PRE-DEPARTURE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040023-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: November 21, 1963
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/10/06: CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040023-9
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MEMORANDUM F01ts Inspector General
THROUGH ; Deputy Director for Support
SUBJECT r Pre-departure Damage Assessment
~. Your suggestion, as contained in your memorandum of
2 November 1963 regarding the desirability of ensuring a pre-
departure damage assessment in the case of resigning or separated
e:nnployeos, has considerable merit. Our experience in. those few
cases of this nature which have come to our attention in the past
has convinced this Office that it is extremely difficult and often im-
possible to obtain a precise definition of the degree of compromise
that might be involved in the event that a former employee defected
or fell into the hands of hostile intelligence organizations.
2. 1 am sure that you appreciate that the total knowledge
accumulated by an Agency employee cannot, in a practical sense,
be reduced to a matter of simple record. Nonetheless, any sub-
sequent damage assessment would certainly be more meaningful
if this Office had ready access, through the employee's parent
component, to a record of his assignment, duties and respon-
sibilities, projects and programs in which he was involved, and
some indication as to the general type of intelligence information
to which he had continuing access.
3. There are two reasons why a program of this nature would
have to be handled by each individual Agency component as opposed
to the incorporation of such a debriefing procedure in exit processing
by this Office. First, as a practical matter, we do not have the
manpower and time available for this purpose. At the present time,
we conduct Security interviews with an average of about 178 employees
who leave the Agency for various reasons each Month. The average
Approved' o~ e as 0 `/'1O/ 6 : CIA- RDP67-c 01' 4R(002'00'040023-9
 Approved For Release 2006/10/06: CIA-RDP67-00134RO00200040023-9
of the Agency's sensitive operational activities.
Secondly, in the interest of compartrzentation and need-to- ow
it would appear to be undesirable, if not insecure, to accumulate
in this Office records which would reflect in total a broad spectrum
time spent in each individual interview ranges from 15 to 45 minutes.
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processing procedures. This can best be achieved by the development
of an w ropria,te Agency regulation which would include a form to be
-` tyke of i:~uo r::_loa, by eac'i parent co-rponent, into our normal exit
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4. In summary, it is believed that it is completely desirable
and feasible to incorporate a requirement for the recording of t=s
aonnel in the development of an appropriate Agency regulation to
agree, this Office would be delighted to work with the Office of Per-.
record had been made on the employee's "check out list". If you
Agency for whatever reason. Compliance with this procedure could
be further ensured by requiring a certification that such a debriefing
completed by every supervisor on every employee who Leaves the
this effect,
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