GERMANY (PRE-WAR)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000500020006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

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G14 W ITZ (I'M
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CIVIL AVIATION
IN
PRE-WAR G f Id'
The olla'ing report on pre-war civil
aviation in Germany is condensed from
a study specially prepared ;or this
series by the Aeronautics Division of
the Library of Congress. The full re-
port covers the subject in very much
more detail and includes charts and a
cc ?ate list of references. It is
avail blo to anyone desiring to carry
out further research.
-- 00000
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CIVIL AVIATION - PRE-UAR GERMANY
A. CIVIL AIR POLICIES
1. German civil aviation was an instrument of national aggrandize-
ment, created by a totalitarian state to forward its idoologr,
and completely dominated by that state in policy and procedures.
Air commerce, air sport and the aircraft industry existed to
feed each other and the Luftwaffe. "Today's air pourer is not
contained only in the air forces of a nation; it includes --
and this is the meaning of Goring's proclamation of a 'nation
of flyers' -- the air force, industry, and civil aviation.
Civil aviation has a front line soldier's position equally with
the Air Force, for it defends the position of a nation in the
air through its technique, transport, sport, and research func-
tions".
Adolf Baumker, Managing Director of the German Acadei r of Aero-
nautical Research in 19l3, indicated the German approach to the
study of air power as early as five years after the Treaty of
Versailles: "We must in investigating the bases (of air power)
distinguish three factors: the aircraft industry, air transpor-
tation, and air sport, in addition to military aviation". Blum-
ker's analysis on Deutsche Lufthansa, the aircraft industry and
air sport, forces the conclusion that each of the three compo-
nents of German civil aviation was an instrument of national
and party policy in exactly the sense of the Luftwaffe.
2. (a) The first German government following World War I had
& centralized all internal scheduled and unscheduled air
(b) transport into the hands of one company; the second govern-
ment extended that company around the world as a weapon in
its geopolitical warfare. The identification of government
and airline was so complete that one man Erhard Milch, was
from 1933 to 1945 both State Secretary of Aviation and
Executive Director of Deutsch Lufthansa. Government con-
trol came about through capital ownership and was imple-
mented by subsidies.
After the Nazi advent to power, Lufthansa placed principal
emphasis on the international field, inter-European and
inter-continental., with particular attention in the latter
respect paid to South America. within Europe, Lufthansa
worked out, usually within the framework of the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association, reciprocal agreements
with Sweden, Holland, France, England, Switzerland, and
Italy, which permitted joint operations betwoen the vari-
ous countries involved. During the war, Denmark, Hungary,
Rumania and Bulgaria were forced to join in this sphere
of influence. "It was quite evident that the National Air
Ministry, acting through the Lufthansa, was very willies
to offer strenuous competition in all phases of commercial
air transportation, regardless of expense".
(c) Because the expense was too much for the ordinary pocket-
book, the German authorities made no special efforts to
promote private flying or the personal plane. In 1938,
for example, there were only 152 private aircraft owners.
However, the schools, clubs, and sport organizations en-
couraged by the government owned approximately 600 planes,
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and thousands learned to fly with them. A brief history
of government sponsorship of private IL,, ng clubs and or-
ganizations follows:
Air sport in pre-war Germany had been centralized in the
Deutsche Luftrat (German Air Advisory Board) since 1924.
This organization worked through the Deutsche Luftfabrt-
Verband (German Aviation Union), a private organization
founded in 1902, to avoid the provisions of the Treaty
of Versailles which banned public support of air sport.
The German Aviation Union in 1929 headed 2119 clubs, or-
ganized into 12 groups. Germany's international repre-
sentation, particularly with the Federation Aeronautique
Internationale, was undertaken by the Aero Club of Germany.
The success of the German Aviation Union was extraordinary,
considering that it was granted ostensibly a yearly sub-
sidy of only 250,00 RM., to be devoted to the purchase of
gliders. Somewhere contributions were obtained to finance
the expansion of membership from 19,300 in 1926 to 15,000
in 1929. The number of planes owned by local clubs in-
creased from 18 in 1926 to 64 in 1929, and the number of
gliders from 125 to 643 in the same period. The Union
owned about 60 balloons, which probably represented an.
investment of 600,000 marks. Possibly the source sub-
sidizing this growth was the secret funds of the iteichs-
wehr.
The Union's analysis of the social origins of the 6,400
members it described as "youths" will show how deeply the
air sport movement had taken roots in every social class:
25% were said to be from the lowest financial olass; 27%
from the lovier middle class; 39% from the upper middle
class, and 9% from the professional class. It is signifi-
cant of the conservative nature of the Union that the Com-
munists were forced into their own air sport club, the
"Storm Bird".
Probably the most striking single feature of the sport
movement was the mushroom growth of gliding and soaring.
In 1920 about 50 enthusiasts gathered at the tlasserkuppe
in the Rhbn mountains to'begi.n an annual contest that
attracted tens of thousands by 1933. Newspapers offered
prizes of from 3 to 5 thousand marks; villages banded
together to send their champion to the -7asserkuppe; and
several flourishing magazines publicized the exploits of
the winners. A society, the Rhbn-Rossiten Gesellschaft,
was founded by private interests not related to the Ger-
man Aviation Union to advance the theory of gliding and
soaring. The Union maintained, in addition, training
schools for gliders at Grunau, Schwarzenberg in Saxony,
Doernberg, the Nasserkuppe, Rossiten, and aangen. The
Union's greatest contribution to the later history of
aeronautics in Germany was probably this creation of air
consciousness in the youth of Germany.
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When the Nazis assumed power, the German Aviation Union
and the Aero Club were in the process of a voluntary mer?.
ger. Glbring halted this combination. The Aero Club re-
tained its identity, but, all other flying clubs in German,-,
including GESring's own National Socialist Flying Corps,
were incorporated into a new organization, the German Air
Sport Union. The Rh8n Rossiten society was renamed, and
made a state institution.
At the same time, aeronautics was introduced as a subject
into the public school curriculum by a decree of the Min-
ister of Education. The aecree prescribed such educational
devices as "aeronautics in moaern languages", "aeronautics
in physical education", and "aeronautics in history". The
Hitler Youth leaaer and the Air Sport Union leader par-
titioned between them the spare time of German youth.
"Recruits for the Luftwaffe", said the agreement, were to
come only from the Hitler Youth, but they were to be chosen
by the Air Sport Union. The 10 to 14-year oldera would be
tested as potential aeronautical material in the so-called
"model plane building work associations". Those selected
would spend their llLth to 18th birthdays in the air sport
squadrons of the Hitler Youth, but be subject for their
purely aeronautical education to the Air Sport Union.
The Hitler Youth in the flight squadron underwent this
program from 14 to 18:
Time Course Agency
1 afternoon World Outlook Hitler Youth
each week
1 afternoon Workshop Service Air Sport Union
each week
2 Saturdays in Physical Training Hitler Youth
the month
2 Saturdays In Flight or Workshop Air Sport Union
the month Service
1 Sunday in Small Arms and Hitler Youth
the month Terrain Sport
1 Sunday in Flight Service Air Sport Union
the month
It is of this period that the Nazi publicist for air sport
was thinking when he mote in 1942 "everywhere animated
activity set in, of which the public knew nothing. It did
not lay in the interests of the Reich to publicize openly
this air sport." On the November 9th after his 18th birth-
day, the Hitler Youth grauuate would become a member of
the Party, and on the Sunday after that a member of the
Air Sport Union. By attaining his I6th birthday, the
youth also became subject to the six months labor service
.3o,
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requirement, followed by his two years of military service
in the Luftwaffe.
The replacement of the Air Sport Union by the National
Socialist Flying Corps (usually abbreviated NSFK) in
April 17, 1937 was a change of name rather than of func-
tion*, The NSFK assumed the duties of supplying rein-
forcements for the Luftwaffe, and developing national
air consciousness. The division of labor between the
Hitler Youth and the Air Sport Union was carried on by
the NSFK. The only difference was that the NSFK, unlike
the Air Sport Union, was a recognized party organization,
and could walk shoulder to shoulder with the SA and the
SS in party parades.
The NSFK was divided into 16 groups, corresponding geo-
graphically with the districts ("Gaue'') of the Hitler Youth
and the Party. Each group was subdivided into regiments
("Standarten") and companies ("StRrme"). The terminoloa-
is that of the SS. By 1938 the situation was thist 150,000
11 to 13 year old boys have one afternnon a week and one
Sunday a month to devote to model flying. Eighty thousand
from 114 to 18 were in the air squadrons of the Hitler Youth,
and 60,000 young men were members of the NSFK. The NSFK
had the added feature of non-flying, but contributing mem-
bers (the "Fbrderer" or sponsor), who numbered 230,000 in
1939, and were allowed to pay a mark a month. The Air
Ministry, for example, sugested in 1938 that it would be
well for its employees to join the NS 'K.
With this sort of financial support, the NSFK in 1938 could
boast 23 soaring schools, 5,000 gliders, 7 schools for
motor flight, and 600 planes. Major General Christiansen,
leader of the NSFK, had ordered 2,000 more planes of the
type of the light Siebel."Hummel" for 19140, and was talk-
ing in terms of muscular flight. In a total of 125 summer
camps, 7,500 Hitler Youth annually underwent flying train-
ing at the hands of the NSFK. The NSFK instructors them-
selves had been indocrinated with the proper political
ideology at the Berlin-DalheLn school of the party's offi-
cial political philosopher, Alfred Rosenberg. Christiansen
could boast that "in close cooperation with the Main Educa-
tion Office of the Party and the FUhrer's delegate for the
entire spiritual and philosophical education, Rosenberg,
the NSFK guarantees the systematic development of the youth
in a uniform spiritual and character-moulding education".
Fees for training and instruction were, surprisingly enough,
rather high. Christiansen in 1938 established five groups
of fees for "everything included" rates for 22 flying les-
sons of one hour each, which reveal the military influence
behind German air sport.
Group A: Members of the NSFK of less than 23 years, fully
suite Ie for flying services, holders of the glider license
second stage, who had not yet done any military duty.
Cost: RU 200, each additional hour RH 12.
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Gro m Bs Similar regulations, but in place of the
stage glider certificate, a service period of
at least two years with the NSFK or with the
"Flieger?4T.S" (F]vrSng Hltl3r Youth). Cost: BY 2y00s
each additional hour HU 21,
Grou C: Members of the NSFK aged up to 35 years
with at igast two years' activity in the PUSFKs the
C glider flying.cortificate was desirable and the
instruction had to be undergone in the interest of
military serviced Costs Rid 600, each additional
hour RM 2i
Grou Ds Members and male sponsors of the NSFK of
up to years of age with a membership or sponsoring
activity of at least 2 years. Costs RM 8000 each
additional hour RM 36.
Group Ss - All other protagonists of the NSFK, including
women* Costs RM 1,000, each additional hour Eli
42.
The whole German air sport movement can be judged
on the basis of the failure or success of the NSFK in
fulfilling its functions of creating suitable
replacements for the Luftwaffe, and generating
national interest in aeronautics. For, as Christiansen
said, "As the Luftwaffe is the veal heart of military
aviation, the Lufthansa of con, rcial aviation, so is
the NSFK the real moaning of the entire German air
sport movement." The opinion of the expert seems to
be that the NSFK failed the Luftwaffe. Asher Lee
says:
In spite of Christiansen's best :ndeavors, the general
opinion anong the older hands of the Luftwaffe was that
pre-training with the National Socialist Flying Corps
did not make any real contribution-to the breeding
of a better race of German ?.ir Force pilots. # t the
beginning of the training course, at the r!gular German
Air Force flying training schools, the young Hitlir
embryo pilots held a certain slight advantage over the
others in theoretical knowledge of aircraft, but more
particularly in political prestige. As the young
aspirant pilots reached the later stages of flying
training, the effects of the National Socialist Flying
Corps training-were progressively thinner up to the
time the average pilot received his wings. It seems
that, on the whole, most very good pilots are born
and not made, and that most average pilots have to fly-
In order to become pilots. A few hours of flying
National Socialist gliders was worth little more than
training on a bicycle would be for a professional
racing motorist, On the whole the National Socialist
Flying Corps remained full of budding promise but never
blossomed.
(d) Government promotion of aircraft manufacturing and the
reasons therefor, are presented in the following sub-.
study which for purposes of clarity is divided into
three sections. Due to the important influence of the
war years on the industry, they have been included In
the study.
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t:i.
Before 1933, Ger:mny can be said to have had no
aircraft industry. Tier total output in.1931
was 13 planes, and in the follow.ng year it was
only three tires that number. Tho companies which
constituted the a' r fra io section of the National
Union of Garman " irci'af t Industry wore Arado,
Dormer, 6rlas, i'i,~ses_er, F ocke-:. ulf, heinkel,
Junkers, Klemm Ues3evocb: mitt and Rohrbacho Their
products ware disti.nl;uished for technical excellence,
but their plants and equipra9nt were very small and
their capital lnvaotnent comparatively insignificant.
With Hitler's tassurnption of power, the creati.og of
a sizeable air force became a primary goal. Goring
began the expansion of the aircraft industry which
was to build the Luftwaffe. He ordered the immediate
increase in production of existing planes, and
initiated the development of new military types.
The purpose of the first action was to provide
companies with manufacturing experience, and to
have something to flay to impress the German people.
The second action involved two basic steps: (1)
design and development and (2) the expansion of the
manufacturing capacity.
The design and development of high preformance
military aircraft were undertaken by engineers in
r Q~rrch institutions and in industry along lines
laid down by ,he National Air Ministry, The
Measersehraitt 109 and 110, the Junkers 52 and 87,
and the Iieinksl III are p trhaps the most success-
ful risults of this research. These planes were
combat-tested in the Spanish Civil Air.
The expansion a# the industry was accompanied by
(1) extension if existing aircraft plants, (2) by
bringing conearns engaged in other industries into
aircraft manufacturing by converting some of their
plants, and (3) by constructing new plants. Some
of the concerns from other industries which took
on t h man of ac turn of aircraft before the war
ngagsd in
conpfmy
Location
Manufacture of
Al.ldemeine Transport-
Leipzig
Cranes, mining and
erlagen
transportation
equipment
t3lohm & Voss
Hamburg
Shipbuilding
Gothaer i'Jaggonfabrik
Gotha
Railroad cars
Henschel Flugzeugwerke Berlin
Locomotives
"Weser" Flug$eugbau
Bremen
Shipbuilding
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Funds for the expinsLon aere provided principally by the ii:ir
directly Lhrou;;h the Sank der dcutschen Luft::whrt
ir:corporatcd in 1938 4th a capital of 70 Pillion 141-, or
through bank credits ;;uar4nteed by the Air :.,in1Gtry, lio.. -
ever, Lhe company r:wra;;errcent, t cnerally 3peakin. , crt.i-4 ie d on
o; )cra t ions with little intcrfe rence fro,u the ~;overnru:nt .
The arrangemcnts :.ere liberal enough so that by cloue
coo-)eration bet:?:ecn the ;overnrre:nt and Lhe aLrcra.ft iwius-
try it .;?~ :a po:,s1ble to repay loans (_uuick1 and thus Lo build
up LYc(: owners'lair) of exr-landed f,-c i.lities."
The J,ir ,','.1ni:;try 1L3elf owned Junkers and i rado, and the
Sa:;ony $LGte Sank controlled rr?la. The i,cichsbank voted
50 ncr(ccnt of the :;ii fires in the Lwo aero-en,:fine CUlii~)L.nics,
Bair.ler-Bonz and in estimate of 150 million X,-L in v,ar
loans from the :ceichsbank alone to t?T. aircraft industry is
probably' an under ;;ta.te.:rent, in vier': of Li,e 20 ,a.i111on .W."
_;iven to only one rcl tively small aircraft accessory
co;:.piny. As for private industry, lt11 ;er.:eirie ,1c :Lriziwa:,s
Gesellschaft controlled Focke- ulf, Li.ttel-UeuLsche atGhl
controlled ATG, and Krupp stood behind :.escr. The aircr?~jft,
aircraft accessory, and aircraft engine industries .-.ere set
up in the form of liiAted liability companies. rather than
as corporations, to avoid the nece;;oity of reporting; on the
volume and nature of output.;.
Until 1934, the 71, ices paid to the aircraft industry irir-
ner'.iately on receipt ere "calculated" or esLim ted Burrs.
Final prices ..cre a:'reed upon annually, after the udiLing
of the Co: panyts books, on the basis of Life Principle of
as:;uring the industry 6 to 8 percent interest on capital
invested. The industry's profits, therefore,, did not de-
pend on volume or quality of output, but only on the -:r::ount
of capital on -inally invested. This principle ewers aban-
doned in 1934. apparently because.it proved uneconomic to
support rrar;71na1 fir nu. Payment before the aa- Lt as CO r r ut(ld
on the basis of an eutirna'.tion of the total value of orders
received after exasaination of the company's books, Prices
determined in this way seemed to have .uaranteed to the
manufacturer his cost price of production plus 6 to S n,~r-
cent. The cost price fi,,,ure included all expenses avid all
taxes, so that the 6 to 8 percent (;ranted was net profit,.
From the first, the keynote of the or,;anizaLion of the Ger-
r:Lan aircraft industry was "ra.LionalIzation". Compct Ltion
was discarded as a matter of policy. Patents and dcsi~;ns
were pooled. Only a few of the more co,.,petcnt groups w,,re
encoura ed to carry on enf;ineerin development. 5everL:i
cor.i )anies ,mere reg;~_arded as satellite or "shadow- plants" nor
concerns v:ith a strong design or4niza.tion, such as Jur'cers
and i,:esserschriitt. henac::el entered the aircraft .LniusLry
of its on accord in 1933 and r,iacle a substantial lnvcsti.iunt
of Its own funds. Henschel developed several ne- desi.,;ns,
but its principal contribution ..a.s the production of air-
planes dc:sit;ned by other com~;ranies. By the "1'icensin..;"
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device, new concerns could be nuipped with maG*ines and
could acquire experience. Junkers, for example, gave li-
censes to Mitteldeutache Motorenwerke and Pommersche Motor-
enwerke, and Dalmler Benz licensed Henschel and Bussing NAG
shortly before the war.
The outlines of the peace-time Nazi aircraft industry had
been definitely fixed by the middle of 1936. Despite the
increase in potential aircraft, production between 1936
and 1938 showed virtually no increase, with the annual out-
put in the latter year at 5,235 planes. Historically, no
important step-up in production was to occur until the sec-
ond part of 1939. The growth of German aircraft production
during t... pre-war years is shown in the following table,
taken from US Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Report
LE_hwoRgan War). Washington, 1945, p. lls
Year
Combat Types
All Other Tvnea
Total
1931
0
33
13
1932
0
36
36
1933
0
368
368
1934
840
1,128
06
1935
1,823
1,360
3 183
1936
2,530
2,582
5,112
1937
2,651
2,955
5,606
1938
3,350
1,885
5,235
1939
4,733
3,562
8,295
Total
15,927
33,889
29,816
On the authority of a report prepared for Goring, the
characteristics of the aircraft industry in 1936 can be
summarized as:
Rabidity of Growths In 1933, the net production of the
aircraft industry was worth 37-1/2 million RM, or 0.2
percent of the total of German production. The automobile
industry was seven times as large. In 1936, the aircraft
industry ranked fourteenth amor the 279 #ndu tries,
studied vd.th a total net production of 527 million W a or
1.6 percent of German indilstrial production. t3hile the
aura of Gerran production had increased 190 percezit, the
production of the aircraft industry had increased 1500 per-
cent. Erip1avees of the aircraft induct-y rnimbered 3240878
in 1936, those of the automobile industry only 11OjWtS.
Dive- rsity in Sires In 1936, the aircraft industry comprised
74 geographically distinct factories, that is, 53 air frame
factories, 16 engine factories, and 5 repair establishments.
Eight factories paid out in salaries over 10 million R&! each,
or 41 percent of the total of salaries in the industry.
Fifteen factories paid out over 33 percent of the total, 28
factories 23 percent, and the last 23 factories only 3 per-
cento 0f the 8 largest factories, 5 produced airframes, and
3 produced aero engines. The production of these 5 air
frame factories amounted to 39 percent of the whole, and
that of the engine factories to 50 percent.
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Em nlovmrnt: Two per cent of all German industrial workers
were employed in the aircraft industry in 1936,
By 1936, the structure of the German aircraft industry had
been planned in terms of its wartime potential, The rela-,
tionship of the peace and war-time aircraft industries can
be expressed in this manners
The aircraft industry built by Germany in the years immedi-
ately preceding the war worked on a single-shift basis to
supply military aviation, If undisturbed, Germany?s peace-
time plant capacity could have produced the peak war time
quantities by the single device of introducing the three
shift system.
German manufacturers by application of "series" or produc-
tion line methods and by extensive production tooling, had
reached a stage far more advanced than actually needed for
1938 or 1939 operations.
Germany fought the war with the peace-time products of the
factories, The Me 109, Mello, Ju 87, and the He 111 were in
substantial production before the war, and the Ju 88 and the
FAY 190 were beginning to come off the lines in 1939 and 1940.
Tho He 177 and the Me 262, projected for 1944, never actually
got into the volume production stage.
Goyernm nt Panng
In his capacity as Air ?Minister, Goring appointed a Director
of Aircraft Supplies, who was charged with the procurement of
aircraft. Udet occupied this position until his death by sui-
cide in 1941, and carried on direct negotiations with the in-
dustry as to production plans. When &!ilch took tldet?s place
in 1941, he set up an organization in the Air Ministry whose
sole function it was to plan the aircraft program., The plan-
ning work on programs was carried on vith the advice of the
Main Committees for Airframes, Supplies, and Accessories,
These committees were formed by Speer when he became Minister
of Armaments and Eunitions in 1942, and were outgrowths of the
Industry Advisory Council formed by Udet in May 1941. The
Main Committees were made up from industry, and represented a
definite industry point of view. The function of these com-
mittees in the aircraft industry was to advise the Director of
Aircraft Procurement and the Air Vinistry on production matters.
In addition, there were Special Committees for most of the prim
cipal aircraft companies, with offices at the main office of
the company, and Special Rings for each of the industries which
supplied the aircraft industry, The Special Comrittees.were
especially important in the cases of the principal "complexes",
Junkers, Messerachritt, and FockopMulfo They funneled the re-
quirements of the member firms of the "complex" as to materi-
als, facilities, and workers. In 1943 the pain Committee for
Airframes was made into the t :ain Committee for Aircraft and
centralized the requirements and facilities of the entire in-
dustry, In X944, the Air Ministry was formally dissolved and
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its procurement facilities taken over by the Speer 1in?
lstry, working through and with the Committees,
The procedure for program planning, while it was still
undertaken by the Air 3:inistry, was as follows: 1) the
General Staff of the Air Forces originated the require-
ments for aircraft by type, approximate numbers and de-
livery schedules, 2) the Air Linistry received the request
from the General Staff and the planning group in the Prom
curement Division undertook the preparation of studies
aimed at the fufillnent of the requirements; 3) the plan-
ning group consulted the Main Committees for airframes, en-
gines, and accessories, and the divisions of the Speer Min-
istry which had jurisdiction over materials, machine tools,
and other matters which were basic to the proposed aircraft
plan; 4) the planning group set itR completed study to the
German Staff of the Air Forces. Goring personally ap-
proved each official program, presumably after consulta-
tion with Hitler. After the Air Ministry was transferred
to the Speer Ministry, the procedure remained substantial-
ly the same,
Comparison
A discussion of the relationships between the aircraft in-
dustry and the government would inevitably infringe on the
story of military aviation, since the story of the aircraft
industry is inseparable from that of the Luftwaffe. How-
ever, a comparison of the German and American war-time air-
craft industry would stress the following differences:
The complete integration of all German aircraft, industry,
experimental engineering, production and operation, under
one central directing organizations
The complete regimentation of all German labor, and the re-
tention in the industry of engineering, supervisory, and
mechanical skills under a policy which made them ineligible
for combat service until proved otherwise. The German
policy, plus the use of slave labor, plus the rigid mili-
tary control over migration of labor, left to all Ger-
man establishments stable seasoned staffs of managements,
engineering, tooling, supervisory, and mechanical skills
which permitted rapidity of evolution in experimental en-
gineering and productive efficiency,
The lavish variety of German experimentation on all manner
of highly speculative devices in a large number of highly
specialized and elaborately equipped individual labora-
tories. This provided an integrated but highly diversi-
fied program of specialized experimentation, which, in
combination with (1) and (2), gave to the German aircraft
industry a rapidity of technical evolution9 and a degree
of flexibility and adaptability in rapidly changing
tactical situations.
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The marked emphasis on internal combustion turbines and jet
and rocket propulsion, and on development and application
of self directing ("robot") control devices, which in Ger-
many at wares and were distinctly in advance of the United
States developments in similar lines.
The elaborate underground laboratory and factory instal-
lations in Germany which, aside from their bomb-proof char.
acteristics, greatly facilitated preservation of secrecy.
The much longer period of continuous German concentration
on war production under compulsory government control which
conditioned the individual German establishment to far
greater dependence on centralized government planning,. and
made it far more amenable to government control than the
individual United States establishments
Government promotion of aeronautical research is presented
in the following -sub study, Changes duo to the war are
also included,
The Air T,;inistry, asset up in 1933, placed a Technical
Office, headed by General Udet, at the apex of the re-
search system. The difference between research and devel-
opment was recognized by the creation of two different
departments headed by the Technical Office, and thus respon-
sible to one man, Udet, who was also the procurement officer.
The Development Department was broken down into 9 divisions,
with.coiplementing testing stations: air frames, motors,
apparatus, and radio, all tested at Rechlin; weapons, tested
at Tarnowitz; bombs, ground organization, torpedo:, and long
distance steering apparatus, tested at Udetfeldt; jets and
guided missles tested at Peenemunde; fighter planes and tac-
tics, tested at Diepensee. The leaders of the divisions
were Air Force Officers, usually with the rank of colonel,
and generally selected for their engineering background..
Each division had a dual responsibility; development and
production, It is estimated that perhaps 10 percent of the
developmental work was actually done by the Air Force, and
90 percent by the research institutes of the large com-
mercial firms. There were a large number of such institutes,
since industrial research in Germany has always been well
advanced. However, the research institutions frequently
became service units because of their close association
with aircraft manufacturers,
Aeronautical research, specifically, was the responbilility
of the ex..Ueimar official, Adolf Baumker. He apparently re-
garded the institute as the fundamental unit in research;
by "institute" he meant a unit small enough to be adminis-
tered effectively by leaders only one echelon removed from
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the workers themselves. In practice, this meant about 300
scientists. The institute leader .liras reciuired to know each
member of his staff :)ersonally, and to be thoroughly con-
versant with the technical aspects of the i,rork. The izotitute
had to be almost autonomous in scientific research, evert
though a number of institutes might be grouped under the
administrative or fiscal management of one establishment.
The director of an establishment coordinated the work of his
institutes, provided heat, light, power, guards, and draft
deferments, but did not attempt to direct their scientific
activities. The institute leader received research pro-
jects directly from the Air Ministry, or originated pro-
jects himself. His reimbursement was determined by the
Minister of Education, and -was ec ual to that of a professor
at the technical colleges. The group leaders at
Luftfahrtforschunganstalt, Braunschweig, received an annual
salary of 11,000 mc:rks, which was equivalent to as many
dollars in war-time Germany. The institute leader received
somewhat more, and the staff workers somewhat less, but
salary was not dependent on im. ediate performance. Lost
important, the institute leader reported directly to Btumker,
and was immune from other pres3ure.
The "fixed" plants: buildings and real estate - were owned
by the government, and assigned to the establishment without
cost. The "novables", apparatus, instruments and furniture -
belonged to the establishment. The aeronautics Research Estab-
lishment at Braunschweig (LFA) had 70 buildings and 5 major
wind tu.,nela. One firing range alone had cost 4 million murks.
The Luftv:affe was equally lavish with its oven testing stations:
Peenumunde represented an investment of 4120,000,000; the Otztal
extension was planned to cost `$0,004,000 to "'75,000,000. Ju-
ridically the institutes ere corporations under public law,
and rnai.nta- necl their civilian character throughout the war,
Operating expenses came from to sources, the Air '.t]tiistzy and
the industrial firms, who were charged for work done. All woney
received :,as accountable, and the ?ir b:inistry would decrease
its ;ra.nts if in any period the money derived from industry was
considerable. Btumker adopted the policy of refusing to accept
industry corc?nis.ions since too many ad hoc tests prevented
proper calibration of equipment.
Parallel to the research establishments, but without actual
physical facilities, were the two honorary organizations -
the'German Academy of Aeronautical Research and the Lilienthal
Society. t,embership in the Academy was the result of election,
and yeas a high distinction. The Academy is perhaps comparable
to the National Academy of Sciences, though restricted to
aeronautics. G8ring was President, and Baumker Lanaging
Chancellor. The exchange of ideas between the science and
industry was the task of the Lilienthal Society, also presided
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over by BAumker. The Central Office for Scientific Aeronau-
tical Publications, which published and distributed all clas-
sified aeronautical research, was a part of the Lilenthal
Society.
A change in the organizational structure of aeronautical re-
search in 1941 occurred as the result of three events: the
death of Udet, and his replacement in the Technical Office by
Milch; Baumker's illness and semi-retirement and the'reorgan-
ization of the dormant national research institute, the "RFR".
One of Mi].ch'a first acts Was to detach the research function
from the Technical Office, and to make it personally subor-
dinate to him, Due to Baumker's state of health, it was nec-
essary to substitute for him a four man Aeronautical Research
Direction, the "Forschungefuhrung der Luftfahrt".
The position of the RFR in aeronautical research needs special
clarification. Its theoretical assignment was to govern the
research work of the technical schools and colleges, but it had
been inactive during the early years of the war. In July 1943,
GBring revived its pours and placed Ozenberg in charge. The
latter made vigorous efforts to build a powerful agency to coor-
dinate research in all its phases, to protect scientists from
the draft, and to accelerate the release of those already in the
services. His relationship to aeronautical research was there-
fore twofolds 1) as a sourca of material and personnel, 2)
as the director of an university and technical college research
work.
Ozenberg's final plan was never carried out, but, is presented
hero as an example of German thinking on the organization of
research in the last desperate phases of the war. In October
1944, he succeeded in getting GBring and Hitler to sign an
order creating a Military Research ]'association, an over-all
body to include the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the universities
and technical colleges. The order creating the Military Re-
search Association assigned to it these tasks.
The control and intensification of all research
dic?sated by war developments,
Examining basic research results to determine what
development work would be most fruitful.
Securing the necessary research staff and materials
to produce the results required.
The R'FR was subdivided into fifteen branch directories, and
twenty plenipotentiaries. The branch directors were repre-
sentatives of each of the important fields of science, en-
gineering, and industry. The plenipotentiaries represented
sub-classes of those fields of industrial production or of
research of special importance in war. For example, there
were branch chiefs for physics, iron and steel, and organic
chemistry, and plenipotentiaries for explosive physics, plas-
?tics, jet propulsion, and remoie steering research. The
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plenipotentiaries determined the research institutes and
testing stations to which research and development projects
would be assigned, The branch chiefs supported the pleni-
potentiaries in their smaller fields, and saw to it that all
available facilities and man power were fully utilized. In
addition to the technical staff, there were special commis-
sions who effected liaison with the commissions of the Speer'
Ministry for Armament and 17ar production.
However., the burden of aeronautical research throughout the war
rested with the Aeronautical Research Direction, whose focus
was the Managing Office. The Managing Office was charged with
(1) the allocation of research orders, (2) the supervision of
research commissions once allocated, (3) the supply of mate-
riel and personnel, (4) liaison between the Research direr-
Lion and the appropriate officials in the service ministries.
To accomplish these functions, the Managing Office was sub-
divided into one department, the Research Department, and two
main groups, Supply of Material, and Operations and Adminis-
tration.
The group Supply of Material provided the establishments with
the apparatus and instruments they themselves could not procure.
A "Central Managing Depot for Aeronautical Apparatus" was es-
1 hl 5_ghnd to s a.pcr-+rise the storage,,, me-1-ntenance and overhaul-
ing of the material used by the research institutions. since
part of its supply function was to keep scientific person-
nel out of the draft, this group worked closely with the 14RFR".
The Operation group provided and assigned the funds and ex4
amined the books of the member establishments. The money came
from the office of the General Managing Aircraft Supplies,
through the Economic Board of the Air Ministry. One of the
four members of the Research Direction was the head of the
Board of Directors of every establishment. The annual busi-
ness account was checked initially at the research Institution,
and finally by the Air Ministry's Economic Board.
The Research Department's sole function was to order the ree-
search project. The problem, as the Managing Director described
it, was that there was no central plan coordinating the re-
search programs of the services. Research requests night ori-
ginate in the Research Division itself, in the Development
Office, in the aircraft industry, or be suggested by the re-
search institute itself. When Georgii assumed office in
November 1943, he found 2,200 unfulfilled research orders on
hand. About 600 of these were farmed out to the universities and
technical colleges, 300 to industry, and the remainder to the
aeronautical research establishments.
Georgii's solution was to withdraw less important problems and
cancel those investigated over a long period of time without
ucceos. In addition, he attained a more systematic subdivis-
ion of the program by differentiating between research commis-
sions; requiring about a year, and those demanding immediate
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More promising, he states, was the practice gradually
evolved of joining research institutions and industry into
joint permanent conferences on broad problems. For ex-
ample, the Aerodynamics Committee, composed of leading
experts of research and industry, established the priority
for problems involving the use of wind tunnels, The ac.
celeratinn of the power increase of the Argus-Schmidt
jet pipe for "V-I" was a problem for which industry vol-
untarily called in the research institutes9 New develop-
ments like the Me 163, the Natter, the Enzian, and the
{'asserfall were the result of industry-research coopera-
tioh.
The following sub-study summarizes the extent of govern.
ment promotion of aeronautical education and evaluates
the results,
There were in pre-war Germany for aeronautical engine-
ering, as for all other branches of engineering, two al-
ternative courses of study: 1) entry to an engineering
school after technical continuation school (or from a
secondary school with a first or second-rate certificate)
after two yearsO workshop experience; 2) entry to a tech-
nical college after graduation from a technical school and
one year?s workshop experience. The first course gave a
certificate in aeronautical engineering, the second course
a diploma.
The Air ?inistry and the Aircraft Industry Economic Group
promoted aeronautical engineering education by means of
grants in aid for living expenses, tuition, and examina-
tion fees, and even full-time scholarships. It is estima.
ted that 30 percent of all aeronautical students received
financial aid from the Government. These aids were not
restricted to the aeronautical engineer; they were avail-
able in all branches of engineering.
Theoretically, the courses had different aims. The cer-
tificate course was designed to produce the practical
engineer, sufficiently grounded in theory for general
engineering duties, perhaps best qualified for design
and production work, The "diploma engineer" was the
highly trained scientific engineer, able to direct tech-
nical development, to engage in research, and to discern
fundamental laws. In practice, the certificate engineer
often stepped over the lines set up by this demarcation,
but government agencies and the military held fast to the
distinction uxrtil 1938,
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The period of time given to these courses was the same as for
other branches of engineering; five half-yearly terms for the
certificate course, and seven half-yearly. terms for the dip-
loma course. At the schools of engineering, certificate ex-
aminations were held at the conclusion of the school term; at
the tenhn5.cal nn1.i- ges, the graduate examination could not be
.-e en before seven full terms were completed.
At the technical colleges the course of studies for the "Junior
division" (the first three or four terms) did not differ mate-
rially from that in mechanical engineering. The senior divi-
sion, entered after successful completion of an over-all ex-
amination, was divided into the three departments: airframe
construction, aero-engine construction, and aircraft operation
(that is, equipment, armament, and maintenance). Airframe
construction included the aerodynamics of design, testing,
research, strength of structures, unit construction, and mate-
rials; aero-engine study embraced the design and construction
of aero-engines, materials, altitude performance, fuels and
storage, and propeller problems; the aircraft operation course
included radio engineering for communication and navigation
and control in flight.
Not all engineering schools or colleges could offer these
special courses. The National Ministry of Science and educa-
tion, as the responsible authority in matters of education,
had set up courses in "light construction" (aircraft construc-
tion) at the following engineering. schools: Berlin-Beuth,
Bremen, Essen, Esslingen, Hamrnzrg, Constance, Magdeburg, Stettin,
Wismar, and at the seven-term State Technical Academy of Chemnitz.
The Air ministry maintained a school of aeronautical engineering
at Thorn, which trained suitable candidates from industry, with-
out cost.
The technical colleges were of two types: The "Lehrzentren"
(Instructional centers) giving instruction in all three-special-
ized sections, and the "LehrstAtten" (Instructional Establish-
ments), instructing only in general aircraft construction. In
the first category were the colleges at Berlin, Brunswick, and
Munich; in the second, Aachen, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, Vienna,
and Danzig (after 1938 and 1939). After 1939, it was also poss-
ible to acquire the degree of Doctor of Physics from the Chair
of Applied Mechanics of the University cf'G&ttingen.
The certificate engineer had to show two yeears$ trractical work-
shop experience before starting his studies. These two years
were made up of one year's general engineering practice, and
one year's special experience. Graduate engineers had to com-
plete at least six months' general workshop experience before
starting the course.
However, the aeronautical engineer was the special concern of
a central directing body: the Engineering Recruiting Section
of the German Aeronautical Research Institute of Berlin
Adlershof. This office supervised and.assisted engineering stu.
dents, starting with the preliminary workshop training until
their transfer into professional employment, The departmennt
allotted the workshop posts for the second section off the
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.practical training, tho course in the manufacturing plants,
in collaboration i .th the Reich student organization. It
allocated funds for the promotion of aeronautical studies,
and directed the activities of the student flying groups and
study groups.
A'.dmission to the higher technical grades of the government
service eras conditional upon passing a state examination. The
examination gave the title of "Flugbaumeister" (Aircraft Construc-
tor) and was preceded by three years` probation as an Assistant
Aircraft Constructor, Training and examination were subdivided
into the following sections: airframe constructions aero-engine
construction, aircraft armament, aircraft equipment, operational
administration. The probationary constructor could select one of
these sections, but was required to study armaments and aero-
engine construction. Flight training was taken in addition to
professional instruction. At least one year of practical work in
the aircraft, industry eras insisted upon, plus two years of train-
ing in the testing establishments of the Luftwaffe or in the Re-
search Institutes,
The Air Force itself was active in the education of its officers
and enlisted personnel. Four air-war colleges, situated at Gatow,
Dresden, Furstenfeldbruck and :"erden, were training 800 active
officers annually by 1938, The technical schools at Adlershof,
Juterbog, Halle, and Gottingen produced about 7,000 specialists
in that year. In cooperation with industry, a four year course
in metal aircraft working and aero-engine mechanics was provided
at the larger factories. On completing their training, the
pupils 'ere required to begin a long-term enlistment with the
Luftwaffe. The practical training was divided into two sectionss
two years in the training r:orkshops, followed by two years in the
assembly and repair shops. At the same time, ',he apprentice was
required to attend the training schools of the factories, and
devote two hours a week of his time to glider construction.
In 1938, Dr. Otto Fuchs, the official charged with the
government survey of aeronautical engineering education, reportea
on the results of his study. His prime conclusion was that German
aeronautics suffered from a lack not so much of aeronautical
engineers as from the general dearth of engineers of all categories.
The decline in the amount of general technical education particu-
larly affected aviation, because German aviation was built on the
mechanical rather than the aeronautical engineer.
At the date of his report, there were in Germany 220,000 graduates
of the mechanical branches of engineering, of whom one-tenth
(22,000) were engaged in aeronautics. A yearly increment of 500
graduate engineers and 2500 certificate engineers could be axpeced.
Of that total, even a peace time atria tion erould need 1,400
engineers as replacements. If the 1 to 10 ration were maintained,
only 50 graduate engineers and 250 certificate graduates would turn to
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aviation; if special circumstances diverted a larger num-
ber to aviation, other industries would feel the want. A
cursory examination of the "help wanted" advertisements
in war time issues of magazines like the Zciitscr hrift dig
Vereine_s Deutsch-c Ipge~nieeurr_a will reveal the truth of
this prediction.
Others of his observations on the state of German aero-
nautical engineering merit repetition here., Dr. Fuchs?
position gave him definite information, and the occasion
of his lecture assures the objectivity of his judgments:
The workshop training of the future graduate engineer was
seldom forwarded by industry, which concentrated on its
own apprentices.
In general, the graduate engineer was less competent that
the certificate engineer. "Industry complains about the
long period of time necessary to work him into the factory
. ., research complains about his deficient physical and
mathematical knowledge". Proof of this incompetency was
the number who failed the Flugbaumeister examination, even
after a three year probationary period.
The university teacher was overworked, and sometimes in-
connetent, Of the 19 institutions giving aeronautical en-
gineering courses, some had two or three instructors and
a few only one. The average teaching load throughout the'
universities was 20 to 24 hours a week. Of 21 instructors
queried, 15 had acquired their special aeronenitical knowl-
edge in a one year course given in 1934/19350
The cost of an engineering education, plus the lack of
social prestige as compared with the officer of the Army
or Air Force, caused fathers to influence their sons to
'turn their attention away from engineering. An officer
with the rank of cP.otain had received an income of
32,000 H1, by his 2'th birthday; his graduate engineer
counterpart had cost the family 2,500 R13 at the same age,
and was just beginning in his profession. The social
inferiority of the graduate engineer was evidenced by the
special formation of an Engineer Corps in the Luftwaffe,
which set the engineer socially distinct from the officer,,
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(g) Lufthansa trained its own pilots at the German Traffic
Pilots School, subsized by the Air Ministry on a non-
t, t basis. Lufthansa formula-,ed educational pclicy,
and provided the teaching staff, while the Air Ministry
supplied the equipnento Most of the trainees were
Lufthansa employees, although somo foreigners were admit-
ted as a propaganda measure.
(h) The only reliable statistical information on Lerman ex-
ports and imports of aeronautical. equipment predates Sep-
tember 1931, After that date statistics concern.ng the ex-
ports and imports of aircraft and automobiles, were com-
bined with aircraft and automotive parts.
For the exporter of aircraft or aircraft equipment to Nazi
Germany, the market was to all intents a military and
governmental one. There were no private companies with
real independence of action, Germany bought aircraft
equipment, particularly British engines,-and was eager for
mrrnufvoturing licenses. The Hamilton propellor, for ex-
ample, was licensed for Orman manufacture. The whole,
,_procedure required preliminary approval by the, Air Ministry,
if difficulties in payment in foreign exchange or transfer
of license fees were to be avoided, Germanys own exports
wero included in the lijalmar Schacht manipulation of
"blocked marks" and harter agreements. The market there-
fore was primarily in the German satellite countries,
Turkey, Riiisie., and Soiith America, and the method of sales-
manship was diplomatic pressure..
(i) The German airport system assumed its first struetaral
organization in the period of free competition before the
formation of Deutsche-Lufthansa. More 1926, states]
cities and smaller political units created "regional
associations" first to build airports, and then, (with the
bait of local subsidy), to induce airlines to use their
facilities. For example, the largest airport, that at
Berlin.-??Adlershof, was owned in 1928 jointly by the City
of Berlin, the Statte of Prussia, and the Reich,, The Reich
was financially interested in 15 airports; approximately
70 other commercial airports were creatures of the local
governments. In 1936 the Reich assumed full title and
control of the airports used in regular air transportation
through the device of a National Union of German Airports,
The purpose of this organization was, according to paragraph
III of its constitution, the promotion of the common
interest and prosperity -.f German airports. The Union took
the orders of the Airport Department of the Air Ministry
bargained with Deutsche Lufthansa, apportioned lump sun
profits to its members, and issued.unofficial directives
and advice. Its main purpose was the establishment of
uniform airport fees, in the form of the"General Conditions
for. the Rent of Airport Facilities", Lufthansa went through
the formality of paying the Union the fees which its finan-
cial reports show were annually returned to it b;r,the, Reich.
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3. (a)
Visitors t., pre yr r Gerr.iany c::.r,ented on the diopropor Lion
bet:.cen the elaborateness of airport facilities and build-
ini e, and the paucity of actual air traffic. Obviously
part of the: intention .as to create visible a bols of
German air poti:er, and for this mason many party gather-
ings were held in the Local airport. Local pride perhaps
explained viuch of the Gerrmm airport system, but .4e have
the v:or:il of Heinz ticn~;ux?tz, Lufth:.nsa e s public r?l,:~tions
director.9 that "certain it iu - :,hat every airport installa-
tion grill, in case of t:ar ; oe of use to iu lit cry aircraft"
Administration of the exclusive control of aerial naviga-
tion granted to the nation by the act of December 15,1933
was delegated to the local Air Boards and their field
stations at the airports. The Air i4.nistry insured the
competency of air navigation personnel by tm.inLq; can-
didates at the navigation school in ildpark near Potsdam.
i~:_p1oyr:icnt was on a civil service basis.
':'hare wu.a some effort made to distinguish bets;oen the faci-
lities provided by the ;~,overnnent as part of its civil
airways system and those furnished by Deutsche Lufha:nsa.
Lufthwnsa opcrGtcd its own i:,cs:~ar.~e service ari the :.A-hort
wave radio stations on its international routes. Since
the ~;overnrtcnt operated the lon ; wave .,:round installations,
any t;:cssat;,e to or from aircraft had to clear through overn-
r.cnt facilities. The ground station also furnished direc-
tion finding service in close cooperation with similar
stations at other airports through a systeri of direct
telephone connections. Because there little ni~ht
flying, ::.nd the actual volume of ~rr4fflc .,as si:rill, Ger-
r.~Lny +s air na.vi;;u.tion 6 uterd:, %v:.ile ude,.uute, ;;t:.s never
,pe,rrLicula rly pror. oted.
t're::ar sc:r.4n ;ove:rnuterrt olicy ., Lth re,;-4rd to oti,nersi?rip
of air ::wrriers is discussed in the follo-An; sub-study:
1911) 1926
The first iprea.ceti ie Germain airline be ;&n operations in 1915,
but wz;s actually incorporated as c.~.r1y au 1917, signif-
icaritly under the aua,,Lces of the National Tr.irw2ort .iniu-
try and the ii.eichsbs.nk. Official encourc. ;eraGnt acs imr;ze-
diate, 1.r ely bccause of: (1) the c1a is German econ-
omic philosophy of state p t'ticipation in ;sublic Lrans-
?or?t it.ion, (2) the clamor of a ;;reavt.l y e.xp4naed :,ar-ttne
aircraft industry for a coriie:;tic i.,Lrket, (3) tiie poltLtca:l
p rt.ic.ulari5r:t of Lhc various c?r;ivn cities, cai:e;.urrities,
and states, and (4) the ,prc:;cncc at hand of lv.r-e rnr,,bcrs
of wt r-Li?.:ined 2ersonnel e:..; cr to return to aviation.
The first nutioncl subsidy .:r:.s ;riven in 1920. The floc.,
of subsidies from the nation And the smaller units tiros
so treat that in 1921 there ::ere 42 airlinc:s, all cor:r-
petine for su'as:idies. In 1922 the Gem,a.n-;cusuian
Air i'rans.:)ort 1,sLioci&.tion ("Deruluft") ?,.L5 form;:e.d a.s
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I1NCCLLA8 S rm-
a joint German-Russian enterprise. By 1925 two interest
groups -- Deutsche Aero-Lloyd and the Junkers Luftwerkehrs-
Gesellachaft -- had assimilated all others. These two
organizations had built up a structure of 23 local associa-
tions -- the so-called "regional" n&r transport companies to tap the local sub idy-givers.
The largest shareholder in Deutsche Aero-Lloyd was the
Reichsbank; Junkers represented the aircraft industry and
other private investors. .Aero-Lloyd had affiliated itself
with the International Air Transport Association (IATA);
Junkers worked out "union" agreements with the airlines of
other countries, pooling planes, research and facilities.
The "union" agreement principle, if properly implemented,
would have meant an extra-national enterprise conducted by
one private company in agreement with foreign companies,
without state control.
Pressure from the National Ministry of Transport was
exercised in favor of a merger of all airlines. Junkers
refused, but Brandenburg and Fish of the government cap-
italized on Junkerst financial difficulties to force through
this merger in 1926. The Deutsche Lufthansa was the result
of the combination of Aero-Lloyd and Junkers. The stock in
the new company supposedly assigned to Junkers was actually
retained by the Reich.
The financial organization of the Deutsche Lufthansa at
its founding mass
Nation .......... 6,500,000 Rk .......... 6%
States ........., 4,750,000 RM .......... 19 %
Cities o....oe..? 6,875,000 Rid oo.......? 27.5 %
Junkers and Aero-
Lloyd '........ 6i tRM ......... ? %
25,000,000 RU 1
The Deutsche Lufthansa assumed the international and
important internal routes of its predecessors. In theory
the Deutsche Lufthansa did not constitute a monopoly, but
in practice the Reich expressly withheld the granting of
national subsidies to any other lines. The Deruluft line
could be left undisturbed because all its German capital
was held by the Deutsche Lufthansa. Throughout the Nazi
regime, the Deutsche Lufthansa retained the forms of pri-
vate economic enterprise, but was a state subsidized
complete monopoly in all essentials.
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t LA?sI
E2 There is considerable unanimity on the larger
goals of the Deutsche L1afthanss. German plibli9ists
present they as:
"Creation-of quicker and more frequent air
connections between all important eeonomie and
cultural German cities under consideration of
their utility in the German folk econoay-, in
which the most important depots shall also
receive a night traffic for post and freight.
"Extension of the inner+Eutopean German air
transportation net to all important centers of
urope, placing particular voight on a service as
frequent as possible.
nBuilding of the Planned longIrange airwuya to the
U.S.A., South .America: and the Far East."
The story of Lufthansa*3 owngroth and the development
of its subsidiarjes will Illustrate jeer fully it
realized these aims.
In 1926 Deutsche Lufthansa accumulated a total of
3,710,814 plane-miles, It operated nine foreign
routes in cooperation with foreigh airlines and had
opened night services from Berlin to Koenigsberg dnd o
Paris. A survey flight with Wo Jluukers, 0.24's was
nade to China by ray of Siberia. This expedition ]aid
the groundwork for the Eurasia Aviation Corporation,
which was founded in 1930 under Chineae'.Gernats auspjcess
the Chinese Ministry of Comnnmications holdin*; two-thirds
of' he stock, A Dornier "?al" Flying Boat was dispatched
to Brazil to survey the possibilities of a South Atlantic
route,
Trial flights were made over the Alps. The nwdy
established lines, Geneva-Marseilles and BorlitrOslo,, point-
ed the tray for later important lines. Condor., a Luf the iea
subsidiary in South America, received the a ncession for
service on the Rio de Janeiro-Porto Alegre coastal route,
paving the way for the subsequent German penetration of
Brazil.
- A regular service was established betaven Berlin
and Madrid. Routes from Berlin to Zurich, Vienna and
Leningrad, as well as from Munich to Milan, were put into
operation,
1222. In spite of a 50 per cent reduction in subsidy, +,,be
company kept expanding. In July, & seap1ane catapulted
from the deck of the Bremen en route to New York initiated
a regular shipe?to-.shore mail service. A similar catapult`
ing took place off Cherbourg on the return trip, the
Plane carrying the mail on ahead to Bremerhaven.
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: The dirigible Graf Zeppelin flew to South America to
Icy the t~rounriwork- for a regular South Atlantic routed Aix-
'mail ser ces were increased and additional long-distance
routes were planned. An expediticn was sent to Baghdad, and
catapult ship-to-shore flights were extended.
lq 2. A scheduled passenger service was opened over the
A ps rom 1%unich to Venice. There was a 15 per cent reduction
in raific in 1932 as a result of the world economic crisis,
'out the number of w^peciat flights increased. r
cI . The character of the company was fundariaentally paltered
ar, a result of the seizure of control In Germany by the Nazis.
Fxom a conventions), airline, founded and subsidized with the
usual, economic and political objectives, it changed into a
direct instrucient of military pourer. The newly-created Air
Ministry assumed jurisdiction over Lufthansa. Without
re.1bquishing his business connections, shard lkilch, execu-
tive director of the company, became Secretary of Civil
Aviation wader Hermann Goring in the new Ministry.
. Conaider?able equipment was added, notably Diesel-
powered aircraft. The last independent internal air transport
company expired and Lufthansa. became practically a monopoly.
On February 3, 1934, Lufthansa began scheduled air-rnwil
flights across. the South Atlantic to South America. A
specially-converted steamship, the Kestfalen, served as a
floating airbaae. Dornier Wal flying boats operated from
13athurst to Natal, refueling from the Westfalen in midocean.
The aircraft was then catapulted from the ship, in order to
attain take-off with the an.axitmua load.
g9. The number of international routes was increased to
e even; trans-!t1autic airmail service to South America was
accelerated, and Condor extended its route to Santiago.
The German Zeppelin-Reederei was formed to operate the Graf
Zep elia on regular trips across the South Atlantic from
Frankfurt to Recife (Pernambuco) to Rio de Janeiro.* Before
1935. French and German interests in South America had con-
flicted, In May of that year Air France and Lufthansa agreed
to technical cooperation and a division of schedules. This
collaboration increased, and in July 1937 a new agreement
provided for the pooling; of receipts on the South Aulerlca
routes, and for technical cooperation on the projected
services in the North Atlantic and to the FarLast, One of
the objects of these agreements was, apparently, to Counter-
act the growth of the Pan American system in South America.
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1936. Trial flights to New York were begun in 1936
vii tiro motored vornier i'7,ying bouts, Routes varied,,
but rra at of the f light s were nwde by way o f Lisbon and
the Azores.
1- 9 7. , great eacpmnsion of Luf`than~sa routes took place
Tn 1.i37. New routes were operated from Copenhagen to
Oslo,, London to Vienna, Berlin to Paris. Berlin to
Stockholm, Berlin to Baghdad, and Buenos J 'Area to
wit ritiugo. Early in 1937 the Deruluft servioes vivre sun-
perided, anal the company was liquidated shortly thereafter.
However, Lufthansa soon roopOned the Baltic routes former.
ly operated by Deruluft. Or: the south Atlantic route the
GrLf ~;ep;:alxn was replaced by Ion;;-range planes such as
the Do 26. The al rbase vessels r'estfalen anxi Ostiark
were stationed on this route. The ~;crfriabeal axial in the
North j314 ritic r. as joined by the new motor-vessel
Friesenlan d to refuel and. Catapalt four-motored Blohia
and Voss flying boats on test f1i hts to New York.
Condor, the large Germatl subsidiary in Brazil, extended
its opcrati_ons, c iectin, v?ith other pro?Axi s airlinea
in South .' mrioa. Sedta, a new subsidiary in Ecuador?
been active operation. Independent companies also were
aided, and planes wa: a nude available on generous
financial tens i. However, when tieropostu Ar entinu, a
bonaf iue independent airline, took advantage of this
generosity, it had to agree to repair its planex in
Coridot's shops, to purohase only Gcrrrtian parts and
accessories, to buy only German aircraft for a period of
five years, and to coordinate its schedules kith those
of Condor and Lufthansa. Other companies, 111ke Varig,
in .hich Condor had a large int$reste and subsequently
Vasil, masqueraded as ntrtictruel airlines, They employed
largely Gen2un or Brazilian-German persorir1X? were
controlled by Ger:ian corp. ny officials, and received
their oquipn-ent from Deutsche Lufthansa, The Latin
Arlerican states were avaro of the subterfuges but were
loathe to interfere with comparAes which m-o'vided trans-
port into regions hitherto almost Inaccessible,.
1938. Luft}wunsa expended its eastern operrzt1ons into
A g istan by exteriding its Baghdad line to Kabul.
In the crest, Deutsche Lufthansa-Peru went into native
ope aiion. ;; transcontinental route was established
from Rio de Janeiro to Lima, with the collaboration of
Lloyd Aereo ]3oliviano, a Junker a company. In late
1938, the routes mileaCe of Lufthansa, exclusive of sub-
sidiaries,, was 32, 720,
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I W% On January 1j 1939, the Austrian airline,
Oesterreichische Luftverkehr A. 0., was taken over,
completing the Lufthansa monopoly in the szpanded
Third Reich. In addition, the airlines in the no-
called Protectorate of Bohemia and Mor&Via were
absorbed by the German air transport system. During
the year Lufthansa acquired Condor's parallel route
to Santiago. Trial and publicity flights across the
North Atlantic were still continued, but Lufthansa
never received the necessary permission to establish
regular servioe, The flying-boat mail service to
South America was maintained successfully up to this
time.
Thy. With the outbreak of War, Lufthansa was nation-
alized and all commercial operations ceased, Later in
the year a number of services were renewed# all on
international routes. With rare exceptions, domestic
operations were not reaumed. New lines were opened to
Moscow in 1940, and to Rovaniemi, Finland, in 1942.
The number of routes steadily decreased, however, as
many of them did not serve military purposes. The
Moscow route operated until Germanys attack m Russia
in the summer of 1941. By an "agreement" early in 1943,
all accessible equipment and facilities of Air France
were transferred to Lufthansa, as were also some of the
French flight and ground personnel. In effect, Air
France was taken over by the German compatq.
In the year before Hitler's advent to poser, Bley, the
official apologist for Lufthansa, asserted that three
great groups contending for world power - the British
Empire, the United States and European Continent - came
into conflict in air transport as in other fields. The
only solution possible was a Pan-European combination
of air transport companies under German direction. By
19!40 the geopolitical emphasis was even more pronounced.
Bley stateds "Owing to the German air victories in East
and West, air power is becoming a geopolitical factor.
Its tremendous speed and radius of action make possible
Winking in terms of continents; it in the means of
traversing, covering and controlling great areas (Gross-
ratmme) from one point. And since the New Order of Europe
is already definitely .indicated as the next historical
reality, air power can be considered In a double sense
as the true bearer of this geopolitical event; firstly,
because it has prepared the victory, and secondly, be-
cause it is the on]y means of mastering and controlling
this area."
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UvCLisS~;1F"i1r U
South America
Sindicato Condors Ltdae was founded at Rio de Janeiro
on December 1, 1329. It was the euocsssor cat a lia?#
known as Kondor Sindikat which had been operating
between fort, Alegre and xio de .3aileir, since February
1927. The principal sponsors of the new line were
J)r. Peter von Bauer and Cantiixa''rite Hamner, officials
of the Gennen-Colombian airline, Seadta. After
failing to attract American capital ,to the line,
Condor secured Gertaan financial aid. partly from
luf"thansa through Aftro??,loyd. partly from Sohlubaoho
Thi.ei ter 6 Cor rang of flu-abur9, and partly. from the
Rar:ibure-AraE rican Line. Additional capita, was
furnished by Louth and (:entrul ittrerioan interests.
Condor vas soon laying the Sound tion .t'or a tilc-ns..
Atlantic air sorvi oe in co pc r ui . on with .C+et aehe
Lufthansa. To advance this plan, the company beeau
a weekly service between Rio de Janeiro and aftl
in February 1)30. This was later extended to
Fernando de :4orotina, where mail for Isurape was
handed over to u fwnburgm' imerican ship a.hieh
subsequently transferred it at,the Canaries to a
Lufthansa plane bound for the c itinent.
In May 1330 the arrival of the Graf Zeppelin at Rio
paved the way fora contract> with the Brazilian
t overnrient in March i034, calling for a minimum u'.r
20 trips a years Condor bcoaity general represealm-
tivo in south baerica for the i)eutsol-o Zeppelin
Reederoi? wozi 1n- closely with it until 19879 when
the Hindenburg disaster compelled cessation of
operations. Condor also cooperated in the establish-
n nt of trartsooeaniio rail service pith catapult planes,
This replaced the i?&ail.ooarryin services or the
dirigible.
In 1932 Condor extericbd its route to Uru-,;atay and to
Buenos Aires. Lufthansa also extended the routes from
Natal to Rio do Janeiro and Buenos Aires. In October
1935, through the efforts of Captain Hammer, Condor
received a four-yoar concession for a route to
Santiago, Chile. In ),939, this contract was extended
to 1942, but this time it .as cgmnted to Lufthansa,
an indication of the interchangeability of Lufthansa
and Condor activities
In common with all the German-dominuted lines, Condor
had little difficulty in securing exuellenb equipment
and personnel, all of whom were German or "Heiman
nationals". Condor's managing director, Ernesto Holeka
was a Gern n; its 18 pilots included 10 Germans or
naturalized Germans; and its planes were serti ced by
13 German mechanics.
Condor acted as the feeder for planes and personnel
for all other Lxis-affiliated airlines in South America,
Do-spite the formality of Brazilian registry, Condor
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iraa a part of Deutsche Lufthansa, whose eeonomic, pe.
litical, and military purposes it served. From a small
begi.nn.ngv Cordcr Crew until it operated over 10,000
route miles, possessed one of the largest and most modern
air fleets on the continent, and had the resources to
undercut the tariffs of all its principal rivals.
Cn Chrstr.as Cay, 1941, Condor was fcrced to cease
operations because of lack of gasoline,.its supply
having been cub ,ff as a result of pressure by the
American and Brazilian governments., The company
was then purged of some, but not all, of its pro
Axis elements, As a result, it was continued on
the Proclaimed List,, Late in August 1942, its
managing director and traffic manager were arrested,
and the other German employees were dismissed. With
the cooperation of the Defense Corporation, the
cornany was turned over to native Brazilians and the
name changed to Services Aes'e os Cruzeiro do Sul,
Ltda, On Iioveriber 22, 1942, it was removed from the
Proclaimed list,
Sedta (S--cied&-d _~cliadoriana de Transportes Aereos)
was founded in 1937 by a group of Ecuadorians and
Germans, headed by Captain Fritz !r. Hamner. The
contract with the Ecuadorian government provided for
the opers.t_on -)fa mute between Guayaquil and Quito.
Hammer was killed in an accident in 1938, end re.
placed by Gustave Ap IYaehsmuth, who had been a pilot
for Condor for ten years. Ecuador granted to
Zachsmuth and 1.oosmsyer, head of Lufthansa in South
America, an extension in Ecuuder of the Rio to Lima
service. In 1940, the company sought permission to
operate to the Galapagos Iolande, and proposed a line
to Bogota to connect with the :>cadta system. These
requests were refused, although a line from Guayaquil
to Loja was approved,
Luf thans i did not absorb Sedta directly, b-tt complete
control was assured by an equipment sgreerent rnd a
monthly subsidy of 32,'00. The company wa;: capitalized
nominally at c12,000,- Passenger revenues were far
below the efstablishea rates because. of Sedta's custom
of. 1ibFr6l 1'scounts enr4 distr`.bution of free passes,
In 1939 about half the passengers paid no fare. Sedtats
personnel was almost without exception German, The
line's turbulent history ended in Septemher 1=`41
when the i,c'.iad-'ri.an government expropriated the company
and seized its" two Ju 521s.
Lufthansa?Perrz was founded in !.:ay 19:8, as a German
snnhs:'diiry, but was repistered as a Peruvian company,
Until some expansion took place in 1S-409 its only route
was Lima-Arequips.La Paz, with occasional stops at
Tacna and Punoo its importance was more strategic
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than economic, as it formed the western link of the
transcontinental penetration by the Axia. At the
height of its activity, it operated about 1,200
miles of route with its two Ju 520s. In 1940 it
Carr-1ed 1,100 pa;,sengors and 3,400 pounds. of express.
After ~.or2d War II began, it had considerable difficulty
in obtaining supplies and capital, Repeated German
violations of Peruvian--neutrality culminated in the
scuttlins, of two ships in an attempt to block Callao
Harbor. This resulted in the extrouriafi ion of the
compat r and the inte ?runent of its: personnel on April 1,,
1941.1
'{; ith q.n Gerrraziz
.ithin Germany Hansa Flugdienot was organized April 30,
1938, with a capital of 50,00 RU (iufthansa, 45,000
Iii; Hansa I ftbild, 5,000 RM), The company vas,
established to take over the charter services and
special flights operated in E rope by Lufthansa. The
chief activities of Hansa Luftbild consisted of making
aerial surveys and conducting special and scenic fl.i.ghts.
Deutsche Zeppelin-Reederei was :i'ormed March 22, 1935.
Its capital stock of 9,559,000 RM was o+.ned by
Luftschiffbau Zeppelin and Deutsche Lufthansa. The line
operated fortnightly services between Frankfurt,
Pernambuco, and Rio de Janeiro in the summer, and had
plans for increasing this to a Sleekly schedule in
1936. However, the destruction of the new dirigible,
Hindenburg, forced a suspension of company activities.
In Aurope
Outside of Germany the Lufthansa's European plan was
subordinated to its South american traffic. Services
hereon Portugueses in Lisbon operated no air services
of its own, but managed the Portuguese end of the
Berl:in-;ituttoart-Geneva- tarseilles -ia_lamanca Lisbon
line of Deutsche Lufthansa. The plan was apparently
to make it possible for Deutsche Lufthansa to use
l'ortujuese airfields for flights to the Azores and
Cape Verde Islands,
Franco's Spain, in 1938, agreed to the formation of
an hicpano--Gc::rnan company, the Iberia Compania de
Li.ncas Aereas, to operate airlines internally and
between Spain, L'.oroceo, and the. Canary Irelands.
The German interest in this company wua sold on
nlkRust 7, 1943, to the state owned Institute
Napional de Industria. Iufthansa monoply of Spanish
internal traffic ryas justified-by the necesuit/y of
flyirL:,,,. over ~panish territory hen operating routes
to South America,
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w p
The situation in two ether countries' Greece and
Icelaund, is still unclear. The Icelandic Aviation
Company (Flugfjelag Islands 0) had originally been
founded by Finnish interests, to provide local,
service within Iceland. Deutsche Lufthansa provided
the aircraft and personnel. In addition to trans-
pertation., the planes were used to search for shoals
of herring for the Icelandic fisheries,, As a reward,
Lufthansa received a note from the Premier of
Iceland, which, according to the German interpretation,
c+antalaad a promise to Lufthansa of flying rights equal
to those granted any other nation until April Is, 1940.
The American occupation of Iceland in 1941 prevented the
completion of any arrangement. For Greece, we have only
7ronsky'a statement that Lufthansa owned 51 per cent
of the stock of the Greek Aerial Communications Company
(Societe Hellonique des Communications Aorienn?s)4 `
ar Flan
In the Far cast, Deutsche Lufthansa's weapon was the
Z'uraoia Cozpunr, formed in February 1930. Tworthirds
Of the capital was advanced by the Chinese Transport-
ation Ministry, one-third by Deutsche Lufthansa.
Actva11y, however, half of the Chinese capital had
been borrowed from Deutsche Lufthansa at seven per
cent interest. E.sela flew the routes Shanghai-
Lantschau, Peiping*Canton, Lantschau-Factau,. ,Sian-
g, Equipment and peraonnel were almost entirely
German. In 1939 seven flights to labul and a few test
flights from Germ to Baghdad were carried out, The
route GerXabul-Afghanistan was later covered once
a week as part of a projected link with the Far East,
(See A. 2(d)e)
No competition existed since Lufthansa was a monopoly.
By arrangements made under the auspices of the International
Air Traffic Association, Air France was permitted to use
the Ports at Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, and Nuremburg; Imperial
Airways yasod the Cologne Aerodrome; the Dutch ELM Jim used
the ports of Hamburg, Berlin, and Frankfurt am Main; the Polish
line "Lot" the Berli p Templehof airport; and the Belgian
Sabena line, the ports at Berlin, Aamburg, and Cologne. Deutsche
Lufthansa undertook the representation of those lines in
Germany: and was accorded the same privilege's in the countries
represented by these national airlines.
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U NNQL 81 I D
(6)
See A 2( b)
On Deteraber 29, 19$9, tris iDeutsehe Lufthansa fl d a t4ta2
of 145 air transports. T1* B1oi t and Voss 222 and 220.
'1yi boats cued the Jun1oers 290 were war time dow 1epd
atnte. Now of these types saw extcusi're oomirrer.cjat
saroiae. as during tho war produotion was concentrated
on the more.oritioal milite.ry nudely. The backbone of
the Lufthkifta Fleet remained the Junkara $20 which was
first developed in 1028. In 1336, C. G. Gray, the
English student of neroriautios, called the Ju 52'the best
trtmport plane iu the world, vnd Prune sand Britain to-
day are still using this model to sane extent on internal
lines,
The Cosh of aaernrtion o l' Ger*ncml air truneportutiod
demanstrabiy in,srsased as tc result of teclunical develop-m
meab, Over the period 1919 to LAO, Deittaohe Lufthansa
used the follovin? earrlcnrrs in civil air transportation:
Trans ert
speed
"
Utility
rro-n-rm
soda l
kza I:e r
)u' o)
Ue l Load
per hr0) .
F 13
1.85
003
66
M 20
170
O,9
la$
Ju t36
260
1.00
273
lie 111
294
1.03
288
Ju 52.
230
1050
345
kit 200
415
2,50
187
Ju 90
290
3,80
1,200
categories of routes
we thia tuvult:
Period
W del
Op eratioti Cost
1932-34
31 20
300
1y36-38
Jti 86
93.2
1936-38
He ill
8315
A direct comparison of planes having approximately the
aww useful load capacity and flying over the same
Lufthansags fleet in peaoo..time vas entirely. German,
since part of its overall mission was to. demonstrate
the worth of German industry. During the,war, so:i
DC-20s aid DC-3'a were seized from the .latch and
Belgians. By contract with neutral 3witasrland, the
Lufthansa DC-2's and DC.34a were kept abreast or the
latest CidL and 1)vugiaa faotory ohari es throughout the
war.
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U LSIFE
(h) For Lafthanea and the Internatiork-A Air Transport Associe?
tion aid 1azfthansa'S operations of foreign airlines, see
A. 3 (a). Oermeny regulated its air traffic and commercial
relations with other countries throes separate treaties.
These so-willed Air Traffic Conventions were all praetim
cally i tentic*1, and generally follotwed the C.I.I3.A. Con.
veritian. Although Germmy, like the United States, was
never a party to that convention, these separate treaties
Yore often described as preliminary, anti were provided
with eanc011at1oa clauses,
S separate treaties were concluded by Gounany with
Switzerland (September 14. 19M)- Denmark (April 25 i
Austria (w4ey 19 , 1939)
SWeden 4May 29
1925) i
,
.
4
. 22, 1926} , barium (May 29, 192 ) , CZ.~eohoslovskia (Jmm~aty
22, 1927) , Italy (F?Sr 20, 1927 , Great Britain (June 29,
i2)
9 7 . SPa (December ., -._~27 , i'oland( ast 289 1929)
TT 2 6?,.. era _ 8 _ _ A ? . _ _. .w
Tugo 1a is (September 3, 1930 s Greece (November 9, 193 5.
Porn (March 11, 1937), and the Union of South Africa
(ch 17, 1937)?
Of the varims international conventions sie#ed tr Germany
the Wares Convention of October 12, 1929 is tin most im-
portant. On January 12, 19379 the Second Convention of
29. 1935 (The > me Convention) regarding the Unifica.
ti.on of u1 ]elating to the Precautionary Attachment of
Aircraft came into force, together with the Act regarding
the Inadmissibility of the Precautionary Attaclznent of
Aircraft. Tae other Home Convention, relating to Damages
caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, was not
ratified by Germany. The International Sanitary Convention
for Aerial Navigation signed April 12, 1933 wag in force in
Ge try.
4. The a inistration of both civil and military aviation by one
ministry indicates how completely they were allied in the German
point of view. Gorman civil aviation, strictly speaking, was
not influenced by military aviation; it was merely mother aspect.
The laafthanaa vas a secondary Air Transport Service for the
L Ift!'affe; the aa.r sport movement was pre-rnilttaar training for
thn Luft gaffe; th Via absence of pea anal flying or competitive
air transport, the edreraft industry had no recour* but to the
Luftwaffe.
What will be said in this parch about civil aviation as a re?
inforcem .t of tt military potential is not confined, to Get aav
al . -T British Ga report Of 1939 states that the prob-
ler;a of the air is one - two sides of a -single coin - aznd the
military aspect of aviation cannot fundamentaUy be separated
fran the civil aspect". The civil aviation of any count=y is eaa
auxillary of the military in that: (1) it maintains a system of
high speed cmmnmication for governaoent and industry, in both
Pe= and war; (2) it justifies the existence of a system of
lighted and radio equipped civil airways; and. (3) it creates an
orgauizatioz of .highly trained personnel.
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-who can be drawn upon for military use. The relationship be-
tween the peace time maintenance of the aircraft industry and
civil aviation is, of course, a fundamental one. It is not in-
eluded here because German civil aviation after 1933 was not an
important customer of the aircraft industry, although perhaps its
best advertisement.
Since the volume of transport operation determines the extent of
the contribution civil aviation can make in any of these respects,
it L doubtful if German civil aviation was regarded by the Nazis
themselves primarily as a successful civilian counterpait of the
Lu 'tu affe.
Part of the answer is., probably, that Gormaty valued its civil
aviation as an immediate political activity of great potential
commercial value. German students of air transport repeated the
elassie statement of the 1930 League of Nations report that state
participation in E ropean civil aviation is an act of politics,
rather than of economics. Indeed, Walter Pahl says that all trans-
portiation is an act of politics, but that air transport, more than
any other form, is an act of high politics. the-phrase, high pol-
itica, had connotations for the Razi mind that require definition.
It is, in essence, the politics that Clausewlts meant when he said
war is the conK ation of politics by other means. The Nazi con-
tribution vas to stress the converses "peace is the continuation
of war by other nears".
Gorman aviation certainly was not economic in what the Nazis
called the "narrow" meaning of returning dividends on capital in-
vested. There is no doubt, however, that the ultimate aims of
Gorman expansion in South America, for example, were broadly eoon1b
amio, with the pUrPo300 of attaining markets and raw materials.
This trade campaign was also a political enterprise. For A.Btarden
says, in his "Struff'le for Airway in Latin America", "under the
Nazi regime, foreign trade became so regimented as to constitute
for all practical purposes a part of government activity. The full
force of the German government was consequently thrown behind the
propaganda efforts designed to help the trade program and increase
the prestige of the Reich".
5. Germany's civil aviation was under the nominal supervision of the
Council of Ambassadors from 1919 to 1926. From the Paris conven-
tion of that date until Germany's withdrawal from the League of
Nations, it is possible to say foreign powers exercised influence
o`er German civil aviation In a negative sense. In March, 1935
with the public recognition of the Luftwaffe, all external re-
straints were cast off.
6. The data to answer this question are still lacking. It Is pass-
ible to estimate Germany's national income in this period ass
1932, 45 billion R1 ; 1934, 52 billion Rai; 1935, 57 billion R1[;
1938, 76 billion RN, and to guess that military expenditures con-
sumed onv-eighth to one-ninth of the national Income. During the
war years, aircraft, together with air force equipment, represented
approx3mate]y 40 percent of total German production, and this per-
centage may be applicable to the period of preparation before the
war. No budget as such were published after 1934. The finances
of the totalitarian state defy examination by orthodox standards,
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Probably the largest vested interest in Nazi Germany as the Nazi
party itself. That group was split internally by clashes of tem-
perament and the personal ambition of a few vigorous personalities
.for flitler*s favor, but presented a united front to the rest of.(;er-
m ny, Idilchs for e..uaple, Intensely disliked Willy i esserechrnitt;
and the development of the Me.262 suffered in consequence; Wring
and Schacht quarrelled over the conduct of the four year plans as
they concerned aviation; Rust felt that education and research Were
,mope properly his provinces than Gdrirgrs. But G8ring remained,
bore the war,-at least, Hitler's "truest paladin," and German
aviation was safe from other influence. During the uar, Speer got
Hitler's ear, and the result was the formal dissolution of the Air
Ministry in 1944,
Oa the whole, the wishes of the banking interests and the aircraft
industry of Germany pdralled those of G8ring. The Reichabank headed
by the confirmed Nazi, Georg von Stauss, the "=aviation banker" - had
been behind the formation of Deutsche Lufthansa, and owned or con-
trolled sort_a of the larger private aircraft and aero-engine commies.
For purposes of representation in German's economic corporate struc-
ture, the aircraft industry like 30 other branches of Industry, had
been organized into an Economic Group: Main Corm tteea and Special
Ring were expressly .'ounded to present the industry point, of view to
S~s;e ~w Armaments )At.iistry, and Frydag, Speer's delegate for aircraft
production, wL-s a ifieriber of the Board of Directors of both Henschel
and Heinkel.
Yet, it is altogether true to say that the final word rested always
with the ovcrnmcnt of.icial and the party he rer)resented. The Nazi
state prided itself on having achieved the "revolutionaryr solution of
r?3taini.ng the entrepreneur in his functions and at the same time aon-
verting him into the service of the state... Chambers and groups, main
committees and rings, and economic Troupe all have one thing in
con on - they reflect the tendency to place the relationship of state
and industry more on the basis of commn trust and cooperation than
on the basis of command." At the time, the industralist was reminded:
''Une thing will remain after the war and become more and more estab-
1 shed: the conviction that the State is the legitimate partner
("`Teilhaber") in every enterprise," and that "the partnership of the
state is all-embracing." The industrialist already knew that for
Hitler "the Party created the State."
$o See A 2(f )
9. Sre A 2(e)
10. Gencral.ly, aircraft development was forwarded in Germany by govern-
ment initiative and supervision of a development contract. The head
of one of the development divisions of the Technical Office would
discuss the desired characteristics of a new weapon or device with
industry representatives, and then issue development contracts to
one or more firms. Often the idea originated with the firm, was suc-
cessfully developed, and then presented to the Air Force for trial
and acceptance. The costs of research and development to the firms
were borne in their entirety by the Air Force,
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B. CIVIL. AIR OU+Q NIZATIONS
1. The governmental structure of Nazi Gsrmaror differed so complete-
ly from accepted standards that any direct description is not
only extremely difficult, but of somewhat dubious value. The
best sti of the German state (by F. Neumann, published in 19122)
i prefaced by the remark that National Socialist Germany was a
'non-state, a chaos, a rule of lawlessness and anarchy."
Essentially, the hierarchy of peacetime civil aviation was in-
distinguishable from that of military aviation. Adolf Hitler,
as rational Lee-der and Chancellor, and Commander of the Armed
Farces, was also the supreme authority for civil air matters.
Officials controlling aviation:
Nationai M nister of Aviation--Hers Goring (also supreme
C om ande in-.Ci:ie of the Air Force)
State Secretary of Aviation-Erhard Mileh (also Inspector General
of th Air Force)
Under I lch?
Chief of Air Defense
General Aviation Office
Air Traffic
Air Police -
Weather Service
Flight Protection
Supervision of Local Air Boards
General Commanding Aircraft Supplies
Research Institutes
Development--the testing stations, the industry
War EconoMr
Industry Personnel-delegated to the German Aero-
nautical Research Establishment, Berlin Adlershof
Supply
Outside of this orgnaization, but still subordinate to Hitler were
the follaring organizations:
The National Socialist Flying Corps
Air Squadrons of the Hitler Youth--Reich Youth Leader
Model Plans Building Associations Reich Youth Leader
Scientific and Technical Associations:
National Union'of German Airports
German Academy ~f Aeronautical Research
Lilienthal Society
Standards Committee for Aviation--branch of the German
Standards Committee
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Industry Associations:
Economic Group of the Aircraft Industry
Research and Education:
Schools and Colleges-Ministry of Science and Education
National Research Council--GI!ring
2, (a) It is believed that the functions of prewar German Govern-
(b) rent agencies concerned with civil aviation have been fully
& covered in other sections of this report.
(c)
3. In the absence of parliamentary debate or of a free press on the
English or American model, an accurate documentation of German
prewar public opinion is impossible. Hover, it can be taken
for ,anted that the aviation interests, the armed forces, and
the general public were satisfied with German civil aviation in
direct .proportion to their contentr+ant with the ideology of the,
Nazi party.. When Germany had political parties, none, with the
exception of the Communists, objected to state subsidies. Since
the most important competitive forte of transport were also
either owned or controlled by the State, there was no overt act
of resentment. At this tine it was stated, "The present friction-
less cooperation of all branches of transportation with aviation
... is notowortly. The railroad and the automobile, which fight
each other, work willingly with the airplane. In large degree
this is brought about by the smallness of the part played by air
transportation in the actual movemant of passengers and freight,
and by the fact that the plane accomplishes functions, particu-
larly in international transportation, in which the others are
not interested." The position the State would ass'.e in the
event of such a conflict was plainly indicated: "A preference
of air transportation as against all other-branches of transporr-
tat.on justifies itself through the national interest."
The plan of authority of the Nazi state was: (1) the concentra-
tion of all power into the hands of a Leader in whose person
the means of governmental and extra-governmental adjustment were
conf ed; (2) the deliberate elimination of any statutory confines
qualifying that parmr. Under such a system, Hitler, or his crea-
tures, controlled everything, made all decisions, and resolved
all conflicts. G15ring, when in favor, exercised this unlimited
power over al]. phases of aviation in Hitler's name.
C. PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS
1. Air Routes
See A-3 (a).
Since Deutsche Lufthansa was a member of the government, its over-
all policy was controlled in its entirety by the Air Ministry.
At the same time, Lufthansa made and enforced its corn operating
policies and procedures. Under such-a system there could be no
place for a Civil Aeronautics Administration or a Civil Aeronautics
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Board. A member of the Lufthansa expressed his bewilderment at
the American air transport industry, "shared in by many eoas-
panies, suffering under rigid, all-inclusive laws, regulations
and decrees, which in allegedly old and bureaucratic Europe are
not thought of."
2. Rates
Rates were fixed by Lufthansa on the basis of what the traffic
would bear. In theory, Lufthansa attempted to bring its rates
drama to the equivalent of prices for first class aceomodations
or the railroad. Rates averaged about 8 cents a mile in July
1939. As propaganda, prices were lover on certain routes than
first class railroad accomodationa, prices in winter were lower
on all routes, rebates were given for the purchase of return
tickets, and for special occasions like the Leipzig Fair.
Lufthansa was responsible for conducting its own eperation as
safely and efficiently as possible. There were actually no
transport category regulations. For exampleg no landing speed
limitation was imposed on aircraft. Lufthansa, hover, had an
operations manual outlining'Its policies and procedures for all
personnel.
4 . Iras ection
There was no governmental regulatory body controlling in any way
equipment, perdonne1, or aircraft maintenance. It must be re-
peated that Lufthansa was a governmental agency as far as its
operating policies and procedures were concerned. Lufthansa de-
pended primarily on the knowledge and technique of the older
maintenance men for the overhaul, maintenance, and inspection of
aircraft. The usual procedure was to inspect and repair the air-
plane and equipment more frequently than is the custom in this
eo?set;ry. This practice was partly due to the operation schedule
which consisted of short hops and low over-all time per month per
airplane.
5. Airports and Communications
See .1A-2 (i),
All the log-books, archives, index cards, legal contracts, liter-
ature and other files of the Company were destroyed or, lost in
the course of the fighting is l pril and May 1945 both by fire and
by other agencie:st
D.
6. Keports and corms
GENERAL EVALUATION
1. Considered only In terms of the Nazi frame of reference, German
commercial aviation was sound, progressive, and well adapted to
the country's political and economic wants.. Deutsche Lufthansa,
for example, was described by a French student in 1939 as
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"prosenting none of the iLc