TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 203
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 29, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT ACT
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
(H.R. 3299, H.R. 6082, H.R. 6294, H.R. 7340,
H.R. 7531, S. 777)
BILIS TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
ACT IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS AND TO MODIFY THE PERSONNEL SECURITY
PROCEDURES FOR CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES
AUGUST 29, SEPTEMBER, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18, 1963
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
23-197 WASHINGTON : 1963
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A
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? ?,,,? ? . ,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
THOMAS E. 'MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin
OMAR BURLESON, Texas-
EDNA F. KELLY, New York
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
ARMISTEAD I. SELDEN, JR., Alabama
J. L. FILCHER, Georgia
BARRATT O'HARA, Illinois
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida.
LEONARD FARBSTEIN, New York
CHARLES C. DIGGS, TR., Michigan
LINDLEY BECKWORTH, Texas
HARRIS B. McDOWELL, JR.. Delaware
WILLIAM T. MURPHY, Illinois
CORNELITJS E. GALLAGHER, New Jersey
ROBERT N. C. NIX; Pennsylvania
JOHN- S. MONAGAN. Ccinnecticut
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
RONALD BROOKS CAMERON, California
?BOYD CRAWFORD, -Staff Administrator
ROY J. BULLOCK, Senior Staff Consultant
ALBERT C. F. WESTPIIAL; Staff -Consultant
FRANKLIN J. SCHUPP, Staff Consultant
? ROBERT .F. BRANDT,. Ditie$tigalgr:.COMIatlpit
HARRY C. CROMER, Staff Consultant
PHILIP B. BILLINGS, Special. Assistant
MARIAN A. CZARNECKI, Staff Consultant
MELVIN. 0. BENSON, Staff Consultant,
JUNE NIGH, Senior Staff Assistant
HELEN C. MATTAS, Staff Assistant
HELEN L. HASHAGEN, Staff Assistant
MARY LOUISE O'BRIEN, Staff Assistant
MARY MEDSGER, Staff Assistant
DORIS B. McCaAcKEN, Staff A88/8tant
ROBERT J. BOWEN, Clerical Assistant
FRANCES P. BOLTON, Ohio
E. ROSS ADAIR, Indiana
WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD, California
PETER FRELINGFIUYSEN, JR., New Jersey
WILLIAM S. BROO.MFIELD, Michigan
ROBERT R. BARRY, New York
J. IRVING WHALLEY, Pennsylvania
H. R. GROSS, Iowa
E. Y. BERRY, South Dakota
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
F. BRADFORD MORSE, Massachusetts
JAMES F. BATTIN, Montana
VERNON W. THOMSON, Wisconsin
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CONTENTS
LIST OF WITNESSES
Thursday, August 29, 1963: ?
Foster, Hon. William-C., Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarma- Page
Innent,,Ageocy _ ___________ ______ _ 5
Tuesday, Shpterriber 10, 1963:
Gibble, Rev. H. Lamar, Pastor, Good Shepherd Church of the Breth-
ren, Kensington, Md., representing the General Brotherhood Board,
Church of the Brethren 70
A Rich, Prof. Alexander, professor of biophysics, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, representing the Federation of, American Scientists
and the Council for a Livable World 55
Shore, Chester C., legislative director, American Veterans Committee_ 65,
Wednesday, September 11, 1963:
Allen, Hon. George V., member, national advisory board, United
World Federalists, Inc 86
Atwater, Prof. Elton, professor of political science, Pennsylvania
State University, representing the Friends Committee on National
Legislation 77
Jones, Everett, General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the
Methodist Church 97
Neumann, Prof. William, Goucher College, Towson, Md.' represent-
ing the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, Inc 100
Thursday, September 12, 1963:
Hutchinson, Mrs. Aileen, representing the Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom 119
Orth, Franklin L., executive vice president, National Rifle Association
of America 116
Sikes, Hon. Robert L. F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida 107
Wood, John, general counsel, Liberty Lobby 126
Tuesday, September 17, 1963:
Andrews, Stanley M., executive director, Americans for National
Security 133
Hirsch, Rabbi Richard G., Commission on Social Action of Reform
Judaism 145
Wednesday, September 18, 1963:
Fisher, Adrian S., Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency 178
Foster, Hon. William C., Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarina-
ment Agency_ 159
STATEMENTS AND MEMORANDUMS SUBMITTED FOR
THE RECORD
Memorandum supplied by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
concerning grant for study on psychological factors in Soviet disarma-
ment positions_ 18-19
Memorandum submitted by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
on personnel of the Agency as of August 31, 1963 25-28
Memorandum submitted by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
on consultants who worked January 1 through August 30; 1963 29
.Memorandum supplied by U.S. Arm.s Control and. Disarmament Agency
on members of the General Advisory Committee?days wOrked Jan-
uary 1 through August 30, 1963 29
Memorandum supplied by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
on contracts and grants for fiscal years .1962 and 1963 30-33
111
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IV CONTENTS
Information submitted by Hon. George V. Allen, United World Federalists,
Inc., giving results of questionnaires sent by various Members of Con- Page
gress to their constituents on questions dealing with U.S. foreign policy__ _ 89-93
Article submitted by Hon. Robert L. F. Sikes, a Representative in Con-
gress from the State of Florida, from magazine Guns and Ammo entitled
"Editorially Speaking?A Vital Bill Before Congress" 108-109
Article submitted by Hon. Robert L. F. Sikes from Sports Afield, August
1963, entitled "Blueprint for Peace?A Threat to Gun Ownership"_ _ 110-116
Memorandum supplied by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
listing fiscal year 1964 studies concerned with the economic impact of
arms control and disarmament 169
Memorandum submitted by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
on members of the peacekeeping panel, contract No. ACDA/GC-19,
with Johns Hopkins University 176
Memorandum supplied by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
regarding damage the Soviet Union is capable of inflicting on the United
States in a nuclear attack 190
Statement supplied by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
On Peace Research Institute study entitled "Quis Custodiet? Con-
trolling the Police in a Disarmed World" 195
Summary of "Quis Custodiet? Controlling the Police in a Disarmed
World," a report prepared by the Peace Research Institute, Washington,
D.C., April 1963 196
Statement submitted by the Student Peace Union on the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act amendments legislation 202
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
ACT
THURSDAY, AUGUST 29, 1963
I-1017SE Or REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS;"
TV ash,ington, D.C.
A The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :30 a.m., room II-322,
ir the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding
Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.
The committee meets this morning in open session for considera-
tion of pending bills relatinc, to arms control and disarmament.
The Chair wants to state that a telephone check shows we will have
a fairly good attendance so I think we will proceed.
Before each member are the bills pertaining to this subject intro-
duced by Mr. Farbstein, Mr. Gallagher, Mr. McDowell, Mr. Morse,
and Mr. Fraser.
Also attached is S. 777, a bill which passed the Senate on June 17,
1963:
(The bills referred to are as folloWs:)
[H.R. 3299, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
(By Mr. Farbstein)
A BILL To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authori-
zation for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor
employees
Be it enacted bp the Senate and House of Representatives of the United.
States of America in Congress assembled, That section 49(a) of the Act entitled
"Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat.
639), is amended by striking out "not to exceed $10,000,000" and inserting in
lieu thereof "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate,".
SEC. 2.- Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act",
approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 6.37), is amended by redesignating sub-
section 45(b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the
following new subsection:
"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or em-
ployees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investiga-
tion prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted
by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the
completed investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a)
hereof, provided that security clearance had been granted to the individual,
concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and
report. The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher
than confidential to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and em-
ployees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field in-
vestigations: Provided, That such investigations shall each include a current
national agency cheek."
1
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2 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
[H.R. 6082, 88th Cong., 1st Bess.]
(By Mr. Gallagher)
A BILL To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to Increase the authori-
zation for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor
-
employees
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the limited States
of America in Congress assembled, That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms
Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639), is
amended by striking out "not to exceed $10,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof
"such Sums as may be necessary and appropriate,".
SEC. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act",
approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by redesignating sub-
section 45(b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the
following new subsection :
"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or em-
ployees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investiga-
tion prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by
a Government agency, other than the Civil. Service Commission or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the com-
pleted investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof.'
provided that security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned
by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The
Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than con-
fidential to contractors or Subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual
or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: Pro-
vided, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency
check."
[H.R. 6204, 88th Cong., 1st sm.]
,(By Mr. McDowell)
A BILL To amend the Ands Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authori-
zation for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor
employees
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
states of America in Congress assembled, That section 49(a) of the Act entitled
"Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961. (75 Stat.
639), is amended by striking out "not to exceed $10,000,000" and inserting in lieu
thereof "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate,".
SEC. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arras Control. and Disarmament Act".
approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by redesignating sub-
section 45(b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the
following new subsection:
"(n) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or
employees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the
Investigation prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investiga-
tion conducted by a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commis-
sion or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Di-
rector that the completed investigation meets the standards established in sub-
section (a) hereof, provided that security clearance had been granted to the
individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investiga-
tion and report. The Director may also grant access for information classified
no higher than confidential to contractors or subcontractors and their officers
and employees, actual or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-
field investigations: Provided, That such investigations shall each include a
current national agency check."
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
4,1
[alt. 7340, 88th Cong., let sess.]
(By Mr. Morse)
A BILL To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authori-
zation for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor
employees
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms
. Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639), is
amended by striking out "not to exceed $10,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof
"such sums as may be necessary and appropriate,".
SEC. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act",
approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by redesignatiug sub-
section 45 ( b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the
following new subsection:
"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or em-
ployees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investiga-
tion prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by
a Government agency, other than *the Civil Service Commission or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the com-
pleted investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof,
provided that security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned by
another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The
Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than confiden-
tial to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or
prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: Pro-
vided, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency
check."
[HE. 7531, 88th Cong., 1st seas.]
(By Mr. Fraser)
A BILL To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authori-
zation for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor
employees
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms
Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639), is
amended by striking out "not to exceed $10,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof
"such sums as may be necessary and appropriate,".
SEC. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act",
approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by redesignatino?b subsec-
tion 45(b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the fol-
lowing new subsection:
"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employ-
ees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation
prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a
Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the com-
pleted investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof,
provided that security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned
by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The
Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than con-
fidential to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual
or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations: Pro-
vided, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency
check."
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4 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
[ S. 7,77, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
AN ACT To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authori-
zation for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor
employees
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms
Control and Disarmament Act", approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639),
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "In
addition, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1964
and 1965, the sum of $20,000,000, to remain available until expended, to carry out
the purposes of this Act."
SEC. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act",
approved September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by redesignating sub-
section 45(b) as subsection 45(c) and by inserting after subsection 45(a) the
following new subsection:
"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or em-
ployees, actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investiga-
tion prescribed in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by
a Government agency, other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, when it is determined by the Director that the com-
pleted investigation meets the standards established in subsection (a) hereof:
Provided, That security clearance had been granted to the individual concerned
by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report. The
Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than 'confi-
dential' to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual
or prospective, on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations:
Provided, That such investigations shall each include a current national agency
check."
SEC. 3. (a) Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is amended
by striking out the words "this or any other law" and inserting in lieu thereof
the words "this Act".
(b) In the proviso strike out the balance of the sentence after the word
"except" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "in accordance with the con-
stitutional processes of the United States".
(c) Such section is further amended by adding at the end thereof the follow-
ing new sentence: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize
any policy or action by any Government agency which would interfere with,
restrict, or prohibit the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms by an in-
dividual for the lawful purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation, education,
or training."
SEC. 4. Section 49 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:
"(c) Not more than 20 per centum of any appropriation made pursuant to
this Act shall be obligated and/or reserved during the last month of a fiscal
year.
"(d) None of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated shall be used
to pay for the dissemination within the United States of propaganda in support
of any pending legislation concerning the work of the United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency."
SEC. 5. In section 31(2) before the word "private" insert the words "United
States".
Passed the Senate June 17, 1963.
Attest:.FELTON M. JOHNSTON,
Secretary.
Chairman MORGAN. Our witness this morning is the Honorable
William C. Foster, who is the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
With Mr. Foster is Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, and
Mr. George Bunn, General Counsel.
Mr. Foster, do you have a prepared statement? You may proceed.
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
5
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, 'U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With your permission, I will read this statement since it covers most
of the points I would like to start off with.
I hope it will be brief.
88TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION
Mr. Chairman, it is my privilege today to appear before you and
the other members of the committee to review the legislative pro-
posals to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. These
proposals would increase the authorization for appropriations and
would modify the personnel security procedures for contractor em-
ployees. The proposals are reflected in a number of identical bills
introduced in the House during this session of Congress.
TWO AGREEMENTS REACHED SO FAR
Since its creation, the Agency's research and negotiating efforts
have contributed substantially to two arms control agreements.
Other agencies have naturally been part of the effort. But the
concepts for both the "hot line' agreement and the limited test ban
were formulated and largely carried out by ACDA.
In each case, the homework was done in advance and the proposal
was put forward with the Agency quarterbacking the activity. Care-
ful advance preparation produced quick agreement after the Soviet
Union accepted each proposal in principle months after it was made.
In each case, ACDA produced the first draft of the agreement in
Washington, and then supplied staff and backup for the negotiators.
The Agency, however, should not be. judged alone by the number
of agreements it makes. It is likely that there will be long periods
when no agreement which would serve our national interests will be
possible. But there will be other agreements. And this committee
ought to have some satisfaction because of the contributions of the
Agency it helped to create.
THE APPROPRIATIONS AMENDMENT
With respect to the legislation now before you, the Agency is pri-
marily concerned about the proposed amendment to increase the au-
thorization for appropriations. Section 49(a) of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Act contained an authorization ceiling of $10 mil-
lion. Of this amount, $8.33 million has been appropriated and only
$1.67 million remains.
The budget request for fiscal year 1964 contained $15 million for
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Eleven million dollars
of this was requested for contract and grant research. The remaining
$4 million is for research by Agency personnel, for administrative
support of our program, and for utilizing the results of research and
study through knowledgeable negotiations.
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6 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
?
The bills introduced in the House in support of the Agency's legis-
lative program would amend the act to authorize the appropriation of
"such sums as may be necessary and appropriate." When originally
introduced, S. 777 was identical to the House bills. As passel by the
Senate, however, S. 777 authorized to be appropriated the sum of $20
million to cover 2 fiscal years, 1964 and 1905.
If the Agency is to carry out thoroughly and effectively the func-
tions assigned to it by Congress, it will need more than the $20inillion
for 2 years authorized in S. 777.
The main effect of limiting available funds to $10 million per year
for the next 2 years would be the impact on the Agency's research pro-
gram. We had planned only small staff increases, in any event, but
even if increases above the fiscal year 1963 level were further restricted,
almost the same amount ($3.7 million, as compared with the $4 million
requested) would be required for program operations in fiscal year
1964. Therefore, a $10 million authorization for fiscal year 1964 would
result in a 40-percent cut in requested contract research funds, from
$11 to $6.3 million.
A cut of this magnitude in our research program -would require us
to reduce substantially some high priority projects. It also would
require us to eliminate other projects which are important for a com-
prehensive, coordinated program. Such a limitation would have an
even greater adverse impact in fiscal year 1965 when not only more
advanced research and analysis will be valuable but in addition more
costly operational proof tests will be required.
The importance of the research program was recognized by Congress
when it created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We
were directed to explore, develop, recommend and, if approved by the
President, negotiate possible alternatives to the arms race in order to
enhance our national security. As I have indicated, both the so-called
hot-line agreement and the limited test ban were produced with this
kind of effort. A broad background of technical information must be
available to our negotiators if we are to participate most wisely at the
conference table.
As the ACDA_ research program has acquired more clearly identified
goals, contracts and grants have been let at an increasing rate. For
fiscal year 1962 the Agency's budget provided $600,000 for contract
research, approximately one-third of its total budget. For fiscal year
1963 Congress provided $4 million for contract research; this was
roughly two-thirds of the Agency's total budget.
The Agency was, incidentally, limited in incurring contractual ob-
ligations during the first part of fiscal year 1963 because the bill con-
taining our appropriation for that year was not enacted until October
18. The funds were not apportioned until November 16. This late
date was the principal reason for the greater rate at which Agency
funds were obligated during the latter part of fiscal year 1963.
There are sound reasons why the ACDA contract research program
should be growing. The Agency is just under 2 years old. During
much of this time we have been developing the basic concepts for the
research program. Early work in this development was, of necessity,
exploratory and conceptual and did not involve much detail. How-
ever, now more detailed research and analysis is required to provide
technical support for sound U.S. negotiating positions.
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
7
To illustrate, it. takes much detailed technical information to de-
velop a good verification system. If nuclear weapon tests, for ex-
ample, are what we want to limit or prohibit under an agreement, we
must first identify the key indicators of foreign nuclear weapon tests.
Second, we mut design a verification system which will monitor
those indicators. Third, we must devise means of testing the elements
of that system. Fourth, we must conduct actual field tests. Gener-
ally speaking, each of these successive steps costs more money than
the last. Because of what has been done, we have confidence in the
present proposed treaty.
Most of the technical contract research on verification of this treaty
has actually been done by the Department of Defense which was as-
signed that responsibility before ACDA was created. But ACDA
has done a great deal of research on this subject since its establishment.
Moreover, it has begun both inhouse and external contract work on
several other areas of possible agreement, many of which require a de-
tection system probably even more complicated than that required by a
test ban.
This effort is expensive. This is particularly true as ACDA gets
into the later stages involving "hardware" research and field tests.
However, ACDA's budget of $11 million for fiscal year 1964, which for
the first time includes some research of a field test nature, is modest
in comparison to similar research efforts by other agencies and indus-
trial concerns.
The increased appropriation we have requested is neither incon-
sistent with our stage of development as an agency nor extravagant.
Moreover, if we are to take the next steps forward from the limited
test ban agreement, we must keep new ideas from contract and grant
research dowing into the Agency. If we are to produce sound arms
control plans consistent with the security of the United States, we must
be able to plan verification systems and test them.
The trend in ACDA research, namely, greater detail and specificity,
is evidenced by the contracts let in the latter half of fiscal year 1963.
Even more indicative of this trend is the list of proposed contract
and grant studies programed for fiscal year 1964. Both these lists
are included in the appendix of the presentation 'booklet the Agency
prepared for the use of the committee.
Included in the fiscal year 1964 list is the field test research project
ACDA has programed in cooperation with DOD. Out of the $11
million requested for research during fiscal year 1964, we planned to
allocate $2.4 million to cover A CDA's share of the cost of this field test
program. The Department of Defense will support an equivalent
share.
If the Agency were limited to $6.3 million instead of $11 million for
fiscal year 1964 research, the inspection field test program would have
to be substantially reduced.
In addition, the grant research program would have to undergo
more than a two-thirds reduction. ACDA looks to this, in part, for
new concepts for agreements that might follow the hot line and the
limited test ban.
Parenthetically, I might say to the committee that the hot line will
go into operation tomorrow. Before it had had field tests, it func-
tioned perfectly and it will be in active operation as of August 30.
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- A cut to $6.3 million would probably require cutting out much of
the contract work directed at steps toward decreasing tension and
reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. Our presenta-
tion statement (pp. 19-20) lists some of the more valuable research
endeavors which probably would have to be eliminated entirely if the
Agency were limited to $6.3 million for research in fiscal year 1964.
The importance we attach to these projects of more modest priority
emphasizes the high degree of importance we attach to the projects we
would retain even at an overall reduced level of research effort. How-
ever, the impact of the Senate cut in authorized appropriations can-
not be measured solely in terms of individual project reductions and
eliminations. Such a budget reduction also will result in reduced
coordination of research projects. Many of these projects are related
and depend upon the successful conclusion of other projects for
maximum effectiveness.
Our experience suggests the importance of research prior to negoti-
ations. The Department of Defense and ACDA research produced a
draft for a limited test ban treaty which was tabled on August 27,
-1962. This was available for inspection by the Soviets for 10 months
before Chairman Khrushchev decided to accept it in principle on
-July 2, 1963. After that, negotiations went quickly because our home-
work had been done in advance.
Our research prOgram as presently planned is designed to study
problems in a systematic and timely way before they become critical
negotiating issues. Only in this way can we have assurance that our
negotiating policies and positions are sound and consistent with the
security of the United States.
We believe that most of the research planned for fiscal year 1964
should be carried out in the near future. It covers a broad range of
conceptual and detailed research projects in the field of arms control
and disarmament. It is expected to provide us with the type of knowl-
edge that will enable us to take negotiating initiatives and respond
effectively, with foresight, to Soviet negotiating initiatives.
The field of arms control and disarmament is not an area of endeavor
in which we can engage safely without making every reasonable effort
to assure ourselves that our proposals and our responses to proposals
would enhance our security if adopted.
Some changes, of course, will be necessary in our planned research
as we proceed, These changes will reflect high priority needs that are
disclosed by negotiation or by unanticipated results from prior re-
search. 'We are currently evaluating the impact the test ban treaty
may have on future research. However, we believe the overall re-
search program planned for fiscal year 1964 is both sound and essen-
tial. I hope the committee will agree that it is a wise investment in
the future security of the United States.
THE SECURITY AMENDMENT
The second amendment to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act
proposed in the House bills would alter somewhat the security provi-
sions of the act. This amendment was included in S. 777 as passed
by the Senate.
Before I discuss the proposed amendment in detail, let me be quite
specific about two things. First, the amendment pertains only to the
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9
employees of contractors; it would not in any way revise the security
procedures or standards for employees or consultants of the Agency.
Second, the proposed amendment is entirely consistent with the funda-
mental security criterion in the act; namely, that standards applicaL
ble to security clearances shall not be less intensive or complete than
in the case of Government agencies having the highest security re-
strictions.
Under the act, as presently written, personnel of contractors may
not have access to classified information until they have been investi-
gated in accordance with the act, which provides for arrangements
for full-field background . investigation by either the Civil Service
Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The amendment would permit the Agency to grant access to con-
tractor personnel who had already received a security clearance from
another Government agency, provided that: . (1) the security clear-
ance had been granted to the individual concerned by the other Gov-
ernment agency on the basis of the same investigation and report that
it furnished to the Director; and, (2) the Director shall have deter-
mined that the person is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty un-
der standards set forth in section 45(a) of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Act.
We request this statutory change because a number of cases have
arisen in which our contractor employees have been required to un-
dergo a Civil Service Commission or Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion full-field background investigation, even though they have been
cleared by another Government agency on the basis of a. full-field
background investigation conducted by an agency other than the
Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This procedure involves a costly duplication of effort, as well as delays.,
and is in our opinion unnecessary in the interest of security.
Each full-field background investigation now costs between $350
and $400. On just two of our contracts, for example, the procedure
proposed by the amendment would have saved the Government over
$5,000.
Clearances based on full-field background investigations normally
have taken around 60 days. When the load has become heavy, they
have taken as much as 90 to 120 days. In the usual case, an Agency
contractor cannot bring his full effort to bear on a study for 2 to 4
months after a contract with the Agency is executed. In instances
where classified bidders' conferences are necessary to enable proposers
to prepare fully responsive proposals, an additional period of delay
is encountered to clear contractor personnel in advance of the bidders''
conference.
Research work has been delayed by our security requirements. I
fully appreciate that some delays are inevitable where strict security
requirements must be observed in the national interest. However,?,
these delays should be reduced to a minimum consistent with sound
security practices.
The change I have been discussing would not result in investigations
which are less intensive or less complete than the act presently requires.
It would not relax the present strict standards for security clearance.
It would merely permit the utilization of an investigative report pre-
pared by an agency other than the Civil Service Commission or the.
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10 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a clearance by such other- agency,
as the basis for clearing contractor personnel.
If the investigative report of the other agency did not, in our opin-
ion, fulfill our normal requirements with respect to thoroughness and
completeness, we would obtain additional information on matters not
adequately covered.
We have discussed this amendment thoroughly with security per-
sonnel of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy
Commission. The proposed procedure would be on a parity with prac-
tices followed by our most sensitive agencies. Indeed, the language
of our proposed amendment is based on a 1961 amendment to the
Atomic Energy Act.
Prior to 1961, section 145 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 also
required an investigation by the Civil Service Commission or the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation for Atomic Energy Commission security
clearances. The 1961 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act author-
ized the Commission to grant access to restricted data to any individual
on the basis of an investigation made by an agency other than the
Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
As I have indicated, our amendment is less far reaching in that it is
limited to contractor personnel.
The last sentence in our security amendment would authorize the
Agency to grant to contractor personnel access to information clas-
sified no higher than "Confidential" on the basis of something less
than a full-field background investigation. Access to confidential
information would be granted to contracor personnel on the basis of
a. check of agencies maintaining personnel security files, such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and various intelligence agencies.
If such a name check disclosed any question whatsoever, access to all
classified information would be withheld pending a more thorough
investigation of the individual involved. This portion. of the amend-
ment would simply authorize the Agency to follow a 'practice already
commonly utilized by other Government agencies.
Such a practice would facilitate the Agency's contract research pro-
gram. In many cases, such as bidders' conferences, a prompt clear-
ance for low-classification material is all that a contractor needs.
The Government's interest would be better served by providing for
a low cost, expeditious national agency check rather than an expensive
and lengthy full-field investigation.
OTHER AMENDMENTS ADDED BY THE SENATE
A number of other amendments to the act were included in S. 777
as passed by the Senate. Among these was an amendment to prevent
any action under the act that would restrict the right of individuals
to possess firearms for "the lawful purpose of personal defense, sport,
recreation, education, or training."
While we believe it unnecessary, the Agency has no objection to such
an amendment. It should alleviate concern along this line that has
developed. The congressional intent that the prohibition apply only
to light, private firearms for personal use is, of course, clear.
None of the Senate amendments would have a major impact on the
Agency, although the one limiting contractors to domestic concerns
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seems unduly restrictive. There seems no good reason for closing
ourselves off from certain useful sources of information abroad.
However, the occasions when we could not get most of the informa-
tion at home will probably be rare.
I might add, in conclusion, that both our present and projected ex-
ternal research programs contain contracts and grants that have a .di-
rect and essential bearing on agreements which could follow in the
wake of the limited test an. I don't know what the next such agree-
ment will be. As the President has said:
No one can predict with certainty " * what further agreements, if any;
can be built on the foundations of this one. They could include controls on
preparations for surprise attack or on numbers and types of armaments. There
could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear weapons. The important
point is that efforts to seek new agreements will go forward.
Many of the contracts and grants listed in our presentation material
are directly related to the possibilities mentioned by the President.
Our outside research projects dealing with inspection and verification
problems have a bearing on many possible areas of agreement. I be-
lieve these studies must be continued if we are to obtain maximum as-
surance that particular agreements are in our national interest.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman you,
Thank you, Mr. Foster.
Mr. Foster, I gather from your statement you feel that the authori-
zation in the bill passed by the other body, which provided a. $10 mil-
lion authorization for fiscal year 1964 and $10 million for fiscal year
1965, puts restrictions on your Agency.
Mr. FOSTER. I feel, sir, that it has a very large impact on our planned
research program which I think has been well developed. It is now
making constructive knowledge available to us and I think that this
disproportionate impact on the research program is unfortunate.
I think that the budget which the President approved and which was
presented to the Congress of $15 million was a good budget.
I think it was, as I said in the statement, based on a very small.
increase in our personnel, an increase which was designed only to take
care of an increasing research program. I think that the terms of
the act, not only to undertake research in a series of fields but also
to coordinate all such research in the U.S. Government does put on
us a real responsibility to do a good job in the field. A cut of this
amount, in my opinion, will have a harmful effect on the progress
of that program.
-Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster, a review of research projects of
the Arms Controls Agency, either already contracted or now in the
stage of being contracted raises a question whether these matters
have been studied or worked on by the Department of Defense or the
CIA,- and whether they should not have been more properly studied
by such an organization. flow does your Agency approach this
problem? Is there any duplication in the type of studies going on
in the Department of Defense and CIA with those financed by your
Agency?
Mr: FOSTER. No, sir. We do not believe there presently is. The
act was supplemented by an Executive order which gave to this
Agency the job of making sure that duplication would be minimized
or eliminated entirely, if possible.
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Before any contract is placed by other agencies?these would be
primarily Department of Defense, AEC, and CIA to a lesser extent;
also the Space Agency?they are in touch with us under the respon-
sibilities of that act and that Executive order and would keep a
running inventory of those research projects?they would make a re--
port semiannually to the Bureau of the Budget of the contracts under-
taken by those agencies. One of those is due September 15 and the
last one was made March 15.
My reply to you is that to the greatest possible extent we can and
with the full cooperation of those other agencies, are eliminating or
minimizing any duplication.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster, on page 12 of the green book in
paragraph (a) you say:
A study to develop techniques for monitoring declared production and for
detecting clandestine production of strategic delivery vehicles within the frame-
work of an Arms Control Agreement to discontinue or limit such produc-
tion * * *.
Presumably such delivery vehicles would include aircraft and mis-
siles. It would appear that the production of aircraft and missiles
would be a principal subject for intelligence operations whether it was
clandestine or not or whether production was increasing, or being
phased out.
My question is, Why should not the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency rely on the Department of Defense and various other intelli-
gence agencies for this kind of research?
Mr. FOSTER. We do clear very directly and regularly with both
the Department of Defense and CIA in this type of investigation. But
those two agencies have a slightly different approach to a limitation
of this sort. We are charged with looking at this from the view-
point of, Are they attempting to evade an arms control agreement
which has been entered into by both sides?
The Department of Defense, obviously, in doing this has a re-
connaissance interest perhaps in what the other side is doing but not
the actual attempt to evade a limiting agreement.
In placing such a contract, however, it is done in complete coopera-
tion with these two departments. We utilize the information they
have and the contractors we have used for this type of activity have
been contractors who are working with the Department of Defense, or
in some cases the Central Intelligence Agency. So, a contract of this
sort is essential from the viewpoint of an arms control agreement and a
possible violation. That is an approach that is different than that
of those other agencies and the stated objective of the study.
Therefore, they are planned differently but in full cooperation with
the other agencies.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster, I notice on page 13 of your state-
ment you discussed the amendment put in by the other body concern-
ing small arms. As one Member of Congress, I have received a con-
siderable volume of mail from organizations of sportsmen in my dis-
trict concerning this amendment. I recognize that this amendment
may have been initiated by people who are opposed to the Disarmament
Agency. I am sure that it has many sincere supporters. You have
indicated that there was no intention or authority in the act of
1961 to limit any ownership of small arms.
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Mr. FOSTER. No intention; no authority was given to the Director.
I can assure you that the Director himself is interested in sporting arms-.
and ammunition.
I have seen no authority or responsibility given to the Director to do
anything about limiting the use of such personal weapons.
As I say, we do not object to the redundancy, if you will, of the
amendment but I can assure you that there was never any action taken
that should have caused any concern in that direction.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster, one further question and I will be
through.
I notice in the Senate report on the hearings that were held there
was some criticism on the letting of contracts by your Agency during.
the last quarter of the fiscal year. The amendment the other body
adopted established a percentage limitation on the letting of contracts
in the last month of the fiscal year.
Was the reason for this delay the fact that your Agency was just
beginning to get into operation, or was the reason the long period of
time it took to complete your investigations and security clearances,
in screening these contracts? What was the reason why the contracts
were let in this increased number in the last quarter of this fiscal year ?
Mr. FOSTER. I think you have touched on some of the reasons. Ac-
tually, we had just over 7 months to place these contracts because we
did not get our money until November 16, 1962. Secondly, at that
point, we were a small agency and we were just beginning to acquire
competent personnel to investigate and to place contracts with the care
which I insist on.
Thirdly, there were some delays, as I have stated in my statement,
made in the clearance of contractor personnel.
I think that the combination of these factors made it very difficult
to place them.
I might mention two other things that bear on this. Due to the
shortness of the year, in some instances we would go right down to the
final negotiation of the contract and find that we either disagreed on
the amount or we disagreed on some of the conditions. Therefore,
we had to start all over again and run a new set of negotiations.
That has happened this year, in 1963?fiscal 1963.
Actually we are coming to the Congress without having obligated
some $441,000, primarily because two contracts which we thought were
all ready to go were not concluded. In one the contractor insisted on
a provision which we were unwilling to accept.
In the other case the contract was placed by the Department of De-
fense for us. They were unable to commit all of the funds they said
we would be able to commit Out of the $4 million that we had for
research in fiscal 1963, we actually committed some $3,559,000.
So, I think it is a combination of several factors. We will have
some trouble again this year, Mr. Chairman, because this is practically
the first of September and we are operating on a remaining authori-
zation of $1,669,000. We are operating at the rate of $270,000 a
month.
We have been unable to take the risk of placing any contracts because
if we place some contracts we might not have enough money to meet
our payrolls.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.
23-197?O3 2
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14 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mrs. Bolton?
Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We are always glad to see you.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mrs. Bolton.
Mrs. BOLTON. On the subject of small arms I live n an area that,
until quite recently, has been considered a safe i
e area, but within the
week there was an inexcusable and horrible tragedy. It makes us all
think a bit about the ease with which anybody can get small arms.
Where do the two things tie in? Nobody is safe on the streets today.
You are a hunter and my family has hunters, too, but can there not
be some kind of regulation? Can anybody have a pistol?
Chairman MORGAN. You did not mean that such control was pro-
vided under this act?
Mrs. BOLTON. How does this tie in?
Mr. FOSTER. I think it does not tie in. Actually, I share with you
the sorrow over this tragic accident in the Kalorama area. That is a
frightful thing when someone cannot peacefully walk a dog without
.being brutally murdered, as be was.
Mrs. BOLTON. The second one in a year.
Mr. FOSTER. Our bill has no effect on this whatsoever. It has no
intent of controlling arms for that purpose. We are directed to
developing arms control and disarmament policies primarily in the
international field and to promote international peace.
Mrs. BOLTON. You assure the sportsmen this does not affect their
sport or anybody else's?
Mr. FOSTER. I am assuring the sportsmen and those who wish to
have personal arms that our responsibility does not go in that
direction.
Mrs. BOLTON. Yes; that is true and I see that perfectly, but where
does the i.esponsibility lie in this?
Mr. FOSTER. I think this is an individual community or State police
responsibility. There are differing views on whether one is safer by
having his own personal arms or whether one is safer by having a
restriction on arms, such as the Sullivan Act in New York State. This
is a highly controversial area.
I do think this is an individual community or State responsibility
and a very important one. I hope that those who are charged with
that responsibility, in view of this tragic accident and tragic murder,
will take steps to at least minimize the possibility of that.
Mrs. BOLTON. May I ask you a question about the investigations?
You will be accepting investigations from other departments?
MT. FOSTER. Yes.
Mrs. BOLTON. Do the departments have exactly the same stand-
ards upon which to investigate?
Mr. FOSTER. Not necessarily. What we are asking for is the ability,
only in the case of contractor personnel.
Mrs. BOLTON. I understand that.
Mr. FosrE.R. Most contracts we place are not at the highest security
level at which our inhouse investigations are made. We are asking
that there be, however, even in the case of contractor personnel, an
investigation, for instance, by the Department of Defense or by the
National Aeronautics and Space Agency. In other words, if a con-
tractor is already working on contracts with one of these sensitive
agencies and if the personnel are working on classified material and
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have already been subject to a full-field investigation by competent
.-.agencies, such as the Air Force, Army, Navy, or the Department of
Defense, or the Office of the Secretary himself, we think that, for con-
tractors at least, that kind of a full-field investigation should be ade-
quate in most cases to take care of the Contractors working for us.
Mrs. BOLTON. Your organization knows exactly what is involved
:in the other organizations?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes. We see the reports. The report would be sub-
mitted to us.
Mrs. BOLTON. Are you making any study? You do not mention it
anywhere and, to me, this is one of the very serious sides in the antici-
pation of an eventual millennium that we need to know what would
-happen when we stop some of our factories from making these military
supplies.
Mr. FOSTER. Yes; we have an Economic Bureau headed by an As-
sistant Director appointed by the President and affirmed by the Senate.
The man in question is Archibald Alexander who is, or who was, an
Under Secretary of the Army. His Bureau is concerned with the
,economic impact of arms control adjustments. It is our belief, and
we have made two or three reports on this on behalf of the United
'States to the United Nations, that with good planning- it would be
-possible to minimize the impact of the kind of cuts that would come
-under any program that is presently set forth to a degree that it can
be met by the assistance of Government in giving due notice and
by the enterprise of individual companies themselves.
We have established in the Government at least, on our initiative,
an interagency committee; Assistant Council of Economic Advisers
of the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, and the
Department of Defense to take a look at these conditions and see
-what can be done about them.
We have also set forth in the 1964 budget several major studies;
the economic impact on specific arms control and disarmament meas-
ures, both in the United States and in the U.S.S.R,. (Presentation
book, appendix, pp. 10, 29-30). It has another virtue, economic in-
vestigation, in that it also gives us some opportunity to verify. So,
we plan to spend in that Bureau about $500,000 if we get the budget.
Mrs. BOLTON. That is fine; but what confidence can we establish in
the minds of our laboring people when we already have some 6 million
people out of jobs? Where are all of those jobs coming from? What
-advice do you give where?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, may I first say that this is not a new experience
for the United States of America, the impact of disarmament. We
have gone through this before and I happen to have been a party at
firsthand in the largest and most abrupt disarmament program man
?could conceive and that was after World War II. We did it without
?distortion for two reasons: one was, of course, there were accumulated
consumer needs which. needed to be met immediately; secondly, we
had planned this from almost the day of Pearl Harbor. We had
planned it in the, Government.. We had planned it in cooperation
with businesses themselves. Businesses themselves are beginning to
-take it seriously and 15 of the largest. contractors have set up disarma-
ment divisions within their companies.
Those divisions not only plan what they will do, come the day,
but they also are attempting to work with us as partners in some
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of these studies. Labor unions are working with us and we are,
making field trips to check, for instance, with communities that have
-
a very major share in defense contracts out of their total employ-
ment, to see what are the things that might be done to supplant the
things they are now doing. For the immediate future, under an
arms control agreement, probably expenditures will be almost as great,.
the world being as it is, because verification instruments and activities:
are very kindred to those used on the other side of the coin.
Many of those in electronics, for instance, who are now making
defense items could turn their production to verification activities.
'Mrs. BOLTON. Yes, but no actual effort is being made to establish
centers where jobs can be found, and so on?
Mr. FOSTER. No; except that rwe do work with the Department of
Commerce which has responsibility under this field.
MTS. BOLTON. RaraiThilg ?
Mr. FOSTER. Retraining in the area of redevelopment activities.
Our people are in constant touch with them and the Department of
Labor. At this point in time, they are doing this simply to be sure
that we are aware of what is being done and also under the research
studies to make plans for what can be done.
Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, perhaps one other question?
Chairman MORGAN. Yes.
Mrs. BOLTON. Will you tell us exactly what we get from the "hot
line"?
Mr. FosTER. Yes, I will tell you.
During last fall at the time of Cuba, a time of great tension, a time.
of near crisis we were seriously concerned by the fact that the two-
heads of state when they had to communicate found it sometimes nec-
essary to communicate by a broadcast which was subject :to all mis-
interpretation of translation and otherwise. In this day of
instantaneous discharge of totally destructive weapons, it has been
thought, and we have studied this at some length, the ability to have a
direct, dependable communication at times of crisis between those who
have to make the decisions, would be a way to reduce the risk of a
possible war by accident or miscalculation. So, for some hundreds
of thousands of dollars -only, it is possible, and we have now installed'
a direct telecommunications line which is dependable and constantly-
tested and which is backed up by a radio link of the same sort.
Mrs. BOLTON. What we get is conversation?
Mr. FOSTER. It is conversation but not by word of mouth. This is-
conversation in written form so that there is no chance of a misunder-
standing due to the frailties of the -human ear or translation. These'
are transmitted simultaneously in both Russian and in English.
Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you. I appreciate that very much.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zabloeki ?
Mr. ZAELOCKI. I pass.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Burleson?
Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, Do you anticipate that-
the Director will be back in executive session in consideration of this-
matter?
Chairman MORGAN. Nothing has been scheduled, Mr. Burleson, but:
if the committee wishes, I am sure the Director will come back.
Mr. FOSTER. At your suggestion, sir.
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Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Foster, I doubt that anyone can be accurate,
but I understand we are now spending in the neighborhood of
'$7 or $8 billion in research of this general nature. Will you give
us
Mr. GROSS. Will the gentlemanyield-for a correction?
Mr. BURLESON. Yes.
Mr. GROSS. According to the Bureau of the Budget it is more nearly
$14 billion.
Mr. BURLESON. I will accept the figure.
I said I did not know the exact figure but if the Bureau of the
Budget says it is near $14 billion, I am sure it must be.
The figure I mentioned did not include the moonshot and things
of that sort. Whether research that is already underway and. that
'which is anticipated is included, I do not know, but I accept the figure.
Anyway, will you give us specifically some of the research programs
in which your Agency is now engaged and explain what you mean by
`"hardware" and "field tests"? I do not know what that means.
Mr. FOSTER. I will take the second part first, the field tests.
For instance, if we were to achieve a limitation on the number of
'airplanes that were to be kept by a particular side under an arms
limiting agreement, we would want to be able, in some fashion, either
by ground inspection or by overflights, to find out whether they had
more airplanes than were allowed under the agreement.
Now, how do you do that? What kind of instruments do you use?
You have various kinds of detection instruments, but what can you
.see by flying over it at 5'00 miles an hour? We don't always know
if an attempt is being made to evade the limitations so a field test
'would be one in which we actually take a look, by one group which
'doesn't kn.ow what's in a particular air command center, to see what
you can see from the air or to see what you can see from passing
through in a jeep or another vehicle with the kind of sensors we
'presently have: infrared, radar
Mr. BURLESON. What would your Agency pay for that operation?
Mr. FOSTER. We would be paying for the scientific means, the con-
verting of a presently offensive airplane to one which would make
this kind of observation.
Mr. BuRLEsoN. Do you mean you can do that sort of thing for $15
million? Would you say that kind of research alone, without the
other, would be a project of value?
Mr. FOSTER. We have planned one such for fiscal year 1964 and that
is a look, in cooperation with the Department of Defense, in which
they would provide the airplanes, they would provide the crews to fly
?them, they would provide the targets at which we look; they would
provide the jeeps and so forth because we have no hardware of our own.
.Our part would be the conversion to help make this responsive to this
new requirement and that particular thing has been estimated in this
next year at just under $6 million, of which we would pick up some-
what less than half.
Because this is not the responsibility presently of the Department
of Defense, they do not have, even in their billions of dollars for
research, money to do this kind of thing, and we were very lucky, we
felt, to get them. to agree to share in this activity to the extent of 50
percent.
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18 TO AMEND THE ARMS- CONTROL. AND DISARMAMENT- ACT- -
Mr. BURLESON. Would that be a part in the Senate report list of the
studies of research contracts and grants? For instance item No. 10,
"Development of Field Test Plan Regarding Reduction of Strategy
Delivery Vehicles." The contract is with the Bendix Corp. it seems.
Mr. FOSTER. No, that is another field test. That is Bendix looking
at a production plant to see whether, from observation of this sort,.
they can tell whether that company would be cheating in the number
it was producing. The field test I have been referring to?it is nearly
at the top of page 5, and that is ?"Research for inspection field test
program, $2,400,000."
Mr. BURLESON. I see here in this report which I haven't had a chance
to study, the subhead "Status of Research Contracts and Grants"?I
suppose that is an example of the various categories of research.
Mr. FOSTER. Those are the ones that were missed in fiscal year 1963:
and are presently in process, and that answers, I hope, the first part
of your question.
Mr. BURLESON. You have concept studies. No. 2: "Supporting.
Studies."
I suppose those are the principal headings. Quite a bit of this is
farmed out to various colleges and universities?
Mr. FOSTER. Some of it is, Mr. Burleson. I think probably one-
tenth or possibly an eighth of it is to universities. It is divided fairly
well between private manufacturing companies, most of whom are
defense contractors, as I indicated earlier, universities, nonprofit re-
search organizations such as Stanford Research, Aerospace, Institute
of Defense Analysis, and various universities such as Yale, Rutgers,
and MIT.
Mr. BURLESON. Here is one at Princeton: "Psychological Factors
in Soviet Disarmament Position (Institute for the Study of National
Behavior, Inc.)."
I am just picking one out. at random. Just what does that mean?'
Mr. FOSTER. We are charged with investigating the scientific' tech-
nological, psychological, military, sociological concepts behind arms-
control and disarmament activities.
In neesotiating, it is useful to find out what may be the psychologic.ai
motivation of the Soviet negotiators and of the government of the
other side. That is a very modest contract of $10,704. I would sub-
mit. Mr. Chairman, for the record, the full details of it. I frankly
don't know?I presume it is one or two specialists in this field who are
making a particular study from the viewpoint of motivation under a.
set of specifics which we have prepared and on which they have made
this proposal. It is a grant, I presume, and we are encouraging.
grants to scholars of various kinds in fields which bear on those basic.
responsibilities with -which we have been charged.
(The information referred to is as follows:)
GRANT FOR STUDY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN SOVIET DISARMAMENT POSITIONS'
A grant of $10.704 was awarded in May 1963 to the Institute for the Study of'
National Behavior. Inc.. Princeton. N.J.. for a 5-month study, (1) to identify
underlying psychological factors influencing Soviet positions on arms control and.
disarmament and (2) to show how these factors affect the substance and con-
duct of negotiations. Dr. Bryant Wedge, a social psychologist who is the.
director of the institute, is principal investigator for the study.
The study is designed to utilize the specialized analytical techniques of the,
psychologist and social scientist for a deeper understanding of basic Soviet
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4
attitudes, to provide insight into Soviet motivations and preoccupations, and the
perceptions and misconceptions that the Soviets may have of Western objectives
in the area of arms control.
The research is to include systematic content analysis of the verbatim records.
of the Disarmament Conference since its inception in March 1962 and of related
public documents of the period. Although these will be the basic source of infor-
mation, other materials pertinent to Soviet national psychology will also be
studied and included in the final report.
Following an initial review of available documentation, a preliminary written
report of the research was submitted to ACDA in July and made available to-
Sovietologists attending the ACDA-sponsored summer conference on Soviet atti-
tudes. A final report is due in November 1963.
In sponsoring this research, ACDA felt that the findings could have direct
application to the planning and conduct of arms control negotiations with the
Soviets. The psychologist's knowledge of human behavior and specialized
techniques of analysis would be used to broaden the political scientist's under-
standing of Soviet motivations, suggesting how most effectively to communicate
with the Soviets and what in substance is most likely of acceptance, or non-
acceptance, because of deeply held Soviet beliefs.
Mr. BURLESON. Now, just to hurry on, here is one under (B), on
page 3: "Summer Study of Soviet Attitudes (Columbia University) ."
I just wonder who in Columbia would know more than would our -
CIA? How authoritative is it and who depends on what they say?
Mr. FOSTER. Columbia University has a very excellent institute for
Russian studies. The director of that institute made a proposal that
he would, during the summer, be able to put together a group of Rus-
sian scholars to examine the current activities of the Soviet Union and
to make a report which would bear on our problems. He put together
I think some 14 or 20 scholars, outstanding scholars. They are out-
standing scholars who are in the university?I understand some CIA
men attended this thing?there is a good report on it, and it was a
very useful summer study. They spent, I think, about 2 or 3 weeks,
and our own people participated, to get the benefit of their discus-
sions and thinking, and this was the way to bring together, in the sum-
mer when these professors were not teaching, to, in effect, pick their
brains as to what their thinking was above and beyond what the CIA,
which is burdened with day-to-day problems, is perhaps able to do.
Mr. BURLESON. You have given us an example of "field test." Is
that the same thing as "hardware"?
Mr. FOSTER. It is the same thing.
Mr. BURLESON. Let me ask you hurriedly about the so-called Lausche
amendment adopted by the Senate when they passed this measure.
Do you agree with the change that has been made in section 33 of
the original law?
Mr. FOSTER. We were quite happy with the original law, Mr. Burle-
son, as it stood. We can operate under the law as amended.
If you wish to have a discussion of the constitutional processes, my
distinguished colleague, Mr. Fisher, was the former counsel of the
State Department, and he is much better equipped than I to speak,
but we can operate under either one.
Mr. BURLESON. Do you have any serious objection to the language
which the Senate put in section 33? I hope this committee will do at
least as much. I think this is moderate. I would hope to produce such
an amendment.
Just one more question, Mr. Foster.
We haven't abandoned the idea of ongrourid inspection; have we?
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Mr. FOSTER. Not at all. Not at all. It is our continued philosophy
that inspection and the ability to verify must accompany any reduc-
tion or limitation on arms and this is consistent with the environment
-test ban treaty, because we have in operation a fine detection system
under national control and in doing things?well, for instance, the
comprehensive test ban treaty which would also control underground
tests, we believe we would require onsite inspections for that, if we
were to take that further limitation.
Mr. BURLESON. Would you have any objections to having the chair-
man designated as one of the team of inspectors?
Mr. FOSTER. This has some difficulties, with all due respect to the
,chairman. The questions are of availability, of present, precise skills
that are required for particular kinds of observation, because this be-
-comes a scientific and technical question.
There is also the problem of mingling of the executive and legis-
lative branches in an administrative function.
Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is more than up.
Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.
Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster, on the second paragraph, page 5, you say, "If nuclear
weapon tests, for example, are what we want to limit or prohibit under
an agreement, we must first identify the key indicators of foreign
nuclear weapon tests. Second, we must design a verification system
which will monitor those indicators. Third, we must devise means of
testing the elements of that system."
First, I want to know, is there an arrangement in the test ban treaty
for onsite inspections?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; there is not. -
Mr. WHALLEY. Secondly, in answer to the three questions that you
-submit, do you have a system that will verify the test?
Mr. FOSTER. We do.
Mr. WHALLEY. Has the work been done, or what will it cost to com-
plete it?
Mr. FOSTER. The work has been done and the system is operating
*very day. We have in the past detected and identified explosions in
-the atmosphere, under water, and there have been no tests in outerspace,
so far as we know, but we have the capability of detecting such tests
as well. And the national system which has been in operation for some
years and which is one of high efficiency, is adequate for this kind of
verification.
As has been said on the other side of the Hill, it is planned to expand
that somewhat and those requests are already before the appropriations
committees because we had already, before the test ban treaty was
signed, decided that such improvements would be desirable.
Mr. Wnstaxy. What objections were there to onsite inspections?
Mr. FOSTER. The basic objection is the fundamental and traditional
-secrecy of the Soviet Union, and its expressed belief that we wanted
onsite inspections for espionage purposes. This is a very firm, built-
in position which they have always had and they have said that they
are perfectly willing to go to complete and general disarmament, and
then give us every opportunity to inspect, but not during the process.
We have said we are unwilling to do otherwise than have the amount
of inspection parallel with and proportionate to the amount of disarma-
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ment, and that would be true of a comprehensive test ban treaty, where
we believe that it would be necessary for us to have the right to go look
at a certain number of underground events in which it is impossible
to distinguish between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. This is a
traditional Russian approach. I faced it in my negotiations with the
Russians over many, many years, and it is built in. We have attempted
to prove to them that this is in their interest as well as ours because it
would give confidence to both sides, that agreements undertaken were
not being violated, but they do object to "verification"?we prefer to
use that word?unless it is accompanied by disarmament. We say we
will accept that principle as long as they are simultaneous.
Mr. WHALLEY Does the cost of these three items come out of
your funds?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. We have been the beneficiaries of the establish-
ment of this system before this Agency was put into operation. We
have added a good deal to some of the parts of that system by the advice
and counsel of our scientists and we are very closely in touch with the
operation of these systems.
Mr. WHALLEY What part will you play from now on then in keep-
ing it up to date?
Mr. FOSTER. We will continue to be closely in touch with them.
There was at one point a suggestion that some of these, under our
statute, perhaps should be transferred to us to operate. The statute
you will recall, states that the force of our functions is to prepare for
and to plan, and if necessary, to operate the verification system. It
is a very small agency and these take some fairly substantial numbers
of operating personnel. We have not had, in the past, the financial
nor the personnel means to do other than to sit as advisers and counsel-
ors and policy suggesters on these systems. We have made, in the 2.
years of our life, many, many contributions to this, and much of what
the new plans are have actually evolved from our own Agency.
Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. MTS. Kelly.
Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster, it is good to have you here explaining the work of the.
Agency.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you.
Mrs KELLY. I am sure we all hope it is most successful.
Mr. Chairman, have we any hearings of the Senate on this bill, so
that we will not have to duplicate, if possible, the questions?
Chairman MORGAN. Yes. Copies are on the table before you.
Mrs. KELLY May I assume, Mr. Foster, that the administration and
operating cost of this program is in the vicinity of $2 million?
Mr. FOSTER. It is running presently at the rate of about $3.7 million.
Mrs. KELLY. On page 35 it shows an anticipated increase in the
contract research in practically every item. Personnel, almost doubled
for 1964. Is that correct, Mr. Chairmen?
? Mr. FOSTER. Yes, that is correct. You will recall during the year
1963 we started with about 100 in personnel, and during the year we
built it up so that we presently have 205 on board, and therefore, the
sliding increase, or the buildup, is what makes it look like a very sub-
stantial increase, but it is not an increase of great size over our present
level.
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Mrs. KELLY. Do you feel you cannot obtain the material that you
have on contract work in other agencies of research in our Govern-
ment without your undertaking another special and separate research
program?
Mr. FOSTER. We are absolutely certain of it, Mrs. Kelly. The ob-
jectives of the other agency are 180 degrees opposite to the objectives of
ours. They are concerned in terms of this sort of research. We all
have the same concern in terms of national security, but when they
attempt to undertake research, it is to actually increase weapons to
promote security. We believe it is possible to decrease weapons and
promote security. We believe the continued massive addition of arms
is not necessarily the way to promote national security, so our objec-
tives and our responsibilities are quite different from those of the De-
fense Department, for instance, and their budgets, they claim?and
I know, because I happened to run those budgets in the old days?are
directed in other directions. So we cannot, unless their own legisla-
tion changed to instruct them to do that same sort of thing, we cannot
achieve the kind of research objectives that we are setting forth in our
programs under the funds to other agencies.
Mrs. KELLY. Wouldn't it be better for your Agency, Mr. Foster, to
have the report of these agencies through their own personnel to de-
duct, instead of going through an outside agency, in schools and col-
leges, to come up with a survey with which they are completely un-
familiar; I assume that they do not have the background of operation
? of that which is in Government? You would have to get clearance
and so forth with those contract people in colleges before you could
? even permit them to do a lot of research.
Mr. FOSTER. In certain of these activities, yes, but if this were avail-
able in other agencies, we do have it available. We are in daily touch
with the Department of Defense at all levels. We are in daily touch
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA. We have complete coordi-
nation in working arrangements so what they have available is avail-
able to us.
These are additive to what is available in those other agendies. As
far as their people go, some of them are assigned to us. We have a
number of military officers who are assigned to our Agency, on a re-
imbursable basis. We have numbers of people from the State Depart-
ment assigned to us on a reimbursable basis. We have one or two
from other agencies assigned to us on the same basis, so that in the
daily working out, our job is one of coordinating what is available in
the -U.S. Government.
Mrs. KELLY If you need any checks with CIA or FBI do they as-
sume the cost of that research? Is it reflected in this program? Is it
? on page 35 where it says: "Administrative support functions per-
formed by State and other agencies"?is that a reflection
Mr. FOSTER. That is a reflection?the reimbursement of personnel
is not in that amount. The $749,000 which is requested for 1964 is
- largely a reimbursement to State for housekeeping, for bookkeeping,
for the furniture, for the rooms, for the telephones, and for all the
housekeeping things. The reimbursement of personnel, both from
State and Defense, is in the $3,074,000.
Mrs. KELLY. Some of these things will have to be answered in
executive session.
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I have many questions which I fear at this point are for executive
session.
Chairman MORGAN. If the committee wishes, Mrs. Kelly, we will
be glad to have the Director back up for an executive session..
Mrs. KELLY I think it will be most necessary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.
Mr. GROSS. I have been interested in knowing what Pugwash Con-
ference means?
Mr. FOSTER. That is a small town in, I think Nova Scotia, Mr.
'Gross. The conferences between Soviet and Anierican scientists were
commenced by Mr. Cyrus Eaton, one of Mrs. Bolton's constituents,.
Mr. GROSS. This Cyrus Eaton is a notorious pro-Communist?you
'don't have to answer that. Let me state that as my opinion.
Have you attended any of these meetings?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; I have not. They have changed in character,
may I say, Mr. Gross. Mr. Eaton is no longer connected with them.
They are exchanges of American and Soviet scientists and British
-scientists and some others.
The principle of exchange of scientific ideas, I think is a useful
one, and some of our very competent and able scientists have picked
up what started at Pugwash and these meetings are continuing, I
think, at a rate of twice a year.
Mr. GROSS. At Pugwash ?
Mr. FOSTER. No, these are held at different locations.
Mr. GROSS. Let me ask you this question?my time is limited, and
I would appreciate it if you would be as brief as possible in your
answers, because I have several questions to ask?Do you advocate
-world government?
Mr. FOSTER. I do not.
Mr. GROSS. One world, or world government, either expression. Do
iyou not advocate one world government?
Mr. FOSTER. We advocate, as the act instructs us, Mr. Gross, to
move toward an ultimate goal of stable peace and general disarmament.
Mr. GROSS. Don't you get fairly close to it with this sort of propa-
ganda?and you are the author, are you not, of the three-stage
disarmament plan?
Mr. FOSTER. We are. -
Mr. GROSS. You are, is that correct?
Mr. FOSTER. I take responsibility for it, yes.
Mr. GROSS. You get dangerously close to it, don't you, when you
set up the United Nations as the ultimate place to invest military
power?what remaining 'power there would be after disarmament?
don't you get close to it?
Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Gross, yes. In those terms. if the world changes
to the extent that all pOlitical tensions are removed, and if it is pos-
sible, through a balanced, safeguarded, staged movement toward the
reduction of arms and the building up Of international institutions, so
that conflicts can be resolved under international law, then it is pos-
sible to give to the United Nations a greater responsibility for the set-
tlement of conflicts between nations. This would be a union of in-
dependent, sovereign states, and it is not, in that sense, world govern-
ment.
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Mr. GROSS. This document is a House document, is it not, a House of
Representatives document?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. GROSS. Did you pay for it out of your funds, or did the House
pay for this propaganda?
Mr. FOSTER. I think it is not propaganda. I think it is an outline of
what has been done under the instructions and under the law.
Mr. GRoss. But the House paid for it? Is that correct?
Mr. FOSTER. I don't know. I doubt it.
This is our second annual report to the House and Congress, as
called for by the law: "The Director shall submit to the President for
transmittal to the Congress not later than January, a report concern-
ing the activities of the Committee." It was paid for under the act.
Mr. GROSS. Well, paid for under the act. By that you mean what?
Mr. FOSTER. We paid for it.
Mr. GROSS. You paid for it, and not the House of Representatives,
is that correct?
Mr. FOSTER. We paid for 5,000. If you want more, you will pay for
the additional.
'Mr. GROSS. Now, let me ask you about your payroll. I have looked
through this green book and I can't find where your payroll is broken
down. Where is the payroll for this organization? I want it as to in-
dividuals and salaries paid.
Mr. FOSTER. That was submitted to your subcommittee, but we will
be glad to submit it?
Mr. GROSS. It is not included in the green 'book?
Mr. FOSTER. It is not in the green book.
Mr. GROSS. But it has been submitted to the committee?
Mr. FOSTER. It has been submitted to the Appropriations Subcom-
mittee.
Mr. GROSS. Why isn't it here?
Mr. FOSTER. It can be here.
'Mr. GROSS. We are interested in what you pay these people. I per-
sonally am interested in your salary. I could start with you.
Mr. FOSTER. My salary is $22,500.
Mr. Grioss. I would like to have all the rest of them.
Mr. FOSTER. We will get them. We will send you a report,
Mr. GROSS. At that point let me ask you: Did you hire one man
for 12 days and pay him $1,200?
Mr. FOSTER. We have certain consultants who get $100 a day. It
is possible.
Mr. Glloss. I say, one man, 12 days, and $1,200. Not a hundred
dollars a day, but a thousand a day. Did you hire an individual on
this basis and pay him
Mr. FOSTER. I think your mathematics are a little off.
Mr. GROSS. Twelve days, $1,200. That would be $100 a day. I
stand corrected.
You paid a man $1,200 for 12 days. Is this the sum total you paid
him ?
. Mr. FOSTER. If you will give me the man's name, I can tell you,
. Mr. GROSS. Why don't you give me his name?
Mr. FOSTER. We have a number of consultants getting $100 a day.
I am sure some of them are hired for 12 days during the course of a
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year, so I think the answer to you is "Yes," and I can't give you spe-
cifics until you tell me. who he is.
Mr. GROSS. You are, blossoming out all over the landscape. Ap-
parently this will be up to $50 million, and maybe $100 million in a
few years. I, for one on this committee-and I hope the chairman
will go -along with this-I want a complete breakdown of your pay-
roll over there as to consultants and everyone else.
I notice in this green book. that you do not list all the beneficiaries
of these contracts by name that you are handing out with the greatest
of abandonment.
Mr. FOSTER. Well, I think we do, sir. I would be very happy to
submit both of those reports to you.
Chairman MORGAN. Without objection it is so ordered.
(The information referred to is as follows:)
Personnel listing as of Aug. 31, 1963
Unclassified positions:
Foster, William C., Director $22, 500
Fisher, Adrian S., Deputy Director 21, 500
Alexander, Archibald, Assistant Director 20, 000
Bonn, George, General Counsel 20, 000
Nordness, Nedville E., Public Affairs Adviser 20, 000
GS-1S:
Berman, William H., Deputy General Counsel 20, 000
Matteson, Robert E., Disarmament Adviser 20, 000
Rathjens, George W., Deputy Assistant Director. 20, 000
Pugh, George R., Deputy Assistant Director 20, 000
Finley, Robert L., Deputy Assistant Director 20, 000
GS-1T:
Conger, Clement E., special assistant 18, 000
GS-16:
Gathright, Wreatham, foreign affairs officer 16, 500
Van Doren, Charles N., assistant general counsel 16, 000
GS-15:
Neidle, Alan F., attorney adviser 14, 565
Gehron, William S., information officer 15, 045
Adams, Emery J., security specialist 16, 005
Ertel, Walter C., budget officer 15, 045
Holt, Phillip C., assistant disarmament adviser 17, 445
Gellner, Charles R., foreign affairs officer 16, 005
Baker, Vincent, foreign affairs officer 15, 045
Moulton, Harland, foreign affairs officer 15, 045
Benjamin, Donald, foreign aferars officer 15, 045
Rich, Nathan, foreign affairs officer 15, 525
Sage, Evan T., foreign affairs officer 16, 005
Holmes, Larry, foreign affairs officer 14, 565
Coleman, Charles, physical science officer 15, 525
Ellis, Robert H., physical science officer 14, 565
Risley, Edward M., foreign affairs officer 16, 005
GS-14:
Davis, Hampton, administrative officer 13, 270
Christopher, Albert, attorney adviser 13. 270
Reinecker, H. Keith, security specialist 13, 270
Brockdorff. M. L., personnel officer 13, 270
Zimmerman, M. 0., contract specialist 14, 120
Lough, Thomas S., project officer 13, 270
Blanchet. Jeremy, foreign affairs officer 13, 270
Wyner. Henry D., economist 13, 695
Siva rd, Ruth L., economist 13, 270
Rodberg. Leonard S., physical science officer 13, 270
Hall. John R., foreign affairs officer 14, 970
I Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
ICIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
DIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
26 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT-
Personnel listing as of Aug. 31, 1963-Continued
Willrich, Mason, attorney adviser $11,
Griffiths, Douglas, contract specialist 11,
Lambert, Robert, foreign affairs officer 11,
Syphax, John W., foreign affairs officer 11,
Myers, Henry R., physical science officer 11,
Kreith, Kurt, physical science officer 11,
GS-12 :
Russell, Mary G., secretary 9,
Puckett, Beatrice, staff assistant 10,
Burmaster, Lenor, foreign affairs officer 10,
DO'ClaltiX, James S., foreign affairs officer 9,
Nary, Ralph W., foreign affairs officer 9,
1501
880,
8804
880
515:
150 ,
475
105
105
790'
475
Mayer, Jean E., foreign affairs officer
9,475
'Stoll, Richard D., physical science officer 10,
420 .
Brandwein, Robert, international economist
9,
475,
GS-11:
Harbinson, David K., attorney adviser
8,
045
Timko, Leona, secretary
8,
045
Walker, Eunice A., information specialist
8,
310
Mills, Bernice M., management technician
8,
575:
GS-10:
Chatterton, Adeline, secretary
Whittier, Alice 0., secretary
7,
7,
535
780.
Doherty, Olive J., secretary
8,
315
GS-9:
Fitzpatrick, Mary M., secretary
8,
025
Eller, June C., staff aid
6,
900
Gulasi, Anne, secretary
7,
125
Shaffer, Mary J.. mail and file supervisor
8,
025
Davis, Adalyn, foreign affairs officer
lhara, Ruth 0.. foreign affairs officer
8,
6,
025.
675
Slany, Elizabeth A., documents officer
7,
125
Johnson, Margaret, secretary
7,
125,
Kennedy, Sadie S., secretary
7,
575
Barry, Julia E., secretary
Krenzel, Julia B., secretary ?
6,
8,
062755
Graves, John H., documents officer
6,
675
GS-8:
Glazer, Katherine, secretary
6,
500
Lersch, Margaret A., secretary
6,
295
McFarland, Esther P., secretary
6,
910
Burchell, Kaye M., secretary
7,
935
OS-i:
Williams, Patricia M., secretary
5,
910
Kascak, Patricia, secretary
6,
095
Weimer, Marian E., secretary
6,
095
Trapp, Pauline S., secretary
6,
280
Ridder, Regina M., secretary
5,
725
Enuton, Barbara, secretary
5,
725
Holm, Medora, staff aid
6,
835
Szpakowski, Helen, secretary
6,
650
Venable, Sammie, secretary
6,465
Barrett, Margaret, secretary
6, 835
Price, Shirley, secretary
6,
280
Edwin, Susan, foreign affairs officer
5,
540
McCottry, Lorraine, secretary
6,
095
Hilton, Rose M., secretary
6,
280
Geigerich, Marjorie, secretary
6,
465
McDougall, Elizabeth, secretary
5,
725
Cunningham, Jean, secretary
5,
910 ,
Givens, Barbara J., secretary
6,
835
Woosley, Dorothy, secretary
5,910 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
CIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
1-Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Personnel listing as of Aug. 31, 1963-Continued
27
GS-7-Continued
Rohrer, Gertrude, secretary
$6,
465
Johnson, Christine, secretary
6,
835
Tewey, Barbara C., secretary
5,
910
Flaherty, Thomas P., clerk
5,
540
Sando, Jack C., foreign affairs officer
5,
540
G 8-6:
Gibbons, Victoria, secretary
5,
205
Allen, Mary F., clerk
5,
375
Yuzzolin, Linda C., secretary
6,
055
? Knerr, Grace B., secretary
5,
205
Hennessey, Patricia, secretary
5,
035
Simms, Regina H., secretary
6,
565
Flisr, Henrietta, secretary
5,
205'
G S-5:
Krause, Gene M., secretary
4,
565
Dexter, Evalyn W., secretary
4,
565
Ishimoto, Paul I., mail and file clerk
5,
525
Vosseler, Oliver J., mail and file clerk
5,
045
Johnson, Francis, mail and file clerk
4,
885
Rowe, JoAnn M, secretary
4,
725
McFarland, Peggy J., documents clerk
5,
045
Weedon, Margaret C., secretary
5,
36:5
Shepherd, Joan, secretary
4,
885
Skeen, Cecelia, secretary
4,
505
Barrett, Bonnie, secretary
4,
565
Grear, Mary R., secretary
4,
725
Kostelnick, Lorraine, secretary
5,
205
Glenn, Marguerite, secretary
5,
205
Gordon, Robert W., foreign affairs assistant
4,
565
G8-4:
Townsend, Susie, M., clerk-stenographer
4,
110
Leik, Trudy I., clerk-stenographer
4,
110
Pollard, Stephen, physical science assistant
4,
110
George, Roxanne, documents clerk
4,
110
Jones, Edna M.. clerk-stenographer
4,
110
,Greene, James E., mail and file clerk
4,
250
Moreau, Bonnie J., clerk-stenographer
4,
250
Mitchell, Odessa, clerk-typist
4,
950
Pigza, Patricia, clerk-stenographer
4,
250
Harley, Lillian, clerk-typist -
5,
090
Hollingworth, Nancy, clerk-typist
4,
530
Gensh, Carole, clerk-stenographer
4,
110
GS-3:
.
Hall, Eileen M., clerk-typist
4,
030
Cooksey, Gretchen C.. clerk-stenographer
3,
820
Bolinger, Nancy, clerk-typist
3,
820
O'Brien. Elizabeth, clerk-typist
3,
820
Lieber, Anita L., clerk-typist
3,
925
Culbert, David, clerk-typist
3,
925
Hall, Patricia, clerk-typist
3,
925
Getz, Phyllis, clerk-typist
.3,
925
Crane, John, clerk-typist
3,
820
Di Film, Patricia, clerk-typist
3,
820
Pluchino, Josephine, Clerk-typist
4,
030
G S-2 : '
Hall, Melvin G., messenger/clerk
3,
980
GS-1:
Pollard, Nathaniel, messenger '
3,
455
Public Law 313 positions:
Basore, Bennett L., physical science officer
20,
000
Wadman, Alton J.. physical science officer
18,
500
Saaty, Thomas L., physical science officer
18,
500
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
CIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
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28 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Personnel listing as of Aug. 31, 1963?Continued
Public Law 313 positions?Continued
Kahn; Lessing, project manager $18, 500
Kopp, Robert, electronic engineer 17, 500
Davis. Harold, military systems analyst 17, 000
Rochlin, Robert S., physcial science officer 16, 000
Foreign Service officer, Reserve, and Staff personnel detailed from De-
partment of State?Reimbursable:
Beam, Jacob D., Assistant Director CM
Timberlake, C. H., Disarmament adviser ,CM
Freund, Richard B., Foreign Service officer FSO-1
Rimestad, Liar, Foreign Service officer FSO-2
De Palma, Samuel, Foreign Service officer FSO-2
Kiefer, Alexander, Foreign Service officer FSO-2
McIntyre, Stuart H., Foreign Service officer? FSO-4
Haynes, William, Foreign Service officer FSO-4
O'Boyle, Anthony, Foreign Service officer FSO-5
Kinsey, William C., Foreign Service officer FSO-5
Pickering, Thomas R., Foreign Service officer FSO-6
Gross, Curt F., Foreign Service officer FSO-7
Prickett, Russell 0., Foreign Service officer F SO -7
Parrent, Alan M., Foreign Service officer FSO-7
Thompson, Richard S.. Foreign Service officer SO-7
deGunzberg, Marie, Foreign Service officer FSO-7
Martin, Robert A., Foreign Service officer FSO-7
Maddox, William, Foreign Service Reserve officer FSR-1
Spingarn, Jerome H., Foreign Service Reserve officer FSR-2
Boggs, Marion W., Foreign Service Reserve officer FSR-2
Weiler, Lawrence D., Foreign Service Reserve officer FSR-3
Halla, Philip J., Foreign Service Reserve officer FSR-3
Akalovsky, Alexander, Foreign Service Reserve officer SR-3
Irvin, Thomas C., Foreign Service Reserve officer FSR-4
Marks, Anne W., Foreign Service Reserve officer FS12-5
Kellogg, James C., Foreign Service Reserve officer FSR-6
Greene, Robert F., Foreign Service Reserve officer FSR-7
Calkins, Howard W., Foreign Service Career Reserve officer FSCR-3
Peyton, Betty A., Foreign Service Staff FSS-5
Mistach, Edward C., Foreign Service Staff FSS-6
Droit, Elizabeth G., Foreign Service Staff FSS-6
Mullins, Francis J., Foreign Service Staff FSS-7
Voegele, Rush, Foreign Service Staff FSS-8
Finnell, Thomas, Foreign Service Staff FSS-9
Military personnel detailed from Department of Defense?Reimbursable:
Parker, Edward N., vice admiral, Assistant Director.
Daley, David S., colonel, U.S. Army.
Greenlee, Pleas E., captain, U.S. Navy.
Long, Paul J., colonel, U.S. Air Force.
McCoy, Charles W., colonel, U.S. Marine Corps.
Parrott, Kent, colonel, U.S. Air Force.
Porter, Stuart, colonel, U.S. Air Force.
Richards, Ira B., colonel, U.S. Army.
Samusson, J. Ernest, colonel, U.S. Army.
Creecy, R. E., captain, U.S. Navy.
Struby, Joseph It., lieutenant colonel, U.S. Air Force.
Sweeney, Arthur H., lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army.
Tisdale, Charles H., commander, U.S. Navy.
Woodstock, Raymond E., lieutenant colonel, U.S. Air Force.
Kline, Edward C., commander, U.S. Navy.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
CIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL, AND DISARMAMENT ACT
29
?
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency listing of consultants who worked
Jan. 1 through Aug. 30, 1.963
Number of
Name and title days worked ,
Amado, Ralph D. (Dr.), physical science officer 20
Andrews, Thomas G. (Dr.), physical science officer 91/2
Barnet, Richard J., foreign affairs officer 31
Bethe, Hans A. (Dr.), foreign affairs officer 1
Bornstein, Morris, international economist 3
Birge, Robert E., physical science officer 22
Daniels, Paul C., foreign affairs officer 361/2
Doty, Paul M., Jr. (Dr.), physical science administrative officer 1
Dudley, Paul L. (Adm.), foreign affairs officer 5
Dyson, Freeman J. (Dr.), physical science officer 35
Emerson, Zola A., management analyst 51
Henkin, Louis (Dr.), attorney-adviser 4
Herrin, Eugene T. (Dr.), physical science officer 2
Johnson, Ralph P. (Dr.), physical science officer 15
Kissinger, Henry A. (Dr.), foreign affairs officer 2
Linde, Hans, attorney-adviser 24
Meselson, Matthew S., physical science officer 43
Mullen, Robert R., public affairs specialist 7
Muller, Steven, foreign affairs officer 18
Oliver, John E. (Dr.), physical science officer 3
Press, Frank (Dr.), foreign affairs officer 8
Sands, Matthew L. (Dr.), physical science officer 2
Schaub, William F., financial economist 10
Schelling, Thomas C. (Dr.), international economist 5
Sohn, Louis B. (Dr.), attorney-adviser 29
Wester, John W., Jr., physical science officer 5
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency General Advisory Committee, days
worked Jan. 1 through Aug. 30, 1963
Name
Days
worked
Home
Title
Roger M. Blough
Rev. Edward A. Con-
way.
John Cowles
4
26
2
Hawley, Pa
Omaha, Nebr
Minneapolis, Minn
Chairman of the board of directors,
United States Steel Co.
Professor of political science, Creigh-
ton University.
President of the Minneapolis Star dr
Tribune Co.
Trevor Gardner
2
Pasadena, Calif
Chairman and president of Hymn
Manufacturing Co.
George B. Kistiakowsk-y_
4
Cambridge, Mass
Professor of chemistry, Harvard Uni-
versity.
Robert A. Lovett
2
Long Island, N.Y
Partner of Brown Bros., Harriman &
Co.
John Jay McCloy_
7
New York, N.Y
Consultant to law firm of Milbank,
Tweed, Hope & Hadley.
Dean Anderson McGee_
4
Oklahoma City, Okla
President of Kerr-McGee Oil Indus-
tries.
Ralph E. McGill
2
Atlanta, Ga
Editor of the Atlanta Constitution.
George Meany
Bethesda. Md_
President of the AFL-CIO.
James A. Perkins
4
Ithaca, N.Y
President, Cornell University.
Herman Phleger
4
Redwood City, Calif
Partner of Brobeck, Phleger & Har-
rison.
Isidor Issac Rabi_
6
New York, N.Y
Professor of physics, Columbia Uni-
versity.
Thomas Dresser White_
4
Washington, D.0
Air Force Chief of Staff (retired).
Herbert Frank York...
2
La Jolla, Calif
Chancellor of the University of Cali-
fornia.
NOTE.?All members of the General Advisory Committee are paid at the rate of $100 per diem, when
actually employed, except Messrs. Blough, Gardner, and Lovett who do not accept pay.
23-197-63 3,
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20: 1
CIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
30 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Contracts and grants, fiscal years 1962 and 1968
Contract or grant
Company or individual
Title of study
Amount
ACDA-1; con-
Bendix Systems Division, Bendix
"TechniqUes for Monitoring Pro-
$150, 000
tract.
Corp., 3300 Plymouth Rd., Ann
duction of Strategic Delivery
Arbor, Mich.
Vehicles."
ACDA-1,
amendment
contract.
do
"To Describe U.S. Strategic Mis-
sile Technology."
19,000
ACDA/WEC-2,
contract.
Raytheon Corp., Missile and Space
Division, Bedford, Mass.
"Progressive Zonal Disarmament"...
121,211
ACDA/WEC-2,
amendment
contract.
_ do
"Develop Planning Principles for
Field Tests .of Inspection Tech-
niques."
78,120
ACDA/ST-3,
contract.
Mathematica, 20 Nassau St.,
Princeton, NJ.
"Statistical Methodology in the
Analysis of Inspection and Con-
trol Procedures for Arms Control
and Disarmament."
47,461
ACDA/GC-4,
contract.
Dr. Kazirnierz Grzybowski, Yale
University , Law School, New
"Peaceful Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes between Bloc
3,000
Haven, Conn.
Nations."
ACDA/ST-5,
contract.
Institute for Defense Analyses, 1710
H St. NW., Washington 6, D.C.
"Inspection and Control in Disar-
mament Agreements."
120,000
ACDA/ST-6,
contract.
Bendix Systems Division, Bendix
Corp., 3300 Plymouth Rd., Aim
"Verification Requirements for
Arms Control and Disarmament
95,000
Arbor, Mich.
Agreements."
ACDA/IR-7,
grant.
American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, 280 Newton St., Brook-
line Station, Boston 46, Mass.
"Alternatives in the Conduct of
Conflict: Behavioral Science Re-
search Toward Peace." ?
15,000
ACDA/IR-8,
grant.
Peace Research Institute, 1329 18th
St. NW., Washington 6, D.C.
"Factors Pertinent to the Political
Control of an Intethational Police
20, 000
Force."
ACDA/WEC-9,
grant.
Institute for Defense Analyses, 1710
H St. NW., Washington 6, D.C.
"Focus on Arms Information and
Reassurance."
10, 000
ACDA/IR-10,
contract.
Hudson Institute, Quaker Ridge
Rd., Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y.
"Political and Strategic Implications
for Arms Control and Disarma-
ment of Civil Defense Programs."
146,265
ACDA/GC-11,
contract.
Richard A. Falk, Center of Inter-
national Studies, Princeton Uni-
versity, Woodrow Wilson Hall,
Princeton, N.J.
"Problems of Subversion and Peace-
ful Change."
4, 500
ACDA/ST-12,
contract.
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.,
Sylvania Electronic Systems,
Western Operation, Post Office
Box 459, Mountain View, Calif.
"Design and Evaluation -of Inspec-
tion Systems for a Ban on Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction in Space
and for Restrictions on Missile
354,000
Flight Tests." ? -
ACDA/ST-12,
'amendment
contract.
do
Special report on "Techniques of
Verification for a Latin American
Nuclear-Free Zone."
5, 726
Do
do
Special report on "Arms Reduction
and the Use of Potsdam-Type
2, 632
Military Liaison Missions."
ACDA/ST-13,
contract.
Aerospace Corp., 2400 El Segundo
Blvd., El Segundo, Calif.
"Implications and Inspection of
Restrictions on Missile and Mili-
tary Space Systems Research,
Development, Test, and Evalu-
ation Activity."
217,700
ACDA/ST-13,
amendment
contract.
do
"Analyze the Technical Problems
Involved in Converting Sounding
Rockets to Surface-to-surface mis-
siles."
4,418
ACDA/WEC-14,
grant.
Institute for Strategic Studies, the
Honorable Alastair Buchan, di-
rector, 18 Adam St., London,
W.C.2, England.
"The Effect of Disarmament on
European Security."
21,064
ACDA/IR-15,
contract.
Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, Division of Sponsored Re-
search, Cambridge 39, Mass.
"Studies on Arms Control and Inter-
national Communism."
65, 000
ACDA/ST-16,
contract.
Bendix Systems Division, Bendix
Corp., 3300 Plymouth Rd., Ann
"Evaluation of Combined Tech-
niques for Monitoring Levels and
218, 500
Arbor, Mich.
Production of Strategic Vehicles."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
CIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
CIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
TOr:AMENDiTIE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
.= 5.;
Contiacts and'grcints fiscal years 1962 and 1963-Continued
,
31
Contract or grant
Company or individual
Title of study
Amount
ACDA/GC-17,
contract.
Historical Evaluation & Research
Organization, 1075 Wisconsin Ave.
NW., Washington 7, D.C.
"Responses to Violations of Arms
Control and Disarmament Agree-
ments."
$162,000
ACDA/WEC-I8,
contract.
Bendix Systems Division, Bendix
Corp., 3300 Plymouth Rd., Ann
Arbor, Mich.
"Design of Field Test of Inspection
in Production of Strategic De-
livery V eh icles."
158,500
ACDA/GC-19,
contract.
The Johns Hopkins University,
(Washington Center of Foreign
"Peace-Keeping Panel"
87, 308
Policy Research), Institute for
Cooperative Research, Whitehead
Hall, Baltimore 18, Md.
ACDA/IR-20,
grant.
Rutgers University, Eagleton Insti-
tute of Politics, Wood Lawn,
Neilson Campus, New Bruns-
wick, N.J.
"Arms and Democracy: The Recip-
rocal Influence of Weapons and
Political Systems."
4o, WO
ACDA/WEC-21,
contract.
Research Analysis Corp., 6935 Ar-
lington Rd., Bethesda 14, Md.
"Interaction of Arms Control and
Disarmament Measures With
177,300
Capabilities of Ground Forces."
ACDA/WEC-22,
contract.
Sylvania Electric Products, Syl-
vania Electronic Systems, Inc.,
Western Operation, Post Office
Box 459, Mountain View, Calif.
"Verification for Retained Levels of
Ground Forces, Armament and
Tactical Nuclear Delivery Ve-
hicles."
202, 000
ACDA/WEC-23,
contract.
Stanford Research Institute, Menlo
Park, Calif.
"Arms Control and Disarmament
Concepts and the Military Envi-
ronment in the European Area."
267,688
A.CDA/IR-24,
contract.
Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Division? of Sponsored
"Regional Arms Control Arrange-
ments for Developing Areas."
14t,'000
Research, Cambridge 39, Mass.
ACDA/DAS-25,
contract.
Columbia University in the City of
New York, Box 20, Low Memo-
rial Library, New York 27, N.Y.
"Factors Affecting Soviet Attitudes
on Disarmament."
91,000
ACDA/IR-26,
grant.
Dr. Richard H. Pfaff, Department
of Political Science, University
of Colorado, Boulder, Colo.
"The Nonmilitary Aspects of
CENTO."
1,500
ACDA/E-28,
grant.
Institute for the Study of National
Behavior, Inc., Dr. Bryant
"Psychological Factors in Soviet
Disarmament Positions."
10,704
Wedge, director, 240 Nassau St.,
Princeton, N.J.
ACDA/WEC-29,
contract.
Burroughs Corp., Burroughs Lab-
oratories, Post Office Box 305,
Paoli, Pa.
"Analysis of Requirements for Auto-
mation of Data Processing for In-
spection Field Tests."
203,999
ACDA/WE 0-30,
contract.
North American Aviation, Space
& Information Systems Division,
12214 Lakewood Blvd., Downey,
Calif.
"Survey of Sensors and Techniques
Applicable to Arms Control In-
spection and Verification."
136,600
ACDA/ST-31,
contract.
Arthur D. Little, Inc., 30 Memorial Mass.
42, ass.
"Ground-Inspectable Features of
Soviet Armaments Production
Technology."
159,000
ACDA/I1t-32,
contract.
YaleCambridge
Yale University, 451 College St.,
New Haven, Conn.
"Arms Control and Disarmament
Concepts and the European Po-
litical Environment."
90,000
ACDA/GC-33,
grant.
President and Fellows of Harvard
College, Harvard University, 10
"Enforcement of Arms Control and
Disarmament Measures by the
6,000
Divinity Ave., Cambridge 38,
Mass.
Impositon of Sanctions on Indi-
vidual Officials."
ACDA/IR-34,
contract.
The Johns Hopkins University
(Washington Center of Foreign
"Future Character and Role of
Peace Observation Arrangements
139, 000
Policy Research), Charles and
Under the United Nations."
34th Sts., Baltimore 18, Md.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20:
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/20: CIA-RDP66B00403R000300230002-3
Information on contracts and grants awarded during fiscal years 1962 and 1963
Contractor
Contract
No.
Grant
No. 1
Unsolic-
ited pro-
posals 3
Procure-
ment by
informal
competi-
tion 3
Procurement by formal competition 4
Sole
source 3
or follow-
on 3
Original
dollar
amount
Invitees
Additional
requests
for the
request for
proposal
Number of
proposals
received
Award
other
than
original
invitees
Bendix Systems Division
ACDA-1
15
1
11
No
$150, 000
Raytheon Co
ACDA/ '
9
0
5
125, 000
W E C-2.
Mathematica
ACDA/ST-3__
9
0
1
47, 461
K. Grzybowski
ACDA/GC-4.
(1)
3,000
Institute for Defense Analyses
ACDA/ST-5__
(9
20, 000
Bendix Systems Division_
ACDA/ST-6
16
5
13
No
95,000
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
ACDA/I11-7
15, 000
Peace Research Institute
ACDA/IR-8
20, 000
Institute for Defense Analyses
ACDA/
10, 000
WEC-9.
Hudson Institute
ACDATIR-10_
6
16
7
No
147, 000
Richard A. Falk _
ACDA/
3
0
3
3,500
GC-11.
Sylvania Electric Products Co
ACDA/ST-12_
11
38
13
No
354, doo
Aerospace Corp
ACDA/ST-13_
Sole source
217,700
Institute for Strategic Studies
ACDA/
21, 064
WEC-14.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ACDA/IR-15
X
65. 000
Bendix Systems Division
ACDA/ST-16_
Follow-
on.9
218,500
Historical Evaluation and Research Organization
ACDA/GC-
17.
s
65
7
Yes
162, 000
...i
Bendix Systems Division
ACDA/
Follow-
158800
WEC-18.
on.I0
' t?
Johns Hopkins University
ACDA/GC-
12
31
3
No
87,408
19.
Rutgers University, Eagleton Institute of Politics
ACDA/IR-
40,-000
20.
Research Analysis Corp
ACDA/
Sole source
177, 300
W EC-21.
H
Sylvania Electronic Systems
ACDA/
- WEC-22.
14
25
12
No
202, 000
1,-J
Stanford Research Institute
ACDA/
15
44
11
No
- 267, 688
W E C-23.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ACDA/IR-24_
9
30
4
No
145, 000
Columbia University
ACDA/DAS-
(1)
. 91,000
25.
Dr. Richard H. Pfaff
ACDA/IR-26_
$1, 500
(Negotiations terminated without agreement)
ACDA/
WE C-27.
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Institute for the Study of National Behavior, Inc
ACDA/E-28
10,704
Burroughs Corp
ACDA/
14
72
22
No
203, 999
WE 0-29.
North American Aviation
ACDA/
9
86
20
No
136, 600
WE C-30.
Arthur D. Little
ACDA/ST-31
Sole
source.
159, 000
Yale University
ACDA/IR-32
22
29
11
No
90, 000
President and fellows of Harvard College (Roger
ACDA/GC-33.
6, 000
Fisher).
The Johns Hopkins University
ACDA/IR-34_
20
7
5
No
139, 000
I The Agency has made a general solicitation of grants for research by individuals and
nonprofit institutions in the field of arms control and disarmament. Thus, all grant
proposers compete against each other for the funds available; the Agency does not seek
competition among prospective grantees on specifiyresearch projects.
2 These are proposals where the initiative for the research project was not taken by the
Agency, but where the initiative was entirely that of the proposer and, either by reason
of the profitmaking character of the proposer, or by reason of the nature of the work, the
Agency believes that the appropriate vehicle for agreement is a contract rather than a
grant. Such proposals must be consistent with the Agency's research program, be well
developed, represent a considerable investment of time and effort by the proposer, and
not be readily available from other sources in order to qualify for a noncompetitive con-
tract award.
Normally the Agency seeks competition by issuing formal Requests for Proposals
(RFP's). In isolated instances, where the interests of the Government would be better
served by significant savings of time and/or money, competition may be sought informally
by telephonic or personal visit inquiries concerning interest and capability of prospective
contractors. See footnotes 7 and 8, infra.
Procurement by formal competition means selection of a contractor after consideration
of competitive proposals received as the result of direct invitations to submit proposals
and of the publication of the invitation in the Department of Commerce Synopsis.
After selection of the contractor, the contract is negotiated.
Contracts may be awarded without seeking competition in instances in which the
project officer has made a thorough review of existing capabilities and has determined
that there is only one source for the work. Before a contract award is made on this basis,
the project officer's evaluation is reviewed by the Research Council and specifically ap-
proved or disapproved by the Director or his Deputy.
0 Follow-on contract awards are similar in nature to sole-source awards, but are made
on the ground that the contractor concerned has already performed such work for the
Agency that it would be contrary to the best interests of the Government to award the
contract to a different organization. See footnotes 9 and 10, infra, for specific examples.
7 Individual. This was an instance where the work desired involved a very unusual
combination of talents and circumstances for a very small contract project; research and
writing experience, knowledge of comparative and Soviet bloc law and facility with a
number of Eastern European languages were the talents required and promptly available
time, as well as ready access to a major library, were the necessary circumstances. The
project officer made informal inquiry of who might fulfill these unusual requirements and
obtained the names of 5 possible persons to perform the work, 1 each from Harvard, Co-
lumbia, Michigan, and Cornell, and Mr. Grzybowski from Washington, D.C. 2 of these
men were planning to be out of the country and 2 others contacted indicated they would
not have time, w.thin the reasonable foreseeable future, to perform the work. Mr. Grzy-
bowski, who upon extensive inquiry was generally said to be eminently qualified, was
ready to proceed promptly at a reasonable price. The Agency did not feel that any pur-
pose would be served by seeking competition on a more formal basis. It was believed
that early completion of the study might prove helpful in connection with the negotia-
tions in Geneva on peacekeeping under a possible arms control and disarmament agree-
ment.
Summer study. In this instance, the Agency contacted the National Academy of
Sciences and the Institute for Defense Analyses, for the performance of the work. The
Academy decided it did not wish to run a study which was heavily concerned with social,
as well as physical sciences, time would not have permitted seeking additional competi-
tion. The Agency then turned to the Institute, a nonprofit research organization. To
have done otherwise would, because of 60- to 90-day clearance requirements fw partici-
pants, have meant delaying the study for a year. Most of the desired participants were
from academic institutions and were only free during the summer months. The study
itself was vitally important to the further progress of Agency research during fiscal year
1963 on both verification and responses to violations.
This contract concerns means of detecting violations of treaty limitations on, strategic
delivery vehicles through indicators related to the deployment, storage, and support of
such vehicles. The study parallels ACDA-1, and because of the experience and per-
formance of Bendix on the earlier study and the close interrelationship of the 2 under-
takings, it was both logical and believed to be in the best interests of the Government to
award this contract to Bendix.
10 This contract is for the design of a field test for verifying treaty limitations on the pro-
duction, testing, storage, maintenance, and deployment of strategic delivery vehicles-.
Because Bendix was the contractor for the 2 earlier studies dealing with means for
detecting violations of such treaty limitations, it was only logical that it should be
selected to develop the plans for giving practical application to its theoretical findings in
the earlier efforts. This was felt to be in the best interests of the Government because
of the special knowledge that Bendix Systems Division personnel had acquired in this
area.
II When the Agency decided to sponsor this study, it concluded that a major research
organization, with a group that specializes in Soviet problems, headed by an individual
with the stature and maturity to direct a study symposium on Soviet attitudes, would
be best equipped to draw together the experts desired, to guide and chair the symposium,
and to prepare the final report. We sought competition for the contract informally by
approaching 4 such organizations; the Russian Research Institute of Columbia was
the only one that was both interested in performing the contract and whose director leas.
willing and able to play the leading role in the project.
CAD
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34 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. GROSS. There are some in this presentation not designated as
to the beneficiaries of the contracts.
How do you handle contracts other than those with individual
consultants and management firms?I am speaking now mainly of
construction contracts. Are they competitive contracts, or what are
they?
Mr. FosTER. We have no construction contracts. We have done
no construction.
We have a series of different kinds of contracts, Mr. Gross. We
have a table which we would be very glad to submit for the record,
Mr. Chairman, showing all the contractors and how the contract is
made.
Chairman MORGAN. Without objection it is so ordered.
Mr. GROSS. You do not have that here, today?
Mr. FOSTER. I have it here today.
Mr. GROSS. Not for the information of the committee?you have
one copy, is that correct?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
You might get what you are looking for at page 1 of the appendix
in the green book.
Mr. GROSS. You farmed out a contract to the State Department for
"Legal and Political Aspects of Inspection, Violation and Response."
Yet you have a legal counsel, don't you, in your organization?
Mr. FOSTER. We do, sir.
Mr. GROSS. This contract, incidentally, is for what-400 and some
odd thousand dollars?$450,000?
Why didn't your own Legal Department provide you with this
information?
Mr. FOSTER. For one thing, I will have to get that amount. What
page is this on?
Mr. GROSS. Page 7 of the appendix.
Mr. FOSTER. "Fiscal Year 1964?Contract Proposed"?it has not
been placed and it is not only one contract, but it is a number of con-
tracts, and I doubt that the State Department is doing more than
a small part of it.
Mr. GROSS. You have a contract listed here somewhere with the
State Department for some legal advice. "Digest of International
Laws" or something of that nature.
Mr. FOSTER. That is a $14,500 contract to which we contributed a
part of the expense so that the State Department, which has this
international responsibility, could be partially reimbursed for addi-
tional work that they did in completing that digest. It is just useful
to both of us.
Mr. GROSS. Yet you say in this "Annual Report to Congress" that
"The Office of the General Counsel is responsible for all legal matters
arising in or referred to the Agency; problems of international law
and organization," and so on and so forth. Yet apparently you are
farminp: out the legal work of your Agency.
Mr. FOSTER. We certainly are, and we are farming out a good deal
of other work. We have a very small staff, Mr. Gross, which is very
busy and there are things it does not have the ability to do, itself.
Mr. GROSS. Could it b possible that those in the Office of Legal
Counsel are spending more of their time in liaison with Congress
and lobbying Congress than in doing their legal work?
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
35
Mr. FOSTER. They spend a good deal of time in liaison with Con-
gress, which I believe is a service to Congress, and is requested by
Congress, and is, I think, a very wise expenditure in order for us to
be helpful to you in the broad responsibilities that you have.
Mr. GROSS. Now, your first bite from the Treasury in fiscal 1962
was $1.8 million, is that correct?
Mr. FOSTER. Our first year's?
Mr. GROSS. YES.
Mr. FOSTER. We had a total of $2 million for our first year's opera-
tion.
Mr. GROSS. A little better than I thought.
Then you went to $6.5 million in fiscal 1963, is that correct?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
Mr. GROSS. And now you want to go to what?
Mr. FOSTER. $15 million.
Mr. GROSS. That is a pretty good increase. You are really blos-
soming out.
Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Gross, this is a highly important activity to the
United States, which has never been done in this way before.
Mr. GROSS. I am sure it hasn't.
Mr. FosTER.- I think it is one of the best investments the United
States has ever made, and I think actually it should be considerably
larger than it is, and it would be under a great many other forms of
management.
If the United States, by investment of $15 or $150 million can save
1 or 2 percent of its arms and have better security, believe me, that is
a good investment.
Mr. GROSS. That is all for now Mr. Chairman. I have exceeded
my time.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara
Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster, I can judge what you have done for our country and
the cause of peace only by the results. Your Agency has had less
than $10 million to work with, as I recall.
Mr. FOSTER. We had $6.5 million for 1963, Mr.- O'Hara. The
Senate has given us $10 million each for 2 years, in their authorization
bill.
Mr. O'HARA. Now,
am I right in saying for that investment of less
than $7 million you have brought to us the hot line?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes sir.
Mr. O'HARA. Which eliminate something that concerned the
American people. There were fears that there might be a war through
accident or miscalculation. The hot line has ended that danger;
hasn't it?
Mr. FOSTER. It has reduced that danger, sir.
Mr. O'HARA. To a minimum.
Mr. FOSTER. We hope SO.
Mr. O'HARA. Then your Agency, with only $6 5 million to work
with, is responsible for the test ban; is it not-?
ME. FOSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'HARA. So that for the small investment in your Agency the
American people have purchased freedom from fear of war by acci-
dent and freedom from fear of deadly poisoned atmosphere. Is that
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36 TO. AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
a fair sizing up of the positive accomplishments of the Agency dur-
ing the brief period of its existence?
Sir. FOSTER. We do not claim all credit for the test ban, but we claim
the basic credit for staffing, initiating, and negotiating it.
Mr. O'HARA. May I say to you, Mr. Foster, that in my district?and
this includes all my constituents, Republicans and Democrats and in-
dependents?all are concerned with peace. Peace with security, of
course. They think that you have given us the best return for any
Money the Congress has ever spent: We spend $50 billion a year pre-
paring for war, if it should come, and with the few million dollars
given your Agency the danger of war has been greatly reduced by the
test ban treaty and the hot line.
How many persons are employed by the Agency?
Mr. FOSTER. 205, as of today.
Mr. O'HARA. I am a Member of Congress. There are 435 of us in
the House. Each has a staff of nine people. That means that for every
person working for your very important Agency, 19 are working for
Members of the House of Representatives.
Well, Mr. Foster, you may get a little criticism from my good friend,
Mr. Gross?and I appreciate his sincerity. You may get a little
criticism from him, but you have been getting the thanks and prayers
of the American people for the great work you have done in the ad-
vancement of peace?peace on earth and peace with security. I hope
that you ,get the full amount that you want and need.
' No one hesitates to appropriate over $50 billion a year for arms.
How anyone can hesitate to give $15 million for the quest for peace is
beyond my power of understanding.
Well, I haven't any questions, but I want to say, God bless you,
Mr. Foster, and your Agency.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. O'Hara.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Derwin ski.
Mr. DERWINgKI. Now that Mr. Foster has been properly eulogized,
Twill return to the questions.
First, Mr. Foster, I think it is fair to point out that we have, for
some years, had a department called the Department of State. We
have a sizable number of personnel involved there, and I am sure
that they could have produced a hot line, and could have produced
a test ban treaty. You are not trying to take complete credit for
these items, are you?
Mr. FOSTER. I made very clear that there are many others who
shared.
Mr. DERWINSKI. It is conceivable that without your Agency the
hot line and the test ban treaty could not have developed?
Mr. FOSTER. Of that I am not sure.
Mr. DERIVINSKI. Is there some genius and skill you have surpris-
ingly and suddenly developed in this Agency that the Department of
State could never have produced?
Mr. FOSTER. For the first time we devoted a group of experts to
this single end, and this has been recommended and has been under
consideration, to my certain knowledge, over the last 6 or 7 years. I
think putting it together and having the competence my associates
have, has made a great contribution to this. and has brought this
about, at least considerably sooner than it would have otherwise come.
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TO. AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 37
Mr. DERWINSKI. I wish to associate myself with remarks made
earlier by Mrs. Kelly and Mr. Burleson, that we have the Director
back in executive session.
On page 11 you have the description of the three-stage disarma-
ment plan to which Mr. Gross referred.
My question is, Theoretically, do you propose the elimination of
offensive military strength and substitution by a U.N. peacekeeping
force? Is that a proper, theoretical interpretation of your views?
Mr. FOSTER. At the end of a long process, which I have no ability
to judge as to time, we would depend on the international legal settle-
ment of conflicts and a common international peace force for external
resolution of such conflicts.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Individual nations would be limited to internal
security forces?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
Mr. BUBLESON. Will the gentleman yield right there?
Mr. DERWINSKL Yes.
Mr. BURLESON. Of course, that would require, as a first step, the
elimination of the so-called Connally amendment, would it not?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes.
Mr. BURLESON. Will the gentleman yield further?
Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes.
Mr. BURLESON. This would mean yielding to the full authority of the
World Court. ? . ?
Mrs. BOLTON. It seems to me it involves the reorganization and the
growth in spiritual capacity of mankind, so that edon't anticipate it
is going to be in any of our lifetimes.
Mr. FOSTER. It is a complete revolution in international and politi-
cal arrangements.
Mrs. BOLTON. A complete revolution in the whole aspect that man
has of his responsibility to the universe.
Mr. FASCELL. It would take a revolution around this table, because
most people would rather fight than not.
Mrs. BOLTON. All you men would. We don't feel that way about it.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Foster, after the test ban treaty was negotiated,
there were natural explanations made, or interpretations given to the
motivation, at least on the part of the Soviet Union, for this agree-
ment. We have been repeatedly told that one of the major factors is
the growth of nationalism in the Soviet European satellites. The presL
sure that this growing nationalism brings to bear on the Soviet Union,
it is being claimed, calls for more practical development of their
diplomacy.
Therefore, growing nationalism has been explained as a positive
factor in the positive production of the test ban treaty. As I under-
stood your answer to one of Mr. Gross' questions, you would deliber-
ately depreciate the effectiveness of nationalism in reaching the stated
goal of world government, or world peace.
If I may rephrase the question: Do you consider the growing or the
maintenance of nationalism an obstacle to world peace?
Mr. FOSTER. No, I don't. I carefully said that the end objective
would still be based on an association of sovereign states, of which
we would certainly be one.
Mr. DERWINSKI. You felt, however, that any unusual nationalistic
motivation within a state must be committed to this world peacekeeping
concept?
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38 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. FOSTER. No, I don't say that, either. I say that the States would
certainly be free to press for the good of their own people. The thing
that would change would be political international relationships and
the settlement of conflicts as between them by law, rather than by force
of arms.
Mr. DERWINSKI. One last question, Mr. Foster. I believe that we
should have some means of obtaining arms control and reaching a
practical and legitimate state of disarmament. Theoretically no one
will argue with this concept.
The concern I have is that we are creating in your Agency an opera-
tion that is literally a bull in a china shop, rushing pellmell into some
future agreement, when really the affected departments that should
truly exercise the leadership and responsibility are the Defense De-
partment and the State Department.
At what point do you start to usurp the responsibility and preroga-
tives of those two departments?
Mr. FOSTER. We never have, and we never will. We operate on a
very well known basic basis of cooperation and coordination. We are
charged with initiating and developing national policy in this field.
It next goes in staff discussions to each of those agencies to which you
refer. We have a Committee of Principals which consists of the Sec-
retary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the President's special assistants on international
affairs and science the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Chairman of Le Joint Chiefs of Staff, and myself. Every pro-
posal that is made for approval by the President is first coordinated
through that group. This is not anything I am usurping. I am
simply carrying out my responsibilities under the law. Coordination
is direct and all of those agencies participate in what goes to the Presi-
dent and he makes the final decision.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Let me rephrase the previous question: In this
area of coordination with other agencies and departments, would you
consider it necessary that you subordinate the policies and operations
of your Agency to the Defense and State Departments, or should they
be subordinate to you in your sphere?
Mr. FosTER. The law has me under the direction of the Secretary
of State, and I report to the President and the Secretary of State.
Anything I do is within that framework.
Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Hays.
Mr. Hays, I want to apologize. I didn't see you come in before I
called on Mr. O'Hara. Do you want to use your time now?
Mr. HAYS. I'm sorry I was late, Mr. Chairman. I had an appoint-
ment out at Walter Reed of long standing? and I had to keep it.
I am sorry to have to ask this, but what is the total amount you are
asking for, Mr. Foster?
Mr. FOSTER. $15 million was our budget request, Mr. Hays.
Mr. HAYS. I notice frequent speeches saying the Pentagon wastes
$3 or $4 billion a year. I don't know whether they do or not, but
they have been charged with it. And I suspect in a $50 billion opera-
tion, with people using jeeps and trucks and so on for which they don't
pay anythin,c, I suspect it is a fair appraisal that they would waste
that much. If they do, they waste in 1 day approximately what you
are asking for for the entire year.
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 39
I suspect?I think peace and disarmament is a little difficult to be
against, but I really believe that some of my colleagues will have
enough mental agility to perform this gymnastic feat. I have a lot
of confidence in them. Personally, I am willing to gamble that much
money, as against $50 billion that we spend for so-called defense, which
really means weapons which, if we ultimately have to use them?and
I don't think there is anybody in the Congress or the country who
hopes we do have to use them, but if we do, they are ultimately for the
destruction of human life.
I am not even as pessimistic as my colleague from Ohio?not because
I think mankind is going to reform itself, but I really believe that the
leaders of the great nations have now come face to face with the al-
ternative of either "Let's try to find a way to peace," or "Let's commit
national suicide," and I don't think that they have had a change of
heart necessarily or that they are any more peaceful than they have
ever been, but they are facing something that they just can't control
and so the alternative is such that it might turn them in this direction.
As far as I am concerned, I don't know what percentage?I am not
competent to figure this out with a calculating machine?what per-
centage $15 million is of $50 billion but I suspect it is one one-hun-
dredth of 1 percent or thereabout, arid I am willing to risk that much
to try to grope toward peace and grope toward disarmament. I am
not going to quibble about the figures.
That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin.
Mr. BArriN. I hope I will have an opportunity to visit with Mr.
Foster in executive session.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fascell.
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Foster, I notice your increase in personnel is 57
in this requested authorization?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. FASCELL. And the balance of the increase would be for the
contract work?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
Mr. FASCELL. I believe you said in certain limited areas under the
act you are an operations organization; is that correct?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. We would, in this field test, do a certain
amount of operating, and of course we have participated in the
supervision of operations to an extent in the protection systems now
established. This is as members of a steering committee, and not
as director of the responsible agency.
Mr. FASCELL. Would you have any additional obligations if the
test ban agreement is ratified by the United States?
Mr. FOSTER. The act is quite clear that we should make prepara-
tions for, do the planning for, and supervise the operation of verifi-
cation systems. Now, how that would be done has not yet been
decided, Mr. Fascell.
Mr. FASCELL. Is there included in this increased authorization the
cost of this?
Mr. FOSTER. No.
Mr. FASCELL. That would come probably in the next budget, am
I correct, or by way of a supplemental?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, these systems are presently operating at a certain
level. Now, there have been some additional amounts requested on
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40 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
the assumption that an expansion was needed. This, however, was
requested by the Department of Defense and not by ourselves.
Mr. FASCELL. It is in the present DOD budget and not in yours?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
Mr. FASCELL. That is what I was trying to get at.
I notice you have several contract studies which are very interesting
to me, and I hope to others. I just picked out some at random.
? On page 2 of the appendix, No. 6, for example, that is being worked
on right now; is that correct?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. FASCELL. It is not completed.
Mr. FOSTER. That is complete. We can send you a copy, if you
like.
Mr. FASCELL. There are going to be others I want to talk about
briefly, but I first wanted to get a question of policy in my mind here.
Are these type contracts?concept studies and other contracts of that
kind?going to be classified in any way, or shall these be considered in
the nature of basic research?
Mr. FOSTER. The basic research, the grants are normally unclassified,
and I think this one was unclassified.
Mr. FASCELL. For example when you get into Soviet attitudes, will
that be classified or unclassified?
Mr. FOSTER. The one we spoke of earlier is unclassified.
Mr. FASGELL. I am not trying to get into the question of the spe-
cifics of a particular contract as to whether or not a particular contract
is classified or unclassified. I am trying to get into the policy question.
For example, let's say you do a behavioral study on psychological atti-
tudes on disarmament. Is this going to be basic research or is this
going to be classified material, and, if so, for whom? For the Agency?
For all agencies? Will it affect the Department of Defense, or will it
be available? Will it be available?of course it will be to State, as I
understand you are under their jurisdiction?USIA, for example, will
they have the benefit of this? USIA doesn't have this same kind of
contractual ability. I would like to give it to them. I would like to
give them the money. They don't have it, and they don't have the
operating responsibility, either. . This is the reason why I asked the
policy question.
Mr. FOSTER, Well, it iS hard to state whether a particular subject is
classified or not, but the judgment is made on each. Mr. Morrow is
also a member of this Committee of Principals, and he has available
to him all of these things we do develop, so he would have in USIA
this study available to him, and all studies are circulated to all the
interested agencies, even though classified.
Mr. FASCELL. As a matter of curiosity, let's take the contract on
relationship between national and political environments in arms con-
trol. Does that include U.S. citizens? It might very well include
Members of Congress, from what I have heard around this table this
morning.
Mr. FOSTER. What page are you on now, sir?
Mr. FASCELL. I am on page 7 of the appendix.
If your researcher wanted to examine my attitude in depth, I would
be delighted to cooperate with him.
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Mr. FOSTER. That is one of our prospective studies in the fiscal year
1964 budget request. The details of that justification are outlined in
more detail at page 25.
Mr. FASCELL. This does not include American attitudes? That is
the big question.
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; it does not. This is within the Soviet Union.
Mr. FASCELL. I fIlla not sure anyone in the Congress might stand
still for your examining American attitudes on this subject, and that
is the only question. I wanted to clarify that for the record.
What you are really trying to do is to research Soviet attitudes on
the problem?
Mr. FOSTER. That is right. The title was not?
Mr. FASCELL. I was not sure what you had in mind and I wanted
to clarify that for the record.
I am delighted to see the use of science with respect to attitudes and
other psychological matters. I have been very interested in this be-
cause of the work of the Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions and Movements. The subcommittee is studying all of the ideo-
logical aspects of what I consider to be the real struggle for survival.
I believe we have to make greater use of what science we have avail-
able, both basic and applied, in the field of ideas. This leads me to
this question: What relationship, if any, do you have on these studies
with the Department of Defense who are spending millions of dollars
for other studies with behavioral scientists, social anthropologists and
others?
Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Alexander's bureau which has cognizance over
this, is in close touch with Mr. Barber's shop which is the -Disarmament
Group in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There is close work-
ing relationship in that, in addition to which we do have continuing
inventory of studies being made which are available to us and which
are included in our report to the Bureau of the Budget.
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Foster, am I correct in thinking this: What we
are doing is basic research involving the minds of people and their
attitudes and reactions toward international problems, but we are
doing it piecemeal? In other words, the Department of Defense is
doing some here and you are doing some with respect to disarmament
and somebody else is doing some someplace else, and the relationship
you might have to the total U.S. effort, carrying it all in the same
direction, might be purely coincidental?
Mr. FOSTER. I think we have some responsibility to act as two
things; one, to coordinate and, two, a catalyst so we would stimulate
some additional studies in other hands that have more money perhaps.
It is not completely uncoordinated.
I would confess to you that we do not, in this field have quite the
opportunity of coordination that you do in some more specific or
rather narrowly defined fields.
Mr. FASCELL. You could envision for the role of this Agency, par-
ticularly on the responsibility of peace, a greater effort toward coordi-
nation and the direction of the kinds of scientific studies we are talking
about?
Mr. FOSTER. I could and we are attempting to undertake that. We
are hoping to establish a Social Science Advisory Board which will
deal with just this kind of problem.
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Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson?
Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster' did you tell us that the hot line to Russia is simply a
teletype wire that runs into the Kremlin and transmits simultaneously
Russian and English?
ME. FOSTER. That is correct.
Mr. THOMSON. Do not the U.S. news services in Moscow have tele-
type wires that come to this country?
Mr. FOSTER. These hot line messages are coded. Those are uncoded
messages.
Mr. THOMSON. Naturally; but there are other teletype wires.
Mr. FOSTER. We are using commercial lines between certain of the
points, Mr. Thomson.
Mr. THOMSON. The only difference is that you send coded messages
when the President talks to Nikita?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct. They come to the National Command
Center at the Pentagon and it is constantly live and in operation to
make sure that it is elective at all times.
? Mr. THOMSON. There is nothing revolutionary about the so-called
hot line to Russia?
Mr. FOSTER. Except that it is encoded, except that it is a direct
line with no intervening in the line.
Mr. THOMSON. Do we have a hot line to Paris?
Mr. FOSTER. Not this type; no, not Paris.
Mr. THOMSON. Would it not be just about as well to have a hot
line to De Gaulle
Mr. FOSTER. It might have some value, sir.
Mr. THOMSON. I am disturbed about your testimony on the use of
other agencies. I have not been convinced there is not overlapping
and duplication and unnecessary expense on the contract work which
you do with other agencies. Your example was to use a military
aircraft to fly over a selected target to look for certain objectives on
the ground. Is that not exactly what the Air Force does when they
fly over targets and does not their intelligence provide them advance
information on where to look and what to expect?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; but the Air Force does not have in a single
airplane for instance, all of the different sensors which would pick
up all of the different evidences of both the obvious and the concealed
activities. They are working with us on this. This is something
which they have an interest in because they have not done it just this
way and they think it will be valuable to them as well.
Mr. THOMSON. Then your expense is incurred by conversion of that
hardware to the purposes for which you are seeking
Mr. FOSTER. Plus the planning and the laying out of the objectives
of the look, the developing of the data processing that should go with
it to make it timely and valuable, and the kind of thing that we are
interested in.
We are undertaking the planning, the policy direction, and the lay-
out of this sort of thing plus the conversion of the hardware that will
be operated by the military.
Mr. THOMSON. Wasn't CIA doing something very similar in the
II-2 overflights?
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43
Mr. FOSTER. Well, that is a form of reconnaissance, sir. The CIA.
is in this plaiming activity with us.
Mr. THOMSON. Is that not a similar type of inspection to what you
propose to make?
Mr. FOSTER. Not exactly. The U-2 is a purely photographic activ-
ity, as you know. There are many other sensors.
I am sorry. I will save some of this for a little later, if I may.
Mr. THOMSON. In that same connection, Mr. Chairman will it be
possible for the committee to hear the Director of the CIA? I think
on this question of testing and inspection
Chairman MORGAN. lir. Thomson, at your request we have talked to
Mr. McCone and he will come up here as soon as time is available.
He will be ready to discuss methods of detection while he is here.
Mr. THOMSON. He is coming?
Chairman MORGAN. Yes.
Mr. THOMSON. Before we complete our hearings on this bill?
Chairman MORGAN. Yes. He will be available after the recess, not
only to discuss this bill but the other request you had made.
Mr. THOMSON. I thought it might be relevant on the question of
detection, inspection and so forth, to hear what the CIA is doing,
which I think may be a duplication of the exact thing this Agency is
proposing.
Mr. FOSTER. May I say again, sir, the end product we have is slightly
different. We have got to design a system that we can negotiate with
the other side. This will be a mutually acceptable verification system.
We are in close and daily touch with the CIA and obviously they have
much of great value in this. Other than that, we attempt to utilize, to
avoid duplication, which is of concern to you and to us
Mr. THOMSON. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. iarbstein ?
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
. Mr. Foster, is yours not basically a "brains" Agency?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, it is a catalytic agent. We have a science group.
We have an experienced group of international Foreign Service of-
ficers. We have a weapons evaluation control group headed by an ac-
tive vice admiral and with him are associated some 12 very fine officers
in the grade of lieutenant colonel or colonel in all of the services.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Then it is basically that, is it not?
Mr. FOSTER. Our job is to think through and come up with plans;
yes sir.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Do you not think your Agency would be more effec-
tive sticking to brainwork rather than operational duties?
Mr. FOSTER. That is essentially what we have done Mr. Farbstein.
The only operating would be this joint operation in the, field tests, and
if word becomes necessary it might be we would have to operate some
part of the verification system on a test ban.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. These activities would be few and far between,
would they not?
Mr. FOSTER. They would change the character of the. present .or-
ganiz ation.
Mr. F.4RBSTEIN. Obviously, for a "brains" organization, you d9 not
need too great a budget? It is not necessary for you to go into the
millions of dollars?
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Mr. FOSTER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Who determines what contracts are to be handed
out, when they are not handled by your own organization?
Mr. FOSTER. You mean those placed in the Department of Defense?
Mr. FARBSTEIN. No.
Mr. FOSTER. We have a system in our own organization but you
are asking about outside?
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Yes; who determines what contracts are to be
placed with outside organizations?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, we have a research council which passes on the
ideas of all of the bureaus within our Agency. We have a contracting
officer who handles each particular contract.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Pardon me for interrupting you, but time is fleet-
ing.
When I get a sentence that is enough of an answer.
Who composes this research council?
Mr. FOSTER. The heads of each of the bureaus plus our executive
officer.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. What bureaus?
Mr. FOSTER. Science and Technology, Weapons Evaluation and
Control, International Relations, Economics, Disarmament Advisory
Staff.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Therefore, at best it would seem to me yours would
be in the nature of a supervisory organization rather than an activist
organization, would it not?
Mr. FOSTER. Policy formulation and study; yes, sir.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Your philosophy, as I learned this morning, is dif-
ferent from that of the Department of Defense?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. In view of that fact, how do you get along with
the Department of Defense?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, I once helped run the Department of Defense.
We both have the same broad basic objectives, the national security
of the United States. You can approach that from differing view-
points. There are differences between us and that is the purpose of
the Committee of Principals' to attempt to resolve differences and
bring about a unified approach.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. You expect that yours will prove to be a permanent
agency?
Mr. FOSTER. I believe it would be useful to have it permanent, Mr.
Farbstein, yes.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Nevertheless, all you need is a rather small budget?
' Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Have you delineated the necessity for the $15 mil-
lion you requested in the budget for fiscal year 1961?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. We have had a hearing before the House
Appropriations Committee on it. We prepared the justification for
it at that time.
MT. FARBSTEIN. For the $15 million?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes sir.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Has the Appropriations Committee acted on it yet?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, they have acted and all they would report out was
$1.6 million, that being the present remaining authorization.
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45
Mr. FARBSTEIN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Fraser?
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Foster, besides being Director of the Agency, do
you have the title of Assistant Secretary of State?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. My sole title is Director of the Agency.
Mr. FRASER. I had the impression from somewhere that you had
some relationship with the Secretary of State. Perhaps it is just
the fact that you report to him?
Mr. FOSTER. I am under the direction of the Secretary of State and
I am under the President. I have two reporting directions.
Mr. FRASER. Could you give us a little of your background?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, I came to Washington for 30 days in 1941, just
before Pearl Harbor. I stayed in Washington through World
War II and I was director of the Purchases Division of the War De-
partment; special assistant to the Secretary of War for Aircraft
Procurement during the war.
I went back to private business for 6 months in 1946 and then be-
came Under Secretary of Commerce. I then became the Deputy
U.S. Representative to Europe for the Marshall plan and then became
the Deputy Administrator of the Marshall plan and then the Ad-
ministrator.
I then became the Deputy Secretary of Defense during the Korean
war. I returned to private business for 7 years part time, because I
was called back to Government on a number of occasions.
I was cochairman of the Gaither Committee and a negotiator on
the Surprise Attack Conference in 1958 with the Soviet Union and
I was at that time executive vice president of the Olin Matheson
Chemical Corp.
I had a different salary, Mr. Gross, at that time.
I then was asked by President Kennedy to come in as a consultant
to Mr. McCloy when he was a special assistant to the President on
disarmament. When this Agency was established, I was made Di-
rector of it.
Mr. FRASER. Thank you.
Do any other countries have a counterpart to the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency?
Mr. FOSTER. Not exactly. Most of the countries which are active
in this situation have a disarmament section of their foreign office.
This is true of the Soviet Union.
All that they have set up is a special disarmament section in the
Soviet Academy of Sciences which works closely with the Foreign
Office group, although not directly a government agency, as we would
consider it. We have recommended that this be done in those coun-
tries where there is a continuing activity, but so far as I know, no
other country has done exactly this.
Mr. FRASER. Do we maintain any kind of a dialog with any other
nations, other than the Soviet Union, on this general question of
disarmament?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes we do. We are in constant touch with our NATO
allies. We are in touch with the eight nonalined nations which are
at Geneva in a conference there, and we, of course, have discussions
with other independent nations around the world as particular ques-
tions of disarmament or nuclear activity come up.
23-197 68i-4
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Our Agency has participated in this directly through our own rep-
resentatives and also through instructions to our embassies in those
countries. We are constantly visited by representatives of other coun-
tries at our Washington headquarters as well.
Mr. FRASER. Most of what you just described would be, I suppose,
a discussion of policy alternatives which we may pursue and other
countries may pursue in attempting to reach agreements. Is there any
kind of dialog carried on at something less than the policy level?
For example, at the technical level?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes; members of our Science and Technology Bureau
have had many meetings with other country representatives. We have
had other types of meetings and international jurists have met repre-
senting other countries and our own. There are constant contacts by
Washington embassies with our staff people in the different offices to
which I have referred.
Mr. FRASER. With respect to the test ban treaty now under consid-
oration in the Senate, supposing it is ratified and fully in effect and
6 months from now, hypothetically, we believe that through one of
our detection systems we have noted a nuclear explosion in violation
of the treaty? Does your Agency have any responsibility then for
outlining the possible steps this Government might take in response
?to the situation with which we would be confronted at that point?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes; I would think we would certainly initiate?
Mr. FRASER. I am not asking what steps might be taken. I am ask-
ing if this is a continuing responsibility of your Agency?
Mr. FOSTER. We do have; yes, sir.
Mr. FRASER. For example, this is moving away from the treaty but
supposing the Soviet Union, which has a number of ICBM's, should
accidently launch one and it should land on the United States and
-detonate. Would your Agency consider the problems that confront
this country in that case, under those circumstances?
Mr. FOSTER. Well?
Mr. FRASER. This is one of those accidental situations we sometimes
-speculate about.
Mr. FOSTER. We have the responsibility of the principal advisers
to the President and the Secretary of State on matters of disarmament
:and arms control policies, and for the formulation of such policies
within the U.S. Government.
We would have a responsibility in this situation of recommending
-to our colleagues in the U.S. Government that, as a catalyst again,
what might be the proper course of action under those circumstances.
Mr. FRASER. One of the things we are doing with respect to our
-rocketry and nuclear devices is to establish elaborate safeguards to
prevent an accidental discharge of a missile. To what extent is your
Agency concerned with the existence of similar precautions within the
Soviet Union? ?
' Mr. FOSTER. We are concerned with it. We have recommended
similar activities be undertaken on their part.
?This is also an activity carried on normally through the embassies.
?Therefore, we would make such recommendations to our embassies
abroad or at formal or informal discussions at Geneva. For instance,
informally, perhaps, at the United Nations.
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Mr. FRASER. Do we have knowledge as to the kind of safeguards
And precautions the Soviet Union is pursuing in this direction?
Mr. FOSTER. Limited; limited knowledge.
Mr. FRASER. Do they talk to us about it?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes; but not very completely. We have made it per-
fectly clear to them on many occasions, and we do in our public prints,
the safeguards we have established to protect us from such an acci-
dent by U.S. weapons. We do not get that same exchange, unfortu-
nately, from them.
Mr. FRASER. Do we have any ideas as to whether their safeguards
.are nearly as elaborate as ours?
Mr. FOSTER. I have no good knowledge of that. I do not have any
good knowledge of that.
.6
Mr. FRASER. I think it was a few years acro?I do not recall the
time, but we had a problem in Minnesota with respect to fallout in the
feeding of dairy cattle. As a matter of fact, the feeding was changed
for a period of time because of the situation that existed. Is this the
kind of problem with which your Agency is familiar and do you study
this problem of fallout levels in the United States?
Mr. FOSTER. No; we are, of course, thoroughly aware of it, but
there is a Federal Radiation Council on which we are not represented.
We do, of course, get the reports and the knowledge of what their
activities are, on a continuing basis, but we are not members of that
Council.
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Foster, I take it that in the formulation of policy,
at least to the extent your own views are involved, you do not sub-
scribe to unilateral disarmament?
Mr. FOSTER. I certainly do not and the Agency does not.
Mr. FRASER. I also gather that you would not consider it feasible
to contemplate substantial, total disarmament on a bilateral or multi-
lateral basis without the creation of some kind of police force?
Mr. FOSTER. No. Our plan for general and complete disarmament
was developed in response to a feeling that this should be an ultimate
objective. In order to achieve that ultimate objective, one must go
through a whole series of balanced safeguarded steps amongst which
would be included the gradual reduction of national forces, and as
they were reduced, have an international peace force.
That would not start until the second stage of our proposed plan.
Our proposed plan, as you will recall, is fairly precise in the first stage.
We would not move to the second stage unless and until all the re-
quirements of the first stage had been carried out.
In turn, the second stage would be under the same philosophy. In
each of the first two stages, we have set numbers and times for that,
and we have not had the wisdom to look into the future to see how
long the third stage might take to achieve many of these revolutions in
thought and relationships. We think it is wise to have at least a
framework under which that might proceed, but whether that would
be 10, 25, or 50 years, I have no judgment on.
Mr. FRASER. The reason I asked that question is that a lot of peo-
ple in this country feel that the way to achieve peace is through dis-
armament. I have reflected on this problem and it seems to me that
disarmament standing alone without the substitution of an interna-
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tional police force of some kind lends no assurance we would' have
peace. -We may find one country has disabled itself from responding
to aggression whereas another country may in some way reconstitute
its forces, or there may be shifts in alliances, which we have seen
so often in the history of the world. I cannot forget the fact that
in World War II we fought against Germany, against Japan, and
with the Soviet Union as our ally, but now suddenly we have West
Germany on our side and Japan on our side and our main problem
is the Soviet Union.
I do not know what the alinement of forces will be 50 years from:
now, but I venture they will not be as they are today.
My impression is that armaments make up only a part of the so-
called balance of power. If you attempt to limit this without dealing-
with the larger problem of the balance of power as we have tradi--
tionally considered it, this is not realistic.
Mr. FOSTER. We completely agree.
Mr. FRASER. So, disarmament, to be meaningful, has to be consid-
ered in a broader context?that is, in the broader terms you have been.
talking about?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki ?
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will reserve most of my questions for the executive session we,
will have with Mr. Foster, but I would like to make a personal obser-
vation at this point.
I am sure that all of my colleagues here, to one degree or another,
have deep personal regard for you, Mr. Foster, because of your past
contributions to our Nation's preparedness and security.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Some of our people who write to us in an effort,.
I suppose, to be helpful to ACDA, and even some of those who have
testified on behalf of ACDA before this committee, or in the Senate,
have aroused a certain amount of concern about the Agency, its ac-
tivities and its direction.
Some of those individuals have on occasion demonstrated a rather-
prominent tendency toward fuzziness in thinking, and softness in
attitude toward our Nation's adversary. I am not at this time going
to identify any individuals or organizations in this group. You know
them well.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one or two questions.
Mr. Director, in answer to prior questions, you stated that the task
of the ACDAis policy formulation and study?and that even in the.
event of an attack upon our country, you would continue to fulfill
those responsibilities.
To what extent does ACDA. make policy recommendations to the
Department of Defense or the State Department at present? For
example, has ACDA had any position on RS-70?
Mr. FOSTER. We have had no official position on the RS-70.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Did you have an unofficial position? Was there
any recommendation made to the Department of Defense in that
instance?
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Mr. FOSTER. Well, this is a bard question to answer because we have
-a number of military people on our staff and some of them may have
-talked.
The Agency, as such has made no written or personal recommen-
dation to the Defense Department on this subject.
There may be other weapons systems, however, which we might
have
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Officially and formally, ACDA does not recommend
policy or direction to the Department of Defense? Except through the
President?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, it is entirely possible that in view of our respon-
sibility for looking into the future, we can and should and do make
comments on certain kinds of weapons systems plans. Maybe we will
talk about this at a little later time in executive session.
? Mr. ZABLOCKI. Including the one that aroused such controversy
about the award of the contract?
? Mr. FOSTER. No, we didn't get into that.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. With respect to the U.S. three-stage disarmament
plan discussed on page 11, and the first stage of it, what liaison does
ACDA maintain with the U.N. at the present time?
Mr. FOSTER. Of course we have no direct liaison. We do have on
the General Assembly a group of our people. Ambassador Dean last
year was one of the delegates and spent 21/2 months there. Ambassa-
dor Steele will be an alternate delegate this year, so that through the
U.S. delegation to the U.N. we have a number of competent officers
who are constantly there during the General Assembly when dis-
armament and arms control activities are being discussed.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. To what extent do you expect your liaison with the
U.N. to increase as you move into stage 2?
? Mr. FOSTER. Certainly it would necessarily increase as you begin to
build up those international institutions such as the international dis-
armament organization and the general discussion of such problems
and the progress toward and the adherence to any agreements under-
taken by the members of the United Nations.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. And if yours were a permanent agency, certainly
such liaison would continue in the third stage?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, it would.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask two short questions?
Chairman MORGAN MT. Fascell.
Mr. FASCELL. Is the United States ahead in the application of social
science in the achievement of all its international objectives, including,
but not limited to, arms control and disarmament?
Mr FOSTER. I don't know that I am competent to answer.
Mr. FASCELL. Would you venture an estimate?
Mr. FOSTER. My estimate would be that we are.
Mr. FASCELL. What effect would an immediate chemical protection
to radioactivity have on the operation of your Agency?
Mr. FOSTER. I think we would be very pleased that that might oc-
cur. I see no likelihood of it, in spite of some of these recent rumors,
but we would still be faced with the necessity of developing arms con-
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trol and disarmament policies for other forms of attack and for the.
dangers from nuclear testing or nuclear activities.
Mr. FASCELL. In policy planning or formulation do you take this.
kind of contingency into account?
Mr. FOSTER. We haven't taken that into account.
Mr. FASCELL. IS it a factor which you ought to take into account?
Mr. FOSTER. I think it ought to be a little nearer to realization be-
fore we do, but I think we should be alert to such development.
Mr. FASCELL. Isn't it a safe assumption that the Russians would
immediately and very diligently?shouldn't it be the assumption that
the Russians are very diligent in seeking some immediate and complete
protection of humans to radioactivity, and this would have immediate'
impact on national planning, both defensive and offensive?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, it would. I still think there are more immediate'
things, with our limited resources, we should be attacking.
Mr. FASCELL. I wasn't thinking of attacking the problem of defense
against radioactivity for the human being. I am thinking strictly
about the place this possibility should have in policy planning and
formulation, both from the standpoint of arms control and disarma-
ment and from the standpoint of offensive operations, militarily, and
from the standpoint of international objectives by the United States.
Chairman MORGAN. Are there further questions?
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.
Mr. GROSS. I want to join with my colleague from Wisconsin,
Thomson, in his question as to whether there isn't tremendous dupli-
cation and overlapping in this program, and. I think the committee
ought to hear witnesses, not at the same time Mr. Foster continues his
testimony but at another time, from the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Defense Department, and other agencies now providing services
for which they are being paid by the Disarmament Agency. I think
we need to go into this very thoroughly.
I hope the chairman will agree to our having witnesses from the
other agencies on this subject.
Chairman MORGAN. We will be glad to consider all requests for
witnesses to appear, but we have to set a deadline for closing our sched-
ule. We have requests from 20 private witnesses to be heard.
Mr. GROSS. IS it not true in 1958 we had a moratorium on high level
testing?
Mr. FOSTER. There was a tacit agreement by both sides that there
would be no nuclear testing for a given period. It was not a joint
moratorium at all.
Mr. GROSS. There was an agreement and there was a suspension of
hi,,ah-level testing?
Mr. FosTER. There was a statement by each side that it did not plan
to undertake nuclear tests.
Mr. GROSS. There was actually a suspension, was there not?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes; there was a suspension for about 3 years.
Mr. GROSS. We were then spending on disarmament approximately
$1 million a year.
Mr. FOSTER. I don't know that I have any figures as to what we were
spending on disarmament. If you include nuclear test ban discussions
in Geneva, it may have been roughly that.
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Mr. GROSS. I think we were appropriating somewhere in the neigh-
borhood of $1 million a year through those particular years for an
office of?what was it called?Disarmament or Secretary for Peace.
We were not spending it at the rate of $15 million, that is certain.
Yet we had a moratorium. And this one may be no more or no less
effective than the other. After the Russians evaluate the tests of their
high level, high megaton devices, they may be back at it again in
another 2 or 3 years and it may be less time than that.
Mr. FOSTER. I think I should point out that this is a formal treaty,
Mr. Congressman.
Mr. GROSS. I understand, but they have had no hesistancy in break-
ing agreements and treaties in the past. Do you agree with that,
Mr. Foster?
Mr. FOSTER. If it is in their national interests, it is entirely possible
they may maintain it.
Mr. GROSS. If they deem it is not in their national interest, they
would break it?
Mr. FOSTER. As would we, if it were not in our national interests.
Mr. GROSS. That is the record.
Well, I doubt if we will break it. We haven't broken many agree-
ments with very many countries in the past.
Mr. FOSTER. We have the right, under the terms of treaty to with-
draw if it is against our national interest.
Mr. GROSS. Are you a member of the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes' sir.
Mr. GROSS. You have been and are now a member of the Council?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes.
Mr. GROSS. Are there any others in your Agency who are also
members?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes; I think Mr. Alexander is.
Mr. GROSS. Has there been or is there now any disposition on the
part of the Disarmament Agency to recommend that SAC be placed
under NATO command?
Mr. FOSTER. No; we haven't participated in any such recommenda-
tion or study.
Mr. GROSS. Was there ever a recommendation to your knowledge in
the Disarmament Agency which you how head that SAC be placed
under NATO command?
Mr. FOSTER. Never under my administration, and I have been the
only Administrator.
Mr. GROSS. You were previously connected with the Defense De-
partment?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. GROSS. And with agencies that were related to the old dis-
armament setup.
To your knowledge, sir, was it ever proposed by any of those en-
gaged in heading up a disarmament agency that the Strategic Air
?
Command be placed under NATO command?
Mr. FOSTER. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. GROSS. You say you are the chief adviser to the President. Mr.
McCloy is no longer chief adviser to the President in disarmament
matters; is that correct?
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Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
Mr. GROSS. You are?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
Mr. GRoss. In reading Mr. McOloy's statement which accompanied
the drafting of the legislation under which you presently operate, I
get the definite impression that he thought one of the fundamental pur-
poses of the Disarmament Agency was to put this Government under
world aovernment. Do you agree, or do you recall his statement that
he made in connection with the transmittal of the bill which created
this Agency?
Mr. FosTER. I don't recall that he stated it in those terms, sir. I
think he hoped that there would be. as I have said earlier, a revolution
in world relationships which could lead to the settlement of inter-
national disputes- under world law, and for that purpose that the
United Nations would have to be a different body and the world would
have to be a 'different world.
Mr. GRoss. I will try to get some further information and try to
corroborate this. Now, you do have the authority to construct labora-
tories do you not, under the law?
Mr. FosTER. We do' sir. ?
Mr. GRoss. But you have not embarked upon any program of labora-
tory construction?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir.
Mr. GROSS. May I ask you this question: In your statement today
and in all the publicity attendant upon the Disarmament Agency we
hear only one thing: fissionable material.
Are you convinced that there is not even the remotest possibility
that the next war will be using the weapons of bacteria and gas or
chemicals?
Mr. FOSTER. We are not convinced that that is impossible and we
have studies in that connection, as well. ?
Mr. GROSS. You have studies presently being conducted?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes.
Mr. GROSS. I should like to ask you further questions about it when
you appear, as to your estimate of the Possibility of this kind of war-
fare, rather than warfare based upon fissionable material.
In answer to Mr. Farbstein you spoke of a small budget and agreed
that your Agency should be operated on a small budget. Would you
please tell the committee what you mean by a small budget?
Mr. FOSTER. I consider, as I said to you earlier, sir, that the amounts
we have requested consistent with the job with which we are seized,
are small amounts. I think the Agency should continue to be small
proportionately, since I think our job is a catalytic job. I think it is
a policy formulation job. As contrasted with the tremendous operat-
ing bud.gets of the operating agencies, I consider it small, but highly
useful, and I consider $15 million toward that end, or even more,
perhaps, next year, to be small in comparison with what can be
achieved and which has shown some evidence of at least a start to
achieving it.
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53
Mr. GROSS. Could you give us any indication or estimate of a ceiling
that you would go to?
Mr. FOSTER. I would say that should be considered in relationship
to what the problems at that time would be. At the moment, $15
million has been considered an appropriate and adequate amount, by
not only your Agency, but by the President and the Bureau of the
Budget.
Mr. GROSS. Of course the 270 employees that you have represents
only a part of your expenditure for personnel services. That is
correct, too, is it not?
Mr. FOSTER. We have 205 employees at the moment. The addi-
tional administrative expenses are shown in the $749,000 which is
largely housekeeping, bookkeeping, telephone and communications
expenses for which we reimburse the State Department.
Mr. GROSS. One last question with respect to the so-called hot line.
You would not expect?if Khrushchev were to launch war upon this
country, you would not expect him to pick up the phone or whatever it
is, or have his operator send word via a teletype machine, that he was
launching an attack?
Mr. FOSTER. Certainly not. This is intended to reduce the risk of
war by miscalculation or accident, which, as I indicated earlier, could
have been a very near thing last year when communications were not
adequate.
Mr. GROSS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
testify.
(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee proceeded to further
business.)
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ACT
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1963
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
ashington, D
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 in
room II-322, the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman)
presiding. -fi
Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order. d
The committee meets this morning in open session to continue hear-
ings on legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
Our first witness this morning is Prof. Alexander Rich, professor of
biophysics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor
Rich is representing the Federation of American Scientists and the
Council for a Livable World.
Piofessor, you have a prepared statement and you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER RICH, PROFESSOR OF BIOPHYSICS AT
THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, REPRESENT-
ING THE FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND THE COUN-
CIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD
Mr. RICH. I would like to file the statement in the record and make
some remarks related to the statement.
Chairman MORGAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The prepared statement of Mr. Rich is as follows:)
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Alexander Rich. I
am a professor of biophysics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I
am appearing before you today in behalf of the Council for a Livable World,
the Federation of American Scientists, and in my own behalf in support of
H.R. 3299, to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
Both you and I are here today because of our interest in the long-term security
of the United States. Several agencies of the Government have been working
strenuously for many years to enhance our security. However, despite our vast
expenditure of funds, today we are less secure than we have been at almost any
time in our history.
? This lack of security does not stem from a failure of effort on the part of
our armed services or a failure on the part of our scientific or industrial com-
munity, but rather stems directly, of course, from the technological changes
which have taken place in the way in which nations are able to wage war
against each other. Coupling the enormous destructive power of a multirnegaton
nuclear weapon with the very high speed and accuracy of a ballistic missile has
brought about this profound change in our outlook. Today a nation with a
relatively small number of these weapons can pose a substantial threat to this
country even though we may have the same weapons in great preponderance.
55
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56 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Lack of national security has a very graphic meaning for us today. Right at
this moment, for example, there are undoubtedly several nuclear missiles which
are already preprogramed and set to land upon this very site. They carry
destructive power more than sufficient to eradicate all life in this area. Thus
it is that you and your families, in a very literal sense, live 20 minutes from
,oblivion. This is the practical meaning of the term "insecurity."
We are, of course, trying to take many measures to make our situation more
secure. For example great effort is directed toward the development of the
antimissile missile. However, the problems behind it are enormous.
Today we are trying to develop antimissile missiles which will protect us
against first generation ballistic missiles. However, it is quite clear that con-
tinued developments in technology will produce second generation vehicles with
considerably greater sophistication than those which are seen today. The prob-
lem of multiple decoys is not one which is easily solved. In short, we cannot
see a likely increase in our security through developments in this area.
This situation has brought about a substantial reorientation in our thinking,
since we are forced to consider other methods for maintaining and increasing
our security. Many people in this country and in other countries believe that
A" disarmament plan under an adequate system of control is the best method to
achieve security.
Most scientists, I believe, share this opinion, and it is my impression and hope
that it is also shared by most legislators as well. The urgency of the situation
has been expressed by President Kennedy, who said, "The weapons of war must
be abolished before they abolish us."
One of our responses to this situation has been the creation of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency to seriously look into the methods which can be
developed to carry out a disarmament agreement to enhance our security. This
'Agency has the task of providing the Government with the background of
information and new ideas so that we can enter into international disarmament
negotiations from a position of strength.
To operate effectively, our negotiators must know that they have studied a
particular problem thoroughly and are familiar with it in all aspects. The Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency has already made a substantial start in this
direction, and the question we are considering today is whether the activities of
this Agency can be improved by modifying the terms under which it operates.
In particular, I believe that the Agency will be able to perform much more
effectively if the authorization ceiling is removed so that the Agency can work
with "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate." This amendment would
place the Agency's funding on the same permanent basis as most other Govern-
ment agencies.
My reasons for supporting this change are as follows: First of all, the Agency
needs to undertake long-term research projects. There is no short cut to develop-
ing a disarmament program. The problems are a complex mixture of technical,
political, and economic factors.
Secondly, an open-end appropriation and authorization means that the Agency
has the flexibility which it needs in special eases.
? Finally, the success of this program depends ultimately on the caliber of
people carrying it out. But putting the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
on the same permanent basis as most other governmental organizations, it will
be possible to attract and hold the best people available for this job.
Let me be a little more specific in describing some of these points. It is
apparent that any disarmament agreement is a very complicated enterprise.
For example, the recent nuclear test ban treaty does not directly bring about
any disarmament, but during the past 2 months we have seen the considerable
entanglement of political problems which it has provoked.
If the treaty had included underground tests as well, then considerably more
technological complications would have been involved. This serves to underline
the fact that continued long-term study and analysis must precede any disarma-
ment step.
When the nuclear test ban treaty is fully ratified, the Agency will have a new
and continuing responsibility in monitoring the treaty. It will be a central
point for collecting and analyzing data and this may come to occupy a fair amount
of its daily effort. However, the Agency also has the responsibility of formulat-
ing additional disarmament steps to enhance our security. This is a long-term
effort.
The crux of a disarmament measure often centers about the inspection pro-
cedures which are evolved for the particular problem. People in the Agency are
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now analyzing potential inspection techniques which might be used if we decided
to create nuclear free zones, or if we decided to negotiate an arrangement to cut
off the production of fissionable materials, or if we negotiated an agreement on
the nontransfer of nuclear weapons.
Any one of these might become the next measure to follow the test ban agree-
ment. They are all quite different, and they require intensive analysis. For
example, what level of inspection is necessary to insure compliance with a treaty
in an atom-free zone? Is it possible to monitor the isotope output of a nuclear
weapons production plant by simply measuring its power consumption?
These are not simple questions, and it is the responsibility of the personnel in
the Agency to be certain that we have the correct answers. These long-term
studies would all be facilitated if the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
were established on the same permanent basis as most other governmental orga-
nizations rather than living a more or less temporary existence.
An open-ended authorization also has other advantages. This does not mean
that the Agency will spend vastly larger amounts of money or necessarily more
money than that which has already been appropriated. However, it does allow
the Agency to spend funds which may be necessary in certain special
contingencies.
Let me give you a specific example of this. A special problem was created
recently with the Russian suggestion that we install a system of control posts
which are located so as to prevent a surprise attack. Such a step might provide
an atmosphere of increased confidence in Europe, and it is necessary that this
proposal be studied fully.
What is involved in a control post? How many people should be there and
with what skills and equipment? Where should these posts be placed, and could
we rely on them? Should we develop new instruments for such posts?
It is clear that the Agency must move rapidly on this issue and possibly spend
more funds. When faced with a contingency of this type under the present
authorization, the Arms Control Agency might have difficulty in obtaining this
vital information. This does not seem to me to be the most effective way for
the Agency to function.
I have described two types of problems, one arising from the necessity for
long-range research and the other stemming from a sudden issue which requires
great attention by the Agency. Both of these situations, together with the con-
tinual problem of obtaining the best personnel for staffing the Agency, make it
extremely desirable to change the authorization of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency so that it can carry out more effectively its search for
increased national security.
A temporary Government organization is quite appropriate when the problem
which it is facing has a short lifetime. However, it is unlikely that the problems
of arms control and disarmament will disappear thus readily and, in a sense,
this is one of the main arguments for approving this amendment.
Finally, I must add that people in other countries watch with great interest
our moves in the field of disarmament. A change of this type will be regarded as
a significant indication of the seriousness of our intentions.
Thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. RICH. We are here today because we are interested in the secu-
rity of the United States. I think the terms "security" and "insecu-
rity" have quite a different meaning today than they have had in the
past. In a very real sense it is fair to assume there are several missiles
right now which are programed to land in this area, and likewise,
prepared to land in my home town of Cambridge. We are 20 minutes
from the edge of destruction.
This is a type of insecurity that we have never experienced in the
past. I think this provides an overtone of concern and urgency to the
kind of legislation which you are considering today. This type of
concern is one that fortunately is felt in other parts of the world as
well.
I have attended several conferences of scientists dealing with sci-
ence and world affairs, the so-called Pugwash conferences, and I have
spoken to Soviet scientists. I remember clearly a discussion with one
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58 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
very eminent mathematical physicist. I asked him why was he at the
conference. It wasn't a conference dealing with his specialty in phys-
ics, but one dealing with problems of security and peace.
His answer was quite simple. He said:
I am a professor at Moscow State University. I realize that if there is a
nuclear war I will be destroyed and my university also, and this is why I am
here at this meeting.
This mirrored in effect the reasons that I and several of my col-
leagues had for being there.
The issue at hand is the question of the authorization for the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. This Agency was established by
the Congress essentially to formulate disarmament agreements, to ex-
plore, develop, recommend, and, with the approval of the President,
to negotiate possible alternatives to the arms race in order to enhance
national security. The question that we are considering today is what
is the most effective way in which this Agency is to operate, and in
particular what kind of appropriations it should have.
My view of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is that it
represents what might be called a prudent investment on the part of
the Government. We don't really know what the long-term prospects
are for disarmament and the extent to which disarmament would en-
hance the security of this country. On the other hand, we do realize
the urgency of the problem and it makes good sense to invest a certain
amount of money and a certain amount of research effort so that we
can explore this field fully and find out to what extent we can enhance
our security by carrying out disarmament measures.
One thing becomes clear as we observe the evolution of political
events in the past few years: we have to make ourselves ready to take
advantage of opportunities that may develop. For example, today we
may have opportunities for negotiating disarmament agreements par-
tially due to the split between the Soviets and the Chinese, to the high
cost of Soviet armaments, or perhaps to the realization on the part of
the Soviets, stimulated by the Cuban crisis, of the enormous threat to
their own society the arms race poses. We don't really know what
all the relevant variables are, but opportunities present themselves and
the essence of the Agency's responsibility is that we be prepared to
take advantage of these opportunities.
Right now we are in the process of ratifying a nuclear test ban
treaty. This treaty is in part a product of the activities of the Agency,
and this treaty in turn will modify the activities of the daily program
of the Agency, especially if, as seems likely, the Agency has a continu-
ing and great responsibility for monitoring the treaty.
In addition, the Agency has the long-term responsibility of doing
research into the kind of disarmament steps that should follow the
treaty. We are not clear what the next step should be, but I would
like to enumerate some of the possibilities which the Agency has the
responsibility of evaluating.
One of the most interesting general areas is the development and
evolution of inspection techniques. We can only have a disarmament
agreement that we believe in if it has all those aspects of a secure
inspection system which assures us that the agreement is being honored
by both sides.
One of the specific possibilities, which this country has talked about,
is that we might enter into an agreement to create nuclear-free zones.
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This poses a great many problems. What kind of inspection tech-
niques are appropriate for nuclear-free zones? How thorough do they
need to be? Are there new hardware devices that we should develop in
order to carry out such an agreement?
We might decide to negotiate a decrease or cutoff in the production
of nuclear isotopes, of isotopes needed for nuclear weapons. What
kind of monitoring would be necessary for such a treaty? For exam-
ple, is it possible to monitor the production of weapons material just
by measuring the power consumption of a plant without actually
entering it?
We might decide to negotiate an agreement on the nontransfer of
nuclear weapons. How could this treaty be implemented?
Recently there has been a great deal of interest in the idea of con-
trol posts which could be established in various countries to minimize
the possibility of a surprise attack. This was, of course, mentioned
recently by Khrushchev. It is the Agency's responsibility to deter-
mine the nature of such a control post, how it could be staffed, what
kind of people should be there, what kind of skills they should have,
what kind of equipment they should have, whether new equipment
should be developed, to what extent we could rely on the informa-
tion thus obtained.
All of these represent areas which require continuing study and
investigation on a long-term basis. This is the problem that the
Agency has to face. The bill which is now before this committee
is one which recommends that the authorization of the Agency be
changed so that it can have those funds with which to operate which
are necessary and appropriate.
The current request by the Agency is for $15 million. Of this
$4 million is for administration and $11 million is for research. This
is an investment made by this country. The fact that the figures
are so heavily weighted in terms of research efforts I think simply
reflects the fact that there is a large area of endeavor which the
Agency has to initiate and supplement relating to the background
material for any disarmament agreement. Even though we are not
at all clear at the present time of the particular direction which
any disarmament agreement will take, the responsibility of the Agency
is to assure the negotiators that enter into any agreement that they
have all the facts at hand.
In the past, before the development of this Agency, we were some-
times pushed to produce proposals and adopt positions without full
thought and research. This is unfortunate. I think since the de-
velopment of the Agency this has changed rather dramatically. We
can see that in the manner in which the group went to Moscow to
negotiate the nuclear test ban treaty. A great deal of research ac-
tivity had gone on before the negotiations, so that when it was actually
under discussion, we had done our homework, so to speak.
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has, of course, carried
out other studies as well. It has a continuing study on the nature
of the inspection process. It has studies on the way in which a coun-
try should respond to violations of disarmament agreements. It has
studies on the ways in which we could control an international police
force. It has studies on the ways in which one could develop a
working form for a disarmament agreement, and the hardware which
is necessary for the monitoring and operating of any disarmament
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60 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
agreement. These are a few isolated areas in the general field of
disarmament that represent part of the broad program which the
Agency is developing.
I think the fact that the Agency is now asking for a larger sum of
money than it had in previous years reflects the gathering momentum
of disarmament studies. I think the importance of this is pointed
out by the fact that today a very great number of people are con-
cerned with the debate at the present time going on in the Senate
over the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty. Judging from what
polls have been made, there seems to be rather broad support among
the people for this treaty. I believe that there is also rather broad
support among the population as a whole for the activities of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
It is in that light that I support the request.
Thank you very much. I would be happy to answer any questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Rich.
Professor Rich, of course you realize this bill has already passed
the other body.
Mr. RICH. Yes.
Chairman MORGAN. As it passed the Senate it provided for a $10
million authorization for a 2-year period. In your statement you in-
dicate that there should be an open-end authorization with no fixed
figure?
Mr. RICH. Yes. This is in accordance with the way which many
agencies operate. This does not necessarily mean that the Agency
will spend more money. It does however provide a degree of flex-
ibility to the operation of the Agency which it does not have at the
present time.
The reason behind this essentially is that there are special cases in
which the Agency might need to spend more money. Let me give
you an example.
In the fall of 1962 it became apparent that the Soviet Union was
introducing an entirely new element into the test ban negotiations;
namely, the use of automatic, unattended seismographs for the detec-
tion of underground explosions. This was an area in which we had
not up to that time done a great deal of work.
As soon as it became evident to us that the Soviets were introducing
essentially a new element, it became very important for us to look
rather intensively into the use of these stations. This involved a con-
siderable expenditure of funds. In this case in particular it was car-
ried out in the Vela program which is operated under the Department
of Defense.
However, in a context in which the Disarmament Agency were
responsible for carrying out a study of this type it would necessitate
a short-term expenditure of funds which might be in excess of its
current appropriations. The essential reason for supporting an open-
end authorization is that it gives the Agency a kind of flexibility which
it doesn't have at the present time.
Chairman MORGAN. Professor Rich, I see you also recommend that
this be a permanent agency?
Mr. RICH. Yes. Nothing would please me more than to have the
Agency disbanded by virtue of the fact that the problem had been
solved. But I think it is unrealistic to believe this will come about
in any short-term period. I think we will be facing the problems
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stemming from the possession of nuclear missiles for quite a while.
I think we have to learn to live with them rationally and control them.
I think the vehicle for doing this is through the gradual evolution and
development of a rational arms control and disarmament program.
I think one would be extremely optimistic to think these problems
will disappear. I think they will intensify, become much more im-
portant to our activities, and that we will be faced in future years
with the necessity for doing the work now performed by the Agency
in a considerably expanded form.
Chairman MORGAN. Professor Rich, being a member of the scien-
tific fraternity, are you familiar with any of the contracts that have
al ready been let by the Disarmament Agency?
Mr. RICH. I have seen some of them. The one in particular that
I am most familiar with is the result of a study carried out by the
Institute of Defense Analysis on verification and response in dis-
armament agreements. This was essentially a research investigation
carried out last summer by about 20 scientists at Woods Hole. It
represents, I think, quite a substantial contribution to the entire prob-
lem. The problems of disarmament are incredibly complex and often
not apparent. One has to really apply very good minds to this prob-
lem on a continuing basis.
If this study is an example of the kind of work that the Agency
will do in the future, I think it augurs well.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Rich.
Mr. Broomfield.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Professor Rich, I find little that I can argue with
you about, but I would like to ask you a few questions. I would like
to find out a little bit more of your thinking on the continuing author-
ization. I feel one of the things that is lacking on many of our for-
eign policy matters is that we don't have enough congressional
review.
I think it is more than just merely dollars and cents connected
with this Agency. I think it is where they are going. You have
mentioned that you have some knowledge of some of the contracts that
have been entered into. I could say you have more information on
that than I do as a member of this committee.
Mr. RICH. I think that congressional liaison is extremely im-
portant. I believe this is one of the responsibilities which the Agency
has and on which it probably should expand its efforts. The ques-
tion is whether the best way to bring this about is through a con-
straint on the authorization.
I think: for example, it would be possible to set up a mechanism
for a periodic review. I think this is very desirable, both in terms
of educating the Congress in terms of some of the problems faced by
the Agency, and also in terms of educating the Agency in the think-
ing of the Congress.
Mr BROOMFIELD. I think that latter part is even more important.
Mr. Ricir. Yes, I think it is important. But I question whether a
constraint on the authorization is the most effective way of bringing
this about.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. I sometimes think that as long as you are reason-
able in your appropriation that it is important that this committee as
well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee keep abreast of the
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62 To, AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
work that they are doing. Will you for the record give us some in-
formation about the group you are representing?
Mr. Ricn. Yes, There are two groups. One of these is the Coun-
cil for a Livable World. This is a group of people who have felt
very strongly that the lack of security engendered by the recent de-
velopments in science and technology has posed such a threat to our
society that we really must do something in terms of educating both
ourselves and the Congress to this problem. For this reason this
group sponsors testimony by individuals like myself, as well as other
activities, and supports congressional candidates.
Mr. BROOlVIILDLD. How large a group is it?
Mr. Rim-I. It is a group that has about 5,000 people in total.
The other group, the Federation of American Scientists, is a group
that was established in 1946. It has in the order of 5,000 or 6,000 mem-:
bers. These people are scientists who feel that, as scientists, they
bear a special responsibility for the interaction between society and
science.
. The. Federation of American Scientists was started by scientists,
both in Chicago and Los Alamos, who were involved in the original
work behind the atomic bomb. 'This group worked very hard; has
worked continuously with the Congress since the original McMahon
Act was passed. They sponsor, in addition to testimony like my own,
study programs by scientists at various academic centers dealing with
problems of science and society. Disarmament has been one of the
issues they have been working on for many years.
,Mr. BROOMFTF.TD. Are you opposed, then, to the bill that was passed
by the Senate?
Mr. Rici. I would rather have an authorization which was larger.
I would support an authorization of $15 million a year, rather than 10.
I think what we are doing by decreasing the authorization is limit-
ing the amount of research that we will be able to do in this area.,
I feel this research is very important. And a limitation like this
I think is against our best interest. So I would favor a bill which has
a, larger authorization to it than the one which the Senate passed.
Mr. BROOMIMLD. You are not so opposed to the 2-year limitation?
Mr. RICH. I would be realistic about it. I would say best of all
would be to make an authorization which places this Agency on the
same basis as other agencies. But if that is not possible, then I would
favor an authorization which would -allow the Agency to function at
optimal effectiveness.
I think this problem will, of course, come up Again in 2 years' time
and the Congress may decide to change its mind then. But I think it
is important that the Agency be allowed to operate effectively in that
interim. I think the $10 million appropriation is not in out best in-
terest because we essentially decrease the amount of information which
i
we would be able to develop n this area.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Professor, do you know of any research work that has been done
relative to the economy of the United States in the event that there is
an agreement on disarmament?
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Mr. RacH. There has been a study carried out, I think first under.
the auspices of the United Nations, under the direction of Professor
Benoit, of Columbia UniVerSity, dealing with the problem. A group
of economists essentially made a study of the economy of the United
States and the way in which it would be modified under the impact of
a Substantial disarmament agreement.
This was a rather thorough study. Tile results were interesting,
and were publicized fairly widely. The study came to the conclusion
that we would not go into a recession or have a substantial difficulty
in making this adjustment. The conclusion was based, I 'think, on
fairly comprehensive survey of the defense industries in this country
and on some reasonable aSsumptions concerning the way in :which the
attivitieS of these defense industries would be modified under a dis-
armament program, ?
For example, it is apparent that certain industries which are now
activein the defense field could evolve into industries Which are active,
Say; in our spate program. Thi S would be a very obvibus transforma-
tion in which the industry would keep going, but its product would be
changed slightly. . .
Mr. MuRrHY. It would be a difficult transition though ? ?
Mr. RICH. It would be difficult in some areas, but I think if it were
carried Out gradually it wOUld not be as difficult as it, appears. In
other Words, I think if one talks in terms Of an abrupt transition then
a large number of difficulties appear. Biit if .one talks in terms of an
eVoluti on, then Ithink the strains are relaxed considerably.
The conclusions show there would be a g,Tadual transformation of.
some industries and some areas in particular ??vould experience more
difficulties than others. But on the whole the conchision was that our
economy could make this adjustment. After all, we made the converse
adjustment. That is to say, we went through a period in which our
indUStries transformed rather radically after World War II, and al-
though there were some strains,-we were still, able to manage without
any Undtte hardship. .
Mr. MilitpHY. Thank you, sir.
Chairman. MolloAN. Overhor Thomson.
Mr. Tiidmsox. Thank yotil Mr. Chairman.
Professor, can you tell me what agencies now monitor any tests that
might be made in other countries ? ?
? Mr. RICH. -res. A prograni was set up in the Department of De-
fense called the Vela program which has the responsibility for con-
ducting research in all kinds of environments for nuclear exploSions.
This prOgrain is. Subdivided into explosions, underground, in the water,
in the atmosphere,
arid in outer space. This is a very large activity
under ARPA, the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Defense
Department. This was established prior to the existence of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
In many ways it would seem logical to have this nOtivity under the
Agency, but historically the Agency wasn't established at that time
and so this was not done.
The Vela program is a very. Comprehensive one. I.think it shows
very Well the virtue of investing money in research in this. area. This
iS shown best hy the change in our attitude concerning the number
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of earthquakes, for example, in the Soviet Union, which might be con-
fused with underground tests.
When this program was first initiated in 1958 we concluded?al-
though I don't have the exact figure?that there would be a relatively
large number of earthquakes which would be confused with under-
ground explosions in the area covered by the Soviet Union. After 4
years of research, this number was decreased enormously, until it came
down to the number of about 75 or so that was given to the Congress
during the testimony this spring.
This more precise knowledge of the number of anticipated earth-
quakes that would mask tests springs directly from the application
of our research efforts to this field. It illustrates, I think very well,
the rewards that one can gain by a coordinated and comprehensive
research program. In a way it is rather comparable to the research
programs carried out by the Arms Control Agency. But in this case
the program is administered by the Department of Defense.
Mr. THOMSON. Do you see any duplication in the efforts in this area
by the Arms Control Agency and the Vela program?
Mr. RICH. Not at all. The Vela project is directly addressed to the
problem of nuclear explosions in various environments. The Arms
Control Agency has a much broader responsibility: It must use this
information. There is a great deal of cordination between the activi-
ties of the Arms Control Agency and the Department of Defense in
this area. There must be. Just as there is,
I might add, a great deal
of coordination betwen the Arms Control Agency and other agencies
of Government, for example, the State Department, or the CIA.
But the aim of the Agency is really quite different from the aims of
the Vela program. The aim of the Agency is to develop in a compre-
hensive way information in the whole field of disarmanment. The
Vela program is directed toward obtaining information about nuclear
explosions, which represents one area, to be sure an important one, in
disarmament?but not the only one.
Mr. TnomsoN. Would you name those other areas that the Arms
Control Agency has that differ from the ones in the Vela?
Mr. Rawl. Some of those I listed before; the evolution and develop-
ment, for example, of inspection techniques on other kinds of agree-
ments, or the control posts which are now being discussed.
For example, in a
Mr. THomsorr. Doesn't the Defense Department have a similar in-
terest in control posts?
Mr. Rim. Indeed they do. I think there would be a fair amount of
coordination in this. In a way the vantage points of these two groups
are different. They are looking toward the same thing, but they are
looking from different points of view.
I think they are both important.
Mr. THOMSON. Couldn't the Defense Department provide the in-
formation to the Agency and then the Agency could place it in the
proper perspective without duplicating the efforts at detection?
Mr. Rion. It does that in this program. There are some fields in
which the overlap is not so complete. As an example of this, we are
considering the possibility of developing nuclear-free zones, or the
possibility of having a cutoff in the production of fissionable material.
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For a cutoff in the production of fissionable material, there would
have to be a great deal of coordination between the activities of the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Agency. The Defense Depart-
ment certainly is interested, but the Atomic Energy Commission is
rather more centrally concerned, since it has developed the informa-
tion needed to carry out this.
But the point is that in any of these areas, it is the Agency that
has the responsibility of developing a coordinated program. I don't
think it would be effective to parcel out these different areas of respon-
sibility to the existing agencies and simply hope to get a coordinated
program.. What we want to have is the efforts of all of these agencies,
but in-such a way as to make the whole package effective. For exam-
ple, avoiding duplication is an important responsibility of the Agency.
If the Agency is aware of what is going on in the Defense Depart-
ment, it can point out, say, to the Atomic Energy Commission that.
it need not carry out certain programs because they are being carried
out elsewhere.
In other words, the Agency's activity is that of a coordinator as
well as of an initiator of new programs. In fact, I think the main
responsibility of the Agency is in this area. I would not regard the
Agency as developing any conflicts at all with other agencies, but
rather as assuring their coordination. This is not unknown in other
agencies. For example, the State Department and the Defense De-
partment often work on similar topics and they do it by coordination.
Mr. TimistsoN. Does MIT have any contracts with the Arms Con-
trol Agency?
Mr. Rim. I don't think so. May I correct that statement: It has
been called to my attention that two groups at MIT do have contracts
with the Agency.
Mr. THOMSON. That is all. Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Rick
Our next witness is Chester C. Shore, legislative director, Ameri-
can Veterans Committee.
Mr. Shore, you have a prepared statement, and you may proceed;
sir.
STATEMENT OF CHESTER C. SHORE, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR,
AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE
Mr. SHORE. I would appreciate it if the prepared statement would
be submitted for the record, and I will make a few remarks.
Chairman MORGAN. Without objection it is so ordered.
(The prepared statement of Mr. Shore follows:)
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Chester C. Shore
and I appear today as a representative of the American Veterans Committee,
an organization of veterans of both World Wars and the Korean conflict. I am
grateful for the opportunity to appear before this committee.
As representative of this veterans organization, I speak on behalf of those
who are intimately acquainted with the horrors of war and thus have a vital
interest in the objective of obtaining a disarmament plan that would ease world
tensions that could lead to war and at the same time provide the necessary
security for our Nation. This desire is set forth in our 1963 platform which
provides as follows:
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66 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
"II. NUCLEAR TESTING AND DISARMAMENT
"Nuclear testing and disarmament are the two pressing questions that have
imperatively forced themselves as first items on the world agenda. The arms
race and renewed nuclear testing continue to pose a mortal danger to mankind
The world is further threatened by the possible growing spread of nuclear weap-
ons. This possibility would make control more complex and difficult and the
threat of war would be heightened. Despite the difficulties and the slow pace
of disarmament negotiations, the United States should continue forcefully and
imaginatively to negotiate for both general and complete disarmament with
proper safeguards and control and for an effective nuclear test ban treaty. The
American Veterans Committee continues to support staged disarmament pro-
posals such as that set forth by the U.S. Government at Geneva.
"The American Veterans Committee states its firm belief that American lead-
ership can help rescue us from the threat of war and lead all nations to a
peaceful world protected by institutions of law and justice. We see the chal-
lenge to the United States to lie ultimately in the search of men everywhere for
reliable systems of international security which make armed aggression impos-
sible, for methods of organization and international cooperation to bring free-
dom from hunger and rising living standards to all continents and all people,
and for political systems of government which protect the rights of each man
and give to each a voice in his own government and his own destiny.
"Achievement of disarmament will bring peace to the world and enable us to
get on with the real business of our century?freedom, security, and human
betterment for all the world."
The American Veterans Committee is a member of the World Veterans Fed-
eration which represent more than 20 million veterans in 51 countries throughout
the free world. At its 10th general assembly the World Veterans Federation
again appealed to all nations to come to an agreement on a treaty for general
and complete disarmament under an effective system of supervision and control.
Work toward this end is admittedly complex and demanding. It requires
analysis, research, testing. and great thought. It cannot be done on a volunteer
basis nor on a crash basis. It requires an established continuing governmental
unit for its achievement. Such is the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. And we, therefore, strongly support legislation which would continue
in operation the work of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
But we are greatly dismayed with the action the Senate took in regard to
S. 777. This bill as originally introduced, as well as many of the House bills
before this committee, would set up the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency on a permanent basis by giving that organization a standing authoriza-
tion or "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate" for its operation. The
bill as it passed the Senate, however, struck out this standing authorization, and
provided for only a 2-year authorization of $20 million.
This committee has heard from Professor Rich in this regard and the Amer-
ican Veterans Committee takes the same position.
We urge this committee to report out legislation that would provide for stand-
ing authorization. This is imperative in order to give the Agency full status
and to show the world we are serious about disarmament. Further, such stand-
ing authorization would better enable the Agency to attract the highest caliber
personnel which is so necessary in this complex field. A temporary organization
is a great handicap to personnel procurement.
Our country should recognize that the work of this Agency will continue as
part of its security and defense system and thus the Agency should be given
permanence. To require the Agency to come back to Congress year after year
for authority to continue would deny the Agency the necessary flexibility in the
event of significant changes in its operation. At the same time, since budget
appropriations must always be justified. Congress will always be able to maintain
the necesary supervision.
In the event that, however, this committee determines that an authorization
limitation is appropriate, our organization believes that the $20 million 2-year
authorization is too low. In its budget request the administration requested
$15 million for fiscal 1964 which at that same rate would mean $30 million for
a 2-year period.
Mr. STTORE. I understand from my reading of the Senate hearings
that Mr. Foster of the Agency pointed up the necessity for standing au-
thorization in order to give the Agency this necessary flexibility.
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however, if the committee does feel that a standing authorization is
not appropriate, we could go on record as believing that a $20 million
2-year authorization is too low. We understand the administration in
its budget request requested $15 million for fiscal year 1964 which at
that rate would mean $30 million for a 2-year period. The work of
this Agency we believe is too important and the potential benefits toO
great for Congress to impose what we believe to be a niggardly author-
ization. To do so Ayould be penny wise and pound foolish.
We therefore believe the minimum authorization should be $30
million for a 2-year period. I am not an expert on this, I am a lay-
man, but I wish to reemphasize the vital concern the Veterans Com-
mittee has as a lay organization and as an organization of veterans;
for the work of this Agency in the field of disarmament, and we hope
and pray that this committee and Congress will do everything that
is possible to assure that this Agency can work effectively toward this
most vital work of complete disarmament.
I would again like to thank the committee for the opportunity to
testify.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you Mr. Shore.
Mr. Shore, was the American you,
Committee represented dur-
ing the Senate hearings?
Mr. SHORE. Yes, sir. Not on disarmament; no, sir, I am sorry. We
did testify on the nuclear test ban, but not disarmament.
Chairman MORGAN. In this quotation you read from your platform,
When was this adopted? Was it during your convention?
Mr. SHORE. It was reaffirmed during our last convention in Wash-
ington in May 1963.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Shore, you feel then that the bill that
passed the Senate with a $20 milliOn authorization for a 2-year period
imposes too severe a limitation on the Agency? i
Mr. SHORE. Yes, sir. We believe t should either be a standing
authorization or else a higher authorization.
Chairman MORGAN. As you have testified, the administration only
asked for $15 million for fiscal 1964.
Mr. SnoRt. I understand that. And projected over a 2-year term
it would be $30 million for 2 years, and I understand the present
authorization is $20 million which would be only
Chairman MORGAN. This is an authorization not an appropriation.
Mr. SHORE. It is $20 million for a 2-year period.
Chairman MORGAN. The Agency has been operating for 2 years on
a $10 million authorization, and they have only used $8,500,000 over
the 2-year period.
Mr. SHORE. I understand that, sir, I would suggest that, as Pro-
fessor Rich has testified, this work is accelerating. There is a larger
need for the work of the Agency, as problems become more complex.
We are coming a little closer toward a solution.
In view of the fact that in the budget hearings the administration
asked for $15 million for 1 year. I would suggest, sir, a higher au-
thorization than the $20 million authorization is appropriate for 2
years.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Shore.
Mr. Broomfield.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Have you been following the newspapers recently,
Mr. Shore, on foreign aid, and the testimony on the floor of the House?
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68 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. SHORE. I have sir.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. You can see what the people through their elected
representatives did after our committee worked 4 months on what I
consider to be the finest foreign aid bill ever reported out of this cornmittee?at least under our able chairman, Dr. Morgan?and they cut
almost an additional $600 million.
Mr. SHoiE., 'think that is unfortunate.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. I think you have to put this in perspective. We
still have to pass this bill through Congress. I think you will be lucky
to-get what the Senate passed.
This is $10 million a year on a 2-year basis. I have supported both
administrations, whether it was the Eisenhower or Kennedy admin-
istration, in this area. What we nod more than anything else is more
review. I think it is dangerous when you start putting these things
on a permanent authorization basis without proper review by this com-
mittee' particularly when you are dealing in foreign policy.
Mr. SHORE. I understand your position, sir. It is still our considered
opinion that we must recognize that this Agency is going to be with
us for a long time. I don't believe that the proper method for review
is by restricting the authorization. I believe committees can always
hold hearings and ask the representatives of the Disarmament Agency
to come up and explain their work.
I think it should be put on a standing basis for the reason of pres-
tige, in order to obtain the best personnel, for the necessary flexibility,
and for other reasons that have been brought before this committee
and the other committee.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. I want to point out to you, as Dr. Morgan has
said, what has been authorized in the past has been more than the,
amount appropriated. The only thing they can spend is what is ap-
propriated. I think if we are reasonable in our authorization, it is
going to provide the flexibility, but still retain the congressional re-
view in this committee, which I think is of the utmost importance.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Farbstein.
Mr. FARBS1TIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have only one ques-
tion.
Mr. Shore, do you have any specific information or knowledge that
you can give us upon which to base an increase in the authorization
aside from the statement you just repeated of Professor Rich, that
work is going to accelerate and will increase?
Mr. SHORE. I also based it on the fact that for 1 year the budget
request of the administration was $15 million. I base it on both those
factors. I have nothing further to add as to the necessity of it.
I ,BM sure Mr. Foster, when be testifies before this committee, can
go into this in more detail. The only point I wish to make is this:
I don't believe on something that is so vital to this country?I think
disarmament is as vital as any -possible subject that can come before
this committee?my only point is this, on something that is so vital, I
only ask Congress and this committee not to be niggardly. I think it
would be more harmful to give too little than to err on the other side
and perhaps give too much.
This is too vital. When you contrast the small amount involved
here with the tremendous amount that is involved in the Department
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of Defense in the arms race, when you contrast the two figures, it seems
that an extra $10 million is a very minor amount, and the potential
benefits are so great and the potential economy to our country, if we
can achieve some disarmament plan that would stop the arms race, or
'slow it clOwn, the possible economic benefits, let alone the other benefits,
even the possible economic benefits that would arise from the point
of view of the tremendous Sums Of money we are Spending on arma-
ments, those possible benefits are sufficient, I think, to warrant this
investment of an additional $10 million.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. The word "niggardly" is a relative term, is it not?
Mr. SHORE. Yes' sir.
MT. FARBSTEIN. That is all.
Mr. SHORE. May I just
Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson.
Mr. THOMSON.. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask one question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shore, what is your personal belief? Do you believe there
can be an agreement on disarmament without Red China being a party
thereto?
Mr. SHORE. To be quite honest, sir, I haven't really considered that
question in proper detail. My personal belief, would be and of course
I am not speaking for the American Veterans' Commitee, that there
can be. Certainty from the point of view of future world peace, it
certainly would be best if we can get as many nations as possible into
an agreement on disarmament.
From a practical point of view, I don't see how we can look forward
to it in the near future. But I see no reason why the other countries
can't have an agreement on disarmament in the absence of Red China.
Mr. MURPHY. May I call your attention to the Washington Naval
Conference held in Washington D.C., in 1922, relative to disarmament
by the United States, United Washington,
and Japan? A proposal was
made for a 5-5-3 ratio in armaments in the Pacific with the United
Kingdom and the United States being assigned 5 as to 3 for Japan.
It is my understanding that Japan withdrew from the Conference not
subscribing to the ratio. You will recall that with the advent of World
War II Japanese naval vessels were more powerful than under the
5-5-3 allotment, and that they had fortified the mandated islands
in the Pacific.
Mr. SHORE. I understand that, sir. I don't think the situation is
'comparable. I don't think Red China today from a military point
of view poses the same sort of military threat that Japan did at that
time. There can always be sufficient flexibility, I believe, in any dis-
armament plan that we could provide for any future contingency if
China should become a serious military threat.
Mr. MURPHY. In reference to the test ban treaty, there are many
,groups that are rather fearful of our security under the provisions
of this treaty at the present time, are there not?
Mr. SHORE. There certainly are.
Mr. MURPHY. The treaty would apply in a case like this?
Mr. SHORE. My only thought?I would point out again I am not
an expert on this subject. I am merely conveying to this committee
our deep concern for the arms race. I am sure the Disarmament
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Agency has taken all these factors into consideration. I am sure any
plan the Disarmament Agency might come up with would take these
matters into consideration.
The only reason for me being here now is that I wish to whole-
heartedly support this Agency because I believe this Agency is doing
very vital work.
Mr. MURPHY. I also believe the Agency is doing good work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Shore.
Mr. SHORE. May I make one other comment? I would point out to
Mr. Broomfield that our organization did testify in support of the
adminstration's foreign aid program. I know you pointed out the
fact that there had been severe cuts in the work that this committee
and the Senate committee came up with on foreign aid. We have,
and we have always supported foreign aid very strongly.
Our members believe in it, are willing to pay the necessary taxes
for it.
Mr. BROOlVIFIELD. Mr. Shore, I also support it.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Shore.
Our next witness is the Reverend H. Lamar Gibble, pastor of Good
Shepherd Church of the Brethren, in Maryland.
Reverend Gibble represents the general brotherhood board. You
have a prepared statement, and you may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF REV. H. LAMAR GIBBLE, PASTOR OF GOOD SHEP-
HERD CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN, KENSINGTON, MD., REPRE-
SENTING GENERAL BROTHERHOOD BOARD, CHURCH OF THE
BRETHREN
Reverend GIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read the prepared
statement and then respond to any questions you may have.
Chairman MORGAN. Please go right ahead.
Reverend GIBBLE. As the chairman has indicated, my name is H.
Lamar Gibble. I live in Kensington, Md., and serve as pastor of the
Good Shepherd Church of the Brethren in this suburban community.
The general brotherhood board of my denomination has requested
that I offer before this committee testimony favorable to the proposed
bill (H.R. 3558) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
In August 1961, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, our organization strongly supported the proposal to estab-
lish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This testimony
was presented because we were confident the proposed Agency could
initiate significant steps toward the achievement of 'general and com-
plete disarmament," world peace, and real security.
Our confidence has not been dimmed as the Agency has emerged
since September 26, 1961, from its status as Public Law 87-297. It
is our judgment that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has
performed significantly and well in its infancy even with its small
initial budget and staff.
Therefore, we support the provisions of the bill before you and would
elaborate on some of the areas with which we are concerned.
1. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency needs to be on a
permanent footing.
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71
With military hardware being produced at ever-increasing rates
and being stockpiled at strategic positions, an effort toward the reduc-
tion of arms seems to be one of the greatest imperatives of our time.
It, therefore, seems clear to us that we cannot deal with arms control
and disarmament in a temporary and halfhearted manner. We do
not deal with the national defense or the problems of agriculture in
this manner. Let us not attempt to deal with arms control and dis-
armament through a temporary agency.
A realistic appraisal of the huge military arsenals in the world
today seems to indicate that a disarmed world cannot be achieved in a
year and maybe not even in a decade. Let us give permanent status
to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, thus indicating our
commitment to the long hard task of disarmament.
2. The "personal security procedures for contractor employees" of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act need to be modified.
ACDA Director William C. Foster has said:
We presently have perhaps the most restrictive security regulations in the
Government, and this applies not only to our own employees, and I hope will
continue to apply to our own employees and consultants, but now as interpreted
also applies to any contractor personnel * * *. When we let a contract, it
sometimes takes as much as 6 months before we are able to utilize the personnel
that we would like to utilize on it, even though they presently have the highest
Defense Department clearances (FCNI, Washington Newsletter, No. 231, De-
cember 1962, p. 4).
One of the most significant functions assigned to the ACDA is its
research function. By Mr. Foster's own statement we gather that the
research activity of the Agency has been impeded. It seems unfair
to impose more stringent security clearances on this Agency's activi-
ties than we do on other sections of the State Department or the De-
fense Department.
We would feel that in this critical and controversial area of arms
control and disarmament the Agency would want to profit by the
work and opinions of the most creative, intelligent, and even contro-
versial individuals and groups. The present law seems to hinder this
freedom on the part of the Agency. Therefore, we favor the proposed
modification of the personnel security procedures in the bill that is
before you.
3. The $10 million appropriations limit written into Public Law 87-
297 should be removed in favor of the proposed amendment.
Financially we have been preparing for war like giants and for
peace like pygmies. The national expenditures for our giant military
arsenal staggers the imagination of the average person.
The following excerpt from President Kennedy's address before
the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1961, vividly
describes the situation:
Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hang-
ing by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident
or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before
they abolish us.
If, indeed, we are to abolish the weapons of war before they abolish
us, we need to be willing to invest as much money and creative energy
in efforts toward arms control and disarmament.
Fifteen million dollars is proposed for the 1964 work of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. In the same year more than $7
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billion, I believe, is budgeted for military research and development
'alone. By comparison it would appear that the modest $15 million
request is so small as to almost seem ridiculous. Yet we hope even this
modest request will be approved.
My denomination, the Church of the Brethren, was born in Germany
over two and a half centuries ago while the wars of Frederick the
Great and the French wars made the Rhine country a continual field of
battle from 1618 to 1744. Its understanding of the Christian faith and
its experience of the horrors of war prevented it since its origins from
becoming a part of the crime and sin of war.
My denomination throughout its history has continued to maintain
this position, attempting as best it can to promote peace, understand-
ing, brotherhood, and good will. We believe that war is sin. We be-
lieve that the power given to man by God is misused when it is used
to destroy?even an enemy.
Therefore we believe that disarmament is consistent with God's
divine will
Therefore,
the nations of earth; and we .wish to support the efforts
being made by the ACDA and any individual in Government or
agency of Government that conscientiously works for disarmament
and the elimination of the causes of war.
Secretary of State Rusk said concerning disarmament:
The obstacles to agreement are great. But all great achievements, in all
ages, have been great precisely because they had seemed beyond our reach.
The question is not whether we can end the arms race. We must end it. Our
very survival may depend on it (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Publication 11, p. 38).
? We believe the ACDA can be a vital part of our Nation's search for
peace and international understanding. We believe that its program
needs to be expanded until it is obvious to the world that we are sin-
cere about our desire for peace and the vital role disarmament has to
play in achieving that peace.
Therefore, sirs, we urge that you act favorably on this legislation
.before you to amend Public Law 87-297.
We thank you for the opportunity to present this statement to you.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Reverend Gibble.
Reverend, does your church have membership all over the United
States?
Reverend GIBBLE. Yes sir; it does. We have a membership of
slightly over 200,000 in the United States.
Chairman MORGAN. Do you have a conference where you make an
agreement on the positions you take on various issues?
Reverend GIBBLE. Yes, sir ; we do. We would have almost an end-
less number of statements concerning peace and disarmament that we
could submit to the committee if they wish.
Chairman MORGAN. This is a general agreement of your church at
the nationallevel?
Reverend GIBBLE. Yes, sir. Sir, we did present testimony similar
to this before the Senate committee.
Ch airman MORG A N. Reverend, you feel then the full $15 million
requested by the Executive is a. modest amount to meet the require-
ments of the Agency?
Reverend GIBBLE. I was very much interested in the previous ques-
tions to those who 'offered testimony before me, and from our point
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 73
of view we feel that the contrast in dollars spent in this area, or, add
to it the Peace Corps, add to it our appropriations in the area of for-
eign aid, which I think are all efforts toward peace' this in contrast to
our vast military effort seems to be pretty small. We feel that more
appropriations could be used.
I was interested in the observation that the $10 million budget for
ACDA was not used this past year: We face this difficulty in church
budgets as well. If a committee uses more than is appropriated, we
have a penalty for them, and if they use less, we have -a penalty too,
because we cut their .appropriations. I think often wrongly so.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gibble, we realize that this is a new Agency
and after the limitation of $10 million was written into the bill .as it
passed in 1961, the Agency was slow in getting underway. It has
now gotten into operation and may be expected to produce results.
We have to recognize that only $81/2- Million out of that original $10,
million authorization has been used. Mr: Foster appeared before
this committee 2 weeks ago and testified that out of the original $10'
million authorization they had used approximately $81/2 million and
that they had only a million and a half of the pending. authorization
to carry it forward.
With a million and a half dollars the operations of the AgencY will
be curtailed if this present bill doesn't pass. I\TOw that the other body
has acted and put a limitation on the 'authorization. for $20 million
over a, 2-year period, it is going to be very difficult to get the approval
of this committee and the House of Representatives for the full $15.
million authorization.
Under legislative procedure this bill would have to go to conference.
As you know, anything that comes out of a conference is a conapro
mise. I never knew the House conferees to sit down with the Senate
conferees and agree to the full amount that passed either of the two
bodies.
Looking at it realistically we have to recognize that even though
this bill passed the House with the full amount of $15 million, we
would have to expect an approximate reduction to around .$121/2
million. We have to look -forward also to the fact that the Arms
Control Agency, which I. support strongly, will have some dollar lim-
itation placed on its authorization whether it is for a 1- or a 2-year
period.
Personally I feel that if the Agency can show need for an increased
authorization after a 1-year period the act can be amended and the
limit on the authorization can be increased.
I am inclined to agree with Mr. Broomfield that we are going to be
very fortunate if we can get through this House a bill similar to
that which passed the. other body.
Reverend. GIBBLE: I think we recognize these practical considera-
tions, and would certainly support your committee if you would work.
for at least the $121/2 million. This would be an increase.
One major thing we are concerned about is that this Agency doesn't
continue for a long period of. time on this same budget. - - If we look
over the report that Mr. Foster made fairly recently, we find that
there are many areas that can be pursued and we feel should be pur-
sued which will demand expenditures. AVe feel there is a very small!
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74 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
amount beincrb used in terms of education for disarmament, so that the
public may know more about disarmament.
I think we have a lot of education in the area of military and very
little in the area of what disarmament and arms control would mean.
We need to face the issues of the economic involvements so that the
general public does not panic if we move in the direction of arms con-
trol and disarmament.
These are all areas that have not really had major studies. I think
the Agency has mainly spent its time on detection systems. This was
necessary. Maybe in the year to come ACDA can move on in some
of these other areas, and certainly money would be needed for studies
in these areas.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Broomfield.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. I merely want to compliment Reverend Gibble for
his testimony and his observations.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Farbstein.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Reverend, I think on page 3 at the bottom there is a sentence: "Its
understanding of the Christian faith and its experience of the horrors
of war prevented it since its origins from becoming a part of the crime
and sin of war."
Just exactly what does that mean? Wherein is that any different
than any other church, the feeling, or the
Reverend GIBBLE. I referred to this in connection with the history
of our church. Our denomination was born in 1708 and grew out of
the Pietist-Anabaptist movement in Germany. Ours was a sect group
that was ostracized and denied religious freedom in some of the prov-
inces of that time. Our forefathers suffered persecution for their
pacifist views and suffered under the religious wars of that time.
Since our origins we have had experience with war and with the
persecution that comes from the position that we take of attempting
to remove ourselves from the causes of war or involvement in it.
Mr. FARBsTEIN. Are you trying to tell me that yours is a pacifist
organization?
Reverend GIBBLE. Yes, sir; the Church of the Brethren is considered
one of the three historic peace churches, along with the Mennonites
and the Friends.
Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson.
Mr. THOMSON. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. McDowell.
Mr. McDowELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to compliment
Reverend Gibble for his testimony here before the committee this
morning in support of this legislation. I think all of us know of the
background and the work of the Church of the Brethren, and respect
their position, not only as they might testify on this type of legislation
but their devotion to their religious belief and their principles to face
up to the problem of how to achieve peace in this world today.
I also want to tell you that I thoroughly agree with your evaluation
that you make in your testimony on page 3 in your comparison of the
amounts of the funds that are requested for this Agency as compared
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 75
with national defense appropriations. I think it might be interesting
to also say the Congress usually appropriates more money for national
defense than the Defense Department requests. Last year we forced
upon them some $700 million that they did not want and did not use.
Yet we are here debating whether or not it is possible for us to
appropriate $15 million for this Agency, as the chairman suggested,
knowing that we cannot achieve it with both bodies voting on the
matter.
It is a commentary of how, sincere we are sometimes in our desire to
really get down to the business of how we achieve peace as compared to
how willing we are to defend ourselves. I am wondering in your ex-
perience whether you would care to comment whether in your opinion
you think that this demonstrates that perhaps in this country over the
years since "World War II that there may just today perhaps be those
influences which, combined with a strong desire for self-preservation,
support large national defense budgets which have had a tendency to
build up an arms and armament lobby in the country.
Reverend GIBBLE. Sir' I think we would concur in what you have
inferred. We thought of presenting this in our testimony, attempting
to compare the eagerness of the Congress to increase military expendi-
tures while being reluctant to increase expenditures in other important
areas. I would think in response to your question, if I have followed
you correctly, we have great concern about the industrial-military com-
plex, and the vested interests that may drive our Nation in the direc-
tion that we are being driven. We have some very real fears in this
area.
This is one of the reasons we made this comparison here in our testi-
mony?what we are anxious to do in terms of the military budget and
what we are reluctant to do in terms of ACDA, or foreign aid appro-
priations, for the Peace Corps, or some other areas in which we have
very much interest because of our desire for peace and international
goodwill.
Mr. McDowELL. I was also glad to hear you associate the foreign
aid bill with the efforts in the peacekeeping field of this legislation
and the Peace Corps and others. I agree with you.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Reverend.
Reverend GIBBLE. Thank you, sir.
? Chairman MORGAN. The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock
tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 11 :45 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Wednesday, September 11, 1963.)
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TO. AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND 'DISARMAMENT
ACT
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1963
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS'
TV ashing ton, D .0
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 :30 a.m., in room
11-322, the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.
Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.
. The committee meets this morning, in open session, on legislation
to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Our first witness
is Prof. Elton Atwater, professor of political scienp,6, Pennsylvania
State University.
Professor Atwater is representing the Friends Committee on Na-
tional Legislation. It is nice to see you again, sir.
You have a prepared statement. You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF ELTON ATWATER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
? SCIENCE; PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, REPRESENTING
THE FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION
? Mr. ATWATER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Elton Atwater. I aria professor of political science at
the-Pennsylvania -State University. I am here today on behalf of the
Friends Committee on National Legislation. Although this com-
mittee is widely representative of the 'views of many Friends, or
Quakers, no organization is Authorized to speak for. all members of
the Religious Society of Friends.
In supportino.a the authorization for the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Iwish,at the outset, to express strong apprOval
for the recent nuclear test ban treaty and to state my hope that it will
be quickly ratified by our Government. If represents a, start in the
direction of 'a broader' internationally supervised disarmament pro-
gram which is one of the essential ingredients Of a genuine peace.
While such -a. peace will; of course, depend oh more than a disarma-
ment agreement, disarmament is nevertheless oheof the indispensable
elements in an effective system of international securitY.
I would like to add here, too, that the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency played- a very important role in the preparation of this
treaty and in the research and background' which went into it. I
believe this is one of the concrete evidences of the kind of work for
which the Agency is to be very highly commended.
? ..; 77
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78 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
With the conclusion of this treaty, it is even more important that
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) be placed on a
permanent statutory basis, and that it be assured sufficient funds to do
a thorough job. We may well be at a significant turning point in
Soviet-Western relations, and the United States must be prepared
to move quickly and imaginatively into other areas of negotiation,
probing constantly for new realms of consensus and agreement.
We should press for arrangements under which the use of nuclear
arms will be prohibited under strict international inspection and su-
pervision. Other ideas, such as the establishment of denuclearized
zones under international observation, need to be reexamined in the
light of the seemingly greater Soviet disposition to negotiate on a
meaningful basis with the West. Time is very important, and, unless
we can move ahead quickly, we may fail to make the most of our
opportunities.
In the light of such consideration, I strongly urge this committee
to approve a permanent authorization for the ACDA, comparable to
that which exists for other regular Government agencies. It would
be most unfortunate to give any impression that we are temporizing
with the disarmament program, or hesitating to make a long-range
commitment to it.
The Friends Committee on National Legislation was deeply disap-
pointed by the Senate action in June, limiting the ACDA authoriza-
tion to 2 years, with only $10 million authorized for each year.
Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee carefully ex-
plained that its action did not provide that the ACDA should cease to
exist on any certain date, it seems to me that the necessity of obtain-
ing a renewed authorization every 2 years always raises the specter
of uncertaintyand temporary life.
This is not the way to treat either our interest or our responsibilities
regarding anything so important as disarmament. The achievement
of international disarmament will require many years of patient,
persistent effort, and there should be no uncertainty about our willing-
ness to stick with it. Ambassador John J. McCloy testified in the
1961 hearings on the establishment of the ACDA that competent
professional personnel could be obtained only if there were a perma-
nent organization which had been given express authority to perform
the necessary research and staff services.
It is essential to develop a staff which is highly dedicated to the
achievement of disarmament, and which is prepared to be imagina-
tive and flexible in its thinking. These qualities will be very much
more difficult to develop if there are uncertainties over the length of
the Agency's authorization.
I can understand the importance of having the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee peri-
odically review the work of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, but I believe this can be accomplished in other ways without
giving up the principle of permanent authorization. I see no reason,
for example, why the Director of the Agency should not periodically
come before these two committees to discuss the work of the Agency
and the status of the international negotiations on disarmament, and to
receive guidance from the committees on future lines of activity.
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Here again let me add that I know you gentlemen can make a great
contribution to this field of the development of the disarmament
policy. I in no way am trying to curtail the role you play. It just
seems to me having a temporary or a limited authorization, or even
what is called a continuing authorization, seems to imply something
less than I would like to see the Congress committed to. That is my
reason for urging permanency of the authorization.
I make these remarks simply to illustrate my point that in the
crucial field of disarmament negotiations we must have an adequately
prepared, imaginative staff to develop a variety of bargaining posi-
tions. In some respects, the work of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency resembles the extensive preparations which our State
Department made for the drafting of the United Nations Charter
between 1939 and 1945.
I am sure one of the main reasons why the United States was able
to play such a constructive role in the creation of the U.N. was because
of the thorough preparation by the various State Department offi-
cials and committees appointed by Cordell Hull. Likewise, the crea-
tion of the reciprocal trade agreements section in the State Depart-
ment in the mid-1930's enabled our Government to play a leading role
in the years to follow in the gradual lowering of international trade
barriers. Tremendous research was needed in this highly compli-
cated field.
? I would like to add another note at this point. This would be
to support the principle of research by outside organizations as well
as research by the Agency itself or by Government organs. It seems
to me that frequently people not immediately concerned with Govern-
ment policy have a somewhat different point of view or may be a
little more flexible in some of their ideas or concepts than those im-
mediately responsibe for the policy concerned. I think it is a source
of greater variety of ideas to draw on the best brains you can on the
outside. Therefore I would support this practice which the Agency
uses of combining contracts to outside agencies with work done by
its own staff.
The achievement of internationally supervised disarmament re-
quires the same kind of thorough preparation that went into the
United Nations Charter or the reciprocal trade agreements program.
In evaluating the research needs of the ACDA, I urge you to follow
the lines originally set forth in the President's request for an author-
ization of $15 million for fiscal 1964, rather than the reduced figure
of $10 million recommended by the Senate.
One of the major research projects contemplated here is an elaborate
field test program (Project Cloudgap) to discover whether a group
of skilled inspectors can detect simulated clandestine violations of
various arms control measures. This is an extremely important prac-
tical project in the development of effective inspection procedures.
This is one of the programs that would probably be cut back if the
research funds for the Agency were reduced.
I might say that I was very much impressed to see the character of
that inspection test program because it seemed to me to be a very real-
istic effort to develop skilled technicians who could do the job of
inspecting and to find out whether skilled evaders could escape detec-
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80 TO
AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
tion. This would be very useful in preparing the machinery for any
kind of broader disarmament or nuclear test limitation.
Also, I would like to raise objection specifically to one of the amend-
ments in the Senate bill which barred research by organizations out--
side the United States. There was one such contractI believe which
was given to the Institute for Strategic Studies in London. I believe
this was the object of that amendment: I don't know whether the
members of the Senate were familiar with this project when they
introduced this amendment or not. I know a little bit about the
agency to which the contract was given, the Institute for Strategic
Studies.
It is made up of .very competent professional, educational, and
former governmental personnel in London, devoted to the making of
studies making British international security and foreign policy. In
this particular case they were asked by the Arms Control Agency to
make a study of the European reaction to a possible arms control
agreement. ,
It seemed to me this agency was in a very good position to make
such a study, perhaps better than one of our own agencies might be.
It seemed to me particularly unfortunate that this kind of thing
would be barred by this particular amendment. I would hope, this
committee might see fit to delete that 'amendment from the bill and
perhaps then in conference it could be eliminated altogether.
While many of the research projects of ACDA relate to the techni-
cal and scientifiC, Aspects of deVeloping, effective inspection and verifi-
cation methods, I am glad to see from therecent list of research plans
that, studies are .also scheduled in? the 'equally important political,
economic, and- historical aspects, of disarmament, negotiations.
A great, deal more study is needed,. on the economic implications of
disarmament, and the possible areas of conversion or ,diversification
of industries now engaoed in ,arms'production. The history of previ-
ous disarmamentnegotTations also. needs to be 'reexamined to see what
lessons may be -pertinent to today5s problems. One of the reasons, _I
believe, why di?armament maklittle headway, in Europe in the mid-
1920's was be,cause of. -the' French insistenCe Cu a, 100-percent "fool-
proof" system of gnaranteeS before, they would begin any steps toward
disarmament.
At times; we have in recent years Made' this same mistake, and the
prospects of disarmament have become stalemated .by the efforts of
both sides to secure 100 percent of their objectives. In mostinterna-
tional negotiations leading. to a mutually satisfactory agreement,
neither side gets 100 percent of what it wants. Yet the mutually
satisfactory' character of the agreement is what makes it enforceable
and practical.
In our search for ways of inducing the Soviet. Union to accept
meaningful inspection, we might well keep this point.in mind. I will
cite here an illustration of what I mean with regard to the effort to get
the Soviet Union to accept the principle of inspection. 'We have not
Made headway yet in reaching agreement on this point. .In the sen-
tences. that follow I will try to explain why .I think that may be the
Case: _
? The Soviet -T_Tnion with its closed society stands to give up more
under a system of effective inspection than we do with our open society.
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When the New York Times, for example, publishes maps of the loca-
tion of various American missile sites we know perfectly well that
information is much more available to ordinary officials of the Soviet
Union than to the readers of Pravda. This is one of the difficulties
between the closed and open society. If we therefore want them to
open up areas in the Soviet Union to inspection, we shall have to offer
them more than comparable inspection privileges in our own territory.
Otherwise it would be an uneven agreement. Here is my suggestion.
To do this, we might, for example, offer to evacuate one military base
on the periphery of the Soviet territory for every two or three annual
international inspection visits they would be willing to accept. If they
would accept 12 to 15 such visits, we might evacuate 5 or 6 bases around
their borders. This is something they really would like. I feel that the
obtaining of 12 to 15 annual inspection visits in the Soviet Union by an
impartial international body would be in the long run far more useful
to us than the military bases there, because it would open up the door-
way to agreement in this area of arms regulation and inspection..
The possible linking of an inspection agreement with the evacuation
of certain bases in the above manner might offer some basis for making
headway toward an agreement to ban all underground tests. It is the
kind of idea which the ACDA might well study in its future research
program.
Similarly, the possibility of linking an inspection agreement with an
agreement on the denuclearization of central Europe, or on an
exchange of nonaggressive pledges between the Eastern and Western
blocs needs to be carefully analyzed. I think Mr. Khrushchev, in sug-
gesting initially the linking of a test ban treaty with some kind of a
nonaggression pact, was saying "Let's see if there are other areas on
-which progress can be made in connection with aims control."
The ACDA should be encouraged to study these possibilities, or to
arrange to have the study made by qualified researchers on the outside.
An $11 million research program on all aspects of arms control and
disarmament is little enough when the vastness of the subject matter
is appreciated. It is an investment in peace planning which I sin-
cerely hope the Congress will approve.
Thank you very much.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Atwater.
Professor Atwater, then you fully endorse the $15 million requested
by the Executive?
Mr. ATWATER. Yes, I do.
Chairman MORGAN. Professor Atwater, I was interested in your sug-
gestion of the deletion of a Senate amendment. Do you have a. copy
of the Senate bill?
Mr. ATWATER. Yes.
Chairman MORGAN. You are speaking of page 4, section 5?
Mr. ATWATER. Yes.
Chairman MORGAN. Where the Senate inserted "the United States"
before the word "private" making a limitation on it that it must be
U.S. private institutions or persons?
Mr. ATWATER. That is right.
Chairman MORGAN. You feel the words "United States" should be
eliminated?
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Mr. ATWATER. I would revert to the wording of the original legis-
lation which said "private organizations." It made no reference to
the nationality.
Chairman MORGAN. I was interested in your suggestion on page 3
of your statement about opening up bases near the Soviet border for
inspection. Is this your own suggestion, or has it ever been suggested
in any of the disarmament talks at Geneva?
Mr. ATWATER. It has been an idea of my own for some time. I have
written on it briefly at various places. I sent a letter to the New
York Times a couple of years ago about it. I never saw it in any
official disarmament talks until the Cuba crisis of a year ago when
there was some discussion that the United States might evacuate cer-
tain bases in Turkey in exchange for the evacuation of Soviet bases
in Cuba. This wasn't quite the same thing. It was the only time I
have seen this idea brought into more general negotiations of this
sort.
Chairman MORGAN. My memory might be faulty, Professor, but I
think our Ambassador to the United Nations was accused of making
such a suggestion' and then denied it; isn't that correct?
Mr. ATWATER. Again my memory is a little hazy. I believe Mr.
Stevenson did
Chairman MORGAN. Deny suggesting the removal of bases?
Mr. ATWATER. I am not sure exactly what he said. I think we
ought to look up the record and see.
Chairman MORGAN. It is my memory that he did deny that he had
made any such suggestion. Would you care to give us some of the
reaction you have received from this proposal?
Mr. ATWATER. I have suggested it to the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency as an idea that might be looked into. I got from
them the reaction that it would be an interesting idea to look into.
Chairman MORGAN. You got no sign of any positive thinking along
this line?
Mr. ATWATER. No; I have not seen any evidence that they had in-
corporated it yet in any of their official recommendations or policy.
By making it in various places such as today, and also to them, I am
trying to see if there might not be interest in it. It makes a great deal
of sense to me because it represents a meaningful kind of exchange
of concessions. That is what it seems to me we are looking for.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Atwater.
Mr. Whalley.
Mr. IV/TALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Atwater, Penn State University, of course, is a great univer-
sity. It is located close to my congressional district. I know it does
wonderful work. I think you should be thanked for coming here
today to give us the benefit of your opinions.
I notice on page 3 where you say as Dr. Morgan has suggested we
might evacuate different bases. It is my understanding that we have
given up our missile bases in Turkey and Italy. I am not sure what
we received in return.
I was of the impression that something was going to be done by
the Russians in evacuating Cuba. Perhaps you know something more
about that.
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Mr. ATWATER. When I initially thought of this idea it was before
the technological development of these bases reached the stage that
some of them seemed to serve less usefulness than they formerly served.
That today may be a little less meaningful to the Soviet Union be-
cause of our conversion of some of these bases and our evacuation of
some of the equipment from them.
However, the bases are still there. We have forces there and they
still represent I think a bargainable point although less of a bargain-
able point than 2 years ago.
Chairman MORGAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WHALLEY. Yes.
Chairman MORGAN. I think we ought to straighten the record out.
The Jupiter missile was removed from Turkey and from Italy be-
cause it was an antique missile. It was an old liquid fuel missile that
was no longer valuable to our defense system.
It wasn't taken out with any deal or anything. The Polaris mis:-
sile has now replaced it. For the first time we have Polaris sub-
marines in service in the Mediterranean to replace the Jupiter. I
don't think there was any deal with the Soviets about Cuba for the
removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey or from Italy.
Mr. WHALLEY. There are some experts, of course, that claim while
the missiles were perhaps obsolete in Turkey or Italy they could have
been replaced with the most modern missiles we have and we would
be in better shape if we had land-based missiles rather than depending
on the Polaris.
If I used the word "deal," perhaps I shouldn't have. I thought
there was some negotiation when we removed the bases from Turkey
and Italy at the same time we were talking about Cuba. It is nice to
have your opinion, Mr. Atwater.
Mr. ATWATER. I didn't want to mix this up with the Cuban affair,
which is another issue. I wanted to link it with the inspection issue.
This is what we need to work hardest on to get Soviet acceptance.
I have been looking for meaningful concessions that we might propose
to get their acceptance of a wider inspection procedure. This seemed
to be a possibility.
I think it. still has utility, though I hope we won't wait until the
bases lose their utility, if they are further altered by technological
-developments.
Mr. WHALLEY. I think we are all for peace. We are hoping that
a good arrangement can be made. This morning we had breakfast
with Gen. Curtis LeMay and had his opinions. By your coming here,
we have yours also.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.
Mr. ZABLOOKI. Professor Atwater, I had a question to follow up
on the interrogation by the chairman. I can't understand, unfortu-
nately, the logic of your statement on page 3, that inasmuch as the
Soviet Union is a closed society and we are an open one, therefore
if we want them to come our way a little bit, we have to open up even
more and give them more than comparable inspection privileges.
You in fact admit that we are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Rus-
sians as far as information, intelligence, and so forth, are concerned.
In order for them to be cooperative, we are to give them more. I can't
quite understand that.
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Mr. ATWATER. I think that for the Russians to be cooperative they
have to pay a price. They don't need to offer inspection to us to get
a lot of information they already have about the United States.
Why should they give us the right to inspect or give an international
-organization the right to move inspectors around their territory when
they perhaps feel that without this machinery they already have
-enough information about what is going on in our territory?
It is an unequal agreement as far as they are concerned, because they
know more about us than we know about them. We want to know
more about them. That would be, I think, a confidence-building
mechanism, if we could get some kind of international inspection
machinery.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is it that we want to know more about them, or that
we simply want an assurance that they are going to be truthful and
will carry out the disarmament procedures? It is not that we want
-to know more about them. We want to know if they are going to carry
out their part of the bargain.
Mr. ATWATER. That involves knowing more about them. It is the
same thing.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Inspection, you have to agree, is necessary if we are
going to make any steps in the direction of disarmament. We are
concerned that the Soviets follow through. You stated that this is
what they would like to do. Have you any indication from the. Soviets
formally?
Mr. ATWATER. They have many times suggested we ought to evac-
uate the bases around the Mediterranean. This is a matter they have
reiterated in various statements. I can say their reaction is a natural
reaction. It corresponds to our reaction to the base in Cuba.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. You suggested this proposal, but have you ever
received a reply directly from them?
Mr. ATWATER. No.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin.
Mr. BATTIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman; thank you.
Mr. Atwater, the U.N. Charter, I believe, recognizes the legality
,of regional defense pacts such as NATO. You are not making a
comparison of our presence in Europe under the NATO alliance
to Russia's presence in this hemisphere in Cuba: are you?
Mr. ATWATER. A Soviet base in this hemisphere is a threat to our
security because we feel it is near and might jeopardize our interest.
I am merely trying to think now how a Soviet official might view an
American base in Turkey or on any of the Soviet borders.
It seems to me they would regard an American base, whether it was
in pursuit of NATO or not, as a threat. They don't regard NATO,
of course, as within the charter. They regard 'NATO as illegal under
the U.N. Charter.
Mr. BATrIN. How do they regard the Warsaw Pact nations?
Mr. ATWATER. The Warsaw Pact is almost, identically worded to
the NATO Treaty and they have I believe offered to scrap both. If
we would scrap NATO, they would scrap the Warsaw Pact.
I suppose they have justified the Warsaw Pact on the basis of the
NATO Pact. The NATO Pact, I might say, provides, you see, for
'enforcement action without sanction of the Security Council. In
the use of regional organizations to enforce peace, articles 52, 53 of
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the U.N. Charter say that no enforcement action shall be taken except
with the authorization of the Security Council.
In this sense NATO might be argued to be not compatible with
the charter.
Mr. BATTIN. Except that I would hasten to add so far all the plans
and work that have gone into the NATO countries has been of a de-
fensive nature more than offensive. Though I didn't hear all of your
statement, I have read the major portion of it. If we can't make any
further progress in the field of disarming through agreements with
the Soviet Union, do you personally favor unilateral disarmament?
Mr. ATWATER. I certainly favor the exploration of steps which
might be taken by our Government unilaterally on the assumption that
this might then induce responses by other countries. I think this
deserves very careful exploration.
Mr. BATTIN. Aren't we in fact doing that now?
Mr. ATWATER. I think so. I would prefer to see an international
agreement, of course, which is what should be our constant objective.
But I think there may be unilateral steps which may be quite com-
patible with our own security which at the same time might serve in
some areas to reduce tension and facilitate international agreements.
Mr. BATTIN. One last question, Mr. Chairman.
Assuming that the test ban treaty presently being debated in the
Senate is ratified, and that Russia and the United States live up to the
terms of that treaty, and that Red China explodes a nuclear device
at some later date?and that is their publicly stated purpose?would
you then consider the overall question between just the United States
and Russia as imperiling the world as far as this is concerned, or
would you be for the control of Red China
Mr. ATWATER. The conduct of nuclear tests and weapons by coun-
tries that are not parties to the treaty, like China or France, is a very
serious problem. It needs to be brought within the framework of
the treaty if it is at all possible to do so.
I think we have to face these developments if and when they arise.
I think it has been stated by those who have been responsible for the
treaty that the Chinese, even if they should explode nuclear devices
in the next year or two, would still be so far behind the Russians and
the Americans that it wouldn't at the moment at least constitute a
basis for letting the whole treaty go out the window.
But it would be a serious, and it is a serious development. I think
there is more chance of eventually bringing the Chinese and the
French into some agreement by having this treaty as a starting point
than by leaving it entirely up to an uncontrolled competitive system
of testing. -
Mr. BATTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson.
Mr. THOMSON. NO questions.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Nix.
Mr. Nix. Professor Atwater, I want to apologize for not having
been here to hear all the statement. I was interested in one thing
which you did say in answer to one of Mr. Zablocki's questions. You
said that the Soviets knew more about us than we knew about them.
I take it you are referring to our nuclear capacity?
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Mr. ATWATER. About our whole system, because we have news-
papers which disclose a great deal of information. A person who sits
and reads all the technical journals that are put out by science and in-
dustry would get a great deal of information about our system and
our society, both military and scientific. That is what I mean.
Mr. Nix. I am concerned about this thing that we are talking about
here. That would be included in the statement you made?
Mr. ATWATER. Yes.
Mr. Nix. I wanted that clarified because I have been on this com-
mittee almost 4 years. I have never yet been able to find out what we
know about them. I would like to have your source of information.
Mr. ATWATER. I am basing it upon the knowledge of the kind of
things which appear in the Soviet press and Soviet publications as
compared to the kind of information which appears in the American
press and American publications. There has been an increasing
amount of Soviet scientific literature available in the last few years.
This has added to our understanding of their system.
.But there still are no journals comparable to, say the New York
Times, which are not Government-controlled, and which publish in-
formation as the very best reporters can find out. Russia has a Gov-
ernment-controlled press, not a private free press.
Obviously those two will give you different kinds of information.
This is why I simply say that their political system inhibits the United
States and its officials in getting information about their nuclear tests
or armament capacity far more than our system inhibits their getting
information. That is why I think it is an uneven situation.
Mr. Nix. I still think it is an assumption, I think it is unwarranted.
I think it should not be the basis for concession.
Mr. ATWATER. This is a matter of opinion. As I said, I think it is
very important to look for meaningful areas of negotiation which will
lead to future agreements. I thought this was one.
Mr. Nix. I thoroughly agree with that. But I think they should
be based in substance and in fact. I don't think they should be
visionary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Atwater.
Mr. ATWATER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and mem-
bers of the committee.
Chairman MORGAN. Our next witness is the Honorable George
Allen, member of the national advisory board, United World Federal-
ists, Inc. Mr. Allen is a witness that has appeared before this com-
mittee many times. Let me say to the newer members of the com-
mittee that for the last 20 years he has been sitting next to me here
at the table on many occasions.
Mr. Allen, you have a prepared statement. You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. ALLEN, MEMBER, NATIONAL
ADVISORY BOARD, UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS, INC.
Mr. ALLEN. I believe members of the committee have copies. I
might read it hurriedly.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am George Venable
Allen of Washington, D.C. I am here today on behalf of United
World Federalists as a member of our national advisory board. It is
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a pleasure for me to appear once again before your distinguished com-
mittee, as I have in the past for other purposes.
I have spent most of my adult life in the foreign affairs field and
have long maintained a keen interest in the development of interna-
tional machinery which could better serve the interests of -U.S. na-
tional security and the cause of peace throughout the world. I have
had the honor to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Iran Yugoslavia, India
and Nepal, and Greece. In 1955-56, I served as :Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. From
1957 to 1960, I served under President Eisenhower as Director of the
U.S. Information Agency.
I am here to register the support of United World Federalists for
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and for the fullest
funding of its work consistent with the wise and effective use of the
American taxpayer's dollar. As a representative of United World
Federalists, I shall speak in support of the first section of the bill,
for the organization does not feel qualified to speak to the merits of
section 2. That relates primarily to the question of contracts and
security, and similar matters. If it is desired later, I shall be happy
to give the committee my personal evaluation of section 2, based on
long years of experience in dealing with security clearances.
In testifying on S. 777 before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Brig. Gen. J. H. Rothschild, USA, retired, expressed our support for
the authorization without dollar limitation set forth in the bill, as
it is in H.R. 3299. General Rothschild gave three reasons why we
felt that it was important to put the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency on the same permanent basis as many other Government
agencies:
1. It will permit the Agency to attract the high caliber personnel which are
so necessary in this largely uncharted, complex field. People capable of provid-
ing the study, research, and imagination so necessary, will be difficult to find,
to enlist, and to keep. A temporary organization is a great handicap to per-
sonnel procurement and to the establishment of a proper esprit de corps.
2. The stature gained by being placed on a permanent basis will permit the
Agency to deal more effectively with other governmental organizations.
3. Granting the Agency a permanent status will be an indication to our people,
and to the world at large, that we are striving for a disarmed world in which
the rule of force has been subordinated to the rule of law.
We, the United World Federalists, understand the reasons why the
Committee on Foreign Relations did not recommend an authorization
without dollar limitation and we appreciate the desirability of periodic
congressional review. Our concern was, and is, to make certain that
this Agency shall continue its important work as an integral part of
the executive branch of the U.S. Government and shall receive what-
ever funds may be necessary to the effective and expeditious discharge
of its responsibilities under Public Law 87-297 enacted by the 87th
Congress.
If this purpose can best be served, in the judgment of this commit-
tee, by periodic authorizations, we will not pursue our original strong
support for an authorization without dollar limitation.
Let me now speak to the Senate bill 777 as amended, which is be-
fore you, along with H.R. 3299. We were pleased that the other body
approved a 2-year authorization, although we would favor a longer
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authorization period as affording greater assurance of job continuity
to prospective employees of the Agency.
We are seriously concerned, however, with the $20 million figure
adopted by the Senate. If this figure is allowed to stand?$20 million
for 2 years?it will mean a one-third curtailment in the projected
Work of this relatively new Agency. The legislative history shows
clearly that the Congress intended the Agency to develop from the
very limited operation of the U.S. Disarmament Administration into
an agency which could effectively discharge the highly difficult and
uniquely new tasks assigned it by the Congress.
The American eagle holds both arrows and an olive branch. We
deem it of the utmost importance and totally consistent with
America's purpose that our country should give equal attention both
to the preparedness of its arrows and the preparedness of its olive
branch. While recognizing the need for disproportionately large sums
for defense through arms, we cannot reconcile the willingness to corn-
mit approximately $56 billion to national security through arms with
a willingness to slash by $5 million the already modest sum of $15 mil-
lion being requested for national security through an increasingly in-
telligent search for arms control and safe, worldwide disarmament.
That means to say $15 million per year or $30 million for the 2-year-
period.
This is false economy. This is pennywise and pound foolish. Such
a course would be foreign to the vision, faith, and courage of the
American pioneers and to the boldness and willingness to invest
heavily in the search for a better and fuller life which they exemplified.
We call upon this committee to authorize a sum of $30 million for
fiscal years 1964 and 1965. This amount would establish an authoriza-
tion consistent with the 1964 appropriation request submitted by Mr.
William C. Foster, Director Of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency and formerly Deputy Secretary of Defense.
We recognize that House approval of a 2-year authorization or $30
million will necessitate a conference with the other body which may
reduce that figure, but at least the House, as the body closer to the
people, will have reflected the overwhelming sentiment, of the Ameri-
can people in favor of pursuing every reasonable step to find a way out
of the present arms race.
In substantiation of this statement as to the sentiments of Americans,
Mr. Chairman, I have attached the results of several polls conducted
by Members of Congress among their own constituents, which I would
request be printed in the record of your hearings at the conclusion of
my statement.
Chairman MORGAN. "Without objection, Mr. Allen, it is so ordered.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
"We believe that a figure of $30 million is conservative in terms of
the responsibilities involved. In view of the fact that the Agency in
April and May had developed its operation to the point where it was
in a position to obligate funds constructively at the rate of about $1
million a month, it is reasonable to assume that its rate of obligation
will continue to rise slowly for at least another year or two. Since the
$1 million monthly rate means a need for at least $12 million yearly,
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CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 89
it is not at all unreasonable to request a $15 million yearly authoriza-
tion for the next 2 fiscal years or a $30 million total.
Of the other amendments to S. 777 made by the Senate, we would
comment on only one and this relates to one already mentioned by
Professor Atwater. During the floor, debate, section 31(2) of .the act
was amended by adding the words "United States" before the word
"private." This amendment has the effect of denying the Agency the
option of obtaining information from "private or public institutions"
abroad through study contracts, even where the Agency may deter-
mine that such information is necessary to its work and cannot be
obtained from domestic sources.
Since the matters dealt with by this Agency involve aspects which
concern many other areas of the world, it would seem self-defeating to
us to enjoin the Agency from utilizing sources of knowledge which
will contribute to its objective just because they are not within our
country. We therefore recommend that your committee, Mr. Chair-
man, either strike the words "United States" from section 31(2) or
modify this section in such a way as to permit the Director of the
Agency some leeway in letting modest contracts abroad when they are
desirable in his judgment.
United World Federalists has no illusions that the achievement of
our country's ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament in a
peaceful world will be quickly or easily reached. Neither do we be-
lieve in unilateral disarmament or in letting down our guard unless
and until adequate international institutions have been established
which can better assure our security and the peace of the world.
We believe firmly, however, that the search for better and more
,economical ways of protecting our Nation and of achieving freedom
from war must be relentlessly pursued and that a full measure of the
wealth with which our country is blessed must be devoted to this
search. Until war is eliminated as an institution and the use of
force in international affairs has been subjected to a world rule of law,
the United States will know no real security, nor its citizens any sub-
stantial relief from the burdens inherent in attempting to maintain a
balance of power which is constantly thrown out of balance by each
new weapon.
The Congress has charged the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency with responsibility for seeking solutions to this fundamental
problem. We hold this search vital to our national security. It is for
-this reason that United World Federalists support a $30 million, 2-
.year authorization for this Agency; and urge this distinguished com-
mittee to so recommend to the full House.
(The material furnished by Mr. Allen is as follows:)
You CONGRESSMAN, WILLIAM B. WIDNALL, 7TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY,
REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON
AUGUST 4, 1961.
MORE QUESTIONNAIRE STATISTICS
During the past session of Congress, I have received enough controversial mail
-on the United Nations and the scope of its present operations and authority to
warrant securing the consensus of my constituents on the subject. Accordingly,
I included 7 questions on the U.N. in the recent questionnaire mailed to 60,000
-families in the district, 12,000 of whom replied.
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Results of this portion of the poll were purposefully omitted from my first
report on the opinions of the voters so that the entire block of inquiries relat-
ing to the United Nations could be dealt with separately and be in that form
more meaningful and interesting.
Uniform heavy support was expressed for the United Nations as the best
hope for peace in the world and for the past effectiveness of the world body.
Similar favor was shown for strengthening the U.N. into a federal form of world
government similar to the United States and for achieving general disarmament
under effective international control governed by rules of law and enforced
by an international armed force.
The following is the statistical breakdown of the percentages of voters favor-
ing, disapproving, or expressing no opinion on the specific questions:
[Percent]
Question
Yes
No
No
opinion
1. Do you regard the United Nations as the best hope for maintaining
world peace?
83. 95
13. 55
2. 50
2. Do you believe that the United Nations has been effective in maintain-
ing a better understanding between nations in the past?
79. 01
16. 05
4.94
3a. Do you believe that one of the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy
should be the achievement of worldwide general and complete dis-
armament under effective international control?
72. 50
21. 25
6. 25
3b. As a means of assuring "effective international control" of any dis-
armament agreement would you favor the creation of rules of law
backed by a World court and enforced by legally controlled inter-
national armed force?
77. 50
8. 75
13. 75
4. Do you believe that the purpose of world peace could be achieved
through strengthening the United Nations?
81.48
12.50
6.02
5. Do you believe that our Federal form of government; through which 50
sovereign States live together in peace, provides an example of a well-
tested system which the peoples of the world might follow by delegat-
ing to a strengthened United Nations constitutionally limited powers
for enforcement of worldwide disarmament and peaceful settlement
of international disputes?
76. 58
8. 75
14.67
6. Do you believe that the United States should take the lead in proposing
measures of this nature in the face of the present attitude of the Soviet
Union?
72. 84
12. 49
14. 67
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENTRY SENATOR BENJAMIN A. SMITH II (DEMOCRAT,
? OF MASSACHUSETTS)', TO 10,000 RESIDENTS OF MASSACHUSETTS IN SEPTEMBER
-1962
Recipients Were selected from his regular mailing list. The results are based
on A return of Almost 37 percent. The Brockton Chamber of Commerce repro-
duced several hundred copies of the questionnaire on its own initiative and
sent them to Brecktob. residents. This added about, 100 returns to the totals.
Excerpt from Senator Smith's November 1, 1962, press release: "I believe all
Americans would prefer to see our struggle for world peace fought in the U.N.
rather than in Cuba or Berlin. This was brought out in a poll on the.U.N.
Which I took in Massachusetts. Over 80 percent of those who replied said We
should place. -major emphasis on the U.N. in our search for peace. A similar
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number believed that worldwide disarmament, effectively controlled, should be
a primary goal of our foreign policy."
Question
Yes No ? No .?
opinion
1. Do you believe that the United States should or should not place
major emphasis on the United Nations in its search for peace?
2. The United Nations has been having grave financial problems be-
cause some members have refused to pay their assessed sharenf its peace-
keeping operations. Do you believe that the United Nations should or
should not have some carefully limited but effective power to tax member
nations?
3. Do you believe that one of the primary goals of U.S. foreign policy
should or should not be the achievement of worldwide general and com-
plete disarmament under effective international control?
4. As a means of assuring "effective international control" of any dis-
armament agreement, would you or would you not favor the creation of
rules of law backed by a world court and enforced by legally controlled
international armed force?
5. Our Federal system of government has made it possible for 50 differ-
ent States of the United States to live together peacefully by delegating
certain authority to the Federal Government in Washington, D.C.
Would yob. or would you not support a federal system for the United
Nations by which the member nations would give the U.N. constitu-
tionally limited executive, legislative, judicial, and police authority in
the area of disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes?
6. Do you or do you not favor the United States taking the lead in pro-
posing measure? to strengthen the United Nations in the face of a probable
negative response by the Soviet Union?
80.2 18.3 1.5
92.4 5.7 1.9
80.5 16.5 3.0
81.5 13.8 4.7
71.7 21.8 6..5
87.4 10.1 2.5
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE UNITED NATIONS REPORTED BY THE HONORABLE
JAMES ROOSEVELT (DEMOCRAT) OF THE 26TH DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[Congressional Record, Jan. 23, 1962, page A405]
An attempt was made to hit all areas of my district, with no particular
differentiation between men and women voters, or between Democrats, Re-
publicans, and nonpartisans. Further, my office was more completely equipped
with precinct rosters for what might be termed "conservative" areas of the
district, than for the so-called "liberal" areas, so there is little doubt that, per-,
centagewise, "conservatives" actually got more questionnaires than "liberals."
Of the 60,000 copies mailed, approximately 11 percent, or 6,600 envelopes,
were returned as undeliverable. This presumably left 53,400 questionnaires
actually delivered into voters' hands. Of these, 7,521, or approximately 14.1
percent, were returned, which direct mail experts tell me is an extremely heavy
return.
The questions asked and the percentage breakdowns of the replies are as
follows:
Question
Yes
No
1. Do you think that the United Nations offers the best hope of keeping peace in the
world?
84.8
15.2
2. Do you think the United States should continue its membership in the U.N.?_
88.8
11.2
3. Do you think that further strengthening of the U.N. would be apt to advance the
cause of world peace?
87.6
12.4
4. Do you think that the foreign policY of the United States should concern itself
with attempting to achieve agreement on total disarmament under conditions
of rigid intethatiOnal inspection,
85.6
15.0
5. If you do, do You feel that such inspection, and the rules therefor, should be ad-
ministered by a world court, backed up by an international armed force adequate
to enforce the court's rulings?
87:2
12.8
6. If you have answered these questions affirmatively, or largely affirmatively, do
you think that the United States should propose such a program to the U.N.,
and to the world, regardless of the present intransigent position of the U.S.S.R.?_
88.1
11.9
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RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR;
(DEMOCRAT, OF MASSACHUSETTS ) , TO 10,000 REGISTERED VOTERS OF THE 11TH
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Recipients were picked at random from voting lists and 1,790 replied making
an 18-percent response. The poll was mailed out during February and March
1962 and the tabulations completed in May 1962.
Question
Number of
affirmative
answers
?
Percent
1. Do you believe that the United States should or should not be a member of the
United Nations?
2. Do you believe that the United Nations has done a good or a poor job of main-
taining Peace?
3. In your opinion is there a better chance for maintaining world peace with or
without the United Nations?
4. Do you believe that the United Nations should try to promote worldwide dis-
armament under effective international control?
5. To make sure that international control is effective, would you favor the creation
of a world court whose rulings would be enforced against violators by an inter-
national armed force?
6. Do you believe that countries should delegate to the United Nations constitu-
tionally limited powers for enforcement of international disputes?
7. Do you believe that the United States should or should not take the lead in
proposing measures to strengthen the United Nations?
1,712 25.4
1,419 79. 0
1,693 94.5
1,621 90.6
1,490 83.3
1,458 81.4
1,593 89.0
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY REPRESENTATIVE STANLEY R. TUPPER
(REPUBLICAN, OF MAINE), TO ALL CONSTITUENTS ON HIS MAILING LIST POE
THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
The poll was mailed on May 29, 1963, and results were tabulated by June 26,
1963.
[Percent]
Question
Yes
No
Undecided
1. Do you regard the U.N. as the best hope for maintaining world peace?__
75.8
21.4
2.8
2. Do you believe the U.N. has been effective in maintaining a better
understanding between nations during the past 18 years?
77.4
19.2
3.4
3. Do you believe that the purpose of world peace could be achieved
through strengthening.the U.N 9
65.9
26.3
7.8
4. Do- you .believe ? that one of the primary objectives of U.S. foreign
policy should be achievement of worldwide general and complete
disarmament under effective international control?
69.1
26.0
4.9
5. Do you believe that all U.N. members should delegate to a strength-
ened U.N. constitutionally limited powers for enforcement of world-
wide. disarmament and peaceful settlement of international dis-
putes?
71.0
23.2
5.8
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY REPRESENTATIVE EDWARD P. BOLAND
( DEMOCRAT, OF MASSACHUSETTS ) , TO 10,000 RESIDENTS OF THE SECOND CONGRES-
SIONAL DISTRICT
Recipients were selected on a random sampling basis from telephone directories.
The results are based on a 27-percent return between July, and November 1962.
Returns rose to 34 percent by January 1963, but the percentages remaained
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almost constant. (The questionnaire included two domestic policy questions,
also. Only those pertaining to foreign policy are reported here.)
Question
Affirma-
tive
Percent
1. Do you believe that the United States should or should not be a member of the
United Nations?
2,487
96.8
2. Do you believe that the United Nations has done a good or a poor job of maintain-
ing peace?
2,161
83.7
3. In your opinion, is there a better chance for maintaining world peace with or with-
out the United Nations?
2,462
96.4
4. Do you believe that the United Nations should try to promote worldwide disarma-
ment under effective international control?
2,347
91.7
5. To make sure that international control is.effective, would you favor the creation
of a World Court whose rulings would be enforced?
2,332
88.6
6. Do you belive that countries should delegate to the United Nations constittition-
ally limited powers for enforcement of worldwide disarmament and settlement
of international disputes?
2,133
85.1
7. Do you believe that the United States should or should not take the lead in propos-
ing measures to strengthen the United Nations?
2,321
94.4
8. Do you favor support of an Alliance for Progress with Latin America, with finan-
? cial assistance where necessary?
2,237
86.6
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT BY SENATOR JOSEPH S. CLARK ( DEMOCRAT, OF
PENNSYLVANIA) , TO 10,000 PERSONS IN PENNSYLVANIA, ON MARCH 10, 1962
These questionnaires were mailed to a random sampling of Pennsylvania
residents taken from telephone books and spread throughout the State according
to density of population. The questions are multiple choice and allow for all
shades of opinion. !Every effort was made to obtain results which would reflect
accurately the thinking of the people of Pennsylvania.
Question
Number
Percent
1. Which policy do you think the United States should follow? (Check one):
(1) Prepare to launch preventive war to defeat the Communists
73
4.55
(2) Continue tobuild up U.S. armed strength to maintain balance with or supe-
riority over the Communists in order to deter or meet with force any
Communist attack
384
23.96
(3) Maintain balance of forces with the Communists but try to negotiate
arms control agreements with them to insure that the balance of forces
is preserved and to reduce dangers of surprise attack
175
10.92
(4) Maintain balance of forces with the Communists but try to negotiate
agreement with them to achieve general worldwide disarmament under
adequate international controls (and a strengthened United Nations
capable of keeping the peace)
888
85.40
(5) Try to reverse the arms race by disarming in part now without trying to
negotiate a disarmament agreement, and urge the Communists to do
likewise
36
? 2.25
(6) Other (spell out)
43
2.68
(7) Haven't made up my mind
4
0.25
Total
1,603
2. Which policy toward the United Nations do you favor? (Check one):
(1) The United States Should withdraw from the 11.N
52
3.26
(2) TheUnited States should stay in the U.N. but place decreasingimportance
on membership, because the U.N. is too weak and divided to keep the
peace
111
6.95
(3) The United States should continue to work through the U.N. as it does
today and try to iMprove gradually the U.N.'s existing machinery for
the peaceful settlement of disputes
466
? 29.20
(4) The United States should attempt through amendment of the present U.N.
Charter or otherwise to give the U.N. additional authority to prevent
war by peaceful means, or by force if necessary
381
23.87
(5) The United States should work to change the U.N. into an International
Governmental Organization of all countries with authority to keep the
peace through a system of enforceable world law against aggression,
binding on all nations and all people
638
33.71
(6) Other (spell out)
41
2.57
(7) Haven't made up my mind
7
0.55
Total
1,596
23-197 6 3 7
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Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen, you feel then that a $30 million figure for 2 years will
be a good investment when we consider the amount that is spent in re-
search by the Department of Defense?
Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Allen, I have been interested in paragraph
3 of your statement, where you say that the organization you rep-
resent is not competent to make any comment on section 2. In the last
sentence of that paragraph, you say "If it is desired later, I shall be
happy to give the committee my personal evaluation of section 2 based
on long years of experience in dealing with security clearances."
I know, during your many years of Government service, you dealt
with this security problem many times. Would you care to give us
your personal evaluation of section 2?
Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. I think all members of the committee will
recall that the question of security in Government has been one which,
for 15 years now, has occupied a great deal of time and attention.
When the matter first arose I was in. the State Department. Later,
in the independent agency, ITSIA, I had occasion to be concerned with
this matter very frequently.
I certainly do not suggest that we relax in the care with which we
concern ourselves with the security of our personnel. The recent ex-
periences of the British Government in this respect show that one can
be too lax concerning the security of government personnel. There
have been some shameful experiences in other governments.
I am not certain, however' that even with the great emphasis we
place on security, we can cast many stones, because we have had some
most unfortunate instances ourselves. I suppose there is no absolute
way of achieving 100-percent security, no matter how carefully we
screen our personnel through historical background research, full-
field investigations, and psychological tests.
Incidentally, we had some small measure of success in selecting new
personnel in the -U.S. Information Agency through screening by a
panel of psychologists, although our decision to do so created a good
deal of concern. I think we were making some headway, but the ap-
propriation for this screening, was discontinued by the Appropria-
tions Committee?I think mistakenly.
There was also some disagreement between USIA and the State
Department on the subject.
There is no absolute security of personnel. When General Bedell
Smith first took over the direction of CIA, a committee of Congress?
perhaps this committee?asked him whether he thought that there
might be any spies in the CIA. He said "I assume there are. I take
it for granted that the Communists ,are trying to penetrate the CIA
and I must go on the assumption that in any organization as large
as this, they may have succeeded. I am going to try as best I pos-
sibly can, all the time I am here, to ferret out any that may be here."
In other words, there is no absolute security. The pendulum can
swing too far. I had some ridiculous cases of people who were going
to be librarians in Rio or Buenos Aires who were held up for 6 or 8
months for full security clearance. We lost applicants time after time
who took other jobs rather than wait for our clearance procedures
for positions which didn't reauire the strictest security concern.
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I would argue for allowing Mr. Foster to satisfy himself and his
organization, and this committee, that he has secure personnel, but I
would not tie his hands with needless redtape which might prevent
his being able to acquire the personnel he needs within a reasonable
time.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
Mr. Whalley.
Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Allen, you have had a very distinguished career with the
U.S. Government. In my opinion, you deserve our commendation for
appearing here today and presenting your opinions and statement.
Thank you very much.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, sir.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.
Mr. ZABLOCKL Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is good to welcome you.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Zablocki.
Mr. ZABLOCKL On page 3, referring to the amendment to Senate
hill 777, section (31) (2), to add the words "United States" before
"private," you state the reason why that section should be amended,
and possibly the words "United States," taken out, is because in-
formation is necessary and cannot be obtained from domestic sources
but can be obtained from private or public institutions abroad.
To what extent has ACDA utilized such information in the past?
Mr. ALLEN. I inquired into that same point, Mr. Zablocki, and was
informed that the Disarmament Agency let a contract for some $21,000
last year to a British firm for some kind of study analysis in the dis-
armament field. And it was that one contract, out of their $10 million
appropriation, which was subject to severe attack. I would expect
that any reasonable director of an agency of this kind, and certainly
Bill Foster is such a person, would be very limited in the number of
foreign contracts he would let.
At the same time, we would of course be unduly nationalistic if
we thought that we had all wisdom in the field of disarmament and
national security. Every other nation, of course, is concerned with
security. Every other nation is concerned that a relatively large part
of its budget goes into disarmament. A lot of other people have been
giving very serious attention and thought to this field.
It might well be that occasionally he could find experts or groups
in some foreign countries who might be useful in his work. I think
putting shackles on him by writing in a limitation that he can only
make contracts with U.S. citizens is unduly restrictive.
Mr. ZABLociii. It would appear that the reason for the Senate ac-
tion may be some concern that the Disarmament Agency is becoming
another CIA.
Mr. ALLEN. I was not aware of that.
Mr. ZABLOCKL There is duplication of services in information
gathering.
Mr. ALLEN. I see.
Chairman MORGAN. That one contract, Mr. Zablocki, that was let
to an institute in England was for the study of the effect of disarma-
ment on European security.
Mr. ZABLOCKI There was only one contract?
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? Chairman MORGAN. One contradt. A 6-month study. A figure of
$21,064.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, has the Agency produced evidence
that that information could not be obtained except by giving the con-
tract to that British firm?
Chairman MORGAN. I suppose that it is possible that the institution
in England was more qualified to study the effect of disarmament on
European security than any American institution.
Mr. ZABLOCKL Being advised of the contract that was awarded,
I think I will privately look into it and see whether it was warranted.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin.
Mr. BATTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I read the record of the debate in the Senate concerning the
amendment that you have discussed in your testimony, that is, the
insertion of the words "United States," it was accepted by the chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Fulbright,
without debate. Perhaps Senator Fulbright had some information
that is not available to you, sir, or to the committee at the present time.
Do you have any comment on that?
Mr. ALLEN I appreciate your information. I was not aware that
Senator Fulbright accepted that without debate or complaint. I
simply do not know the circumstances under which that arose. I may
point out that I am also active in a private voluntary group here in
Washington called the Washington Institute for Foreign Affairs,
which is modeled somewhat on the Council on Foreign Relations in
New York. Our group here consists largely of former officials of
the Government, both military and civilian, and prominent persons
in the field of law and business and academic life here in Washington.
We are in close contact with similar organizations in other coun-
tries. One in Britain, for example, Chatham House, carries on a
good deal of research and publication, and has a long and very good
history of serious studies on international affairs of this kind. I can
speak with some knowledge that there is a considerable body of highly
intelligent information and analysis in certain foreign institutions.
The French have been engaged in studies on international affairs
for a very long time. I don't know whether they might have any-
thing of use in this connection or not.
I think we would make a mistake to shut our eyes to that possibility.
Mr. BATrix. The contract that was awarded to the English con-
cern was awarded to the Institute for Strategic Studies in England.
The information I have is that the same type of institute was de-
nied a charter in France and in Germany by the French and German
Governments. Whether that had any bearing upon the insertion of
the words "United States" I don't know.
Another question that I have, and again I would call for your
opinion, don't you believe that some of the cost involved in the studies
of the disarmament question should also be borne by some of the
countries who will receive the fruits of any agreements or discoveries
that are made in this field, such as England, France, Germany, and
Europe generally speaking?
Mr. ALLEN. I take it that similar studies are going on in certain
other countries, particularly in Great Britain, and in private insti-
tutes?academic or otherwise?in France, Germany, Italy, and van-
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97
ous other countries. I know that one in Greece, for example, is quite
active.
It might be well to have closer liaison and understanding between
groups in the Western World active in this field. Joint projects might
well be brought forward which would require joint contributions of
funds. I doubt that the United States would be able to enter into
such joint contracts if the limitation put in by the Senate were al-
lowed to stand.
Mr. BATTIN. Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson?
Mr. THOMSON. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Nix.
Mr. Nix. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Our next witness is Mr. Everett Jones, repre-
senting the General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Meth-
odist Church.
STATEMENT OF EVERETT JONES, GENERAL BOARD OF CHRISTIAN
SOCIAL CONCERNS OF THE METHODIST' CHURCH
Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee. My
name is Everett R. Jones. I am a mechanical contractor residing in
Damascus, Md., and a member of the General Board of Christian
Social Concerns of the Methodist Church.
National security and world peace require the achievement of safe-
guarded disarmament. It is surely evident that an arms race which
continues despite a test ban treaty threatens the possibility of an
eventual explosion into war through accident, folly, or madness. The
fantastic destruction that would come to our country, as well as to
all Western civilization, lies beyond the imagination's grasp.
The only adequate defense that either side can now have against
war is participation in mutual disarmament that removes the arms
from both sides while safeguarding the national security of each.
Arms, which have historically served as a source of security for
nations, have now become a primary source of insecurity.
Whereas arms have traditionally been essential to a nation's defense,
only effective world disarmament can any longer provide a really
meaningful defense for the existence and welfare of our Nation.
Whether the motive be high morality or the elemental matter of sur-
vival, all logic demands a massive effort for safeguarded world dis-
armament.
Congressional regard for national security in a world not yet dis-
armed'would cause it to immediately reject any suggestion that the
U.S. Department of Defense should be on a temporary basis. The
increasing realization that arms at best can only buy time, and that
national safety requires disarmament, surely calls for putting ACDA
on a permanent footing.
Congress certainly should be reluctant to leave on a temporary basis
any agency of Government whose existence and efforts are essential to
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98 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
the security of the Nation. Thus We hope that Congress will approve
the bill giving permanency to the ACDA, in its basic original form.
One would hardly describe as vigorous a disarmament effort that
receives only as much as 1 percent of the financial support given
to the research and development of arms. Yet the $15 million pro-
posed for the 1964 work of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency falls far short of that sum, .being only about two-tenths
of 1 percent of the more than $7 billion budgeted for military re-
search and development for the same year.
The carefully prepared disarmament plans being presented by the
United States at Geneva reveal the valuable work that the ACDA
has been able to perform on a budget that is minuscule in propor-
tion to the gravity of its task. The broadened effort contemplated
in the current budget request is heartening, but still falls far short
of the massive effort that is needed.
Some important problems in disarmament will be touched only
lightly under the proposed 1964 ACDA budget. For instance, sub-
stantial additional research should be done on the relationship of
disarmament to the U.S. economy.
The economic benefits of disarmament should be documented, such
as the reduced role of Government in business which would result in
the restoration to free enterprise of the multitudes of businesses and
millions of workers now dependent on defense expenditures from
public funds. To give assurance that this can be done in a beneficial
rather than a disastrous manner, models of conversion procedure
from an arms economy to a disarmed economy should be constructed.
There should be an extensive exploration of the possibilities for
strengthening health research, education, and other desirable pro-
grams through money .made available to individuals and local com-
munities by the reduction of Federal taxes which would result from
disarmament.
Thorough research should be carried out as to the enforceable safe-
guards necessary if the disarmament system is to give each country
assurance that, once it has joined others in laying down its arms, no
other country can take advantage of its disarmed condition.
. The public information of the ACDA needs to be stepped up con-
siderably. The existing misinformation and lack of information
among the American people is greater in the area of disarmament
than in any other significant matter. Vigorous organized attacks
upon.. the ACDA and upon the U.S. disarmament proposals are ap-
pearing with increasing frequency across the Nation. Gross misre-
presentations and distortions are often accepted as truth by the pub-
lic because accurate information is not easily available.
The ACDA budget should allow for factual briefings to be given
for representatives from interested nongovernmental organizations.
It should be possible for the ACDA to hold such briefing conferences
on a regional basis, particularly in areas where misunderstanding and
Opposition is the greatest.
The public has not only a need but a right to be adequately informed
on the developments in a subject so Vital to their future.
To meet this responsibility of the Government for adequate in-
formation to the citizenry would require many times the sum requested
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for this purpose. Congress could take a significant step in that di-
rection by increasing the amount presently asked.
As an illustration of a more specific need for information, the
Methodist Church has recently embarked on an expanded program of
disarmament education among its people. In the coming year it plans
to hold many conferences and workshops, at local and national levels,
on the problems and possibilities of disarmament. For this impor-
tant work the church will lean heavily on the materials' and in some
cases the personnel which can be made available by the ACDA.
The Methodist Church, since its 1940 general conference, has stead-
fastly supported the cause of safeguarded world disarmament. In
addition, the 1960 general conference stated:
We commend the President, the Congress and the State Department of the
United ? States on their attention to disarmament, but we call for an expansion
of efforts and staff to develop a comprehensive, safeguarded disarmament plan
upon which to focus negotiations.
Members of Congress, acting in the interests of our national se-
curity and defense, which now require the achievement of lasting
peace through an effective system of world disarmament, will surely
want the ACDA to accelerate its work and will also want to provide
funds adequate for that purpose.
We earnestly hope, therefore, that your committee will not only
resist all efforts to decrease the requested appropriation for this
Agency, but that in light of the importance of disarmament to our
national security, will consider an increase in that appropriation.
Now that a test ban treaty has been signed, we need to prepare for
every opportunity to make further progress in the area of safeguarded
world disarmament, with full awareness that this objective will not
only require adequate funds, but also demand many years of patient
and determined effort to achieve success. To this end we urge af-
firmative action on the Disarmament Agency legislation.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Jones.
Mr. .JONES. Are there any questions?
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Jones, as a member of the Methodist
Church I am not familiar with the General Board of Christian Social
Concerns of the Methodist Church. How often does this board
Meet?
Mr. JONES. This board meets annually. We have a 90-man board.
I am a lay member. We are represented throughout the 10-million
member church by approximately 45 laymen, 45 ministers, some of
them bishops.
Chairman MORGAN. It meets annually?
Mr. JoNEs. Yes. We have still further committees which meet
more often than that.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Jones I notice on pages 3 and 4 of your
statement you give a considerable amount of emphasis to pointing
out that public information as to the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency needs to be stepped up considerably. I am sure you are fa-
miliar with the fact that the Senate put an amendment in the bill,
and I want to read it:
None of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated shall be used to pay
for the dissemination within the United States of propaganda in support of any
pending legislation concerning the work of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarm-
ament Agency.
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100 TO AMEND `THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. JONES. Not in support of the legislation, but in the program
itself; that is, in the information concerning disarmament. I agree
with the statement, that an agency ought not to support legislation to
continue its existence. But the information which they have we need
as a church;, our people need it. I think this is not in support of the
legislation as such, sir, as it would be in promoting a disarmament
program.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Jones.
Mr. Whalley.
Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jones, you say you think the $15 million figure that is asked for
should be increased. Do you have any idea what figure would be
adequate?
Mr. JONES. No, sir. We are not technicians in this sense. We
feel that a massive effort would require more than this recommended
reduction that the Senate approved. We feel that this effort, if you
are comparing a $7 billion research program of arms production, that
this is infinitesimal in comparison to that. It needs considerably
more support.
Mr. WHALLEY Thank you very much.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Zablocki.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have no questions, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin ?
Mr. BATTIN. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Murphy?
Mr. MURPHY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson.
Mr. TuomsoN. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Nix?
Mr. ,Nix. I will follow Mr. Zablocki's leadership. I have no ques-
tions.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Jones.
Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Our final witness this morning is Prof. Wil-
liam Neumann, Goucher College, Towson, Md., representing the Na-
tional Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, Inc.
Professor, you have a prepared statement. You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF PROF. WILLIAM NEUMANN, GOUCHER COLLEGE,
TOWSON, MD., REPRESENTING THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR
A SANE NUCLEAR POLICY, INC.
Mr. NEUMANN. My name is William L. Neumann. I am a professor
of history at Goucher College, Towson, Md., and I am appearing on
behalf of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. My
area of scholarly interest is international relations and I served for
2 years as foreign relations specialist for the Senate Republican policy
committee.
Since the formation of nation-states there have been two contend-
ing theories over the best way to maintain peace. Both theories have
had the support of great thinkers and both can cite many plausible
historical examples in defense of their validity.
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 101
One theory holds that the way to preserve the peace is to prepare
for war and thus intimidate all possible enemies by an imposing show
of force. Sometimes this technique has been effective; at other times
and occasions it has led only to a contest between states, each trying
to outintimidate the other. The result of such contests is very fre-
quently war.
The other theory claims that peace can best be maintained by eas-
ing the conflicts and tensions which create wars by diplomacy, mu-
tual compromise and, if necessary, by some form of adjudication.
Many wars have been prevented by these means; some have erupted
despite diplomatic efforts at finding a nonviolent settlement.
Since neither theory has proven infallible, nations seek to follow
both. Sinde 1945, however, and with due regard for the establishment
of the United Nations, the major powers have devoted a major share
of their national budgets and many of their best minds to only one
theory, the idea of deterring enemies through accumulated force.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has devoted more than
a small fraction of its military expenditures to the United Nations and
to diplomatic efforts.
The creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was
a unique step in the exploration of ways of maintaining peace without
the use of military threats. The Agency's first year has not produced
great results nor have its funds always been expended in the wisest
way. But we would still call for a dramatic expansion of the work
of the ACDA, an expansion which necessitates a larger staff and a
more substantial budget.
I may say here that research is inevitably wasteful to some extent.
I think you gentlemen who have had some experience with medical
research know you may spend $5 million and get no results, and then
somebody comes along with a $10,000 grant, and gets great results.
You have to use the shotgun approach.
I am afraid this is the same way for research in the field of disarm-
ment. You have to spend money because you don't know who is
going to come up with the good ideas. Somebody will come up with
some good ideas.
The lack of a permanent legislative status, budgetary uncertainties
and efforts by some private groups to confuse the public about the
Agency's goals have hindered its performance. The type of top-
quality minds and capable administrators which the Military Estab-
lishment recruits for its important programs have been difficult to
secure for an organization whose future is uncertain.
If this Agency was worth creating, it should be given the support
it needs to achieve its ends. In a world in which the major powers
spend more than $14 million hourly in preparation for war, the United
States ought to spend at least that amount yearly in support of alter-
nate approaches.
Even in military circles it is beginning to be recognized that the
deterrent theory in an acre of nuclear weapons is reachinc, a point of
decreasing utility. Secretary of 'Defense McNamara made this point
in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
I cannot allege that the vast increase in our nuclear forces, accompanied as
it was by large increases in Soviet nuclear stockpiles, has produced a comparable
enhancement in our security * * *. It is clear that the absolute growth of Soviet
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j iv 111V1E1N 1) tirJ ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
capability to inflict damage on the United States has narrowed the range of
contingencies in which our nuclear deterrent is credible.
The alternative is disarmament and expanded and enriched diplo-
matic efforts. But the wildest enthusiast for disarmament will not
claim that its achievement is possible in a year or two. The technical
problems are great, the psychlogical, economic, and political prob-
lems are greater. As in the Military Establishment, the solving of
these problems calls for a great deal of research and thought by the
best of minds.
?As an historian I can speak of how little is still known about the
disarmament efforts, successful and unsuccessful of the past. In 1818
the Senate ratified a treaty with this Nation's major enemy, Great
Britain, 3 years after an unsatisfactory peace?the peace of the Treaty
of Ghent?after a bitter war in which this Nation's Capital was
occupied by the enemy. That treaty began an effort at disarming the
Great Lakes border, but it only slowly became effective and expanded
over the course of 50 years into a completely disarmed Canadian-
American frontier.
There has been little recent historical study of this evolutionary
case of disarmament directed at throwing light on the problems of
the present. The same is true of the much misunderstood Washing-
ton Naval Limitations Agreement of 1922 which halted an expensive
naval race between the United States and Britain. This same treaty
gave our diplomats a period of eased tensions of almost a decade in
which to work out the complex problems of conflicting interests with
Japan in China.
The diplomats failed, but the treaty was a success in its limited
objectives. It, too, deserves more thorough study, particularly since
it operated without serious violations despite lack of any system of
inspections or sanctions against violations.
These are only a few of the historical areas which deserve study as
possible guides for future action. I need not enumerate for this com-
mittee, as previous witnesses have, the many economic problems which
disarmament presents. Some of our most capable economists are
confident that this economy can adjust to peace and even decrease our
present level of unemployment. But this, too, requires careful study
of the various areas of this country and of methods of reconversion to
production which will meet the many unfulfilled needs of the world.
These are not answers which can be completely and finally worked
out within the 2 years of extra life which the Senate bill has recom-
mended for this Agency. These are answers which may take a life-
time to work out, but a lifetime of peace and lowering levels of nuclear
threat.
The goal to which this Agency seeks to expedite progress is one on
which all reasonable men agree. The existing obstacles are great.
No further obstacles should be placed in the way of an authorization
or budgetary nature which hamper this pioneering agency.
On behalf of my organizaion, I urge that you authorize permanent
status and the possibility for major expansion of the work and in-
fluence of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Neumann.
Professor Neumann, you don't mention the amount, but from read-
ing between the lines of your statement, I think you recommend the
full $15 million requested by the Executive?
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MT. NEUMANN. Yes, sir.
Chairman MORGAN. You feel any reduction in the full $15 million
would be a handicap to the Agency?
Mr. NEUMANN. Yes, because as I said you have to waste some
money to get results. There is no other way of doing it. Maybe you
shouldn't even say "waste," in this respect, but you have to spend some
money, as a military agency knows very well. You have to spend
money in this area, too.
Chairman MORGAN. Professor Neumann, as a specialist for the
Senate Republican policy committee you have had some experience
here on Capitol Hill and you know the concern that Members of
Congress have about enlarging agencies and that agencies grow too
fast. You feel that the progress made so far by the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency and what is proposed that it do during
the next 2 years is not the case of an agency that is growing too fast?
Mr. NEUMANN. I share with Congress the fear of expanding agen-
cies. I think we are straining at a gnat over this little Agency. This
is not one I am afraid that is going to become a gigantic agency.
We have many expanding agencies that Congress could do something
about. But I don't think this will be that important an agency.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Neumann.
Mr. Whalley.
Mr. WHALLEY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. You state in your opening paragraph that you
worked 2 years for the Senate Republican policy committee.
Mr. NEUMANN. I served under Robert Taft and William Knowland ;
1950 through early 1953.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. No further questions. Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Battin.
Mr. BATTIN. I was curious. On page 1 of your statement you say,
"One theory holds that the way to preserve the peace is to prepare
for war and thus intimidate all possible enemies by an imposing
show of force."
Would you relate this to both the United States and Russia, or just
to Russia?
Mr. NEUMANN. I think that is what the deterrent is supposed to do.
It is supposed to deter Russia from taking any steps by an imposing
show of force.
Mr. BATTIN. Assume then that Russia were to continue to build its
force and we said "No, we don't want to." Then which one would
gain the psychological and military objective?
Mr. NEUMANN. I think we have reached a very unique position in
the history of the world where two nations are quite capable of de-
terring each other and are stalemated; that is, both can kill each
other's population many times over, and therefore the concept of
deterrent has reached declining utility. To know that the Russians
can kill the Americans 5 times or to know that Americans can kill
the Russians 10 times, to step that up to 15 times or 20 times I don't
think makes anyone feel more deterred.
I feel deterred at this point. I know many people feel deterred.
I don't know that increasing the amount of atomic power will deter
us any more or the Russians any more.
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104 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. BATTIN. Continuing in the same paragraph of your statement,
why you feel that history evidently would show that we have reached
the point of intimidation, and the result in such cases is usually and
"very frequently war."
Mr. NEUMANN. Yes.
Mr. BATTIN. Would you say that the United States was prepared
for war at the beginning of World War I?
Mr. NEUMANN. You are referring to 1914?
ME. BATTIN. Yes.
Mr. NEUMANN. The United States was not prepared for war in
1914.
Mr. BATTIN. Would you say we were prepared for war in December
.1941?
Mr. NEUMANN. I would say in certain areas fairly well prepared.
Mr. BATTIN. Would you care to specify?
? Mr. NEUMANN. I would say in the case of the Naval Establishment
quite well prepared; in fact if you look at the record the Naval Estab-
lishment received more money from Congress than they had asked.
The Navy made some mistakes. They did not place great importance
on aircraft carriers. That was not a fault of Congress. That was the
fault of the naval men.
They did not use the money to the most satisfactory purposes at
that point.
? Mr. BATTIN. You are aware of the necessary appropriation proce-
dure in Congress to build aircraft or ships. They must be authorized
by Congress?
MT. NEUMANN. Yes.
Mr. BA I-TIN. The TFX of recent date is a good example. We just
don't appropriate a sum of money and tell the services 'You do with
it what you want."
Mr. NEUMANN. No. To go back to the period that I know best,
I am an historian. In the late 1930's actually the Navy said "We
don't need any more money for aircraft carriers," and continued to
build battleships, which as you know very well proved not to be of
any great value. They had plenty of money. Their lack of prepara-
tion was due to misjudgment of the nature of World War II, rather
-than the lack of money from the Congress of the United States.
Mr. BATTIN. Wouldn't it be a fair statement, too, that it was the
lack of the judgment of what Japan might do?
Mr. NEUMANN. I think it was a failure of intelligence, a clinging
to certain traditional concepts which the military ofttimes do, and a
failure to recognize that the world has changed. I think that is the
same problem we have now.
Mr. BATTIN. Being an old Navy man I recall they were building
battleships right up t the end of World VVar II.
Mr. NEUMANN. If you look at the history of attempts to end the
Cavalry Corps, you will see it more ridiculously, because throughout
the twenties they said "We will need them during the next war. They
will charge and rip up the tanks."
We have a long history of misjudgment in this area.
Mr. BATTIN. And it has led to catastrophe on the part of this coun-
try as far as its losses of men and money are concerned and not being
the deterrent force that you say often leads to war?
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?
Mr. NEUMANN. Yes. I don't think the United States has made
such a catastrophic misjudgment as the Germans in World War II
or the misjudgment that Stalin made on the eve of World War II.
We have made misjudgments, but they haven't been as great. It
hasn't cost America the way it cost the Russians, as much as 7 mil-
lion men.
Mr. BATrIN. Maybe we are better shots.
One final question. It is one I am sure you would care to clear up.
As I read the record, you leave me with the general impression that
anybody who disagrees with the position that you have taken and
other witnesses have taken is unreasonable and uninformed?
Mr. NEUMANN. I don't think that is a conclusion. The goal which
I refer to is a peaceful disarmed world. I think everyone wants a
peaceful world. Mr. Teller has talked about the need for total dis-
armament, too. I don't think reasonable men disagree about the end._
We disagree about the means.
Mr. BATTIN. This is what we are talking about, living in a peaceful
world. It is a question of how we arrive at that goal that seems to
have some conflict in the country.
Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. MURPHY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Governor Thomson?
Mr. THomsoN. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Professor Neumann.
The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Thursday, September 12, 1963.)
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ACT
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1963
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 :30 a.m., in
room H-322, the Capitol; Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman)
presiding.
Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.
The committee meets this ItiOriling in open session for the continua-
tion of the hearings on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
legislation. Our first witness this morning is the diStinguished Mein-
ber of Congress from the great State of Florida, a former member of
this committee during his earlier tenure of Congress, the Honorable
Robert L. F. Sikes.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. F. SLICES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. SIKES This meeting does bring back Memories. In my first
2 years in Congress I served on this committee. It was a great priv-
ilege. I served with most of the men whose pictures adorn these walls.
Sol Bloom was then chairman. Boyd Crawford was already the
committee clerk, but of course a much younger man. It has been a
long time, but I retain many pleasant memories.
The bill, S. 777, an act to amend the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Act, contains new language which was inserted in the bill at
the request of Senator Hickenlooper. It is found in paragraph (c),
section 3, of the bill on page 3 and reads as follows:
Such section is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following
new sentence: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be censtrued to authorize
any policy or action by any Government agency which Would interfere with
restrict; or prohibit the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms by an indi-
vidual for the lawful purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation, education,
or training."
This is similar to H.R. 6364 introduced by me as a separate bill
amending section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
In the Senate at the time of the passage of the act, Mr. Humphrey
had this to say about the language to which I have referred,:
The amendment is self-explanatory. It is the committee's view that nothing
in the original act would have authorized the Agency to deal with the question
of individual ownership and possession of firearms. Since some concern seems
to exist, nevertheless, in the minds of sportsmen and others, the committee
? 107
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108 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
recommends this amendment to the Senate to make the congressional intent
entirely clear.
It appears on page 10240 of the Congressional Record of June 13,
1963.
It is my hope that this language will be retained in the bill if it is
reported by your committee. This is language which has been urged
by the National Rifle Association of the United States, by a number
of sports magazines, such as Guns and Ammo, by powerful military,
veterans' and patriotic organizations, and by many individuals. I
have before me an editorial from the magazine, Guns and Ammo,
which I submit for the record of the committee. The editorial is
entitled "A Vital Bill Before Congress" and refers to my amendment.
Chairman MORGAN. Without objection, Mr. Sikes, this editorial
will be inserted in the record.
(The editorial referred to is as follows:)
EDITORIALLY SPEAKING! !?A VITAL BILL BEFORE CONGRESS
A year ago this month, Guns and Ammo initiated the right to keep and bear
arms campaign with an editorial announcement in this column. One of the first
articles to appear in the new department was a two-part series, authored by
Fritz Samuels, analyzing Public Law 87-297, 87th Congress, H.R. 9118?an act
which established the highly controversial U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency.
, Samuels interviewed the Honorable Judge Hilliard Comstock, a Superior
Court Judge of California and past president of the National Rifle Association.
He is currently the head of the NRA's legislative committee. Judge Comstock
literally ripped into the Arms Control and Disarmament Act as a very real
threat which could conceivably be used to virtually disarm the citizenry if the
Federal Government ever chose to do so. The usually staid National Rifle As-
sociation recognized the potential danger to the private ownership of firearms
and so stated in a resolution framed and adopted by the legislative committee.
(Guns & Ammo, September 1962.)
G&A's two-part series really stirred the pot and resulted in a flood of mail to
the House of Representatives and the Senate. How really effective Judge Com-
stock's critical analyses of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act was became
apparent when Guns & Ammo received a four-page letter from William C. Fos-
ter, the Director of the Agency and currently the U.S. representative on dis-
armament in Geneva. Mr. Foster took issue with us and with Judge Comstock.
He had this to say :
"First, let me assure you readers that, in my capacity as Director of this
Agency, I have neither the power nor the desire to confiscate or require registra-
tion of firearms owned by private citizens for sporting purposes. I am advised
by my General Counsel that nothing in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act
authorizes this Agency to take such action. As the article points out (G. & A.'s
article?Ed.), the second amendment to the Constitution provides that the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.' No strained
interpretation of the act?such as that of Judge Comstock?which violated this
amendment would be countenanced by the executive branch of this Government or
the U.S. courts. An amendment to the act such as you suggest, to preserve a citi-
zen's right to bear arms, might cast doubts upon the efficacy of the second amend-
ment and thereby tend to defeat the very purpose which you are attempting to
serve."
The amendment to which Mr. Foster refers is one which G. & A. has felt
should be included in the Disarmament Act and which would serve to specifically
exclude private firearms owned by U.S. citizens for lawful purposes. It isn't
that we feel that Mr. Foster and the Federal Government aren't sincere in their
current avowal that the right of the citizens to keep and bear arms would
never be infringed. There is no doubt that Mr. Foster and our present admin-
istration really mean what they say. However, what assurance do we have
that a successor to Mr. Foster or succeeding administrations would feel as they
do? What would prevent the future adoption of another amendment which
would include the elimination or curtailment of privately owned firearms? Can
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TO AMEND TF:17 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 109
Mr. Foster guarantee some 50 million gun owners in the United States if the
issue came before the Supreme Court that, in the absence of a specific clause
excluding privately owned firearms, the justices would not rule against the
"right to keep and bear arms"?
The right we enjoy today is too precious to take any untoward chances with.
The private ownership of firearms is the hallmark of a free people. We intend
to keep it that way.
Now it seems that some Members of Congress feel as we do. So much so,
In fact, that Congressman Robert L. F. Sikes, Florida Democrat, recently in-
troduced a short but terribly important bill numbered H.R. 6364.
Mr. SIKES. Insofar as I can determine, Mr. Chairman, there is no
opposition to the amendment. In a letter addressed to the chairman by
Mr. William C. Foster, it is stated that :
?
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has no objection to such an
amendment, but believes it unnecessary.
Now it may be unnecessary, Mr. Chairman, just as insurance on
property may be unnecessary, but it sometimes is a very useful thing to
have. You may have a building that you consider fireproof and then
should a fuel oil truck overturn against the side of the building, or
should there be a short circuit in the electric system, orshould a firebug
with incendiaries get loose in the neighborhood, you find that you no
longer have a fireproof building. Then you wish you had insurance,
but it is too late. Such an eventuality could happen in this case and
I believe the language will be a very useful protection to have.
As the committee well knows, the content of the legislation and the
executive policy on the subject of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency have generated much publicity and reaction throughout the
country. Many patriotic organizations and individuals have been
highly critical of the purposes and scope of the Disarmament Act. The
general grounds for criticism have been that the implementation of
this law would place the United States in a dangerous political, eco-
nomic, and military position vis-a-vis the Communist bloc.
There is a great deal of public apprehension over the prospect of
leaving our defenses to the U.N.
The language, temper, and range of the act are idealistic and broad.
Certain perhaps unintended consequences could conceivably flow from
the carrying out of its existing provisions, and such consequences
would negate one of our most cherished rights. This right is the pos-
session and use of firearms by the law-abiding private citizen.
Thousands of Americans who own and enjoy firearms for defense
and sport strongly feel that the continuation of this ownership and
enjoyment is seriously threatened by the vague language and admin-
istrative interpretation of the disarmament statute. Assurances of the
Director and other officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency have not dispelled this fear.
I believe there is substance to the apprehension of our citizens. The
all-encompassing nature of the law and Agency pronouncements there-
on speak for themselves. In order to make absolutely clear that the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act does not include the elimination
of private firearms as part of the proposed disarmament program, I
support the amendment adopted by the Senate and covered by my bill
on this subject.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Sikes.
23-197-631-8
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110 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. Sikes, I want to assure you as the chairman of the committee
that during the markup of the bill I will support this amendment.
During the testimony of the Director of the Arms Control Agency he
was asked about this amendment and indicated that he had no objec-
tion. It will have my support when we mark up the bill.
Mr. SIKES. That is very reassuring.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.
Mr. GROSS. I commend the gentleman from Florida for his state-
ment and for this support of this amendment. I certainly support it.
I would say to him and to others of like mind that this will be a con-
tinuing fight if Mr. Foster and others of his persuasion get what they
are seeking now, an international police force. They will try to dis-
arm every citizen of this country, if the police force is to be operated
through the United Nations or any other form of one-world govern-
ment.
This is their aim. This is their desire, to create a one-world situa-
tion. I don't agree with it at all. As long as I am around here I will
certainly?
Mr. SIKES. The public is genuinely disturbed about that prospect
and I think overwhelmingly supports this measure of protection.
Mr. GROSS. I certainly do. I thank the gentleman.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Sikes.
(The following article from Sports Afield, August 1963, has been
submitted by Mr. Sikes for inclusion in the record at this point:)
BLUEPRINT FOR PEACE---A THREAT TO GUN, OWNERSHIP ?
(By Pete Brown)
Is the American Government about to sell the second amendment (right to
bear arms) for a doubtful peace? Here are the grim, hidden facts:
Are the 30 million private American gun owners a threat to peace and security
in this country?or the world?
Yes; under certain conditions this is entirely possible. There is little doubt
that this possibility of a threat was fully intended by those States, of the original
13, which insisted on adoption of the first 10 amendments of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. We can be forever thankful that some of the original States were very
suspicious of unbridled government power and demanded that these amendments,
later to be known as our Bill of Rights, be passed as soon as possible after the
establishment of the Government to be formed under the Constitution.
Of course our response to the words "peace" and "security" depends on our
understanding of these two terms. Peace and security do not mean the same
to all people. To the growing cult of mildness, peace means simply freedom
from the threat of war. We can have this brand of peace any time we seek
it. All we have to do is surrender our sovereignty and our capacity for self-
defense, and thereby throw ourselves on the mercy of the powers that be.
Security, to some people, means being taken care of from cradle to grave.
These people generally reason that an all-powerful Federal Government is best
qualified to take on this responsibility. We can get this kind of security at
any time by merely surrendering our liberties. Those who seek the power
to impose their will on the majority are only too happy to assume full re-
sponsibility for the peace and security of others. Naturally, those who re-
linquish their responsibility are expected to surrender their capacity to disturb
the "peace." Not too long ago we had an offer to "bury us," and I'm quite
sure it was intended that this service be rendered entirely free of charge.
Although a kind of peace and security is always easily and instantly obtain-
able, the conditions have always been repugnant to the vast majority of the
American people. We are endowed with a heritage which inspires us to fight?if
necessary?to preserve our national sovereignty and our individual liberties.
Need I point out the fact that without forefathers, friends and relatives will-
ing to die for this cause?as many have?we would not enjoy our liberties today?
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 111
Yes, I think we can say quite definitely that 30 million gun owners are a
threat to a peace and security which involves surrender of our liberties or a
surrender of our Government of the people, by the people, for the people.
Most of our Founding Fathers who were responsible for our Constitution were
learned men. They were aware of the poisoning influences which seeped into
the Roman Empire and brought about its fall. They knew that a nation of
people not ready and willing to fight its own battles is effete. They themselves
were fresh from one of freedom's greatest struggles, and they were satisfied
that the government of a free, self-governing people has no reason to fear its
own citizens. They know that citizens experienced in the use of firearms add
strength which only a nation of free people can muster.
DICTATOR STATES DON'T DARE ALLOW THEIR CITIZENRY TO BEAR OR EVEN. TO KEEP ARMS
By the same token, our Founding Fathers were apparently fully aware of the
fact that the government of an oppressed people does fear its subjects. That, in
a nutshell, is a very good reason for there always being a right to keep and
bear arms?our second amendment. Lose our second amendment, or pervert
its meaning, and it will signal our downfall as a great nation?the bastion of
freedom.
The legislative attempts at outlawing guns can be dealt with by an alert peo-
ple, and wrong-way legislation can be corrected; but there is an entirely new
threat looming big in the form of a disarmament treaty proposed by our Gov-
ernment. If accepted, it would leave us powerless to act. The decisions rela-
tive to whether or not we can have guns and the conditions under which we
will be permitted to use them?if at all?will not even be made by our Govern-
ment. These decisions will be made by representatives from various countries,
including enemy powers. It also appears that we would have foreign inspectors
in this country to see that the conditions imposed on us are enforced. Our only
recourse as a nation will be through the World Court. The World Court
consists of 15 judges, of which one may be an American. The other 14 will be
from various countries, including enemy countries. Can we expect them to be
sympathetic to our cause? Does this sound like a pretty package? It is not
exaggeration. Unless you have studied the provisions of the proposed treaty,
you don't know the half of it. It is far worse than I've been able to reveal in
a few words.
REPLACING THE WORD "POLICE" WITH THE WORD "PEACE" REALLY DOESN'T
CHANGE ANYTHING
The treaty outlines a three-phase disarmament plan. All parties to the
treaty would agree to do away, for all practical purposes, with their entire
military forces and all armaments within a period of something over 6 years.
The only military force, as such, remaining would exist only to be placed at
the disposal of a United Nations command. This would be called a peace
force. As the treaty puts it, by the final stage of the plan: "Parties to the
treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of
reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising
and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employ-
ment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing." There are vague
provisions for retaining armaments for forces which parties to the treaty would
be permitted to retain to maintain internal order and protect the personal se-
curity of their citizens. Dictator states don't dare permit an armed citizenry.
Is it likely that the administrators of the proposed ?treaty would permit U.S.
citizens to have weapons?
The United States presented this treaty, referred to as an outline of basic
provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world,
at the 17-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Reports coming out of
Geneva would indicate that the negotiations are concerned with nuclear weapons
only, but this by no means reflects the thinking behind the entire disarmament
picture as revealed in the treaty proposed by our Government.
The provisions of the treaty are found in a seldom-mentioned Government
publication "Blueprint for the Peace Race?Outline of the Basic Provisions of a
Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." It is
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 4, General Series 3,
released in May 1962. It has been available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.?price, 30 cents.
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112 TO AMEND .TT-TE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
The basic provisions outlined in this treaty were presented to the Genera/
Assembly of the United Nations by President Kennedy on September 25, 1961.
This was just 2 days after the Congress had approved the Disarmament Act
establishing the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, now headed by
William C. Foster.
AN EFFICIENT REGISTRATION OF WEAPONS MAKES CONFISCATION AN EASY
AND RAPID PROCEDURE
The fact that this treaty proposes that we do away with our entire Military
Establishment and place ourselves militarily at the mercy of a world order means
surrender of our national sovereignty. It would seem that such a drastic,
historymaking proposal by our own Government would be top news. But it
has had very little mention in the press or on the air. The long silence regard-
ing the terms of this treaty is, I think, one of the most baffling mysteries of our
time.
As late as April 5, 1962, about 6 months after the President presented the dis-
armament plan to the United Nations, even key Senators in the U.S. Senate stated
that they had no knowledge of the plan. A colloquy on the floor of the Senate,
as recorded in the Congressional Record for April 5, 1962, reveals this very
clearly.
Some Members of Congress have since indicated that this treaty does not
include sporting weapons. It doesn't mention sporting weapons specifically?
nor does it exclude them. It would be exceedingly naive to expect specific men-
tion of sporting weapons. However, if you read the treaty, you can see that
these can easily be included after the treaty is put into force. But from that
time on, an aroused American public won't mean much. The treaty does refer
to all armaments, with certain exceptions for what is apparently a police force.
"Subject to agreed requirements for nonnuclear armaments of agreed types for
national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal
security of citizens, the parties to the treaty would eliminate all armaments
remaining at their disposal at the end of stage II." We'll be told that sporting
weapons are not included in the treaty terms. Then try to get sporting weapons
(carefully defined) excluded, and see how far you get.
As soon as the proposed treaty is agreed upon, ratified by the Congress
and put into force, the International Disarmament Organization would be
established to function within the framework of the United Nations in accord-
ance with the terms and conditions of the treaty.
After a careful reading of the terms of the treaty, it becomes apparent that
It makes little difference whether sporting weapons are mentioned or not. If
the International Disarmament Organization decides to include them, they can
do it. There are provisions for amending the treaty and/or adopting rules
for implementing the broad terms of the treaty. As a Nation, we have only
one vote in the matter. As a Nation, our only recourse is to the World Court,
where, at present, we have only one vote?not as a Nation, but a vote cast by
1 United States-appointed judge out of 15 sitting on the World Court.
As individual citizens, we would have no recourse, because our elected rep-
resentatives, once the treaty is signed, have no voice in disarmament matters,
and it appears that our courts would have no jurisdiction. The disarmament
treaty would spell the end of the Connally reservation. This reservation con-
sists of six little words "as determined by the United States." When the United
States accepted jurisdiction of the World Court in 1946, we excluded disputes
with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of the United States. By the Connally reservation, we also reserved the right
to determine whether or not a dispute is within our domestic jurisdiction. We
might point out that the Communist nations have not accepted the World Court,
and there are other Western nations which have also placed restrictions on
acceptance of the court's jurisdiction.
A careful reading of the disarmament treaty also reveals that we will be
under the surveillance of a foreign "Peace Observation Corps" and policed by
a foreign "Peace Force." The individual citizens of this country will have no
control over these peace cadres. They will constitute an international gestapo.
Let's face it; replacing the word "police" with the word "peace" in the names
of these organizations doesn't really change a thing?another subterfuge.
There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution which allows for this sort of thing,
but there is reason to fear that the Supreme Court, citing article VI, section 2
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?of the Constitution, will decide that treaties supersede the Constitution. If we
are not intent on upholding the Constitution, and wish to circumvent it, then I
suppose the treaty route is the quick and easy way to do it. If this is our Gov-
ernment's decision, even if we offer no protest, let's at least go into it with
our eyes wide open. Our Bill of Rights will no longer have any meaning?least
of all the second amendment, guaranteeing the right to keep and bear arms.
Surrender our military forces, our armament, and our sovereignty, and we are
heading up a one-way, dead end street. After all of the blood that has been
shed to gain and protect our freedoms, why should we now offer them up on a
silver platter as a sort of sacrifice to the United Nations? Do we have the
right to subject future generations to possible untold misery and possible en-
slavement because we have surrendered their sovereignty and destroyed their
means of protection?
Now, if we disband our military forces, and destroy all of our armament?
except what we turn over to the command of the "Peace Force"?who will then
be the guardians of our liberties? Perhaps this deserves looking into. The
United Nations Security Council directs the U.N. military actions, and I presume
that this will also be the case with the U.N. "Peace Force." I wonder how many
people know that since the beginning of the United Nations, the Undersecretary
for Political and Security Council Affairs has always been a Russian?
1946 to 1949, Arkady S. Sobelov, U.S.S.R.
1950 to 1953, Konstantine Zinchenko, U.S.S.R.
1953 to 1957, Ilya Tchernyshev, U.S.S.R.
1957 to 1960, Anatoly Dobrynin, U.S.S.R.
1960 to 1962, Georgei 0. Arkadev, U.S.S.R.
1962 to 1963, Eugeney D. Kiselev, U.S.S.R.
1963, Vladimir Suslov, U.S.S.R.
Instead of simply standing ready to go on the defensive, the "American
people should be demanding the repeal of some objectionable and useless legis-
lation now on the books. At the Federal level, let's take a look at the National
Firearms Act. This act is another subterfuge. It is a tax act, but its real
purpose was to prevent criminals from obtaining gangster weapons. The so-
called gangster weapons include fully automatic weapons, shotguns with bar-
rels less than 18 inches, rifles with barrels less than 16 inches, altered
shotguns or rifles with an overall length less than 26 inches, pistols with
shoulder stocks and silencers. This act has caused legitimate gun users and
gun collectors much inconvenience and many headaches. After I tried, un-
successfully, to ascertain the number and the nature of convictions under the
act, I have concluded that the act has done little or nothing in the way of curb-
ing crime. I am informed by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the
Internal Revenue Department that the only figures available show seizures
and arrests. The figures they sent me do not reveal the number of convictions.
Why not get rid of the tax act and deal directly with the criminal, as was in-
directly intended?
We might ask the same question concerning the Federal Firearms Act. This
is an act to regulate interstate traffic in firearms, but it was designed to deny
the criminal lawful access to firearms. This act is of little, if any, concern
to the criminal, but it does cause the sportsman and dealer inconvenience and
some anxiety. Both acts are good cause for anxiety?for the reason that the
Internal Revenue Department, administrator of the act, has the power to make
regulations for administering it. In 1957 this bureaucratic power to make reg-
ulations was exercised, and regulations which would have worked a real hard-
ship on sportsmen and dealers, even concerning the purchase of ammunition,
pretty nearly got by the American public. An alert dealer happened to spot
the advance notice of these regulations in the Federal Register. He sounded
the alarm. Dealers and sportsmen throughout the country rallied to the cause,
and another objectionable bit of legislation was given the heave-ho. The
matter shouldn't have ended there. The power to make law by bureaucratic
fiat has no place in our form of government. This power should be removed,
and I don't know of a better way to do it than to shoot at getting the acts re-
pealed entirely. If anyone can prove any real merit in these acts, perhaps it
can be preserved in new legislation which is directed squarely at the real prob-
lem?the criminal, not the gun.
Sometimes even legislative action at the Federal level slips by. In 1961 a bill
was written to strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, and this bill was passed.
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114 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
The significance of this bill was not recognized at first and even received some
support from the sportsman's corner.
Among other things, the Federal Firearms Act before the 1961 change pro-
hibited the shipment of firearms in interstate or foreign commerce to or by a
felon (convicted of a crime of violence), a fugitive or a person under indict-
ment for a crime of violence. A crime of violence is defined as murder, man-
slaughter. rape, mayhem, kidnaping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, assault
with intent to kill, commit rape or rob, assault with a dangerous weapon or
assault to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year.
This regulation, as it stood, was not readily abused, because it is not too easy
to trump up a charge of a crime of violence.
However, the 1961 bill amended the act to eliminate the term "crime of
violence" and inserted in lieu thereof the words "crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding 1 year." It is doubtful that this change will do one
particle of good in curbing crime. It does open up the possibility of abuse of the
act. There are numerous things for which a person can be indicted and for
which punishment involves imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year. Revenue
agents may. for example, have a dealer indicted for selling a certain collector's
item which the agents claim is illegal, or perhaps indicted for something in con-
nection with his income tax. It's assume that there is no idea of convicting
the dealer, but while he is awaiting trial and a verdict, he is prevented from
shipping or receiving firearms in interstate commerce. This could work such
a hardship on this dealer that it could put him out of business without his
ever having had a trial. This new amendment makes it possible to use the act
as a threat of harassment and nothing more. It's another subterfuge and avoids
coming to grips with the real problem?the criminal.
Has the second amendment outlived its purpose? Is it out of place in our
modern society? Of course not; there has never been a greater need for the
second amendment. iStand before a globe of the world, turn it slowly, and look
at the countries which have fallen to tyranny since World War II. They com-
prise a vast area of the globe's surface, and their boundaries confine millions of
peonle who have lost their liberties.
Why have so many nations fallen, and why have the suppressed people not
been able to gain or regain their freedoms? The reasons may not be quite the
same in every case, but these people in every case most certainly lacked either
the power or the will to resist the takeover. We won't explore all the reasons,
but it is axiomatic that compulsory registration of sporting and protection weap-
ons preceded their downfall. Please note that I said registration preceded their
downfall. Registration doesn't necessarily lead to downfall. However, an effi-
cient registration of weapons makes confiscation a very neat, easy, and rapid
procedure. And when this confiscation takes place, it is for one reason only.
The citizens have lost or are about to lose their freedoms. The government?
be it their own or a government imposed by outside influence?feels that it has
good reason to fear the governed.
Of course people will argue that weapons must be registered or confiscated to
curb crime.
In the first place, individual citizens in the past have been responsible for
the taking of a large percentage of criminals. A study made in Chicago several
years ago revealed that 45 percent of the criminals killed while committing a
crime were killed by "unofficial self-defenders."
I'm not aware of any more recent comparative figures, but I suspect that the
percentage of criminals taken by private citizens has been drastically reduced.
The trend has been toward discouraging people from defending themselves. It
seems that if a person is so rash and undisciplined as to attempt self-defense,
he had better be in a position to prove that he was unsuccessful in an attempt
to run from his assailant. (A knife in the back is generally accepted proof.)
I've actually seen where authorities have advised people to submit to whatever
abuse or indignity is demanded and then scream for the police.
The trend has also been toward making it more and more difficult for the
private citizen to have a gun readily available for self-defense. The American
citizen is thereby frequently denied the weapon which, under certain circum-
stances, would be the most effective means of protecting himself and his family.
This denial, of course, tends to give the criminal a tremendous advantage.
Legislating against the gun rather than the culprit can successfully remove
guns from the hands of law-abiding people, but it is mighty difficult to prevent
the criminal from getting a gun. This has been demonstrated in New York
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State, where they have the disarming Sullivan law. Even young punks are
able to fashion handmade guns. These guns don't look like much, but at close
range they are just as deadly as the most expensive gun money can buy. If some
nervous thug puts a gun in my ribs, I'd prefer it to be a regular factory-made
gun. While I'm deciding my next move, I'd hate to contemplate the uncertain
mechanism of a crude, handmade zip gun. I wouldn't gamble on its not work-
ing, but on the other hand it might be a trifle too sensitive in the hands of some
hopped-up twerp with trigger-finger twitch.
There is only one way to stop crime with guns, and that is to make it very
tough on those who use a gun in the commission of a crime. It is doubtful that
this will prevent crime. Let's not forget that there are such things as knives
and all sort of everyday instruments which are silent, practically impossible to
trace and very deadly. I detest the idea of having someone hacking at me with
a knife. I even protested having my tonsils removed.
Try to outlaw all weapons?impossible. Legislating against inanimate objects
is no substitute for dealing directly with the individual. We have an obligation
to teach our young people responsibility and self-discipline. Failing this, we
have no choice but to be tough on those convicted of criminal activity. We can
deal severely with the criminal and still make every attempt to get him back
on the right track. With severe and fair treatment, we would certainly dis-
courage new entries, and perhaps make possible the quicker rehabilitation of
the habitual offenders.
How about the police? Do they recommend the registration and outlawing
of guns? Sure, you can find some police authorities favoring the outlawing of
guns. I don't know of any police who do, but I haven't really been looking for
them. There are a lot of police I know who favor private ownership of firearms.
The National Police Officers Association of America and the National Shooting
Sports Foundation, Inc., recently signed a joint resolution. I won't repeat every
"whereas" and "lie it further resolved," but here are enough to indicate the
feeling of the National Police Officers Association of America:
"Whereas the beginning history of our Nation was written and our sover-
eignty assured by the heroic sacrifice of volunteer riflemen, adept in their use
and armed by their own personal weapons: and
"Whereas the professional military forces of our country have through the
conflicts of the past relied upon trained citizen soldiers who were capable in the
use of firearms; and
"Whereas it is reasonable to believe that a capable and well-armed citizenry,
as a potential backup to our regular forces, could well deter an aggressor from
our shores and effectively assist in interdicting the enemy's progress, should he
effect a bridgehead; and
"Whereas restrictive antigun laws do not succeed in disarming the criminal,
but do disarm the law-abiding citizen, thus denying the law-abiding citizen ef-
fective self-defense, as well as jeopardizing his opportunities for training in the
use of firearms and discouraging his hunting and gun sports afield. We, the un-
dersigned, make the following statements for and in behalf of the National Police
Officers Association of America and National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc..
in the best interests of all law-abiding citizens of the United States of America:
Be it further
"Resolved, That we now commend the prosecutors of the Federal Government
and the various States for the vigorous action taken on their part in the prosecu-
tion of criminals committing felonies while armed with a firearm. And, further
strongly recommend to the courts a continuance of the policy of strict enforce-
ment of the penalties prescribed wherein a crime is aggravated by the use of
a firearm; and be it further
"Resolved, That we believe that an American citizen of voting age or a member
of the U.S. Armed Forces, of whatever age, should have the right to legally pur-
chase, without restriction, a handgun, rifle, air rifle, shotgun, or a like item, ex-
cepting fully automatic firearms."
We are accustomed to resisting what we consider misdirected legislation on
local. State, and National levels, but now we are faced with international con-
trol outside the sphere of our Government, and this calls for a new awakening.
Within the framework of our Government, even when we lose a round, there is
always the possibility of changing the law. In the final analysis, the will of the
people prevails, and in this we believe. With our background of freedom and
self-government, we have confidence in the will of an informed U.S. public. The
fact that our people do not seem to be informed about the general disarmament
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116 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
treaty proposed by our Government at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva
is cause for alarm.
We feel sure that the American people, fully aware of what is involved in
-our Government's "Blueprint for the Peace Race"?a treaty on general and
.complete disarmament?would flood the Congress with mail protesting this in-
strument for national suicide. Our best hope is to keep in touch with our
Senators and Representatives regarding this treaty and to let them know what
we think about it.
Chairman MORGAN. The next witness is Franklin L. Orth, execu-
tive vice president of the National Rifle Association of America.
You have a prepared statement. You may proceed; sir.
STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN L. ORTH, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Mr. ORTH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a
distinct honor and privilege to be allowed to appear before this august
body. As executive vice president of the National Rifle Association,
I speak for a shooter-sportsmen membership of more than 570,000
individuals and over 11,000 affiliated clubs and associations. You
will note the statement says 570,000. At the time I printed this that
was so. It is now over 600,000. This is one of the fastest growing
organizations in the United States.
Since the original association charter was granted in 1871, the
basic objectives of the National Rifle Association have been to promote
social welfare and public safety, law and order; to increase the knowl-
edge of small arms and promote efficiency in the use of such arms on
the part of members of law enforcement agencies, of the Armed
Forces and of the citizens who would be subject to service in our
Armed Forces in the event of war; and generally to encourage the
lawful ownership and use of small arms by citizens of good repute.
The association constantly directs its efforts into a program of activ-
ities which advance firearms safety education as a public service,
marksmanship training as a contribution to the national defense, and
hunting and shooting as wholesome forms of recreation.
The association is highly respected by citizens of all walks of life
or fairness, logic, and a wealth of information and experience with
respect to the lawful use of firearms. Our educational programs di-
rect firearms safety throughout the Nation. Both our marksmanship
training and hunter safety training programs are recognized as an
'outstanding public service.
The competitive programs for rifle and pistol shooting, both nation-
ally and internationally, are receiving wide public interest with ever-
increasing participation by military personnel, law enforcement offi-
cers, and civilians.
The National Rifle Association wishes to go formally on record in
support of H.R. 6364, introduced by Representative Robert Sikes, of
Florida, and referred to your committee. This bill would amend
section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act by adding at the
end thereof the following new sentence:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize any policy or
action by any Government agency which would interfere with, restrict, or
-prohibit the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms by an individual for the
lawful purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation, education, or training.
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Senate bill 777,- to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act
in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to.
modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees,
includes the addition by Senator Hickenlooper to section 3 of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act of the wording quoted above.
This bill, as amended, has been approved in the Senate. Lurge that
this amendment be retained by the House.
During the several weeks of legislative activity preceding the enact-
ment of Public Law -87=297, which established the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the National Rifle Association advised both the
U.S. House of Representatives and Senate of its growing concern that
the title and content of that public law might give rise to a feeling
among the general public that the possession and use of firearms by
the private citizen could possibly be placed in a position of jeopardy.
As a result of our urgings, and others the title was amended in such
a manner as to better convey the real functions of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. However, such feelings of doubt and
mistrust as to the functions of- that Agency have become reality.
Perhaps this has been brought about by the wide distribution of
certain Government publications on general and complete disarma-
ment, or because of a public disbelief of the Value of any dealings.
with foreign nations on this subject.
Whatever the case may be, H.R. 6361 and S. 777 should, to a great
extent, allay the concern of the citizen-sportsman as to 'any infringe-
ment on his lawful possession and Use of firearms by any Government
agency.
The National Rifle Association has long championed, the importance.
of the citizen skilled in the use of small arms as an integral role in
the defense of his country during times of national emergency. Of
equal importance to -the advancement of our national preparedness is:
the- continual familiarization and practice with firearms-during peace-
time that can only be gained by experience and instruction.
Some people feel that there is a decreasing need for marksmanship.
activities in this day and age of nuclear and electronic warfare. In
some ways the encroachment of organized society has tended, to de-
emphasize' the importance of such training to the 6xteht that man:
has, in many instances, sought other avenues of pleasure and recrea-
tional activities. This unfortunate circumstance has been brought
about, in part, by somewhat of a reliance on nuclear weapons and'
devices as a deterrent to war or as a prime countermeasure to an attack
on our shores.
The importance of the rifleman in this present age of sophisticated'
weaponry was highlighted by President- John F. Kennedy during a.
visit to the Marine Barracks in Washington on July 12, 1962. Speak-
ing before the assembled companies of the men of the corps, he said :-
All of us, I am sure, 10 years ago, thought that the need for the man with the-
rifle would be passing away from the scene in the 1960's. *And it is true that
there are a good many Americans tonight who are stationed underground in a
hardened silo whose duty is to watch some tables and some dials and a button.
But the very size and magnitude of these new, great weapons have placed a
new emphasis upon what we call rather strangely conventional war, and they'
have made it even more mandatory than ever that we keep the man with the
rifle * * *.
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118 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Thus, thinking men know that the awful devastation caused by
nuclear explosives is something to be avoided or resorted to only after
all other efforts of defense have been exhausted. Military experts
throughout the world realize that "limited" warfare is the only means
of combat short of nuclear involvement.
Military strategy of today emphasizes the small, highly trained, and
mobile units of special forces capable of guerrilla-type warfare and
combat-ready units able to be transported into action on a moment's
notice. The dependency in such operations on the foot soldier highly
trained and skilled in the use of small arms is a matter of basic
military tactics.
Such skill in the knowledge and use of basic weapons is the reward
of proper training of its user. Effective instruction in marksman-
ship must be conducted by capable coaches with individual instruc-
tion for each man while he is on the firing line.
No shortcuts, no substitutes have been found which would other-
wise produce the necessary results. A civilian populace trained at
leisure in the use of firearms during peacetime, whether by competi-
tive shooting or hunting in the field, can be, and has been, a bulwark
of defense of this country in periods of national emergency when
time for such training is of the essence.
To deprive the citizens of our country of the tools for firearms
training, whether for the purpose of national defense or for recrea-
tional activities, by means of an international disarmament agree-
ment, would be tantamount to national catastrophe and suicide.
While the National Rifle Association does not feel that such a
phase of disarmament is presently contemplated by the precise terms
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, we certainly subscribe
to the intent and content of section 33 (b) , as amended by these bills,
as a definite assurance of the prevention of such an action by any
future administration or agency in its negotiations with foreign
nations.
We urge this committee to vote in favor of the passage of these
measures. Such action on your part will make great strides in our
national endeavor to seek world peace and tranquillity, and at the
same time will insure the lawful use of firearms by our citizenry, a
use that has played such an important role in our national heritage.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Orth.
Mr. Orth, we have always appreciated the advice we got from the
National Rifle Association in the past. I know I have received many
letters from sportsmen and rifle clubs in my district on this matter.
I think we should have given a little bit more time and research
to this matter when we considered the original bill in 1961. I know
Mr. Sikes was very active with the members of the committee and
On the floor during the debate and we are grateful for his interest.
I want to assure you again, as I assured Mr. Sikes, that in the mark-
up of the bill which should take place in the next week or 10 days I
Will be supporting this.
Mr. ORTH. Thank you very much.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.
'Mr. GROSS. I want to commend you as I did Representative Sikes
for your support of this provision and say to you, as I did to Repre-
sentative Sikes, that you had better stay on the job with your organi-
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119
zation to see it is retained because it will come out if some people have
their way.
This is not in any way to reflect upon the statement just made to
you by the chairman, and his support of this provision. I am sure
he will do his best to keep it in any future legislation, but there are
those who will try to take it out.
Mr. ORTH. Thank you, sir. As you know, this association has
strongly supported the Constitution, the second amendment of which
gives the ordinary citizen the right to keep and bear arms. But this
in one way or another is being watered down by interpretations of
our courts. So that I feel that your statement is absolutely accurate,
that we must remain on the job and we will be on the job.
Mr. GROSS. Thank you, sir.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson.
Mr. THOMSON. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to welcome a Wis-
consin man before this committee. As a member of his very fine asso-
ciation and as a father who has a boy who is also a member, I have
great confidence that they will remain eternally vigilant for the rights
of the individual. I, too, want to give him the assurance that the
chairman already has, that I will be supporting this proposal which
you have presented here today.
Mr. ORTH. Thank you Congressman Thomson.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Orth, speaking of Wisconsin, last week
spent a night at Superior, Wis. The day before I was there a black
bear had walked into the lobby of the main hotel. I didn't have a
rifle with me, however.
Mr. ORTH. You might have wished you had, sir.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Orth.
The next witness is Mrs. Aileen Hutchinson representing the
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.
STATEMENT OF MRS. AILEEN HUTCHINSON, REPRESENTING THE
WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. You have a prepared statement. You may
proceed.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Thank you.
I am Mrs. Aileen Hutchinson of 3316 McComas Avenue, Kensing-
ton, Md. I am speaking in behalf of the Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom, U.S. Section, of which I am a member.
I serve on the national legislative committee of that body.
The league was founded in 1915 and Jane Addams, an outspoken
advocate of the causes of peace and freedom, was its first president.
We have continued in her footsteps, supporting and working for those
conditions, political, economic, social, and psychological, which can
bring peace and freedom to the world through nonviolent means.
The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom urges
this committee to grant continuing authorization to the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency by approving H.R. 3299 rather than
the amended Senate bill which would restrict the Agency's authoriza-
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120 TO AMEND ,THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
tion to another 2-year period. In the 2 years of its existence, the -
Agency has proved its right to exist as a permanent branch of our
Government.
Without such an Agency whose personnel are concerned only with
disarmament questions, the United States may not have taken the-
positive role in negotiation which has led to many breakthroughs in
areas of agreement with the Soviet Union. At this time after many
years of deadlock, we have concluded a test ban treaty which is pres-
ently being debated in the Senate for advice and consent to ratify.
i
This s the first real move toward world peace, and a signal to the-
rest of the world of our sincerity in attempting to find peaceful solu-
tions to conflict.
In addition to its role in negotiations, the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency has authorized and conducted research which has
added to our knowledge of verification, inspection, and other arms-
control problems. The results of this kind of research can speed up
the negotiation process and lead to further breakthroughs in agree-
ment with the Soviet Union.
The league is particularly pleased with the intention of the Agency
to expand its operations in the field of economics. We hope that with.
the adequate staffing of the Economics Bureau, the study of the-
economics of disarmament will be given the attention it deserves.
We need greatly expanded research in this area so that we can plarr
and prepare in advance for the conversion of our economy to peace-
ful uses when further agreements for disarmament finally come, as
they must if human beings are to survive on this planet.
The league would like to see the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency given the standing and prestige within Government circles:
and with the public that its work in the field of disarmament deserves.
The original supporters of the Agency envisioned it as providing op-
posing ideas to the almost overwhelming opinions of the armaments:
proponents.
It should be this Agency's function to voice the disarmament posi-
tion continuously and persuasively with other Government agencies
and with the American public. Members of Congress should depend
on the expert advice of the Agency's staff to increase their knowledge.
of disarmament questions. It should stand on an equal footing with
other agencies of Government.
Unfortunately, there are certain aspects of the mandate which
created this Agency which seem to impede its effectiveness. Unlike
other sections of the Department of State, the most stringent security
clearances are required of applicants for positions with the Agency..
The unnecessarily long wait for clearance deters many qualified peo-
ple from seeking employment.
More important, this Agency should be seeking and attracting
creative, intelligent people who are not afraid to voice their opinions
in controversial areas. We suspect the Agency's clearance procedures
either deter or blacklist the very people who have the most to con-
tribute to the important work of disarmament.
The league also believes that in the area of public relations, the
Agency has not sufficiently striven to inform the American people
about its purposes and activities. This Agency is the logical one to
conduct the educational campaign so vitally necessary to win public-
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support for the administration's efforts in arms control and disarma-
? ment. We urge Congress to encourage the Agency's efforts in this
-direction rather than to impede them by crippling amendments.
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in a strengthened
position can contribute more effectively to the ongoing research, ne-
gotiations' and education necessary to reach further international
agreements bringing about world peace for which we in the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom have so earnestly
worked.
The league affirms its belief in a world of peace and freedom under
the rule of law. We hope that the U.S. Government will continue to
support the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as an example
of the effort that all men must make to attain that world. Until all
mien have shown that they are willing to work together for peace and
freedom, the world will never be safe from the threat of nuclear de-
struction.
Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you Mrs. Hutchinson.
Mrs. Hutchinson, what is the total membership of the International
League for Peace and Freedom? Is it a large organization?
Mrs. HurcHiNsorr. You mean nationally, not internationally?
Chairman MORGAN. Nationally.
Mrs. HurcHnsisox. I would say about 10,000.
Chairman MORGAN. Mrs. Hutchinson, your organization fully ap-
proves the $15 million requested by the executive branch?
Mrs. HirrcilmrsoN. Yes. As I understand the wording of the orig-
inal S. 777, which is the same as your H.R. 3299, that is, without the
.amendments
Chairman MORGAN. That is correct.
Mrs. HuTcHiNsoN. That is the one we approve of because we felt
it gave continuing authorization to the Agency rather than restrict-
ing it to another 2-year period.
Chairman MORGAN. You feel the $10 million annual limitation
.authorized by the Senate bill is going to be a handicap to the Agency?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. My understanding from what I have heard from
the Agency people and others is that it isn't the money involved but it
is the prestige involved in (riving this Agency a continuing authoriza-
tion rather than having it come back year after year to again have
hearings and to again be authorized to exist.
Isn't that correct, when you put a limitation on it such as the
amendment to S. 777?
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Foster testified that, if he received the $15
million requested, the Agency could proceed with its research pro-
gram and function very well. Of course' he said the $10 million au-
thorization ? granted by the Senate would cause him to cut back his
program.
The Senate gave him a 2-year authorization, a total of $20? million
to take care of both fiscal 1964 and fiscal 1965.
Mrs. HurcHirrsoN. Our point was the 2-year limitation, that is what
we are opposed to. We would like to see it not limited to a 2-year
period but be given in effect continuing authorization.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hutchinson.
Mr. Broomfield.
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Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask a question
relative to your statement, Mrs. Hutchinson. On page 2, you state
in the second paragraph:
Unlike other sections of the Department of State, the most stringent security
clearances are required of applicants for positions with the Agency. The un-
necessarily long wait for clearance deters many qualified people from seeking
employment. More important, this Agency should be seeking and attracting
creative, intelligent people who are not afraid to voice their opinions in con-
troversial areas. We suspect the Agency's clearance procedures either deter
or blacklist the very people who have the most to contribute to the important
work of disarmament.
Do you stand on that statement?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes. From what I have understood and from
reading the act?we may have misread the act?that the original
Disarmament Agency as it was in the Department of State, the staff
on the original Disarmament Agency had to go through additional
very stringent security clearances when they were set up as a new
Agency.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. YOU don't think it is necessary that we should
have stringent clearance before these people are hired?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Why wasn't it necessary when they were a sec-
tion of the Department of State? Even looking at the Senate amend-
ment here, apparently it went down even into contractors and sub-
contractors to the point where work was delayed and appointments
were delayed over and over again because these people even if they
had original clearances had to have new ones by the FBI and so
forth. Is that correct?
Mr. BRoomFiELD. It may be. I am merely saying this kind of state-
ment is what is going to be required. I am sure the Congress will
insist on continued congressional review for this very reason. If you
ever took this off, I am not sure what would happen. What worries
me most of all is whether you are trying to break down the barriers for
screening people in this particular area.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I understand the screening is more severe.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. So don't you think it is necessary to be more
severe in this particular area?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I don't see why it shouldn't be the same as it
is in other important areas of the Department of State or Department
of Defense and so forth. If these people are supposed to be working
on disarmament, which is a positive step, why should they be so
stringently limited in who they can hire? I also notice this takes a
long time, that the clearances take an unusually long time and some
people who are qualified and want to work for the Agency can't wait
for financial reasons.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would rather have you come out with a state-
ment that you feel it should be improved as far as the procedures go,
rather than letting down the barriers.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I didn't say that. I mean that it should be im-
proved as far as the stringent ones that are now in existence.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.
Mr. WHALLEY Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mrs. Hutchinson, following on Mr. Broomfield's questions, do you
know the difference of time between clearance of State Department
and Disarmament personnel?
Mrs. HuTar:Inv-sox. I heard it was something?of course, what we
have heard from different people may be wrong, but it took up to 18
months to 2 years.
Mr. WHALLEY For Disarmament. How much time does it take
to clear State Department personnel?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I assume a few months. This is what I heard
from people who were applicants or who knew people? who were
applicants.
Mr. WHALLEY. The principal items then you are talking about are
a continuing authorization and also the clearance?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes.
Mr. WHALLEY The continuance of the Agency and shorter clear-
ance time.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes, because of the fact that I think it deters
qualified people who would be sincerely interested.
Mr. WHALLEY Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman' I don't recall that Director Foster made
any complaint when he was before the committee about the slowness
of security clearance in the organization. Do you recall any?
Chairman MORGAN. I think he testified that he had no problem
in clearing the top people, but when he got down to the contractors
and subcontractors he thought there should be some relaxation.
Mr. GROSS. If an emergency developed, the Secretary of State would
have authority to waive clearance, would he not?
Chairman MORGAN. I do not believe there is any authority to do
so under the original act.
Mr. GROSS. He has already used that right to waive clearance in
the State Department, to my certain knowledge. I don't understand
that this poses any problem with respect to the functioning of this
organization.
Mrs. Hutchinson, why is it wrong for Congress to scrutinize this
program every year? What is wrong about Congress looking over
the shoulder of the Disarmament Agency and asking those people
to justify all that they are doing?policy, spending, and all of that
soft of thing? Why?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. The Congress can still do that, can they not,
as they do with every other agency, and continue to scrutinize every-
thing they do. It is your right and duty to do so. I understand as
far as prestige and standing is concerned, when it has this sort of
temporary status?
Mr. GROSS. Why do you ask it to be put on a permanent basis?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Because other agencies of similar standing are
on a permanent basis, and because the queistion of disarmament is so
crucially important, requiring continuing and careful negotiation that
should not be interrupted.
Mr. GROSS. There are some that are not, too.
Mrs. HurcHiNsoN. This would not deter you 'from continuing to
scrutinize that Agency, would it?
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124 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. GROSS. We have, it seems to me, a much better opportunity to
scrutinize what they are doing if they come in here dependent year
after year for their authorization?come before this committee. lrou
say that in the 2 years of its existence the Agency has proved its right
to existence as a permanent branch of Government.
What has it done to prove this right?
Mrs. H-crTcmisrsoN. We have before us right now the test ban
treaty. Other steps have been worked on, and new ones will be
necessary to reach further agreements, according to administration
spokesmen.
Mr. GROSS. Do you think this was accomplished?for whatever it
is worth, and I don't think it is worth very much?do you think this
was accomplished by the Disarmament Agency alone?
Mrs. HurcHiNsmc. I understand that all the top negotiators and
all the people who worked on this come from the Disarmament
Agency, yes?with the exception of the final negotiations?and they
are continuing work in this research, in many areas that we are not
too well aware of. In Geneva, in some other areas of this arms
control, they have been able to reach agreements?over a long period
and maybe very small agreements, but they have been able to make
some breakthrough, in addition to the hot line between Washington
and Moscow.
Mr. GROSS. It seems to me Mr. Foster was very much in the back-
ground in Geneva in this last business over there this limited nuclear
test ban treaty. It seems to me one W. Averell Harriman 'was the top
dog over there in the publicity, pictures, everything else.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Harriman was not in Geneva.
Mr. GROSS. He was in Moscow, which I think is even worse, from the
standpoint of negotiation of the test ban treaty.
Mr. BRoomnELD. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. GROSS. Certainly.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Who in the Disarmament Agency was in Moscow
at the time of the negotiations?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I don't know. Our feeling is that the work in
Moscow was a culmination of all that had gone before. You wouldn't
get a test ban treaty if good, long, hard negotiation had not gone before.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Do you know of anyone connected with the Dis-
armament Agency who sat in on the negotiations in Moscow?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I didn't check it, so I couldn't say.
Mr. GROSS. You say this is the first real move toward real peace, this
limited test ban treaty?
Mrs. HurcuncsoN. 'Yes, sir.
Mr. GROSS. You don't really believe that?
Mrs. HuToxixsoN. I really do. That is what I have been working
for for many years.
Mr. GROSS. We have dumped much money down the drain on dis-
armament and peace offices, if this is the first real move.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. This is the first real conclusion we have made.
Mr. GROSS. So you want to give this Agency now $10 million a year
for a period of 2 years, $10 million each for 2 years? Is this the bill
you support?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Foster wanted $15 million, did he not?
Mr. GROSS. You support the $15 million, is that right?
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Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes, on a continuing basis.
Mr. GROSS. That would increase them from $61/2 to $15 million
They started at $1,800,000 in fiscal 1962. They went to $6,500,000 in
fiscal 1963 and now they want to go to $15 million in 1964.
Mrs. HurcHiNsoN. Which is a drop in the bucket, sir, compared to
the billions spent every year. We have to make that realistic com-
parison always.
Mr. GROSS. I don't know whether you own property or not, but you
could probably break down the tax on your property into a few cents
per foot. This business of "it is small by comparison with something
else," can be big in its cumulative effect.
ow in the world do you think this Disarmament Agency spends
six and a half million on 205 employees? That is the number they had,
on what they are pleased to call on board," when Mr. Foster appeared
before this committee.
How do they spend six and a half million on 205 employees?
They haven't put a penny in brick and mortar.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. They are subcontracting out to other agencies.
Mr. GROSS. Have you read any of the material obtained through
those subcontracting out jobs?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I read one of the reports from Woods Hole
which I thought was revealing on the problem of arms control and
inspection.
Mr. GROSS. There is more drivel contained in some of these reports
than I have read from any other agency in a long time. I am sure
our opinions would differ as to the value of these reports. We got into
a test moratorium in 1958, didn't we? Do you know how much we
were spending at that time On a disarmament agency in this Govern-
ment?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. We didn't have one. We only had a section in
the State Department.
Mr. GROSS. All right. A disarmament setup. Do you know what
we were spending on that setup in 1958?
Mrs. HTJTCHINSON. No, sir.
Mr. GROSS. Between $700,000 and a million dollars, as I remember
the figures.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. There was no negotiated treaty at that time.
That just happened to be a moratorium?
Mr. GROSS. What is the difference, whether it is a treaty, understand-
ing, or agreement. The Russians will break it when it is their desire
to break it. What is the difference whether it is a treaty or what it is?
Mrs. H-crrcmicsoN. When a treaty or contract in a,ny society, even
with our own society, is desirable to both parties, they both keep it.
If it is not beneficial to both, neither keeps it.
Mr. GROSS. It is just that simple?
Mrs. HirrcHiNsox. You know that from your own business con-
tracts.
Mr. GROSS. Do you think we would break this treaty that we are
apparently headed into now? Would you suggest that we break it?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I think I misunderstood you. No what I am
trying to say is that this treaty is obviously to the benefit of both parties
concerned, or it would never have been consummated in the first place,
that it is to our mutual benefit, therefore we will keep it.
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126 TO AMEND IE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. GROSS. If it is ratified by the other body, I hope it will be to
our mutual benefit, but I am afraid it won't be. I am afraid we start
off with a treaty that is loaded against the United States. So you
think that we ought to spend money for studies such as those in the
field of economics?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Yes, very much SO.
Mr. GROSS. We have a Department of Commerce. We have people
studying economics, domestic and international economics, all over
the map in this Government.
Why should we spend money on a disarmament agency to go into
the field of studies in economics?
Mrs. HurciansisoN. Because apparently the other agencies are not
studying the specific problem of the conversion of the economy,
which will be a great problem if we get disarmament in this country.
We need those studies to make advance planning.
Of course, people who work in the defense industry will be con-
siderably concerned about the loss of their business and about the loss
of jobs, if we begin to get, as we hope we will, gradual arms control
d disarmament.
You need to make those advance plans.
Mr. GROSS. You are real liberal with the taxpayers' money. I will
say that.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I am not. I would love to see a cut in the de-
fense budget.
Mr. GROSS. I imagine you would. How do you feel about the
amendment that was discussed earlier in this session?
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. The firearms one?
Mr. GROSS. Yes.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I think it is fine. These people are apparently
optimistic because when it comes to individuals holding firearms it
means we have won the peace. If this is all they are concerned about,
it means they are quite optimistic about disarmament coming about.
It is a right in our Bill of Rights. As I understand it, it is to pro-
tect the individual against a tyrannical government. It is important
to keep that right.
Mr. GROSS. I could comment on that, but I don't believe I want to
get, that deeply into politics right now. That is all for the time be-
ing, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson.
Mr. TiMmsoN. No questions.
Chairman ,MORGAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hutchinson.
Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Thank you for hearing me.
Chairman MORGAN. Our next witness is John W. Wood, general
counsel for the Liberty Lobby.
Mr. Wood, you have a prepared statement.
You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF JOHN W. WOOD, GENERAL COUNSEL, LIBERTY
LOBBY
Mr. WOOD. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Liberty
Lobby is opposed to any attempt by the U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency to secure either unlimited spending authorizations
and/or establishment of the Agency as a permanent independent
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agency of the Government. It is our hope that your committee will
recommend the adoption of S. 777 as it came from the Senate, which:
limits expenditures of the Agency to $10 million for each of the next,
2 years and continues the Agency only as a temporary organization.
S. 777 also contains the Lausche amendment which eliminated objec-
tional language from the Disarmament Act and specifically spells out
that only the Senate can advise and consent to a treaty. This amend-
ment, as adopted by the Senate, we should also point out, covers a
similar idea as expressed in House Resolution 83, introduced by Con-
gressman Omar Burleson, which is pending before your committee, on
which, I might add, we also support.
Liberty Lobby believes that the entire fiscal philosohy behind the
Agency's request for the "use of all necessary moneys" cannot be jus-
tified by the use of any standard of business experience. If agencies
can have this power, then it is unnecessary to establish appropriation
committees and committees on government operations. With such
financial power, each agency administrator could create an ever-
expanding bureaucracy. The ACDA under this proposal might well
become the grandest and most expensive example of Parkinson's law
yet seen on the Government bureaucratic scene.
I must point out also that this unrealistic approach to fiscal power
was recognized early in the deliberations of the Senate committee
and a specific figure was readily obtainable from the Arms Control
Agency. This suggestion was even cut by action of the Senate on the
final vote and the Senate's version reduced the amount to $10 million
each year for the next 2 years.
We believe even this amount is too much. After all, under the pre-
vious authorization the Agency took 18 months to spend $10 million.
Now, under the Senate action, they would receive $10 million for each
of the next 2 years. Surely even tais speeds up the Agency's spending
rate tremendously. A cut down to $5 million for each of the 2 years
seems more reasonable.
A previous witness for the proponents of increased funds, evidently
well briefed, stated that the Agency needs $4 million for administra-
tion and $11 million for research contracts. We humbly suggest that
a more reasonable suggestion would be to give the Agency $1 million
for administration and $4 million for research, and turn over most of
the present research projects to the Department of Defense and other
agencies of the Government who are concerned with our military
posture and the political relationships arising out of this military
posture.
The establishment of huge civilian research firms manned, not by
? men trained in military techniques and security requirements, but by
theorists and writers not qualified by experience to delve in the eso-
teric knowledge of national security problems, has been seen with
alarm both by portions of the public and by some professional military
authorities. To use a popular word, Liberty Lobby believes the Arms
Control Agency is guilty of creating the proliferation of these so-
called experts on disarmament.
Peace is a commendable goal and all Americans long for it, but
there are those who do not want to achieve peace by jumping at the
first carrot offered suddenly by Mr. Khrushchev. Unfortunately, we
have come to the reluctant conclusion that the heads of the U.S. Arms
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Control and Disarmament Agency are naive or woefully blind to the
dangers involved in seeking disarmament agreements with the Soviets
since it was just last October that the Communists almost pulled
another "Pearl Harbor" via the Red missiles in Cuba.
Have our disarmament leaders already forgotten this attempted
treachery by Mr. K.? Liberty Lobby thus believes that this it not
the time for disarmament but for better national security measures.
If this be true, then there is no justification for such research in the
name of peace but rather more should be allocated to the means of
maintaining our national vigilance. We are for world peace, but
not at the price of giving up some of the sovereign rights of Americans
and we earnestly believe that if the general disarmament proposals
which we offered at Geneva and which were the result of the research
and work of our Arms Control Agency were adopted, we would lose
some of these rights.
It is of fashion today for many to label those who believe in national
sovereignty as "rightists" but all through the history of the 18th and
19th century America this same view, so different than the new "one
world" view in sovereignty, was called national patriotism. Believ-
ing as we do in national sovereignty, we reject the basic proposals of
the Disarmament Agency which would require eventual surrender of
some if not all of our national sovereignty.
However, apart from these basic differences of approach to peace
and national strength, we must realistically accept the fact that the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is in existence. It is
our hope that during the probable short span of bureaucratic life
Congress will maintain vigorous control of its functions and
adminstration.
Therefore, although we would prefer a more drastic curtailment of
the Agency, Liberty Lobby urges your committee to adopt the pro-
visions of S. 777 and reject all efforts which would permit either
open-end financing or a larger annual appropriation during the next
2 fiscal years.
Also,
although we recognize that Liberty Lobby's views on this
subject probably do not reflect the views held by many on your com-
mittee, we dro urge your earnest consideration of the arguments pre-
sented in this short brief.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Wood.
Mr. Wood, in your first paragraph, second sentence, you say, "It is
our hope that your committee will recommend the adoption of S.
777, as it came from the Senate, which limits expenditures of the
Agency to $10 million for each of the next 2 years." Down at the
bottom of the page, after you make this recommendation, I see you
cut that $10 to $5 million.
Mr. WOOD. We would prefer $5 million. If we can't get 5, we will
take 10.
Chairman MORGAN. You make a recommendation up here for $10
million, and, when you get to the bottom of the page, you recommend
only $5 million.
Mr. Wool). I suppose we thought it over when we came down the
page. As I say, we would probably abolish the Agency altogether.
But that seems rather unlikely.
Chairman MORGAN. I see you raise serious objection because this
Agency is staffed by civilians instead of military.
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129
Mr. WOOD. Yes, sir.
Chairman MORGAN. Then we should have a general as Secretary
of Defense, according to your idea; instead of a civilian?
Mr. WOOD. As Secretary of Defense?
Chairman MORGAN. Perhaps we should dismiss Mr. McNamara,
and put in some retired general?
Mr. WOOD. I could think of several generals; yes, sir, that I would
like to see as Secretary of Defense.
Chairman MORGAN. Have you gone over the hearings on the origi-
nal bill creating this Agency in 1961, and noted the military men that
testified in favor of the Agency?
Mr. WooD. I wasn't in Washington at that time.
Chairman MORGAN. Would you consider General Eisenhower a
pretty good soldier?
Mr. WOOD. I think he is a good man.
Chairman MORGAN. I want to read his statement in support of the
Disarmament Agency. Here is what he said:
While any progress toward real disarmament can be achieved only where
the opposing sides genuinely pursue the ideal of peace, yet it is futile to specu-
late as to whether progress toward peace or disarmament should take priority
in such effort. It is clear that they must progress in step-by-step coordina-
tion, as otherwise nothing will be accomplished.
He sent a letter to this committee strongly endorsing this state-
ment. General Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in 1961, and appeared before the committee in support of the
Agency. Many others submitted statements.
This legislation was strongly supported by the former Secretary
of Defense during the Eisenhower administration, Secretary Tom
Gates, who appeared here and testified on behalf of this Agency.
Mr. WOOD. You mean no military people appeared before your
committeee in opposition?
Chairman MORGAN. Not a single one.
Mr. WOOD. I have read some statements by various generals, rank-
ing officers, in opposition to it. I don't know whether they appeared.
I wasn't here.
Chairman MORGAN. Do you remember who the generals were?
Mr. WOOD. I remember General MacArthur, which I think is in
my office, in opposition to the Arms Control Agency. I consider
him a good general.
Chairman MORGAN. I consider him a good general. I am not aware
of his statement. I would appreciate your mailing a statement of his
views on disarmament to me.
Mr. WOOD. I will.
Chairman MORGAN. I have never seen any published statement by
General MacArthur opposing the Disarmament Agency.
The vice presidential candidate, and former Ambassador to the
U.N., Henry Cabot Lodge, also appeared here and testified for this
Agency in 1961. So I think both military and civilian, from both
administrations, supported this Agency. There wasn't a single wit-
ness, as far as I can remember, that appeared against this Agency
during the original bearings in 1961:
Mr. WOOD. Since they didn't appear
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130 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Chairman MORGAN. These are the first hearings that we have had
since the original legislation was considered. I do not remember
any witnesses in opposition at that time.
Mr. Broomfield.
. Mr. BROOMFIELD. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. MthipHY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley?
? Mr. IITHALLEy. Thank :s7ou, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wood, how many members does the Liberty Lobby have?
Mr. WOOD. We don't call them members. We call them subscribers.
They subscribe to our monthly legiSlative report. We have approxi-
mately 30,000 over the entire country.
Mr. WHALLEY. How do you know what to put in this brief, and
who does prepare it?
? Mr. WOOD. We have a research director who prepares a great deal
of our material. He worked on this. We had some help from Mr.
Stanley Andrews, who is Executive Director of the Americans for
National Security. Our organization is primarily concerned in this
work and?of your Mr. Burleson's resolution.
- Mr. WHALLEY. 30,000 members. Is there a membership fee?
Mr. Wool). Yes, sir.
Mr. WHALLEY. What would be your complete budget?
.Mr. WOOD. For this year, it will exceed $100,000. I am not sure of
the exact amount.
Mr. WHALLEy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
.Mr. WOOD. I would estimate $110,000.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.
Mr. GROSS-. Mr. Wood, I think you are probably right in your last
statement with respect to the money, more nearly right, let me put it
that way, in suggesting $5 million annually for this Agency. If I had
my way, it would be shaved considerably below $5 million a year.
Mr. Wool). I would be happy to amend our record.
Mr. GROSS. The chairman speaks of the generals who testified in
behalf of this legislation. I suspect that the generals are interested in
arms control more than they are in disarmament. I will say to the
chairman that the Defense Department is interested, 365 days a, year,
in arms control, the control of enemy arms. That is their business
over there.
Chairman MORGAN. They are also interested in disarmament, Mr.
Gross.
Mr. GROSS. They are interested especially iii the control of enemy
arms. That is their business. That is why some of them object as
strongly as they can without being decapitated to this so-called limited
test ban treaty.
Chairman MORGAN. I can't agree with that. I do not believe that
any general who testified on this matter did not state his own views.
Mr. GROSS. I have, always wished we might have had some generals
at Potsdam and Yalta?generals who would speak their minds. No
one spoke out against the establishment of West Berlin as an island,
isolated and strategically impossible of defense. I am surprised we
had no generals there who would speak out in protest. Of course, we
had one in the person of General MacArthur who spoke his piece about
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Yalu, the pursuit of the Communists, the conduct of the Korean war,
and they lopped off his head; a Democrat President lopped off his
head. So it goes.
They can go to a certain point?generals and admirals?and they
quickly find themselves stretched out on the guillotine.
Chairman MORGAN. We had a great general in Europe at that time
and he was elected President.
Mr. Gkoss. That is one of the reasons why I, as a Republican, was
not one of his most enthusiastic supporters. I am perfectly willing
to have that on the record. He was one of those who didn't speak out,
along with President Truman, in the final settlement at Potsdam,
when and where we were outfoxed by the Communists to the point
that it cost us a billion dollars to operate the Berlin airlift, and it
has cost us heavily ever since because of that blunder.
I don't care to pursue that any further.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson.
Mr. THOMSON. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Wood.
The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock Tuesday morning.
(Whereupon, at 11 :20 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Tuesday, September 17,1963.)
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ACT
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1963
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON-FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.0 .
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room
1-1-3222 the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.
Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.
The committee meets this morning in continuation of the hearings
on legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of
1961. Our first witness this morning is Mr. Stanley M. Andrews,
executive director of Americans for National Security.
Mr. Andrews, you have a prepared statement and you may proceed,
sir.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY M. ANDREWS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AMERICANS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. ANDREWS. *Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name
is Stanley Andrews: I am registered as a lobbyist for Americans for
National Security. My personal background includes work in both
religious and newspaper fields, also 10 years in State government
work, including a year as executive secretary of the Governor's Ad-
visory Council on Nuclear Energy, followed by four and a half Years
as research' assistant for a U.S. Senator. Since then I have engaged
in public relations work. . ?
I represent today Americans for National Security, which was
organized and incorporated early this year to provide a means by
which patriotic groups of all persuasions interested in national de-
fense problems and a strong national defense system could be alerted
to current issues in the field. We do not seek memberships and have
relied largely on the good will of friends.
Up to now, our most important function has been to interest citi-
zens and the Congress in the need for passage of the Burleson-Curtis
resolution. As a byproduct, we recently generated some interest in
amendments to S. 777 which were subsequently adopted in part by
the Senate. We issue no newsletter and have printed only two items
dealing with the Burleson-Curtis resolution. We work largely with
various patriotic groups through correspondence and by contacts
here on the Hill.
No one can quarrel with the administration's objective of seeking
peace. This has been the quest of the last 25 years. We all want it
for our children, but some of us do not want it on a "peace at any
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134 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
price" basis. We do not want it at the price of weakening or losing
our own national security and sovereignty. This is the general
philosophy of AFNS.
Americans for National Security is opposed to the administration
bill which provides some $15 million for the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency for each of the next 2 years. It is our hope that
your committee will adopt rather the provisions of S. 777 as finally
passed by the Senate, and which limits the expenditures of the Agency
to the sum of $10 million for each of the next 2 fiscal years.
We commend the bill adopted by the Senate since it does not make
A.CDA a permanent agency. It is our belief that the research work
and the negotiations needed for any general disarmament plan can
best be accomplished by and under the direction of the Department
of Defense.
We would, incidentally, urge your committee to review and examine
the type and need for the present and proposed research contracts of
the Agency.
AFNS believes that efforts to seek peace are essential in the thermo-
nuclear age. Those engaged in such a serious pursuit, however, should
not be spending their time in efforts to build up a new Federal bu-
reaucracy whose objectives are not even foreseeable in the next two
decades.
We believe that such necessary research rightfully belongs in the
custody of the men at the Pentagon who know best the military and
economic strategies of the enemy and are indoctrinated with a philos-
ophy of "winning."
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency evidently pro-
ceeds on the basis that an arms race inevitably results in a war.
Actually most modern students of history will admit it is difficult to
point to a single war that was a direct outcome of an arms race.
The Agency in many statements has talked about "world opinion
and the need to satisfy the uncommitted nations." It has well. been
said that "security policies cannot be determined by a world Gallup
poll." Instead AFNS believes that the United States instead of al-
ways adjusting to world opinion needs to take strong positions with-
out seeking a momentarily widespread popularity.
AFNS believes this Agency is committed to types of unilateral dis-
armament under the guise of 'economy" and that its research reports
tend to build cloud castles of world government contrary to American
traditions.
AFNS is also opposed to the adoption of the new subsection 45(b)
as proposed. We do not believe ACDA should be granted a waiver on
the provisions that research contractors must have a full-field investi-
gation by the FBI or the Civil Service Commission before being
allowed access to classified materials. AFNS firmly believes any
agency concerned with the problems of peace and war, defense and
security, should maintain the strictest. type of preemployment
investigation.
Actually, we hold that the Agency should be abolished and its re-
search functions placed more properly in the Defense Department.
Being realists, however, we accept the practical position which is the
reducing of the powers and functions of this Agency and the curtail-
ment of a policy of fiscal irresponsibility which the administration bill
would continue.
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An examination of the annual report Of the Agency gives some little
indication of the use of the Agency's funds for domestic propaganda
purposes; that is, to sell the Agency and its objectives to the Amer-
ican public. Congress has always frowned on Government agencies
using appropriated tax funds to "hard sell" the citizenry of the -United
States.
For the size of the Agency, it has exercised unusual public relations
activity both in the Halls of Congress and in the various communica-
tion channels of the Nation. S. 777 recognizes this danger and a proper
safeguard was adopted. This amendment was commended by Senator
Fulbright.
We recommend your consideration of the language of S. 777 for all
of the above reasons and for the additional reason that the Lansche
amendment, which eliminated some objectionable wordage on the sub-
ject of securing the advice and consent of the legislative branch for
any proposed treaties' is essential to maintain the necessary checks-
balance system of our Government. This amendment contains similar
language to the Burleson-Curtis resolution which is also before your
committee.
For all of these reasons we urge your committee to accept the
Senate bill as it comes to you, without changes, except for the security
provision which we pointed out earlier. The security provision should
remain most stringent since security of the Nation depends on these
employees in a large part.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I reiterate our basic position.
AFNS does not believe in the necessity of an ACDA nor any financing
of such an agency, but since we recognize its existence on the bureau-
cratic scene, we believe its services can be better utilized by absorption
of the Agency into the Department of Defense. We hope that in the
future some further study of this suggestion may be made by those
interested in national security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews, you say your organization is a recent one. Was it
incorporated last year?
Mr. ANDREWS. NO; this year.
Chairman MORGAN. Are you the head of the new organization?
Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.
Chairman MORGAN. How many members does it have?
Mr. ANDREWS. We do not have members. The organization was
conceived by a number of people interested in this field and after we
determined our position, which eventually became what is now called
the Burleson-Curtis resolution' then we contacted various retired mili-
tary men around the country, had them endorse it, and we have been
working since on that basis.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Andrews, of course the Lausche amend-
ment is already incorporated in S. 777.
Mr. ANDREWS. That is right; we commend that.
Chairman MORGAN. Am I to understand that you endorse the pres-
ent bill, because of the Lau.sche amendment?
Mr. ANDREWS. No, no; not necessarily. We commend it because
we feel that the original bill, as you are well acquainted with, pro-
vided for open-end financing. Then in the committee there was an
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agreement that it would be $15 million per year for the next 2 years,
and then on the floor of the Senate that was further reduced to $10
million a year.
We feel that since that $10 million for each of 2 years represents
a .100-percent increase in your original appropriation that the $10
million for each of the 2 years is a compromise in favor of the Agency.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Andrews, how did your organization arrive
at an opinion that the Agency should be transferred to the Depart-
ment of Defense? How would you arrive at an opinion on any issue?
You say you have no members.
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I think as I first stated, Dr. Morgan, a group
of us who are generally interested in military problems?we do not
pretend to be experts in the field?reached an agreement that this was
our position.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Andrews, are you familiar with the hear-
ings in 1961 when this Agency was created?
Mr. ANDREWS. I was on the staff of Senator Lausche at that time.
Chairman MORGAN. You are aware, of course, that some very promi-
nent military men testified on behalf of this Agency.
Mr. ANDREWS. That is right, there is no question, but I think I
could at the same time, Dr. Morgan, cite a number of military men
who presently would not agree with it.
Chairman MORGAN. You agree that General Eisenhower was a great
general; don't you?
Mr. ANDREWS. That is a matter of opinion. i happen to be a
Democrat and I am not so willing to say that.
Chairman MORGAN. Well, I think he was a great general. He en-
dorsed this Agency. General Lemnitzer, who was then Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961, testified before this committee on
behalf of this Agency.
Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Morgan, we just had an example?and I hope I
am not presumptuous in citing this to you with your many years of
experience here?but we certainly have had an example on the other
side in the hearings on the treaty where high military men undoubtedly
had .their arms twisted to come to an agreement that the administra-
tion wants.
Chairman MORGAN. I can't believe that any man who accepts the
responsibility of being Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the
head of the Navy or head of the Marines?I would hate to think that
all of our recognized military leaders that we are depending on for
our security could have their aims twisted so that they would not
do what they thought was in the best interest of our country.
Mr. ANDREWS. They are employees per se, and you do not argue
with your boss up to a certain point. I can remember many occasions,
if I could make a personal remark, when the Senator and staff would
discuss some issue and then there was a point where he said, "But
this is my viewpoint," and at that point we naturally were the loyal
employees who followed the boss' thinking.
Certainly it is most reasonable to consider these men?when a man
disagrees with any administration, a military man, he loses his job.
Now certainly Admiral Anderson has lost his job for disagreeing with
the administration.
Chairman MORGAN. I don't think he lost his job. I think he got a
promotion.
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Mr. ANDREWS. Oh, no; he even took a cut in salary, as I recall.
Chairman MORGAN. He may have gotten a raise in salary. A gen-
eral doesn't make as much as our top ambassadors.
Mr. ANDREWS. I Sall not sure about that.
Chairman MORGAN. Well, being made Ambassador to an important
country like Portugal is not a demotion.
Mr. ANDREWS. You wouldn't want to bet that he will be Ambassador
12 months from now.
Chairman MORGAN. I don't know. It depends upon what kind of
job he does. He is in a very important country. He had a lot of ex-
perience in dealing with foreign governments. I think it was a good
appointment.
Mr. ANDREWS. I think it was a fine appointment.
Chairman MORGAN. I don't think there was anything wrong in his
differing with the Secretary of Defense. He didn't differ with the
President.
Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.
Chairman MORGAN. I can't understand why this Agency should be
put over in the Department of Defense.
Mr. ANDREWS. Can I explain why I think so?
Chairman MORGAN. Sure.
Mr. ANDREWS. Beyond what I have said here, I think this, Mr.
Chairman: The problems that are involved in any disarmament
scheme are technical problems involving military strategies, military
requirements, military technology, and I think the only men who are?
and this is a matter of opinion, naturally?but it is my personal opinion
that it takes men who, from the time they were a plebe at West Point
to the time that they are a member of the Joint Staff, to get the back-
ground, the experience, so that they can make value judgments.
Frankly, I read a few of the research reports that have come out
of the Agency and I think a fair judgment is that some of them do not
have the technical background. They do not have these years of ex-
perience in viewing these subjects from a military viewpoint, and you
get into a situation of using the old derogatory term, we have "egg-
heads" coming out with theories and they are not given then the
proper review over at the Department of Defense.
That is an opinion. Certainly I would like to see peace, Dr. Morgan.
I have five children; I have a real concern for peace. I have a boy in
college who will be going into the armed services. I realize those
problems. I am a clergyman. Certainly I am for peace. But I am
not for peace at the risk of all of our security and I feel that civilians
are not competent to judge these technical problems of security.
Chairman MORGAN. The President is a civilian and he is the Com-
mander in Chief.
Mr. ANDREWS. The President has available to him all of the re-
sources of technical information. I am not quarreling with the Presi-
dent. I am quarreling at this point only with the Agency.
Chairman MORGAN. I think that to put the Agency in the Depart-
ment of Defense is in a sense going in the opposite direction. Its job
is not to focus on disarmament. We need an agency to work on dis-
armament.
Mr. ANDREWS. But Dr. Morgan, you say that the Department of
Defense has gone in the opposite direction. I disagree with you, be-
cause I believe that a strong defense setup of a country guarantees
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138 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
the peace of the country. If we have a strong defense, no one is going.
toattack us, not even the Soviets.
Chairman MORGAN. There are countries in Latin America where a
strong military system has maintained military dictatorships.
Mr. ANDREWS. I would never want to see that.
Chairman MORGAN. You would never want to see it, but we have
always recognized the importance of civilian control over the military
in this country.
Mr. ANDREWS. You still have the civilian controls. You have a
civilian Secretary, and then he is directly responsible to the Com-
mander in Chief, who is a civilian.
Chairman MORGAN. A civilian Secretary of Defense, Secretary
Gates, testified in 1961 on behalf of this legislation. Former President
Eisenhower issued a very strong letter.
MT, ANDREWS. I read it.
Chairman MORGAN. Former Secretary of State Christian Herter?
these people all supported the creation of the Agency?General
Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, two members of the
Atomic Energy Commission.
MT. ANDREWS. Isn't it rather difficult, Dr. Morgan, to be against
something that seems as simple as being against sin? It is like the
Senators who are now saying we can't vote against the treaty because
it looks like then we are voting for radioactive fallout for all of the
children in the United States.
Chairman MORGAN. How does your organization stand on the
treaty?
Mr. ANDREWS. I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Com
Mittee in opposition.
Chairman MORGAN. You testified in opposition?
Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Broomfield.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
? Chairman MORGAN. MT. Zablocki.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I regret that I was a bit late. I
am reading the statement of Mr. Andrews. I have no questions at
this time.
? Chairman MORGAN. MT. Fountain.
Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I was otherwise tied up
and couldn't get here earlier. Do I understand Mr. Andrews is
testifying concerning the Burleson resolution?
Chairman MORGAN. No; he testified in support of the Senate bill
that includes the Lausche amendment, which is similar to some of the
provisions of the Burleson resolution.
Mr. FOUNTAIN. You mean a bill the Senate has passed?
Chairman MORGAN. A bill the Senate has passed includes the
Lausche amendment. It deals with one of the purposes of the
Burleson resolution.
? Mr. FOUNTAIN. Well, I haven't had a chance to analyze the amend-
ment so I don't have any questions. I will say that when we passed
this bill, ? the House adopted an amendment which I proposed. It
was designed to do what I understand the Burleson amendment is
now attempting to reemphasize and maybe what the Senate has done.
I don't know. Personally - I am not opposed to anything that will
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strengthen this country or will make it necessary that proper con-
stitutional consultation be had between the President and the Congress,
but this amendment which I proposed?I don't have it here?pro-
hibited unilateral action on disarmament except in compliance with
the Constitution of the United States or by affirmative action of both
Houses of the Congress. Here is the proviso which I offered and
which was adopted.
Of course there were some other amendments:
Section 33. The Director is authorized and directed to prepare for the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such other Government agencies
as the President may determine, recommendations concerning U.S. arms control
and disarmament policy : Provided?
and this proviso was inserted here because it seemed to be one of the
best places to put it, and for no other reason?
Provided, however, that no action shall be taken under this?
and get this next language?
or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce,
or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant
to the treatymaking power of the President under the Constitution or unless
authorized by further affirmative legislation of the Congress of the United
States?
and in view of the authority, of course, of the President, as Commander
in Chief, that was the strongest language I could think of at that
particular time, and since then I haven't seen any which I think is
any stronger, although if there is any way we can improve the arms
control legislation to prevent what I had in mind in that amendment,
I would support it, even if it is simply adding repetitious language
to the legislation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to comment that we are aware of the
Congressman's amendment. And that we found ourselves agreeing
with most of it, except, Mr. Congressman, we felt that under the Con-
stitution only the Senate should have the right and, therefore, the
Lausche amendment provided for a change in the language.
The present language I believe reads that a treaty shall be by
advice and consent of the Senate or by other affirmative action of the
Congress, and it was our feeling that that "other affirmative actionof
Congress" was not constitutional, since the Constitution clearly says
that only the Senate?frankly, I wish
. Mr. FOUNTAIN. Well, it depends upon what you are talking about.
It depends upon whether or not the action of the President might be
construed as not coming within the constitutional provision and maybe
not requiring a ratification of the Senate. That is why I wanted to
be sure if any such thing did happen that the President would have to
come to the whole Congress for affirmative action if he didn't have
to come to the Senate.
You have the protection of the requirement of confirmation by the
Senate, but if it is something that does not come to the Senate there
might be some debate as to whether or not it requires consent of the
Senate, then the Executive would have to come and get affirmative
action of the whole Congress. That was the purpose for the language
including the House. If it's a treaty, naturally, it would go only to
the Senate; but if any such action is taken which does not require
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J 40 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Senate confirmation, then I wanted affirmative action by the whole
Congress.
Mr. ANDREWS. We are concerned that there will be further disarma-
ment steps taken by Executive order which would not come under
the purview of the treaty and I think the committee should consider
that problem very closely. Certainly the treaty is merely a first step,
whether you agree that it is good or bad. It is a step forward in the
field of disarmament, and certainly other steps are going to come
along.
Now, unless these other stops are written in the form of treaties,
and there is nothing that says they will be, it is quite possible that
further steps in disarmament will be taken through Executive order,
Executive agreement.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Broomfield.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. The gentleman mentioned earlier that he was a
Democrat, and he also said
MT. ANDREWS. A Lausche Democrat.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Oh, I didn't know you had a division in the Demo-
crats by different type. The thing that amazes me is your attitude of
not trusting the President. Now I am a Republican. I don't care
whether it is President Eisenhower or President Kennedy, I don't
think either one of the gentlemen would do anything that would jeop-
ardize the security of the United States. You are implying that
through Executive order they might change this Disarmament Agency
and enter into agreements through the executive branch rather than
consulting Congress.
I don't agree with that. Even as a Republican, I don't think Presi-
dent Kennedy would do anything to change the security of the United
States.
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, that, of course, is your opinion, Congressman.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. And I didn't vote for him.
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I did.
Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Broomfield, what we had in mind here?I don't
think it was a question of trust or lack of trust of any particular
man in the White House?it was simply to protect the country in the
event mistakes, errors of judgment, and so forth, were made. Someone
might be in the White House who would go too far on his own in dis-
armament. Under my amendment, if Senate action is not sought we
might insist that the entire Congress must act. Obviously, constitu-
tionally, the House has no say-so over treaties, although I think it
would be a good idea.
I quite agree with you when we have a man who is elected President
by the people of the United States, under the Constitution, he is the
chief foreign officer of the United States. He has control of the for-
eign policy, and when we elect him, if he does something within his
constitutional right which is detrimental to the United States, there
is not too much we can do about it at the time except come up here
and do a lot of talking and maybe passing of resolutions. This area
of disarmament is so important to our country and national security
that I felt there was something that could be done and should be done
to give us a stronger feeling of greater security. Without my amend-
ment, many of us would not have voted for the arms control bill.
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Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Fountain, if you will yield just a moment, I
agree with what you are saying as far as these provisions and safe-
guards are concerned. The question I take issue with is that of ques-
t,
timing the integrity of a President, regardless of whether he is a
Republican or a Democrat. I am merely making the point that I trust
President Kennedy to do what is right for our country.
Mr. ANDREWS. May I comment. I would like for the record to
make it plain I was not casting any aspersions on the integrity of
any President of the United States. Sometimes I think the majority
opinion, even in a democracy, is wrong, but I respect the intent of
people. I see no sinister connotation.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Whalley.
Mr. WHALLEY Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Andrews, I am not sure that anyone has asked how many mem-
bers the Americans for National Security has ?
Mr. ANDREWS. I think as I explained in earlier questioning we do
not have a membership per se. Our function, has been merely to act
as an alerting agency to other patriotic groups.
For instance, we have discussions with the American Legion, Vet-
erans of Foreign Wars, various groups, who are interested, who have
passed resolutions at their national conventions, in this general area.
Then when we see what we think is the issue, we try to alert these
organizations to take some active part.
Mr. WHALLEY. How many members do you think you would have?
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I would say we have an area of influence over
some 100,000 or 300,000 people, through various organizations that co-
operate with us.
Mr. WHALLEY How would an organization like that get started?
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, it is a very easy thing to explain. Last Oc-
tober several aids of several Senators?both Republican and Demo-
cratic, I might say?we had a discussion as to where the Government
was going on this policy of disarmament and we felt that guidelines
were necessary and that these guidelines should be provided by the
Congress, and as a result of those discussions and some studies that I
have made, we determined that we didn't need a new organization in
the field to get memberships and to carry on organization activities,
but we needed an organization that could alert other organizations
already in the field.
Then as a result of that the Burleson-Curtis resolution was written.
I might say for the record that?no, I will let that go.
There were other provisions in the original Burleson resolution, but
the resolution, as you have it before your committee, we felt we could
support and we have tried to get a great interest in it. In fact, I
hope some of you Congressmen have had some letters concerning it.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Will the gentleman yield at that point?
Mr. WHALLEY. Certainly.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Are you implying, sir, that AFNS wrote the original
Burleson resolution?
Mr. ANDREWS. Oh, no, we were merely in on the discussions con-
cerning it.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. There wasn't a resolution prior to the one now filed
that I have seen. You mentioned the "original Burleson resolution."
Mr. ANDREWS. I meant the original draft.
23-197,-63-10
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142 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Chairman MORGAN. It was introduced this year?
Mr. ANDREWS. It was introduced this year.
Chairman MORGAN. I think Mr. Andrews said that he had discus-
sions last October. .
Mr. ANDREWS. That is right, but it was ntit introchiced until this
year.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Then the original draft you are speaking of
Mr. ANDREWS. Was circulated among a number of people who were
interested. Then when the final draft was decided on by Congress-
men we, of course, had no part in that. I think I have had, I would
say, three conversations with the Congressman?very casual ones at
that.
Mr. WHALLEY. I agree with Mr. Fountain, and I also agree with
Mr. Broomfield, the President has the biggest and busiest job in the
world, there is always a chance of an error, and I think Congress
should have something to say about the decisions.
Thank you very much.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. No questions.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Fraser.
? Mr. ? FRASER. Mr. Andrews, you use the word "we" repeatedly in
your testimony. To whom are you referring?
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I am using it in the sense of the organization.
Mr. FRASER. Do you have a board of directors?
Mr. ANDREWS, We have a hoard of endorsers, yes.
Mr. FRASER. Is that published any place that we can have it?
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, on our letterhead. I will make one available
for the record.
Mr. FRASER. I think it. would be interesting for the committee to
have it.
Mr. ANDREWS. I will be glad to put the names in the record at the
present time, if you wish. The members of the board of . endorsers
are Brig. Gen. W. P. Campbell, U.S. Army, retired; Adm. Charles
M. Cooke., U.S. Navy, retired; Adm. Charles S. Freeman, U.S. Navy,
retired; Revillo P. Oliver, Ph. D.; Rear Adm. E. D. McEathron,
U.S. Navy, retired; Adm. J. W. Reeves, U.S. Navy, retired; Col.
F. W. Alstetter, U.S. Army, retired.
Mr. FRASER. These are persons who?
Mr. ANDREWS. Who have endorsed the purposes and who endorse
the policies of the organization.
Mr. FRASER. How large a staff do you have?
Mr. ANDREWS. I am the organization.
Mr. FRASER. How is the organization financed?
Mr. ANDREWS. We made an appeal in May for funds.
Mr. FRASER. You refer in your testimony to the fact that the men
at the Pentagon are indoctrinated with a philosophy of winning.
MT. ANDREWS. That is right.
Mr. FRASER. I gather that you feel perhaps that some of the others
in the executive branch are not. What do you mean by a "philosophy
of winning"?
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I would define it as a philosophy that we are
going to keep our Nation in a superior military position, so that in
case of any conflict we would be capable of winning The philosophy
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which was given in several speeches by members of the Disarmament
Agency at seminars in which they implied that we would be perhaps
better off?it was a theory worth considering?of letting the Soviet
build up their first strike capacity to ourselves so that then they
wouldn't be afraid of us, I think is a philosophy of defeat, and I
think that it is entirely contrary to the thinking of military men at
the Pentagon.
Mr. FRASER. Do I understand then that what you mean by winning
is that we would inflict more damage through a nuclear exchange?
we would inflict more damage on the Soviet Union than they would
inflict on ?
Mr. ANDREWS. I would say my philosophy of winning is that we
would maintain, as President Theodore Roosevelt said many years ago,
a big stick. I am still not advocating a nuclear holocaust, Congress-
man.
Mr. FRASER. I would judge that what you argue is that through your
approach you are less likely to have one.
Mr. ANDREWS. That is right. I do not believe that an arms race
and the building up of arms necessarily means that that is going to
create a war situation. A strong arms force has acted as a deterrent
in the past, and I believe it could still serve as a deterrent.
I think it served as a deterrent in Cuba. Mr. Khrushchev knew
what we had. He wasn't any more anxious for a real war than we are.
Mr. FRASER. Is your committee limited just to consideration of
questions that may relate to disarmament or do you get into other
policies?
Mr. ANDREWS. No; strictly disarmament.
Mr. FRASER. You don't, for example, have any position on our
policy toward Cuba?
Mr. ANDREWS. No, I have not.
Mr. FRASER. Or toward the United Nations?
Mr. ANDREWS. No; I have not declared any, and I would certainly
have to take that up if I did. It is strictly for disarmament and we
felt that the treaty was part of the disarmament picture. ?
Mr. FRASER. You make the statement that you think the Disarm-
ament Agency is committed to types of unilateral disarmament in the
guise of economy.
Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.
Mr. FRASER. Do you get that from testimony or statements of Mr.
Foster?
Mr. ANDREWS. I get that from observation when it is quite obvious
that the Agency has recommended to the administration the cutting
down of various technical forces which would be a. defense for our
Nation.
Mr. FRASER. Do you have any specific report or document that you
could refer to in this connection?
Mr. ANDREWS. No, I have not. Not available here.
Mr. FRASER. Well, could you supply US with some'?
Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, I think I could as to the various types of mili-
tary forces and weapons which in the last 2 years have been denigrated,
and certainly I would assume
Mr. FRASER. These are publications now that the Disarmament
Agency has put out?
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144 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. ANDREWS. I didn't say the Disarmament Agency, I said the
influence of the Agency. Certainly those who are counseling the ad-
ministration are coming out of the Agency.
Mr. FRASER. Is it your statement, Mr. Andrews, that the Agency
is determining our defense policies?
Mr. ANDREWS. I didn't say that. The President of the United States
determines our policy. I certainly think with any administrator, and
the President is the chief administrator of our Nation, he is influenced
by those about him. I certainly know that is true.
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Andrews, this is an important charge you have
made here.
Mr. ANDREWS. There is no charge.
Mr. FRASER. Well, I asked Mr. Foster directly whether he believed
in unilateral disarmament and he was emphatic that he did not. Now
you make the statement as to the Agency is committed to unilateral
disarmament under the guise of economy. Now you say there are writ-
ten reports, but they are not from that Agency.
Now let me ask you, Mr. Andrews, Do you have anything in writing,
published by that Agency that will substantiate this statement?
Mr. ANDREWS. No.
Mr. FRASER. Are you prepared to withdraw the statement?
Mr. ANDREWS. No; because I think if you take up a recent copy of
U.S. News & World It e p ort you will see a fine objective article there
which shows the various types of weapons systems, of carriers for
weapons, and so forth, of systems which have all been eliminated or
dropped in the last 2 years.
Mr. FRASER. All right, sir, and does that article attribute that to the
Disarmament Agency?
Mr. ANDREWS. Well, certainly it is an inference.
Mr. FRASER. But it is your inference. Does the article say that in
anyway?
Mr. ANDREWS. I don't recall.
Mr. FRASER. Then why do you make this kind of charge, Mr.
Andrews? This is a matter that is really important to the national
security and you are charging this Agency with advocating unilateral
disarmament.
Mr. ANDREWS. I am saying that
Mr. FRASER. Don't you think that we are entitled to a responsible
foundation for a statement of this kind?
Mr. ANDREWS. I think I have given one which is that certainly the
administration is taking the advice of the Disarmament Agency. That
is what they are paying them for. That is their job.
Mr. FRASER. Can you show me anywhere where the Disarmament
Agency is charged with the responsibility of advising the President
with respect to the structure of our defense forces?
Mr. ANDREWS. I would have to look it up.
Mr. FRASER. So you have no present knowledge that they have any
such responsibility; is that right?
I have no further questions.
(Discussion off the record).
? Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, before we close?I realize all of
us have limited time?I have reexamined the amendment which I
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offered and the amendments put in by the Senate and I am not so
sure that the Senate amendment doesn't weaken the amendment
to which I referred, which we adopted in the House.
As a matter of fact, I first bad in my amendment, language
similar to that in the Senate bill before us?"in accordance with the
constitutional processes of the United States". However there seems
to be such a divergence of opinion as to what "constitutional processes"
are and as to what authority the President might use pursuant to
some other law, that when I wrote my amendment, I used the language
"no action shall be taken under this or any other law." I referred
specifically to the treatymakincr power of the President under the
Constitution, so as to avoid the possibility of action by Executive
order. We stated that it had to be done under the treatymaking
power, but we added the other language, "or unless authorized by
further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States,"
to take care of any such action as might not require Senate consent
or where the advice and consent of the Senate may not be sought.
There may be differences of opinion as to what "constitutional proc-
esses" are or whether or not it is the kind of document or agreement
which would come before the Senate under the treatymaking power
of the President.
In other words, we got it "under this or any other law" and we
have also bound the President to take such action as is taken, pursuant
to his treatymaking power and not pursuant to his power to issue
Executive orders, as Commander in Chief, and so forth. Consequently,
I am not sure but what the Senate amendment weakens the amendment
we already have in the bill.
Would you think about that ?
MT. ANDREWS. I Would like to. I will take a look at that,
Congressman.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.
Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, sir.
Chairman MORGAN. Our next witness is Rabbi Richard G. Hirsch.
Rabbi Hirsch is a representative of the Commission on Social Action
of Reform Judaism.
Rabbi Hirsch, .you have a prepared statement, and you may pro-
ceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF RABBI RICHARD G. HIRSCH, DIRECTOR, COMMIS-
SION ON SOCIAL ACTION OF REFORM JUDAISM
Rabbi HIRSCH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
am Rabbi Richard G. Hirsch, director of the Religious Action Center,
Union of American Hebrew Congregations. I appear in behalf of
the Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, a joint instru-
mentality of the Central Conference of American Rabbis and the
Union of American Hebrew Congregrations. Other national agencies
which are members of the Commission on Social Action are the Na-
tional Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, the National Federation of
Temple Brotherhoods, and the National Federation of Temple Youth.
/At the most recent biennial convention of the Union of American
Hebrew Congregations, held in Washington in November 1961. 9.
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146 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
resolution on world peace was adopted, which contained the following
statement:
We commend the United States for intensified efforts to achieve universal en-
forcible disarmament and urge that all such efforts be carried forward with the
greatest of urgency and imagination. In this regard, we express gratification
that the U.S. Congress has established an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
to augment and accelerate studies and planning in this field. ?
In the 2 years since its establishment, the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency has justified its existence. Despite meager funds
and limited staff, the Agency has fulfilled the major functions assigned
to it by Public Law 87-29'7 (Arms Control and Disarmament Act).
As the fountainhead for disarmament proposals, the Agency has been
responsible for three negotiation instruments of great significance: An
outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete dis-
armament in a peaceful world; a draft treaty banning nuclear tests
in all environments; and a draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests
in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.
The latter provided the basis for the test ban treaty which, hopefully,
will be overwhelmingly ratified by the Senate within the next few
days. The Agency shared with the State Department major responsi-
bility for the successful negotiation of the test ban treaty and was also
responsible for the formulation of the so-called hot line agreement be-
tween the United States and Russia.
These "first steps," to use the cautious but sanguine language of
President Kennedy, must now be bolstered by preparations for addi-
tional steps. In these preparations, the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency plays an indispensable role.
In this thermonuclear acre' men have perverted blessed discoveries
OW
capable of enriching life cursed instruments capable of annihilat-
ing life?and have reversed the prophetic vision by turning plow-
shares into swords. Yet the massive military power which our own
Nation has assembled has given us no real guarantee of peace and
security. We have established a mighty system of defense based on
deterrence, but this system is not infallible, because it is based on the
following theoretical assumptions which may prove to be inaccurate
and misleading:
(a) The assumption that there will be no irrationality?that the
leader of an opposing nation will recognize that any attack on the
United States will lead to retaliation resulting in the destruction of his
own country. However, in the light of world history, especially dur-
ing the last generation, totalitarian systems of government, which do
not have the checks on leadership built into our democratic system,
have not been renowned for their rational behavior.
(b) The assumption that there will be no miscalculation?that both
we and potential enemies will always be fully cognizant of each other's
intentions. The Cuban crisis was resolved because both Russia and
the United States were to a certain extent informed of each other's
policies and the ramifications thereof. However, in a future crisis,
one of the two parties to an international dispute may not be firmly
convinced that the other will use its total nuclear force. This might
well lead to a full-scale war, even though neither nation originally
intended to go that far.
(c) The assumption that there will be no accident?that no mechani-
cal failure or human aberration will occur. It has been generally
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recognized that there are no foolproof "fail safe" measures which will
guarantee against mechanical failure. And what assurance do we
have that one day a pilot, either ours or a potential enemy's, motivated
by mistaken patriotic impulses, will not take matters into his own
hands, as did the French pilot who in 1957 bombed an Algerian village
without any orders from his superiors ?
An additional factor leading to world instability is the prolifera-
tion of nations possessing nuclear weapons. The more fingers grasp
the nuclear trigger, the more does our security based on deterrence
diminish. The signing of the test ban treaty and its pending ratifica-
tion by the Senate express the conviction of our Government and of
our people that the only secure system of defense lies in the direction
of establishing a disarmed world governed by law. The Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency is a vital instrument for implementing
that objective.
However, the ACDA can perform its necessary functions only if it
is permanently established. To fail to give permanent authorization
to the Agency is to bobble it with uncertainty and to limit its con-
tinuity of staff and program. A realistic evaluation of international
relations requires a recognition that peace will not be attained quickly
or effortlessly. The highly complex problems of disarmament and
arms control are inextricably related to even more complex political,
economic, social, and psychological problems.
The resolution of these problems requires the persistent efforts of
experts dedicated to their tasks over a period of many years. Numer-
ous other governmental agencies dealing with areas of less gravity
have permanent status. Certainly the objective which the ACDA
pursues merits the permanent status that will reflect our Nation's
permanent commitment "to seek peace and pursue it."
Proper financing is likewise essential for the fulfillment of the
ACDA's functions as a vital supplement to other governmental
efforts. The nation which can afford to devote more than one-half
of its national budget to military defense should be able to devote
one-sixtieth of 1 percent of its budget to the ultimate defense?nego-
tiated disarmament. The nation which can afford to spend more
than $6 million an hour, every day of the year, for its military pre-
paredness should be able to afford more than 2 hours a year worth of
those funds to prepare for peace.
I therefore urge this committee as a minimum to restoie the original
request for authorization of $15 million for 1964, and to give serious
consideration to the allocation of "such sums as may be necessary and
appropriate."
Inadequate funds have prevented the ACDA from implementing
sufficiently one of its assigned functions:
The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms
control and disarmament.
At the present time, the plethora of misinformation almost suffo-
cates the paucity of valid information. Civic and religious groups
such as ours have been attempting to fill the void, but we require on both
the national and regional levels the active assistance and guidance
which can best be provided by the physical presence of ACDA per-
sonnel, and the dissemination of more extensive printed and audio-
visual materials.
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148 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Our Nation must begin the process of expending much more of our
human and financial resources on efforts directed toward disarmament.
We have been able to expand our military power, because we have
devoted ever larger sums ($7 billion for next year) to scientific re-
search for the development of new and more powerful weapons. Does
it not stand to reason that in order to regulate and control these arms,
the same scope and degree of scientific research must be developed and
applied?
In the last few years, striking new scientific discoveries have been
made in the areas of detection and inspection. This type of research
must be intensified. It has been especially encouraging to note that
the ACDA envisages the expansion of its research endeavors in the
areas of political, economic, and historical ramifications of disarma-
ment.
We have lived with war, or the threat of war, for so long that our
people, our economy, indeed our civilization, has become conditioned
to it. We must begin now to formulate plans for the reconditioning
of our Nation and our world to peace, in confidence that we can meet
the radical changes which peace may bring in its wake. Science has
taught the world how to wage war. Now science must teach the
world how to wage peace.
Even as we endorse a permanent status and maximum budget for
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, we would direct the at-
tention of this committee to necessary prerequisites for a lasting peace.
Jewish tradition maintains that there is a basic distinction between
the Latin word "pax" which is the root of our English word for
peace?and "shalom," the Hebrew word. "Pax," which is also the
root for "pact," literally means, according to the dictionary, "the
absence of a state of war." "Shalom" means much more?"complete-
ness," "wholeness," "perfection," not the absence of something nega-
tive, but the presence of something positive.
True peace requires more than a balance of power between nations,
and more even than a state of disarmament. True peace requires
international harmony predicated on the well-being of every nation,
and the personal well-being of every individual. It is our fervent
prayer that disarmament will enable us to devote more of our ener-
gies to the elimination of poverty, ignorance, disease, and exploita-
tion?and to the eventual realization of "shalom."
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Rabbi Hirsch.
Rabbi Hirsch, the group you represent here fully supports the Ex-
ecutive request of the full amount of $15 million?
Rabbi HIRSCH. We do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. You feel then that the bill which passed the
other body with a limitation of $20 million over a 2-year period would
impose too severe a limitation on the Arms Control Agency?
Rabbi HIRSCH. I believe so, and I believe the testimony of the
previous witness indicated such.
Chairman MORGAN. Rabbi Hirsch, you feel confident then that the
Arms Control Agency, which was created by the Congress in 1961,
has been helpful? It has contributed to establishing the hot line
and to working out the nuclear treaty that is now under consideration
by the other body.
Rabbi HIRSCH. I think so, and we have been very gratified by the
role played by this Agency. I think it is essential to recognize that
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the Agency is still in a very formative stage and the fact that it could
achieve what it has up to this point is a good harbinger for the future.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Rabbi Hirsch.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, MT. Chairman.
Rabbi Hirsch, it was a very eloquent statement you made. I have
very brief questions.
At the end of your testimony you pointed out that our civilization
has become accustomed to war and the threat of war, and that we
must now begin to formulate plans for the reconditioning of our
Nation and our world to peace.
Is it your feeling that the existence, or the absence of the Arms
Control Agency would affect the reconditioning of our Nation to
peace? Surely if that should be desirable, we could do it with or
without the Agency.
Do you feel that the Agency is going to expedite a trend toward
peace? Isn't the problem really a question of whether the other
side?the Sino-Soviet bloc?is willing to come to some kind of agree-
ment, not whether we have the mechanics with which to develop the
plowshares again?
Rabbi HiRscii. Well, Mr. Congressman, I think the U.S. foreign
policy is in large measure a reaction to the foreign policy of Russia
and of other nations, just as to a certain extent their policy is a reac-
tion to ours. I think it is true that peace will be achieved if each
nation feels that peace is in its interest.
On the other hand I think there is an element of peace for which
we are responsible. Take the problem, for example, of economics.
One of the problems which the Agency is presently studying?al-
though I don't think the Agency has been able to give sufficient atten-
tion to it?is the question of the economics of disarmament.
I understand that one of the areas to which they would like to
proceed is this very serious question of how you achieve disarmament
without disrupting the entire economy of the Nation. It is this type
of problem which it is essential for us to begin to study, and to be pre-
pared for, should further steps of disarmament present themselves.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But do you think that the fact that this
Agency has not yet made any intensive study of the economics of dis-
armament has deterred us from trying to seek some kind of arms
control?
Rabbi HIRSCH. No; I don't think so. But I think that there is al-
ways that possibility. I think there are elements in the country who
would utilize either overtly or covertly the fact that disarmament
might disrupt the economy as a pretext for being opposed to dis-
armament.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't think there is any question that if we
should have peace tomorrow it would disrupt our economy, and any
intensive study would presumably come up with that conclusion.
I don't think that we could really argue that experts would say
there will not be a disruption of our economy as it is presently con-
stituted if we should stop spending at the rate of $50 billion a year for
essentially military purposes.
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Rabbi HIRSCH. But there have been studies already undertaken, and
-incidentally the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has, I be-
lieve, issued several such studies on the economics of disarmament?
and there have been other studies made by private groups as well?
which do indicate how the transition can occur without deleterious
consequences to the economy.
The important element is that we have to begin to prepare for these steps,just as we have expended so much energy in the past to prepare
for possible war.
Mr. FRELINGHITYSEN. One of the reasons there is some criticism of
the Agency is the fact that it is felt by some that it will be used, and
that the treaty which is about to be ratified itself may be used, as ways
in which we will lower our own guard, even though our security is still
threatened. Some feel that if we talk about how we would adjust to
a. peacetime economy, we may believe that. conditions are such as to
make this possible, whereas the other side is only waiting its oppor-
tunity to pounce on us and proceed with its scheme of world domina-
tion.
In other words, I think one of the reasons why the Agency is not
wholly accepted is the feeling that it is leaning toward a softening of
our very necessary defense posture. Not that we don't want and don't
all share your peaceful objectives, but we may feel prematurely, if
conditions and tensions are relaxed, that we can reduce our spending
for military purposes, and do less research in some areas which may
be of crucial importance to our own security.
Rabbi HIRSCH. Well, I think what you are saying is correct, Mr.
Congressman.
- I think many people oppose the nuclear test ban treaty not because
of the lack of intrinsic value in the treaty itself, but because of what
the treaty presupposes for the future, and I am sure that there are
those?just as the previous witness manifested?who are opposed to
anything which smacks of steps leading in the direction of peace
because they feel this will lower our guard.
The United States has to take both- postures and I think we have
done that. That is why I am so convinced of the validity and the
necessity for the perpetuation of this Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. We must take the posture that we are ready for war and we
have to prepare for war, but we cannot neglect the other posture which
is in line with the ultimate objectives and principles upon which this
country has been based; namely, that we want to have world peace.
My premise is that you would balance off the amounts of money that
this Nation has spent, we have spent much more proportionately in the
preparations for possible war than we have spent in the preparations
for possible world peace. A reduction of the Agency's budget would
just proceed in that same disproportionate direction to which too
many people in our Nation may want us to go.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Of course, from some points of view, Congress
is not always logical. "We spend a tenth on our foreign aid program
of what we do on our military program, and yet the foreign aid pro-
gram is in a lot more trouble than the military program.
The fact is that a comparatively small amount for an agency like
this is going to be subject to more criticism than a large amount for
a military agency.
Thank you.
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151
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. ZabloCki.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. On page four of your statement, Rabbi Hirsth, you
indicate the conviction of your group and other civic and religious
groups such as yours that it is necessary to fill the void in the dissemi-
nation and coordination of public information concerning arms con-
trol and disarmament. Can you give the committee specific examples
of your commission's efforts in this regard?
Rabbi HIRSCH. From time to time we have held various seminars on
peace. We represent several agencies, as I indicated in my introduc-
tion, one of which is the Central Conference of American Rabbis. We
have plans for several conferences in the near future for rabbis and
for our lay people as well on the subject of disarmament and peace.
We have had various training sessions to which we have brought
some of the material disseminated by the ACDA, by the State Depart-
ment, and by other agencies of Government.
Mr. ZABLOCKT. The Commission on Social Action of Reform Juda-
ism did not publish any of its own brochures in this regard?
Rabbi HIRSCH. We have one published; that is, one printed pam-
phlet on the subject of Judaism and international relations which
tries to relate the basic ethical stance of Judaism to contemporary
issues in international relations.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. But that question does not enter directly into arms
control. .
Rabbi HIRSCH. It does enter into the subject of disarmament, not
in any great detail, but it does urge that we proceed in the direction
of disarmament.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. What is the publication date of that brochure?
Rabbi HIRSCH. I think 1960. If the question you are asking is
whether or not it referred specifically to the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, it was published prior to the establishment of the
Agency, but it talks about disarmament in general.
Mr. ZABLOCKI.I believe a sample copy of the brochure for the com-
mittee would be very helpful.
Rabbi HIRSCH. We would be very happy to submit it.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ch airman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.
Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hirsch I am very much interested in your statement. Of
course, everybody agrees that world peace is a desire of our country,
but it is very difficult to achieve when you realize that Russia has sup-
posedly broken 50 of the 52 agreements that it has entered into. There
are so many other areas, as you know?Israel and the Arab countries
on a smaller scale. Would you care to suggest how France and Red
China could be brought into this nuclear ban?
Rabbi IhRsux. Well, I would certainly have no statement to offer
that would be authoritative, that is, representing the commission. If
you ask my own personal view
Mr. WHALLEY. Just personally.
Rabbi HIRSCH. I think that it would be very difficult to bring China
into this, to have China affix its signature as one of the signatories of
the test ban treaty, for all kinds of reasons that I am sure you gentle-
men are much more familiar with than I am.
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152 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
As for France, I would hope that eventually, if not now, then per-
haps in the foreseeable future, France would consider it to be in its
best interest to affix its signature to the treaty.
Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Farbstein.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rabbi Hirsch, I want to say good morning to you, and thank you
for a very fine statement. I am sorry I was unable to be here earlier,
but I have gone through this statement of yours, and I want to, as
I said, compliment you on it.
There isn't much I can question you on, except perhaps to repeat,
in a different fashion, some of the questions that have been put to you.
Now the mere entering into a test ban agreement doesn't, of necessity,
in and of itself, mean that there has to be a relaxation of defense,
does it?
Rabbi HIRSCH. I don't think so at all. I don't think there should be.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. We can enter into a test ban treaty and still, as the
President has said, in his letter of recent date, still keep our guard up;
and, as has been suggested, the attitude being manifested is one of
a desire for peaceful relations rather than standing with your fists
raised constantly; isn't that so?
Rabbi HIRSCH. I think so.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. You favor the continuation of this Agency, irre-
spective of the amount appropriated; isn't that so?
Rabbi HIRSCH. We have asked for permanent authorization as our
primary concern.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. But there is nothing definite that you can add to
the question of moneys as such. You take the position, I believe, that
because they are asking for $15 million, we ought to give it to them.
And because we are satisfied that this organization won't waste any
money, yet at the same time we don't want to be niggardly with them,
but there is no basis upon which you can rest a statement that they
should be given the $15 million as such?
Rabbi HIRSCH. Well, our organization would not be qualified to
comment on specific budgets.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. That IS what I thought.
Rabbi HIRSCH. We feel that they ought to be given, as the proposed
bill suggests, "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate." The
only reason why we specifically supported the $15 million was that
that amount was the request which had been made by the adminis-
tration.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. I see.
Rabbi HIRSCH. But I don't think that any private agency outside
Government is really qualified to comment on the specific amounts
without having made the studies.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. That is exactly what I thought, but your main pur-
pose in coming here is because of your feeling that this Disarmament
Agency should be maintained, should be made permanent, because
this is an added means whereby we may be able to arrive at a peaceful
solution for the troubles of the world?
Rabbi HIRSCH. That is correct.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you very much, Rabbi.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.
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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rabbi, do you believe there can be an agreement on disarmament
without Red China being a party thereto?
Rabbi HIRSCH. Again, I want to speak personally and not on behalf
of the organizations which I represent. I think there can be an agree-
ment on modified disarmament without Red China being a party
thereto, but if such an agreement were to occur, the parties thereto
would have to be cognizant of the military strength of China and
should not permit their strength to be so modified that it would net
be capable of dealing with China.
Mr. MURPHY. Rabbi, I cannot understand how any one of the three
powers, United Kingdom, Russia, or the United States, would enter
into any agreement relative to disarmament when China is not a party
to the agreement. The reason I asked this question was because of the
Washington Naval Disarmament Conference that was held in this
city in 1922. This conference set up a ratio of 5-5-3, as to the arma-
ments allowed the United Kingdom, United States and Japan in the
Pacific. It is my understanding that Japan withdrew from the con-
ference taking exception to the allotment of 5 to the United Kingdom
and the United States, and 3 to Japan. We found that with the event
of World War II, Japan, who had not disarmed according to the con-
ference, had greater naval strength in the Pacific than the United
Kingdom and the United States who had disarmed. Japan also
fortified the mandated islands in the Pacific. It was a great awakening
as to Japan's naval power. I am supporting this legislation and believe
that we should do everything possible to work toward a peaceful
existence in the world and be prepared in the event of a disarmament
agreement as to the transition from a war to a peace economy.
Rabbi HinscH. Well, I agree with you, Congressman, that that is a
very important factor and should be borne in mind. I also agree with
you that I think we can learn a great deal from the study of the past.
One of the areas into which I would hope the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency would go, either with its own staff or perhaps
instituting special studies outside of its own staff, is the area of his-
torical experience which I think has much bearing on our action for
the future.
Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Momagan.
Mr. MoNAGAN. Well, Rabbi, along the lines of the last question,
isn't this a somewhat relative matter, however? That is, the military
significance of Red China has some importance, but it is not of the
same scale of importance as that of, shall we say, the major powers of
Russia and the United States in this whole disarmament matter at
the present time?
Rabbi RIRSCH. I would agree. I thought I indicated, in answer to
an earlier question, that I considered the relative strength to be sig-
nificant and that the United States and Russia could enter into nego-
tiated disarmament agreements without in any way impairing their
capacity to deal with a possible future enemy in the form of China.
Mr. MONAGAN. It might be a step in the right direction. We have
heard a lot about that in recent days. It might be moving in the right
direction without having a completely watertight agreement that
would include every nation in the world.
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154 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Rabbi HIRSCH. That is right; I agree.
Mr. MONAGAN. In fact, France provides the same sort of problem
that Red China does in this area, I think.
Rabbi HIRSCH. It is interesting to note, while we are talking about
this subject, that the proverb. upon which President Kennedy based
his "first step" was a Chinese proverb.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fraser.
Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rabbi Hirsch, in 1938, what would have been the most effective
steps that the United States could have made toward peace ?
Rabbi HIRSCH. I think the experience prior to the World War II
period indicates that we have to be concerned about not disarming to
the point where we are no longer capable of meeting our responsi-
bilities in the world. In retrospect I am sure I would have wanted
the United States to have had much greater arms strength in the
1930's than it did possess.
Mr. MURPHY. Will you yield?
Mr. FRASER. Surely.
Mr. MURPHY. Around the period of 1938 or 1939. the United States
passed the Neutrality Act, is that correct? Would you say that was
one of the reasons that European nations began to arm?
Rabbi IIIRscll. There are all kinds of reasons why I think the
European nations began to arm.
Mr. MURPHY. I know, but it created an emergency. Russia entered
immediately into a pact with Germany for self-protection because she
was not prepared at the time.
Rabbi HIRSCH. My
point is I do think we can learn a great deal
from historical experience, and we have to remember the historical
experience.
On the other hand, we also have to recognize that we are living in
a new world which requires other arrangements and I think that there
is one other factor which is especially significant and which was not
present during the World War II period, which is of course the nuclear
force, which rafts war on a completely different basis from what it was
in any experience known to man.
Mr. FRASER. So that as I understand the answer to my question,
Rabbi Hirsch, you feel that the thing we might have done in 1938 tO
contribute to peace might have been to build up our armaments?
Rabbi HIRSCH. I didn't understand that to be your question, Mr.
Congressman.
Mr. FRASER. My question was what policy should this country have
pursued in 1938 to attempt to more adequately have pursued the peace?
Rabbi HIRSCH. If we are speaking in retrospect, I would not neces-
sarily pick the year 1938. You have a rough year there. I would say
that the United States in retrospect should have maintained sufficient
armed strength to be able to exert and manifest the position of leader-
ship which it expected to have in the world.
Mr. FRASER. Is it fair to conclude from what you are saying that
our position of weakness created a condition conducive to the develop-
ment of war?
Rabbi HIRSCH. I think so.
Mr. FRASER. After World War II we disbanded much of our armed
strength. In retrospect do you think that was a contribution toward
peace?
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Rabbi Hinscx. The word "retrospect" is the keyword.
Mr. FRASER. I understand. We learn from history.
Rabbi HiRscH. I think in retrospect it was. At the time, and with
relations between countries being what they were, I think it was the
correct move, and I am not implying that if I had been in the, position
to say something about it at the time, that I would not have done the
same thing we did.
Mr. FRASER. Wouldn't you say, Rabbi Hirsch, that many . of the
things that we do as a country tend to be influenced by a kind of popu-
lar attitude? There is a general belief today that disarmament is a
desirable goal without regard to some of the other problems that may
exist. You have already given us an example where a lack of national
strength may have contributed to the likelihood of war.
Rabbi HIRSCH. I agree.
Mr. FRASER. Wouldn't you say, then, that rather than have the ac-
tions of Congress and the national administration be influenced as
much, by what I would in some respects call uninformed public opin-
ion, that it would be desirable that there be an agency that devotes
full time, attention, and study to this whole problem of disarmament
and to the relationship between our actions in maintaining or fail-
ing to maintain our military strength and the likelihood of war?
Rabbi Hiascu. The only thing I have question with, Congressman,
is the either/or basis you propose.
Mr. FRASER. Well, let's assume that the Disarmament Agency has
the goal of advising the President on ways in which peace can be se-
cured. Isn't it desirable that in the pursuit of that objective there
should be careful professional studies undertaken?
Rabbi HIRSCH. That is what I am advocating,_ and that is what I
think is very important. ? The only question I had in connection with
your question was the seeming implication that somehow or other
public opinion being misinformed as it so often is, its effect or influ-
ence on these proposals might be deleterious. It is not a question of
either/or, but of both/and both experts and an informed public. We
have agencies with experts, but we also have to educate our people,
because if the people do not support our objectives we can't achieve
them.
Mr. FRASER. Well, if we are going to educate our people, we need to
know as much about the subject as we can.
Rabbi HiRscx. Right.
Mr. FRASER. An agency such as the one that is under discussion
may contribute a better understanding of the relationship of arma-
ments to the securing of peace than we have today.
Rabbi HIRSCH. What I am advocating is that this Agency be as-
signed a great deal more funds than it presently has for such study.
It seems to me one of the problems has been that insufficient attention
has been paid to the necessity of keeping the people well informed.
For example, in the Senate bill, section 3(c), referring to the fact
that "nothing contained in this act shall be construed to authorize any
policy or action by any Government agency which would interfere
with, restrict, or prohibit the acquisition, possession or use of firearms
by an individual for the lawful purpose of personal defense, sport, rec-
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156 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
reation, education, or training"?that was inserted in the Senate bill
because of a lack of education or a lack of knowledge on the part
of the public as to what the Disarmament Agency was really dealing
with.
Mr. FRASER. Let's go back now. Twice in recent history we have
disarmed under circumstances which in retrospect made war more
likely. We have talked about the two times. Both of these events
took place without the existence of a Disarmament Agency.
What I am suggesting to you?and I want to see if you concur?
is that if we had had a Disarmament Agency at that time, if we had
had careful technical studies, careful historical review, in other words
if insight into the relationship between armaments and war and peace
had been better developed and this information had been made known
to the Congress and to the people, in retrospect our actions might
have been wiser than they now appear to have been.
Rabbi HIRSCH. I think so, and I believe it is an important point that
you are making and I would wish that view would be more widely
held.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Will the gentleman yield?
MY. FRASER. Yes.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. The mere fact that the committee has a title doesn't
of necessity mean that it goes blindly along a certain alley even though
it finds that that alley is a difficult one and an injurious one. In other
words, as suggested by Mr. Fraser, if it determines that it is in the
interest of our Nation, we presume that they would give us good ad-
vice insofar as armament as against disarmament.
Mr FRELINGEITTYSEN. Would the gentleman yield?
MY. FRASER. Yes.
MY. FRELINGEMYSEN. It seems to me that the Disarmament Agency
isn't likely to come up with a recommendation that we arm. Mr.
Fraser's point seems to be or as I understood Rabbi Hirsch's point,
that if we had taken a look and evaluated properly in the 1930's we
probably would have been building up our armaments.
I don't suppose, Mr. Fraser, you are suggesting that if the Agency
were in existence that they would have been recommending that we
build up. Surely their objective would be to lend support to those who
felt we should be reducing our armaments. The whole purport of this
kind of agency is to develop reasons why there should be a relaxation
of tensions. One of the ways in which you can relax tensions is to re-
duce armaments not increase them.
Mr. FRASER. if the gentleman will yield
MY. FRELINGHITYSEN. You have the floor.
Mr. FRASER. Let me say that the contrast between the proposal which
is on the table at Geneva and the other kind of disarmament agree-
ments we have entered into in the past?Congressman Murphy already
referred to one of them, the Naval Limitations Agreement?the dif-
ference between what we have on the table in Geneva and those earlier
experiments is very important, in my judgment. In the draft treaty
at Geneva, as I understand it, there is provision for a substitute force
controlled by some international agency. I regard this, frankly, as
almost a condition precedent to any meaningful disarmament. We
didn't have any such provision in these earlier disarmament agree-
ments, so when Ethiopia was invaded by Italy, we did nothing. No-
body did anything.
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This is why I say that more insight into the relation of disarma-
ments and political relationships is needed in this country. Otherwise
I am fearful we may go back and repeat the errors of history without
having developed the insight.
That is my view. That is why I think the Agency would be help-
ful..
Chairman MORGAN. Any further questions?
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Rabbi Hirsch would
comment on section 4, paragraph (d) , and I quote:
None of the funds herein authorized to be appropriated shall be used to pay
for the dissemination within the United States of propaganda in support of any
pending legislation concerning the work of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency.
In view of the fact that you said that the activity of ACDA ought
to be more fully understood and known to the public, would you care
to comment on this particular amendment appended to the legislation
in the Senate.
Rabbi HIRSCH. I am not clear, Mr. Congressman, as -to what your
question is.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, Rabbi Hirsch, you have stated earlier that the
activity of the Agency ought to be better understood by the U.S. public.
On the other hand, the proposal. contains a restriction on the part of
the Agency in disseminating information.
Rabbi Hntscn. Well, the restriction, as I understand it, concerns
legislation.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, I am not so sure that that is intended only for
the purpose of lobbying in support of any pending legislation. The
limitation could also be interpreted to mean that the Agency could not
disseminate any information in the United States.
Mr. FRELINGHTJYSEN. The word isn't "information," it is "prop-
aganda." Does that have significance, Mr. Zablocki ?
Mr. ZABLOCKI. That would have some significance. I am not sure
that the Senate report was clear on this point.
Rabbi HIRSCH. I think the. key word is "legislation." For example,
I know that ACDA put out a very fine pamphlet which we did use
and which we did disseminate to our people and which other religious
and civic groups used to explain the provisions of the nuclear test ban
treaty.
It was an informative brochure which some of you may have seen
which set forth questions and answers about the treaty. That type of
information is essential for educating the public in order to under-
stand what is happening in foreign affairs.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Now, the very fact that the Agency had made avail-
able to your committee brochures?would this be considered propa-
ganda? Under the limitation proposed in section 4 on the use of
funds, ACDA would be prohibited in the future to publish such a
pamphlet.
Let me read from the Senate report:
This language reflects the committee's concern over the organized pressures
brought to bear during consideration of S. 777. The committee is fully aware
of the constitutional rights of citizens to petition their Government. It is con-
cerned, however, that tax funds gathered from all the citizens not be used directly
or indirectly to encourage expressions of particular groups of citizens simply
l?,,ause those groups support positions taken by the Government agency.
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158 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
RabbiRsci.i. We are dealing with a complex problem here. Re-
ferring to the specific issue of the nuclear test ban treaty and the dis-
semination of information concerning the treaty by the ACDA, that
Agency performed for us and for the Nation an invaluable service.
The absence of that information would have meant great confusion, I
believe, in the thinking of the populace.
Now, whether or not that type of information relates specifically to
the subject contained here, namely, of Pending legislation, is something
I am not qualified to answer. My own view would be that if the intent
of section 4(d) is to prohibit the Agency from disseminating the type
of information they did in connection with the nuclear test ban treaty,
I would be adamantly opposed to section 4(d).
Mr. ZABLOCKI. I want to join you in your opposition. I believe
that the American pUblic should be informed. Therefore, I believe
the Congress; ought to give guidelines to the ACDA as to the extent
that they may disseminate information.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara, any questions?
Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I regret very much my unavoidable delay. .1 had anticipated lis-
teningto you, Rabbi. I have been reading your splendid statement
and in the underlying thought I am in complete agreement.
I note that you suggest that we should restore the $15 million figure,
and you point out the large sums of money we are spending for arms,
i
and certainly $15 million s a small sum of money to spend for. peace.
I read with interest and inspiration your . statement. You have
made an outstanding contribution to our hearing.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Rabbi Hirsch.
The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 11 :48 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at
10 a.m., Wednesday; September 18, 1963.)
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ACT
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1963
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington,D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room
1-11-322; the Capitol, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.
Chairman MORGAN. Let's come to order.
The committee meets this morning in executive session on legislation
to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Our witness this
morning is the Honorable William C. Foster, Director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Mr. Foster, at your previous appearance the committee requested
that you appear in executive 'session. You have a short prepared
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I thought it would be help-
ful to hit a few of these points before the questioning. I am pleased to
have the opportunity to appear before you again.
I realize that the prime purpose of this hearing is to enable the com-
mittee members to ask questions. However, with your permission, I
would like to read a statement that may clarify some points about
which you are concerned:
When I appeared before you on August 29, I spoke in detail of
the importance of adequate funding for our research program. Softie
of you expressed concern about overlapping or duplication of research.
It was also suggested that some of our research projects should be con-
ducted by other agencies.
Two years ago this committee held hearings on the arms control and
disarmament bill. Many Government officials testified concerning the
need for a coordinated research effort in this field. The creation of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency resulted. One of the four
primary functions assigned the Agency was 'the conduct, support, and
coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy
formulation."
Section 35 of the act authorized the President to establish procedures
for coordinating the Government's total effort in the field of arms
control and disarmament. The President established such procedures
in Executive Order 11044.
159
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160 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
The Executive order was coordinated by the Bureau of the Budget
with the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission,
and other interested agencies. One of the main objectives was to
avoid overlap and duplication in research.
To assist in carrying out the responsibility for coordinating Gov-
ernment research in this field, an ACDA Research Council was estab-
lished promptly after the Executive order was issued. This Council
is composed of the principal bureau and office heads of the 'Agency.
It advises me on three categories of arms control and disarmament
research:
(1) Studies undertaken by ACDA staff;
(2) ACDA contract research studies; and
(3) Staff and contract studies of all other agencies.
My directive to. the Research _Council stressed the importance of
preventing oVerlapping or duplicating research within ACDA and
between ACDA and other agencies.
The affected agencies designated in the Executive order include
the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. These agencies submit to ACDA semiannual re-
ports covering all current or contemplated research projects in the
field of arms control and disarmament.
On the basis of the reports, the Research Council prepares an
evaluation of all Government research in the field. I submit these
reports to the Bureau of the Budget. This semiannual review focuses
our attention regularly on the overall Government effort and puts
us constantly on watch for duplication.
As a further means of preventing duplication in research, we re-
quire Agency officers responsible for individual research projects
to coordinate the substantive scope of each planned contract or grant
with other appropriate agencies. They do this before we request con-
tract proposals for the study. Thus, there is assurance against dupli-
cation of effort as well as an opportunity to improve the subject mat-
ter of the study through consultation with others.
On the basis of the information we obtain through these coordinat-
ing mechanisms, we do research that has not been done and that we
believe needs doing. Our effort to avoid duplication and unnecessary
overlapping is, I might add, considerably more than was done prior
to the creation of the Agency.
Despite the fact that the Agency uses the research 'capabilities and
facilities of other Government agencies to the fullest extent possible,
there are large areas of study Where work sponsored by ACDA is
necessary and appropriate. ?
As Commisisoner Haworth of the AEC told you in 1961:
The bill before you endows the proposed Agency with extensive authority to
sponsor research in its own and other facilities under a variety of conditions.
This authority is necessary. As you know, Mr. Chairman, existing Government
agencies have carried out programs of research in the field of disarmament * * *.
At the same time we feel that not enough has been done * * *.
* .
The new Agency, as the? organization primarily responsible for disarmament,
should have authority to carry on research quite independently of other agen-
cies. This will preserve its independence in cases where a completely separate
evaluatien should be made, and will make it possible to proceed where available
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assistance from other agencies may not be adequate. Even more importantly,
the Agency's own research will provide the core around which the program
can be integrated.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric also asserted the importance
of the new Agency doing independent research:
There should be an arm of Government to exhaust the possibilities of such
measures and to explore their implications with respect to our military capa-
bilities, our economy, and our collective defense alliances. Hence, the need for
a separate agency to focus solely on disarmament and arms control, an agency
which will have no other responsibilities to divert it from these vital concerns.
The establishment and operation of such an agency, under the direction of
the President and the Secretary of State * * should in no way impair the
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense.
If the Government's program in this field is to constitute a cohesive
whole, the research work of other Government agencies must be sup-
plemented. And, in a context of dollar amounts, the $11 million
which we have requested for fiscal year 1964 research is certainly
supplemental in nature. By comparison, the Department of Defense
has spent over $168 million on Projedt Vela alone.
Mr. BARRY. What is Vela ?
Mr. FOSTER. Vela is the activity for research on the detection
means for atomic tests. It is applied to the three environments,
underground, the atmosphere, and space, and the total authorizations
are almost a quarter of a billion dollars now, of which this $168 million
has already been spent.
A little reflection on the character of the arms control problem will
illustrate why independent research by ACDA is required to fill out
our knowledge.
It was suggested during the hearings several weeks ago that there
is a great similarity between the problem of intelligence gathering,
or military reconnaissance, and the problem of arms control inspection.
While this is true in part, it is also true that there are many significant
differences.
Intelligence gathering is accomplished primarily by covert means.
Arms control inspection, conducted pursuant to negotiated agreements,
would not be similarly inhibited.
This means that there are important differences in the types of
sensing equipment utilized and in the potential of aerial and other
reconnaissance systems.
Thus under mutually agreed inspection procedures, there is the
possibility of having overt observers on the ground in the territory
to be inspected. Such observers could be equipped with sensing and
recording devices impossible to use in clandestine intelligence opera-
tions.
Arms control agreements may even provide for locating inspectors
within military production facilities. This type of. observation has,
no counterpart in intelligence operations.
Studies of these types of inspection are not ordinarily pursued under.
other Government research programs. Such studies encompass a
large range of research necessary to fill gaps in our overall knowledge.
We have similar requirements for research in areas other than
inspection. For example, we must understand fully possible changes
in the military environment which would result from formally nego-
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162 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
tiated arms control agreements, and we must explore thoroughly the
economic implications of arms control and disarmament measures.
I want to emphasize this need for understanding the problem of
economic adjustment to steps toward arms control. The problem
sometimes is posed as one without solution. This overlooks the fact
that the United States grew to affluence with a very limited defense
budget.
We have successfully mobilized for war and converted back to peace
several times in the past several decades. We are neither dependent
upon defense spending for our prosperity nor incapable of reorienting
our production base while continuing our economic growth.
This is not to suggest that a reduction in defense spending will not.
create problems. But research and planning can prepare the way
and can help to solve these problems.
Studies in this area are an important part of our projected pro-
gram. Again, we plan to conduct this program in cooperation, and
after coordination, with other relevant agencies, including, in this
area, State and local governmental entities.
Certainly we plan to look to State and local authorities, as well as
to industry and labor, to obtain accurate information on the probable
economic implications of arms control.
I see no useful purpose in delaying investigation and .preparation
for economic impact until disarmament prospects appear more imme-
diately promising. The sooner we do our homework in this area, the
better prepared we will be to cope with such readjustments as may be
necessary.
In addition to our extensive effort to coordinate research work by
all Government agencies in the field of arms control, we make every
possible attempt to utilize existing capabilities. Where studies, capa-
bilities, or facilities of relevance are available, we use them.
If a small addition to an existing DOD contract will provide us
with necessary information, the Agency endeavors to use DOD as
the contracting agent. For example, ACDA has made arrangements
with the DOD to use the computation facility of the Weapons Systems
Evaluation Group in the Pentagon. This arrangement allows ACDA
to benefit from the extensive BOD investment in a facility designed
to analyze different military force postures.
There are also many. cases where a project is of mutual interest and
where joint sponsorship is desirable. In such instances, we may use
the other agency as the contracting agent.
Probably the most important example of such an arrangement is i
our inspection field test program, Project Cloud Gap. This s a joint
ACDA?DOD effort 'concerned primarily with the test and evaluation
of inspection procedures. It involves some considerations that are
not encountered in ordinary military intelligence operations.
To assure that the Cloud Gap project makes full use of all exist-
ing knowledge, however, a Steering Committee, composed of senior
representatives of ACDA, DOD, CIA, and AEC, has been established.
This Committee reviews the Cloud Gap program and makes its
recommendations before any major element of the program receives
final approval by ACDA and DOD.
Most of the Cloud Gap inspection equipment and personnel, as
well as the equipment to be inspected and monitored, will be supplied
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by the DOD. The planning of the program, however, is a joint effort
and ACDA has primarily responsibility for analysis and evaluation.
The detailed planning and support contracting for the program will
be handled by DOD, using both DOD funds and funds supplied by
ACDA. Our projected share for fiscal year 1964 is a little less than
half and amounts to approximately $2.4 million.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that Congress has given
ACDA overall responsibility for research in this field. If necessary
research projects have not been programed by other agencies, it is
our responsibility to pursue them. This is our job, and, to the best
of our abilities, we perform it without duplication and without in-
fringing upon the functions of other agencies.
As former President Eisenhower said in a letter which Mr. McCloy
inserted in the record of your hearings in 1961: .
As we know, negotiation for disarmament is one of the functions of diplo-
macy, the traditional responsibility of the State Department under the Presi-
dent. But we also know that in today's world, the many included problems
in the general one of disarmament are so technical and complex that there is
required a special group of statesmen, scientists,., international _lawyers, and the
like, in order to serve effectively the Secretary of State, the President and the
country in this important field.
With the help of Congress, this is what we are trying to do.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.
Mr. Foster, just how deep do you go into inspection systems? I
notice you mention one here, Cloud Gap. Does your Agency do re-
search on inspection systems?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, this is a major part Of our activity. The
Cloud Gap proposal will deal with field tests in many areas. I think
one of the most interesting of those has to do with something of con-
cern to the Congress at this moment in time; namely, the detection of
atomic tests by the other side. While this program; as I indicated, as
far as research goes, has been under the administration Of the De-
partment of Defense, this I think was because we were not at that
time in business. Actually we are the largest clients of that research
program.
We are also very much engaged in the establishment of procedure
under which they will make their research, and I think have worked
very closely in the laying out of fields which they should devote them-
selves to. This is an executive session
Chairman MORGAN. Yes. ?
Mr. FOSTER. [Security deletion.] We are thoroughly familiar with
the actual detection system in our country and it. is because of our
knowledge of, our contribution to, and the close working relationships
that we have with this, that we have felt confident when we under-
took negotiations on such things as the present three-environment
test ban treaty, depending in this case on our national systems and
without onsite inspection.
The reason we are able to do this is that this system has been op-
erating. We know the results. We have watched these results every
day in finding events that happened around the world and we are
conscious of the solid scientific basis for their findings.
The system, of course, because of the emphasis of the proposed
treaty, is being expanded, as Secretary McNamara has said in his
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164 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
testimony, and this will require additional expenditures to make sure
that in certain environments the presently perhaps somewhat less
than elaborate systems will be expanded to take care of any eventuali-
ties. I refer to such things as the ability to detect in outer space.
This, up to now, has not been a matter of concern because nobody
has wanted to face the expense of testing in outer space, but if we are
concerned with the possible violation of the treaty, it is necessary for
us to actually put into operation those elements of the system which
we have tested thoroughly but which have not been yet mounted be-
cause this was not a condition which required the investment in actual.
field equipment.
So in this way, Mr. Chairman, we are very definitely concerned
with research on the detection systems and have made many sugges-
tions as to improvements to meet the kind of conditions with which
we have been dealing in our negotiations.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.
Mr. Broomfield.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What role did your Agency have in the agreements in Moscow,
Was your personnel present for the signing of the treaty?
Mr. FOSTER. Do you mean the initialing, the negotiating?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Yes. .
Mr. FOSTER. Yes. As a matter- of fact the basis for the negotiations
was the treaty form which we had worked out a year ago in 1962,
which was worked out and iniitiated by our Agency and then went
through the usual process of coordination with the Committee of
Principals and then during many months from August 1962 when we
had tabled two different forms of treaty, one a comprehensive treaty
and one a treaty covering the three environments. We had continued
negotiations at Geneva on the subject and also; as a representative of
the President, in January I conducted negotiations with Mr. Fedo-
renko and Mr. Tsarapkin in New York and Washington and then I
continued them in Geneva starting in the spring.
When the apparent change in state of mind was exhibited by Mr.
Khrushchev in his July 2 speech which indicated the possibility of a
negotiation of this present treaty, we immediately again called a meet-
ing of the Committee of Principals. It was decided that Mr. Harri-
man would be sent to Moscow as the representative of the President in
view of his many contacts with Mr. Khrushchev, but the drawing up
of the instructions, that part of the activity was at our initiation and
done by us, of course with cooperation again of the Committee of
Principals and finally with the President, and when the mission was
selected, my deputy, Mr. Fisher, was Mr. Harriman's deputy. The
scientists who went were our scientists. The interpreter was our inter-
preter, the secretaries were our secretaries, so that we made up some
40 or 50 percent of the delegation and in the drafting committee, Mr.
Fisher was the actual member of the drafting committee that worked
with the representative of the Soviet Union in the final drafting of the
treaty.
The sionino., of course, that was kind of ceremonial. I went along
as a member of the delegation for the signing, but we have participated
in every step of this negotiation all of the way through.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. I appreciate that very much.
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 165
Thank you very much Mr. Chairman..
Chairman MORGAN. Air. Burleson.
Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Foster, in your discussion of the coordination
of these programs may I inquire whether or not in the many other
departments, particularly the Defense Department, but State and
others, you find a lack of cooperation in coordinating these efforts
which you have described?
Mr. FOSTER. No, Mr. Burleson, quite frankly we don't. We have had
the finest cooperation from the members of the Committee of Princi-
pals, which Includes the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the
AEC, Director of Central Intelligence, and various other members,
including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Now I don't mean to say by that that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
always enthusiastic about every proposal we made to look at the possi-
bility of reducing, for instance, the level of forces in connection with a
general and complete disarmament program but as far as willingness
to give us technical information on it, it is of the finest.
We have, as I have said previously, 13 field grade officers on reim-
bursable detail to the Agency, very good people, colonels, captains in
the Navy, and a. vice admiral,?an active vice admiral?heads our
Weapons Control Bureau.
Our scientists have the closest, relationship with these men that I
have been talking about.
Speaking of this, Harold Brown and his colleagues in Defense Re-
search and Engineering Group, and my own personal relationships
with Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Barber, are of the finest as
they are with these other gentlemen to whom I have referred, so that
we do have excellent cooperation.
The President's own interest in this field was evidenced on many
occasions when the Committee of Principals met with him in order
to give him the final recommendations or the points of view which are
in the minds of the various members of the Committee. The Executive
order, which was issued, following the passage of the act, makes it
clear that as Director I have access to the President at any time on
questions of differences between us and the Department of Defense,
always after I have made my position clear to the other side and he in
turn has made his position clear to me.
So this works very well. As I say, there are differences, obviously.
This is a very important, complicated field, and there are differing ap-
proaches to many of these considerations, but it has been a harmonious
and a coordinated activity and I think there is some evidence of this in
the testimony which is being given on the test ban treaty.
It has been thoroughly coordinated through this procedure.
Mr. BURLESON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster, I have only one question, following up what you said
about the nature of your relationship with the other agencies. You
have said quite frankly that there have been differences between your
agency and the Department of Defense. I notice also that you quote
President Eisenhower in your statement.
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166 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
I would like to refer to section 22 of the act which says;
In carrying out his duties under this act. the Director shall under the direc-
tion of the Secretary of State, have prime responsibility within the Government
for arms control and disarmament matters, as defined in this act. .
The quote from President Eisenhower says that negotiation for
disarmament is one of the functions of diplomacy, the traditional re-
sponsibility of the State Department under the President. Then he
goes on to say that the problems are so technical and complex that
there is required a special group of statesmen, scientists, international
lawyers, and the like, in order to serve effectively the Secretary of
State, the President, and the country.
My question is this: How has the relationship between your Agency
and the Department of State developed? Is there a clear subordina-
tion of your efforts to the Department of State? You mentioned that
the Department of Defense and yourselves have differing views. Do
you have different views with the Department of State, or is the Sec-
retary of State clearly your boss?
This language was inserted, if my recollection is correct, so that
there would be a clear chain of command through the Secretary of
State. Is that not so?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, that is so. I operate under the direction of the
Secretary of State, except in the coordination of research functions
within the U.S. Government. In that capacity I report directly to the
President of the United States or in matters of different views I re-
port to the President of the United States.
Now as to the actual way this works out, we, of course, are housed
in the Department of State. We have maintained the independence of
the Agency as such, and we have different offices than they do, but co-
ordinating every day. For instance, in our dealings with the Euro-
pean scene we coordinate with the Soviet desk and the European Bu-
reau. The Secretary of State I see and talk to every day.
He has said publicly that he spends 50 percent of his time in this
field. The papers which he has, the position papers on this field, are
prepared by us. They are of course, commented on by his Bureaus,
but my line to him is direct, and in the meeting of the Committee of
Principals, he is the Chairman of that Committee, and I am a member.
Of course, when we go to the President, he is the man who sets forth
the issue ahd the general results of the discussion and usually calls on
me to outline the details of such issue before the President. On the
organization chart of the State Department there is a dotted line from
the Secretary of State to me, and under me there is this Agency, and
we are shown separately on the organization chart..
So while this is a direct chain of command in the negotiating field
and in the fields in which the State Department has this responsibility
traditionally and constitutionally, there is no doubt that I report to
the Secretary of State, but the orders to my organization come through
me and not through State Department officials at other levels.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I gather from what you say that the relation-
ship is harmonious.
Mr. FOSTER. Yes.
Mr. FRELINGIMYSEN. But there is definitely a subordination on
your part to the Secretary? I am not sure what the direction on his
part consists of. Does he determine whether you should, or should
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 167
not, involve yourself in some matter or whether it belongs to the State
Department ?
Mr. FOSTER. It usually works the other way. We initiate Mr.
Frelinghuysen?arms control and disarmament is a fairly readily de-
fined -phase of international negotiations and in this field it is custo-
mary that we will prepare a position or an idea or create the basis
for a negotiation which then I will usually discuss with the Secretary
in general terms. Then I come back and we put it in further detail,
at which point it would be discussed at an appropriate level with
the Bureau in the State Department, an opposite member of one of
my Bureaus.
Mr. FRELINGEWYSEN. You say your office initiates. Does that mean
you don't have to clear with anybody, presumably the Secretary, before
you initiate a project ? He surely has the power to veto and say, "I
think it would be better for you to utilize available personnel on some
other project."
Mr. FOSTER. When I say "initiate," what we do is we are charged
with the formulation of policy in the fields of arms control and
disarmament. For example, we may in our discussions and staff meet-
ings conceive that in the upcoming General Assembly it would be
desirable to have this sort of approach to a particular item which
might be of interest to the Soviet Union.
We would normally discuss this detail in our own shop. As a matter
of good business we would probably also then discuss it with the In-
ternational Organization Bureau in the State Department., but we
would not allow a veto from that office to prevent my going to the
Secretary with it, if we continued to think it was a good idea..
We would use, however, whatever knowledge was in that other
office to make our idea a better one.
Mr. FRELINGHTTYSEN. But there is no question about the Secretary's
capability to veto a, suggestion which you think is good if he thinks it
is inadvisable?
Mr. FOSTER. Except that I could also take it to the President if I
felt strongly enough about it, but I should state that the Secretary
of State and I have for 2 years had the finest of relationships and I
recall no instance where that has occurred.
Mr. FRELINGHITYSEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Foster.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara.
Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster, I take it if there were any matters in dispute with
regard to policy, the decision probably would be made by President
Kennedy, wouldn't it?'
Mr. FOSTER. If it is a basic decision, and I feel strongly about it,
am sure the Secretary of State would want me to take it to the
President.
Mr. O'HARA. And all of us know that the President would make -
the decision if it were a matter of vital concern.
Mr. FOSTER. Yes; he certainly would.
Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Foster, I was interested in the enlphasis that you
Place on the readjustment of the economy from a wartime basis to a
Peacetime basis, on page 7 of your statement.
Is there any other agency working in the vitally important. field of
readjustment of the economy?
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168 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
Mr. FOSTER. We have, Mr. O'Hara, attempted to generate perhaps
more active interest in this. We have initiated and stimulated an
interagency committee chaired by the Council of Economic Advisers,
with a membership consisting of the DOD, the Department of Com-
merce, the Department of Labor, and ourselves, to have each of the
member agencies of that committee look at the parts of concern to them
in this field.
We have also worked closely with an industry advisory group which
the Secretary of Defense set up consisting of representatives of the
large contractors and our Mr. Alexander, Assistant Director for Eco-
nomics, is a member of that committee. That committee is starting on
field trips to various States in league with the State governments and
the community governments, starting next month, I think, with Cali-
fornia?obviously because of its large defense interest?but will go to
other States, Illinois, Colorado, Michigan, going down the line to
attempt to stimulate at the local level, a study of this.
We have not been satisfied that this has been actively enough pur-
sued. We doubt that it can be done best by us, but we think again that
we can be a catalyst in this to stimulate this approach at levels where
the primary interest resides; namely, in the fields of industry and in
the fields of the local and State governments, and we are hopeful that
by working with the other interested Federal agencies, that this can
he gotten well along.
The interagency committee, to which I referred, meets quite regu-
larly now, and as I say, they have started an active campaign of start-
ing the word to the other levels of government and of industry.
Mr. O'HARA. I noted, Mr. Foster, your statement that the problem
sometimes is posed as One without solution. Now you do not reach that
same conclusion?
Mr. FOSTER. I certainly do not. I think that while the evidence
after World War II?while the conditions after World War II were
quite different than would occur following an arms control or disarma-
ment program; nonetheless there were many similarities. We were
-quite able in World War II by prior planning to meet these conditions
of very abrupt demobilization and disarmament successfully.
You recall we started to plan for the contract termination process
the week after Pearl Harbor, in the Department of Defense, and all
during that period plans were made, the office was established, proce-
dures were all worked out with industry and within the Government
to take care of the situation which would arise when the war termi-
nated.
Also we stimulated and worked with committees such as the Com-
mittee for Economic Development, which encouraged planning at the
community level for that turnover. It happened that I was Director
of Purchases for the War Department at the end of the war, and I am
-aware of the fact that we canceled almost a hundred billion dollars
worth of contracts in practically 24 hours.
You will recall the demobilization of personnel was in the neighbor-
hood of 11 million in the course of 18 months. We were able to meet
that condition.
True, it was a situation where consumer demand had been built up
greatly, but. this was a very rapid process. It was not comparable to
any disarmament problems I can now envisage, but nonetheless we
should begin to plan now for conditions that would occur.
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Mr. O'HARA. How much money do you devote to reseach in the
economic field ?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, it has not. been great in the past year, Mr. O'Hara.
We have an expanded program for the corning year, which, if we were
to get the $11 million we are asking for for research?I think it runs in
the vicinity of a million?I will get you that figure.
Mr. O'HARA. Could that program wisely be expanded?
Mr. FOSTER. I doubt that it requires an expansion in the present
period. I think that the major thing to be done now is to establish
some of these mechanisms, to have some research into the distribution
of contracts, the possible diversion of certain of these to other figures?
I am corrected, it is $500,000 for the 1964 fiscal proposal, but the major
part of it is in the planning field, with some research into economic
impacts on particular regions and we can supply for the record the
title of those particular research projects.
(The information is as follows:)
U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
LIST OF FISCAL YEAR 1964 STUDIES CONCERNED WITH THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
1. "Economic Impact of Specific Arms Control and Disarmament Measures in
the U.S.S.R." (Described on app. 10 of presentation book.)
2. "Effect of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Electromagnetic Industry
(United States)." (Described on app. 29-30 of the presentation book.)
3. "Methods for Analyzing Defense Employment (a Feasible Study)."
(Described on app. 30 of presentation book.)
4. "Regional Case Study (Economic Impact)." (Described on app. 31 of
the presentation book.)
Mr. FOSTER. We have selected as particularly affected by such cuts
the electronics industry so we would make a survey of the electronics -
industry during the year and then these regional studies which I had.
referred to would also be part of the research activity.
We have in the past, as you probably know, published two studies
of the economic and social consequences of -disarmament. One. was
published in 1962 and the other was our contribution to the ? United
Nations study in the fall of 1961.
Mr. O'HARA.. Is all the research in that field without duplica-
tion ?
Mr. FOSTER. I know of no organized. approach to this except that
which we have now begun to study. We had established an advisory
panel on this in 1961 and some of the members of that panel have
gone on and written. individual studies following that experience,
and, of course, the United Nations has TIONV published two studies?
one a country-by-country study and one a general study produced by
a panel which they selected and they used much of our material, inci-
dentally, in both of their studies. -
Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Foster. I apologize, Mr. Chairman,
for going over my 5 minutes.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Barry.
Mr. BARRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster and Mr. Fisher, it is my understanding that you are
before us now wanting a. $20 million authorization for use during the
next 2 years; is that correct?
Mr. FOSTER. We wanted?our request., Mr. Barry, was for an open
authorization, and our budget request was $15 million for fiscal 1964.
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170 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
The Senate passed a bill in which they gave us?they authorized $20
million for 2 years which was less than we had requested, and would
entail a very substantial cut in our research program.
Mr. BARRY. What did you spend for fiscal year ? 1963, just ended?
Mr. FOSTER. $6,100,000, roughly,. and on research, $3,560,000.
Mr. BARRY. So roughly $10 million was eXpended during fiscal
1963?
Mr. FOSTER. No; . of the $6.1 million, $3.5 million roughly was for
research.
Mr. BARRY. SO, $10 million each year, 1964 and 1965, which the
Senate has put in, does represent about a 50-percent ? increase over
the amount expended in the last fiscal year?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes sir. Not?on personnel it would not represent
that much; it would represent about. 10 or 15 percent on personnel'
and would represent on research about a 50-percent increase..
Mr. BARRY. You believe that the Senate bill should be amended to
increase it?
Mr. FOSTER. I feel very strongly that. the reduction from $11 mil-
lion to about $6 million for research will have a real impact on a
research program which is actually just getting underway and is
becoming more and more useful. The first year or year and a half
We had to build our organization. We had to get contractors who
understood this procedure. We .had to develop a ? set of sources and
we are in a position now to take advantage of what has been built and
a reduction to the $10 million has its impact primarily on the research
program and I think quite frankly, as I have expressed before, I feel
very strongly that this kind of investment in this kind, Of research has
the possibility of tremendous payoffs and I therefore am deeply of the
opinion that the interests of the United States would be better served
by a research program which we had very carefully prepared and
which incidentally would be fully useful in this field.
Mr. BARRY. You are holding up on the letting of those contracts
until an authorization 'and appropriation is made; is that correct?
Are. they in that stage of development?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir. We have no funds to allocate for research
at all because the only authorization that we have is $1,669,000 which
is the remnant of the original 10. Therefore we are just barely able
to keep our personnel together and we have not felt it wise. to request
proposals for any contracts except one very small one, which I felt was
so urgent it should be placed in any event, so that this means that for
a number of months that we have been unable?as we were last year
unable?to place any research contracts because of the lack of adequate
authorizations.
Mr. BARRY. 'Would you say that your efforts are being. rather seri-
ously crippled by this lag of time and also the indefiniteness with
respect to how much money you are going to haVe?
Mr: FOSTER. I think delayed, I would not say seriously crippled.
My instructions to the organization are that they are to go through
all of the negotiating process with the Contractors to the extent that
they can on the clear understanding that we do not have the, money,
but we are hopeful of getting it.
However, in view of the uncertainty of course we are not 'able. it,
move ahead, for instance, with such important contracts at a rate that
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I would like to, such important contracts as the Cloud Gap situation
which is a field test of verification machinery and which had in our
program been allocated $2,400,000.
If we are to be limited to the Senate level, I would feel it unwise to
devote that high proportion of our available funds to that contract.
Mr. BARRY. Defense does participate?
Mr. FOSTER. Defense participates extensively and they finance that
particular contract a little more than 50 percent because of their belief
that it would be a valuable thing to undertake.
Mr. BARRY. What concerns me, Mr.. Foster, is all these reports are
made and then you say on page 3 that they are submitted to the Bureau
of the Budget. Just what -does the Bureau of the Budget do about
them?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, - the Bureau of the Budget submission is an in-
ternal audit process to examine, to see whether duplication has been
eliminated.
Mr. BARRY. But. You have already done that. ?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, they just want to check to make sure that we
have. They do not make any substantive use of these reports. Those
are used by us and by other agencies.
Mr. BARRY. Are, they being used?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes.
Mr. BARRY. And are they acting on your studies and the research
tho.f- has been developed thus far?
Mr. FOSTER. Very definitely. In our negotiating we have used a
good deal of this background.
Mr. BARRY. Has there been a considerable saving to our defense
posture or defense budget, shall we say,- arising out of this?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir I cannot say that it has as yet. We have two
agreements which we have negotiated. One is the so-called hot line
which is in operation, and I attended one of the test runs in the -
Department of Defense the other day on this. It is tested every hour
on the hour to make sure that the lines are open, and this agreement
was a development of some of our studies, of means by which we might
reduce the risk of war:
The second agreement, of course, is the nuclear test ban treaty,
in the three environments and the ability to accept this with, in our
belief, full confidence in our ability to detect, is partially due to some
of the research that we did on detection ? systems and seismology,
so there is no real saving as yet, Mr. Barry, but this is contemplated
for the future.
Mr. BARRY. It is contemplated and hoped for?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes.
Mr. BARRY. You say on page G:
We require Agency officers responsible for individual projects to coordinate the
substance and scope of .each planned contract with other appropriate agencies.
Does that mean you have the authority to say to an agency of Gov-
ernment, "Look, this thing is being: done elsewhere and you can't do
it," or does it just mean that you point it out to them and then it is. up
to them to use their good business discretion .in seeing that it not be
done?
Mr. FOSTER. The word "coordinate" is a magic word in Government,
as you know. The process would normally be that we would point
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172 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
out to the Department of Defense that this is something that we had
done, or we thought could be done better in another way, if we had
that feeling.
In the normal course of events there would be a discussion between
our two staffs. It might come up to the Secretary of Defense and me
to decide which of us should do it, or whether it should be done at all;
but the normal process is that if it is pointed out at the staff level,
there is a discussion and one side. or the other agrees that they will
adopt it, we will take it up.
Mr. BARRY. Well, has it actually
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, this has occurred.
Mr. BARRY. Has it worked so that it does eliminate and prevent the
overlapping?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Barry, it has reduced that overlap, I am quite
confident.
Mr. BARRY. You say on page 7 that you must explore thoroughly
the economic implications of arms control and disarmament measures
and in answer to Mr. O'Hara, I think you indicated that some half
million dollars had gone into this.
Mr. FOSTER. Was proposed to go into it.
Mr. BARRY. Well, then at the bottom of the page you say:
We are neither dependent upon defense spending for our prosperity nor inca-
pable of reorienting our production base while contemplating our economic
growth.
That seemed a little inconsistent to me. Indeed, if we are not de-
pendent upon defense spending, why spend the money to look into the
economic aspects of disarmament.
Mr. FOSTER. I am afraid that is a little bit of shorthand on my part.
I meant that our economy is one that depends in the main on other
than defense spending, and while defense spending is an important
element, it is not necessarily the best way to use our economic resources,
and we have in the past, with very low defense budgets, still had a
tremendous eeonomic growth and in that sense we don't depend en-
tirely on having defense expenditures to keep our economy healthy.
Mr. BARRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say for the short
time you have been in existence, I think you have made remarkable
progress.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank yin". -
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Beckworth.
BECKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster, as I interpret what you said, the Agency of which you
are the head works very closely with the Defense Department at all
times.
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, it does.
Mr. BECKWORTH, .When a major judgment that you make in behalf
of your Agency is made, do you think the American people generally
know that that judgment at least has the sanction of the Defense
Department?
Mr. FOSTER. I am afraid that it has failed to have that knowledge
in many instances, and I can assure you I am concerned by that. We
make every attempt to make it clear in every congressional appearance
that we make that these are concerted judgments. They are always
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173
concerted with the Department of Defense. Our law says ? that any-
thing we do must be consistent with the national security and I can
assure you personally that that has been my guiding light for 25 years,
so that anything that we undertake is thoroughly discussed and gone
over with these agencies which also have a major interest in national
security, sometimes from another viewpoint.
We have a responsibility for the dissemination of information con-
cerning our workings, but we have very modest means by which to
carry those out, and I am afraid we haven't done it as well as we
should.
Mr. BECKWORTII. That certainly is my feeling, that there are many
people in this Nation who honestly do not know that major judgments
that you have made in behalf of your Agency are concurred in by the
Defense Department. I believe one of the best things that could be
done would be to try to acquaint them with that fact.
May I ask this: Has there been any primary decision Or judgment
i
made so far by your Agency that has not been concurred n by the
Defense Department?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, I can think of none.
Mr. BECKWORTIT. That is very comforting and I say . again the
American people ought to know that and this administration or the
next administration, whichever party is represented, as I see it, ought
to try to see that there is a greater effort made to see that Americans
throughout the Nation do know that the Defense Department is in on
these decisions.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you,
sir. We shall certainly attempt to do it.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gross.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Foster, you have been asked this question in various
ways. I want to ask it in another:
Do you accept the Defense Department's opinions as to what is
good for our national security or do you appeal such opinions to the
President or to the Secretary of State?
Mr. FOSTER. I don't always accept the military judgment as neces-
sarily being the final answer . as to the things that are good for the
security of the United States. When I say the "military judgment"
mean primarily the strictly military judgment of the military officers.
We have made no judgments which have been accepted by the Com-
mittee of Principals and the other agencies which are members of
the Committee of Principals which have not been concurred in on a
broad basis by those agencies.
The military judgments on some points at the beginning of discussion
have seemed to be opposed to the position which we were recom-
mended but when all of the factors have been taken into account, the
final judgment as to the national security has been accepted by those
other agencies.
Mr. 6Ross. Well, you scarcely answered my question. In the event
of a disagreement, would you go to the Secretary of State or to the
President?
Mr. FOSTER. I would go to the Secretary of State?well, this method.
is that such questions are discussed by the Committee of Principals,
at which are present the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense
and these other officials. If at the Committee of Principals there is
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a consensus then it is easy. If there is a disagreement, I would cer-
tainly reserve the right to go to the President on it if I felt strongly
about it.
Mr. GROSS. All right, now is the Joint Chiefs of Staff represented
in the Committee of Principals?
Mr. FOSTER. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is a member of that
committee.
Mr. GROSS. Was the Joint Chiefs of Staff represented in the plan-
ning, for the Harriman mission to Moscow?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, it was.
Mr. GROSS. By whom?
Mr. FOSTER. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Mr. GROSS. Was there a military man on the Moscow mission?
Mr. FOSTER. NO, Sir.
Mr. GROSS. Why not?
Mr. FOSTER. The instructions were developed by the President's
representative and approved-by the President, and the mission open
ated under the instructions which were developed on this side of the
water. There was no need of a military man there to carry out the
negotiating functions.
Mr. GROSS. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve of the limited
test ban treaty which was tabled at Geneva on August 27, 1962, and
upon which the present treaty is based?
Mr. FOSTER. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was present at the
meetings at which it was discussed by the President and his advisers
and their advice was considered in the decision to proceed with it.
Mr. GROSS. Did they approve?
Mr. FOSTER. I don't think they have to approve in a corporate sense.
The President met with his advisers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
made some suggestions, some of which were included in the treaty
as presented, and the President made a decision that that was the
position of the United States and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
accepted that decision as that of the President of the United States.
Mr. GROSS. But you dont care to answer whether they approved or
did not approve, is that your answer?
Mr. FOSTER. I don't know that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have to
take a corporate vote to approve a treaty. They have appeared at
the meeting of the Security Council the President had with his ad-
visers and the President must make a decision taking into account
all of the advice which is available to him.
Mr. GROSS. Do you personally study the Joint Chiefs of Staff's posi-
tions on disarmament issues?
Mr. FOSTER. I certainly do.
Mr. GROSS. Did Mr. Harriman to your knowledge?
Mr. FOSTER. I can't answer that question.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Foster, in the book "Arms Control, Disarmament
and National Security," edited by Donald G. Brennan, a statement is
made in the foreword by Jerome Weisner, scientific adviser to the
President, and I quote:
If the arms race is allowed to continue its accelerating pace, our country will
have less security, not more, with each passing year.
Do you believe this?
Mr. FOSTER. I do.
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Mr. GRoss. Well, if security is reduced by our building weapons in
the so-called arms race, wouldn't it follow that .our security would be
enhanced by not building weapons?
Mr. FOSTER. It isn't that simple, Mr. Gross. There are a great
many interrelated factors in such a situation and the sheer building
of arms is not necessarily the way to build security.
Mr. GROSS. In the draft treaty on general and complete disarma-
ment referred to as GCD, which the United States tabled at Geneva
on the 18th of April 1962, it is stated under Principles, paragraph
(b) (4) of that?
As national armaments are reduced, the 'United .Nations would be progressively
strengthened in order to improve its capacity to insure international security
and the peaceful settlement of differences.
I presume you concur in this since I refer to a document which was
produced in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Is this pre-
sumption correct?
Mr. FOSTER. That presumption is correct.
Mr. GROSS. Now as the United States and the U.S.S.R. disarm, the
U.N. builds a military establishment in order to solve international
differences, I assume you would say that is correct?
Mr. FOSTER. Again this is an oversimplification. The principle of
this proposal is that as armaments are reduced, other means of veri-
fying, of resolving differences are developed in parallel. As I have
said on many occasions, before a process such as this may progress far,
many revolutionary changes must take place between nations and in
the international institutions which presently are inadequate to sup-
plant such national forces.
Mr. GROSS. Who, Mr. Foster, will control this supreme United Na-
tions military establishment?
Mr. FOSTER. The United Nations, in the third stage of a proposal
such as this, which third stage would be 10 years, 15 years, 25 years,
a hundred years off, I do not know. It will follow the revolutionary
developments to which I have referred. ?
The United Nations would control the international peace force.
It would control it under the type of participation in which sovereign
nations have their Say in that control. It would be also associated
with an improvement in the functions of international law. There
would be international disarmament organizations which would un-
dertake verification procedures to guarantee that people were not
violating treaties undertaken, so what we are talking about is a mas-
sive change in political and personal and human and military relation-
ships.
I do not think this is impossible. Certainly it is a long way off, but
the objectives of our country and the objectives of my Agency are set
forward very clearly in the law to ultimately work toward a world of
stability and peace. I do not think this is a bad objective. To do
that you have got to achieve all of these other revolutionary changes.
These are what are contemplated in such a plan. -
Mr. GROSS. If the ultimate world power rests in the U.N., doesn't
that constitute world government?
Mr. FOSTER. The ultimate power rests in the U.N. which is an
organization of independent states.
i\'fr. GROSS. An organization of independent states?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct.
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Mr. GROSS'. I wonder how the majority?does the majority of the
1.12 members of the U.N. have a tradition calling for civil control of
the military?
Mr. FOSTER. We still have a Security Council.
Mr. GROSS. Well, that is scarcely an answer to my question. Does
a majority of the 112 members of the U.N. have a tradition calling
for civil control of the military?
Mr. FOSTER. I can't answer that. I would suspect they do. I don't
know how big the majority is.
Mr. GROSS. That is a rather civilized concept, is it not, civil control
of the military?
Mr. FOSTER. It is our concept.
Mr. Gitoss. Wouldn't you like to see that as the concept of any in-
ternational military power?
Mr. FOSTER. I happen to agree that it is a good concept. I do not
believe that it is absolutely certain that our concepts of government
will always be accepted by all of the other nations of the world.
Mr. GROSS. Well, that is the danger of this thing, one of the real
dangers of this setup which you have proposed and with which I don't
agree for one minute. Certainly all of us would like to see disarma-
ment, but not on the basis of vesting the military power and the sover-
eignty of the United States in the United Nations or any agency of the
United Nations.
MT. FOSTER. I don't, think we do that, Mr. Gross.
Mr. GROSS. Well, that is what you propose.
Mr. FOSTER. I don't think so.
Mr. GROSS. I suspect I have used my 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman.
would like to come back. I have additional questions.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster, on page 9 of your statement you mentioned that a spe-
cial steering committee was established, made up of your Agency, the
Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central
Intelligence Agency, to assure that the Cloud Gap project makes full
use of existing knowledge. My question is, Does your Agency or the
special steering committee have any knowledge of a test being made
recently in the Antarctic?
Mr. FOSTER. Nuclear test?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, or any nuclear explosion.
Mr. FOSTER. No. sir, we do not.
Mr. MURPHY. All right. Thank you.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson.
Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster, I was looking at your proposal in this green book in
the appendix on page 3, you refer to a peacekeeping panel study at
Johns Hopkins University, at a cost of $87,000. Could you tell. me
who the panelists were in that study, or could you supply the names?
Mr. FOSTER. I will supply the names. I will have to supply the list.
(The information is as follows:)
MEMBERS OP THE PEACEKEEPING PANEL, CONTRACT NO. ACDA/GC-19, WITH
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Arnold Wolfers (chairman of the panel), director, the Washington Center of
Foreign Policy Research, affiliated with the School of Advanced International
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?
?
Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, 1957 to present date; consultant, De-
partment of State, 1960 to present date; consultant, Department of the Army,
1960 to present date; professor' international relations, Yale University, 1944-57.
Dr. Wolfer's publications in the field of international relations include: "Brit-
ain and France Between Two Wars"; "Alliance Policy in the Cold War";
"Discord and Collaboration" ; and numerous articles concerning international
affairs.
Livingston T. Merchant, research associate, Washington Center of Foreign
Policy Research: formerly, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
1959-61; U.S. Ambassador to Canada, 1956-58 and 1961-62; Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs, 1953-56 and 1958-59.
Charles Burton Marshall, research associate, Washington Center of Foreign
Policy Research, 1959 to present date; formerly, member, policy planning staff,
U.S. Department of State, 1950-53; political adviser to Prime Minister of Pakis-
tan, 1955-57: visiting research scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1958-59.
Mr. Marshall's publications include: "The Limits of Foreign. Policy," and
numerous articles concerning international relations.
Robert E. Osgood, professor, American foreign policy, the School of Advanced
International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University; research associate,
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research ; formerly, professor of political
science, University of Chicago.
Mr. Osgood's publications include: "Ideals and Self-Interest in. America's
Foreign Relations"; "Limited War?The Challenge to American Strategy";
"NATO?The Entangling Alliance"; and numerous articles on international
relations.
Robert W. Tucker, professor, political science, Johns Hopkins University,
1961 to present date: from 1954 to 1961, assistant and associate professor, politi-
cal science, Johns Hopkins University; research associate, Washington Center
of Foreign Policy Research 1961 to present date.
Mr. Tucker's publications include: "The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea";
"The Just War"; and numerous articles on international relations.
Paul Y. Hammond, research associate, the Washington Center of Foreign
Policy Research; assistant professor of political science, Yale University.
Mr. Hammond's publications include: "Organizing for Defense"; "Strategy,
Politics, and Defense Budgets"; and numerous articles concerning international
relations.
? Laurence W. Martin, associate professor, johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, 1961 to present date; formerly, instructor in political
Science, Yale University, and assistant professor, MIT. ?
Mr. Martin's publications include: "The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign
Affairs" ; "Neutralism and Non-Alignment" ; and numerous articles on interna-
tional relations.
Mr. THOMSON. What did they do, read papers at that panel?
Mr. FOSTER. No; they had seminars, meetings, read papers, pre-
pared papers, discussed papers. Papers are prepared by members of
the panel and they are discussed by members of the panel in panel
meetings.
? The contract extends for a year and we have real confidence due to
the level of the experience of the members of the panel that this will
be a. very useful exercise.
Mr. THOMSON. Well, could you tell us what specific accomplish-
ments of importance to your Agency came out of this panel study?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, we don't have much to go op this. We have only
had 3 months of this particular contract. Our 96fficers do participate
in these panel discussions and therefore the officers have gained by
exposure to the thinking of these panel members, but the study is not
complete. It will not be complete until the middle of next year but
we have confidence that we will gain from this.
Mr. THOMSON. Now, on page 6 of the appendix, I notice you con-
tributed $14,500 to the State Department.
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178 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
? MT. FOSTER. Yes, sir. ?
Mr. THOMSON. To provide an installment of printing costs on a
State Department digest which was then already well underway and
I- wonder why you would contribute to such a cost.
STATEMENT OF ADRIAN S. FISHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Mr. FISHER. If I could respond to that, Mr. Thomson. This is the
Whiteman edition of Hackworth's Digest. Those of you familiar with
international law know the great role that has had. The question was,
Should we have international materials dealing with disarmament
appear in that digest, in which case the cost might properly be picked
up by us or whether we should have a separate section ?, It appeared
to us quite appropriate that we felt we were in good company if we
had the materials dealing with the structure of disarmament in the
total digest. It is a very small- part of the total cost. This is a
current bringing up to date of the old Hackworth Digest, last printed,
I think, in 1941. It is being brought up to date by Marjory White-
man, an Assistant Legal Adviser of the State Department, an extremely
brilliant lawyer, to bring it up to date, 1962 as it is put out. We
wanted to be included as a part of the overall publication. We felt
that was better for us than to have one of our own dealing with the
international legal materials, insofar as they bore on disarmament.
- Mr. THOMSON. Now, I notice on page 27 of the appendix?item 8,
page 27, under A.4, you are making a study of disputes of the status
of individuals; that is, the status of indigenous natives -in South
Africa. Do we need to disarm those natives in South Africa or con-
trol the armaments there, or what i.s the purpose of such a study?
Mr. FOSTER. I am informed that some international disputes arise
out of disputes between individuals, particularly in some of these
newer nations, and these four points are a listing of the kinds of mat-
ters which lead to international disputes and 14 is one such and is
being studied with that end in view. If one can find what the basis of
a dispute is, it is possible that one might find a better way to solvethe
situation.
Mr. THOMSON. Did you have an observer in the caucus room last
week when there were some individual disputes?
Mr. FOSTER. I am not sure that led to international disputes, Gover-
nor Thomson, but maybe it did. Maybe we should have observed it.
Mr. THOMSON. Mr. Foster, in your request for financing, don't you
find it rather amazing that the other body passed out a bill for less
money than was asked for? The other body is always the body that
is looked to to increase the authorizations and isn't this an amazing
situation in which you find yourself before this committee?
Mr. FOSTER. I haveilearned after a great many years not to comment
on the relationshipabetween the two bodies. I would rather reserve
comment.
Mr. THOMSON. Mr. Foster, do you anticipate that we will receive
some specifications on the question of inspection and detection from
the CIA?will they testify tomorrow?
Chairman MORGAN. No, Mr. McCone is unable to be here.
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179
Mr. THOMSON. Well, I have had the opinion expressed to me many
times that this country was retreating from a strong position taken
by the President just a very few short months ago that inspection was
essential and would be demanded. Now, when this test ban treaty is
proposed, with great fanfare as you say, champagne glasses and peace
around the corner, there is no requirement for inspection of any kind.
Now, is that because we are retreating from a strong position or is it
because of the rapid development of detection devices that were un-
known at the time the President made his statement?
Mr. FOSTER. It is no retreat, Governor Thompson. There have
been some very substantial advancements in detection capabilities since
the President's speech, I think you refer to one early in the year
1962, after the Soviet Union had completed a group of tests. The
concern that had been expressed by the President referred primarily -
to those areas where we did not have the capacity to detect and iden-
tify; namely, underground. We have had a long time a consider-
able capacity to detect in the atmosphere and underwater and a capa-
bility for detection in the same way in space. We have a very substan-
tial capability to detect underground. Our concern and our reason
for insistence on inspection?onsite inspection?concerned under-
ground tests where we cannot distinguish always the manmade from
the natural events. We still do not have complete capacity for under-
around detection.
The capacity to detect in the atmosphere has been developed over
many years. It has constantly improved, partiolly by virtue of the
expenditure of funds under the Vela program, and we doubt that
there are any other than the very smallest of explosions which would
go undetected, and the smallest explosions, in fact fairly substantial
explosions, under the proposed treaty can be done legally underground
and therefore it would be unlikely that the Soviet Union attempt to do
in the atmosphere an explosion which they could do legally under-
ground with practically the same results. So to answer your ques-
tion, the capacity of our system is in our being quite capable of detect-
ing and distinguishing events in the atmosphere, underwater, and in
outer space, based purely on U.S. control activities. Therefore, we do
not need onsite inspection to support our national security and our
ability to determine whether this treaty is being violated or not. We
still require?and this has been the basic difference between the Soviet
Union and ourselves?we still require onsite inspection in order to
distinguish between some manmade explosion underground and cer-
tain natural earthquakes. Our capacity so to distinguish others is
very good indeed and, as I say, the ability to undertake such tests un-
derground legally is easy. Therefore we feel that onsite inspection
or any inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union is unnecessary
to protect our rights under this three-environment treaty.
Mr. THomsoN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Monagan.
Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foster, when your pamphlet, "The Economic Impacts of Dis-
armament," was first published, "I read it at that time and I thought
it was very interesting. As I recall now the conclusions seemed to
be quite optimistic and also I thought that the basis on which the
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180 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
conclusions were founded was not too clear. I just am wondering if
you have any feeling of that sort, and secondly is this study being
continued, with the objective of having more specification in these
findings?
Mr. FOSTER. I think you are right, Mr. Monagan. I think this was
a first cut. It was done by a part-time panel, a very distinguished
panel, representing a great many sectors, and I think in the cir-
cumstances was a good job. We do feel it must be studied more thor-
oughly. It is being studied more thoroughly. As a matter of fact, the
country study which was done for the United Nations was a good deal
more complete and was done pretty much by our staff working with
an interagency committee consisting of Federal Reserve, Budget Bu-
reau, Commerce, Labor, DOD and State. However, this is a con-
tinuing problem and while I share some of the optimistic conclusions
of that first study in that the impact would be such that with proper
planning it could be made acceptable, we realize that there are certain
regions where this is not quite that easy, and, of course, that was a
pretty general study and what we are trying to do now is be more
specific, get down to industries, regions, that type of approach, to
- see what can be done, looking at it in advance, to make this transition
more acceptable.
Mr. MONAGAN. Well, I would hope that the conclusions were cor-
rect. As you say, they have been correct in past postwar experience,
but that, of course, is no criterion for the present. But I am glad
to hear that more study is being given to it, and I am happy, too,
that you have clarified your statement on the point of the dependence
of the economy on defense spending, because just as an example,
,Connecticut, which I represent, is a State where a billion dollars of
defense money are spent every year. United Aircraft employs 50,000
people, the largest employer by far in the State. Eighty percent of
their production is defense production. So obviously the impact there
could be very substantial and might be very abrupt.
? Mr. FOSTER. I am glad to state that they are one of the companies
which has established a disarmament division, as you probably know,
- which is studying this on their own and also attempting to find ways
in which, if it comes, it will be possible to convert. We have had many
conversations with them in that direction.
Mr. MONAGAN. But even though meanwhile we study the impact,
of course, we get back to the essential question that this whole matter
of disarmament. is an iffy proposition unless you have a disposition
on the part of the Soviets, for example, to enter into meaningful dis-
cussions or to have a frame of mind that will make disarmament some-
thing practical to talk about, do you not?
Mr. FOSTER. We do. This is very definitely a two-sided game and
if we are Unable to get appropriate responses from them, it cannot
go forward.
Mr. MONAGAN. Now, this is the Arms Control Agency and you do
discuss in your statement. certain things that perhaps have been sub-
stantially contribnted to through the activities of this Agency; the
'hot line, and the test ban treaty, but these are not actually the control
or reduction of armaments, are they?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, they are not. They are simply steps in the di-
rection of possible further agreements which might lead to arms con-
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6
trol and arms reduction. The test ban treaty itself does impose control
on certain aspects of new weapons development, mainly the large nu-
clear weapons which can only be tested in the atmosphere and which
are prohibited from testing by this treaty and which therefore does
impose a certain amount of restriction on further development.
Mr. MONAGAN. Do you feel that the atmosphere exists, or the frame
of mind exists insofar as the Russians are concerned, where it is pos-
sible now to talk about meaningful reduction or control of armaments?
Mr. FOSTER. Let me say that there has been an obvious change in
the state of mind on the part of the Russian negotiators. We are
hopeful that this is a permanent change in the state of mind which
may lead to other things. It seems quite clear to us from our various
contacts, Geneva, Moscow, New York, that there is no intent on their
part presently to move toward major arms reduction and disarma-
ment processes. They look at this as a sort of start, perhaps, to some
more meaningful things but I think at this moment in time they are
thinking of it in terms of other small steps Which, when integrated,
will gradually build this kind of base. I think this from our view-
point is completely acceptable and is perhaps a sounder way to pro-
ceed. [Security deletion.]
So there -appears to be a change in the state of mind here and it is
one that can lead, if this is permanent and if this split with the
Chinese is what, it looks to be, it can lead to more substantial and more
meaningful arms control and arms reduction measures.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield
briefly?
Mr. MONAGAN. Yes, I would be glad to.
Mr. FRELINGITUYSEN. How do you account for the change of mind,
Mr. Foster?
Mr. FOSTER. I presently am one who believes that it is largely moti-
vated by the fight between the respective leaders of the Communist
world, namely the Chinese-Soviet split. I also think it is occasioned
to a degree by the real economic pressures which they are exposed to
at this moment in time. They have had a bad agricultural year. It
looks as if it may have been a very serious agricultural year. This is
an expensive club, and with the diversion that they have had to make
from their less plentiful economic resources than ours, I think that
they would like very much to have a breathing space in this regard.
I think this is another factor. So I think that, economic pressures,
the fight with the other Communist great nation, I think these two
things together have made it politically acceptable to the Kremlin
to move somewhat in this direction.
Mr. FRELINGIMYSEN. Thank you.
Mr. MONAGAN. Of course, it could all change tomorrow.
Mr. FOSTER. It could, and if Mr. Khrushchey were to die and Mr.
Mao were to die and new leaders came in, perhaps they would get
together. At the moment I am convinced that this is a serious split.
Mr. MONAGAN. Now, you have spoken about testing the hot line
every hour on the hour. How is that done? I am curious to know.
Mr. FosrEn. Well, you know the principle. They supplied us with
certain Russian equipment which encodes the messages in Russian
and we supplied them with certain American equipment which en-
codes the stuff in English.
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There are two systems, parallel systems. One is a direct line for
the telecommunications activity which is on an encoded typewriter.
It is a tape that is run through a typewriter which goes right on the
line, direct to Moscow, through London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Hel-
sinki to Moscow. The parallel line is a radio line which goes to Tan-
giers and then direct to Moscow. The land line, of course, is the more
dependable and this is the primary line but should that fail on one
of these tests then it is presumed that the radio link could be activated
in the same way so both links are tested every hour. The English
message is initiated on the even hours from the United States and
acknowledged in Moscow and on the odd hours it is initiated at Mos-
cow and acknowledged on this end and there is a telecommunications
room set up in the Pentagon, in the National Command Center,
manned 24 hours a day with ltussian interpreters, Russian-speaking
officers so that this can be done at any time. Of course, it is switched
to the White House by a direct switch in those instances where the
President or Khrushchev wants to take command of the channel and
then is a direct channel without any dropouts on the line. It has been
in operation now since the first of September and the normal test mes-
sage is the usual "brown dog jumps over the"?whatever it is?except
the first message from Russia described in lyrical language the beau-
ties of a Moscow sunset. We have never been able to equal that mes-
sage. I happen to have a copy of that message, Mr. Chairman, I will
give it to you. This is the way it came over the line.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would think we would be ingenious enough
to say something original, or maybe poetic each time we test.
Mr. BURLESON. Yes, something about Texas should be appropriate.
Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Foster, I have heard the claim made that you
were given a lot of "retreads" for personnel. Are you happy with the
personnel in your Agency?
Mr. FOSTER. I think I personally recruited 90 percent of the top
40 percent of the staff. I acquired and am very grateful for the ac-
quisition of a number of State Department people who have worked
in this field, and particularly in my International Relations Bureau,
while in my Science and Technology Bureau, in my Weapons Evalua-
tion and Control Bureau, in the Economics Bureau, I think that there
are no people who might be classified technically as retreads and I
happen to think I have one of the finest agencies in town, all of the
way through. They are a very fine group of people.
Mr. MONAGAN. I didn't mean technically I meant susbtantially, and
I thought because of the importance of this claim that has been made,
if correct, I would like to ask you about it and have it put On the
record.
Mr. FOSTER. Let me just say
Mr. FISHER. I am sorry, did you want this on the record?
Mr. MONAGAN. Oh, yes.
Mr. FOSTER. Well, I wanted to say when the Agency was set up
there were 50 people in the Disarmament Administration of the State
Department and I took all 50 of those people. I suspect I still have
20 or 25 of them but I have 205 people aboard now so that at least
175 people that we have recruited since the Agency actually started
in business in September 1961.
Mr. MONAGAN. Are most of those new employees rather than trans-
fers from other departments?
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 183
Mr. FOSTER. I would say in science and technology most of them are
from outside Government. In the Economics Bureau, it is probably
75 percent from Government. In the weapons evaluation and control
group, the military obviously are from the Department of Defense
but there are another 25 people and of those 25, 20 of them probably
came from outside.
Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you very much.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fraser.
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Foster, does your Agency advise the President
with respect to the structure of our Armed Forces or with respect
to which type of offensive or defensive weapons systems should be
kept in operational status?
Mr. 'FOSTER. No, sir, we don't. The Secretary of Defense under
the Executive order is instructed to keep us advised as to major
changes in forces or armaments. We in turn are instructed to keep
the Secretary of Defense informed as to proposed arms control and
disarmament plans. If there is a major new weapons system pro-
jected or major changes in weapons systems are contemplated, if it
appears to have an arms control implication, we are normally aware
of it and we are privileged to make comments on such plans. but we
do not initiate such plans, but, for instance, in the large yield nuclear
weapons we felt this had an arms control implication and we made
known our comments from an arms control viewpoint as to the pos-
sible political and psychological and other effects of such a develop-
ment. So I think that my answer to your question is we do, not
advise on new proposals but we comment on those which appear to
have arms control and disarmament implications.
Mr. FRASER. Under the claim or guise of economy would you be
advising the President as to what weapons systems to employ as
against
Mr. FOSTER. In order to reduce the budget, this sort of thing, do
you mean?
Mr. FRASER. Yes.
Mr. FOSTER. NO, sir.
Mr. FRASER. This country has been a party to one or more disarma-
ment agreements in past years. Can you tell me anything about
those?
Mr. FOSTER. There have been several, as you have indicated. Of
course, there was the naval reduction in the 1920's. The earliest
one was the one between us and Canada in 1840, something which
was fairly successful but the naval one was not very successful in
the 1920's. There have been nonaggression. pacts in the past which
might be included in your question. These have not been particularly
successful.
Mr. FRASER. I take it that in the studies that you have made you
take a look at the history of disarmament.
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. FRASER. Not only as to those in which our Nation has been a
participant but as to disarmament enterprises throughout the world.
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, we have had some past studies and some current
studies on this sort of thing, to see what can be learned from the
form of and the results of such agreements.
Mr. FRASER. IS it your impression, Mr. i Foster, that sometimes the
policies of this country are dictated in large part n the disarmament
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184 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
field or toward the lessening of armaments by the force of public
opinion. I am thinking of what happened after World War II when
there was a general consensus apparently that we could demobilize
our Armed Forces.
Mr. FOSTER. I am sure that public opinion has an influence on such.
It certainly did after World War II, a very strong influence, and I
would suspect that it can and will have an influence in the future.
Mr. FRASER. SO, Mr. Foster, whether your Agency existed or not
this country might well be exploring either unilateral or multilateral
disarmament programs, based on our historical experience?on the
history of this country ?
Mr. FOSTER. I think it is entirely possible that there would be some
movement?I am sure that there would be some movement toward
such. I happen to think it would not be as wise in the ability to
achieve such as it does, having an agency which devotes its time and
thought in conjunction with other agencies to the subject.
Mr. FRASER. There is, for example, across the country today a gen-
eral feeling that nuclear war should be avoided at almost any cost
and with this feeling among the public there may be efforts made to
do something about the situation. Now, would I be correct in saying
that to the extent that your Agency is able to provide refined and
careful analysis of the di fferent kinds of disarmament arrangements
that might be entered into, that you might help advise the President
so as to avoid an imprudent or unwise kind of disarmament program?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Fraser, I would think that this would cer-
tainly be a real objective of the work of our Agency and one that -I
think there is real hope we might contribute to.
Mr. FRASER. In fact, it might be as important to avoid an unwise
disarmament agreement as not to have any disarmament.
Mr. FOSTER. I agree with the statement. I think when the chips
are down the American public will probably come out with a wise
decision but I think we could be helpful in achieving that wise
decision.
Mr. FRASER. Now, when we talk about the hot line, you say that
it isn't a form of arms control but in a way it is, to the extent that
you are attempting to reduce some of the consequences of the political
or psychological difficulties that may arise from, for example, a con-
frontation with the Soviets. At least by the technical device of a hot
line you are lessening the chance of an improvident or accidental
war?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; I think we definitely do. I think this con-
tributes substantially to a reduction in the risk of war and in that
sense it is an arms control activity. I think had we had this last fall
when we were very close to a tragedy I think at times, partially due
to the lack of dependable and rapid communications, this would have
been a real asset, and I think it can have that potential effect in the
future.
Mr. FRASER. I think I asked you these questions before, but just to
try to finish my thoughts here, the program that is outlined in the
general disarmament agreement that was put on the table at Geneva,
does take into account the problems that we would face in the political
sphere if we were to disarm or there were to be disarmament. You
have -already referred to the idea of building up a United Nations
police force.
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Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; it does, and it outlines in general terms the
basis on which the United States would want to preceed in the buildup
of such institutions and, of course, it is a progressive plan which
only moves forward as the current steps are completed. The plan is
designed to have the opportunity to review whether these things have
been achieved as the plan progresses and it leaves within the decision
of the United States the question of whether to move to the next
step, being satisfied that those steps called for have been carried out
to the extent that they do protect the security of the United States.
Mr. FRASER. Thank you. That is all.
Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, if all the members of the committee
have completed their initial question may I be permitted a further
inquiry?
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Burleson..
Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Foster, perhaps I should direct my question to
Mr. Fisher since it involves legalities:
You may -recall we mentioned the amendment by the other body to
section 33 of the bill. It comes in subsection 3 of the Senate measure
having to do with a. change in the wording of that section, striking out
"this or any other law" at thebottom of page 2 and at the top of page 3.
Further in the proviso, the amendment strikes out the balance of the
sentence after the word "except" and inserts "in accordance with the
constitutional processes of the United States." Now, I take it that
there are two purposes involved in this amendment. No. 1, it is in-
tended to assure that agreements which may be consummated under
this legislation, be ratified by constitutional procedures. No. 2, it
removed that part which says, "Or unless authorized by further
affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United Stakes."
It has been interpreted by some that this deleted portion authorizes
the House of Representatives, by a majority vote and a majority of
the Senate, to pass on matters reserved to the Senate under the Con-
stitution. - Now, I assume the repeal- of this language removes this
possibility. There is always this borderline question as to what should
be 'done by executive agreements and what should be done by treaty.
Now, as I Understand the constitutional processes, once a provision of
law is in effect, its implementation is by executive agreements. To
amend a treaty, such as is now before the Senate, may, and in my
opinion does, require further action of ratification. I take it this
amendment attempts to insure that further agreements under this or
any other act?or under any other provisions of law?require rati-
fication by the Senate of the United States, and it would remove the
House of Representatives from any authority in determining the issue.
Do on agree with this amendment?
? Mr. FISHER. Well, this again involves the probabilistic actions of
the other body. The term "executive agreement" has been confused,
to mean two different things: One, that the President enters into it on
his own; or two, that he enters into it by authorization subsequently
given or previously given by both Houses of the Congress. Those are
two quite separate factors.
" If I may violate my statement?I will probably regret it?but when
I was asked my opinion of this by the other body, they initially pro-
posed merely to eliminate the?to just leave the words "treatymaking
power of the President under the Constitution"?and with the defer-
ence of an executive witness I said I thought it inadvisable to do that
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186 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
because in my judgment the Constitution did make provision for agree-
ments entered into by the approval of both Houses of Congress. The
reciprocal trade programs are an illustration of that. People may
argue whether it is wise or not, but the fact that under the Constitution
there are some types of agreements that might be authorized by the
Congress as opposed to done by treaty, I didn't want to make a?to
say well, we can't ever have under any circumstances agreement ap-
proved by both Houses of Congress, because that would seem to me
to be reflecting on the possible authority of this body in some circum-
stances where it might exist. As a result the bill that was reported
out did not make this change. The change was made on the floor.
The change was made on the floor?its sponsor talked like he was
merely making the?like he was trying to eliminate any reference to
the House. That is the observations that were made when the amend-
ment was proposed.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Which amendment are we talking about now?
Mr. FISHER. We are talking about the amendment made on the floor
of the Senate.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The change in the proviso section, or the
change with reference to this or any other law?
Mr. BURLESON. It is under the beading "policy formulations," sub-
section 3 of section 33.
Mr. FISHER. It is in the provisos.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just the proviso?
Mr. FISHER. Yes.
Mr. BURLESON. Originally, as I understood it, a proposal was made
to place a period after "Constitution" and the remainder of that sen-
tence was to be deleted. That was the original proposal, as I under-
stand it.
Mr. FISHER. The committee did not act on that.
Mr. BURLESON. That is correct, but then when it came to the floor,
the language to which I have just referred was added and the other
deleted, which is this last sentence on policy formulation.
Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir, but it doesn't refer solely to the treatymaking
power under the Constitution, as I undertand the way it has been
passed by the other body.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What in your opinion is the significance of
the change, if the gentleman would yield? I don't want to interrupt
but does Mr. Fisher feel there is any difference in the significance of
the language which is in the law, and the change approved by the
Senate?
Mr. FISHER. Well, in my judgment there is no difference; however,
reading the legislative history of the sponsor who offered this amend-
ment on the door, it leads me to think that there is. If I were asked
as an opinon for a lawyer, if I may step back into that role, I would
say that the constitutional processes of the United States include
things like the reciprocal trade program. I don't consider that un-
constitutional. So I don't think it changes it. I think, however, the
sponsor of the amendment on the floor may think that it does and it
would seem to me that this would be an appropriate matter for this
group to discuss with your colleagues when, as this bill inevitably does,
It goes to conference, just to be sure there is no misunderstanding on
this subject.
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Mr. BURLESON. Well, would you agree that supposedly the intent
was the two things I mentioned: No. 1, to prevent substantive changes
in the form of amendments by executive agreements. That is No. 1,
and the other is that it clearly would eliminate the House of Repre-
sentatives insofar as passing on the implementations or amendments
to existing agreements or treaties?
Mr. FISHER. Well, I think of the two objectives, the elimination of
the executive agreement obligating us to disarm merely on the basis
of the authority of this act, we agree with that. We agreed with the
Fountain amendment and in fact I helped Congressman Fountain
draft it in this room 2 years ago. Se we are perfectly acceptable to
the continuation of the language in the act is it now is. In fact, I be-
lieve the effect of the Senate language is to continue one portion of
the Fountain amendment, that is to state the view of the Senate that
this act does not authorize an executive agreement. It requires either
subsequent treaty or subsequent act of Congress. Here is where I think
what he offered and what he said may have a slight difference. I think
it is his view that the amendment offered by the distinguished
Senator from Ohio in fact said it always has to be a treaty and there-
fore the House of Representatives is precluded from a role. I don't
consider that the effect of the language. If it had said as was origi-
nally proposed, "only in accordance with the treatymaking power,"
that would clearly be the language, but where instead it says "except
in accordance with the constitutional processes of the United States,"
I would not so interpret it. However, if the sponsor of the language
does, it occurs to me that that is an appropriate matter for this group
to take up and get cleared up.
Mr. O'HARA. Would the gentleman yield?
MT. BI7RLESON. Certainly.
Mr. O'HARA. Who was the author?
Mr. FISHER. Senator Lausche.
Mr. BURLESON. From what you have just said, as a constitutional
lawyer, I assume you feel that the language proposed in the commit-
tee was actually stronger than the language adopted on the floor of the
Senate?
Chairman MORGAN. That was Mr. Fountain's opinion.
Mr. FISHER. I think I would agree with that, sir. I think the
language that the committee reported out materially settled one of the
problems. It did not purport to make a constitutional division beween
treaties of two-thirds of the Senate and executive agreements approved
by the Congress. It let the Constitution be where it is on that subject.
Mr. BURLESON. Well, what would be wrong in spelling out in some
detail, to require that any amendments to this act in connection with
disarmament and arms control must be in the form of a treaty, ratified
by a two-thirds vote of the Senate? The language in the latter part
would take care of itself. If I am correct, not only would it not be
necessary to have the remainder of the sentence, but it also would not
be necessary to say that the House of Representatives shall have
nothing to do with it. It is automatic. Do you agree with that?
Mr. FISHER. No, sir, not entirely, because it seems to me that there
might be some circumstances under which this body would consider it
proper to have an agreement approved by a subsequent?mind you, I
say a subsequent act of Congress. You might have a somewhat more
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188 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
limited type of agreement, the authorization for which?I don't think
a general disarmament treaty would be a treaty, obviously, it would go
under article II, clause 2 of the Constitution, but there might be some
other things that we might want to do and the Congress empowered to
regulate the Armed Forces. Now, I am not suggesting that we think
we have any authority in. this law to do it, the Fountain amendment
with which we agree makes that quite clear. But I would not want
DOW to say that never under any circumstances could agreement be?
agreement which came for approval of the two bodies of Congress
rather than merely the Senate and make that decision now which .is
what I urged the Senate not to do and I would think that in a sense this
body would want to recognize that there are some types of agreement
on which it has a coequal role with the Senate?not the ones of greater
political significance, but limited .agreements?there ? are some types
of agreements on which the approval by both Houses of Congress is
a recognized constitutional form of action. I would not want to say
that there 18 nothing in the di sarinament field as such that that type of
agreement?that would require that type of approval.
Mr. BURLESON. I don't want to belabor the point but following your
thesis, the theory that the House of Representatives may pass on.mat-
ters not submitted as a treaty, are we to assume that an executive agree-
ment might or could be submitted for approval of both Houses of
Congress? Further, if proposed changes come under the category of
executive agreements then why would it be necessary or desirable for
action of either body of Congress? That is the logical conclusion to
what you said, is it not?
Mr. FISHER. No, sir, if T may respectfully disagree, I think there
are types of things we could agree to if we had the approval of Con-
gress, given under Congress delegated power, for example, to deal
with the Armed Forces, which we would not have the authority to
commit the Government on other bases of security power. I think that
there is a great area of international authority, the Executive plus two
Houses of Congress, then there is the Executive alone, and that it
seemed to me was the spirit of the original Fountain amendment. I
don't want to speak for Congressman Fountain in his absence.
Mr. BURLESON. I think you stated it well.
Mr. FISHER. That was the way I understood the spirit of the original
Fountain amendment and he wanted to say you might act in two ways
to obligate the United States, whichever is proper?treaty or approval
by subsequent act of Congress. "We are saying to you now, Don't say
that you can do it without or that we have given you that, authority in
passmgthis law." That was as I understood the spirit of Congressman
Fountain's amendment, and we indicated that the executive branch had
no objection to it, we did it with no reservation, we didn't have any
objection to it. To the extent that a proposed amendment would elimi-
nate not one of those ruts which we agree should be eliminated but. two
of those ruts, and say there is only a third, then it would seem to me
that that in a. sense is maybe a reflection on the role of this body which
I don't believe is required by the Constitution., since there might be
agreements which we could enter into in this field which we got subse-
quent statutory authorization for.
Mr. BURLESON. Well, I .am not arguing. I am trying to clarify.
After all each tub sits on its own bottom insofar a.s the implementa-
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?
tion or amendments to this or any other agreements and 'finally it
comes to rest upon the President of the United States as to what he
considers really are executive agreements versus treaties. If he decides
it is a substitute agreement there is just not anything the Congress can
do about it in any way, is there?
Mr. FISHER. -Well, sir, there is, because we deal in a constant con-
tinuing relationship with the Congress.
Mr. -BuRLEsoN. Well we can't sue one another. We can pass a bill
or we can take any action we please, but the fact is the President can
enter into agreements in those matters not considered by him to be a
treaty.
Mr. FISHER. Well, sir, I remember once in the Army I was asked
by the sergeant, "Lieutenant, here is where you sign your consent." I
said, "Sergeant, they can't make me consent." And he said, "No,
sonny, they can just make you wish they had." In terms of continuing
relationships, if the Congress enacts its view on that, and we act in a
way you think is improper, maybe you can't stop us, but you can make
us wish we had done it your way, so I am perfectly willing to think
that the Fountain amendment as drafted is satisfactory. This is
equally satisfactory as I interpreted it. It occurred to me as long
as the House and Senate are satisfied on their respective roles then I
perhaps should have indicated what I said at the very beginning that
a member of the executive branch shouldn't get involved in it. I
believe I have discussed this with the Director. That is the reason
I am talking about it, and I believe we would be satisfied with the
Fountain amendment as originally drafted and we would be satisfied
with this as we interpret it that this group and the Senate are satisfied
with it. Anything you come up with is all right with us.
Mr. BURLESON. Would you be agreeable with placing the period as
it was originally considered in the Foreign Relations Committee, after
the word "Constitution" and leaving the remainder.
Mr. FISHER. Yes; I think I would, provided this body and the Sen-
ate were satisfied with this. This is the most important thing. We
can't do anything subsequently obligating the United States on the
basis of our own authority. That is the reason we agreed with the
Fountain amendment in the first place and we would agree to any
change of it that this group and the Senate would find satisfactory.
Mr. BURLESON. Thank you, sir.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Barry.
Mr. BARRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is changing the subject to a much less deep subject, but one
very important to me. You indicated, Mr. Foster [security deletion]
that you believe this is a serious break with China. Then you also
mentioned something about the Soviets wanting this test ban because
it was a breathing space for them. Well, in the light of all that, how
are we being affected, if this is all true? Are we relaxing our testing?
Is this breathing space merely to accommodate or is there some ad-
vantage to us?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, there is a definite advantage to us in that we
certainly contribute to the reduction of proliferation of these arms
in the rest of the world. We now have 95 signatures on this test ban
treaty and I should think that we will have 105 within the next 2 or 3
weeks. [ Security deletion.]
23-197-63-13
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190 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
As far as what happens with us, we are actually accelerating our
underground test program. We are improving our ability to test in
the atmosphere quickly by restoration of facilities on Johnson Island
and in the equipment needed to resume atmospheric tests in a hurry.
We are beefing up our detection system as I indicated and we are sup-
porting the laboratories with a vigorous development program.
Mr. BARRY. In other words, the net effect of the test ban so far as
we are concerned is to accelerate our own experimentation.
Mr. FOSTER. In the underground field. Of course, it does put limits
on our test activities in the atmosphere and, therefore, it is a measure
of control on the development of larger weapons. I think the major
advantage of this, of course, is that it forms a test opportunity as to
whether the Soviet Union really is in the process of a fundamental
change and whether as time goes on we can build on this first agree-
ment or substantive agreements in the direction of arms control. [Se-
curity deletion.]
Mr. BARRY. Last week I was in the Soviet Union and was talking
to the Acting Foreign Minister there and he indicated that
Mr. MONAGAN. Is this off the record now?
Mr. BARRY. No?that there were pertain things that there was no
possibility of getting together on where there couldn't be any agree-
ment, and to stay off those subjects, but that we should probe areas
where there was some possibility of getting together in the general
field of disarmament and the first thing he asked me was what about
these things, captive nations you talk about over here. I said, "Well,
get your troops out of Hungary and East Germany and Poland and
we may not have so much to talk about." He said, 'Well, if you get
your troops out of Germany we will get our troops out of those other
countries.' So I just pass that on as a possibility. The question may
be rather puerile, but I would like to get some technical answer to the
ability of the Soviet Union to so-called incinerate us.
Mr. FOSTER. I think McNamara has put into the public domain the
numbers of strategic delivery, vehicles which are in the inventories of
each side or prospectively will be in the inventories in the course of the
next 3 or 4 years. What they have in the way of delivery vehicles
and what they have in the way of warheads to our knowledge is such
that if they were to mount a surprise attack by airplanes, by missiles,
and by submarine-launched missiles it would be possible for them to
put on the United States a significant number of megatons of nuclear
warheads. [Security deletion.]
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is this public information, Mr. Foster?
Mr. FOSTER. This I am quite sure is public information. Why
don't we supply this for the record? There is no doubt but what
they can destroy many of our largest cities and probably would run
casualties of the order of a hundred million in a surprise attack,
with what we know to be in their inventory.
(The information referred to is as follows:)
U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
STATEMENT REGARDING DAMAGE THE SOVIET UNION IS CAPABLE OF INFLICTING ON
THE UNITED STATES IN A NUCLEAR ATTACK
Secretary McNamara, in testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on August 13, 1963, on the nuclear test ban treaty, gave the following
comparison of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces:
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"The U.S. force today now contains more than 500 missiles?Atlas, Titan,
Minuteman, Polaris?and is planned to increase to over 1,700 by 1966. In addi-
tion, the United States has SAC bombers on air alert and over 500 SAC bombers
on quick reaction alert.
"By comparison, the consensus is that today the Soviets could place less than
half as many bombers over North America on a first strike mission; the Soviets
are estimated to have today only a fraction as many ICBM missiles, and their
sub-launched ballistic missiles are short range, require surface launch, and
generally are not comparable to our Polaris force. Between now and 1966,
it is estimated that our ballistic missile numerical superiority will increase both
absolutely and relatively."
"That is the very general picture. It is the picture of existing and continu-
ing U.S. nuclear superiority."
From this comparison of nuclear forces, it would appear evident that in spite
of Soviet numerical inferiority in its strategic nuclear force, the numbers of
Soviet bombers and missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons against tar-
gets in the United States are and will continue to be sufficient to inflict very
grave damage. This conclusion is emphasized when one considers the com-
paratively high degree of urbanization in the United States and the fact that
the majority of our major urban-industrial complexes which would be likely
targets for Soviet attack are located within a few hundred miles of a coastline.
A rough estimate of the damage levels on both sides which could result from
a nuclear war was given by President Kennedy in his address to the people on
July 26, 1963. The President stated:
"A full-scale nuclear exchange lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons
now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans,
and Russians."
Mr. BARRY. If we knew they were going to attack us, if our intelli-
gence showed that, what if anything could we do?
Mr. FOSTER. Our basic policy has been that we would not mount a
preemptive attack, that we have placed our missiles in hardened bases
or in invulnerable Polaris submarines and others, so that even after
they had mounted such an attack, we would have the ability to destroy
Russia in a second strike. This is the philosophy of our military
posture. How anyone can know in advance what they are sure to do,
I don't know. This is the problem of instability, but both sides with-
out any question, Mr. Barry, have this ability to destroy lives up to the
hundreds of millions and certainly to completely destroy civilization
as we know it, not only in our two countries but probably in the
Northern Hemisphere.
MT. BARRY. Thank you, MT. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. MT. Gross.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Foster, I want to turn to your grants and contracts.
In fiscal year 1963 ACDA assigned contracts to Bendix, Sylvania,
Aerospace, Raytheon, North American Aviation?perhaps others.
These are to be found in the appendix?I won't take the time to give
the identifying numbers unless someone is interested in them.
These firms manufacture highly specialized equipment and have
contracts with the Department of Defense. My question is, Do you
find any conflict between the development and sale of equipment for
military use on the one hand, and equipment for the ACDA program
which, if successful, may result in decrease in sales by these companies
to the Department of Defense?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir. Our contracts are not hardware contracts.
We are not ordering equipment from these companies, we are taking
advantage of their engineering and their experience in these activities
and in each instance these companies have set up different separate
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departments to?as I indicated in the case of United Aircraft?to
study the problems connected with arms control and disarmament, and
also to make proposals on research in this field.
The companies which you have mentioned all have defense contracts.
Mr. GROSS. Many millions of dollars of defense contracts?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes; many millions of dollars, and the experience
which they have obtained in that regard is available to them in the
studies which .they make for us, and in many cases the reports that
they have made or the studies they have made to the Department of
Defense are turned over to us, and in many cases to the contractor for
use in meeting these different specifications which we give them in our
own contracts.
Mr. GROSS. You find no conflict at all in hiring these firms for the
purpose of providing you with information, while they are supplying
many millions of dollars worth of materials and services under
contract?
Mr. FOSTER. On the contrary, Mr. Gross we find that this enables
them better to meet the specifications and the objectives which the
contracts from us ask for. This is done in cooperation with the
departments who are their prime contractors in the Other field.
Mr. GROSS. Well, do the reports of these contractors suggest directly
or indirectly the use of equipment which they alone manufacture or
are alone capable of manufacturing?
Mr. FOSTER. I know of no instance of that, sir.
Mr. GROSS. On what basis was each of these firms selected?
Mr. FOSTER. Well, we have a table which I would be very glad to
provide for the record, which shows the process by which each of these
was placed.
For instance, the Bendix contract with ACDA, No. 1, we invited
15 companies to submit a proposal on this assignment and we received
11 proposals from the 15, and the contract was given to 1 of those
invited to bid; namely, Bendix.
Raytheon, we invited nine people to submit proposals, five submitted
proposals; lendix Contra& No. 6, we invited 16 to make a pro-
posal, we had 5 additional requests; and incidentally, as we send out
a request for proposal we now are apt to get a great many additional
proposals, knowing that we are placing contracts which was not true
when we started.
Mr. GROSS. Let me ask you this question: Are these all on the basis
of invitation?
Mr. FOSTER. No, sir, not all of them. There are some grants which
are made on the basis of an unsolicited proposal which we feel is use-
ful to finance. There are some?
Mr. GROSS. What do you mean by that, Mr. Foster, an "unsolicited
proposal." Do you mean they volunteer to provide you with informa-
tion and you pay for it?
Mr. FOSTER. That is correct. They come in and say that they be-
lieve they have resources to make a useful study on such and such a
subject. I will read. These are the instances where the initiative
was entirely that of the proposer and, either by reason of the profit-
making character of the proposer, or by reason of the nature of the
work, the Agency believes that the appropriate vehicle for agreement
is a contract rather than a grant. Such pr-onsals must be
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with the Agency's research program, be well developed, represent a
considerable investment of time and efort by the proposer, and not be
readily available from other sources in order to qualify for a non-
competitive contract award.
It submits a list of the people that it has that might work on such
a proposal, and it submits an outline of what it thinks it might find
and the way in which it might approach that. There have been a
few such unsolicited proposals that we have accepted, and given a
contract to. There was one which was given to MIT in the amount
of $65,000?contract No. ACDA No. 15?they have an institute?well,
this is one?I think that is the only one of such.
Mr. GROSS. Does the committee have a complete list of those
contracts?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, you do.
Mr. GROSS. And whether by invitation or unsolicited?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, we have submitted this.
Mr. GROSS. Or by negotiation?
Mr. FOSTER. That is right.
Mr. GROSS. This committee has all that?has that list?
Mr. FOSTER. YOU do.
Mr. GROSS. All right.
Now let me ask about this one title, "European View of European
Security and the Present General and Complete Disarmament Pro-
posals.'
That study is by a British group, the Institute for Strategic Studies.
I am not going to pass judgment on the competence of the institute,
but the question is whether its findings may not reflect British inter-
pretation of -European events_, and even more basic is whether it is
appropriate for part of the State Department to employ a foreign
agency to make a study which will be "ground in," or put into foreign
policy views of the United States.
Mr. FOSTER. The Institute for Strategic Studies is a nonprofit -in-
stitution in Great Britain which has on its board many other national-
ities represented. It has made studies for the British Government,
and it has also made studies for NATO. It has access to a great deal
of information concerning the European problems. It has an objec-
tive approach to that?that is, perhaps in some ways more objective
than a U.S. institution would?and we felt it would be valuable to
have the benefit of their competence, their access to European infor-
mation, which it is possible we could get, but not as readily?and I
might say that they have produced a very interesting document which
we have found of great value.
Now the Senate has introduced an amendment to the bill which
would prevent our doing this in the future. We regret this, although
this will not work any serious handicaps on our work, but the Insti-
? tute of Strategic Studies is a highly respected European organization.
It is partially financed by American sources, and I would very gladly
place additional contracts with them for things in which they have
greater competence than some of our own people do.
Mr. GROSS. I am personally pleased that the Senate put that pro-
v,ision in their bill.
Now, I have before me this volume 2, appendixes, collaborative
studies by certain people. I won't read the names of the authors. I
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194 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
don't know what this?apparently these are two French words, I don't
know how to pronounce them?but apparently this fat volume deals
with the subject of "Controlling the Police in a Disarmed World."
It carries this stamp on the cover: "Peace Research Institute."
I don't find this listed in your appendix anywhere as to cost. Can
you tell me about this deal, where this blossomed?
Mr. FosTER. Yes, it is listed, I think. It is ACDA IR-8. It is in
? the sum of $20,000, and again it took advantage of the particular
expertise of some individuals in this field, the Peace Research Insti-
? tute I think is a Washington organization. This was a 1962 contract,
and it was a grant.
Mr. GROSS. When you say, Mr. Foster, that this is the work of ex-
pertise?do you mean that it is done by experts; is that it? I would
ask you to evaluate this sort of thing. Do you have any reports? Who
in your organization reads these so-called studies and evaluates them?
Mr. FOSTER. I have indicated in the statement we have established a
Research Council which consists of each of the heads of the Bureaus
in the Agency. It is chaired by the Director of Research and
Technology.
This group meets regularly and passes on the research projects of
each Bureau, decides which of the suggested research activities will be
financed, passes on the form of the project, and recommends to the
Director the contractor which shall be selected. The Bureau respon-
sible receives reports when made, and, with a review committee under
the cognizance of the Research Council recommends the utilization
of the reports.
Mr. GRoss. Well, Mr. Foster, I call your attention to page A-14,
since you seem to think this is a valuable document, and I read this
sentence:
Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the
capability of the Soviet police system to keep law and order over 200 million-odd
Russians and the many additional millions in the satellite states.
- Do you agree with that? Would you like to have it read again?
Mr. FOSTER. Yes, I would.
Mr. GROSS (reading) :
Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the
capability of the Soviet police system to keep law and order over the 200 million-
odd Russians and the many additional millions in the satellite states.
Mr. O'HARA. What page is that on?
Mr. GRoss. Page A-14.
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, do we have that book Mr. Gross is
quoting from?
Mr. GROSS. It is available to you.
. Mr. FOSTER. You are reading from the report itself?
Mr. GROSS. Yes, a statement by one of the men that you describe as an
expert.
Mr. O'HARA. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to know what he
is quoting from. -
Mr. GROSS. I am quoting from a study made by six individuals who
were paid by the Disarmament Control Agency
Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Chairman, can we get a copy of that book?
Chairman MORGAN. Is it available to the committee?
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Mr. GROSS. Of course it is available.
(The document referred to has been furnished and is contained in
the file,s of the committee.)
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, can we inquire what the study is about ?
I can't judge the statement myself unless I know the context.
Mr. GROSS. The study is 'Controlling the POlice in a Disarmed
World."
Mr. FRASER. Does this presuppose it is a disarmed world ?
Mr. GROSS. I am trying to find out what it is myself.
Mr. O'HARA. I don't like questions in the dark. I know nothing
about the subject matter of the question.
Mr. GROSS. Well, I didn't yield to the gentleman and if I have the
floor
Mr. O'HARA. Then, Mr. Chairman, if this persists I shall raise a
question of decorum. This has gone on for 10 or 15 minutes now.
I don't like questions raised in the dark. Nobody knows the basis of
the questions or what relation they have to the Disarmament Agency.
Chairman MORGAN. I think Mr. Gross has been a little more en-
ergetic than some other members of the committee and has taken the
trouble to study one of the reports. He is asking questions about the
report. I hate to see you raise a point of order. I would like to
proceed with the hearing.
Mr. FOSTER. We would be very glad, Mr. Chairman, to submit an
evaluation of the entire report. I can't really comment on one sentence
from an outside report, and I don't necessarily agree with every
sentence made by independent students of this.
I just don't know how that happens to fit into the context. I think
what is referred to here is is it possible in a peaceful world to depend
on the national police to keep nations from streaming over the borders
and this might have some value in such a situation, but I third;
it would be of more value if we give a broad evaluation of the whole
report, rather than for me to comment on a single sentence.
(The following information has been submitted by the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency for inclusion in the record at this
point:)
? STATEMENT OF E.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY ON PEACE
INSTITUTE STUDY ENTITLED "QUIS CUSTODIET ? CONTROLLING THE POLICE
IN A DISARMED WORLD'
The purpose of this study was to make a preliminary examination of the
political control of an international police force. The fundamental problem
is to develop a system of political control that will permit effective use of such
a force and, at the same time, inhibit actions by the force that would be detri-
mental to the interests of the United States and other countries. This prelimi-
nary study was also intended to identify areas requiring more detailed re-
search.
The Agency recognizes that major reductions of national armaments will not
? prevent international disputes from arising. Some such disputes may lead to
open conflict. Consequently, various arrangements for keeping the peace will
have to accompany agreements for reducing national arms. An international
police force, properly controlled, is being considered as one possible means of
assuring the security of this and other states.
The approach adopted by the Peace Research Institute was to examine such
2 The study was condncted under a $20,000 grant awarded by the Agency and accepted
by Mr. Tames J. Wadsworth on behalf of the Peace Research Institute in June 1962. The
final report was published in April 11903, and $4,759.38 not required in connection with
the study was returned to the Government.
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iv tilVJ r-J1A .1./ 1 21 Cd i.'ROL AND DISARMA_MENT' ACT
a force from a number of different points of view. In addition to a paper on
the overall problem of controlling an international police force, papers were
devoted to the international political control of such a force in local, regional,
and worldwide operations; to the internal organization and operation of
such a force; and to operational guidelines and restrictions on the use of such
a force. Scholars engaged in the study were from two private research institutes
as well as Yale University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, North-
western University and the Universities of Chicago and Michigan.
The views expressed by the individual writers of these papers do not neces-
sarily reflect those of the Agency. This is specifically stated in a footnote on
page 1, volume I of the report. The Agency does, in fact, disagree with certain
of these views. Indeed, the study reflects a substantial divergence of opinion
among the writers on a number of points. Since there was no requirement that
the participants arrive at consensus of opinion, such a divergence of views was
to be expected and is one of the values of a study of this character. It is the
task of ACDA to synthesize, evaluate and extract from such studies what might
be useful.
Keeping in mind that the study was exploratory, rather than definitive in
character, and evaluating it on the overall basis, we believe that the study illu-
minates the basic differences between reaching agreement on, and exercising
effective political control over, an international force with relatively limited
functions on the one hand, and the capabilities and problems involved in parallel
arrangements of a more extensive character on the other. It will be necessary
to examine conclusions and implications of this study in greater depth, as well
as to determine the suitability of more specific approaches in light of the problems
identified. The study will assist us in directing our further efforts in this area.
SUMMARY OF "QUIS GUSTODIET ? CONTROLLING THE POLICE IN A DISARMED WORLD"
A REPORT PREPARED BY TFIE PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
APRIL 1963
NOTE.?The report consists of seven papers, the major theses of which are
summarized below.
1. Quis Custodiet? Controlling the Police in a Disarmed World (vol. I), Arthur
I. Waskow.
Waskow rejects the idea of an international force in the form of a "world
army" having such power that "no state could challenge it." He argues, specif-
ically against a force equipped with nuclear weapons, expressing the view
that basically governments would fear such an army might prove uncontrollable.
In contrast, he contemplates an international force constructed "on the model
of true police functions."
The force Waskow describes is small; uses police rather than military methods;
meets violations early and aims at the specific violations rather than at the
violating nation; is prepared to increase the amount of coercion in a given
situation if authorized to do so by a wider international consensus; and is
unwilling to control international conflict of a political and economic nature.
Three "police missions" are envisaged for the International Police Force
(IPF) ; preventing the possession or manufacture of prohibited weapons;
restoring order where domestic conflict threatens international peace; and
protecting international boundaries from incursions by lightly armed or unarmed
forces.
Waskow recommends that ACDA undertake or encourage studies in the fol-
lowing areas: (1) Historical examination of transition periods in the transfer
of military power and of periods when political power has been exercised by
nonlethal equivalents of war; (2) operations analyses of the problems of financ-
ing, transporting, training, equipping, and arming an international police force;
(3) simulations of international crises in a disarmed world; (4) examinations
of the question of whether an international police force as described above can
enforce an agreement on GCD in a manner acceptable to the United States;
(5) examination of the question of how proposals for an IPF would be received
by other governments.
I The report was prepared under a grant by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. The judgments expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Agency or any other department or agency of the U.S.
Government.
This summary was prepared by the staff of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
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197
Waskow notes that Hans Morgenthau in direct contrast, argues that in an
international crisis, the distinctions between a police response and a military
response may dissolve. The international order being defended in a crisis will
take on the qualities of a government. If, as Waskow suggests, an IPF enforced
rules on individuals rather than on states, this would constitute an utter nega-
tion of national sovereignty," says Morgenthau. The enforcement would be a
governmental act.
Walter Millis agrees on a police-type force, but argues that in controlling
international violence, main reliance must be placed on existing national _police.
The role of an IPF must be severely limited.
2. The Political Control of an International Police Force (vol. II, pp. al-G1),
Walter Millis.
;In discussing the factors pertinent to the potential control of an international
police force, Millis contends the primary factor is the constitutional role to be
played by the force in a demilitarized world order. Millis sees such a world
order as one in which today's existing global constitution will have undergone
a dramatic revision; i.e., a transformation from the existing "police-cum-military
organization of legal coercion."
Main reliance for keeping order will be placed on the national police forces,
according to Millis. However, they will not be adequate for all situations; and
"when they break down * * * we will have to have a supranational police
force." The constitutional role of such a force will be limited to securing observ-
ance of "that minimum of basic rules * * * accepted as necessary to the survival
of the demilitarized world system."
These basic rules are: (a) all states must divest themselves of all instru-
mentalities of military power or threat and must not rebuild them; ( b) all
states are bound to resolve any national differences arising among them by
nonmilitary and nonviolent means.
How would such a force be organized? Millis suggests that it be unitary in
character (i.e., directed by a unitary executive head appointed by and solely
responsible to a supranational political authority) and beyond veto by any of the
member states.
He then raises two serious questions about the role of the force: (1) How to
prevent it from becoming an independent superpower? and (2) even if there is
no such development, can an individual state be protected against the misuse
of the powers granted to an international force?
Millis answers the first of these questions by proposing that while the inter-
national police power must be final, the physical force at its command must be
minimal. For example, he wants no weapons of mass destruction in the hands of
an IPF.
The second problem of control could be solved, in Millis' view, by a supra-
national authority to which the police executive and its organization would be
responsible and which would be the final source of political control over the
police. , The authority would consist of representatives nominated by the member
states of the world community, directly appointed by the great-power govern-
ments, and chosen in some form of regional convention for the seats allotted
to regional groupings. Millis imagines a small group of highly able men
charged with providing political control and direction of the police force?
and nothing else. Such a body, he emphasizes, "would be competent to keep
a tolerable minimum of world order."
Millis is doubtful about the concept (advanced by Roger Fisher and Arthur
Waskow) of having international authority reach beyond national govern-
ments to the individual citizens. "If," he says, "an international police has
a function of this kind * * * it will have to be very narrowly and specifically
delimited * * * and one that can be carried out with very modest amounts of
armed power."
3. "The Impartiality of the International Police" (vol. II, pp. B-1-23), Hans
J. Morgenthau.
Morgenthau's paper is comprised of an analysis of the traditional police func-
tions within the state and an application of this analysis to the function of the
international police force in a disarmed world.
In the nontotalitarian state, the police's law enforcement function is "spe-
cialized or marginal." Peace and order really depend on the psychological pre-
dilection of the citizens to support the status quo. Within such a state the
impartiality of the police has two different meanings. The police are not im-
partial when it comes to supporting the existing legal order and the political,
social, and economic status quo. It is their purpose to defend it. On the other
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hand, impartiality in its meaning of equality before the law can be achieved by
the police.
In discussing an international police force, Morgenthau makes two assump-
tions: (1) the world could be disarmed only in the sense that no nation will
be able to wage a major war after the model of the two World Wars; (2) the
day-to-day enforcement of legal rules in international relations will not be ap-
preciably affected by general and complete disarmament.
In this type world Morgenthau sees only one law enforcement function in
the strict sense left: the enforcement of disarmament itself. Here the issue
of impartiality of the international police poses itself in terms similar to those
within the nation. The police, while committed to preserving the established
international order, must guard against the charge of unfairness in operation.
To avoid unfairness, Morgenthau urges such measures as a judicious national
composition of the force, strict legal standards reducing the discretion of the
international police, and judicial review of the actions of the police.
4. "Sequential Controls for International Police," (vol. II, pp. C-1-51), Roger
Fisher.
Fisher's study is concerned with the question of how international police can
control the conduct of governments and vice versa.
Basic to the author's concept is a process of control consisting of a sequence
of steps that the IPF could carry out. Once a primary rule of conduct is broken,
says Fisher, a single response is not adequate. Rather he suggests a sequence
of responses designed to "turn first-order violations into second-order com-
pliance." Fisher defines first order rules as primary rules of international con-
duct?such as those established by a disarmament treaty. He expects a "fair
amount of noncompliance" with these rules. What Fisher's scheme aims to avoid
are those crises arising from "second-order violations," violations arising from
defiance by an official of an explicit order issued by a court or law enforcement
official.
Fisher believes that the IPF should operate on the assumption it is enforcing
the conduct of individuals rather than of governments. Analogies are drawn
from domestic legal systems.
A number of ways of obtaining compliance are suggested. The overall aim
should be to "alter the anticipated consequences of noncompliance, i.e., reducing
the costs by narrowing the impact that rule enforcement will have on govern-
ment; and by providing rewards for compliance." Finally for deterrent effect,
there should be much stiffer penalties for second order noncompliance than for
first order.
Fisher's second major point calls for the control of the IPF by a system of
checks and balances. These include such measures as (1) dividing the IPF
into units, each having standing authority to do limited things; (2) strengthen-
ing those factors tending to cause respect for the limits on the authority; and
(3) finally, determining those bodies which would augment (or restrict) the
authorized actions of the various units.
A crucial point in Fisher's plan is that there should be an increasing con-
sensus as a condition of increasing the capability of the international police
contingent. The force available to it should not, in Fisher's view, extend to
nuclear weapons.
5. "The Internal Operations and Organization of an International Police
Force" (vol. II, pp. D-1-69), J. David Singer.
Singer's study offers what he calls "essentially a prescientific checklist,"
whose "value is more for its cataloging of the issues and the range of alterna-
tive approaches than for the arrangements proposed."
Singer proposes to reduce armaments and develop a U.N. force simultaneously.
He suggests the notion of arms transfer whereby a fixed but increasing per-
centage of each class of each disarmament treaty signatory's conventional
weapons be delivered to designated U.N. force depots. A large portion of these
would be retained by the force. Next, nuclear weapons and strategic-delivery
vehicles would be disposed of through "sequestration," i.e., the weapons and
vehicles would be taken to warehouse-type depots by small technical maintenance
forces where the U.N. force would have custodial rather than operational con-
trol over them. The depots would not be so well defended that the original
owners of the weapons could not repossess them. Repossession of course would
mean open abrogation of the treaty.
Singer next outlines the sort of political organ under which the U.N. force
might operate. Basically he envisages a modified Security Council called the
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.tab
Security Advisory Council, consisting of two divisions. The Arms Control
Division would receive, store and maintain the quantities of conventional and
nuclear weapons in addition to performing such functions as gathering and
transmitting information weapons levels and deployment in the signatory na-
tions. The Police Force Division would be responsible for manning, deploying
and perhaps using a small but significant portion of the conventional weapons.
Singer does not feel this Division should be equipped with nuclear weapons.
In general, Singer's IPP would be considerably stronger and of a more perma-
nent nature than that contemplated by Fisher, Waskow, or Millis.
When discussing the organization of personnel within the IPF Singer sug-
gests the advantages and disadvantages of the integrated multinational unit.
? He tends to favor this type unit. In a detailed analysis of the question of loyalty
to an international force and how to develop it, Singer rejects the idea that
the Force seek "thoroughly denationalized individuals." The important thing
is to find men who have the capacities for several loyalties, i.e., a loyalty toward
? their nation as well as toward the world community.
In his section on "finances," Singer suggests that nations transfer arms to the
U.N. for cash. He feels that this would obviate much of the sheer economic
and resource waste inherent in most disarmament plans and since the U.N.
would be purchasing secondhand weapons instead of new ones, the cost of hard-
ware procurement for the IPF would be lowered.
In speculative fashion Singer examines the possibility of financing U.N.
security activities with an independent source of income. Such income might
be derived from "the natural resources of the seas of Antarctica; a monopoly of
global communications and transport, or an automatic levy on same; the sale
of passports; a monopoly on atomic energy * * * and perhaps, most intriguing
of all, direct personal and corporation taxation."
6. "Political Control of International Forces in Dealing with Problems of
Local Instability, and Notes on the Early Experience of the United Nations
Force in the Congo" (vol. II, pp. E-1-59), Lincoln P. Bloomfield.
Bloomfield concludes in his first paper that (1) in a disarming or even dis-
armed world, the majority of peacekeeping problems may well be characterized
by internal disorder, subversion and indirect aggression, civil war and insur-
gency movements of all varieties; (2) problems of local instability will not be
any easier to deal with than they are today; and (3) the problem of political
control (of IPF) at the top will labor under many of ? the fundamental dis-
abilities we have become aware of in U.N. operations thus far. He believes
although political control below the top is a less vexing matter, solutions ad-
dressed to lower levels will not go to the heart of the matter.
Based on his contact with the U.N. Congo operation personnel, Bloomfield
records a number of concrete recommendations aimed at improving the quality
of the response to future international crises. Some of these are : The need
for riot police in certain cases rather than infantry; the urgent necessity for
some sort of standardization of U.N. equipment; a troop rotation policy with
a minimum tour of at least 1 year; clearer directives for military and civilian
personnel covering the aims of the operation and channels of command.
In questioning whether GOD might have destablizing influence on the stra-
tegies of the superpowers, Bloomfield, in marked contrast with Millis and
Waskow, raises the possibility of sudden and secret rearmament in a stage III
environment. Millis in particular, discounts the likelihood of "nuclear black-
mail in a disarmed world" as "wholly unreal."
7. "Some Thoughts on Problems of Thinking Into the Future With Particular
References to Political Control of an International Police Force" (vol. II, pp.
F-1-39), Richard C. Snyder.
Snyder's paper is concerned with the improvement of planning for future
arms control environments. He recommends the coordinated use of four basic
research techniques in the formulation of what he calls a multiple strategy
for planning: (1) Trend analyses-continuing recordings of events and conditions
relevant to the arms control problem which can be coded and stored for quick
retrieval, (2) trend projection, (3) the development of historical analogs such
as those brought out in the PRI papers (the confrontation of Federal and State
forces in Mississippi cited by Fisher, the U.N. Congo experiences described by
Bloomfield), (4) situational analysis, and (5) the use of simulation and gaming.
Mr. GROSS. This man goes on to say the breakup of the Russian
Communist empire today would doubtless be conducive to freedom,
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but would be a good deal more catastrophic for world order than was
the breakup of the Austro7Hungarian empire in 1918.
Mr. FOSTER. I can conceive of that being so.
Mr. GROSS. I don't know that the world came to an end because of
the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1918, nor was there
any great catastrophe flowing from it.
Mr. FOSTER. We could well have had the breakup of the world
if we had had nuclear weapons at that time.
Mr. GROSS. Of course we didn't have nuclear weapons at that time
and there isn't any point in trying to associate nuclear weapons with
the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1918.
Mr. FOSTER. I was talking about your question, which is talking
about a time when there are nuclear weapons, and this report is di-
rected to that.
Mr. GROSS. Well, I would like to have you give to the committee
your evaluation of this particular information contained on page 14,
and you can relate it backward and forward to the rest of the drivel
which is contained in this volume.
I have read it, and I have never found more drivel. I haven't for-
gotten the day, Mr. Foster, that you came to former Representative
Davis and myself, the chairman of the Manpower Subcommittee, ask-
ing for additional supergrades for your Disarmament Agency, and I
will never forget the fact that at that time we tried to tell you that
there was information available, and good information available in
the various departments and agencies of this Government, that you
didn't have to blossom out and spend millions of dollars on contracts
and grants for studies of this kind and other descriptions, and I will
never forget your answer to this, that your Agency was not going to do
any "intellectual hitchhiking."
Remember?
Mr. FOSTER. May I make one correction to that, Mr. Gross?
Mr. GROSS. Yes,
in just a minute. Here is an excellent example.
Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara.
Mr. O'HARA. I object to the lecturing of any witness before this
committee. The gentleman from Iowa has had the floor for a long
time, much in excess of the 5 minutes. He has finally come to the mat-
ter of hitting his fist on the desk, talking about a man no longer in
the Congress, what he did. It has nothing to do with what we are
discussing.
Mr. GROSS. I didn't yield for this purpose, Mr. Chairman. I, don't
yield to the gentleman.
Mr. O'HARA. Well, I am objecting.
Mr. GROSS. I don't yield to the gentleman. I ask that we proceed
in the regular order.
Chairman MORGAN. After every member has had an opportunity to
ask questions under the 5-minute rule, it has been customary to be
rather lenient in allowing members to proceed for more than 5 minutes.
I am not going to speak for either Mr. Davis, who I know very well, or
Mr. Gross, b I participated in working out an arrangement with
the Manpower Subcommittee, which was adopted by the House, which
established the number of supergrade jobs.
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TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT 201
I think Mr. Gross agreed with me. I don't know why he is ob-
jecting now.
Mr. GROSS. I certainly agreed with it, but what I am trying to say
is,
Mr. Chairman they are going out into the contract field.
Mr. THOMSON. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. O'HARA. Certainly.
Mr. THOMSON. I would like Mr. Foster to make the reply he in-
dicated.
Chairman MORGAN. I think he wants to. With Mr. O'Hara's per-
mission he would like to reply.
Mr. FOSTER. I will make a very brief comment.
Mr. Gross, that was not I you were talking about.
Mr. GROSS. I beg your pardon.
Mr. FOSTER. I say you didn't talk to me on that subject at all. That
happened to be Mr. Fisher.
Mr. GROSS. You were there.
Mr. FOSTER. I was not there. When was this?
Mr. GROSS. I can't give you the specific date.
Mr. FOSTER. September 1961?
'Chairman MORGAN. September 1961.
Mr. GROSS. I can't give you the specific date. I will get it for you.
Mr. FOSTER. I was not present. I did not have that conversation.
Mr. O'HARA. Now, Mr. Chairman, do I still have the floor?
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara.
Mr. O'HARA. Might I ask the chairman how much longer we are
going to remain here?
Chairman MORGAN. As lonc, as you have any questions.
Do you have any questions,%Ir. O'Hara?
:Mr. O'HARA. If I stop, do we adjourn?
Chairman MORGAN. I don't know whether Governor Thomson or
Mr. Fraser have any questions.
Mr. THOMSON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Do you have any questions, Mr. Fraser?
Mr. .O'HARA. I will yield to Mr. Fraser. May I first remark that
in my opinion Mr. Foster has .been one of the most convincing and
intelligently articulate witnesses I have ever heard at a congressional
hearing. I think the gentleman from Iowa erred in judgment in con-
tinuing his interrogation.
Mr. GROSS. What is this?
Mr. O'HARA. He more than answered every question that you asked
him. Every tune you asked him a question you got a complete,
elusive answer.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Fisher holds what position in your organization?
Mr. FOSTER. Deputy Director.
Mr. GROSS. You are Deputy Director?
Mr. FISHER. I was not at the time of the discussion.
Mr. BARRY. Mr. Chairman, I move we adjourn.
Mr. O'HARA. Second the motion.
Chairman MORGAN. If there are no further questions, the committee
stands adjourned.
Thank you, Mr. Foster.
(Whereupon, at 12 :48 p.m., the committee adjourned.)
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202 TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
(The following statement was submitted for inclusion in the record:)
STATEMENT OF THE STUDENT PEACE UNION
The Student Peace Union, an organization of young people with close to 5,000
members on college and high school campuses across the Nation, would like
to go on record as advocating the fullest possible support of an adequate appro-
priation for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
According to its statement of purpose, the Student Peace Union "believes that
war can no longer be used successfully to settle international disputes," and
further asserts that we "must seek new and creative means of achieving a free
and peaceful society." As a step toward seeking those new and creative means
of ending the arms race, we welcomed the passage in the last session of Congress
of the bill establishing the ACDA.
The passage of the ACDA bill by bipartisan majorities of 73 to 14 in the Senate
and 290 to 54 in the House was an encouraging sign that at long last this country
was determined to bring to bear on the complex problems of disarmament the
best minds in the country.
Public Law 87-297, which established the ACDA, described the Agency's pur-
pose in these words: "" * An ultimate goal of the United Sttaes is a world
which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments;
in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in
which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully."
It seems obvious to us that the 18 years since the beginning of the nuclear age
have been marked by neglect of the warning spoken by Albert Einstein, who said
that "the unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes
of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." We must
change our "modes of thinking" about the nature of the arms race, for the nature
of modern warfare is such that any recourse to it will mean the end of civili-
zation as we know it and the destruction of our ideals of democracy.
When the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established, it was
given authorization to spend up to $10 million. That money is now exhausted.
It has become apparent that if the Agency is to discharge the mission given it,
its authorization must be greatly increased. When the Senate this year passed
S. 777, authorizing new funds for the Agency, it only provided for expenditures
of $20 million for the next 2 fiscal years, or $10 million per year. The House bill,
H.R. 3299, has an open-ended authorization, and the Appropriations Committee
will probably grant the Agency close to the amount already approved by the
Senate.
In our view, neither the Senate appropriation nor the proposal in the House
to grant the Agency $15 million per year is realistic. The complex problems of
disarmament cannot be thoroughly researched on such a picayune monetary
foundation. The Senate Armed Services Committee recently reported a mili-
tary appropriations bill calling for the expenditure of more than $47 billion for
the Defense Department for the current fiscal year. This represents more than
$5 million each hour for the Military Establishment. The magnitude of these
figures brings to mind the cogent warning of the Secretary of Defense, who
stated in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that "as
the arms race continues and the weapons multiply and become more swift and
deadly, the possibility of a global catastrophe, either by miscalculation or design,
becomes more real." In concluding his statement, Secretary McNamara stated
that "more armaments, whether offensive or defensive, cannot solve this
dilemma."
In our pinchpenny attitude toward appropriations for the ACDA, we seem to
have ignored the import of these words. One cannot formulate a coherent policy
on disarmament on a budget less than that spent by the Defense Department in 2
hours. The Student Peace Union favors an appropriation at least double that
approved in S. 777. This seems to us a bare minimum.
We would also like to make certain comments on the operation of the Agency
itself. In several respects, we are critical of the efforts of the Agency, although
we realize that many of its deficiencies are due to the restricted budget on which
it has been forced to operate. The Agency has carried out some valuable func-
tions. The preparation of the "Outlines of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on Gen-
eral and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" has served as a fruitful
basis for the 17-nation disarmament negotiations in Geneva, and hopefully the
United States will go back to Geneva, after the ratification of the limited test
ban treaty, determined to negotiate a comprehensive disarmament treaty.
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Another solid achievement of the Agency has been the studies commissioned by
it to investigate the steps needed to provide the economic adjustments necessary
for disarmament, so vital to our economic well-being. The report of the panel of
economists headed by Dr. Emile Benoit, of Columbia University, was an effective
presentation of the feasibility of a rationally planned program for economic
adjustment.
Unfortunately, in our view, these studies represent only a minimal commitment
on the part of the administration and the Agency to the development of a com-
prehensive attack on this problem. We fully support the proposal of Senator
George McGovern, on August 2, that an Economic Conversion Commission be
established to carry out programs in this area.
Another area in which we feel that the Agency has not fulfilled its promise is its
unwillingness to study in depth the political problems underlying the cold war,
and their relation to disarmament. The study of the possible military disen-
gagement of Central Europe is vital, but it has been virtually ignored. We be-
lieve that the Agency should be encouraged to commission research on these
political problems by scholars representing a wide range of opinion, so that the
administration can get the benefit of widely divergent views. The Agency has
seemed to us too cautious in this area.
It is a matter of common knowledge that many of the most promising staff
members of the Agency have left it because of: (1) dissatisfaction with the scope
of studies undertaken, and (2) the reluctance of Congress to provide adequate
funding for studies needed in various fields.
It is the opinion of the Student Peace Union that the functions of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency cannot be fulfilled unless the Congress is willing
to appropriate a much greater amount of money for its operation.
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