REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION TO ACCOMPANY S. CON. RES. 2 TOGETHER WITH THE INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100040001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 22, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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Calendar No. 1595
84TH CONGRESS1 .
2d Session j
SENATE
f REPORT
1No. 1570
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TO ACCOMPANY
S. Con. Res. 2
TOGETHER WITH THE
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN
FEBRUARY 23 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1956.?Ordered to be printed
A
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71006 WASHINGTON t 1956
it
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COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION
THEODORE FRANCIS OREEN, Rhode Island, Chairman
CARL HAYDEN, Arizona
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, In., Missouri .
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
Gosport F. HARMON,
It
WILLIAM E. IENNER, Indiana
FRANK A. BARRETT, Wyoming
JOSEPH R. McCARTHY, WLsoonsin
CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
Chief Clerk and Counsel
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CONTENTS
Page
Explanation of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 1
Amendments Z
Summary of objectives of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 2
Introduction 3.
Background of the Central Intelligence Agency:
I. Historical a
IL National Security Act of 1947 4
III. The CIA Act of 1949
IV. Other pertinent legislation
Investigations of the CIA:
I. Four surveys of the CIA 6
IT. The First Hoover Commission Report (1949) 6
III. The special committee 7
IV. General Doolittle's group (1954) 7
V. The Second Hoover Commission Report (1955) 8
A. The Clark Task Force Report:
1. Recommendations
2. Comments:
(a) Soviet bloc 10
(b) Allen Dulles 10
(c) Administration flaws 10
(d) Public relations 11
(e) Congressional affairs 11
(f) Agency enjoys wide exemptions 12
3. Permanent "watchdog" commission 12
B. The sole recommendation of the Hoover Commission.. 12
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities:
I. Origin of Board 13
II. Composition of Board 13
III. Executive Order 10656 13
IV. White House comments 14
V. Why the Board, by itself, is not enough 15
Selected comments on the establishment of a congressional committee to
? exercise legislative surveillance over CIA:
I. By the Director of CIA 15
II. Editorial comment 17
The argument for a Joint Committee on the Central Intelligence Agency:
I. Analogy to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 17
II. To provide adequate congressional liaison with CIA 18
III. Studies of CIA by temporary groups are not sufficient 19
IV. Security, for security's sake, invites abuse 19
Conclusion 20
Appendix: References 21
Individual views of Mr. Hayden.. 23
9
DI
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84TH CONGRESS }
2d Session
?
"
Calendar No.1595
SENATE REPORT
No. 1570
; ? JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:
AGENCY
. ,
FEBRUARY 23 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1956.?Ordered to be printed
Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, aub.
mitted the following
REPORT
together with the
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN
[To accompany S. Con. Res. 2]
The Committee on Rules and Administration, to wham was referred
the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) to establish a Joint Com-
mittee on Central Intelligence, having considered same, report
favorably thereon, with amendments, and recommend that the
resolution, as amended, be adopted by the Senate.
EXPLANATION OF SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 2
This concurrent resolution, sponsored by 35 Senators, would estab-
lish a joint committee of Congress to have legislative oversight of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Such committee would be composed of six Members from the
Senate, and six Members from the House of Representatives. Mem-
bership on the joint committee would be limited to Senators and
Representatives already serving as members of Subcommittees on
the Central Intelligence Agency of the Committees on Appropria-
tions and Armed Services in both branches of Congress.
These Members would select their chairman and staff and have
full cognizance and supervision over matters relating to the, Central
Intelligence Agency, with power to advise, inquire, and report.
Staff and other committee expense for the first year was set at $250,000
by .the Rules and Administration Committee.
?
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2 Joni'', COM Jt ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AMENDMENTS
Amendments to Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 proposed by the
Committee on Rules and Administration are as follows:
1. On page 3, line 21, strike the word "public";
2. On page 3, lines 23 to 25, inclusive, strike out the last sentence;
3. On page 4, line 6, after the word "Government", strike out the
period and inserti?
on a reimbursable basis with the prior consent of the heads of the departments or
agencies concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration.
4. On page 4, line 8, insert in the blank the figure "$250,000" ?
5. On page 4, line 8, after the word "paid", strike out "one-half";
6. On page 4, line 9, after the word "Senate", strike out "and one-
half";
7. On page 4, strike out line 10;
8. On page 4, line 11, after the word "chairman.", strike out "Dis-
bursements to";
9. On page 4, strike out lines 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.
The effect of the first two amendments would be to bring reporting
fees for both public and executive hearings of the joint committee into
conformity with regulations now controlling reporting costs of Senate
committees. The effect of the third amendment would insure that
prior consent of the heads of the departments or agencies concerned,
and of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, must be
obtained for the joint committee to utilize the reimbursable services
of agency personnel detailed to it. The fourth amendment would
limit the joint committee's expenditures for staff and other expenses
during its first year to $250,000. Amendments 5 to 9, inclusive,
would provide that all the funds necessary to the operations of the
joint committee be disbursed by the Senate without reimbursement
from the House of Representatives. These amendments would thus
eliminate duplication of accounts, prevent difficulties which might
arise due to conflicts in some of the fiscal regulations governing the
two Houses of Congress, and make the language of the present resolu-
tion conform to the current disbursement practices controlling prac-
tically all other joint congressional committees.
SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES OF SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 2
A. This concurrent resolution, in creating a joint committee to
oversee the Central Intelligence Agency, adopts the essence of a
recommendation made to Congress by the Hoover Commission.
B. At the same time, it preserves the continuity of present con-
gressional cognizance of CIA at committee level by limiting the
membership on the joint committee to those Senators and Representa-
tives now most privy to CIA's operations.
C. Approval of the resolution will give Congress a joint com-
mittee analogous to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and like
the latter, dedicated to the promotion of the public and legislative
will in a sensitive agency imperative to our country's international
survival.
D. It will also give Congress a specific group which can work
hand in hand with a civilian group already appointed by the President
to study intelligence activities, particularly the CIA. ' The civilian
warmo.
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JOLNT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 3
group referred to was appointed after its organization had been
suggested by the Hoover Commission.
E. It will provide the Central Intelligence Agency with a con-
gressional committee acting for it as a unit in Congress, and one cap-
able of furnishing CIA protection against unwarranted attack or
inquiry.
F. The establishment of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence
will insure the existence of a trained, specialized, and dedicated staff to
gather information and make independent checks and appraisals of
CIA activities pursuant to the committee's directives and supervision.
The effect sbould be to allay much of the suspicion already expressed
in Congress concerning the activities and efficiency of CIA operations.
INTRODUCTION
The requirement of a centralized, responsible intelligence organiza-
tion which can act as the collator and prophet of international
intentions hostile to the United States is an imperative one. It
would be difficult to phrase a more apt expression of its significance
than was contained in the Hoover Commission's Report on Intelligence,
Activities:
The fate of the Nation well may rest on accurate and complete intelligence
data which may serve as a trustworthy guide for top-level governmental decisions
on policy and action in a troubled world, where so many forces and ideologies
work at cross-purposes.
The Central Intelligence Agency was created to fill this need.
Whether or not it has met that need has never been understood too
clearly by the press or the public. Its very secrecy keeps its operations
from justification or criticism. The suspicion grows, however, that
some of its secrecy has been secrecy for its own sake. The efficiency
of the CIA has been doubted, its results questioned.
BACKGROUND OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I. HISTORICAL
The concept of a centralized intelligence agency with unit responsi-
bility evolved slowly. In World War I, the United States had no
intelligence service equal to the name. Between World War I and
World War II, the Nation relied chiefly on the military services and
the State Department for its foreign strategic and tactical information.
With the outbreak of World War II, the need for centralized intelli-
gence information became even more apparent. As a step toward
meeting that need, the Office of the Coordinator of Information was
set up in 1941 to collect and analyze information data, military or
otherwise, which might bear upon national defense strategy. Later,
in June 1942, the Office of Strategic Services emerged as the organi-
zation charged with the compilation of secret war information for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This OSS organization remained intact until the close of World
War II. In the fall of 1944, its Director was asked by the President
to recommend the concept for a postwar intelligence organization:
In substance, his recommendations were followed out when the
President, in January 1946, created the National Intelligenbe
Authority consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and
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4, JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
the President's personal representative to coordinate Federal foreign
intelligence activities. A Central Intelligence Group was also
organized by directive, with a Director designated by the President
to assist the National Intelligence Authority and to be responsible
to it. In the period of 6 years the CIA has been examined 4 times?
twice by task forces of 2 Hoover Commissions. The substance of the
findings over the spread of these years were generally the same?that
inadequacies and poor organization existed and had gone uncorrected.
II. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Both the Authority (NIA) and the Central Intelligence Group
(CIG) vanished with the enactment of the National Security Act of
1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 61 Stat. 495; 50 U. S. C. Supp. 403)
by which Congress established a National Security Council (NSC)
and created under it a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with a.
Director at its head.
The purposes of the CIA were defined by the act as follows:
(d) 'For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it
shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security
Council?
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such
intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate
to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the
coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies
of the Government as relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security,
and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within
the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities:
Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement
powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the depart-
ments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided
further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such
additional services of common concern as the National Security Council
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from
time to time direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and ap-
proved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of
the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security
shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such
intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such depart-
ments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided,
shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the written request
of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such
information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to
the national security.
The Central Intelligence Agency is headed by a Director and a
Deputy Director, both of whom are appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director or the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence may be chosen from the
commissioned officers of the armed services in an active or retired
status, but at no time shall more than one of the two positions be
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'
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
5
occupied by such a commissioned officer. The Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the
Director during his absence or disability.
The Director of Central Intelligence, in the performance of his
responsibility, receives pertinent information from all branches of
the Government engaged in the collection of intelligence, including the
Atomic Energy Commission. He gives advice and recommendations
to the National Security Council on such matters. The function of
the National Security Council is to advise the President with respect
to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating
to the national security so as to enable the military services and the
other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving the national security.
The report "Intelligence Activities" (a report to Congress from the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Washington, D. C., June 1955) prepared by a task force under
the chairmanship of Gen. Mark W. Clark, The Citadel, S. C., com-
ments on the establishment of CIA as follows:
? The CIA well may attribute its existence to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
and to the postwar investigation into the part intelligence or lack of intelligence
played in the failure of our military forces to receive adequate and prompt warning
of the impending Japanese attack.
That investigation of events leading up to the "day of infamy" impressed upon
Congress the fact that information necessary to anticipate the attack actually
was available to the Government; but that there was no systemi n existence to
assure that the information, properly evaluated, would be brought to the attention
of the President and his chief advisers so that appropriate decisions could be
made and timely instructions transmitted to the interested military commanders.
It also demonstrated that in the prewar Government organization no single
official was responsible for whatever failure of intelligence was involved; and the
blame for the military surprise fell, justly or unjustly, on the military commanders
present and immediately involved in the debacle.
Therefore, in 1947, when legislation for a national intelligence organization was
being considered, there was a widespread feeling among Members of the Congress
that responsibility for the coordination of the production of national intelligence,
as distinguished from departmental intelligence, and for its dissemination, must
be centered at one point.
Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its Director charged with
the coordination of the intelligence effort? was authorized to fill this need * * *.
III. THE CIA ACT OF 1949
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (Public Law 110, 81st
Cong., 1st sess., approved June 20, 1949; 63 Stat. 208) followed
2 years later to strengthen CIA administration. This act dealt
with such matters as procurement, travel, allowances, and related
expenses. It contained an alien-admission clause to aid the Nation's
intelligence mission. The statute further gave protection to the
confidential nature of the Agency's functions, and allowed special
instruction of Agency personnel. Among other provisions were these:
SEc. 7. In the interests of the security of foreign intelligence activities of the
United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 102 (d) (3)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first
session) that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from authorized disclosure, the Agency shall be
exempted from the provisions of sections 1 and 2, chapter 795 of the Act of August
28, 1935 (49 Stat. 956, 957; 5 U. S. C. 654), and the provisions of any other law
which requires the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names,
official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided,
S. Rept.1570)
?
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6 JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
That in furtherance of this section, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall
make no reports to the Congress in connection with the Agency under section 607,
title VI, chapter 212 of the Act of June 30, 1945, as amended (5 U. S. C. 947 (b)).
SEC. 10. * * *.
(b) The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard
to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government
funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such
expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every
such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein
certified.
IV. OTHER PERTINENT LEGISLATION
Other acts applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency, since
adopted, include:
Public Law 697 (81st Cong., 2d sess., approved August 16, 1950)
relating to the compensation of certain professional and scientific
positions in CIA; Public Law 53 (82d Cong., 1st sess., approved
June 26, 1951) regarding employment of retired officers and warrant
officers in CIA; Public Law 15 (83d Cong., 1st sess., approved April 4,
1953) providing for the appointment of a Deputy Director of CIA;
and Public Law 161 (84th Cong. 1st sess., approved July 26, 1955)
authorizing moneys for a CIA headquarters installation.
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CIA
I. FOUR SURVEYS OF THE CIA
The CIA has been twice investigated, examined, and appraised
by task forces of the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission), once in 1949
and again in 1955. The first Hoover Commission inquiry was
completed in 1949 pursuant to Public Law 162, 80th Congress, 1st
session, approved July 7, 1947. The second was finished in 1955
pursuant to Public Law 108, 83d Congress, 1st session, approved
July 10, 1953. Both investigations covered CIA as part of the
national intelligence function of the United States.
The CIA was surveyed for the White House by a group of four,
under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, in 1954. A
fourth investigation, by a special committee headed by Allen Dulles,
its present Director, received press mention in 1951. Today, under a
recent Executive order of the President, still another group, made up
of private, public-spirited citizens, is also checking into CIA operations
and results.
II. THE FIRST HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT (1949)
The first Hoover Commission survey of intelligence functions and
of the Central Intelligence Agency, was made pursuant to Public
Law 162 (80th Cong., approved July 7, 1947) and returned to Con-
gress by the Hoover Commission in report form on February 15, 1949.
This report attached appendix G as the findings of the F. Eberstadt
Task Force. The Eberstadt Task Force gave passing mention to
CIA, perhaps because of its general newness in the Government.
It did, however, find:
The Central Intelligence Agency is sound in principle, but improvement is
needed in practice. It is not now properly organized. A serious deficiency is
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 7
the lack of an adequate top-level evaluation board or section, whose duties are
confined solely to the evaluation of intelligence, with no responsibilities for general
policy or administrative matters.
The Eberstadt Task Force recommended:
* * * That vigorous efforts be made to improve the internal structure of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the quality of its product * * *; that there be
established within the Agency at the top echelon an evaluation board or section
composed of competent and experienced personnel who would have no adminis-
trative responsibilities, and whose duties would be confined solely to intelligence
evaluation.
Six years later another task force (the Clark Task Force) was also
recommending efforts to improve the internal structure of the CIA
and the quality of its product.
III. THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
On this special committee the New York Times Magazine of May
27, 1951, reported, as follows:
A special committee of three civilians of extensive wartime experience in
intelligence?Allan W. Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa,
which was appointed to study CIA operations, found much cause for dissatis-
faction. Continued demands for improvement led to the appointment in 1950
of Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith as Director. * * *
IV. GENERAL DOOLITTLE'S GROUP
Another comparable board of consultants was also set up by the
White House later on in 1954. Announced publicly for the first time
on October 14, 1954, as a group charged with investigating the secret
operations of the CIA, this was a board of four men headed by Lt. Gen.
James H. Doolittle and included, in addition, William D. Franke,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Morris Hadley, New York attorney;
and William D. Pauley, former Ambassador to Brazil.
Publication of the activities of the Doolittle group occurred 3
days before the first meeting of the Clark Task Force group, already
named by act of Congress to conduct a similar study. The Doolittle
studies had, however, been under way for some time. This apparent
duplication of effort led to the following comment in the New York
Times of October 14, 1954:
There was some feeling among intelligence circles yesterday that the two
investigations represented some duplication and overlapping, and that some
friction had developed, or might develop. This was said to be partly because
one investigation, that of General Clark, stemmed from legislative, or congres-
sional, authorization, whereas the other?that of General Doolittle?represented
the executive branch of Government.
In any case informed circles agreed that the investigations probably meant that
both Congress and the executive department were determined to improve the
Government's intelligence operations and evaluations.
Experts believe much progress has been made in the development of global
intelligence services but some "leaks" and failures?some of which are inevitable
in any intelligence service?and several recent events have caused some anxiety.
They include the arrest of Mr. [Joseph S.] Petersen, who handled what was known
in World War II as "Magic"?the information gathered by breaking the codes
of foreign nations; the defection to the Communists of Dr. Otto John, head of
Western Germany's secret service; the earlier but possibly not related defections
of the British diplomats, Guy F. DeMoney Burgess and Donald D. MacLean;
the case of British atomic physicist Dr. Klaus Fuchs now in prison as a traitor;
and the amazing network of intrigue, espionage, and counterespionage recently
revealed in high places in the French Government.
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8 JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Some experts believe that all these events are somehow interrelated. There
have been, moreover, some sharp recent criticisms of overlapping, duplicating
and uncoordinated activities of various United States sponsored intelligence
agencies in Germany.
Seven clays after the first public announcement of this Doolittle
study, the White House issued a statement in which the CIA won an
accolade from the Doolittle Board for doing a "creditable job."
The Board, it was said, had been asked by the President to look into
certain phases of the CIA. It denied that there was an overlap in
the Clark Task Force report. Certain recommendations were made
directly by the Board to the President without being made public,
though General Doolittle, in a release said:
There are important areas in which the CIA organization, administration, and
operations can and should be improved, The Agency is aware of these problems
and, in many cases, steps are being taken toward their solution. * * *
Roughly 8 months later, the Clark Task Force was saying:
The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate intelligence data
from behind the Iron Curtain * * *. The task force feels that certain adminis-
trative flaws have developed in the CIA, which must be corrected * * *.
or, the same thing all over again.
V. THE SECOND HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT (1955)
The actual investigation into the. intelligence activities of the
Government, under the Hoover Commission, was performed by a
task force chairmanned by Gen. Mark W. Clark. This task force
was initially instructed by the Hoover Commission to study and make
recommendations as to the structure and administration of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Those instructions were later changed by the
Commission to embrace studies of all intelligence operations of the
Federal Government and recommendations for changes necessary to
promote economy, efficiency, and approved services in this field.
The Clark Task Force found at least 12 major departments and
agencies engaged in intelligence of one form or another. In addition,
10 or more agencies' activities were discovered that expend public
funds directly or indirectly in behalf of the intelligence effort of the
Government. In the descriptive words of the task force report:
The machinery for accomplishing our intelligence objectives, hereafter called
the intelligence community when referred to as a whole, includes the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the intelligence sections of the Departments of State, of the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Some of these agencies approach or exceed the operations of the CIA in functions
and in expenditures. However, since CIA is charged with the overall responsibil-
ity for coordinating the output of all intelligence forces, the task force gave
special attention to the work of that Agency.
? It is noteworthy that a review which was broadened from a study
of the Central Intelligence Agency to all intelligence agencies of the
Government ended finally by making its most cogent and critical
remarks about the CIA.
A. THE CLARK TASK FORCE REPORT
The Clark Task Force report was submitted in two parts. One
was public; tbe. other, being related to the national security, bore the
highest security classification. The latter report was sent directly to
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 9
the President and was not considered by the Commission because of
its extremely sensitive content.
An extract from the unclassified Clark report says:
Recommendations covering overseas counterintelligence operations, carried out
by the military services and the Central Intelligence Agency, are contained in our
classified report.
From this it is apparent that many pertinent facts about CIA's
overseas functionings were lost to the comment of the full Hoover.
Commission. More importantly, it would appear this was also true
of the task force findings on overall CIA organization. A recommen-
dation to the Commission by the task force that the CIA be reorgan-
ized internally carries this footnote:
Details and supporting factual matter relating to this recommendation are
contained in the separate classified report of the task force.. They cannot be
incorporated in this report for security reasons.
The unclassified report of the Clark Task Force was published in
the Commission's report to Congress. It makes pertinent recommen-
dations about CIA that may be discussed and considered.
1. Recommendations
The Clark Task Force made nine principal recommendations.
Succinctly stated, they are as follows:
1. That the Central Intelligence Agency be reorganized internally
to produce greater emphasis on certain of its basic statutory functions;
and that the Director of CIA employ an executive officer or "chief of
staff" of that Agency.
2. That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed of
Members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited
citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence, be
established by act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organ--
ization, functions, policies, and results of the Government agencies
handling foreign intelligence operations; and to report, under adequate
security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress'
and to the President, annually and at such other times as may be
necessary or advisable. This "watchdog" commission would be
empowered by law to demand and receive all information needed for
.its use and would be patterned after the Hoover Commission.
3. That increases be made in the salaries of the Director and other
key employees of CIA, and that additional medical, hospital, and
statutory leave benefits be accorded CIA employees on overseas duty.
4. That the CIA be authorized to employ other retired military
personnel without regard to the laws limiting their compensation.
5. That all intelligence agencies recheck the security status of all
personnel at intervals not to exceed 5 years.
6. That responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and
for scientific intelligence be transferred from the State Department
to CIA.
7. That Congress appropriate funds for adequate CIA headquarters
in or near Washington, D. C.
8. That methods for selection of the coordinating committee mem-
bers on atomic energy intelligence be made highly selective.
9. That a comprehensive coordinated program be developed to
expand linguistic training in the overall intelligence effort.
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10 JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2. Comments
The Clark task force made many comments in addition to its
recommendations. Some of these are grouped under topical headings
below:
(a) Soviet bloc.?
The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate intelligence from behind
the Iron Curtain. Proper directional emphasis, aggressive leadership, boldness
and persistence are essential to achieve desired results. [Emphasis supplied.)
The aggressiveness of the Soviet bloc, their methods of infiltration, subversive
activities and propaganda employed in the cold war now in progress, as well as
the difficulty of penetration of their security barriers, point up the fact that our
intelligence effort must be the best in our history. This, added to the advent of
nuclear weapons, together with their advanced delivery system, has made adequate
and timely intelligence imperative to our national security.
Security measures adopted by the Communists have been provokingly con-
ceived and boldly employed. They have been quite effective in comparison with our
security measures, whirh have permitted the collection of vital secrets in this country
with relative ease. The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is
potentially available. Through concentration on the prime target we must exert
every conceivable and practicable effort to get it. * * * [Emphasis supplied.]
? ? ?
The major aim would be greater concentration on the collection of intelligence
information from our primary target?Russia and her satellites, and Communist
China.
One inference from the last statement is that this Nation holds
more intelligence on its friends (and neutrals) than on the Soviet and
Chinese bloc.
(b) Allen Dulles.?Although the Clark Task . Force found the
Director of CIA to be "industrious, objective, selfless, enthusiastic,
and imaginative," suggestion was observed that he and others were
now too much concerned about the operational side of CIA's activities:
We are convinced, however, that in his enthusiasm he has taken upon himself
too many burdensome duties and responsibilities on the operational side of
CIA's activities * * *.
(c) Administrative jlaws.?The task force found that the legislative
and organizational setup of the intelligence family was soundly con-
ceived, but had administrative flaws.
* * * The task force feels that certain administrative flaws have developed in
the CIA, which must be corrected to give proper emphasis and direction to its
basic responsibilities.
Failure to produce certain elements of intelligence has been due in part to the
restrictive effects of some of our national attitudes and policies toward the col-
lection of intelligence so necessary for effective resistance to Soviet aggression.
Also, among some of those responsible for implementation of our foreign policy
by diplomacy and negotiation, there seems to exist an abhorrence to anything
that might lead to diplomatic or even protocol complications.
* * * * * * *
The glamor and excitement of some angles of our intelligence effort must not
be permitted to overshadow other vital phases of the work or to cause neglect of
primary functions. A majority of the task force is convinced that an internal
reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency is necessary to give assurance
that each of these functions gets adequate attention without diversionary interest.
?
' ?
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 11
(d) Public relations.?
The task force feels that the American people can and should give their full
confidence and support to the intelligence program, and contribute in every
possible way to the vital work in which these agencies are engaged.
One of the aims [should be) the creation of a compact commission * * * to
keep the public assured of the essential and trustworthy accomplishments of our
intelligeece forces, and to enlist public support and participation in the intelligence
effort.
Action of this sort is needed to promote a general awareness and appreciation,
among the people of the significance and objectives of the intelligence program.
There is a corollary demand for clarification of misunderstandings which have
arisen in the public mind, largely as a result of the misapplication of secrecy.
[Emphasis supplied.]
(e) Congressional affairs.?
The task force further is concerned over the absence of satisfactory machinery
for surveillance of the stewardship of the CIA. It is making recommendations
which it believes will provide the proper type of "watchdog" commission as a
means of reestablishing that relationship between the CIA and the Congress so
essential to and characteristic of our democratic form of government, but which
was abrogated by the enactment of Public Law 110 and other statutes relating to the
agency. It would include representatives of both Houses of Congress and of the
Chief Executive. Its duties would embrace a review of the operations and
effectiveness, not only of the CIA, but also of all other intelligence agencies.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The task force report adds:
The task force fully realizes that the Central Intelligence Agency, as a major
fountain of intelligence for the Nation, must of necessity operate in an atmosphere
of secrecy and with an unusual amount of freedom and independence. Obviously,
it cannot achieve its full purpose if subjected to open scrutiny and the extensive
checks and balances which apply to the average governmental agency.
Because of its peculiar position, the CIA has been freed by the Congress from
outside surveillance of its operations and its fiscal accounts. There is always a
danger that such freedom from restraints could inspire laxity and abuses which
might prove costly to the American people.
Although the task force has discovered no indication of abuse of powers by the
CIA or other Intelligence agencies, it nevertheless is firmly convinced, as a matter
of future insurance, that some reliable, systematic review of all the agencies and their
operations should be provided by congressional action as a checkrein to assure both the
Congress and the people that this hub of the Intelligence effort is functioning in an
efficient, effective, and reasonably economical manner. [Emphasis supplied.]
Within the Armed Services Committee, there is a liaison channel between the
Congress and CIA which serves a worthy purpose, but which cannot include
private citizens in its membership and has not attempted to encompass the wide
scope of service and continuity which this task force considers essential for
"watchdog" purposes.
The task force recognizes that secrecy is necessary for proper operation of our
foreign intelligence activities but is concerned over the possibility of the growth
of license and abuses of power where disclosure of costs, organization, personnel,
and functions are precluded by law.
On the other hand, sporadic investigations in this field might inadvertently
result in unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the detriment of
the intelligence effort. Periodic audits or studies by some qualified, impartial
agency would remove both of these dangers and would also allay any suspicions
and distrust which have developed in the public mind by the complete secrecy
?
of these operations. Such a procedure also might serve to shield our intelligence
program from unjustifiable attacks upon the agencies concerned, and enhance
public confidence and support of this vital work.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 legalized the administrative
procedures for the Agency. It was passed by the Congress on the unanimous
recommendation of the Armed Services Committee.
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(f) Agency enjoys wide exemptions.?
The act exempts the Agency from compliance with any provision of law limiting
transfers of appropriations; any requirements for publication or disclosure of
the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel
employed by the Agency; and any regulations relating to the expenditure of
Government funds.
The widespread conviction among Members of Congress that this situation ?
should be corrected is indicated by the fact that more than a score of resolutions
have been introduced in the current session calling for a review or watch over our
intelligence activities, usually by a large joint committee of the two Houses.
3. Permanent "watchdog" commission
? The report indicated that the task force considered a small, perma-
nent commission modeled on the Hoover Commission as the best
group for "watchdog" purposes. (As will be seen, this mixed com-
mission of private citizens and Members of Congress was not con-
curred in by the Hoover Commission.) In furtherance of its premise,
however, the task force was of the opinion that this mixed commission
should, inter alia:
(1) Conduct comprehensive studies of foreign intelligence
activities of the United States ?
(2) Look for overlapping and duplication;
? (3) Determine whether expenditures are within budget author-
izations and in keeping with the expressed intent of the Congress;
(4) Consider whether any of the activities are in conflict with
the foreign policy aims and program of the United States; and
(5) Employ a small permanent staff with power to inquire and
examine.
? This mixed commission would also stand in close relation to the
foreign intelligence agencies of the Government and support their
needs legislatively. Presumably, it would act in lieu of a congressional
committee assigned to those and other tasks, though the report is silent
on that point. An integral part of its duties would be reports of its
findings and its recommendations to the President and to the Congress
annually, and at such other times as might be appropriate or necessary.
B. THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE HOOVER COMMISSION
The report of .the Hoover Commission on intelligence activities was
transmitted to Congress on June 29, 1955. It was divided into two
parts. Part II was the complete, unclassified report made by the
Clark task force. The one recommendation made by the overall
Hoover Commission was set forth in part I, which was limited to two
pages. That recommendation, in two specific parts, was as follows:.
Recommendation
(a) That the President appoint a committee of experienced private citizens, who
shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the
work of Government foreign intelligence activities. This committee should also
give such information to the oublic as the President may direct. The Commission
should function on a part-time and per diem basis.
(b) That the Congress consider creating a joint congressional committee on
foreign intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In such
case, the two committees, one Presidential and the other congressional, could
collaborate on matters of special importance to the national security.
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The "first" recommendation did not carry out wholly the task force.
recommendation for a "watchdog" commission. The Hoover Com-
mission comment on this was specifically to the point that?
while mixed congressional and citizens' committees for temporary service are
useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make
recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties.
The "second" recommendation of the Hoover Commission, concern-
ing a joint committee on foreign intelligence, was wholly new and
arrived at independently by the Commission after a survey of the
task force findings. Its mention of the current Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy is especially germane.
PRESIDENT'S BOARD OF CONSULTANTS ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
I. ORIGIN OF BOARD
This Board was named at the White House, on January 13, 1956,
pursuant to the above recommendation of the Commission on Organi-
zation of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Com-
mission), and after consultation with the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. Although it is slated to look into the administration of all
Government foreign intelligence activities, the Board's chief concern
will be with the CIA. The eight-man board was named under the
authority of Executive Order 10656, title 3, dated February 8, 1956.
II. COMPOSITION OF BOARD
The Board is comprised of the following members:
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr. (chairman), pusident, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology;
Adm. Richard L. Conolly, retired, president, Long Island University;
Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, Air Force in Far East, in World War II;
Benjamin F. Fairless, director and member of finance committee,
United States Steel Corp.;
Gen. John E. Hull, retired, former commander Air Force in Far East,
and now president, Manufacturing Chemists Association;
Joseph P. Kennedy, former Ambassador to Great Britain;
Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary
of State;
Edward L. Ryerson, chairman of executive committee, Inland Steel
Corp.
III. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10656
The Executive Order 10656, which established the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, was issued by
the President on February 6, 1956, and reads as follows:
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and
in order to enhance the security of the United States and the conduct of its for-.
eign affairs by furthering the availability of intelligence of the highest order, it is
ordered as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established the President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities, hereinafter referred to as the President's Board.
The members of the President's Board shall be appointed by the President from
among persons outside the Government and on the basis of ability, experience,
and knowledge of matters relating to the national defense and security, and snail
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14 JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
serve without compensation, but may receive transportation and per-diem allow-
ances as authorized by law for persons serving without compensation.
SEC. 2. The President's Board shall conduct an objective review of the foreign
intelligence activities of the Government and of the performance of the functions
of the Central Intelligence Agency and shall report its findings to the President
semi-annually or at more frequent intervals as the President's Board may deem
appropriate. Such reports shall embrace the quality of the foreign intelligence
provided to the Executive Branch of the Government, the performance by the
Central Intelligence Agency of its functions, the performance of their respective
intelligence functions by the principal intelligence elements of executive depart-
ments and other agencies, and any other related foreign intelligence matter
which the President's Board deems appropriate.
SEC. 3. The members of the President's Board, individually and sitting as the
President's Board, shall consult from time to time with the Director of Central
Intelligence concerning the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and with
intelligence elements of other departments and agencies. The Director of Central
Intelligence and the intelligence elements concerned are authorized to make
available to the President's Board or to its individual members any information
concerning foreign intelligence activities relating to the national interest which
the President's Board or its members may require to fulfill their responsibilities
to the President under this order.
Sac. 4. Each member of the President's Board shall execute an undertaking not
to reveal any classified information obtained by virtue of his service on the
President's Board except to the President or to such persons as the President
may designate.
Sac. 5. The transportation and per-diem allowances referred to in section 1
of this order, and any other expenditures arising in connection with the activities
of the President's Board, shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the
heading "Special Projects" in Title I of the General Government Matters Appro-
priation Act, 1956 (Public Law 110, approved June 29,1955), without regard to
the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised Statutes and section 9 of the Act of
March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U. S. C. 672 and 673).
SEC. 6. This order shall be effective as of January 13, 1956.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.
The WHITE HOUSE,
February 6, 1956.
? (21 Fed. Reg. 26, p. 859)
INT. WHITE HOUSE COMMENTS
According to the White House press release covering the Board's
selection, the President, in his message to the members, commented
as follows:
While the review by your group would be concerned with all Government foreign
intelligence activities, I would expect particular detailed attention to be concen-
trated on the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and of those intelligence
elements of key importance in other departments and agencies. I am particularly
anxious to obtain your views as to the overall progress that is being made, the
quality of training and personnel, security, progress in research, effectiveness of
specific projects and of the handling of funds, and general competence in carrying
out assigned intelligence tasks.
A letter then addressed by the President to the Director of Central
Intelligence, after noting the Director's concurrence in the appoint-
ment of the Board, contained the following expression of the Board's
contemplated scope:
While the review would concern itself with the sum total of these activities
[foreign intelligence activities] it would be expected that major attention would
be concentrated upon the work of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The letter continued:
The work of this Board together with the regular reviews conducted by the?
appropriate committees of the Congress will help to provide a method for assuring
the Congress, the public, and the executive branch that this highly important ,
and sensitive work is being efficiently conducted.
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V. WHY THE BOARD, BY ITSELF, IS NOT ENOUGH
From the foregoing, several conclusions can be drawn in assessing
the likely merit of the Presidential Board:
1. The Board will report its findings directly to the President.
No provision is made to require the Board to maintain congressional
liaison. This notwithstanding the fact that many of the findings
which the President appears anxious to obtain, for example, those
relating to the "handling of funds" and "general competence," fall
squarely within the legislative cognizance.
2. The Board functions essentially on a schedule of semiannual
meetings and operates on a per diem and travel allowance basis.
There is no provision for a continuous staff, as envisioned by the
Clark Task Force, capable of conducting comprehensive surveys.
The Board is a part-time operation.
3. The Board will report its information, good or bad, to the
President, thus strengthening the already tight control of the Executive
over CIA. This, of course, would be the ultimate result only in the
absence of a joint congressional committee such as is proposed in
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2. The President, by creating the
new Board, has given effect to the first phase of the Hoover Commis-
sion's recommendation. The second and equally imperative phase
of that recommendation falls within the responsibility of Congress.
That the Hoover Commission contemplated its recommendation be
considered in pari materia is obvious from the language of the recom-
mendation itself:
In such case, the two committees, one presidential and the other congressional
could collaborate on matters of special importance to the national security.
Adoption of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 would implement the
Hoover Commission's "second" recommendation relating to the
creation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence. It would complement
the Executive Board, already appointed by the President, in con-
formity with the "first" recommendation of the Hoover Commission.
SELECTED COMMENTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE TO EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE SURVEILLANCE OVER CIA
I. BY THE DIRECTOR OF CIA
By Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, as extracted
from 9, feature article entitled "We Tell Russia Too Much", which
appeared in the March 19, 1954, issue of United States News and World
Report (at p. 67):
Question. Has it ever been published how much appropriations you have?
Answer. No, but I have seen some speculation in the press with figures which
were several times exaggerated.
Question. What committees of Congress do you have to deal with regularly?
Answer. We deal with the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the
House, and we deal with both Appropriations Committees. Also we make peri-
odic reports to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Question. Don't they show in the budget some lump sum that you use?
Answer. No.
Question. Don't you have to appear before committees in executive session and
explain your operations?
Answer. I appear before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and
talk with them and give them a picture of the nature of the work we are doing, tell
about our personnel, and where the money goes.
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Question. So that there is a check on the Agency
Answer. Oh, yes, and not only by Congress. We work closely with the Bureau
of the Budget and operate within policies established by the National Security
Council. We consult on an almost daily basis with other agencies of the Govern-
ment, particularly the State and Defense Departments. Further, we make-
periodic reports on our activities to the National Security Council, and I see that
the President is kept informed of all important developments. CIA is not a policy-
making agency; we furnish intelligence to assist in the formulation of policy.
Question. What can you tell us about the rumors that CIA is to be investigated
by committees of Congress?
Answer. I have no way to judge about that, and, as I just mentioned, we are-
already in close touch with the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.
I would like to say this about investigations. Any investigation, whether by a
congressional committee or any other body, which results in a disclosure of our
secret activities and operations or uncovers our personnel would help a potential
enemy just as if the enemy were able to infiltrate their agents right into our shop.
If it were necessary to go into the details of operations before any committees
anywhere?the security of your operations would quickly be broken. You couldn't
run an intelligence agency on that basis. No intelligence agency in the world is
run on that basis.
In intelligence you have to take certain things on faith. You have to look to
the man who is directing the organization and the result he achieves. .If you,
haven't someone who can be trusted, or who doesn't get results, you'd better
throw him out and get somebody else.
Question. I understand a bill has been introduced into Congress to set up a
joint congressional committee on intelligence which would do in the intelligence
field what the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does in the atomic field. Can
you tell us anything about this?
' Answer. I have studied these bills. They have been put in, I believe, by good
friends of the Agency who are interested in finding a way to reconcile the exercise
of congressional authority with the special need for security in an operation like ,
that of CIA.
However, I don't know whether it would add anything very much to the present
system of congressional control exercised through the Armed Services and Appro-
priations Committees. I naturally wish to respect the prerogatives of Congress
and recognize that their confidence is essential if the Agency is to receive
appropriations necessary to carry on its work efficiently.
Certainly I shall cooperate with the Congress in every way compatible with the
need for security. When the 80th Congress set up the CIA they recognized this
problem and wrote into the law that as Director I should be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Any
disclosure which leads to publicity and gets information into the hands of potential
enemies would to my mind be "unauthorized."
Question. How do you get around the fact that the Accounting Office must.
have a list of your employees and vouchers of the money you have spent?
Answer. That is not the case. That is not required of our Agency. We
couldn't operate with security if it were.
Question. So that it wouldn't be possible for a foreign government to get a
list of your employees and their salaries -
Answer. No, by golly. It would be highly dangerous if they?could.
Again quoting Mr. Dulles from a letter addressed by him to the?
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, on April 30, 1954,
in regard to Senate Concurrent Resolution 69 of the 83d. Congress, a
resolution similar to the measure discussed in this report:
In considering any proposal such as Senate Concurrent Resolution 69, due.
emphasis must be given to security factors. To obtain the cooperation of all
those individuals and organizations whose assistance is essential to the proper
performance of our duties, we must be in a position to assure them that the confi-
dence inherent in their relationship with us is protected by every precaution and
is known to the absolute minimum of those responsible persons who must have
knowledge thereof. In addition persons informed on United States intelligence
activities are potential targets of hostile operations. Consequently, the security
conditions under which any joint committee must necessarily operate cannot be.
Overstressed.
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? The parenthetical observation can be made here that neither can
the security conditions under which the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy must? necessarily operate be overstressed. Yet that joint
'committee has operated successfully for years.
II. EDITORIAL COMMENT
? Two samplings of editorial comment from the public press are
.especially cogent.
From the New York Times of January 26, 1956:
"WATCHDOG" FOR CIA
Creation by President Eisenhower of a so-called "watchdog" board of citizens
to review the Government's foreign intelligence activities, particularly those of the
Central Intelligence Agency, does carry out to the letter one recommendation
made by the Hoover Commission last spring. But we doubt that such a com-
mittee?even though under the distinguished chairmanship of Dr. James R.
Killian, Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology?is enough
to fill the need.
What is required is not so much a part-time board of private citizens, no
matter how eminent, as a permanent committee with strong congressional
representation to provide some guide to broad legislative supervision of the work
of the Central Intelligence Agency. Senator Mansfield, of Montana, has long
advocated a joint congressional committee which would have the same relation-
ship to the Central Intelligence Agency as the present one on atomic energy now
has to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. Once again we endorse that
proposal.
We are not advocating that Congress or anyone else should interfere with the
day-to-day operation of the Central Intelligence Agency. That would obviously
be nonsensical. But it is not nonsensical for a responsible body of congressional
leaders to be in a position to understand and to evaluate the foreign intelligence
work that is carried out on behalf of the "United States Government. And if
such a supervisory body were established we are confident that many of CIA's
troubles with Congress, based on suspicion and misunderstanding, would
.evaporate.
Hearings on the plan for a joint congressional committee are scheduled to
begin this week. We hope that Senator Mansfield will not be deflected from his
purpose.
From the Washington Post and Times Herald, of January 21, 1956:
No doubt the creation of this board and the enlargement of the House Armed
Services Subcommittee were in part intended to fend off passage of Senator
Mansfield's bill for a Joint Congressional Committee on Central Intelligence. Some
CIA officials have been skeptical of the Mansfield proposal bill because of the
difficulty of insuring that members would not attempt to direct operations or
blab secrets. Perhaps the new arrangements will serve somewhat the same pur-
pose as a congressional committee, though in this newspaper's opinion a more
specific legislative link would pay dividends if a satisfactory formula could be
found. At any rate, the principle of a continuing outside check on intelligence is
important, and the appointment of the new board is noteworthy on this account.
THE ARGUMENT FOR A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I. ANALOGY TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
Congressional oversight has always existed over atomic energy.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy functions in an area equally
sensitive as foreign intelligence. It possesses a highly specialized and
competent staff in which it has full confidence. Most of the work
performed by this joint commit tee is of the highest security classifi-
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18 JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
cation. And yet the names, titles, and salaries of the staff publicly
appear yearly in the report of the Secretary of the Senate.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has cognizance of matters
transcending or cross-cutting the military use of the atom. In this
regard, it probably traverses jurisdictional lines of Armed Services
Committees from time to time. Yet there is no dispute as to these
interlocking jurisdictions whenever they occur.
The work of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been of
benefit to the country at large. It has maintained congressional
liaison with, and congressional control of, much of the work of the
Atomic Energy Commission. It has provided a forum where infor-
mation can be solicited and exchanged to the mutual satisfaction of
all parties. It has given to Congress, for its guidance and assistance,
a trained staff especially concerned with atomic energy matters. It
has, at the same time, provided the Atomic Energy Commission with
a legislative group familiar with its problems and alert to its particular
needs and objectives.
The members of the Atomic Energy Committee have the full con-
fidence of the other Members of Congress. Their legislative actions
are based on the knowledge that trusted Members of both Houses are
fully cognizant of developments in atomic energy. They do not have
to depend on the unilateral judgment of the executive branch as to
what Members of Congress ought or ought not to know.
What is true of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy can be true
of a new joint committee organized to oversee the Central Intelligence
Agency. The establishment of such a committee could carry forward
the essence and the purpose of the second phase of the Hoover Com-
mission recommendation. It need not be organized as a committee
on foreign intelligence to go beyond the fields traversed by the CIA.
A joint committee on the CIA would direct itself to the activities of
that agency and, thus, to the core of the Nation's intelligence function.
II. TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON WITH CIA
A new joint committee staff would be able to maintain an effective'
check on the operations of the CIA. It would insure that the Congress
was currently advised of central intelligence on a. need-to-know loasis.
The creation of a specialized joint committee would promote new
confidence between Congress and the CIA, and establish a. congres-
sional outlet through which the general public could be appropriately
advised of pertinent intelligence information. It would also be an
amenable .forum for the registering of congressional doubts and com-
plaints and the initiation of advisory and corrective action with respect
to any errors which might be apparent. There would be a private.
scrutiny at high level for both public and democratic ends. No.
classified or ill-advised revelations would be made. At the same timer
any suspicions could be resolved as they arise.
The joint committee would replace interim briefing and interim
visits by. CIA representatives to the Hill with more constant liaison
between the Congress and the Agency, especially with the Agency's
legislative needs. The staff selected by the joint committee could
pursue independent investigations on a confidential or nonconfidential
basis as required. When it is considered that the joint committee
would be composed of those members of the Armed Services and
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 19
Appropriations Committees who are now cognizant of CIA affairs,
and that they in turn shall select the staff, any objection predicated on
control or security grounds is quickly dissipated.
III. STUDIES OF CIA BY TEMPORARY GROUPS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT
The record on CIA should now be so complete that further ad hoc
boards to inquire into its functions are no longer necessary. Each
survey has found inadequacies; each survey has found an Agency well
aware of its shortcomings but always taking steps to correct them.
The findings in the past, for the most part, were secret and were con-
veyed to the White House because of their security classification. If
the substances of the findings were laid before Congress afterward,
there was no permanent congressional staff ready to give them inde-
pendent evaluation.
It is not enough that CIA be responsible alone to the White House
or the National Security Council. Such responsibility should be
shared with Congress in a more complete manner. Until a committee
of the kind Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 proposes is established,
there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Central
Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which
it is shrouded. As Hanson Baldwin has commented in the New
York Times:
[CIA] engages in activities that, unless carefully balanced and well executed,
could lead to political, psychological, and even military defeats, and even to
changes to our form of government.
A congressional auditing of the CIA is compatible with the legiti-
mate purposes of the Government. It is true that intelligence services
of other major countries operate without direct control of the legis-
latures. This is understandable in a totalitarian government, such
as the Soviet Union. It is even understandable in a parliamentary
democracy, such as Gteat Britain, where the entire administration is
part of its responsibility to the Parliament. Our form of government,
however, is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system
gets seriously out of balance at any point, the whole system is jeop-
ardized and the way is open for the growth of tyranny.
IV. SECRECY, FOR SECRECY'S SAKE, INVITES ABUSE
It is agreed that an intelligence agency must maintain secrecy to be
effective. If sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they
would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be
cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In
addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost
if it were known that we possessed it. Secrecy for these purposes
is obviously necessary.
There is, however, a profound difference between an essential degree
of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose, and secrecy for the mere sake
of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we
accept this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake, we will have no way of
knowing whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one.
Secrecy now beclouds everything about CIA, its cost, its personnel,
its efficiency, its failures, its successes. An aura of superiority has
i
been built around it. It s freed from practically every ordinary form
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20 JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
of congressional review. The CIA has unquestionably placed itself
above other Government agencies. There has been no regular,
methodical view of this Agency, other than a briefing which is supplied
to a few members of selected subcommittees. It is difficult to legislate
intelligently if there is a dearth of the information upon which Con-
gress must rely in its deliberations to protect the public welfare in any
governmental concern.
CONCLUSION
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 has 35 recorded sponsors, more
than one-third of the Senate. There are some 25 concurrent resolu-
tions of like nature pending in the House of Representatives. The
? Committee on Rules and Administration believes that these two facts
show the conviction of a large segment of the Congress that action
should be taken on the matter in both Houses without further delay.
The representatives of the people should be given, through a joint
? committee of Congress, the right to act vis-a-vis the CIA. To that
end, the Committee on Rules and Administration recommends that
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, as amended, be approved.
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APPENDIX
REFERENCES
Federal Register' volume 21, No. 26, February 9, 1956, page 859 (Title 3, Execu-
tive Order 10656).
Press release, White House, January 13, 1956, Board of Consultants for Foreign
Intelligence Activities.
Intelligence Activities: A Report on Intelligence Activities pursuant to Public
Law 108, 83d Congress, report of the Commission on the Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, June 29, 1955, Washington, D. C.
(Clark Task Force Report).
National Security Organization: A Report With Recommendations, report of the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
January 13, 1949, Washington, D. C. (appendix G).
Editorial Research Reports, volume 1, 1949, No. 19, May 18, 1949.
U. S. News and World Report, March 19, 1954.
New, York Times, N. Y., October 14, 1954.
Washington Post and Times-Herald, Washington, D. C., October 2, 1952.
21
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ftie
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INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN
STATEMENT
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 is based upon the mistaken and
.erroneous assumption that the Congress has maintained little or no
.control over the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
:and that Senators and Members of Congress who should be informed
have been kept in the dark as to its activities because of a veil of
?secrecy imposed by the executive branch. The truth is that the
Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Repre-
? sentatives have continuously and do now maintain supervision over
the operations of that Agency to an entirely adequate degree. This
is made clear by quoting a paragraph from a letter addressed on
.January 26, 1956, to the chairman of the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration by the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Russell;
.who is the chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services:
The responsible officials in the Central Intelligence Agency have demonstrated
their willingness to keep the Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittee
`?fully informed on the subject of the Agency's activities and operations. Although
I cannot speak with authority on the extent to which all the existing subcommittees
?on Central Intelligence Agency carry out their functions, I do know that the
'subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee has had periodic contact
with the appropriate Central Intelligence Agency officials. At these meetings
the Central Intelligence Agency representatives have candidly furnished the
?desired information and have responded to the specific complaints and criticisms
that, have been voiced in Congress and in the press. It is entirely coincidental
'but it happens that the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee is holding its first
meeting of 1956 with Central Intelligence Agency officials on the same date that
,your committee has scheduled for the considerathn of Senate Concurrent Resolu-
tion 2.
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE JURISDICTION
While no definite rule has been adopted by either body conferring
jurisdiction over legislation relating to the Central Intelligence Agency
upon the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, there is a clear precedent which establishes that
jurisdiction. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central
Intelligence Agency and since then the 3 subsequent amendments
to that act affecting the Agency have all been considered by and
:reported from those 2 committees.
The functions of the Central Intelligence Agency are essentially
lunctions of an executive character in assisting the President of
the United States, the National Security Council, the State Depart-
.ment, and the Department of Defense to carry out their responsibili-
ties. If a joint committee of the Congress is established to supervise
the work of this executive Agency, it might very well be argued that
due to some failure of the standing committees of both branches of
Congress properly to petform their duties, a joint committee should
23
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24 JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
be set up for each of the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, Cora-
merce, and other executive agencies. If the CIA must have a "watch-
dog" joint committee why not have one for the FBI?
THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES
Owing to the active interest taken by the ranking members of the-
Senate and House Armed Services Committees in the operations of
the Central Intelligence Agency, it has not been necessary for like
members of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to
devote as much attention to what the Agency is doing as would
otherwise be required. When submitting requests for funds to carry-
on its activities, responsible officials of the Agency have demonstrated
each year their willingness to keep the designated members of the-
Appropriations Committees fully informed as to its operations.
There has been open and free exchange of all necessary information.
required for an adequate liaison between the Congress and the Central
Intelligence Agency. No information has been denied and all desired
information has been candidly supplied.
I can also personally certify that committee members have, from.
time to time, refused proffered information because such information
has no relation to the normal legislative procedures of Congress.
How far to go in seekinc, detailed information is well stated in this.
further\ quotation from Senator Russell's letter:
Throughout my tenure in the Senate I have consistently advocated the right
of Members of Congress to information that was required for the formulation of
legislation. In this instance, the legislation affecting the Central Intelligence-
Agency is not of sufficient magnitude to be burdensome. On the other hand, the-
importance of the results of Central Intelligence Agency activities to our national
safety can hardly be exaggerated. If there is one Agency of the Government in
which we must take some matters on faith without a constant examination of its.
methods and sources, I believe this Agency is the Central Intelligence Agency.
The concurrent resolution leaves little or no room to "take some-
matters in faith" by specifically directing that?
The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently
informed with respect to all of its activities.
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
As the history in the majority report indicates the Central Intelli-
gence Agency has been intensely and repeatedly investigated by
various special commissions during the past 5 years. Reference is:
made to a number of recommendations by these commissions and the
report implies that there is little or no evidence of any action by the
Central Intelligence Agency as a result of these recommendations.
It is not alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency has failed to?
cooperate fully with commissions, sponsored both by the Congress:
and by the Executive, which have investigated its activities, or that.
it has failed to take positive action on their recommendations and to,
report such action to the appropriate congressional committees.
For example the majority report refers to recommendations in the.
1949 Hoover example,
report that a top-level evaluation board be-
set up within the Agency and that the internal structure of the.
Agency be reorganized and improved. In 1950, such an evaluation,
.board was set up, and the internal structure of the Agency has been:
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JOINT COMMITEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25
reorganized so as to improve its effectiveness. It is a fact that suc-
cessive commissions which have investigated the Central Intelligence
Agency have disagreed with the recommendations of their predeces-
sors. It is also a fact that the Agency has adopted legitimate recom-
mendations made in such reports without disrupting the continuity
.of its organization and activities.
The majority report also shows that, as recommended in the 1955
Hoover Commission report, the President by an Executive order
issued on February 6, 1956, has established a board of consultants
consisting of eight distinguished citizens, outside of the Government,
to keep him regularly advised on the conduct of activities in the
foreign intelligence field and to report its findings at least twice a
year. The imposition of another supervisory committee with juris-
diction over the Agency would only serve to complicate matters.
The Congress and the President have given the Central Intelligence
Agency a most important job to do. Subcommittees of standing
committees of the Congress have been created to provide for the
appropriate jurisdiction of the Congress over this activity. The
greatest service we can do now is to facilitate the important work of
the Agency and to let it get its job done without being watchdogged
to death.
THERE IS NO SECRECY FOR THE SAKE OF SECRECY
It should be emphasized, most strongly, that secrecy for secrecy's
sake does not exist in, nor is it an objective of, the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Such confidential and secret procedures and operations as necessarily
characterize its activity are designed wholly for the security of this
Nation, the saving of men's lives and the obtaining of essential
information which will achieve these vital ends. There is no present
evidence of any policy of secrecy having become sacrosanct. Upon
the contrary, such secrecy as is being observed is appropriate and
necessary.
Furthermore, I repeat that the Central Intelligence Agency is
subject to congressional review by four established and fully authorized
subcommittees. The first 2 of these are the subcommittees on the
Central Intelligence Agency of the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees; the second 2 of these are subcommittees of the Senate
and House Appropriations Committees. These subcommittees seem
clearly to be adequate for such a supervisory purpose and function.
If they are not doing their job fully and properly, it should be brought
promptly and emphatically to their attention as a more appropriate
and effective means of achieving the end desired than the creation of
a new joint congressional committee for such a purpose.
THE JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF
It would be almost impossible for the staff of such a joint legislative
committee to function helpfully because of the high security demanded
in the work of the Central Intelligence Agency. The information
given to Members of Congress by officials of the Central Intelligence
Agency is given to them personally and their judgment as to what
may be properly reported is final.
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T.
26 JOINT COlvlivLITTEE ON CgNTRAL INTELLIGENCE ACIMICY
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 empowers the joint committee?
to appoint such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographie
assistants as it deems necessary
and the majority report states that?
The establishment of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence will insure the.
existence of a trained, specialized, and dedicated staff to gather information and
make independent checks and appraisals of CIA activities pursuant to the com-
mittee's directives and supervision.
This statement appears to contemplate that the staff will do the-
work and reach conclusions as to how effectively the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is operating.
A new and separate staff of some magnitude must be contemplated
since an annual expenditure of $250,000 is authorized. This is.
almost as much as the $258,000 now available to the Joint Committee.
on Atomic Energy, which at present maintains a professional and
clerical staff of 21 individuals.
There is actually no real need for such a staff either large or small.
Despite the flexibility which the Congress has granted to the Central
Intelligence Agency in carrying out its unique functions, the Agency
has administratively taken measures to control its expenditures in at
least as strict a manner as other Government agencies and to require
a complete accounting for the use of all of its funds, vouchered or
unvouchered. This system, and the actual use of the funds are-
described each year to the appropriations subcommittees.
The Central Intelligence Agency is essentially an executive Agency.
It is not an arm of the Congress to carry into effect legislative policies.
as are the Interstate Commerce, the Federal Trade or other like
Commissions. The act of July 26, 1947, after first creating a National ?
Security Council to advise the President on national security matters
then established the Central Intelligence Agency under the National
Security Council. The principal functions of the Agency were to
correlate and evaluate for the Council information obtained from
other departments and agencies of the Government and to keep the
Chief Executive informed from day to day as to the activities of
foreign governments with whom the Constitution gives the President
the sole right to conduct foreign relations and to negotiate treaties.
It is obvious that there is no possible way for the joint committee
to keep "fully and currently informed" with respect to all of the
activities of the Central Intelligence Agency except to have a member
of its staff sit in as a "watchdog" at all meetings of the National
S3curity Council, and after each meeting make a report to the joint
committee of what he has learned.
THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH CANNOT TAKE OVER AN EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION
The creation of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, with
the functions and powers provided for in Senate Concurrent Resolu?-
:tion 2 would be certain to raise a constitutional issue on the separation
of powers between the executive and legislative branches of the.
Government. Activities are undertaken by the Central Intelligence-
Agency only in accordance with directives of the National Security
Council. The availability of intelligence of the highest order to the
President and to the National Security Council is amessential element
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JOINT COlVENIITEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 27
in the formulation of the foreign policy of the United States, and in
the conduct of foreign relations by the President in carrying out that,
policy. Any congressional action which seeks to alter the legally
established relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the National Security Council would tend to impinge upon the
constitutional authority and responsibility of the President in the
conduct of foreign affairs.
The provisions of the National Security Act are a recognition by
the Congress of the highly sensitive nature of Government intelligence
activities. Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, if adopted, will not be
submitted to the President for approval or disapproval. Conse-
quently, any of its provisions which contravene existing law wilt
have no mandatory effect. The existence of such provisions in a
resolution agreed to by both Houses, however, would lead inevitably-
to continuing difficulties of construction and interpretation wnich,
would impair the continuity of sound and proper relationships between.
the executive and legislative branches in intelligence matters.
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND mun. ATOMIC ENERGY'
COMMISSION
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commis.
sion have nothing in common except the secrecy which is required
because both deal with highly classified matters of the greatest
importance to the national security.. Beyond that, their functions are
not comparable. Through the Commission as its Operator, the
Government is in the manufacturing business?the business of making.
nuclear energy. Consequently, the Congress has a very different
relationship with that Commission than any other governmental
agency.
The cost of this business operation is enormous. Beginning in 1941
with the Manhattan project, financed first from the emergency fund
for the President and later in various hidden amounts in appropriation
bills, and continuing with the Atomic Energy Commission since 1947,.
appropriations have totaled $15,202,600,000, of which $6,806, 200,000
has been expended for operations and $8,396,400,000 has been
expended for facilities. The total amount made available to the.
Central Intelligence Agency since it was created in 1947, is only a
minor fraction of even the smallest of those vast sums.
There has been need to make only minor changes in the act creating
the Central Intelligence Agency, but the problems of Atomic Energy
are constantly changing. Legislation concerning the activities of the
Atomic Energy Commission must be frequently brought up to date.
'to permit it to function adequately.
The dynamics of the program for developing peacetime aspects
of atomic energy have tremendous potential consequences for major
aspects of national policy. The future production of electric power
-
from coal, oil, or natural gas may be vitally affected. Atomic Energy
Commission policies can give rise to conflicts of interest between.
various groups and individuals and the resulting issues must be sub-
jected to legislative scrutiny. For example, bills before the Joint
Committee have such subjects as construction of industrial facilities,
housing at Oak Ridge and self-goveriunent at Hanford, taxation,
patents, contract awards, and guaranty of uranium ore prices. No,
such factors relate to the conduct of foreign. intelligence.
1.
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28 JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
A Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was established because of
the particular nature of the nuclear problem and the fact that the
Federal Government was forced to go into private business on a mas-
sive scale. This had important domestic implications in a broad
ro.np of fields. The intelligence activities, which it is proposed be
subject to a joint committee's scrutiny, are peculiarly the prerogative
of the Executive and intimately associated with the conduct of the
foreign relations of the country.
I am firmly convinced that Congress now, through its regular com-
mittees on Armed Services and on Appropriations has the opportunity
to get the necessary information from the Central Intelligence Agency
and the designated members of those committees are doing so without
in any way endangering the security of the information given them.
We must also remember that the Central Intelligence Agency carries
on its work outside the United States boundaries. Many of its agents
are in constant physical danger. We, as Members of Congress, must
do our part to see that the work is carried on wisely, efficiently, and
with due security to the persons who are working in the interests of
our Government.
The contacts between the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Congress should never be allowed to prejudice or compromise the
highly secret work of that Agency. What the Congress has needed to
know in the past it has been told. What the Congress will require to
know in the future it can obtain through means already in existence.
A new joint committee will only complicate the process.
For the above stated reasons I voted against reporting Senate
concurrent resolution 2 to the Senate and urgently recommend that it
be not agreed to.
CARL HAYDEN.
0
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