THE SCIENCE OF SPYING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100050001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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THE SCIENCE OF SPYING
:Produced by Ted Yates
Directed by Georges Klotz
Associate Producer Robert Rogers
Edited by Georges Klotz
Filmed by
Dexter Alley
Grant Wolfkill
Sound by Al Hoagland ?
Unit Manager Arthur White
Narrated by John Chancellor
May 4, 1965
NBC NEWS
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OPENING
AUDIO
This is a Russian PT 76, the current model Red Army
amphibious tank. It is now the property of the
United States Army. It was not given to us by
the Russians; we didn't buy it; nor did we capture,
it in battle. You could say the tank - - all 15
tons of it - - was obtained through intelligence
channels; or, you could say, we stole it.
Once upon a time, spying or espionage was a fairly
straightforward game. But we have come a long way,
rather quickly, from Mata Hari. There is something
new in the science of spying. It's not just steal-
ing military hardware and secret plans, but using
tanks and plans and men to promote our policies and
sometimes to overthrow governments which we don't
like. Both sides in the cold war deny it: both
sides do it.
In the spy.business, the dagger is replacing the
cloak, and that is what this program is about.
John Chancellor reporting.
1
VIDEO
John Chancellor on Russian
tank
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ACT I
Self-protection is a primary function of any organism.
That is as true of the green grass as it is of con-
tinental nuclear powers. Since the beginning of man,
tribes and clans and nations have spied on one an-
.other, across the valleys, across the oceans, and
now across the world.
We watch for the electronic imprint of the enemy's
bombers; we listen for the whine of his missiles.
We send beautiful, sophisticated machines over his
territory to monitorhis coded talk, to tally his
gantrys to make inventory of hisl.eapons. The very
air is full of information, for the spies of today.
Much of this, for Americans, begins and ends in this
building located at Langley, Virginia. This is the
headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, of
the United States Gqvernment. Everybody knows it,
although the sign on the gate reads "Bureau of Public
Roads".
It might have been designed by Ian Fleming: row upon
row of serried, secret cubicles, rooms of codes and
computers which translate Russian to English at
30,000 words an hour. They burn their documents in a
hundred-thousand-dollar furnace.,
This is the Pentagon of the secret war. It is a depot
for subversion, and a kind of clandestine university.
For many years its kindly, scholarly headmaster was
a super-spy in'the classic mold named Allen Dulles.
Montage of overseas' listening
posts and radar stations;
starting with Formosa
U-2 in flight
Views of CIA Building
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MR. DULLES:
information
methods ,and
Intelligence is nothing really other than
and knowledge. In the days of Socrates,by various
even before that, mankind has been seeking
knowledge of everything that influences his own life
or the life of a nation to which he belongs. But the
idea that it is necessarily nefarious, always engaged in
overthrowing governments, that's false. That's for the
birds.
Now there are times . . there are times when the United
States goVernment feels that the developments in another
government, such as in the Vietnam situation, is of a
nature to imperil the safety and the security, the peace
of the world, and asks the Central Intelligence Agency
to be its agent in that particular situation.
JOHN CHANCELLOR 7 Mr. Dulles, I know you have heard this
many times, that there are people who say that we - with
regard to the CIA - are waging a secret war with an in-
visible government.
MR. DULLES: We are obviously engaged in many facets of what
is generally called the cold war, which the communist
policies forced upon us.
fact of life.
But may I say this, and I do it with all solemnity, at no
time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any
intelligence that was not approved at the highest level.
No use denying that. That's a
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Whatever you say about it, the CIA has
kept busy for the past 18 years. This is Laos, in South-
east Asia, not so much a kingdom as a political playing
field for the great powers.
- 3 -
Dulles-Chancellor
Interview
Scenes of warfare in
Laos
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Some Laotian warriors are supplied by the Russians, some
by the Americans. The United States supplies a hundred
thousand tribesmen with rice and bullets, through a sort
of "Air CIA": secret contracts with small so-called
"private" airlines. One is called Air America. In all)
a fleet of 50 aircraft is involved, all flown by civilians,
who are often the target of communist gunfire.
We found to of the pilots in a Hong Kong bar,
a New Zealander named Len Cowper and an American named
Chuck Bade, reminiscing about their secret flights.
So as we were flying along I heard pup-pup-pup into
the aircraft, so I looked out the side there and
the FL's were lined up there about 15 or 20 on each
side practically at point blank range. One of the
boys quit the next day. He was a little green.
The men that you knew down there ,and the length of
time you spent there.. . how many guys were killed?
Well, there was R., Campbell, Chet Brown, Woody Baker,
Jerry Riley.
What kind of missions actually were you flying down
there?
Quite often I didn't know what I was going to do. I
just know I had a load to take up there. I didn't know
what they were for. I wasn't paid to know. All I
was paid for was to take them up there.
Really. . . I really never knew who I was picking up.
I never knew who was watching me. Just like a blind
date.
Pilots in Hong Kong bar
JOHN CHANCELLOR: A "blind date" in 1953 involved the over- Views'tof Mossedegh greeting
Soviet diplomat
throw of the Premier of Iran. The CIA was clearly involved.
ALLEN DULLES: T'e government of Mossedegh, if you recall Allen Dulles
history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now
that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not
deny.
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JOHN CHANCELLOR: Actually, the Shah had tried to fire
Mossadegh, and had failed. With the vigorous help of CIA
and British operatives, the coup was carried out, with
Iranians doing most of the work. Mossadegh's crime had
been his nationalization of the great pool of Persian oil,
and his flirtation with the Russians. When it was all
over, the west had held on to the oil, and Mossadegh had
only his famous tears.
The CIA is alleged to have sent this P51 fighter against
Indonesian President Soekarno in 1958.
And later that year, Soekarno captured an American pilot
named Allen Pope. Pope had been flying a B-26 bomber for
anti-Soekarno rebels, while on CIA duty.
ALLEN DULLES: Well, all I can tell you is that we were
not happy with Mr. Soekarno in 1958 and I donit think
we are very happy with him in 1965.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: The Congo is a natural and deadly
battleground for American and, Russian agents. The
latest CIA help to the central government is an air
force piloted by Cubans.
Is it possible that there may have been American agents
in the Congo who later turned up in Laos? I mean are
there men on both sides engaged in these battles around
the world?
ALLEN DULLES: Oh yes.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Do they meet?
ALLEN DULLES: Well, if they meet too much, are seen too
much, they lose their utility.
Scene's of disorder in
Teheran
View of American
furnished aircraft and
captured American pilot.
Allen Dulles
Jungle execution in
Congo
Chancellor-Dulies
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JOHN CHANCELLOR: And as far away as Tibet where rebels
fight the Chinese communists, there is CIA assistance.
If it would benefit our side, the CIA would recruit
the abominable snowman.
ALLEN DULLES: I am not going into the Tibet situation
because I would be going beyond what . . even what I
know about it. I do think there are times where the
supporting movements. . is one of the best ways of
preventing the communists frolu taking over.
And that has been done from time to time.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Mr. Dulles, do the Russians have
a CIA?
ALLEN DULLES: The KGB is one of the most sinister
organizations that was ever organized.
JOHN nHANCELLOR: Are the Russians good at this?'
ALLEN DULLES: Oh yes. Oh, my yes. You take some of their
operations. They are classic. Way back when we lost
Czechoslovakia, that was a classic operation. You
take their operation in Cuba. Grgat skill was shown
in that. Take several things they are working on now,
1
such as Indonesia, the Sudan, so forth and so on, because
they have a marvelous apparatus.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Do they spend more on this kind of
activity than we do?
ALLEN DULLES: Oh, they must.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Do we have an application of morality
.in our activities they don't?
ALLEN DULLES: Far more than they do, yes.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Could you talk on this subject?
- 6 -
Tibetan, guerrillas with
weapons
Allen Dulles
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ALLEN DULLES: Well, only as far as I know we don't
engage in assassinations and kidnapping, things of that
kind. As far as I know we never have.
As far as we know they have, and have done it quite
consistently.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: In your years as director of the
CIA, sir, did you apply a moral standard to the judg-
ments you had to make on operations?
ALLEN DULLES: Yes, I did. Why? Because given the
calibre of the men and women I had working for me, I
didn't want to ask them to do a thing that I wouldn't
do.
One or two said that even what I assigned them, they
preferred not to do. That rs alright with me. I didn't
ask them to do it.
All that I can say is that I am a parson's son, and I
was brought up as a Presbyterian, maybe as a Calvanist,
maybe that may be a fatalist. I don't know.
But I hope I have a reasonable moral standard
END ACT I
7
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ACT II
JOHN CHANCELLOR: The man who created the U-2 also planned
the Bay of Pigs. One was a fantastic success, but the
other wasn't; Richard Bissell is now a private citizen,
and a thoughtful one.
Mr. Bissell, ii is a truism in our society that moral ends 144,A7
justify immoral means. Children are taught that. It is in-
grained in the national character of this country. And yet
you and your colleagues in the CIA must on many occasions
have had to abandon that. How did you deal with it?
RICHARD BISSELL: I suppose the way people deal with this
under all kinds of circumstances. . and the one that occurs
to me as the most prominent historically is warfare . . in
that they feel a higher loyalty and that they are acting in
obedience to that higher loyalty. In my position in the CIA
I had a chance to know of and remotely to observe many
operations. And I will not deny that there were occasions
when Americans involved in these', as it were, out in front,
had - - as people do in wartime - - to undertake certain
actions that were contrary to their moral precepts. But
I will say that I think this happens a great deal less
often, again, than one might surmise.
I think the morality of . . shall we call it for short
cold war . . is so infinitely easier than .the morality
of almost any 1:nd of hot war that I never encountered
this as a serious problem.'
JOHN CHANCELL011: The distinction between cold and hot war
morality becamo academic to the crew of this British Coaster
on the 28th of June, 1954.
8
?
U-2 in flight
Bissell - Chancellor
Interview
Beached hulk of British
freighter Spring-Fjord .
in Guatemala.
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Called the Spring-Fjord, she was lying off the coast of Guatemala
that day, loaded with coffee and cotton.
That happened to be the time when the. American government
was overthrowing the communist-oriented government of
Guatemala. A P-38 fighter, piloted and operated by the
CIA thought the Spring-Fjord was carrying aircraft to the
legal government of Guatemala, so the American pilot dropped
three bombs. Only one went off, while the crew escaped un-
hurt, and all 2,000 tons of the Spring-Fjord now rest on the
beach, testimony to a rather starting miscalculation.
This pained the CIA, but the.whole Guatemalan episode
pained other Americans, some of them influential.
One of them who was pained, and is pained is Senator
Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota.
SENATOR McCARTHY: If we believe what the Constitution says
about the responsibility of Congress,to declare war for
example; to have the CIA at the direction of the President
actually formenting war Or carrying on a war in a country;'
;Lf we are to do this without any kind of congressional
approval, I think we would put some real strain on the
Constitution.
It is interesting to note that people from small countries,
Latin American countries, for example, greatly concerned
by our CIA because a secret agency of this kind in a rela-
tive small country with a weak government can become the
real force of government and operate as a kind of independent
force of foreign policy in the extension of foreign policy
- 9 -
Senator Eugene McCarthy of
Minnesota
Views of present-day
Guatemala
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JOHN CHANCELLOR: And it did happen here: Guatemala City, Guatemala City
:the capital of a country where the rich are very rich,
the poor very poor and the politics all mixed up.
Guatemala is the kind of Central American country that
used to be called a banana'republic before people started
talking about wars of national liberation. Most of the
citizens of Guatemala are Indians, and most of them live
in the shadow of a small wealthy class which owns most
of the arable land. It is still a plantation society,
plagued by the economic and political illnesses of such
a society. For m-st of its history, it has been ruled by
a dictatorship. But, as the 19501s began, the pendulum
swung from right to left, and the winds of change swept
across Guatemala.
The pendulum swung very far left with the election in 1950
of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz as president. He confiscated
the lands of the wealthy and filled his government with
communists. He became, in local and American eyes, a
menace. So the American government, thru the CIA, made
an alliance with Arbenzls opposition, and as of that moment,
he was doomed. An American who had been air attache at
our embassy there, named Fred Sherwood, tells how the
plot began.
FRED SHERWOOD: 'Several of us thought perhaps we could
stop this movement by organizing something in the form of
vigilantes Or night raiders. For example, there was a
group that tried to bring in some Puerto Rican and Cuban
gangsters who made an offer , a package deal so to speak,
to kill or assasinate any 12 communists within the country
for,
50,000.
-10-
Views of central square
of Guatemala City
Views of pro-Arbenz
crowds in city square
Arbenz addressing crowds.
Fred Sherwood at his
home in Guatemala
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We went around trying to raise money, but we were only
successful in raising part of this and so this never
came off.
The American government threw in their forces with these
small groups and helped organize these resistance groups.
This help was forthcoming in all sorts of technicians,
pilots, demolition teams, radio technicians, professional
psychologists who organized rumor networks. These men
provided the know how of organizing a successful re-
volution.
Jack Puerifoy had been selected very carefully as Ambassador
to Guatemala as he had just cleaned out the communists
in Greece.
Whitey Wittaur named Ambassador to Honduras. Whitey Wittaur
was General Chennaultts deputy in tHe Flying Tigers and also
formed the Chinese National Airlines. I am quite sure
that if any of the pilots flying for the liberation army
had been shot down, some of those pilots could have
spoken Chinese.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: The most important pilot for the liberation
army, however, spoke American. The liberation army was CIA
sponsored and directed, but it dirytillt have an easy time in
its overthrow of the Arbenz'regime. The army had bogged
down when an American freebooter named Jerry Delarm strafed
the city and blew up the government oil reserves.
Delarm did that while flying a P-47 furnished by the United
States. Now he flies his own Lodestar, owns his own
charter service, and minds his own business.
JERRY DELARM: I have been flying in Latin America for -
.ever since 1939 on and off.
-11-
American Embassy in
Guatemala City
Picture of Jack Puerifoy
Picture of Whitey Wittaur
F-47 Fighter Plane
Flaming oil tanks
Jerry Delarm
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I like it here. It's easy living.: Siestas, and not much
rushing. No rut. It's a nice place.
The first problem I had with communism down here started
back in the time of Colonel Castillo Armas in Guatemala.
That's when I started.
And from then on. That's about it.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Two days after Delarm blew up the oil
reserves, Arbenz resigned; however, his replacements hesi-
tated to embrace Delarm's employers, so Delarm got back
in his plane and blew up the main army powder magazine,
which rather decided tl:e question.
The replacement for Colonel Arbenz was Carlos Castillo-Armas,
the entry backed by the USA. He arrived in the American
ambassador's plane. Within about a month, there was little
trace of the Marxist innovations of Colonel Arbenz.
Guatemala and what the CIA and the US did there came within
your tenure at the CIA. Do you regard that operation as a
success?
RICHARD BISSELL: I do.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Can you tell me a little more about it?
Why do you regard it as a success?
RICHARD BISSELL: Well, I will give you an answer that
may sound slightly bureaucratic in its tone, but in the case
of that operation, notably as of other large operations,
the whole policy making machinery of the executive branch
of the government was involved. The CIA had an assigned
role which was really in a major role in that operation.
And I think it is a success because the assigned role was
carried out substantially as assigned.
-12-
Views of ruined Fort
? Matamoros
Crowds welcoming Castillo-
Armas.
Castillo-Armas arriving in
Guatemala City in jeep.
Chancellor-Bissell
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There was one sub-incident in that which I don't wish to
identify, in which an action was taken that went beyond
the established limits of. policy. And I mention this
only because you can't take on operations of this - -
P
covert operations or overt, for that matter - - of this
scope, draw narrow boundaries of policy around them and be
?
absolutely sure that those boundaries will never be over-
stepped.
The overstepping in the case of Guatemala, the one case I
am aware of, mercifully turned out to be of little signi-
ficance and to do no political and minor financial damage
to the US or, for that matter, anybody else. So I say
that it was from the standpoint of an organization
commissioned to do a job, just an unqualified success.
SENATOR EUGENE MC CARTHY: I think the basic question with
regard to Guatemala is whether they carried it out with some
kind of presidential direction; which if they did, would be
subject to some question because an action to overthrow
an established government is essentially an act of war and
it is my judgment there ought to be some kind of commitment
on the part of Congress to fully satisfy the Constitution.
Hulk of British freighter
Spring-Fjord on Guatemalan
beach.
Senator Eugene McCarthy '
END ACT II
1
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ACT III
JOHN CHANCELLOR: There is more to this story. The
sanitized Guatemalan regime of Castillo-Armas lasted for
2 years, and then he met his death in the presidential
palace.
The killer was a palace sentry-, who took his own life.
No one, therefore, knows for sure who murdered Castillo-
Armas. ,Some of his associates had found him to be too
honest and too liberal. His was a regime not without
corruption and with considerable American aid.
Guatemala's next president was Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes,
progressive and pro-American. He was plagued by communist
guerrillas but his downfall came O'rom the right - - at the
hands of his own defense 4nister.
Fuentes is now an exile in Costa Rica. He tells how he
allowed the CIA to use his country as a training camp for
the brigade of Cuban refugees who landed in the Bay of Pigs
to overthrow his old enemy, Castro.
MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES: It was very difficult to get the
connection until the beginning of 1960. Then we talked
with President Eisenhower And then he sent some people
to my country and, of course, they were not military men.
They were civilians. They presented me some credentials.
The credentials were with the CIA. I have never seen them
before. They ask me not to ask for principal nameonly
first names as Peter, John; James. The most difficult
of the program was to look for a place where no spies and
press men went to see how they were doing. And Mr. Arejo
offered his coffee plantation, a farm called Helvetia.
-14 -
Views of Guatemala City
and National Palace '
Views of Castillo-Arms/
corpse
Pictures of Miguel Ydigoras
Fuentes addressing crowds
in Guatemala City.
Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes in
exile in Costa Rica
Views of training camp
Helvetia.
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?
We denied as usual all this organization saying
that it was only rumors and doesn't exist in any
camp. And they built some roads in order to reach
this hilly place, and they built some barracks of
wood so that one year later they were rotten.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: This hilly place has just about
been taken over by the forest. this was the camp-
ground of the proud and optimistic Cuban brigade,
recruited, paid, trained, supplied by the Central
Intelligence Agency in perhaps the largest covert ,
operation in the history of subversion. ?
What remains now is only the outdoor altar at which
the Cubans prayed for victory.
The CIA's RichErd Bissell, author of the invasion
plans, reflects on the lessons learned.
RICHARD BISSELL: I think this is an unlearnable
lesson. In any future operation of this kind,
again, there is going to be an operator. His eyes
are going to be fixed on the success of th6 operation.
So far as he is concerned, it is going to be de-
sirable to do things that from the standpoint of
others in the government will involve major risks
in a quite different dimension. There is always
going to be this incredibly difficult choice and if
it is an important issue, it is going to be in every
case, as it was then, the President's choice.
-15-
Richard Bissell voice over views
of Helvetia training camp. Cuban
Brigade altar in midst of jungle'
clearing.
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I think one of the few things that can be said pretty much
as fact about the Bay of Pigs is that although it might Views of crashed CIA
plane on Guatemalan
have failed, the invasion might have failed in any number beach.
of ways, it did, in fact, fail because the battle was
lost in the air.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Truth is the most fragile commodity in the
secret war - - this CIA transport is a relic of our Cuban
crusade - - shot up while dropping supplies over Cuba, ita
American crew crash landed on this Guatemalan beach. At
about this time, Washington was insisting that no Ameritans
were involved.
Another critism is that we always seem to end up supporting
right-wing dictatorships. Guatemala today - -this is it's
military academy - - has reverted to the jungle of a military
dictatorship. The present regime was recognized by the United
States less than a month after the overthrow of Ydigoras
Fuentes, who was the CIA's Guatemalan landlord.
We find ourselves in the United States supporting governments
of the right-wing all around the world?
RICHARD BISSELL: I think it is characteristic of much of
the under-developed world that there is no responsible
competent center, or even left of center. All too often
there is either an oligarchy regime, tribal in some areas,
or more feudal in parts of Latin America and others., and
by confronting it, an opposition that is hopelessly far to
the left, explicitly communist allied.
I take it that a part of our national political objective
is to elicit, to bring into beihg, to 'encourage the creation
in much of this part of the world of a responsible center,
or even left of center, and perhaps we are succeeding4
- 16 -
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Views of cadets marching
at Escuela Polytechnicat
Guatemala's West Point
, Richard Bissell
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for instance, in some parts of Latin America.
P
But I think in this sense it has to be admitted that in?
many places we find ourselves supporting the right, not
because we are rightest, but because there are literally
no other alternatives to chaos, or to encouragement of
those who have made themselves explicitly our enemies.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: There are people in Guatemala today
who are explicitly our enemies, and this is their handi-
work. This is what used to be the United States AID '
Mission Garage, in downtown Guatemala City. On New
Burned US AID Mission garage
in Guatemala City.
Year's Eve it was invaded by communist terrorists.
They destroyed twenty American automobiles, and a
travelling library donated by the citizens of Montgomery,
Alabama.
The same night the guerrillas touchecr,off an explosion
at the American Military Mission, and tried to set fire to
an American refinery. Thus Guatemalan politics continue
following a melancholy routine. The pendulum is still
swinging, and the new insurgents want it to swing away from
Scorched lAlliance For
our side. .To them, the Alliance for Progress is a capitalist Progress Posters on
floor of bombed building.
abstraction.
?!;
END ACT III
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ACT IV
JUN CHANCULOR: Guatemala today is in a state of seige:
Guatemalan newsboy hawking
raper with "State of
since February all its civil liberties suspended, it is pubject Seige" headlines.
to terrorism from serious insurgents. They have cone close
to killing Colonel Harold Hotver, Chief of the American Mili-
tary Mission; they have blown up a truckload of soldiers
on a downtown street; they have assassinated the chief of
the secret police; they have held up the office of the
United Fruit Company ( for an 18-thousand dollar haul);
the CIA says Fidel Castro contributed 200 thousand in 1963
alone; and it is estimated that the guerrillas now number
500, many in these hills.
Their chief is a former Guatemalan army officer, one of the
loaders of an unsuccessful revolt in November, 1960; since
then Guatemala's police and army have been hunting him, but
they can't catch him.
NBC's Robert Rogers, not without difficulty, did. Rogers
found him and interviewed him. His name is Marco Antonio
Yon Sosa.
ROBERT ROGERS: Commandante Yon Sosa, why did you take to
the hills in 1960?
YON SOSA: One of the main reasons we began our struggle was
the presence of the United States base at Helvetia Plantation
near Retahuleu. There American officers were training anti,-
Castro Cuban mercenaries with the cooperation of the Ydigoras
Fuentes government. That is the one and only thing for
which we are grateful to the Central Intelligence Agency.
If it were not for their interference in Guatemala at that time
we might not be fighting in the mountains today. They gave our
movement its determination.
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Views of Guatemala City
and mountains.
Mountain top
Marco Antonio Yon Sosa
.. and his lieutenant "Otto"
being interviewed by
?Robert Rogers
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ROGERS: There have been Constant rumors of your people being trained
in Cuba. This is not true?
YON SOSA: No. At least for the present, there are no people
who have been trained in Cuba fighting with us in the mountains.
There might be such people in other countries, but not in Guatemala.
ROGERS: Where did the officer in your guerrilla movement become
such expert fighters?
YON SOSA: Well, the best training is combat itself. But
we have some officers who were trained in the United States
at Fort Benning. The training they received there was excellent.
With that training and the support they received from the
Guatemalan people, they are invincible.
ROGERS: How much military supportls the US giving to the
government here?
YON SOSA: During the past two years they have completely equipped
four battalions, more than a regiment.
ROGERS: Commandante, in the last few weeks your organizatiOn
has burned the American AID garage here, tried to blow up the
American Military Mission, and tried to kill the chief of
the American Military Mission.
YON SOSA: Colonel Houser
American - - a gringo -
States forces fighting in
was attacked not because he is an
but because he represents the United.
Vietnam.
Also he is one of the American
officers advising the government forces, helping them repress the
peasants in the areas where our guerrillas operate. As for
the attack on the Military Mission, these Americans are in-
structing the government forces in how to fight our movement. It
is only right that we should attack them - - not because they are
Americans - - but because of what they are doing in our country.
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The attack on the AID vehicles was for the same reason.
We oppose United States policy in Guatemala because it is an
interventionist policy. The Americans come here and put presidents
into office and remove them.
ROGERS: Commandante, last week your men blew up an army truck
right in the center of Guatemala City and over the past months
have assasinated a number of high government officials. Do
you consider yourself a terrorist?
YON SOSA: I know that anyone can feel indignant when a
truckload of soldiers is blown up in a city street. But
you must consider the reason fox: our attack. About three
weeks ago the unit to which those soldiers belonged went
into the mountains of Izabel. They tortured and murdered
the inhabitants. They raped a young girl before her whole
family. It was to avenge these atrocities that we killed
those soldiers. To destroy a truckload of soldiers or to
execute an enemy does not give us pleasure. But we must
do these thin43. They serve a higher political purpose.
ROGERS: Why are you opposed to US policy and to the
Alliance for Progress?
YON SOSA: I believe the Alliance for Progress was inspired
by good intentions but it is too late. In order to function
at all the Alliance needs certain basic preconditions - - the
-tax reform, agrarian reform. But as soon as these reforms are
attempted the ruling classes, the oligarchy, the large land-
owners begin to maneuver against them. They stop all progress.
Hnw then can w make progress peacefully. It is impossible.
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RICHARD BISSELL: Poverty doesn't yield to short term solutions.
P
Political disorder doesn't yield to it. Situations like
the one that, in fact, historically obtained in Guatemala
where a small minority in a small under-developed potion,.
situations of this kind really cannot be countered by an
combination of actions that I can thing of/ at least, in
the short run that can be assumed under the heading of
"working to remove the soil in Vhich communism grows".
There just come moments and, unfortunately, quite a lot of
them, in world affairs, where power has to be exerted.
And I have long felt that many of the critisms that are
leveled at this one agency of the government are in fact the
critisms of those who hate to admit to themselves or anyone
else that power must sometimes be used, and, as I implied
a moment ago, they choose to level their critism at one
piece of the US government in order to make: these critisms
more acceptable.
END ACT IV
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Views of Guatemala City
slums
Close up of Bissell
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ACT V
JOHN CHANCELLOR: The activities of the CIA must be secret,
Views of CIA
but the debate about its role in our lives must be public: Building
here are the views of three men who know a lot about it.
Mr. Bissell, why do we need the CIA and covert political
operations in addition to a State Department and a Pentagon?
RICHARD BISSELL: It is perfectly clear that most of our Richard Bissell
conflict with the USSR, and perhaps this is true of China, is in
the non-military dimension. We are rivals in ideas, we are
rivals in economic activities, we are rivals in diplomacy,
we are rivals in the threat of use of power. But we are also
rivals in a whole variety of activities that are not public,
that are not open. They include espionage, the include sub-
version, which more precisely I suppose, could be described
as the effort to influence the course of events in other
countries covertly. If we are not prepared to meet all of
these challenges at their own level, I think the consequence
is that we may gradually find ourselves forced to meet them
at a level of escalation that we would not choose.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Senator, now that we have. apparently
acquiesced in :romoral acts on the part of the CIA, does this
imperil our liberties or effect us in any constitutional way?
(McCarthy):
I wouldn't go F.-,c far as to say it consitutes at the present
time a great threat to our constitdional liberty or to con-
stitutional government. But I do think it intrudes somewhat
upon the traditional areas and channels of representative
government and of constitutional government. As you know,you
get charges and claims and counter-claims and counter-charges
that the CIA makes its own policy.
-22-
John Chancellor
Senator McCtIrthy
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I think that perhaps in some cases it has, but whether it
makes policy and then brings it back and has it approved and
then goes on to carry it out, I don't know.
ALLEN DULLES: I know that criticism, but I can assure rou
that as the machine works no important decisions are made on
CIA evidence alone as far as I know, not in any situation that
I know. It certainly wasn't donep Cuba, Guatemala and these
other cases.
SENATOR McCARTHY: You have. charges that it has policies
different from those which the State Department people in
the same area may be trying to carry out.
RICHARD BISSELL: I feel myself that some of the critism
of the CIA, some, perhaps quite a part of its reputation comes
from junior officials who in all honesty learn of its activities
after the fact and have no chance to participate in the de-
cision that prompted these actions to be taken.
JOHN CHANCELLOR: Would these junior officials include ambassadors?
RICHARD BISSELL: I have known of cases, the only ones I can
remember are a good many years in the past, when ambassadors
have been kept in ignorance of activities of the CIA in the
countries to which they were accredited, in every case, and .
without exception, with the express approval of the Secretary
of State at the time.
SENATOR McCARTHY: I don't think they give a full report
to any one of the committees to which they report. They report.
to the armed services, I understand, or to some people on the
armed services. We have had some statements from those who
are supposed to receive this testimony that they really
Allen Dulles
Senator McCarthy
Richard Bissell
John Chancellor
Richard Bissell
Senator McCarthy
don't know and don't want to know what the CIA is doing.
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ALLEN DULLES: I can assure you that the CIA when I was there
as director, and I am quitesure it is the same with Mr. McCone
has given these committees full information about what it's
doing, how it's spending its money and how it operates. When'
I appeared before them,again and again, I have been stopped
by members of Congress saying, "we don't want to hear about this. We
might talk in our sleep. Don't tell us this."
SENATOR McCARTHY: As I say, I do feel that the fact that you
have some kind of congressional supervision in addition to the
executive supervision would tend to keep a kind of moral
hold against just what might become a kind of completely immoral
or ammoral operation. At the time of the confirmation hearings on
John McCone, I raised. the question as to what standards of
judgment the director of the CIA was prepared to apply to the
activities of the CIA and of its agencies. And I thought the
.,esponse not generally very satisfactory. The defense, so far
as there was a defense, was in the.main that the CIA was
primarily anti-communist. Well, this did not really go to the
point which I was raising. Even when you are dealing with
communists, again we have traditionally held that no matter
who our enemy might be, we still insist on the application of
some measure of moral judgment or moral standard.
RICHARD BISSELL: Those who believe that the US government
on occasion resorts to force when it shouldn't, should in all
fairness and justice, direct their views to the question of,
national policy and not hide behind the critism that whereas
the president and cabinet generally are enlightened people,
there is an evil, and ill-controlled agency, which imports
this sinister element into US policy.
Allen Dulles
Senator McCarthy
Richard Bissell
END ACT V
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CLOSING
JOHN CHANCELLOR: As citizens of the United States in the second
half of this century, we are learning to live with some uncom-
fortable realities. We live in a sort of ethical coexistence
with our war heads and mis4iles, because we acknowledge the in-
evitability of their possession. Given the state of the world
and our position in it, it was inevitable that we acquire these
awful weapons.
What all of us may not realize, however, is that we have
created another weapons system of secret and subversive action.
This, too, given the state of the world, may have been in-
evitable.
We have created elaborate safeguards against the misuse of the.
warheads, but the warheads are in reserve. The CIA's on
. .active duty in a constant, secret, dirty war. Safeguards in
this area are less efficient.
The problem we have is how to reconcile the necessity of the
CIA with its secret offenses against our public morality.
.,.?
These days, it's getting more and more uncomfortable to be
an American, and there doesn't seem to be much me can do
about it.
Thank you, and goodnight.
THE END
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