CBS REPORTS "THE HOT AND COLD WAR OF ALLEN DULLES"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100150001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1962
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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CBS REPORTS
"The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles"
as broadcast over the
CBS TELEVISION NETWORK
Thursday, April 26, 1962
10:00 - 11 :00 PM, EST
REPORTER: Eric Sevareid
PRODUCER: Edward M. Jones
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Fred W. Friendly
All copyright and right of copyright in this transcript and
in the program are owned by CBS. This transcript may not
be copied or reproduced or used in any way (other than for
purposes of reference, discussion and review) without the
written permission of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
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ANNOUNCER: Tonight:on CBS REPORTS: "The Hot and Cold
Wars of Allen Dulles." Reporter: Eric Sevareid.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, we all know about the failures
of American Intelligence. Are'there any successes we don't know
about?
DULLES: Yes, there are a good many. As the President
said when he came out to say goodbye to me out at the new building
a few months ago, he remarked that "your failures are always
advertised and your successes are unsung." There's also a quote, as
I remember, I can't remember the exact quote, but in a different
connection. He said something like this - I think it was after
Cuba - that "success has a thousand parents and failure is an
orphan." Sometimes, you know, I feel a little like an orphan, but
there have been successes, too.
(ANNOUNCEMENT)
ANNOUNCER: CBS REPORTS: "The Hot and Cold Wars of
Allen Dulles." Here is CBS News Correspondent Eric Sevareid.
SEVAREID: Allen Welsh Dulles is an original in American
political history. He, more than any one else, put the United
States into the business of massive, peacetime intelligence - a
role forced upon us by the world-wide communist drive, but a role
that is still alien in spirit to our open society and alien in
practice to the traditional public accountability of our government.
Many Americans dislike this role. They have called Mr. Dulles our
"master spy." They have accused the Central Intelligence Agency of
murder, incitement to revolution, of protecting dictators, of
undermining official foreign policy, even, in the case of the U-2
and the Cuban invasion, of usurping presidential powers. In
Washington, Mr. Dulles has as many warm admirers, perhaps more, than
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he has hot opponents. He has known many triumphs and many
tragedies. The Korean War crippled his only son. The Cuban
invasion disaster clouded his last year in office. But when he
recently retired, President Kennedy awarded him the National Security
Medal.
Allen Dulles, one part cloak-and-dagger
expert, two parts elder statesman, has not yet written his C.I.A.
autobiography, but he has agreed to share with CBS REPORTS a few
electronic memoirs.
Mr. Dulles, when Khrushchev was here, did you
get a chance to talk with him at all?
DULLES: Yes. I didn't have a long talk with him,
but I had a very - quite an amusing encounter with him. It took
place at the dinner that President Eisenhower gave for Khrushchev,
and the President introduced me, and said: "This is Mr. Dulles.
You may know Mr. Dulles." He turned to his reporters, kind of a
twinkle in his eye, because he's got a keen - you must admit, hers
got a good sense of humor, and he said; "Oh, yes, I know you.
I read your reports."
SEVAREID: Really?
DULLES: Yes. And I said: "I hope you get them
legally." And, "Oh," he said, "you know, you know how we get them.
We all pay the same agents and we all get the same reports." And,
"Well," I said, "that's kind of sharing the wealth, isn't it?" And
then we had a laugh and that ended it.
SEVAREID:
reports?
DULLES:
Did he mean your public or your private
Ah, he never told me. I think he had in mind
that he read agent reports.
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SEVAREID: Do you think it's possible that he has?
DULLES: Every once in a while somebody gets caught,
but that game goes both ways.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, the Russian writer and
propagandist Ehrenburg once wrote: That if the master spy, Mr.
Dulles, ever got to heaven by anybody's absent-mindedness, you would
"mine the clouds and begin to slaughter the angels."
DULLES: "Shoot the stars and slaughter the angels."
SEVAREID: Have you ever committed any act of violence
in your life?
DULLES: No. Too much emphasis is put by the general
public on what they believe is sort of traditional espionage -
people rushing around and stealing people's papers and getting
information in that way. Not very much information is got in that
way.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, before we talk about the Central
Intelligence Agency directly, I'd like to ask you a bit about your
World War II experiences in Switzerland for the O.S.S. How did
you go about setting up that European espionage network?
DULLES: Eric, I think in a sense I was lucky in that
I had to scrape around myself, and I couldn't call on great cohorts
to come and join me from the United States. Maybe that is a little
ambiguous, but I didntt get cluttered up with the bureaucracy of a
large organization, because until the frontier opened up two years
later, no American could join me there and work there, because no
American could come legally into Switzerland. Some would come in by
parachuting into France, and then moving over, but they could not
work with me; so I had to use my ingenuity as best I could and try
to find people with whom I could work. There was, from the beginning,
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a group of Germans who never kowtowed to Hitler, who were opposed
to him from the beginning, for ideological and other motives; and
working through them, it was very helpful.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, would it be accurate to say that
because of your work in World War II in Switzerland, Washington kept
informed on these plots against Hitler's life?
DULLES: They knew about the last plot. I did have
the details of the last and most serious plot that almost succeeded
on the 20th of July, 1944. A German, who was working with Canaris,
kept me informed of the details; and he went up, at the risk of his
life - because he then was suspect to the Himmler people - and took
part in the plot. Before he left, he left me a long memorandum about
it which I reported to Washington a week before the plot took place.
It came very close to succeeding. If Hitler,
as he went by - he was having - Hitler was having a briefing at the
time. He was up on the East Front in East Prussia, and he was
having his regular morning briefing, and Stauffenberg, who had
the bomb, was in the room. He had a special message for Hitler,
so he was admitted. He put the bomb down in this briefcase against
a leg of a table. It was a - you know, one of these long tables
that are in barracks with legs at various intervals. He put it
down on the leg nearest to where Hitler was. Here was a long map,
twenty feet or more long, with maps of the East Front, the West
Front, and so forth, and so on. And Hitler was being briefed there,
and just before the bomb went off, Hitler went off here to see how
the front was, let's say, in Pinsk, and that took him ten feet away
from the bomb. The bomb went off and he was blown out of the
building, but he wasn't seriously wounded. It was a shack - it was
just a barracks there.
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SEVAREID :
that fine degree?
DULLES:
SEVAREID:
you and every one else?
DULLES:
Well, nobody could predict his movements to
Not to twenty feet, no.
It must have been a great disappointment to
Well, it was. I remember waiting to see
whether - would they get hold of the radio that day, and they never
got hold of the radio. You know, that's one of the - in modern
revolutions, one of the great things to note is, have they got
control of the radio, and again and again as Itve sat back, either
when revolutions were upcoming, the indication to you as to whether
one side or the other is winning is, who has got control of the air?
Whots got control of the radio? I don't know whether you as an
expert in this field realize how important that is. Generally, you
know, the intelligence business, I know it well - generally, you
can scoop us.
SEVAREID:
DULLES:
This is a terrible thought
you know.
Well, our messages have to be coded and
decoded, and so forth, and so on, and so that the flash that you get,
that you get on the air, comes first.
SEVAREID: You apparently knew very early in 145, Mr.
Dulles, that the Japanese were in very bad shape. How did you know
that?
DULLES:
Eric, at that time, I had access to
information that was reaching the German Foreign Office, which was
smuggled out to me in Switzerland in the form of certain cables that
the German Foreign Office was receiving from various parts of the
world. Among those cables were messages from the German Ambassador
in Tokyo, the German Air Attache and the German Army Attache.
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Those cables showed, very clearly, the plight of the Japanese
Air Force, and the plight of the Japanese Navy. By the end of 144
and early 145, their position, both in air and sea, was becoming
almost untenable, far more than the public realized. Word came
through to me from certain Japanese sources with whom I was in
contact, that the Japanese would like to find a way of negotiating
for a surrender. By this time, the negotiations in Italy for the
German surrender were somewhat public property.
SEVAREID: You mean the surrender of those twenty-two
German divisions in Italy that you negotiated a week or so before
the collapse of the rest of the German Army?
DULLES: Yes - because by that time, the surrender
had gone through and the armistice had been signed and put into
effect. So the Japanese said: "Well, this is the channel for us."
So they turned to me on that. They made quite interesting proposals,
and as result of these proposals, I was asked to go up to Potsdam
in the time of the Potsdam Conference, when President Truman met
there with Stalin, you remember, and Churchill. I took to Stimson
at that time the proposals that had come through this channel with
regard to an early Japanese surrender.
SEVAREID: Do you think that the dropping of those first
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary
in terms of bringing about the Japanese surrender?
DULLES: Well, that's an awfully hard question to
answer. I have the deepest respect for the men who made that
decision. I do feel that there was a failure to interpret available
intelligence as to the extent of the Japanese collapse, and their
inability really effectively to carry on the war.
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SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, during the last war when you were
in Switzerland, isn't it true that you used to meet with Dr. Carl
Jung, the psychiatrist, to try to figure out how Hitler and the
Germans would act and react to certain situations?
DULLES: I did go to him very often, and I found his
judgments as to what a man like Hitler, who was an introvert - I
believe, I'm not a psychologist, but I - would do, as compared to
what Mussolini, who was an extra-extrovert, would do. At that time,
when I was talking with him and we were getting toward the end of
the war, and one of the questions I was interested in was, would
Hitler hole up in the mountains - you know, in the famous but non-
existent redoubt - and carry on the war indefinitely? Or would he
commit suicide, or what he would do? Jung was very, very good on
that, and also very good on many other matters.
SEVAREID: Do we make any progress or even any attempts
to do that with a man like Khrushchev? Any long-range psycho-
analysis?
DULLES: Yes, there's quite a lot of study being
made of Khrushchev's actions and reactions. I'm myself somewhat of
a disciple of Pavlov, as an interpreter of what Khrushchev does.
You remember the theory of Pavlov is that you train a dog to respond
to three bells - you open the door and you ring three bells, and you
give him sugar, and then you do that for a month; and then all of a
sudden, you open the door and the three bells, instead of sugar,
you beat him over the back with a stick. The dog's puzzled. The
dog doesn't know what's happened, and you vary this business, and so
forth, and pretty soon, the dog's gone pretty well crazy.
SEVAREID: Eventually, it reduces the animal and perhaps
the human being -
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DULLES: Well, does a human being react? I mean, we
spend all our time trying to decide what does Khrushchev mean?
Today, it's co-existence and everything, and then the next day
there's something else. Take the breaking of the test ban and
starting to test. What day does he choose for that? He could
choose among days - he chooses the day of the opening of the
unaligned nations' conference in Belgrade. Khrushchev thinks, this
is the thing. "This shows I'm strong. This shows I don't worry
about what you unaligned nations are going to decide here, or do
here. I'm going to test. I know you're going to protest, so
protest."
SEVAREID: Well, in the Pavlovian theory, the animal,
and we think now of human beings reacting to Communist propaganda
instead of animals, is reduced eventually to confusion and finally
to apathy.
DULLES: Apathy or insanity - whatever you like of it,
yes. For example, in May of 1960, you recall that Khrushchev
brutally broke off the conference in Paris with President Eisenhower
and Macmillan and the French, at a. time when he had known for years
that the U-2 was flying, and yet he used this as an excuse in '
truly Pavlovian manner, so that all this rage and so forth, and so
on - that was fabricated. He wanted to destroy the conference and
he took that method of doing it. His actions at the U.N., when he
took off his shoe and beat the table, and certain of-his other
actions there.
SEVAREID: Can you say anything about the effectiveness
of those U-2 flights over Russia? Were they worth it?
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DULLES: Well, I would like on that, refer to the
statement that the Secretary of Defense made in the hearings that
was published at the time, in which he indicated that - I don't
remember his exact words, but generally that most valuable
information had been obtained with regard to missiles, aircraft,
other military installations, which were obtainable by no other
means, his - that's some statement of record that he made at that
time.
SEVAREID: Is there not a real possibility that
satellites could not get this kind of information in spite of
Russian secrecy?
DULLES: That I'll have to leave to the Department
of Defense to answer. Its perfectly true that the Soviets consider
that their ability to maintain great zones of security and secrecy
is considered by them as a major asset. They've said this very
frankly. They've said, "We're not going to let you get in there,
because that is of vital importance to our national security and
we're going to keep it. That's the attitude they're now showing at
the Geneva Conference and there we are - I mean, we're up against
that - and that is why, when the U-2 came along, they felt so
sensitive about it, because a method had been found for over-
coming the restrictions they had placed and the security they felt
they had.
SEVAREID: Is there anything you'd like to say, Mr.
Dulles, about the pilot of the U-2, Francis Powers?
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DULLES: I never shared some of the public, and maybe
of the press, criticism of Powers. While it was difficult to tell
until after we - the Agency had talked with 'Aim and had made their
report, how well he had done, I think on the whole he handled himself
properly. You must remember that he was an aviator. He was a great
navigator. He had a very difficult assignment merely on the
aviation-navigation side, and to expect of him - to make of him a
great undercover agent was impossible. One of these two
professions, or a fine av3.ator - one of these two professions
took all a man's time, all a man's concentration and thought; and
I'm not sure that point has been brought out fully enough.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, some people said that the pilot,
Mr. Powers, should have taken his own life. Is there any way you
can have a man sign a contract to commit suicide?
DULLES: No - no, no, you couldn't - First place, it
would be ineffective. In the second place, I think it would be
immoral, and we just didn't do it. We said, "Here, you have this.
If you get into a situation where you think that death is better
than what awaits you, use it."
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, about the foul-up on all the
explanations of the U-2 affair when it first happened. The government
went through a lot of agony. We looked very silly. Now, is it
necessary that we go through all that? Do we have to explain? I
remember the British had a frogman who disappeared in a British
harbor near a Russian ship. There were great accusations and
suspicions of espionage on their part, but the British Government,
as far as I remember, said nothing about it at all and the matter
finally died away. Much as it would harm the interests of a man
looking for news, can't Washington operate the same way?
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DULLES: I doubt whether, in the two situations to
which you probably refer, one the U-2 and the other Cuba,probably,
one could have ever rested on the answer "No comment."
SEVAREID: You could not?
DULLES: I doubt whether you could have. It seems to me
it would have raised an even more serious problem than the problem
of disclosing intelligence operations, namely the problem of
responsibility in government.
SEVAREID: How do you mean?
DULLES: Well, I mean this. Do we have a kind of a
government here that would let, say, me as then Director of Central
Intelligence send an airplane even seventy thousand feet high over
Russia: Is that a responsible kind of government? Or mount an
expedition, or have something to do with an expedition for the training
of Cubans that were going to Cuba? It seems to me that that kind of
thing can only be done with the approval of the highest authority and
if the American people or the world began to think that we had a
government here where that kind of thing could be done without approval
by the highest authority, there might be a feeling of uneasiness, that
there are some people here who could do things that might lead to
serious international complications without knowledge at the highest
level. So could the President have - have declined knowledge of these
situations, or said,"I won't say anything about them."
SEVAREID: Well, doesn't this bring up the question then,
as to whether there ought to be a formal watchdog committee in Congress
to look at the C.I.A. constantly and what it does?
DULLES: We have had from - for many years a subcommittee
of the Appropriations Committee of the House and the Senate, that went
over our entire budget, to whom we disclosed any information they
wantAri _
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SEVAREID: Would you inform those men in advance of any
consequential operation?
DULLES: Certainly.
SEVAREID: You would feel obliged to?
DULLES: Have you forgotten, Eric, have you forgotten
that after the U-2 incident, Clarence Cannon got up - and I'll send
that to you - Clarence Cannon got up in the House, May 15, 1 think
it was, or thereabouts when this thing broke, and he said, "I knew
all about this. We appropriated the money for this. Our Committee
was told about this." Well, I don't want to quote all his words, but
it was a - it was quite a thrilling speech and when he got through,
the House rang with applause. Now, you ought to look at that, and
that's an answer; and if we told the House Committee about the U-2,
which was the most secret thing we had and the best-kept secret for
five years of any operation that I've ever known, obviously we told
these committees of other things. We told them everything they wanted
to know.
SEVAREID: At any time, have any of those Congressmen so
informed of highly secret operations broken secrecy?
DULLES: Never, sir. Never.
ANNOUNCER: CBS REPORTS: "The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen
Dulles" will continue immediately after this message.
(ANNOUNCEMENT)
ANNOUNCER: CBS REPORTS: "The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen
Dulles" continues. Here again is Eric Sevareid.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, there's been much criticism that
we took much too long to recognize the danger of Castro and try to do
something about it.
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DULLES: Maybe we were slow about it. Certainly we got
disturbed about Castro at a fairly early date, but what were you
going to do about it? Castro was in there, with the great support
of the majority of the people, and if we had planned any expedition
at an earlier date, that might not have been of any more success than
the one that we did after rather mature preparations.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, if you can, would you tell me, in
regard to the Cuban affair of last spring, where you think the central
basic mistake was?
DULLES: The President has said that he assumed
responsibility for the action taken. That was his own initiative.. In
matters of that kind, where they wish the director of Central
Intelligence Agency to assume responsibility, hers always prepared
to do it; and I have never discussed the Cuban operation. I think I'd
rather limit my remarks to pointing out that there were certain
factors which bore upon the timing of any operation if it was carried
out, namely, that we knew that Cuban pilots were being trained in
Czechoslovakia, that MIG's were in crates in large numbers in Cuba,
and that if these trained pilots got back and these MIG's became
operative, the possibility of any invasion by a Cuban force, or even
by an American force, would be greatly - the dangers and the problems
would be greatly increased.
SEVAREID: But what about the philosophical and the legal
argument that the Cuban invasion was both immoral and illegal?
DULLES: Well, I think I'd respond to that by asking you
a question. Here you had a group of fine young men - these Cubans -
formed the brigade that went into Cuba, who asked nothing other than
the opportunity to try to restore a free government in their country,
who were ready to risk their lives and have done so - whether they
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should have been told that they would get no sympathy, no support,
no aid from the United States, that's the question. I just pose that
question. I don't ask you to answer it, but I'll answer your question
with another question.
SEVAREID: Is it true that we did not inform the Cuban
underground in Cuba of the date, the place and the timing of that
landing?
DULLES: Eric, we didn't inform them. As I recall, we
informed very few people when we started the invasion of France in
June of '44. You can't do that. We did not inform the Cuban
underground of the time and place of the invasion. To do so would
have been informing Castro and it would have been catastrophe for
the invading force.
SEVAREID: We did achieve some element of surprise, did
we?
DULLES: Complete surprise was achieved as regards the
place of landing.
SEVAREID: But not timing, because that was published.
DULLES: No, they did not know the exact timing. They
had been crying "invasion" for weeks and months before, and as you
note, they're even now crying that invasions are being planned.
SEVAREID: It's been in one of these books about the
C.I.A., Mr. Dulles, that the C.I.A. people refused to put into effect
the Presidential order to keep out all former Batista supporters
from that expedition. What is the truth of that?
DULLES: Well, it's not true at all, Eric. It was an
absolute rule that no Batistianas were to be accepted. Now, there
may have been, in fifteen hundred people, there's always a
possibility you make one or two mistakes, a few mistakes, but nobody
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was knowingly selected, by the Cuban selectors of the members of the
brigade, who favored Batista.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, after the failure of the Cuban
invasion, there were predictions and requests that inside the C.I.A.
operations and intelligence be separated as functions. What has
happened in that area?
DULLES: There was a committee set up by the President
to look into all phases of the operation. I won't deny that the
conclusion was reached, and it was unanimous, that this operation
took on a character that - particularly in its latter phases - which
exceeded the scope of the normal activities of the C.I.A., and I
agree with that. I agree with that.
SEVAREID: You think the C.I.A. got too deeply into that
affair?
DULLES: Well, I feel that operations of the C.I.A.
should be of a character, if they get into operations, and that is
up to the Executive, if they get into operations, those operations
should be of a nature that could be kept quiet and be of the
concealed type.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, what about this whole problem of
briefing Presidential candidates on very secret matters? Now, this
came up in Mr. Nixon's book recently, when he said that Mr. Kennedy,
having been briefed during the campaign by you on the Cuban
operation, took advantage of that and took a very strong line against
Castro in his campaign speeches, while he - Mr. Nixon - also knowing
what was going on, felt he was obliged to take a different line -
that he was put in a bad position. In your public statement, at the
time, you said that your briefings of Kennedy did not cover the
actual Cuban operation.
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DULLES: As far as this last incident you've mentioned,
I don't think there's any use going into that any further. The
statements have been made - there is an honest misunderstanding and
I don't propose to go into that any further. I think, however,
we ought to, in the future campaigns, get the briefing of candidates
a little better organized.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, if I could change the subject
somewhat, Walter Lippmann, who's not uninformed about Washington,
said on one of these programs, in fact, that your brother, Secretary
of State Dulles, paid very little attention to the State Department
as such because he had his own foreign service, namely your
Intelligence service. What would be your reaction to that statement?
DULLES: Well, I don't know. I know you're a very
accurate quoter of others, but I wouldn't agree with that.
SEVAREID: But wouldn't it be a fair inference that since
you were his brother, after all, he would give an undue importance to
your information, or be prejudiced in favor of it over that of his
own State Department?
DULLES: I don't know. It might have been just the
opposite. You can't tell. I do not think that he did so. And we
didn't always agree. He had strong feelings and sometimes I had
strong feelings. On our basic philosophy of life and approach to the
world, yes, we agreed; but every once in a while, we would have
disagreements, too.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, I have found, personally, that
overseas a good many of our ambassadors and ministers express some
irritation about the activities of C.I.A. people in their area.
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DULLES: That's correct. There have been cases where a
diplomat in a foreign country has looked at the picture somewhat
differently than it has been looked at in Washington.
SEVAREID: Are you saying, Mr. Dulles, that there have
been no cases abroad where the activities of C.I.A. have conflicted
with our official State Department foreign policy in those countries?
DULLES: There have been none.
SEVAREID: None at all?
DULLES: None at all.
SEVAREID: One of the new books about the C.I.A., Mr.
Dulles, makes a claim that in Iran a few years ago, at the time of
Mossadegh, the C.I.A. people spent literally millions of dollars
hiring people to riot in the streets and do other things, to get rid
of Mossadegh. Is there anything you can say about that?
DULLES: Well, I can say that the statement that we
spent many dollars doing that is utterly false.
SEVAREID: There's been a general argument in the Left
or liberal press writers in this country...
DULLES: Yes.
SEVAREID: ... that the C.I.A. people have sort of
automatically tended to support very extreme Right Wing groups in
foreign countries because of an obsession with communism, and have
therefore set back progressive democratic possibilities in foreign
countries.
DULLES: I think just the opposite is the case. If you
go over a situation like the situation in Korea and many others I
could cite, I would say that by and large we were quicker than others
to recognize the dangers in these situations, because I have often
felt in many countries that the strongest antagonists of the
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Communists, and those who knew them best were often - not always -
were often some of the Socialist leaders.
SEVAREID: The story of C.I.A. agents supposedly
encouraging the revolting French generals was apparently encouraged,
or at least believed, by some French Government officials at fairly
high level. How do you account for that?
DULLEST Well, I don't know whether they really
believed it, but it might have been convenient at that time not to
deny it. But any time a revolution happens anywhere, the Soviet
will begin by saying the C.I.A. did it. Now, if that's believed,
that's bad. I have collected - over the years I was there as
director, I collected literally thousands of items of Soviet
propaganda, just along these lines, and now books are being
published that say that we got rid of Farouk in Egypt - probably
was a good thing if one had done it; we didn't - we put in Nasser,
which we didn't do, that we've done all kinds of things in various
parts of the world; and it's hard to deal with it. You just say
it's not true, but here it appears. It's repeated in books that seem
to come from reputable sources. I don't know. I think maybe you
could give me some good advice as to what I could do as an individual,
because I know these things aren't true.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, on this whole question of dealing
with Communist tactics around the world, there are those, as you
know, who think we would be stronger and more effective if we
followed the so-called "passive" or "soft line." That is, never
try anything like an invasion of Cuba, or an undeclared war in
Vietnam and not test the bombs, whatever the Russians do - a kind of
leadership by moral example. If this were followed, what do you think
would happen?
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DULLES: Disaster. I don't think you can meet this form
of evil by merely passive resistance. You recall well the days of
the Thirties. What happened when Hitler first denounced the Treaty
of Versailles? Withdrew from the disarmament conference? Invaded
the Rhineland? Took over Austria? Invaded Czechoslovakia? A lot of
cheeks were turned to Hitler then, and look what happened - almost
happened to the world? Do we want to repeat that sort of thing again?
I don't think we do. I think you must meet aggression, open or
covert, and you must meet it where it appears, whether in Berlin or
Laos or South Vietnam.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, some Europeans, Jean Monnet, for
example, say that Americans are much too obsessed about Russian
communism. Do you think this is true?
DULLES: I think that is true in a sense, and not true
in another sense. I think that the one grave peril that we face is
the Communist peril. That is the only peril to our freedoms, to our
institutions, to everything that we hold dear. Now, I think that it
is true that the Communists practice on us and on other countries
towards which they're directing their attack, they try on us what I
would call the overload theory. They will start a lot of petty
annoyances in various parts of the world, without knowing whether they
are going to seriously push them ahead, in order to divert our
attention, maybe, from the major points of their attack.
SEVAREID: Could you give any concrete examples of what
has turned out to be minor or major?
DULLES: Well, I think we overrated the Soviet danger,
letts say, in the Congo. They went in there with a great fanfare.
They supported Gizenga. They established a Lumumba Institute in
Moscow, and it looked as though they were going to make a serious
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attempt at take-over in the Belgian Congo. Well, it didn't work
out that way at all. Now, maybe they intended to do it, but they
didn't find the situation ripe, and they beat a pretty hasty retreat.
SEVAREID: Would you call Vietnam a serious threat or
just a tactical operation?
DULLES: No, I think that's a serious threat. I
consider South Vietnam of major importance, and not just one of the
overload theory type of operations.
ANNOUNCER: CBS REPORTS continues in just a moment with
Mr. Dulles on the subjects of Communist aims and Communist conflicts
immediately after this message.
(ANNOUNCEMENT)
ANNOUNCER: CBS REPORTS continues. Here again is Eric
Sevareid.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, when you and others talk about a
Russian wish to dominate the world, what exactly do you mean? Is it
in terms of Russian national power over the world, the Communist
philosophy and system over the world - exactly what?
DULLES: They have several facets to their policy.
They believe, and some of them believe it fanatically, that communism
is the wave of the future, is the form of economic life that is best
adapted to push a country forward. They believe that inevitably,
through economic pressures and the like, more and more countries
will adopt communism. But they also believe that governments don't
generally fall. They - you get along better if you push them.
SEVAREID: How could they dominate a world in which this
country, with all its power, existed?
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DULLES: Well, they would believe that if they could
take over enough of the rest of the world, then they could encircle
us, and then eventually we would have to either adopt their system
or face an eventual war, possibly. They dontt believe that the
United States is going Communist in the next decade or two, or
anything of that kind, obviously. I think they feel that there is
a strong tide in the world today to get the rascals out. I mean,
take Latin America, no matter what the government is, there are a lot
of disaffected people, and where you do not have, as you do not have
in many countries of the world, sort of an organized party system,
all of the disaffected tend to gather together under the Communist
banner, or led by the Communists because they're the best organized
to lead a movement - get the rascals out. Now, maybe in some cases,
they are rascals. In a good.many cases, they're not rascals. They
are just in and have power, and from the Communist point of view,
become the rascals.
SEVAREID: Don't they already have perhaps too much on
their plate? They can't control Albania, or Yugoslavia, or China -
all Communist systems and states. May it not be that a pluralistic
communism around the world would be anti-Moscow?
DULLES: That's quite true, but difficulties at home
have rarely stopped countries in foreign adventure, sometimes has
pushed them on. I believe that the splits, the fissures, the
differences between various Communist countries, is today one of
the greatest pre-occupations that Khrushchev has. After all, he's
said that what he calls the Socialist world, if the world becomes all
Socialist, they'll all live - lie down in peace, and live together.
Well, that isn't what's happened; and when you see little Albania
practically throwing out the Russian representation there, both civil
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and military, that is really something. Why they went, hard to
tell; obviously, at that time they felt that they would have to use
force to stay, and they didn't want another Hungary on their hands
at that moment. Hungary - in a country which was not contiguous
with their own. But anyway, they got out. The Chinese thing is,
obviously, very serious. And it was they, I believe, although the
experts differ on this, I rather believe it was they that did the
acts that resulted in the withdrawal of the Russian technicians.
Now, I don't look forward to revolution in the
Communist world. A new generation is coming on in Russia, and I have
a feeling that some of the younger generation of Russians, as they
learn more about what goes on in the rest of the world, are going
to bring great pressure to get more freedoms. They'll want to hear
your radio and see your television. They'll want to learn what goes
on in the rest of the world. They'll begin to see the basic falsity
of the whole history of Russia. They're having a terrible time now
in getting out their histories. What do you say about Stalin?
Twenty-five years of rule. Twenty-five years the great hero.
Stalingrad. Stalin in the tomb. In 1956, came out the great speech
of Khrushchev's denigrating Stalin, but they never dared let that
speech circulate in Russia. They leaked little parts of it and
they had to go back to the attack now - that was at the Twentieth
Party Congress. At the Twenty-second Party Congress they had to go
back to the attack, because they hadn't gotten over to the people.
SEVAREID:
speech originally?
DULLES:
Wasn't it your Agency that got a hold of that
I'm willing to accept that charge. Khrushchev
charged me with it at one time. You'll find it in one of his
statements, back two or three years ago.
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SEVAREID:Jell, you'd have to rank that rather high
among the accomplishments.
DULLES: I think it was one of the really important
accomplishments.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, I know the problem of communism
inside the United States is not - has not been under your jurisdiction,
but the F.B.I.; but what are your feelings about it? Is it a
serious matter?
DULLES: Well, I think that due to the vigilance of the
F.B.I. and what J. Edgar Hoover has done, it's probably much less of
an internal menace here with us than it is with many other countries.
I think that the frustration of the American citizen and of the
citizens of other countries who are told, "Here's this great menace.
You must do something to meet this menace"; and yet the ordinary
man, the man in the street, the man and woman, he doesn't know how he
can contribute. He agrees as to the judgment that there is a menace,
that our society is menaced by communism, but what's he to do? And
that has resulted in certain aberrations that I don't need to define,
because you and those who are listening and hearing and seeing will
probably know what I have in mind - to these aberrations and I think
a great many innocent people without realizing the harm they are
doing, get led astray by this. Well, now, there are certain things
one can do. In the first place, we ought to learn what we can about
it so we understand it. We can do it by understanding that our great
strength is showing that our system, our free system is more
efficient and more effective than the Communist system, and we all,
on these issues, we all rally together in support of the actions
our government has taken strongly to defend our positions where they
may be threatened by communism and the positions of the free world,
whether it's Berlin or Laos or Vietnam, or wherever it may be.
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SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, would this be a fair summation of
your recipe for the average American: Be informed, believe in your
country, and as the late Elmer Davis put it, "Don't let 'em scare
you."
DULLES: I'd like to leave it at that.
ANNOUNCER: On May 10th, two weeks from tonight, CBS
REPORTS: "Birth Control and the Law," a sequel to the prize-winning
"Population Explosion" of two and one half years ago. Birth
control, its legal, moral, social aspects within the United States,
will be the subject of this report. CBS REPORTS: "Birth Control
and the Law," May 10th.
Next Thursday night most of these stations
will present Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, in an
interview AT THE SOURCE. Learn his views on the farm bill now before
Congress, AT THE SOURCE next Thursday night.
CBS REPORTS: "The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen
Dulles" was filmed and edited by the staff of CBS REPORTS under the
supervision and control of CBS NEWS.
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SUBJECT INDEX
Page
Briefing of presidential candidates ................... 15-16
China ................................................. 21-22
C.I.A.:
And Congress ..................................... 11-12
And State Department 16-17
Failures and successes 1, 23
Influences in foreign revolutions 17-18
Involvement in operations .....,.....R ............... 15
Communism:
American obsession with 19, 23
Domination of the world ............................. 20
Inside the United States ............................ 23
Overload theory ...........o ......................... 20
Passive resistence to 13-19
Congo ................................................. 19-20
Cuba ............................................... 2, 12-14
De-Stalinization ......................................... 22
Dulles, John Foster ...................................... 16
Ehrenburg, Ilya ........................................... 3
French generals' revolt .................................. 18
Hiroshima bomb ............................................ 6
Hitler, Adolf ...................................... 4, 7, 19
Iran ..................................................... 17
Jung , D r . Carl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Kennedy, President John F . ................................ 1
Khrushchev, Premier Nikita ....................... 2, 7-8, 22
Lippmann, Walter ......................................... 16
Mussolini, Benito ......................................... 7
Nixon, Richard ........................................ 15-16
(continued)
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SUBJECT INDEX (Concluded)
Page
O.S.S. and World War II:
German Foreign Office ................................ 5
Japanese surrender ................................. 5-6
Setting up O.S.S. in Switzerland ................... 3-4
Pavlov theory ........................................... 7-8
Potsdam Conference ........................................ 6
Powers, Francis Gary ................................... 9-10
Radio, importance in revolutions 5
U-2 flights ...................................... 8-9, 1012
U.S.S.R., new generation ................................. 22
Vietnam .................................................. 20
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