PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN TRAVEL OF PERSONNEL POSSESSING SPECIAL SECURITY CLEARANCES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP66B00560R000100080145-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 15, 2000
Sequence Number:
145
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 8, 1963
Content Type:
BRIEF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP66B00560R000100080145-7.pdf | 139.53 KB |
Body:
Approved For Rease 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP66
SECRET
8 February 1963
BRIEF FOR Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT" Procedures for Foreign Travel of Personnel
'Possessing Special Security Clearances
-1. At its meeting on 19 September 1962, the United States
Intelligence Board requested that the Security Committee, in
coordination with the SIGINT Committee, review the existing
regulations and procedures, including pertinent provisions of
DCID No. 6/3, which control the foreign travel of COMINT-
indoctrinated personnel to hazardous areas. The review was
extended to include clearances for T, K-H, and - as 25X1A
the same? problems are applicable.
2. This review resulted from the proposed foreign-travel
of two consultants of NSA to attend an International Symposium
in Moscow. NSA had denied permission to travel and submitted
the matter to the Board for consideration. The decision of NSA
was confirmed by the Board but questions were raised as to .the
procedures being. followed, particularly as concerns individuals
holding, clearances ? with more than one agency.
3. The Security Committee, in coordination with the SIGINT
Committee, reviewed DCID No. 6/3 and concluded that as now
written it provides adequate policy guidance for the control of
foreign travel by persons indoctrinated for COMINT.
4. The Committee .noted no particular problem concerning
the foreign travel of staff employees of Government. Two prob-
lems were noted as concerns consultants and contractor person-
nel. Such individuals are frequently utilized in a. sensitive ca-
pacity. by more than one Government agency and a coordinating
Group 1
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program is not provided which would allow the total assessment
of the. security risks against the sensitive intelligence involved.
This paper. provides for a coordinating system whereby a check
can be made of the central indices for T,. K-H, and 25X1A
for COMIN.T-indoctrinated industrial personnel. This will per-
mit.:the proper assessment on.the basis of full knowledge of the
sensitive intelligence possessed by one individual.
5. The second problem concerns the lack. of. authority by
Government to enforce travel restrictions upon consultants and
contractor personnel. possessing sensitive intelligence. The
effectiveness of restrictive actions depends largely on the co-
operativeness of the personnel involved. Security briefing pro-
grams. and the inclusion within 'security indoctrination forms of
restrictions upon travel should assist in making these controls
more effective. Further, placing a responsibility upon a con-
tractor for ensuring that. his employees comply with such pro-
cedures-will assist to some degree.
6.. An appeal mechanism is provided for to the USIB,
when proposed travel is denied and. the individual feels that. an
appeal is justified.
7. The Committee is recommending. the following. proce-
dures be implemented:
(a) Each department and agency ensure the
assessment of the risks involved in
private foreign travel of employees to
denied areas and effect coordination
with other agencies. as necessary and
appropriate.
(b) . Each. department: and agency should
check .the central. indices maintained
for T, K-H, - and COMINT 25X1 A
prior to granting approval to. consult-
ants and contractor personnel to tra-
vel to hazardous. areas Where such
clearances do exist, the initial depart-
ment or agency should effect the
SECRET
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necessary coordination to assure that the
total access to sensitive intelligence is
assessed against the risks involved.
(c) Where foreign travel to a hazardous area
is approved, the traveller should be given
a security briefing on the risks. involved
and should be debriefed as appropriate
upon return to ensure the reporting, of
pertinent information.
Where the request. for approval is denied,
the requestor should be informed generally
as to reasons for .the denial. Where an
appeal is made for reconsideration of a
denialfor travel, the head of the agency
concerned, at his discretion, may refer
the matter to the USIB for consideration.
(e) Departments and. agencies should-notify
promptly through USIB other agencies
within the intelligence community of those
instances wherein an individual disregards
the denial of a travel request and proceeds
abroad .to a. denied area.
25X1A
R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director of Security
SECRET
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