U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200170026-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: July 31, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

1964
Approved FoE MUNAL K ~tci7 Pf RJq f 0200170026-2
mately 156,000 is allocated to three coun-
tries, Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany;
and only 30 percent is available for over 100
other countries and areas. A careful exam-
ination of our actual immigration policy over
the last 10 years reveals that this is not an
accurate picture.
The fact that we are a country of many
races and national origins, that those who
built this country and developed it made de-
cisions about opening our doors to the rest
of the world, that anything which makes it
appear that we, ourselves, are discriminat-
ing in principle against particular national
origins, suggests that we think less well of
our citizens of those national origins, than
of other citizens, and that we are somehow
fearful or timid about receiving other such
citizens from certain parts of the world.
The national origins principle, rather than
the facts of our actual immigration, is
picked up by people unfriendly to the
United States and made an issue in their
countries. This causes political disturb-
ances in the good relations which we would
hope to establish.
I therefore urge the committee to reflect
in the letter of the law the policy adopted by
the Congress during the last decade and to
eliminate, with the safeguards proposed by
the administration bill, the national ori-
gins system which has created an unwhole-
some atmosphere in our foreign relations.
The administration's proposal eliminates
the national origins system on a gradual
basis by reducing all quotas by 20 percent
each year for 5 years. The present total au-
thorized annual quota admissions of ap-
proximately 156,000 would be maintained,
except initially all minimum quotas and
subquotas would be increased from 100 to
200. These minimum quotas would have
the 20-percent reducation each year applied
to them.
A quota reserve pool is established by sec-
tion 2 of the bill before the committee un-
der which all numbers would be allocated
by the fifth year. In each of the 5 years con-
stituting the period of transition, the pool
would consist of (1) the numbers released
from national origin qoutas each year, un-
der the 20 percent progressive reduction plan
and (2) numbers assigned to the old quotas
but unused the previous year because insuf-
ficient demand for them existed in the as-
signed quota area.
Experience has shown that we have ap-
proximately 50,000 visa numbers annually
which are unused and are not available for
reallocation to other quota areas. These
unused numbers are chiefly from the United
Kingdom and Irish qoutas.
In the fifth year all quota allocations would
be made from the quota reserve pool which
would then become a world-wide quota. So
that no one country could enjoy a dispropor-
tionate amount of numbers from the pool
based on registrations of relatively long-
standing, the bill provides that no one of the
highly oversubscribed quota areas would re-
ceive more than 10 percent of the total au-
thorized quota numbers.
A strict first-come, first-served basis of al-
locating visa quotas would create some prob-
lems in certain countries of Northern and
Western Europe, which under the national
origins system enjoyed a situation where
quota numbers were readily available to visa
applicants.
To apply the new principle rigidly would
result, after a few years, in eliminating im-
migration from these countries almost en-
tirely. Such a result would be undesirable,
not only because it frustrates the aim of the
bill that immigration from all countries
should continue, but also because many of
the countries so affected are among our clos-
est allies. At a time when our national se-
curity rests in large part on a continual
strengthening of our ties with these coun-
tries, it would be anomalous indeed to re-
r
16939
strict opportunities for their nationals here.
Therefore, the bill allows the President to.
reserve a portion of the pool for allocation
to qualified immigrants, who could obtain
visas under the present system, but not under
the terms of the bill before the committee,
and whose admission would further the na-
tional security interests in maintaining close
ties with their countries. The bill before you
proposes that 50 percent of the pool be avail-
able for this purpose. However, since the
introduction of the bill we have determined,
in consultation with the Attorney General,
that 30 percent of the pool would suffice to
meet our objective. This is indicated in a
projection of estimated admissions for the
first 5 years under the bill and in the com-
putation of the estimated percentage of the
reserve which will be utilized annually dur-
ing the first 5 years. I am pleased to offer
these charts for the record.
The second issue to which I should like to
address myself is our immigration policy
toward Asian persons. We urge the Congress
to bring to a final conclusion a development
which began more than 20 years ago; we do
not ask for a drastic departure from existing
policy. As you well know, Mr. Chairman, the
Congress eliminated the Chinese exclusion
laws in 1943 at the request of President
Roosevelt. At that time it established a
quota which permitted Chinese persons to
immigrate to this country. Progressively
liberal amendments have followed this well-
considered beginning of a revision of our
exclusion policy as far as Asian persons are
concerned. Race as a bar to naturalization
and thereby to immigration was eliminated
with the passage of the Immigration and
Nationality Act in 1952. That act placed
Asian spouses and children of American citi-
zens on equal footing with all other immi-
grants of non-Asian ancestry by giving them
the privilege of nonquota status. The es-
tablishment of an upper limit of 2,000 for the
so-called minimum quotas in the Asian area,
and the rule that the quota of an Asian per-
son born outside Asia be governed by an-
cestry, remained the only discriminatory
provisions in the 1952 act as far as Asian per-
sons are concerned. The 2,000 limit on the
number of Asian immigrants from any non-
quota area was removed by Congress in 1961.
Therefore, only one discriminatory provision
remains in the law as far as Asian persons
are concerned. This provision requires that
an Asian person be charged to an Asian quota
even if he was born outside Asia, whether in
a quota or nonquota area.
For all practical purposes, Congress has
already significantly tempered this provision
during the last 10 years by passing the special
legislation to which I referred earlier. This
observation is best documented by the vol-
ume and composition of immigration from
the major countries in the Far East-119,677
`immigrants came to the United States from
China, Japan, and the Philippines from 1953
to 1963. More than 90 percent of these im-
migrants, 109,654, were nonquota immigrants.
Those who read our immigration laws and
see that China has access to 205 quota num-
bers annually while Japan has a quota of
185, and the Philippines a qouta of 100, are
unaware of the actual number of immigrants
from these countries. Against the back-
ground of the volume of Asian immigration
into the United States between 1953 and 1963,
any increase in the volume of immigration
resulting from the proposed amendments
would be limited. We deprive ourselves of
a powerful weapon in our fight against mis-
information if we do not reconcile here too
the letter of the law with the facts of im-
migration and thus erase the unfavorable
impression which unjustifiably has become
attached to our immigration policy toward
Asian persons.
it is of great importance to us from a for-
eign policy point of view that this last ves-
tige of discrimination against Asian persons
I should like to address myself first to
the formula by which we select quota im-
migrants. When Congress in 1924 devised
this method usually referred to as the na-
tional origins system, its primary objective
was to' maintain the ethnic balance among
the American population as it existed in
1920.
This system preserves preferences based on
race and place of birth in the admission of
quota immigrants to the United States. This
results in discrimination in our hospitality
to different nationalities in a world situation
which is quite different from that which
existed at the time the national origins sys-
tem was originally adopted.
Since the end of World War II, the United
States has been placed in a critical role of
leadership in 'a troubled and changing world.
We are concerned to see that our immigra-
tion laws,reffect our'real character and ob-
jectives.
What other peoples think about us plays
an important role In the achievement of our
foreign policies. We in the United States
have learned to judge our fellow Americans
on the basis of their ability, industry, intel-
ligence, integrity, and all the other factors
which truly determine a man's value to so-
ciety. We do not reflect this judgment of our
fellow citizens when we hold to immigration
laws which classify men according to na-
tional and geographical origin. It is not
difficult, therefore, to understand the re-
action to this policy of a man from a geo-
graphical area, or of a national origin, which
is not favored by our present quota laws.
Irrespective of whether the man desires to
come to the United States or not, he gets the
impression that our standards of judgment
are not based on the merits of the individ-
ual-as we proclaim-but rather on an as-
sumption which can be interpreted as bias
and prejudice.
This basic rule embodying the national
origins systems was not intended to be the
exclusive principle governing American im-
migration policy. From the very beginning
Congress gave equal weight to our good
neighbor policy when it exempted from quota
restrictions natives of our sister republics in
the Western Hemishpere. Similarly, the
Congress recognized the importance of
uniting separated families by permitting
wives and children of U.S. citizens to join
their husbands and fathers outside of any
quota restrictions. As the years progressed,
the Congress has permitted more and more
classes of immigrants to come to the United
States irrespective of their national origin.
In passing the Displaced Persons Act of 1948,
the Refugee Relief Act in 1953, and the Fair
Share Refugee-Escapee Act in 1960, the Con-
gress has made major contributions to the
solution of the refugee problem. The main
objective of these acts was to permit refugees
to come to the United States expeditiously
without subjecting them to delays as a result
of quota restrictions. ' During the last 7
years the Congress, in five bills, has taken
additional steps to ease existing quota re-
strictions by admitting 'as nonquota immi-
grants those quota immigrants who had been
waiting for visas for a considerable period
of time. Asa result of this liberalizing pol-
icy of the Congress, only 34 percent of the
2,599,340 immigrants who came to the United
States from 1953: through 1962 were quota
immigrants.
The action we urge upon you, Mr. Chair-
man, is, therefore, not to make a drastic de-
parture from a long established immigra-
tion policy but rather to reconcile our im-
migration policy as it has developed in recent
years with the letter of the general law. The
image held by many here and abroad of our
immigration policy is one of discrimination
which selects prospective immigrants based
strictly on their national origin. This is un-
derstandable, since 70 percent of the total
authorized annual immigration of approxi-
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be eliminated from our immigration laws.
This action would bring to a logical conclu-
sion the progressive policy the Congress has
followed since 1943.
Two aspects of our present immigration
laws are a source of misunderstanding and
friction in the hemisphere.
A major problem arises from the fact that
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
exempts from quota limitations only those
persons born in Western Hemisphere coun-
tries that were independent at the time the
law was enacted. This means that Jamaica
and Trinidad-which achieved their inde-
pendence after the date of the act-are each
subjected to restrictions of 100 quota visas
annually while their hemisphere neighbors
are not. An additional irritant for these two
countries is the fact that the language of
the present law would grant nonquota status
automatically to dependencies on the main-
land If they become independent.
The Governments and people of Jamaica
and Trinidad have made strong representa-
tions asking to be placed on an equal footing
with the other American states.
It has long been the policy of the Congress
to recognize the unique status of our inde-
pendent hemisphere neighbors by according
them nonquota immigration status. Ja-
maica and Trinidad are among the friendliest
of these neighbors. I urge the committee to
remove the accidental discrimination against
them by granting nonquota status. The ad-
ministration's proposal would also accord
nonquota status to any dependencies that
achieve independence in the future. making
it clear to all concerned that there are no
seoond-class countries In the hemisphere
family.
The differential treatment accorded Ja-
maica and Trinidad In the matter of non-
quota status is compounded by the so-called
Asia-Pacific triangle provisions of existing
law which require that persons of Asian an-
cestry be charged to the quota of their ethnic
origin rather than their place of birth. This
provision of the Immigration and National-
ity Act affects most countries in the hemi-
sphere since in many of them some segment
of the population is of Asian ethnic origin.
The question has special importance for
Jamaica and Trinidad (roughly 40 percent
of the Trinidad population is of Asian an-
cestry) since the law not only discriminates
against these two countries on the basis of
nationality by withholding nonquota status,
but, in addition, establishes differential
treatment for large segments of their popu-
lations on the basis of Asian ancestry-even
though the persons affected are often gen-
erations removed from Asia, Nonquota sta-
tus for Jamaica and Trinidad would have
no significance for these persons unless the
Asia-Pacific triangle provisions of the law
are repealed. I respectfully urge that such
action be taken to remove this last vestige of
discrimination-the final step required to
place all immigrants from our sister Ameri-
can states on an equal footing.
I realize, you may be concerned about the
effect of granting nonquota status to these
countries on the flow of Immigration to the
United States. No doubt this flow will in-
crease slightly as a result of this action.
since the United States has always had an
attraction for those seeking economic op-
portunity and political freedom. I do not
believe, however, that this Increase will be
dramatic or injurious to our national in-
terest. We do not ask that the qualitative
requirements be lifted or modified for these
immigrants. They, as all others, will have
to satisfy the public charge provisions of
the law. They will have to pass the health,
educational, and security tests prescribed by
existing law. Furthermore, the Secretary of
Labor always has the authority to close the
door to immigrants whose admission would
adversely affect the working conditions of
American labor, or who would take posi-
tions for which American labor is available.
Without going into details of the eco-
nomic aspects of the administration's pro-
posal, on which Secretary Wirtz will expand
when he testifies before this committee, I
would like to make a few general observa-
tions.
When Congress developed the national
origins system in 1924, it appears that it
may have been fearful that our country
would be swamped with vast numbers of un-
trained and impoverished people. Present-
day immigration is very different in volume
and makeup from the older migration on
which most of our thinking is still based;
and its significance for this country Is con-
siderably different. Immigration now comes
in limited volume and includes a relatively
high proportion of older people, females, and
persons of high skill and training.
The significance of immigration for the
'United States now depends less on the num-
ber than on the quality of the immigrants.
The explanation for the high professional
and technical quality of present immigra-
tion lies in part in the nonquota and pref-
erence provisions of our immigration laws
that favor the admission of highly quell-
fied migrants. But still more it depends
on world conditions of postwar economic and
social dislocations, discriminations, and
insecurities in various parts of the world
that have disturbed social and occupational
strata not normally disposed to emigrate
and has attracted them to the greater po-
litical freedom and economic opportunity
offered in the United States. Under present
circumstances the United States has a rare
opportunity to draw migrants of high in-
telligence and ability from abroad; and im-
migration, if well administered, can be one
of our greatest national resources, a source
of manpower and brain power in a divided
world.
Mr. Chairman. I urge you and members of
this committee to give most careful con-
sideration to the President's proposals em-
bodied in S. 1932. The adoption of these
proposals would substantially assist In the
conduct of our foreign relations because
their impact Ismuch wider than just on our
Immigration situation. History has made
of this country a people drawn from many
races, religions, and national origins.
The central issue of our time is between
freedom and coercion-between free societies
and a world of free nations, on the one hand,
and a world in which the human race is
regimented under Communist rule. As the
great leader of the cause of freedom, we are
expected to exemplify all that freedom
means. We have proclaimed, again and
again, from the Declaration of Independence
until the present day, that freedom is the
right of all men. The rest of the world
watches us closely to see whether or not
we live up to the great principles we have
proclaimed and promoted. Our blemishes
delight our enemies and dismay our friends.
In recent legislation, the Congress has re-
affirmed our basic commitment to ourselves:
that all our citizens are equally entitled to
their rights as citizens and human beings.
I believe that the amendments to our
immigration laws proposed by the adminis-
tration would materially strengthen our po-
sition in the world struggle In which we are
engaged. And if we remain alert and ener-
getic and resolute, and true to the Ideas and
Ideals which gave birth to our Nation and
which have now seized the minds of men
everywhere. Including millions behind the
Iron and Bamboo Curtains, I have no doubt
as to how the contest between freedom and
coercion will be resolved.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
U.B. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
Mr. HART. Mr. President, Americans
share with Cuban refugees an active de-
sire for the liberation of their homeland;
and we are pledged to help defend and
strengthen the forces of freedom
throughout this hemisphere.
The solemn words of Secretary of State
Rusk before the Organization of Ameri-
can States-OAS-last week, put on the
line, once again, America's attitude to-
ward the Castro regime and the Commu-
nist subversion of this hemisphere. More
important, Mr. President, the Secretary's
statement and the affirmative steps taken
by the OAS reflect our active determina-
tion to continue the two longstanding
principal lines of strategy for dealing
with the menace of Castro's communism.
These lines of strategy are summarized
well in a white paper issued by the State
Department In May 1964:
First. we must take all possible measures
to strengthen the Latin American nations so
that they may, through individual and col-
lective means, resist Communist subversion.
Second, we must employ all available in-
struments of power less than acts of war to
limit or reduce the ability of the Cuban
Goverment to advance the Communist cause
in Latin America through propaganda, sab-
otage, and subversion.
To the greatest extent possible, we are pur-
suing both Lines of strategy within the
framework of the inter-American system.
Mr, President, these lines of strategy
reflect the responsible leadership Presi-
dent Johnson is giving to our Nation's
foreign relations. I deeply believe they
also reflect an American consensus-sup-
ported, I may add, by an overwhelming
majority of the Cuban exiles-or. how to
handle Castro.
As the white paper correctly points
out-and I emphasize this point, Mr.
President-even the most vigorous critics
of our Cuban policy reject the taking of
steps that involve acts of war.
On the other hand, there currently
seems little sign of a possibility to nego-
tiate seriously with the present regime.
As President Johnson said recently, we
need deeds, not words, from the Castro
regime. In my book, this Is a long list of
deeds, including the release of thousands
of political prisoners who Castro finally
admits are in his dungeons.
The generally accepted limits of Amer-
ican policy toward Cuba, therefore, are
well defined and narrow. It behooves
the vigorous critics to bear this factor in
mind, and not delude the American
people into believing there are prudent
alternatives to accomplish miracles over-
night.
The disheveled state of Cuban society
and the frantic pleas for help by the
Castro brothers would indicate that our
policy of collective action to isolate Cuba
is bearing fruit. There is little doubt in
my mind that the United States is in a
position of great strength as it continues
to cope with the Castro regime. The
steps taken by the OAS reinforce our
position.
Mr. President, it is hoped that a re-
sponsible political alternative to the
Castro regime will emerge on the island
of Cuba. In the meantime, I am con-
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1964 Approved F SI05
fident that our Government will con-
tinue to use wisely our great strength as
we pursue determined efforts to broaden
the boundaries of freedom within this
hemisphere.
The Cuban white paper, issued by the
State Department in May, is a helpful
document and a clear statement of the
basis and content of U.S. policy toward
Cuba. I commend it to Senators; and
I ask unanimous consent it be printed
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
Mr. President, as Senators know, sev-
eral American newsmen and journalists
are currently in Cuba. Their reports
should be of interest to all Americans.
As Mr. Derick Daniels, assistant manag-
ing editor of the Detroit Free Press, put
it:
Our man will report what he sees and finds
in what we consider to be a newsworthy spot.
Two reports by Mr. Lee Winfrey, of
the Detroit Free Press, and one report
by Mr. Al Burt, of the Miami Herald,
were published in the July 25 and 26
issues of the Miami Herald. I ask unan-
imous consent these three articles also
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the pam-
phlet and the articles were ordered to be
printed in the RECORD, as follows:
EXHIBIT 1
U.S. POLICY .TOWARD CUBA
Foreign policies are rarely born full armed
like Minerva. More often they evolve in
response to events and circumstances.
in such cases there is a danger that the
assumptions on which policies are founded
may become obscured.
This has happened to some extent with
regard to our policy toward the present
government of Cuba. Some of the public
discussion that has surounded that policy
has involved misapprehensions on a num-
ber of fronts-misapprehensions as to the
nature of the danger posed by the present
and potential activities of the Castro gov-
ernment, misapprehensions as to the range
of policies available to counter that danger,
and misapprehensions as to the objectives
that we can expect to accomplish by the
policies employed.
We shall try to answer some of the ques-
tions that have arisen with regard to our
Cuba policy and shall try to clarify some of
the confusion that has been apparent in the
public debate.
First, what is the nature of the threat
imposed by the existence of a Communist
regime in Cuba?
It is not, in our judgment, a 'military
threat to the United States. We shall never
permit it to menace our own strategic power,
as our actions 4n October 19e2 demonstrated.
We are taking constant and effective meas-
ures to insure that such a threat does not
occur again-and we shall continue to take
those measures.
Nor do we regard Cuba as a direct military
threat to Latin America. The Cuban armed
forces are large and equipped with modern
weaponry. They are by all odds the most
powerful military establishment in Latin
America. But Ciba does not possess airlift
and sealift sufficient to permit it to- take
offensive action against its neighbors, and,
in any event, we maintain overwhelming
military forces in,the area to prevent Cuba
from attacking other American Republics.
The menace of Castro communism to Latin
America is of a different and perhaps a more
modern kind. It is the menace of subver-
sion-the undermining of existing govern-
ments, the arming of organized Communist
minorities, and the mounting of campaigns
of sabotage and terror.
Some areas of Latin America are peculiarly
vulnerable to such tactics. Vulnerability is
greatest where social injustice is widely
prevalent, where anachronistic societies re-
main dominated by small elites-tight little
oligarchies that control the bulk of the pro-
ductive wealth. In some places these oli-
garchies have only recently-and reluc-
tantly-begun to make concessions to the
insistent demands of the millions of eco-
nomically submerged peoples for a measure
of social justice and a decent standard of
living.
For Latin America, as has been frequently
remarked, is in the throes of a great trans-
formation from a continent of backward so-
cieties to a continent of new, modern na-
tions. During this period of change and
tension, it offers a tempting target for the
Communists. They are at least as conscious
as we of the importance and weakness of the
area. They are at least as determined as we
to see that the brew produced by the Latin
American ferment is to their liking. They
have, therefore, regarded the establishment
of a Communist government in Cuba-a
Communist Latin American state at the very
doorstep of the United States-as a major
asset for communism.
CASTRO'S BID FOR POWER
In their determination to establish a cen-
ter of subversion for Latin America in Cuba,
the Communists have found a natural lieu-
tenant in Fidel Castro. Castro regards him-
self as the "liberator" of all Latin America.
A born revolutionary, driven by a hunger
for power and prestige, he looks upon the
southern half of the American Continent as
a proper field for the fulfillment of his ambi-
tions. He seeks a revolutionary millennium
in which the example. of Cuba will have
swept the continent, and his position of
liberator and leader-not of the small island
of Cuba, but of all Latin America-will have
been assured. -
This vision springs from his psychological
and political needs. It is necessary to the
man and equally to his followers, whose revo-
lutionary enthusiasm must be constantly
fed on the prospect of further advance
beyond the confines of the island-an island
which they look upon as the base from which
the continentwide revolution will be propa-
gated by word and deed.
That Castro intends to extend Communist
power, and that he is actively seeking to do
so, have been clearly shown. The most re-
cent and dramatic evidence is the three tons
of arms sent from Cuba to Venezuelan Cas-
troist insurgents. An investigating commit-
tee of the Organization of American States
(OAS) was appointed to study all aspects of
this case. It found that the evidence clearly
substantiated the Venezuelan Government's
charges of Cuban intervention and aggres-
sion. The committee's report provides the
basis for further collective OAS action
against Cuba, and the members are consult-
ing now among themselves to determine the
collective measures which should be taken.
TWO LINES OF STRATEGY
The United States, as the strongest nation
in the Western Hemisphere, is faced with a
difficult but - practical problem. With the
existence of a Communist center in Latin
America, how do we and our Latin American
allies prevent that center from being used
as an active center for Communist Infection?
The most obvious and direct way to elimi-
nate the Castro regime in Cuba would be by
direct military action designed to replace the
present government by a non-Communist
government friendly to the West. Less di-
rect action might take the form of an
enforced blockade-which would still be an
act of war.
At the other end of the spectrum from
military action is a policy of trying to nego-
tiate with Castro. Taking account of the
decisions reached within the American sys-
tem, we have consistently maintained that
two elements in the Cuban situation are not
negotiable. First, Castro's political, eco-
nomic, and military dependence upon the
Soviets; and, second, the continuance of Cas-
tro's subversive activities in Latin America.
We see no present evidence that Castro is
prepared to eliminate these two conditions-
and, in fact, the evidence thus- far is all the
other way.
The limits within which the United States
must erect a Cuban policy are, therefore, well
defined and narrow. If, on the one hand, we
do not wish to adopt policies that involve an
act of -war-and even the most vigorous
critics of our Cuban policy have rejected this
course of action-and, on the other, there
seems little sign of a possibility of serious
negotiation with the present regime, we are
left with two principal lines of strategy for
dealing with the menace of Castro's Cuba to
Latin America: -
First, we must take all possible measures
to strengthen the Latin American nations so
that they may, through individual and col-
lective means, resist Communist subversion.
Second, we must employ all available in-
struments of power.less than acts of war to
limit or reduce the ability of the Cuban
Government to advance the Communist
cause in Latin America through propaganda,
sabotage, and subversion.
To the greatest extent possible, we are
pursuing both these lines of strategy within
the framework of the inter-American system.
We have sought to make clear to our Latin
American friends that the problem of pro-
tecting the continent against the menace of
Castro communism must be tackled by the
American states as a collective undertaking.
The Organization of American States is the
principal instrumentality for this purpose,
but we are also employing other multilateral
groupings within the Inter-American family.
In January 1962, the Foreign Ministers of
the OAS formally found the Castro regime
to be incompatible with the inter-American
system and excluded it from further partici-
pation In that system. The Foreign Ministers
also approved the immediate suspension of -
trade with Cuba in arms and war material.
In early October 1962, the Foreign Min-
isters of the OAS informally met to consider
the problems arising from growing Sino-
Soviet Intervention in Cuba, particularly the
attempt to convert the island into an armed
base for Communist subversive penetration
of the hemisphere. In their conclusions, tba
Foreign Ministers pointed out:
1. The need for the American Republics
and all other independent countries to re-
view their policies on trade with Cuba, in-
cluding the use of their ships in the Cuban
trade;
2. The importance of intensifying meas-
ures against Communist subversion;
3. The desirability of keeping a careful
check on the delivery of arms to Cuba; and
4. The need for special studies of the
transfer of funds for subversive purposes, the
flow of subversive propaganda, and the utili-,
zation of Cuba as a base for training In-sub-
versive techniques.
The Council of the OAS subsequently di-
rected the preparation of a special study on
measures for controlling funds, propaganda,
and training for subversive purposes. The
Council sent the report, incorporating spe-
cific and general recommendations in these
three fields, to member governments in July
1963 urging that the recommended measures
be carried out promptly.
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Meanwhile, in April 1963, the five Central
American Republics, together with Panama
and the United States, undertook a coopera-
tive effort to safeguard the Caribbean area
against Cuban subversive activities. At that
meeting, and at a subsequent second meet-
ing in January 1984, the cooperating coun-
tries agreed on a series of measures to In-
crease the security of the countries of the
area. The program includes the control of
subversive travel, funds, and propaganda, the
strengthening of security organizations, and
the improvement of communications be-
tween national security agencies.
'Following its own investigation of the re-
cently discovered Venezuelan arms cache,
the OAS is now studying additional measures
for dealing with Cuba as a base of subversion
and for policing Cuban-supported activities
in Latin America.
These cooperative actions by the American
states have shown considerable success. In
order to control movement to and from Cuba
for subversive purposes, many Latin Ameri-
ican governments have instituted procedures
for restricting travel by their nationals to
Cuba. As a result of these measures, only
50 percent as many Latin Americans were
able to travel to Cuba during 1983 as during
the preceding year.
We continue to work with individual gov-
ernments to help them Improve the ability
of their police and armed forces to deal with
terrorism and insurgency. The United States
and Latin American governments are also
cooperating with Increasing effectiveness In
exchanging intelligence on Castroiet sub-
version activities and in improving com-
munications between their security services.
TIE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS
In the long run, however, Latin America
will be rendered Immune to Communist in-
fection only by an amelioration of the con-
ditions-political, economic, and social-in
which subversion flourishes. The United
States and the free nations of Latin America
have, therefore, through the Alliance for
Progress, undertaken a major collective ef-
fort, It is directed at the ambitious target
of transforming the structure and produc-
tive capacity of the Latin American nations
so As to bring about not merely an increase
but a more equitable distribution of re-
sources.
Given the magnitude of this undertaking.
it will be years before major results can be
achieved. But until such a transformation
Is accomplished, Latin America will remain
a fertile'seedbed for Communist subversion.
PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC DENIAL
By strengthening the Latin American na-
tions through collective political, economic.
and military measures we are Increasing
their ability to resist subversion. But at the
same time we must actively pursue measures
against Cuba to limit its ability to subvert.
In this effort we are exploiting the propa-
ganda potential to the fullest. But an in-
formation program must be regarded pri-
marily as a supplement to substantive pol-
ides, Given the present limits of action.
we must rely, as our major instrument, on
a systematic program of economic denial.
This is the only policy-short of the use
of force-that gives promise of having a sig-
nificant impact on Cuba and its continuance
as a Communist base in the Western Hem-
isphere.
Such a program, in our judgment, can and
does work effectively to achieve objectives
that are in the manifest Interest not only
of the United States and Latin America but
of other free-world nations.
In discussing the effectiveness of this pro-
gram, let us make one point quite clear. We
have never contended that a program of eco-
nomic denial-short of an act of war such
as a military blockade that would cut off
bloc as well as free-world trade-is likely
by Itself to bring down the present Cuban
reginle-
The objectives which this program can no-
compllsh ate more limited. They are four
in number:
First--and most Important-to demon-
strate to the peoples of the American Re-
publics that communism has no future In
the Western Hemisphere;
Second, to make plain to the people of
Cuba and to elements of the power struc-
ture of the regime that the present regime
cannot serve their interests;
Third, to reduce the will and ability of
the present Cuban regime to export subver-
s on and violence to the other American
states;
Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet
Union of maintaining a Communist outpost
in the Western Hemisphere.
Those are the objectives which we seek
to achieve by a program of economic denial
against Cuba. That program reflects the
purpose of the Organitation of American
States. In our opinion, it Is realistically
designed to accomplish the limited but none-
theless important objectives toward which it
Is directed.
Z'F? rTVENEss OF THE DENIAL PROGRAM
Economic denial Is a weapon that must be
used with great selectivity. It can never be
more effective than the economic circum-
stances of the target country. A program
of general economic denial against the So-
viet Union, for example, would in the long
run make little sense, since the Soviet Union
imports from the free world only about one-
half of 1 percent of its gross national prod-
uct.
But Cuba presents a wholly different situa-
tion. It is a small island with meager nat-
ural resources and a low level of industrial
development. Prior to the Castro regime.
its imports from the free world-principally
the United States-represented more than
s0 percent of its gross national product.
Those Imports were the vital elements of
its economic prosperity. They consisted
principally of industrial goods and equip-
ment, fuel, raw materials. and foodstuffs.
Cube's industrial installations. its power-
plants, Its sugar mills, its transportation
equipment, are all of western origin. After
5 years Cuba's industrial plant is obsolete
and rapidly deteriorating. With no con-
tinuing supply of spare parts, it has resorted
to cannibalizing Its existing equipment.
In addition, Cuba has become far more
exposed and vulnerable to economic pressure
because Castro's internal policies have driven
into exile several hundred thousand Cu-
bans--t a managerial and professional elite.
There is now a great shortage of skills, and
much of the equipment In the industrial
plant Is mishandled. This situation has
been further aggravated by management de-
cisions taken on Ideological, rather than
economic, grounds.
Cuba is. therefore, vulnerable to a policy
Of economic denial. Its vulnerability is well
illustrated by what has happened to the
Cuban economy since trade with the West
was first restricted. Today the Cuban stand-
ard of living Is some 20 percent below pre-
Castro levels. Many essential Items are ra-
tioned and many imported Items, such as
fresh fruits and canned goods, have almost
disappeared. The Cuban people are allowed
two bars of soap per person per month, 3
pounds of meat per person per month, and 8
ounces of coffee per person per month-when
they can get them.
Industrial output, which accounts for less
than 25 percent of the gross national prod-
uct, has remained stagnant. Quality has fre-
quently been sacrificed to maintain the
volume of production. In many Industries
output Is shoddy, centralized operations in-
efficient, and labor productivity, extremely
low, in large part because of lack of morale
and incentive. Plants and machinery are
often Idle because of a lack of spare parts
or raw materials, and breakdowns in water,
power, and transport exacerbate the general
disorganization.
Cuban sugar production-the basis of the
entire economy-has fallen drastically.
Last year's production of 3.8 million tons
was the lowest since the early 1940's, and the
crop for this year will probably be near the
same figure.
With the curtailment of free-world trade,
exports have fallen drasticplly-from more
than 4800 million in 1958 to less than $500
million In 1963. The lines of trade have
been completely redrawn. In 1958 substan-
tially all imports came from free-world
sources; last year 85 percent came from the
Communist bloc.
It Is perhaps pertinent to point out that
Cuban exports to Latin America fell from
$24 million in 1953 to an estimated $8 mil-
lion In 1962, while Latin American exports
to Cuba fell from $78 million In 1958 to an
estimated $6.7 million in 1962.
ALLIED COOPERATION
In order to exploit Cuba's economic vul-
nerability we have developed programs of
common action on two levels: First, to re-
strict the availability of free-world shipping
to Cuba; second, to limit the categories of
goods that may be available to Cuba.
In order to make these policies effective,
we have sought the cooperation of the other
major industrialized countries of the free
world, and particularly our NATO allies. We
have obtained considerable, although not
complete, cooperation.
For example, the number of calls by free-
world vessels at Cuban ports dropped 60 per-
cent in 1963 as compared to 1962, and there
are reasonable prospects that, over 1964 as
a whole, there will be a further drop.
Realistically, we must recognize that the
restriction of free-world shipping, while use-
ful, is of only limited utility. Shipping under
the control of the bloc could transport the
goods that Cuba requires, although at the
cost of a considerable reorganization and dis-
ruption of schedules and charters.
Much more important is the denial of
those categories of goods that are most vital
to the operation of the Cuban economy.
This Includes Industrial goods, transport
equipment, and critical materials. Not only
1s Cuba wholly dependent on a large and
continuing import of consumer goods if it is
to maintain more than a subsistence econ-
omy, but its limited industrial plant, includ-
ing the sugar Industry, is based on Western
equipment that Is rapidly becoming worn
out and obsolete and on Western transport
equipment that is rapidly falling apart. It
is important, therefore, that the West should
not bolster the economy by providing spare
parts and replacements.
This was the reason, for example, that the
United States took such a strong position
against the recent sale of 450 buses to the
Castro government-100 of which are to be
used in Havana. Those 400 additional buses
will almost double available public transport
In the city that dominates Cuba's economic
life. Without those buses the efficiency of
the Cuban economy and the level of Cuban
morale would be further impaired.
The sale of Western locomotives to Cuba
could have an even greater impact. Move-
ment of sugar to Cuban ports is almost - en-
tirely by rail, and the motive power of the
Cuban railroad system Is presently In a criti-
cal state of disrepair. In a late-1963 descrip-
tion of the "desperate state" of the railroad
system, a Cuban official organ estimated that
only one-quarter as many locomotives were
then in operating condition as in 1059. To
replace even a part of this equipment would
be a very big boon to the Cuban economy.
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A MISLEADING COMPARISON Cuban economy, let it be clearly understood It is an odd feeling to walk through the
courtyard at the Moncada School where
people
th Cuban
t
d
.
a
The position of our Government in seeking that it is not aime
e. to prevent the sale of such heavy equipment The United States has no quarrel with the these pictures are tacked to every tree, and
to the Cuban regime has, unfortunately, not people of Cuba. It feels no animosity, only have a smiling Cuban teenager come up and
always been fully understood either in the sympathy and sorrow. We have shown our ask you for an American cigarette.
United States or by some of our friends good will by exempting food and medicines Contrasts like that are common here. CTC,
abroad. The question has frequently been from the restrictions imposed on our trade the Communist labor union, put on a show in
people. sought in any tthe square band rsday nighrockt. A feat ll e w usic a
confused by the curious contention that the with Cuba. We have
sale of U.S. wheat sale he Soviet Union e way to
how justifies the saof critical supplies s to to We are confident that the people of Cuba complete with electrified guitar.
Cuba. Such. an argument betrays a misun- will not always be compelled to suffer under There are about 15 American reporters stay-
srof the nature and objectives of democracy, will they be ing the Casa city'stchiefe
the program cent r
all ant to
the of economic denial. achieve freedom and
sitters
As mentioned above, the continentwide able to develop the high potential of their rest Pheir fench eet awhile.a So iarwthewCuban
economy of the Soviet Union, which in many country for economic and social progress.
ways approaches self-sufficiency, is far less And so we oppose the present Cuban regime Government o where tded bleasa e promise to let
vulnerable to economic denial than that of not just because its ambitions menace our reporters (National Institute ple of the Tourist
Cuba. There would be no point in trying to hemispheric neighbors. We oppose it, above busy moving of the re Tourist
influence Soviet strength or Soviet policy by all, because its standards of conduct and its Industry) has been al buses the
general effort to deny exports to that coun- tyrannical practices condemn the Cuban peo- ers rs around in Czech but when they are over no n-
you from wandering off are ver no lo.
try. All that has ever been attempted is a ple to misery and fear. guided
One ps you from stops Friday was a mammoth
selective program of denying access primarily The Cuban people deserve better than that. sto
to strategic goods: tent city, erected in Antonio Maceo baseball
trade in The United has long had a modest [From the Miami 964]) Herald, July 25, park to take care of thousands of campesinos
Union. The esecial aspect of with the t sale coming to town for this weekend rally.
CUBAN ODD CONTRAST: REVOLUTION SAN- Beneath mammoth circus tents, double-
as its unusual size size an e and of the character. wheat sale The UNIFORMS TIAGO REFLECTS REFFLELECTS CTS, AN
was it decked bunks hammered together out of wood
Soviet Union has been traditionally an ex- (By Lee Winfrey) await the guests. The cots have steel springs
porter of wheat, and before approaching the SANTIAGO, CUBA.-Mixing the old Cuban and thin mattresses and they are crammed
Unite it bulk of o its StstwAa had import requirements contracted the culture with the new, Santiago Friday con- so close together you have to walk sideways
Canada Australia. ima. requirements from tinued to prepare for the 26th of July revo- to get between them.
Uniteands ere,f from Soviet from point lutionary rally here Sunday. In such close quarters, hundreds of farm-
were, from th2 'A e million tons At night, along La Trocha Street, Santi- /ers will be able to sleep free. A big mess hall
of States
ss
of view, y discussed Even u the have totaled only ago's annual July carnival makes the neigh- at the end of the grounds is set up to serve
abut 31 dpercent would have totaled bread borhood a bedlam. them box lunches for 50 cents each.
about ro pduction. ercent of normal Soviet bread Between blocks and blocks of open air beer The boxes are about half the size of a
grUn pro joints and pushwagon pig meat stands, the cigarette carton. Friday noon they were
Under sale circumstances the it Is S quite cUnion lear people dance shoulder to shoulder in the filled with rice, tunafish, and sweet potatoes
that of involved the sale d wheat to the Soviet ed t streets to the sound of jukeboxes turned up and early arrivals were eating them as
nvolved considerations quite unrelated to to ear-hammering volume. though they enjoyed them.
th of goods os and involved other in the capital equipment to economi Cubac . In the daytime around Cespedes Squares, Within the tiers of bunks beneath the
god the militiamen walk in ones and twos, each tents, the sexes are not segregated. "My job
was not fag a wheat to the to Soviet Union in green fatigues, each with a heavy .45- was to furnish beds for the campesinos," said
was not of twat importance r the to caliber pistol swinging from a cartridge belt Oscar More, who is in. charge of the grounds.
foodomy ks was of slight Importance But to our around his waist. "The rest is their problem."
foods of industrial the Soviet people. Bour The carnival is old and goes back many Santiago's most obvious problem is a short-
a, serious ous years. It 1s Santiago's version of the Mardi age of some items. At a nearby 5-and-10-
and is parts and transport
Cuban econ- gras and dawn lights the way home for many cent store the other night, the two middle
Impairment in in arts thhoe state Cuba of f the mean
impairm the the revelers who flock there. aisles were open and shoppers wandered
omy. The militiamen are relatively new. Along through them freely to look at novelty items.
Oddly, enough, these two quite meside- with the numberless billboards which blare The aisles on either side were blocked off have liberately, by been confused, quite de-distinct
"Patria o Muerte" (Fatherland or Death) and a store employee admitted shoppers five
li ew : b, by people holding quite disparate would their world dates from July 26, 1953, when at a time as others left. There was a line
views: by an n Europe who would Fidel Castro Ruz, a Havana lawyer, attacked of about 20 people waiting to get in to look
like u find ail by excuse sell he equipment an army barracks here. at .women's blouses, and a line of about 100
to Cuba, and by those i n America ca who would Moncada Barracks, where Castro began his waiting to examine a counter full of pots-and
like to find a basis for attacking the wheat revolution, is now a grammar school with pans.
sale. An objective comparison of these two 285 students. The old parade grounds is now You can buy food in the restaurants and
situations reveals the emptiness of the argu- a baseball diamond and the old concrete prices are less than exorbitant. Chicken and
Pent. walls have been torn down and replaced with rice cost two pesos ($2 even) at the Hotel
TO THE PEOPLE OF CUBA a chain link fence. Imperil Thursday night.
These in brief are the bases for our policy With 157 men and 2 women, Castro at- The most expensive item on the menu Was
toward Cuba and the reasons why we. are tacked the barracks at 5 a.m. on a Sunday shrimp for $3.25.
seeking-and shall continue to seek-to limit when many Santiagueros were making their Breakfast Friday at the Casa Grande cost
the supply of critical goods to the Cuban. weary way home from a carnival. He picked $2.20. The prices of individual items were
economy. a perfect time, for now his annual anniver- 10 cents for coffee, 20 cents for toast, 30 cents
This program is directed at the present sary speech comes at the end of the city's for pineapple juice, and $1.60 for an order of
Cuban Government. It will be continued so most enjoyable week. ham.
long as that government persists in its efforts Santiago normally is a rather dull, drab- There doesn't seem to be any resentment
to subvert and undermine the free societies looking city of about a quarter million. among Santfagueros toward individual
of Latin America. The brightest things in town are the bill- Americans. An American walking through
Within recent weeks it has become more boards. They all say things like "Viva la 26 the streets draws no suspicious glances and
than ever apparent that our program is suc- de Julio" and they are painted in the most no rudeness. In aSometimes shop there is more than
ceeding. Cuba under communism is provid- vivid tones of red and black, that. old man who wandered ho near r the he square,
that
ing a spectacle of economic failure for all There is a new name in this year's 26th of
July rally. one of the shoppers there was an American.
Cuban Far pe eromople, comm offering a unism is better life bringin g fog It is that of Ramon Lopez Pena, who seems The old man was carrying a Bible.
the to see.
to be well on his way to becoming the revo- "God bless you," he said. "I am a Chris-
o
only depression and want.
lution's newest folk hero. tian."
Today the Cuban economy is nt a manage- Lopez Pena was a Cuban soldier who died He wouldn't say any more.
a mess produced tinterference, incompete managel of a gunshot wound outside Guantanamo
ideological io ann t and the refusal
ern Naval Base this week. The Cubans insist [From the Miami (Fla.) Herald, July 26,
of f the United States and d many other r Western that an American sentry shot him, a charge 1964]
societies to deal with a government that is which the United States has denied.
seeking to undermine its neighbors. There are more pictures of Lopez Pena CROWDS HAIL CASTRO AT SANTIAGO FIESTA
The magnitude of the Cuban economic around town than of anyone except Premier (By Lee Winfrey)
failure is clearly apparent in the constant Castro. The posters are all the same-they SANTIAGO, CUBA.-Excitement mounted in
complaints of the present Cuban leaders. show the face of the young soldier, eyes Santiago Saturday as the last few hours
But if our program of economic denial is closed in death, and over his portrait printed passed before the climatic 26th of July Rev-
helping to accentuate the failures of the in red, the words "Yankee Assassins I" olutionary rally today.
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Approved F C,WK ?ffiN%y2iilBD 6 Q4 3R000200170026-2 July 31
The colorful presence of Premier Fidel
Castro helped add to the hubbub.
A feature of Saturday's festivities was a
gymnastic exhibition at Sports City, a 10,000-
seat baseball stadium built here by the Castro
government.
Along the route to the stadiups Saturday
morning, militiamen were posted on the roof
of every building taller than one story.
"They have learned their lesson from Pres-
ident Kennedy," said a source who is not
with the government. "They never had this
before, the militia on the roof. But since
President Kennedy [was shot], they have
this."
The stadium was completely full. Castro,
wearing his customary green fatigues and a
pistol on his hip, entered a few minutes be-
fore 10 a.m. and took a seat in the center
of an elevated -wooden stand, above the con-
crete seats in the rightfield bleachers.
The crowd set up a cheer and began to
clap. Their enthusiasm seemed genuine:
they craned their necks to see the Premier
and they were grinning with apparent de-
light.
After the applause died down, a trained
cheering section began a series of chants.
ending in the cry: "Commandante en jefe
ordene." (Commander in chief, order us.)
The applause then became less pleasant
to hear: it assumed a metronomic heavy-
handed beat, an exercise in adulation. It
went on for several minutes.
Castro looked tired. He has been in town
since Thursday night, doing things like visit-
ing the local carnival at 2 am. and pitching
baseball in the afternoon and he obviously
has been getting little sleep. Other than
that, he appeared well.
Militiamen were scattered throughout the
stands but security did not appear to be ex-
cessive. Most of the uniformed men behaved
like spectators rather than guards, watching
the festivities on the- field most of the time.
The entertainment was a series of tableaus
in which hundreds of young Cubans acted
out various phases of the revolution, in
pantomime.
The first one was entitled "Cuba, Free and
Sovereign." Six hundred young men and
400 young women took part, each dressed
entirely in white and carrying a brilliant
flag of solid scarlet.
They marched around for awhile to the
accompaniment of music, blaring from a
loudspeaker. Then they spelled out the
words "26 de Julio," knelt in pattern and all
bowed their heads like Moslems praying.
The audience applauded and the marchers
left through a gate in the right field fence.
Perhaps the most unusual of the eight
tableaus, which took 2 hours to unwind, was
one entitled "The Victory of Free Baseball
Against Enslaved Baseball."
Dressed In Identical baseball uniforms of
bluish-green, 640 young men took part.
Lining up In long rows, they first laid their
bats, balls, and gloves on the ground.
While dirgelike musikc groaned over them,
they went halfheartedly through the mo-
tions of pitching and catching. Then they
all fell fiat illustrating the slavery of the old
days when Havana had a team in America's
professional International League.
The music quickened and they sprang
erect. Revolutionary athletes now, they
plucked up their equipment and ran through
a spirited pantomime of pitching and
batting.
Americans in the audience, who had not
realized that Willie Mays and Mickey Mantle
perform in chains, watched all this with close
attention.
Beyond the outfield fence, the green and
brown ridges of the Sierra Maestra, where
Castro once took refuge, looked rough and
steep. Within the well-built concrete sta-
dium, however, there was only one direct
reminder that the Cuban government con-
siders itself threatened and besieged.
Midway through the program. 400 soldiers
in uniforms fanned out across the field.
They lined up in firing positions, some stand-
ing, some kneeling, some lying down, half of
them pointing their rifles-at the jam-packed
left-field stands. None aimed at Castro.
In unison they shouted. "Commandante
Ordene." then fired a shattering volley. A
cry of amused relief went up from the left-
field stands when no one fell wounded and
the crowd realized the bullets were blanks.
The revolution's emphasis on youth was
clearly apparent. Five hundred and forty
children marched in one tableau entitled,
"The Children Are the Hope of the World."
None looked more than 10 years old and many
as young as S.
Among the spectators was Jerry Rubin, 26.
of Berkeley, Calif., who has been traveling
with a group of American students in Cuba
since June 12.
[Prom the Miami (Pla.) Herald, of July 26.
1964)
AN AassalcAx WALKS STSSers or Cues WrrH-
OuT CHAI,I.ZNat
(By Al Burt)
SaxrtAOo, CvsA.-Here within sight of the
Sierra Maestro, In the heartland of Fidel
Castro's Revolution, an American can walk
streets lined by angry. anti-U.S. propaganda,
without a challenge and hardly a stare.
The Cuban man on the street seems to feel
that any strange-looking people running
around should not be bothered because the
government probably brought them.
In a restaurant or at a store counter, a
Cuban may bear what sounds like an accent
out of his past and ask its origin.
A self-oonfeesed Yankee draws friendliness
In some, in others only blankness of curiosity.
Little animosity is displayed. To be a
Miami Yankee puts you in a special league-
because Miami Is looked on as exile head-
quarters.
One old fellow's eyes lighted up and his
face took on a wise look. "Did President
Johnson send you?" he asked. He oould not
be convinced otherwise and maintained a
pleased, crafty look without explaining his
pleasure.
But an American who stops too long and
talks soon will and a man at his elbow to as-
sist him. These men are courteous, busi-
nesslike and plentiful.
Sometimes they are helpful.
There is nothing startling about Santiago.
unless it is the flood of Castro's pictures and
slogans. Even prepared for them, they over-
whelm you with doomsday promises of fight-
ing to the and, delivered in cheerleader style.
The overriding impression Is that daily
life Is guided by necessity. People adapt
to the shortages of food, clothing and manu-
factured items.
Revolutionary sacrifice is preached and
must be practiced. This undoubtedly dis-
pleases and inconveniences some-but a
newly arrived visitor sees no displeasure.
There are no antigovernment signs, no
scrawled messages on walls, no overt indi-
cation even in the revelry of the carnival,
where the tipsy might grow brave.
The first meetings of the skeptical U.S.
press and suspicious Cuban officials went off
withbarely a mutter. Conflicting opinions
rarely have slipped past determined good
humor.
However, there is an occasional jest with a
message.
One militiaman, who had his picture taken
standing by some boys putting together
lunch boxes for the 26th of July celebrants,
called out, "What will you can that plc-
ture-a militiaman making the boys work?"
Shepherd for the newsman is Pablo Ruiz,
who wears the customary fatigues and .45
and says he works for the Cuban Sports
Institute.
"There is a total misconception about Cuba
in the United States," he advised. "You will
not write this but I will tell you. Look
around at the people you see. Could they
be so happy if this were a slave country?"
In back of the Moncada Barracks, fa-
mous as the sight of Fidel Castro's first revo-
lutionary attack. Ruiz joined In watching
some boys get up a baseball game.
All but one chubby youngster scrambled
to play. "Isn't Fatty going to play?" some-
one asked. "Sure," a boy replied. "It's his
ball."
In the sweltering heat of Santiago, it would
be difficult to perceive happiness even in
the happy.
Philosophically, there seems to be some
parallel between the Cuban people and those
who play baseball with "Patty."
If there is only one game in town, or one
baseball in the park, that Is the one you
PI
MODERN THEOLOGY: THREAT OR
PROMISE-ADDRESS BY ROBERT
W. SARNOFF
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, a recent
address by Robert W. Sarnoff, chairman
of the board of the National Broadcast-
ing Co., at the Bryant College com-
mencement, in Providence, in my home
State of Rhode Island, pointed up in
meaningful fashion the promises and
threats stemming from our rapidly ac-
celerating developments in science and
technology.
Mr. Sarnoff emphasized the point that
enlightened education is needed today as
never before. Youthful leaders, he ad-
vocated, should become both specialists
and generalists, which will mean longer
periods of schooling and broader prepa-
rations for careers.
In an environment of challenge and
change-
He said-
education cannot end with formal training,
but must continue as a lifelong process of
developing habits of mind and thought,
of sharpening one's comprehension of the
influences that are reshaping our world.
He touched upon the question of Gov-
ernment regulation and the problem
incident to the effect of broadcasting
election results from one time zone to
another. While I do not necessarily
agree with Mr. Sarnoff, I do believe
that these problems need ventilation.
Mr. President, this is an extremely
thoughtful address. Because I believe it
will be of great interest to my colleagues,
I ask unanimous consent that It be
printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
MODERN TECHNOLOGY: THRTAT OR PROMISE
(By Robert W. Sarnoff)
I am greatly privileged and honored to
join you today and to become a fellow
alumnus of your distinguished institution.
Since my own commencement 25 years
ago, I have been aware that It Is traditional
for a guest on these occasions to attempt
to impart, in a matter of minutes, more
wisdom than members of the graduating
class have accumulated In their years of con-
centrated study and some two decades of
life. Such a task Is a most imposing chal-
lenge both to speaker and to listener. And
it is forbidding even to one engaged in a
communications medium that has often cov-
ered a century or more in an hour, although
it has sometimes been accused of reversing
the process with a 60-second commercial that
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP66B00403R000200170026-2