THE CUBAN CRISIS: HOW CLOSE WE WERE TO WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200170001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1964
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Revealed for the first time by President Kennedy's
former Assistant Secretary of State is the startling story of:
...The stray U-2, flying toward Russia at the height
of the Cuban crisis, that could have triggered World War III
...The hurried secret meetings between unofficial
U. S. and Russian representatives that stopped the drift toward war
99'6 How much Senator Keating actually knew when
he warned of a Soviet missile buildup in Cuba
BY ROGER HILSMAN
The Cuban crisis: how close we were to war
THE BLACKEST HOUR of the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis came on Saturday, October 27. Early that
morning, Nikita Khrushchev suddenly pulled back
from proposals pointing toward a solution. Worse
news quickly followed. Soviet antiaircraft mis-
siles in Cuba had shot down an American U-2.
Early that afternoon, Secretary of State Dean
Rusk asked me to take a draft of a reply to Khru-
shchev over to the White House for President
John E Kennedy's approval. I delivered it to
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs, in the Presi-
dent's outer office and, a few moments later, started
to return to the State Department.
As I passed the guard at the West Executive
Entrance, he grabbed my arm and told me that
my office was calling me-urgently. I took the call,
and learned of a crisis within the crisis that has
never before been reported in detail. An American
U-2, on a routine air-sampling mission between
Alaska and the North Pole, had picked the wrong
star for its return flight, and was at that moment
over the Soviet Union. Soviet fighter planes had
scrambled. The U-2 pilot had gone on the air-in
the clear-to call for help. American fighters in
Alaska had also scrambled and were attempting
to rendezvous with the U-2 to escort it home.
I ran upstairs and found the President,
Bundy and several others in Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln's
office. The President knew at a glance that some-
thing was terribly wrong. Shaky from lack of
sleep, I told my story.
The implications were obvious and horren-
dous: The Soviets might well regard this U-2 flight
as a last-minute intelligence reconnaissance in
preparation for nuclear war. "One of your planes,"
Khrushchev himself later wrote, "violates our
frontier during this anxious time we are both
experiencing, when everything has been put into
combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding
American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear
bomber, which might push us to a fatefulstep ...?"
Ernest Hemingway once described true cour-
age as "grace under pressure." President Kennedy
gave a short laugh that broke the tension. "There
is always some so-and-so," he said, "who doesn't
get the word."
That critical afternoon of Saturday, October
continued
COPYRIGHT Q 1964 BY ROGER HILSMAN. DERIVED FROM THE NOOK --THE POLITICS OP POLICY-MAKINGI THE KENNEDY YEARS." BOON TO BE PUBLISHED BY DOUBLEDAY A COMPANY.
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27, marked the climax of a series of fateful events
that began the previous July, when the first ship-
ment of Soviet arms reached Cuba. It was not until
October 14 that U.S. intelligence learned that the
shipments included long-range nuclear missiles.
Yet, four days before that discovery was made,
Sen. Kenneth B. Keating of New York made a
speech alleging that six intermediate-range-missile
bases were under construction in Cuba.
Much later, in an interview on the NBC pro-
gram Monitor, Saturday, November 3, and again in
an interview published in U.S. News and World
Report on November 19, Keating-fearful of the
charge that he was more interested in personal
publicity than in giving his country information
vital to its security-insisted that he had gotten or
verified the information from "official" sources.
With which official Senator Keating "verified"
that information is a mystery. No one has ever
been able to discover whom he talked to. Further,
since no one in the intelligence community knew
that there were intermediate- or medium-range
missiles or missile sites in Cuba until after October
14, it is hard to see how the Senator could have
"verified" his information. In actuality, as soon
as Senator Keating's speech began to come over
the tickers, Thomas L. Hughes, Deputy Director
of Intelligence and Research in the Department of
State, personally telephoned the chief of every
intelligence agency in Washington, or one of his
deputies, to ask if they had any reports to which
Keating might be referring. The answers were
uniformly negative, and the State Department so
informed the press.
How accurate was Keating?
The second mystery-which also still remains
-is just what information Keating had, and where
he got it. He said there were six intermediate-range-
missile sites being built in Cuba, but he did not say
where they were-which would have been most
vital information. In fact, the Soviets intendeio__
build four intermediate-range sites and six me-
dium-range sites, but we now know that at the time
Keating spoke, construction was not far enough
along on some of the sites, for a refugee or anyone
else to recognize them as missile installations.
Conceivably, Keating could have gotten some
refugee reports before official Washington did. But
there seem to have been, in fact, only two such re-
ports of any significance, neither of which corre-
sponded to Keating's allegations.
The charge that Keating was more interested
in personal publicity than in his country's welfare
may be extreme. But until the Senator comes for-
ward with a better explanation than he has so far
supplied, one of two possible conclusions is ines-
capable: Either Senator Keating was peddling
someone's rumors for some purpose of his own,
despite the highly dangerous international situa.
tion; or, alternatively, he had information the
United States Government did not have that could
have guided a U-2 to the missile sites before
October 14, and at less risk to the pilot.
While the argument over the Keating speech
raged on, the ubiquitous U-2 was about to lift the
curtain. A flight over western Cuba was proposed
on October 4, approved at a special meeting on Oc-
tober 9 and readied on the 10th. The aircraft stood
by, waiting for good weather, on the 11th, the 12th
and the 13th. On Sunday the 14th, the flight was
made as planned and without incident. Routinely,
the package of films was. flown -to the processing
laboratories that night. Routinely, the processed
film was flown to the interpretation center Mon-
day morning. Routinely, the interpreters began
going over the pictures, frame by frame. Then,
suddenly, late Monday afternoon, routine stopped.
The photographs clearly showed the telltale four-
slash "signature" of Soviet offensive ballistic mis-
siles at San Cristobal, in western Cuba.
Could the missiles have been discovered any
earlier than they were? U-2 flights on August 29
and September 5 had shown nothing at San
Cristobal, Remedios or Sagua la Grande, and only
some unidentifiable scratchings at Guanajay. But
the October 14 flight and others in the days im-
mediately following showed sites recognizable as
ballistic-missile installations in all four areas.
The Russians must have done their survey
work for the MRBM and IRBM sites in July and
August. Construction apparently started on the
Guanajay IRBM site in early September; on the
San Cristobal and Remedios sites between Septem-
her 15 and 20; and on the Sagua la Grande site
between September 25 and 30.
From the time the Russians made their deci-
sion to send ballistic missiles to Cuba in June until
September 8, when they arrived, classic methods
of intelligence-i.e., old-fashioned espionage-
might have provided information about Soviet
intentions. In the second stage-from September
8, when the missiles reached Cuban ports, until the
time they were installed at the sites-old-fashioned
spying might even have revealed their presence
in the guarded warehouses or under the canvas
concealing them in truck convoys.
But classic espionage is extraordinarily diffi-
cult, time-consuming and risky. Inability to get
information by such means should not necessarily
be counted a failure. Also, to take the action the
U.S. did in fact take requires "harder" informa.
tion than agent reports, and this kind of infor-
mation could only be acquired in the third stage-
after missiles and supporting equipment had ar-
rived at the sites, and the installations were rec-
ognizable in aerial photographs.
We now know that the first ballistic missiles
and related equipment probably arrived in Cuba
on September 8. They were then moved out to the
sites by night convoys, probably between Septem-
ber 9 and 14. We also know that the second Rus-
sian shipment probably arrived on September 15,
again with the truck convoys moving out over
the next several days.
It could reasonably be argued that the U-2
flight of October 14 found the missiles at just
about the earliest possible moment. But it could
also be argued that if the intelligence community
had gotten suspicious of the western end of the is-
land in late September and dispatched a U-2 to the
right spot on, say, October 2 or 3, the plane might
well have come back with photographic proof. The
question is whether it is reasonable to conclude
that intelligence suspicions about the western end
of the island might have been aroused sooner than
they actually were.
In a postmortem on the reports available be-
fore October 14, only four seem significant-even
with all the benefits of hindsight:
? A subagent in Cuba reported that in the
middle of the night of September 12, he saw a
truck convoy heading west from one of the heavily
guarded port areas near Havana. He said the con-
voy included trailers 20 meters (60 feet) long,
whose contents were hidden by canvas stretched
over what appeared to be a wooden frame. The
report reached Washington on September 21, and
Central Intelligence Agency headquarters distrib-
uted it with a comment that the subagent had
probably seen a trailer carrying a short-range,
anti-aircraft Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM), which
is only 30 feet long.
? In late September, a report came that Fidel
Castro's private pilot had boasted Cuba had long-
range missiles and no longer feared the United
States. It was distributed without comment.
? On October 3, another report told of "un-
usual activity, probably connected with missiles,"
in Pinar del Rio, at the western end of Cuba.
? On October 4-after the decision to fly over
western Cuba had already been made-a second
report of a long-trailer convoy arrived. This con-
voy had been spotted on September 17 and, like
the one seen on the night of September 12, was
rolling toward the west.
There was no hint of location in the braggings
of Castro's private pilot. Still, it could be argued
that the report of the convoy with exceptionally
long trailers, received in Washington on Septem.
ber 21, might have had a greater impact. But skep-
ticism about one man's estimate of the length of a
trailer seen at night under difficult and probably
nerve-racking circumstances is not unreasonable,
particularly against the background of a mass of
reports that had been proved false.
A clue that was overlooked
Something else that was overlooked at the
time now seems even more significant. Two of the
Soviet cargo ships diverted from their normal
tasks to run arms to Cuba-the Omsk and the Pol-
lava-had exceptionally large hatches. Looking
back, the intelligence experts feel that it was these
large-hatch ships that secretly brought in the
60-foot missiles. It is by the arrival of these two
vessels in Cuba on September 8 and 15, in fact.
that the missile shipments are dated. But word
that two of the Soviet freighters had exceptionally
large hatches was not brought to the attention of
the policy makers-or even the higher-ups in the
intelligence agencies-until after the missiles
themselves had been discovered in Cuba.
This, too, turns out to be understandable.
There was nothing new or startling about the two
ships. One, the Omsk, had been built in Japan. and
both had been specially designed for the Soviet
lumbering industry, which normally requires ex-
tra-large hatches. Also, we knew that the Soviets
had had some trouble finding the ships they needed
to send their aid to Cuba, and our shipping intelli-
gence experts presumably deduced that lumbering
ships could be more easily spared than others.
On balance, then, the evidence does not show
that, as a practical matter, the missiles could have
been discovered sooner than they were. After all,
the decision to look again at the western end of the
island actually came on October 4; the following
delay was to make sure that the flight plan avoided
unnecessary risk to the pilot and the U-2, our most
valuable source of information.
Given all these difficulties, it is something of a
miracle that the missiles were discovered as early
as they were. Cuba, 1962, was an intelligence vic-
tory, and a victory of a very high order.
If a criticism must be made, it would he that
even though American intelligence won a victory,
it was also-in one sense at least-a little lazy.
As the scientific instruments of information
gathering have become ever more marvelous, the
intelligence community, with the normal Ameri-
can love of technological gadgetry, has neglected
the time-consuming, tedious but still essential
ways of classic espionage. Recruiting, training and
planting an agent may take years, and it may be
still more years before he reports anything of sig-
nificance. It's so much easier to send a U-2 or use
some other scientific gadget. But there are some
matters on which we need information that a U-2
camera cannot pick up. And in the case of ballistic
missiles in Cuba, a U-2 might have been dispatched
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sooner, guided more directly to suspected sites,
and routed on a safer track, had there been in
Cuba a better network of traditional agents.
In the end, the Soviets were caught, as Sen.
Hubert Humphrey has said, "with their rockets
down and their missiles showing"-and caught
in time for the U.S. to take effective action.
The morning after the discovery, McGeorge
Bundy briefed the President in his bedroom. Ken-
nedy. still in bathrobe and slippers, instructed
Bundy to arrange for a meeting at 11:45 that
morning of the group that became known as the
ExCom. the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council.
The ExCom met in the Cabinet Room of the
White House and decided immediately to put Cuba
under virtually constant air surveillance.
At first. there was some sentiment for an air
strike or a coup de main by parachute forces to
wipe out the missile bases in a surprise attack.
The risks would have been high. No military com-
mander would guarantee 100 percent success; and
it was always possible that some local Soviet com-
mander would panic. assume that the big war was
on. with the Soviet Union itself under attack, and
take matters into his own hands.
Just as important, an attack without warning
was both morally reprehensible and in violation
of American traditions and ideals. Attorney Gen-
eral Robert F Kennedy argued most persuasively
against a surprise assault and reminded the group
of Pearl Harbor. "For the United States to attack a
small country without warning," he said, "would
irreparably hurt our reputation in the world-and
our own conscience." He added that he did not
want John F Kennedy to go down in history as the
American Tojo.
By Thursday, October 18, a consensus began
to develop in the ExCom for a blockade against
offensive weapons as a first step. On Friday, the
President indicated that a blockade was also his
preference and set Monday evening, October 22,
as the time of disclosure.
There was much to do. Resolutions for the
UN and the Organization of American States had
to be drafted. Special arrangements had to be
made to brief our major allies. Presidential letters
had to be drafted for 43 heads of government, and
messages had to he sent to our posts overseas, ex-
plaining our action. Leaders of Congress had to he
informed. The Pentagon had to alert the Strategic
Air Command, assemble the blockade forces and
ready the troops needed for an invasion, if one
should become necessary. U. Alexis Johnson, Dep-
uty Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs,
was chosen to coordinate the scenario-a schedule
of who was to do what and when, all keyed to
seven o'clock Monday evening, when the Presi-
dent would speak to the world. With the machinery
geared and in motion, we could only wait-and
hope nothing leaked that would give the Soviets
a chance to take the initiative away from us.
Miraculously, the secret held-but barely.
Washington was taut with the sense of crisis. Too
many high officials
canceled social engagements
or were called away from them. Too many people
were at the office too early and stayed too late. Re-
porters prowled the corridors of the State Depart-
ment and the Pentagon, looking for a lead.
At five p.m. on Monday, October 22, the Pres-
ident briefed Congressional leaders. Sen. Richard
13. Russell of Georgia urged an immediate inva-
sion. Surprisingly, Sen. J. William Fulbright of
Arkansas supported him. He felt that intercepting
Soviet ships at sea was just as risky as taking out
the bases themselves.
At six p.m., Russian Ambassador Anatoly F.
Dobrynin was ushered into the office of Secretary
of State Rusk. He looked relaxed. Twenty-five min-
utes later, he came out-tense and, it seemed to re-
porters, shaken, clutching a copy of the President's
speech in his hand. "Ask the Secretary," was the
only reply he would give to questions.
At seven, the President spoke to the nation
and the world from his office. After describing the
surveillance by the United States and what it had
discovered, he told of the "strict quarantine on all
offensive military equipment under shipment to
Cuba" and other steps he had ordered. He also
warned Khrushchev: "It shall be the policy of this
nation to regard any nuclear missile launched
from Cuba against any nation in the Western
Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on
the United States, requiring a full retaliatory
response upon the Soviet Union."
President Kennedy's sensitivity to the prece-
dents that would be set in this first nuclear crisis
the world had faced was matched by a determina-
tion so to pace events as to give the Soviet leaders
time to think out the consequences of each move.
His purpose was to avoid putting them in a posi.
tion where their only response could be, in the
President's own words, a "spasm reaction."
Thus, on Monday, the President announced
only his intention to impose a quarantine. He
waited until Tuesday to issue the actual proclama-
tion. And the proclamation provided still another
pause by making the quarantine effective the next
day, Wednesday, October 24, at 10 a.m.
Even then, the President ordered the Navy
screen not to intercept a Soviet ship until abso-
lutely necessary-and had the order transmitted in
the clear. The first contact with a Soviet ship there.
fore did not come until Thursday at 8 a.m.-when
the oil tanker Bucharest was hailed but not board-
ed. The first boarding did not occur until 24 hours
later, on Friday, October 26.
A threat from Khrushchev
On Wednesday morning, the Soviet Govern.
ment officially rejected the United States proclama-
tion of quarantine.
Khrushchev apparently wanted to accompany
this rejection with a threat, one that would be pub-
lic but not official. He needed a foil, and what he
seems to have done was to scan the list of private
American citizens visiting Moscow for a name that
would suit his purpose. William Knox, president of
Westinghouse International, who was in Moscow
on business, suddenly got a call to the Kremlin.
Khrushchev admitted to Knox that Soviet missiles
were present in Cuba, and went on to say that the
Soviet Union would use them if necessary. Attack-
ing the Kennedy quarantine proclamation, Khrush-
chev added that if the United States stopped So.
viet ships, Soviet submarines would be forced to
sink a U.S. ship-a series of events, he warned, that
would very likely bring on World War III.
Late Wednesday came the first hint of a break.
Some of the Soviet ships heading toward Cuba al-
tered course, and the rest stopped dead in the wa-
ter-where they wallowed for several days.
This was a sign that the Soviet Union realized
what President Kennedy had been stressing all
along to the ExCom-that in a nuclear confronta-
tion. neither side could afford precipitate action. A
scribbled sign posted in a State Department brief-
ing room made the same point in a wry attempt at
humor. "In a Nuclear Age," it read, "nations must
make war as porcupines make love-care/ully."
Intelligence reportson Friday the 26th showed
that work on all sites was going forward at full
speed. The only ship so far boarded and inspected
was a Lebanese freighter under Soviet charter, but
a direct confrontation between American and So-
viet vessels could not long he delayed.
There are several channels of communication
between the Soviet and American governments.
Some are very formal and official, and some are
entirely unofficial.
A special officer with a nominal title or a Tass
correspondent with unusual connections, for ex-
ample, might he used to push a line or convey a
threat. Occasionally, the Russians (night resort to
this irregular channel to try out a proposal or test
a reaction in advance and thus avoid committing
themselves prematurely. In the Cuban crisis, two
of the channels were probably decisive-the very
formal letters shuttling between Kennedy and
Khrushchev and a set of communications through
a very informal and unofficial channel.
At 1:30 Friday afternoon, John Scali, State
Department correspondent for ABC and a man
known to be trusted at the highest levels of the
U.S. Government, received an urgent telephone
call from a senior Soviet official asking for an
immediate appointment. Most Washington corre-
spondents maintain a contact in the Soviet Em-
bassy, and Scali had lunched with Mr. X on several
previous occasions, although never on such short,
peremptory notice. What made this call so signifi-
cant to Scali was not only its urgency, but that he
knew Mr. X was the head of Soviet intelligence in
the United States-a man with his own direct chan.
nels of communication to the Kremlin.
They met at the Occidental Restaurant, and
Mr. X went straight to the point-and an extraor-
dinary point it was too. He asked Scali to find
out immediately from his "high-level friends in
the State Department" whether the United States
would be interested in a solution to the crisis
along the following lines: (1) The Soviet Union
would agree to dismantle and remove the offensive
missiles in Cuba; (2) it would allow United
Nations inspectors to supervise and verify the
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removal; (3) it would pledge not to reintroduce
ballistic missiles, ever, to Cuba; and (4), in re-
turn, the United States would pledge publicly not
to invade Cuba. Mr. X added that if Ambassador
Adlai E. Stevenson pursued this approach at the
United Nations, where U Thant was attempting to
mediate, Soviet delegate Valerian Zorin would be
interested. And, after giving Scali his home phone
number with instructions to call at any hour day
or night, he emphasized that the matter was "of
the greatest urgency."
Scali came directly to me, as State Depart-
ment Director of Intelligence and Research, and
typed out the gist of his conversation with Mr. X.
After Scali left, there was some debate among the
"sovietologists" about how seriously to take this
highly unorthodox approach. In the end, its very
unusualness argued for at least putting it up to
the ExCom for consideration.
But it was Secretary Rusk who saw the full
possibilities in an entirely unofficial exchange of
views with the Soviet Union and who seized the
opportunity the X approach seemed to present.
After a short discussion with other members of
the ExCom, Rusk asked me to bring Scali up in
the private elevator to see him.
Rusk told Scali that the approach made
through him was our first direct word that the
Soviets might be thinking of a deal and that it
fitted in with some hints that had been dropped
that afternoon at the UN. The Secretary asked
Scali to go back to the Soviet official and tell him
the United States was interested, but that time
was very, very short-no more than two days.
Rusk had written what Scali was to say on a piece
of yellow paper in his own handwriting:
"I have reason to believe that the USG
[United States Government] sees real possibilities
and supposes that the representatives of the two
governments in New York could work this matter
out with U Thant and with each other. My im-
pression is, however, that time is very urgent."
Rusk authorized Scali to tell the Soviet official
that the statement came from the "highest levels
in the government of the United States."
Scali then phoned Mr. X at the Soviet Em-
bassy and arranged to meet with him 15 minutes
later, at 7:35 p.m., in the coffee shop of the
Statler Hilton Hotel, which is just a block away
from the Soviet Embassy.
Over coffee, Scali relayed his news. The one
thing Mr. X wanted to be certain of was that it
actually represented the views of the United States
Government. Several times, he asked if Scali's in-
formation on the American reaction came from
high sources, and Scali replied that it came from
very high sources.
Satisfied on this point, Mr. X tried to do
some dickering. Since there was to be inspection
of Cuban bases, he said, why shouldn't there also
he inspection of American bases in Florida from
which an invasion of Cuba might originate?
This was a new element, Scali pointed out,
and he had no information on how the United
States Government might react. But speaking as
a reporter, he went on, he felt that this new
element would raise a terrible complication. Since
there were no American missiles pointed at Cuba,
the situations were entirely different, and he felt
President Kennedy would reject any such pro-
posal. Scali stressed again the urgency. If time
were spent haggling over some such condition like
Mr. X's new proposal, there might be a disaster
for Cuba, for the Soviet Union and for the world.
Mr. X thanked Scali, repeated with emphasis
that Scali's information would be communicated
immediately to the very highest levels in the
Kremlin and to 'Lorin at the United Nations. He
left in obvious haste.
Scali reported back to me, and we went again
to see Secretary Rusk. In the meantime, Khru-
shchev's four-part cable letter to President Ken-
nedy had begun to come in. This message has not
been made public, but the key elements have been
described in several magazine and newspaper ar-
ticles. Long and discursive, it bore the unmistak-
able stamp of Khrushchev himself. It contained
no specific proposal or conditions. but showed
throughout an appreciation of the risk of nuclear
war and the need for reaching an agreement. One
key passage, for example. likened the crisis to a
rope with a knot in the middle, with President
Kennedy pulling on one end and Khrushchev
pulling on the other. The more they both pulled,
the more the knot would tighten, until finally
it could be cut only with a sword. But if they both
stopped pulling, the knot could be untied.
This cable must have been drafted at about
the same time as the instructions to Mr. X.. For
the two communications were clearly related: The
cable indicated a willingness to negotiate, and
Mr. X's unofficial approach suggested a formula
for the negotiations.
"John," Rusk told Scali, "you have served
your country well. Remember when you report
this-that, eyeball to eyeball, they blinked first."
Analyzing the Russian moves
At the Secretary's request, a group of us in
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research spent the
rest of the night preparing an analysis of the
Khrushchev cable and the X approach-"to in-
clude any hookers in it"-that would be ready
for the members of the ExCom before the next
morning's meeting.
Our judgment was that the Russians had in-
deed blinked and that even though there were
some possible hookers to be guarded against in the
proposals, they should be taken seriously.
On close examination, it'seemed clear that
Mr. X's approach and the Khrushchev cable were
indeed linked. X's assignment apparently was to
stimulate U.S. interest in Khrushchev's imprecise
formulations by adding specifics-especially on
the question of inspection, which the Soviet Union
knew was central for the United States.
The Soviets had backed off from direct con-
frontation with the United States, had opened the
way for talks and had at least postponed a direct
U.S. effort to remove the missiles. From all the
evidence, it seemed to us that Khrushchev had
faced the prospect of an escalating confrontation,
that he was horrified at what lie saw and that he
was sincerely searching for a way out. But it could
also be argued that he was only playing for time
until the missiles were operational, which would
be in about two or three weeks. We therefore also
recommended that a precondition for further
negotiations be that the Soviets stop work on the
new missile sites.
On Saturday morning, the ExCom met with
somewhat brighter spirits-only to have them
quickly dashed by Khrushchev's broadcast note
reneging on the messages of the night before and
by the shooting down of a U-2 over Cuba.
At 10:17 a.m., the news tickers cleared the
first bulletin of the new note from Khrushchev.
being broadcast by Radio Moscow. As the details
came in, it was clear that the Russians had re-
versed their position. They now offered to trade
their missiles in Cuba for American missiles in
Turkey. This was the blackest hour of the crisis.
There was some speculation that the hard-liners in
the Kremlin. possibly backed by the military.
might be taking over. The Russians must know,
the reasoning went, that shooting down U-2's
would force us to take direct action against the
antiaircraft SAM's. What they had done, there-
fore, seemed to mean that they were bent on a
showdown. If so, it would not be possible any
longer to control and pace events. Everything
would inevitably be foreshortened, and an actual
American invasion of Cuba might be no later
than 18 hours away.
Then it was our turn to make a slip-the
crossing of the Soviet border by our stray U.2.
Eventually, the U-2 made it back to base safely,
and later Kennedy was able to explain the cir-
cumstances. But in the meantime, some way had
to be found to get back to the more promising
proposals put forward on Friday-and quickly.
Rusk called Scali to his office later that afternoon
and suggested he see Mr. X again and ask what
had happened. Had the whole operation been a
trap to divert attention while the Soviets planned a
double cross? What was going on at the Kremlin?
Scali and Mr. X met at 4:15 p.m. in a
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deserted banquet hall off the mezzanine of the
Statler Hilton. Mr. X was puzzled and unhappy.
Responding to Scali's challenge, he sought to
explain the morning's message linking Cuba to
Turkey and reneging on his formula of the night
before as the result of had communications-that
the cable had been drafted before his report on
the favorable American reaction reached Moscow.
Scali exploded. He said he couldn't believe Mr.
X's explanation. In his opinion, Scali said, it was
all it "stinking double cross." And if this were so,
Scali went on. it amounted to one of the most
colossal misjudgements in history. The United
States was absolutely determined to get the mis-
siles out of Cuba, as the President had said. Time
was now running out. A U-2 had been shot down
over Cuba. and the United States had to conclude
that the Soviet military people there had gotten
new and more dangerous instructions.
A Russian feeler is rejected
;As for Mr. X's claim that there was no
double cross. Scali wanted him to know that an
exchange of Soviet missile bases for U.S. missile
bases was completely. totally and perpetually un-
acceptable. It had been unacceptable in the past,
it was unacceptable today. and it would be un-
acceptable tomorrow and ad infinitum. If the
Russians wanted to talk about American missile
bases in Europe. they should talk about the prob-
lem within the framework of general disarmament
and not seek to inject it into the Cuban crisis.
"they parted - Mr. X assuring Scali that a
reply would surely cone soon, and Scali repeat-
ing how critically short the time was.
Scali went to the State Department to report
and was whisked to the White House to stand by
while the ExCom members read the report of his
conversation he had dictated.
Then, with all the evidence on the table, the
ExCunl considered what to do next. It was Hobert
Kennedy who conceived a brilliant diplomatic ma-
neuver. Later dubbed the "Trollope ploy," after
the recurrent scene in Anthony Trollope's novels
in which the girl interprets a squeeze of her hand
as a proposal of marriage, Robert Kennedy's sug-
gestion was to deal with Friday's package of
signals-Khrushchev's cable and the approach
through Scali-as if the conflicting message on
Saturday linking Cuba and Turkey simply did not
exist. That -nessage, in fact. had already been re-
jected in a public announcement. The thing to do
now was to answer the Friday approaches and
make the answer public. Kt\rushchev's Friday-
night cable had not mentioned inspection, but in-
spection had been a key element of the proposal
put forward by Mr. X. With certain items selected
from the cable and others from the Scali-Mr. X ex-
change. a reply was drafted for the President's
signature and released:
"I have read your letter of October 26th with
great care and welcome the statement of your
desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem.
The first thing that needs to be done, however, is
for work to cease on offensive missile bases in
Cuba.... Assuming this is done promptly, I have
given my representatives in New York instructions
that will permit them to work out this weekend-in
cooperation with the Acting Secretary General
and your representative-an arrangement for the
I,ermanent solution to the Cuban problem.... As
I read your letter, the key elements of your pro.
I-sals-which seem generally acceptable as I un.
,lei stand them - are as follows: (I) You would
agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba
under appropriate United Nations observation
and supervision; and undertake, with suitable
safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such
weapons systems into Cuba. (2) We, on our part,
would agree-upon the establishment of adequate
arrangements through the United Nations to en-
sure the carrying out and continuation of these
commitments-(a) to remove promptly the quar-
antine measures now in effect and 1b) to give
assurances against an invasion of Cuba."
Another channel was then used to make clear
once again the sense of urgency and seriousness
felt in Washington. Again, there was nothing to
do but wait. As the meeting broke up, President 11
Kennedy remarked that it could "go either way.
Just before nine o'clock Sunday morning,
October 24"). Moscow radio announced that it
would have an important statement to broadcast
at nine sharp. It was a letter from Chairman
Khrushchev: "In order to eliminate as rapidly as
possible the conflict which endangers the cause
of peace.... the Soviet Government ... has given
a new order to dismantle the arms which you
described as offensive. and to crate and return
them to the Soviet Union."
Sunday night. Scali had his last meeting with
Mr. X. "I have been instructed." Mr. X said in
the classic language of diplomacy. "to thank you
and to tell you that the information you supplied
was very valuable to the Chairman in helping him
make up his mind quickly. And." he added with a
smile, "that includes your `explosion' Saturday."
Why did the Soviet Union back down in
Cuba? What are the lessons of the crisis? And
what is its meaning for the future? Was it, indeed,
a turning point in history?
The risks to both sides in the Cuban missile
confrontation were very real, very direct and very
high. As ])(-all Itusk has said. a misstep might have
meant the "incineration" of the entire Northern
Hemisphere. Even so, it is not possible to say that
a nuclear threat as such caused [lie Soviet Union
to back down. The Soviet leaders probably had
considerable confidence in the judgment and sense
of responsibility of the American leaders. and they
undoubtedly assumed that the U .S. response would
begin with conventional means and would con-
tinue to be confined to conventional means, unless
the Soviets themselves did something that raised
the ante. However. it is also not possible to say that
the Soviet leaders backed down solely in the face
of a threat to invade Cuba with conventional, non-
nuclear forces. even though they knew that the
troops they had in Cuba could not stand up to
such an invasion.
On balance, the best judgment seems to be
that the Soviets retreated when confronted by a
threat of combined conventional and nuclear
power. Cuba is far from the sources of Soviet
strength. With vastly shorter lines of communica-
tion, the United States could apply overwhelm-
ingly preponderant conventional power at the
point of contact-Cuba-and do so under an um-
brella of nuclear power that foreclosed any possi-
bility of the Soviets trying to use nuclear weapons
to redress the imbalance at that contact point. It
was this combination of overwhelming conven-
tional power on the spot and adequate nuclear
power overall that proved irresistible.
Thus the first and most obvious lesson of the
Cuban missile crisis is that of power. The United
States decided to accept the Soviet challenge, and
U.S. strength and determination were sufficient
to meet the challenge.
But it would be a mistake to conclude that
this same formula of will and power can be trans-
lated into success in every kind of confrontation-
that it would necessarily work in Laos, for exam-
ple, or Vietnam. The arena in the Cuban case was
close to the sources of American power, as we
have said, and distant from the sources of Soviet
power. But, more important, there was no doubt
at all about the stakes: The threat from Cuba in
October, 1962, was nuclear, and it was directed
at the American heartland.
It would also be a mistake to think that the
formula of will and power is appropriate to all
political objectives. The issue here is the relation-
ship of means to ends-the appropriateness and
acceptability both to world opinion and to the
American conscience of using military force to
accomplish particular objectives. It is acceptable
and fitting that the United States use the full
panoply of its military power to remove a threat
to its survival. But at some point as one moves
down the scale from national survival to progres-
sively lesser objectives, the political costs of using
raw military force begin to exceed the potential
gains. Reasonable men may quarrel with Presi-
dent Kennedy's choice of when to make this shift
from military power in the Cuban missile crisis-
which was just after the removal of the missiles
and bombers. but before the withdrawal of Soviet
advisers and the elimination of the Castro regime
-but they would not question the principle itself.
The keynote of the United States response
was flexibility and self-disciplined restraint -a
graduated effort that avoided trying to achieve
too much and stopped short of confronting all
adversary with stark and imperative choices. Out
of the basic policy flowed precedents: restraint
in the use of power: flexibility in developing a
solution; the pacing of events to give the other
side time to think and to obviate "spasm reac-
tions": the making of a "little international law"
outlawing the secret and rapid development of
nuclear weapons; the deliberate regard for prece-
dent and the effect of present action on the longer
future; and. finally. the relevance to that longer
future of moral integrity-a point on which both
the President and the Attorney General so strongly
and steadily insisted.
Khrushchev's choice after Cuba
Following the crisis. the Soviets had only two
alternatives. One was a crash intercontinental-bal-
listic-missile program to redress the strategic bal-
ance. This would mean austerity at home and a
return to the coldest kind of cold war abroad. And
as a most unpalatable corollary, it would necessi-
tate an immediate healing of the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute-on Chinese terms.
The other alternative was the one actually
chosen-easing the tensions of the cold war, with
the Test Ban Treaty as the first concrete step.
The Soviet u:uat program could be stretched out,
and the burdens lightened of competing so aggres-
sively in the underdeveloped regions of the world.
This course of action also had a corollary for the
Sino-Soviet dispute-a sharpening of the tension,
perhaps even an open break.
The Soviets have gazed down the gun barrel
of nuclear war, as have we: they have probed its
awesome dimensions, and they have turned away.
This experience has not caused them to cease
being Communists nor to give up their goal of
world domination. But for the moment, at least,
they seem to recognize that, on so small a planet as
ours, nuclear war is one means that would jeop-
ardize their ends rather than serve them.
The threat of nuclear war has not been elini-
inated from the world, nor is there yet a recon-
ciliation between East and West. But if either of
these objectives ever is attained, historians will
probably mark the Cuban missile crisis of 1962
as the beginning.
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