PRE-WAR GERMANY - RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000500050007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

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(PRE-WAR)
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PREWAR GhPM;ANY - RAILS.AY TPANSPORTATION
A0 POLICIES
lo The Reichsbahn law of July 4, 1939, was the final definition
of the position of the German National Railroads its inter-
nal organization& its financial status, its relationship to
the Government and other public bodies and undertakings,
Paradoxically;, the Peichabahn must be described as a com-
pletely state-owned enterprise which-still enjoyed financial,
administrative end.. operating autonomy,, As a juristic person.
it adrinistered all its operations under its own responsi-
bility, Its peculiar status under the legal device of a
Sonderverrriogon des Peiches" (Special Property of the Nation)
have it the self-government necessary for successful opera-
tion;; though "belonging to the Reich alone, influenced by the
Reich alonep and responsible to the Reich alone". The only
injunction expressly laid on the Reichabahn was that it was
not to consider itself as a profit enterprise but as a pub-
lic servi:e which had to be self-supporting at the same timed
The transportation policy of the German Governments between
the wars transcended the usual duties of regulation of abuses
arising from monopolistic tendencies,, or the general protec-
tion of the public interest, The preamble to the law on
land passenger traffic of December 6, 19.'i7p expresses the
German attitude in these words%
"In the National Socialist state the leadership
(Tlihrung) in regard to transportation is a task of
the State. The means of transportation can be
operated either by private persons or by public
bodies, But all must subject themselves to the
rules which are framed uniformly for the whole
Reich, Each branch of transportation must be as-
signed those tasks which it is likely to serve in
the best possible manner within the'frame of the
whole transportation system and of the national
econor^y0"
In transportation. as in other phases of economic activity,,
the 1inzi state brought to completion tendencies already ex-
istinga for "in Germany the concept of transportation
(Verkehrszedanke) has always been most initmately bound up
with the concept of the National State (Reiehsgedanke)
The German transport system has been "nothing other than
the expression of the political and politico=economic ideas"
of Germany.
Paragraph I of the law of February 17, 1934,E charged the
Reich Minister of Transport with the organization of the
whole system of surface transportation on the basis of
this conception of uniform control, The way had been pre-
pared for him by the nationalization of the state railroads
and the main highways, the inauguration of motor transport
regulation, and the assumption by the Hitlerian State of
broad powers after the eradication of the states as politi-
cal entities. Fore than 9O,o of the trucksp about 5O?; of
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PRE-TAR GER, VAMY - RAILWAY TRANSPOPTATIOU (A-l CONT'D)
the buses, and most of the river vessels were permitted to
remain privately-owned and operated,' lloxever, the 1_'inistry,
by means of the "self-governing" Transport Groups, exer-
cised far-reaching control on the transportation services
and auxiliary enterprises not immediately owned by the
Government. Hence, the- German :Ministry of Transport from
1934 to 1939 exercised the functions of a railway board of
managers for the Reichsbahn, combined with responsibilities
similar to those of the.U S Interstate Commerce Commission
and of the JS Maritime Commission as regards the remaining
carrierso
In pre-war years such as 1937, the Reichsbahn handled about
73jV of all freight traffic of the country, as against 31f
handled by privately-owned railway lines, 21 1/2% by water-
way carriers and 2 1/2a by highway vehicles. In the pas-
senger field, statistical evidence is less complete, but
the Reichabahn apparently conducted some 70% of all passen-
ger travel, privately-owned railways about 3"', and the
motor carriers about 27T,, much of which was purely local
business, In physical extent, the inland waterwa"=s (streams
and canals) totaled 120000 kilometers, the railroad net
80,000 kilometers, and the road net (including the Autos
bahnen) 250,000 kilometers.
The following indicates generally the proportions of the
pre-war division of traffics
Type of Transportation
Freight Tons
Passengers
Private railways
3,700,000,000
22,200,000
State railways
(the Reichsbahn)
97,832,600,000
618,204,100
Waterways
28,972,600,000
highways
3,254,000,000
214,000,000
Total
133,759,200,000
881,404,100
2. The law of February 17, 1934, combined in the National
Transport Ministry the governmental regulation of all modes
of surface transportation with the management of the na-
tional? railroads. The glaring exception to the "uniformity
of control" prescribed by this law was the independent ad-
ministrative position of Dr. Friar Todt, succeeded by
Alfred Speer, as General Inspector of the German Road System,*
AlthouZh the posts of Minister of Transport and General
;'tanager of the Reichsbahn were combined in one person after
1937, the Transport ,?.ii.ni stry, through its railroad depart-
ments, administered the railroads on a basis of extreme
decentralization*
3. The Germans were among the first to recognize that the
"armed forces of a nation are not a thing in themselves,but
an. expression of the entire state and folk structure. A
real people in arms riust utilize for the purposes of national
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PPE-.':AR GRRr'AM'Y o PATL.Ay TRVi?POT'TATI011 (A-3 CO"?'T'D)
defense everything that the land and its characteristics pro-
vide... An industrialized state must possess armed forces
that use all the possibilities of industry". This concept is
that which General Thomas, Chief of the ilitar,;-Economics
Section of the German General Staff, called "depth of arma-
ment",, and which is usually despribed in Ludendorff's phrase
as "total war". "A certain military political meaning can be
demonstrated for every branch of politics", The place of
transportation in this scheme of grand strartcgy is subordim
nated to the general needs of the economy. "The principle is
that transportation does not exist for itself, but has its
only meaning and justification in serving the country's
economy"o The 'ittelland canal, for example, was conceived
in terms of the huge Hermann Goring works at Salzgittero
The roles assigned to transport in theoretical considerations
of strategy were therefore secondary to Its economic Impor-
tance In the war potentialo At the same time, German trans-
portation was in a state of all but complete mobili?ation
even before the outbreak of wary, `lost obviously, pre-war
physical transportation facilities far exceeded the demands
of a normal peace time industry. That the restrictions on
highway and inland waterway traffic were kept,in force until
1938 demonstrates that neither the Autobahnen nor the canals
fulfilled essential needs. "If from many sides critical
opinions are heard which r>roclai.m our overcapacity, it still
remains an enduring principle that a responsible government
plans and creates all traffic means and establishments in
terms of the future. In transportation, potential must be
greater than immediate transport needso The best exa!rple Is
the building of the Autobahnen ordered by the 'ruhrero"
The strategic meaning of the Reichsbahn in Nazi thinking is
Illustrated by a significant change in the wording of the
fundamental laws. Paragraph 2 of the laws of August 30,
1924, and .:arch 13, 1930, agreed that the Reichsbahn was "to
conduct its operations for the preservation of the German
folk economy under business principles." In section 3, para-
graph 3, the law of July 4, 1939, provided that the "Reichsm
bahn is to be administered for the use of the German people;
in this connection, the importance of the national defense
is to be considered"o
4. After November 1923, the German Reichsbahn received no finan-s
cial subsidy from the Peicho On the contrary, from 1924 to
1931 the railroad paid sums approximating 660 million 1?'.!
annually for reparations under the Dswes plan, and at the
same time a transportation tax averaging 290 million RM an-
nually. After the end of reparations, a fixed sum of 70
million R" was.paid annually in addition to the transport
tax. 'ith the expansion of German industry under the Maria,
the Reichsbahn was called on to contribute even more sub-
stantially to the Government. In 1937, a plan was worked
out whereby 3; of a total under 4 billion RM. And 97' of any
sum over 4 billion R;+, were to be turned over to the Govern-
ment0 The amounts for 1937 and 1 38 were 15708 million RIP
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PRE-WAR GFP?.ANY PItIL,A i TRA! SPORTATION (A-4 i o'TT?D)
and 193.4 million Rt1 respectively. In addition to these sums
the leichsbahn paid the transport tax, which for 1937 was
254x7 million RY and for 1938 266.7 million iii", The law of
July 4, 19390 on the assumption that with the absorption of
the Austrian, Sudeten, and t'enel lines a total operating in-
come of 4.6 billion R;' might be expected, provided that r,-k, of
this arount--and in no case less than 100 million R`+ annually
should be paid to the Nation,, This was to be treated as opera-
ting expense. In addition,, it was provided that the contribu-
tion should be increased or decreased by 10% of the amount of
which the total income exceeded or fell below the stated level
of 4.6 billion RM.
5. The use of the "Gemeinnut?liehes Tarifsystem" as an instru-
ment to effect Nazi economic ideas is described in C-2.
The subordination of the states to the nation was an avowed
goal of the post-Bismarckian Merman Nation, As part of this
policy, the eimar constitution assumed for the Reich control
of all moans of transportation, but practice lagged behind
the expression of intention, The states fought the Reiehs-
bank on the allotment of railroad stops and stations,, and the
geo;;rsphical definitions of administrative boundaries. Seven
thousand local political units were involved in the adminis-
tration of the roads, The transfer of waterways to the Reich
set for April 1, 1921, was never effected, because the states
wished to grivc up only the duty of maintenance, while re-
servinc to themselves the right of administering flood control,
drainn .ea reclamation and water transportation. The law of
February 17, 1934, with exceptions already noted, accomplished
the transport unification of Germany, to go along with the
political unification proclaimed by littler on January 30, 1933.
In the field of what the Germans called "Bevo1kerungspolitik"
(population politics) important missions were assigned the
railroad and the Autobahaeno "The state has built a series
of railroads which, by private economic standards, were never
worth building, because they brought in no profit. Thinly
settled, economically poor districts have been tied up with
industrial and cultural developments. The economy of border
districts, where the populsce, because of the proximity of
the foreigner, needed particular strengthening, has been
supported." The decentralization of industry was stated as
an official government policy as early as f'?rch 29, 19350
Transportation was also an agent of politics in the narrowest
sense of that word. The canals, the Autobahnen, the com-
merical air fleet were all visible symbols of the vitality of
the new regime, as well as sources of employment for the work-
less, "At all times the roads 1:eve been the expression of
the culture and status of a people. The highways of ancient
Rome, of ',:apoleon and the Chinese moire, and of the Incas
bear witness to this fact. Our roads also shall exist
eternally--The name Adolf :;itler obliges us to make of his
roads the expression of our.new ere."
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PRE-?AR 011,'R"A! Y - RAILM1AY ?ZA-ISPOP`rATION (A-5 CO9TID)
r'l
The German conception of the place of that country in the
world georranhic structure has been popularized in the geo-
political writings of Karl Haushofer0 The traffic-geographical
conditions of Germany can be summarized as: (a) the almost
parallel south to north course of comparatively closely
situated rivers (Rhine, i''eser, Elbe, Oder, Vistula) which
needed only the east west connections supplied by the yittel-
land and Adolf Hitler canals; (b) the influence of river val-
leys by the shaping of the mountain ran-es in the development
of the railways; (c) the full opportunities provided the
automobile by the extensive lowlands that make up the greater
part of GGermanye
The perennial aspirations of the nationalistic intelligentsia
of Germany, Fiddle Europe under German domination, and the
"Drang nach Osten" were undoubtedly conscious aims of the
German transportation policy, An example in point is the
wctersvayso "The crime consideration has been not whether the
way would be a sound economic development, not whether tolls
received plus income from power plants would carry the fixed
charges incurred for construction, but whether the completed
waterway would serve as an artery in a completely united and
self-sufficient economic area, composed of Germany and the
small states on the Danube, under the domination of Germany,
and affording basic economic security and military powers"
Be ORGA?IZATION
1, The t'ini stry of Transport was concerned only with major prob-
2 leas of policy, such as rates, status of personnel, and bud-
& getarv matters, Routine control and day-to-day management
3 were effected by the 26 (in 1P38) Divisional Vanagementa
(Reichsbahndirektionen), who were not limited in authority to
the maintenance of way and structure and the operation of
equipment, as in the American scheme of divisional organiza-
tion. On certain matters of policy the 'inister had the ad-
vice of a special advisory council, formed of representatives
of industry, trade, and public, Directly under him there
were two technical offices, at Berlin and Munich, in charge
of mechanical and civil engineering, workshops, research, and
other technical matters requiring common administration,
Under the divisions were the local district offices for traf-
fic, construction, operations, locomotives and rolling stock,
responsible for their particular function in their districts.
The major workshops were supervised by a board consisting of
ten of the division managers, To coordinate the work of the
26 divisional mane ,eients there were three operating offices,
in Berlin (Last), Essen (West), and Munich (South) o They were
responsible for the harmonious coordination of train and traf-
fic working in the divisions under their immediate controlo
However, the divisions were on equal footing with the operating
offices, and in all administrative matters were responsible
only to fierlino
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PRE .AR GFRT.',AtIY RAIL.":AY TRANSPORTATION (B.4, 2 & 3 CO`T'D)
The general regulation of private railroads was also the
task of the divisional president, although tariff problems
were still reserved to the Winister. In the case of light
railroads, the regulatory functions were divided. Powers
of administrative regulation were delegated to the state
authorities, whereas technical regulation was exercised in
all areas (except Bavaria) by the presidents of the divi-
sion managements. Both private and light railways were
members of the Reich Railways Transport Group in the Na-
tional Transport Group of the German corporative system,
The Railway Transport Group therefore represented the rail-.
roads insofar as they remained in private, municipal or
state hands, but only in a consultative sensed
The centralization of power in the Reiehsverkehrsminis-
terium (Linistry of Transport begun by the decree of
June 21, 1919, and confirmed by the law of February 17,
1934, continued all through the prewar period. It is to
be noted that two aspects of transportation were assigned
to other agencies: (a) air transportation was the business
of the General fir Office in the National Air Ministry,
(b) the supervision of road construction and maintenance
had been shifted to the Inspector General for Roads.
The 11,'ini.stry of Transport was headed by a `"inister, Dr.
Ing,e,ho Dorpmuller. The Undersecretary, Ur. Ing.
Ganzen!rUller, was the overall head of the Railroad Divi-
sions. An Advisory Council (Beirat) consisting mainly of
industry representatives and transportation experts, car-
ried out purely consultative functions. The various divi-
sions of the Ministry will be discussed below as they were
related to each form of transport.
n
The railroad divisions of the Reichsverkehrsministerium
did not merely "supervise" or "control" the administration
of the Reich railroads; they managed them directly. All
organs of the Reichebarn were Reich aggencies, its em-
ployees were civil servants of the Reich. The "inister
of Transport was the head of the Reichsbahn, with the
title of Gencraldirektor der Deutschen Reichsbahno As
Assistant in this capacity, he had an Undersecretary of
the ?inistr, whose title was Stellvertretender General-
direktor (Deputy General ',tanager).
The Railway Traffic and Rates Division (Fisenbahn-Verkehrs-
und Tarifebteilung) prepared and adjusted rate schedules,
organized the regular transportation services for passen-
gers and shippers, and in addition handled large mass
movements of persons and goods and arranged preferential
rate schedules therefor, In this capacity,, it managed the
transport aspects of the 1'uernberg mass meeting of "Kraft
du rch Freude"; and in wartime it adapted railroad trans-
port regulations to military needs, in cooperation with
the. Railroad Finances and Legal Patters Division.
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PRE `'AR GEP AIdY - RAIL'"AY TRA''SPORTATIO11 (b-i, 2 & 3 CO'JT'D)
The Operational Management Division (Eisenbahnbetriebe-
abteilung) controlled the operRtional coordination of
the whole railroad system, including the technique of
train and locomotive services, marshalling and switching,
and the preparation of timetables.
The 'Machine-technical patters and Purchasing Division
(Eisenbahn-tlaschinentechnische=und-Einkaufsabteilung)
placed orders for major new acquisitions,, and was the top
administrative agency in control of workshops, stores0
locomotives and electrification works. It handled mech-
anization projects, electrification, and research on the
problem of substituting domestic materials for imported
ones in order to save foreign exchatige.
The Railroad Finances and Legal Me.tters Division (L:isen-
bahn-Finanz-und Rechtsabteilung) handled the finances of
the Reichsbahn, one of the world's largest single busi-
ness enterprises, separately from the general finances
of the Reich, The accounts of-the Reichsbahn were pre-
pared from the daily reports of the 26 Divisional
M.?anagements, which were treated almost as separate enter-
prises. As prescribed by the Reichsbahngesetz, balance
sheets and profit-and-loss accounts had to be published
yearly. This Division had two sections. The Legal Sec-,
tion (Rechtsabttilung) handled the Reichsbahn's day-to-
day legal business, formulated rail legislation and
transport regulations. The Light Railroad Section
(Hleinabteilung) regulated the 136 privately-owned rail-
roads, the 309 narrow-gauge railroads, and the 100 com-
mercially run sidings, all totaling about 13,000 kilometers,
which formed approximately 20% of the Reichsbahn's entire
network. Routine technical matters for these roads were
controlled by division managements. The private and
light railroads were organized into a corporate system of
transportation, which as a unit exercised strict control
over its members and interfered radically with the manage-
ment of the component enterprises, This corporate system
was under the control of The Division for General Adminis-
tration (Abteilung fur Vervraltung)o
the Division of Personnel Matters (Eisenbahn-Personal-
abtailung) handled the personnel affairs of more than
1,000,000 men and women. One section (under a Ministerial-
direktor) dealt with employees; another (under a Minis-
terialrat) with laborers.
The Division of' Construction (Eisenbahn-Bauabteiiung) super-
vised the reconstruction and expansion pro" ram. In addition,
numerous Construction Offices (Neubauamter were created;
these were subordinated to the Divisional Managements.
The Railway Planning Division (Eisenbahn Planungsabteilung),
a newcomer among the railroad divisions, seems to have
assumed, before 1943, the functions of the former Railroad
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PPE-':,'rAR GFR!:`ANY RAIL:',AY TPANSPORTATI0N (I3-1, 2 & 3 C0"7T'D)
Construction Division (Eisenbahn-Bauabteilung). Although
no complete description of the work of this division is
available, it may be assumed that the jurisdictional dif-
ference between it and the Division of Construction was
that the Planning Division prepared the plans for new con-
struction and reconstruction projects, the execution of
which was supervised by the Division of Construction.
The Railway Military Matters Group (Eisenbahnwehrmachtliohe
Angelegenheiten), set up long before the war as a liaison
between the ::inistry of Transport and the :'ehrnacht, pre-
pared the plans to meet the needs of military transporta-
tion and arranged schedules to go into effect when war
should begin. During the war, this division cooperated
closely with the military authorities.
The Audit Organization of the Reichsbahn (tiauptprufungsamt)
audited the Reichsbahn accounts0 It cleared accounts with
the Reehnungshof des Deutsches Reiches (Court of Accounts
of the Reich). Subordinated to the above were the audit
offices attached to the Central Offices and to each Divi-
sion !?anagemento The chiefs of these were the accounting
officers of the respective agencies. When they acted in
the capacity of chief of audit offices, they reported to
the Chief Audit Office; otherwise, they reported to the
President of their agency.
Complementing the Transport "inistry in its performance of
regulatory functions were two organizations, a resume of
whose workings will be given here.
,By the Act of November 27, 1934# Germany's business enter-
prises were organized into self-governing groups, headed
by the Reich Ftonomic Chamberso with compulsory membership.
The 140,000 transportation enterprises were originally a
part of this system, but by a decree of September 23, 1936,
they were separated from the other Reich groups, renamed
"Organization of Transport", and divided into seven func-
tional groups.
The Transport Groups were placed under the jurisdiction of
the Linister of Transport, whereas the other Reich Groups,
remained under the nominal administration of the Ministry
of Economics. The Transport Groups, although referred to
as "self-governing bodies"# acted as government agencies,
with power to intervene in almost every aspect of the
management of the transportation enterprises, including
questions of expansion, transfer of officers, and personnel
problems. Through interchange of delegates with the other
organizations, such as the Reich Chamber of Economy, the
functional and regional groupings of industry and trade,
and the German Labor Front, uniformity of administration
was theoretically ensured,
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PRE=s.*AR GER:'ANY - RAILivAY TRANSPORTATION (B=la 2 & 3 CONT'D)
Those transportation facilities which were not in the hands
of the Reich were thus united into the Reich Transportation
Industry (Reiehsverkehrsgewerbe) with these seven groups.
1. Ocean Transport
2. Motor Transportation
3o Private Railways
4. Inland Shipping
5 Forwarding and Storage
6, Auxiliaries of Transport
7. Hauling and Carting
These groups were divided into Trade Groups (Fl chgruppen),
which in their turn were divided into Sub-Trade Groups
(Faohuntergruppen).
The function of the National Transportation Advisory Council
eras to produce a close liaison between different branches
of the industry and in turn with the users of transporta-
tion0 The results of their deliberations were presented to
the Transport Minister to use or reject as he saw fit. The
Council meetings were held irregularly at the convenience
of the '?inister, who also fixed the agenda for the meetingo
The broad purpose was an exchange.of ideas on the national
scale between shipper and carrier. The composition of the
council indicates the character of its representation; The
leaders of the 7 transport groups, 6 delegates from indusa
trya 2 from the National Food Chamber, and 1 each from the
Air P:Tinistry, the Post Office, and the Inspector General
of Roads, the Cities, the German Labor Service, and the
Nntional'Cultural Chamber,, The Advisory Council was dupli-
cated xll down the echelons of command so that every sub-
group had an advisory council formed on the same representa-
tive principle.
4. As has been said, prior to the .7eimar Republic, ltranspor-
tation matters were not centralized in the Reich. The
Weimar Constit ti on, however, transferred the state
railroads to the Reich for uniform management. By the
decree of June 21, 1919, the Reich Ministry of Transport
was established. In 1934, the Reich Ministry of Transport
and the Prussisn Ministry of Transport were unified under
the name of the Reichs-und Preussisches Ve rkehrsministerium.
After the annexation of Austria, the name again became
Reie',:?verkehrsmini ste rium.
when the `Ministry of Transport was created, the aim was to
concentrate all supervision and control in one Reich agency.
The states showed considerable resistance, which was gradually
overcome to some extent Under the Nazi regime, the internal
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PRE-:':AP R IL,kx TRA:';PoRTAIION (B-4 ,C'-T'D)
organization and personnel of the ''inistry of Transport were
at first left relatively unchanged* The concentration of
power in the 'Ministry of Transport continued, although im.
portant sectors were again taken out of its jurisdiction:
(a) the ;:inistry of Air Transport took over aerial transpor-
tation; (b) the construction of waterways was transferred to
the Inspector General for Mater and Power; (c) the supervi-
sion of road construction and maintenance was transferred to
the Inspector General for Roads; and (d) maritime shipping
was placed under the Reich Commissioner for Ocean Shipping
in 1941.
5. In the absence of a free press or of parliamentary debate
on the Anglo-American models there could be no free expres-
sion of opinion in Germany on the operating efficiency of a
government department or a state ~ronopolyo Taking perfor-
mance as the yardstick of measurementp we have the statement
of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:
"In brief', the Reichebahn was the sort of plant
any railway man would like to have constructed had
he been free from financial obligations. Fsprit de
corps anon; German railroaders appears to have been
verj food. 'r oreover, the standard of technical
training and general competence was exceptionally
good."
"Prior to the war, Germany possessed one of the
most complex, adequate and well-maintained railroad
systems in the world,..A strong inland waterway
a;:atem connecting the important rivers of North
Germany, crisscrossing the Ruhr coal area, and pro-
viding through water transportation from the Ruhr
into the Berlin area, accounted for 21 to 36 per-
cent of the total freight traffic movement. It
was well adapted to the movement of heavy cargoes
in and out. of the Ruhr district. Commercial high-
way transportation of freight was of little signific-
ance, accounting for less than three percent of the
total, and coastwise shipping was of minor importance
compared with the total inland movement. Contrary
to general belief at the outbreak of the war. none
of these transportation systems was underwaintained.
Standards were well above those common in the :united
States, an element of strength which would permit
curtailment in maintenance for a period of ,oars
before operating efficiency or safety would be
affected."
Co ADx INISTRATION
1, This question is not strictly applicable, since the govern-
mental policy was one of restricting rather than expanding
transport facilities and enterprises. For specific infor-
mation, see the relevant sections of this report.
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PRE-77',V GL.:R".'ANY RAIL. AY 9RMNSFORTATT01`i (0-2)
2. The German rate structure was known as Gemein irtsehaf-
tiliches Tarifsystem (rate structure based on the interests
of the economic life of the country as a whole)0 The sub-
ordination of the freight rate structure to considerations
of economy, defense and politics may be illustrated by noting
some of.the special adjustments. The railroad rates effective
in 1937 reflected the four-year plan. Thus special rates
were established for raw materials used in the manufacture of
artificial wool and cotton yarns Special rates were also
allowed for German raw materials where such rates stimulated
their use and saved foreign exchanges examples were ores,
slags, and synthetic Diesel fuel. Low rates on potash and
calcium were desi;fined to help agriculture; On the other hands
by way of aiding exports, iron and steel goods,, paper, glass
supplies, and chemicals could be hauled to seaports at
special rates. Material for the Autobahnen was carried at
cost, this accomodation (rendered for an ostensible subsi-
diary which was in reality a rival) amounting to a probable
total sacrifice,of 100 million Rte! at the end of lp37. In
addition, some arrangements were even more directly politi-
cal. &iilding materials for the party grounds at Nurenberg
were forwarded at a reduced rate of 30 percent. In addition,
goods destined for winter help were shipped free of charged
entailing a freight revenue loss to the Reichsbahn of 18
million RY.
The Reichsbahn had separate rating systems in operation for
wagon-load traffic and traffic in part wagon=loads, and
furthers, according to whether the traffic was conveyed in
ordinary freight trains. The ordinary rate classification
applied only to wagonload traffic; there was no classifi-
cation for part wagon-load traffic,, which was charged ac-
cording to freight tables based on weight and distance,
Wagon-load rates applied to wagon loads of 15 tons and up-
wards, and were increased by fixed percentages, varying with
the class of goods for wagon-loads of ten tons and five tons
respectively, All haulage rates tapered downwards with in-
crease in distance.
The exceptional tariffs were not always special rates as
usually understood, that is, rates applying to certain goods
and to certain areas. There was a considerable number of ex-
ceptional tariffs in favor of-certain commodities from all
stations to all stations in Germany. Some of these so-called
special rates had a general application and thus functioned
merely as a new classification added to the general tariff.
Thus, there was a raw materials tariff for bulk commodities
such as fertilizers. potatoes, minerals, etch These general
exceptional rates had no quantity restrictions and were avail-
able to and from all stations in Germany.
In addition, there were many genuine exceptional tariffs,
These rates were subjected to a number of restrictions over
and above those which would apply to the same commodity
when dispatched at the normal rate. The employment by a
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PRE-':AR GE.R'ANY RAIL:-AY TRANSPORTATION (C-2 ClG!''T'D)
trader of a given special exceptional tariff was usually de-
pendent upon the observation by him of certain attendant
clauses. An example was the 'producer' clause; when this was
imposed the goods for dispatch must have come from a particu-
lar country, district or town, This clause was generally im-
posed as a discrimination between home products and imported
goods, but was also employed to aid the development of an
industry in an area unfavorably situated geographically. !'then
the clause 'prohibiting re-export' was applied, goods were
given a reduced rate to a particular foreign country on the
understanding that once the goods had reached their destina-
tion, they would not be re-consigned elsewhere,
Exceptional tariffs were introduced on the German railways
as part of a policy which aimed at adjusting the cost of
transport so as to benefit the country as a whole by assisting
industry and trade against foreign competition, and by de-
veloping exports. The exceptional tariffs may be divided
into two main categories: (a) Exceptional assistance tariffs;
these were introduced in order to favor economic activities
within Germany. They facilitated the transport of vital
goods, the movements of exports from their place of origin to
the seaport, and protection of home ;markets. They overcame
temporary disadvantages by emergency measures, eogo they per-
mitted the granting of rebates to retain the custom of tra-
ders near s frontier, who could obtain cheaper rates by using
a foreign railway, (b) Lxceptional competitive tariffs:
these tariffs were designed to prevent any undue trespassing
within Germany of foreign transport systems which could offer
lower rates for exports and imports - seaports, railways,
wntorways, air or road transport. A prominent example of
such tariffs was the Seehafenausnahmetarife, which exerted
a powerful influence in diverting to Bremen and aamburg from
Antwerp and Rotterdam the traffic of 7estern Germany, and
which to some extent diverted from Antwerp, Rotterdame
;:_nrseilles, :,enoa and Trieste the traffic of South Germany
and Switzerland.
3o Since the fixing of tariff rates is the single most important
instrument of regulating transport competition, this question
is implicitly answered in the answers to question C-2.
4. There were no peculiarities in the German administrative
system of safety regulation and inspection which require en-
umeration here. The only difference from commonly accepted
practices lay in the high degree of centrmlization within
the `.'inistry of Transport.
5. The employees of the Reichsbahna by far the largest single
element in transportation, were civil servants, and therefore
subjected to the training and educational requirements of
civil service. They were similarly divided into three main
classes: higher civil servants (hohere Beemte), civil ser-
vants of intermediate rank (mittlere Beamte), and those of
lower rank (untere Beamte)o Prior to the war higher officials
numbered about 1.2r, civil servants of intermediate rank 30%,
and those of lower rank 68.8'u of railroad personnel.
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PIMp~'iA?. R:.ILNAY TRANS POPTAT I ON (C-5 CO! T4D)
The higher carreer was in general open only to well recommended
applicants with full university education and good scholastic
records. Applicants with legal background were required to
have passed the state bar examination whi'ch required, in ad-
dition to graduation from a university. 3 to 4 years of train-
ing in courts end law offices, Applicants with engineering
background were required to have graduated from an institute
of technology in mechancial or civil engineeringe and, after 3
years training in technical railroad service or in other techni-
cal enterprises, to have passed a special engineering examination
for higher -railroad serviced "hen admitted to railroad service,,
both classes were trained for a period of 1 1/2 to 2 years in all
fields of practical routine (In division managements, superintend-
ents? offices, and subordinate agencies), They then started as
junior section members of a division management. Promotions were
based on ability, Under pre=war conditions about 45% of higher
officials were civil engineers, 25f mechanical engineers, and
20;' had legal training. Only about 10" were promoted from the
intermediate ranks,
The intermediate career was open to boys who had completed 4
years of grammar school and 6 years of high school. Many
applicants, however had a better educations and for admission
to technical services graduates from technical high schools were
preferred, Positions as chiefs and assistants in the agencies
subordinate to the division managements and all important clerical
jobs in agencies of all grades were filled with civil servants of
intermediate rank.
Civil servants of lower rank were usually recruited from workmen
employed in railroad service or from former non"oommissioned army
officers who v- after.a certain period of service had obtained
a certificate for preferential admission to civil service
(?ivilvereorgungsschein)n Such positions as stationmaster at
small stations, clerical helper; locomotive engineer, fireman,
conductor, and foreman in maintenance of way and structure and
eauipment service, were occupied by servants of lower ranks
The status-of workmen was similar to that which prevailed in
German industry in general. The largest groups of workmen were.
helpers in services usually performed by civi' servants
(Hilfekrafte in Beamtendienst), workers in train and switching
service (Betriebsarbeiter), track laborers (Bahnarbeiter), and
shop laborers (Vierkstattearbeiter)o A small number of employees,
such as typists and clerks (mostly women); had the status of
olcriual workers (Angestollte)o Their status was determined by
the general provisions which German legislation had established
for cl-:.rical workers
As of September 1, 1938 Germany had ratified these international
transport conventions of the League of Nations: the transit
conventions, ports convention, railways convention, the declare.
tion recognizing the flag of Inland States, the hydro?electris
power convention, the road and motor traffic $onventionso Germany
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belonged to the following international organizations con-
cerned with transportations
RAI1;:':AY TRANS FOPTATION (C-6 CONTOD)
The Baltic and International Association of Navigation
Congresses
International Shipping Conference
International Shipping Federation
Union for the Use of Carriages and Vans in International
Traffic
International Railway Congress Association
Central Office for International Railway Transport
International Railway Union
International Railway Wagon Union
International Conference for Promoting Technical Uniformity
on Railways
European Conference on Time.Tableao
of
In additions Germany was a member of the Verein '.'itteleuropaischer
Eisenbahnverwaltungen (Association of Central European Railway
Administrations)o he last organizations since voting representa-
tion was based on mileage and its decisions were binding on all
memberships, was of fundamental importanceo
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