise attacks, She could lose her
greatest advantage!
SCHORR: U 2 could interrupt you for one minute here, I
think as long as we concentrate on this question of inspection, the possibil-
ity of a disarmament agreement is going to be very slim indeed. The kind
of Inspection we want is a.. kind of inspection that Russians vonit let
.11u.ssians do in their am country and with the underground launching pads
and and the missiles on stibmarines,, it does seen to me that this question
of inspection is getting a bit outdated.
MUMIOW: Well then you are saying that there is no real
chance.
SCHORR: _I -M. what the Russians want is a lot of things,
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mht0h I don't hope that ge sill give theip,.but"X do. -think the approach to
the problem inAtead of an overe.11 disarmament agreement with inspection
.instead of trying to decide to aVoill surprise attacks in a clinch,: Is to
try and break out of . the:. clinch to try to disengage, to try,:to.....
, It tame- :tide to try and ..break out of la clinch..
SCHORR: --Yes.' (severet sleeking simultaneously)
ICALISCIER: Once you have inspection, Ban., how do, You know
that any agreement .14.g log to .be .kept?
SCHORR: . You can Start with a partial agreement TeMb.
of Europe iwhere you Can inspect, but an overall disarmament agreement with
inspection in Russia ic just unpalatable to that regime as long as it is
Communist and Its afraid ittcgoing to remain Ciimmunist for still a littiv
time
PITIRROW: Leiser, vhat what do you think lie ought to
do as viewed from Germann
LEISERt . Well, Ed., our European allies emphatically
think that *we should .start to negotiate and start now. Th.eir attitude
? seems to be, donn just stzu3d there say something., Well, if vette to
say anything and find out what the Russians real answers are, I think
that we're going to have to aal, it quietly behind closed doora, using the-
techniques of old faShioned diplomacy.. I think 'we've had enough of
_
Summit meetings, beating of the propaganda. *Immo and the clinking of the
'martini glasses. I think perhaps an example offers itself in 'what
happened 'when Russia's Malik and America's Jessup go together and settled
the Berlin blockade an agreement by the way that has stuck.
NENDRICICI (inter.) What do you mean that the Russians
vented to settle the Berlin blockade, how do you know that they really
want to engage in disengagement?
_ _ -? - ? rat %elm+ vie try.
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KENDRICK:
LEISER:
SCRGENBRUN: Ales yoa used to be in and the Iluesiauis?
disengaged from Austria.
KENDRICK:
Well, they proposed it.
(several speaking 41111ultaxteously)
We can only find out by negotiating..
14URROW:
LEISER:
'That se
Go:ehead
-tail, I uas'go
to ' eay, ,that the the
technique of negotiation must be the .614 fashioned diplomatic kind. The
substance of negotiation I think, must startModestly. .We: start :email, Ita:
dozist try and agattie all. the. issuea that els take one
on -disengagements Jaime 4, a relatively small: issue, Ise disease tho- -
poseibility.of oar: vithdrawing our troops or at least our atomic %leap=
to the Rhine and find out how far the'SOviets'are. prepared to 'withdraw
? their i?apons. I uggesit that thie le an, area in Uhich- tha.Rtissians
be milling to permit inepection.-
14.1RROWs - ?eU11 Winston, uthat d? o yon think ve Must do
immediately, uthat is the urgent thing e mast.aCComplish In the
East if Ue can?
249, zthink :that fret^ priority'. In the Middle
East-must go to achieving or at any rate trying to achieve a settlement
?of the biggest single. problem'- the "Arab,aeraeli conflict. There 14j11 be
Profound instability :in the Middle East as long US that conflict goes on
and as long as there is this instabilitY. there Will' be no **eat :the.
Cold Warbetueen the.. Rai:Sian:4 and ourselves in the area.
leiRRQW: Bpi do: you think .it teal& be settled?
BURDETT:, Well,. we- cannot get that settlement certainly
without doing some unpopular things. I think it ulU take time and that
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a. year will not be ?enough.. But certainly we will get no here if lee go, on
treating this, as the 'untouchable problem, valve got to make ..a start .and ,a
try. The end purpose of any settlement of course, must be to get full Arab
recognition that Israel is here to stay. ,But, the Israeli's, I.think,, must,
J 0 ?
face up to the fact that, they bear a`tmajor responsibi4ty, for. the nine,
hundred and twenty7seVen thousand Arab refugees. PAY have to make an
unconditional offer to take the, refugees, badk, pew,.I do not believe that
such an offer. would Cost Israel a great deal,. the refugees like other_
Arabs have come to especially since the Israeli invasion of
,? . . ? ? .
Egypt that. Israel, is, strong and .cannot be 'wiped out4,1 I, think that only .a
small portion of .them even those who .awvad property in Palestine woulit
want to return to. Israel, in order to become ,second-elwss Israeli citizens.
Most of them -would probably accept compensation which:will have to be
-
proylded and would be willing to seek a new life elsewhere.
EENDRICItt kia.7 I ask you something. Why don't the Arab
states take back the Arab refugees since they're the ones who caused them
. . ? . ? ?
to be refugees in the first place.
BITADETT Whether they cause d them to be refugees in the
first place Alex., is a matter of great historical clispute.,. I think my-.
,
self, that the Arabs and the Israeli's share a responsibility there. They
do not take them back to? a political 'reason. Namely, to perpetuate their
?. .? . , . ? ? .
grievance against Israel and thereby to perpetuate their .argUment against
them.
.6CHOENBRUN. t 'Alright Vinson,. why don't, these Arab states use
some of their billions - and billions, of dollar" s Of 'oil. Money to do somethine
" ^ ? ? . .
about taking care of Arab refugees?. Why does Israel have to put up all tk
, .
money?
irlvim OnnA i* A billiOnair g
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but he's a broke billionaire. Bele always running out of funds.
SCHOMBRUN: You should be so broke! (LAUGHTER)
BURDETT: But, I think secondly as part of a general
settlement, Israel must give up.land -not a great deal of land, but
enough to return to Arab rule the Arab villages and farms along the borders
and also to end the absurdity of Arab comMunities,baing -split down the
middle by a demarcation-line,
MURRO4 Don't you think that any Israeli Government
that accepted that proposal mould be outof office in 214-hours?
BURDETT: .fio, I believe the opposite Ed, I believe' that
such territorial concessions are a political necessity.' I believe that
no Arab Government could risk a settlement that did not involve such
concessions I believe that an leraeii Government could., There would
.
be a crisis in Israel the Government might fall, but I donit believe that
"this .mould affect the ultimate stability of Government itself in Israel.,
whereas, I believe it Would follow it would lead to a ..? a series of
breakdomne in the Arab.states.
KELTRICK: Winston .., your say your saying
the -same thing that Dan says, that it only take one to unclinch.
BURDETT: There is a difference .04 there is a, great
difference. Ab, the. Arabs are acting various things of the Israeli's,
various relatively email practical concessions, I think they mould settle.
For Israel is asking only one thing of the Arabs, and that is, peace on
?
her borders and full:Arab recognition.. This, she mould have to get out
of any settlement. She could not be asked to make these secrificee in
Order to get an impermanent settlement thd in order for this settlement
to be accepted, as permanent, there woUld'have to be absolute guarantees.
of ArabIsraeli borders, in the first Instance by the United States and .
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IRARS Or CRISIS: 12/29/57 ..32..
certainly also by the United Rations. Now, I don't vish to imply, I think
it would be absurd and dishonest to imply that there are no political risks
involved in seeking a settlement of this kind, I think there are risks, there
are great risks, for example, badly handled, this 'whole. project could set
off now dissentious among the Arab 'states," each of which is only to ready
to duap on its neighbor with accusations of sell-out to Israel.- I think
also, that there :would be stiff resistance and possibly serious political
repercussions in Israel itself., I think though," that Israel could stand
up to those repercussioni# and the essential political fact here, is that
the United States is the only country in a position to bring pressure and
to induce the Israeli" 'to give up come of their fixed old emotional
positions.
=MOW: ?Of course, the Russians are also in a position
to encourage the Arabs in their ambition to wipe Israel off the map.
BURDDTT: This is true, and all. the More reason it seems
to me that we should try to meet this problem before the Russians try to
exploit it.
=MOW: ralischer, what do you think we should do in the
rar East?
NALISCIIER: Well, we've got to do something that I think
is a thousand times harder then the crash missiles program. We've got
to revamp our thinking .entirely in regard-to about half- the world's
population, maybe more, the semi-colonial and colonial, and former colonial
peoples. While we're staring hypnotized at Russia across Western Europe,
we're being out flanked in Asia In Africa even in, the South Pacific. Now,
the present Afroasian Conference is a sort of thing that points this up..
The ,Indonesians have a dispute with the Dutch, they asked us to mediate
tie refused, now, they're getting the sort of support that they vaant, from
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YEARS OF , '12/29/57 ? 43.3..
the Communist coun.tries.
SCHORRt
KALISCHMizWell,
Not yet. They just ?asked for it.
-tb.ey've asked for it, but you well,
they've gotten moral...support and this is exactly ohat President Sukarno
.said to a visiting Congressman lii.:?Jakarta:.?? (inter) No 'Wit President
, .
Sukarno asked Our Congressman Sauna, he stacit "I don't just want American
military and economie..aidt. I vent American political aid," and that, is
what he is getting from th.e Commulilst countries. Welvc also got to: do
something else. We've also got to admit that our Cana policy is bank.-
=pt. I don't think, ttiere is a General in the Pentagon lib.? honestly
believes that Chiang4fal-shek has a China mandarin's chance of fighting
his 'way back to the mainland or that he'd be able to remain on Formosa
unless 'we kept him there. I don't, think there is a diplomat in the Far
East that thinks that our policy of non?recognition in seven years of
economic sanctions is going to, bring down the Communist Governm.ent. I
think.velve got to admit vhat veva got to do 'what our major allies
in Europe and Asia have admitted and do - and that is, recognise the
Policing regime for 'what: it is 7. the unfriendly, but existing Government
of mainland China. We should recognize the Chiang regime for 'what it ler.
the friendly and existing Government of Formosa, and then I think, possibly
we might try something ratherunorthodox like, offering farm products aitt
to Red China the next tiMe there is a flood ,or famine.-- They ... if they
.accepted? it mould mean that Russia could not or mould not help, if they
refused, it would mean that they 'would have to explain this to their oun
people. In either ease, ve"4 get out from behind this 'wall laestre building
around'. China -which is really a Vail ve're building around ourselves.
MUREOW: Schoenbrun, that do you think is urgent to be
accomplished?
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VARS'OF 12/29/57 .34.
SCHOEMBRIINit , Well, I thin4c. we might begin Irj trying to correct
those false habits of thought that the President talked about. It our free,
system is not inherently stronger then the Communist system, then it
follow logically that lie must vork harder, pay more taxes and have more
respect for learning: I think tat lee should give up some of our OM self
deluding Eqths, for example, the illusion that Russia is going to come
unstuffed because of internal pressures: Dan Schorr has told as that Russia
is likely to evolve, but no revolution in sight. If that's so, veva got .
to start living 'with the idea that Russia is going to be around for a very
long time, that the competition is not going to end, it's going to groti
more intense. I think that's uhy our allies have asked us to negotiate.
Not necessarily a global settlement Ed, personaly, I don't believe that
disarmament can be brought about over night I am more inclined to agree
with those uf rgsr colleagues 4sho said, that vie ought to try to have a
series of disentanglomente at the pressure points, in the Middle East,
in middle Europe in any specific area or on any specific issue, 'where.
ve can seek the chances of agreements through n6rtal diplomatic channels,
And, finally Ed, if I may say so very briefly, I think me fve got to be
true to our own faith. We cannot support colonial pouers vith.out weakening
the moral posture of uhat tie call the 117ree World. And, 'then Mr. Dulles
tells the American people as he did recently, that our ties of friendship
vith Spain are symbolic of the links in the _Free World, I. think he's mis-
, using the Tr3 o rcl Free World. Let us by all means ,have alliances with Spain
and 'with 'Yugoslavia, let's adnat, hovever, that they are alliances of
mutual self. interest ?e not of mutual ideology, let's. not misabuse and
abuse that precious 'word FreedOm. , President Eisenhouer said, that this
is a time for greatness. I 'would suggest it is also a time for facing up
to the full truth.
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NURROW: Eric Sevareld, what do you think Ye must do?
, ?
3EVA1EEDt Well, Rd, to put it very briefly, I am assuming
that a control of space over, this ... I am assuming that the 'world leader..
ship and the very fundamental scientific revolution is at stake a revo-
lution is going to change manta life enormously. Therefore, I believe,
so far as this country is concerned, tie have to try to go all out.; I
think there will have to be .. lothether vie like it or not, some Government
hand directly on the economy. I think ye must get some better control of
our *dwindling natural resources, some better control of our rather
scattered and somewhat misused scientists and engineers., Surely, %delve
got to get at this shockingly delayed problem of an obsolescent educational
system, ye may even need a bigger Army for more flexible military policy
around the vorld. if all this means higher taxes, then so be it. 1 think
most of us would rather be broke then dead - though sometimes the Government
seems to have some doubts about it.
1.1URROWt Well gentlemen yould any of you like to sum up
this discussien, (LAUGHTER)
SEYAREID: Would you?
=ROW: Well, VII try and if you have disagreement at ?
any point by all means speak up.
it seems to ,me there are certain things upon
leach you gentlemen are in complete agreement. First of all, you all agree
that our lack of leadership le shoving. That some of our illusions have been
shattered and that many of our allies have become disillusioned. You agree
that our allies are determined, one, to talk 'with the Russians and tuo,
perhaps to do business with them.. That they are not impressed !with our
belief - yidly held,that the Russians are going to collapse from internal
pressures. You also appear to believe that if 1.tle persist in our self right-.
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-36-;
eons, inflexible policy -matching.bothvith bomb, MIssailanhasslles
threat ylth threat, that theniaithinmeastrable course, we in this country
may find ourselvesi merely a great continental inland cif the coast of
Kamchatka 'kith the resit ..of the .00rld 'either united against us orIaholly
Indifferent to our fate, :it seems that you also agree that we must somehow
disenthrall ourselves and learn not only to till* anew, but to act : ? .
and I have also the Impressionthat none of yeu,belipve,,that death In ?
defense of a balanced budget lt.a proper.7eay for free nen to die You all
seem to feel that the President posed .the question properly' in Paris lthen
he sal4nuhatIall,Vve pay in freedom for freedom," butl.that.he has not
yet made much progress in answering that question. You've cast up, vhat
vould call &rather ominous balance sheet, yet somehou? 1 find Your &is-.
course rather optimistic. None of yen suggests, that humans having devised
3_1:method of destroying humanity will no proceed to use it. None of you
mention the phrase, preventive var. Several of you stressed the fact,
that the free morld is richly endoued with men, metal, machines and moriof
and that what is required is a call to sacrificet which according to
Sevareld, uould.be promptly answered by the people of this country. Dan.
Schorr certainly made it abundantly clear, that the Russians have their
own problems frequently well concealed, but they are certainly not nine.
feet tall. Most of you, I have the feeling although syou didnit say it,.
have rather the sense :that this is, the best of all possible times to be
alives.because never before have the stakes been so high.: never before
have the actions and the decisions of this country been so Important. ?
? And, I think you also A!'most of you had the.. feeling, that if we spend to
much time debating the past we Any lose the future.
Thank you very much gentlemen, and good health
and good neva. Good night and Good luck.
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ANNOUNCM: This has been the, nInth ?edition of YEARS OP CRISIS,
an annual report .by Edvard R. Nurrov and other CBS NEWS correspondentsfrom
the Inrportzuit news centers of the vorlit directed by Don Hewitt.
Ed Trans. NON. 4
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