MCNAMARA'S WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200150045-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: June 3, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

CONGRESSION
Federal highway projects are financed out
of the highway trust fund, and are not in-
volved in the difficulties being experienced
by the general fund of the Treasury. There-
fore they are excluded from this discussion.
Exclusive of highways and projects related
to military functions, new direct Federal
civil public works alone proposed in the
1965 budget would cost $2 billion to complete
(budget document, p. 386). Funds for these
projects in 1965 are in numerous accounts
throughout the budget.
The budget proposals for new appropria-
tions and other spending authority totaling
$103.8 billion colild aiid should be reduced
by upward of a billion dollars through post-
pealing starts on new public works projects
which are not urgent.
addition, for economy arid efficiency,
And elimination of waste and extravagance,
the $10.2 billion reduction in appropriations
? and other spending authority generally in-
Chides a 10 pedant- cut in new money for
Federal civilian ,construction projects already
-Underway. ??
There is no doubt about the fact that the
$103.8 billion in requests for new appropria-
tions and other obligational authority could
and Should be reduced by at least $2.7 bil-
lion in the interest of efficiency, and econ-
omy, and the elimination of waste and ex-
travagance (along with nonessential and
postponable programs, projects, construc-
tion, etc.).
' zxl>rmrrirRns
The basic reason "for Federal takes Is to
meet Federal- expenditures. And Federal
expenditures, Under the Constitution, are
made pursuant to appropriations enacted by
law. Federal taxes are too Thigh, but Federal
_Appropriations and expenditures are higher.
Federal expenditures have exceeded the
, ,
revenue, in 28 of the last 34 years. Over this
period -te Federal debt has been increased
&ore. $16.2 billion to $310 billion; and inter-
est on the debt has risen from $659 million
to 811 binioh. k year. -
The dan,ger 'of inflation always lurks in
'Federal deffaii' financing. It is there now.
he purchasing Power of the dollar has
dropped in every year since
be another deficit next year unless expendi- Foreign aid (including payroll costs)-- $1.3
tures are held to the level of revenue. Federal civilian payroll costs (excluding
Since deficits are determined by the excess foreign aid)
of expenditures over revenue, and expendi- Proposed new programs and projects__
tures are made pursuant to appropriations, Waste, extravagance and inefficiency
(along with nonessential and post-
ponable programs, projects, construc-
tion, etc.)
1955 There will [In billions]
A, e
NOIR lease ZQQ5LE1HatotbR_DPArikKillgoIR000200150045-3 w-i2f
1964 pproved
obviously the first thing to do is reduce new
appropriations and other spending author-
ity. But with $90.4 billion of balances in
prior appropriations and other spending au-
thority already available before the first dol-
lar of new spending authority is enacted,
something more than cutting new apprcrpria-
tions and other spending authority needs to
be done. Recission of some of the balances
is a place to start.
Cutting appropriations will directly reduce
annual expenditures in accounts where there
are no balances, and where annual appropria-
tions do not exceed annual expenditures.
But cutting appropriations does not neces-
sarily reduce annual expenditures from ac-
counts where any other situation exists.
But effective reduction of annual expendi-
tures from accounts where balances exist,
and in instances where appropriations ex-
ceed expenditures is largely a matter of ad-
ministrative control in the executive branch.
The urgent need for the administration
and the Congress to join in a concerted and
effective effort to reduce Federal expendi-
tures to meet revenue estimates for the com-
ing year is clear.
My own examination and evaluation of
the spending objectives represented in the
some 800 budget accounts leads to the con-
clusion that Federal expenditures in fiscal
year 1965, beginning July 1, could and should
be reduced by at least $6.5 billion, from $97.9
billion estimated in the January budget to
$91.4 billion.
With combined and sympathetic effort by
both the legislative and executive branches,
I have no doubt that reductions in this
amount could and should be made without
impairment of any essential Federal func-
tion.
I suggest minimum reductions in expendi-
tures which may be categorically summarized
as follows:
.9
1.9
2.4
Total expenditure reduction____ 6. 5
Reasons and justifications for these sug-
gested expenditure reductions follow gener-
ally the same pattern already described with
respect to suggested reductions in the new
appropriations and other authority to obli-
gate public money.
The fact is thatexclusive of 70-odd ac-
counts in military functions-the budget
shows some 400 nonmilitary expenditure
items increased in the coming year as com-
pared with the current year level, against
some 275 reduced. About 50 items are in
approximately the same amounts.
Some of the so-called reductions, such as
those anticipating the sale of certificates of
participation in pools of loans and mort-
gages held by Export-Import Bank, Federal
National Mortgage Associations, and Veter-
ans' Administration, are questionable. They
represent no actual expenditure reduction or
restraint. And these are not the only ques-
tionable so-called reductions.
As a matter of fact, 1965 budget expendi-
ture estimates show categorical increases
over 1964, as follows:
Su gested expenditure reductions;irg departments
ABLE 1 . g
,
-
- thousands of dollars]
[In millions]
Space research and technology up__:
Natural resources up
Health, labor and welfare up
Education up
Interest up
Allowances for "attack on poverty,"
civilian pay raise and contingen-
cies up
Total
$590
105
299
343
400
844
2,581
The suggested expenditure reductions, as
applied to Federal departments and princi-
pal agencies, are shown in table 1 as follows:
and agencies
FIn Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Dgpartments and agencies Fiscal year 1964 1965, Suggested 1965, after
1963 actual estimate January reduction reduction
estimate
nerveOffice of the President _ __ 23, 113 24, 677 27, 581 9,215 18, 306
1111 S appropriated to President (except foreign aid) 40,482 532, 530 231, 443 24, 707 206, 736
ore gn aid:
Military assistance, Department of Defense 1, 720, 755 1, 400, 000 1, 200, 000 360, 000 840, 000
Econtnnic assiStance:
- Funds appropriated to the President:
- Grants and loans .. 2,043, 100 2, 100, 000 2, 100,000 862, 620 1, 287, 380
? _
interpational financial institutions 121, 656 111, 656 61, 655 61, 656
,Peace Corp 42, 259 73, 000 90, 000 37, 959 52, 041
Export-Import Rank -391, 550 -650, 231 -855,914 632 -856, 516
? Other programs: Agriculture, Commerce, and State 225, 834 262,200 259, 547 1,000 258,017
Department of Agriculture 7, 519, 667 0,731, 691 5, 571, 018 126, 949 5, 444, 969
Department of Commerce672, 689 780, 650 826,450 150, 442 076, 008
-Department of Defense- military functions 48, 252, 421 00,000, 000 50, 000, 000 1 240, 100 49, 759, 900
Department of Defense-civil functions 1, 128, 066 1, 141, 205 1, 192, 339 108, 447 1, 083, 892
Department of Irealth, Education, and Welfare 4, 909, 340 5, 530, 278 5, 853, 482 908, 982 4, 944, 500
Departinnnt of 'Interior1, 028, 800 1,113,900 1, 148, 150 107, 496 1,040, 654
Department of Justice 317, 035 329, 990 343, 100 28, 085 315, 015
Department of Labor 257, 279 415, 374 666, 812 366, 593 300, 219
Post Office Department_ _ 770, 335 546,015 474, 700 474, 700
Departnfent of Slate 401, 213 374, 000 373, 000 56, 129 316, 871
Department of the Treasury , 11, 027, 931 11, 873, 984 12, 335, 187 59, 816 12, 275, 371
Atomic Energy Commission 2, 757, 876 2, 800, 000 2, 735,000 277, 200 2, 457, 800
Federal Aviation Agency 726, 311 790,000 829, 000 38, 954 790, 046
General Rervices Administration 464, 382 554, 975 577, 700 79, 609 498, 097
>I:J.04911w and Rome Finance Agency' 410, 330 212, 339 149, 050 219, 157 -70,107
,Nationat Aeronautics and Space Administration 2, 552, 347 4, 400, 000 4, 990, 000 585, 000 4, 405, 000
'Veterans' Administration. 5, 172, 823 1,348, 818 1,060, 340 83, 557 4, 982, 783
.' Other, executive branch750, 437 1, 159, 090 1, 953, 640 5,305, 773 647, 867
Legislative and judicial branches._ 210, 265 233, 093 250, 497 250, 497
- Total 93, 155, 190 99, 089, 384 98, 499, 784 6, 512 722 91, 987, 062
_
Deduct intcrfund transactions -513,397 -684, 565 -599, 519 -599, 519
- (-Ir., a I otal ' - Anoroved-For-Release-200510-11e5-:-CiA=R Pb otAbtib,daitob 5 f512, 722 91, 387, 543
-...i
,
1 Reductions suggested only for eiv defense, and proposed legislation for military Personnel pay raise and uniform rations.
Approved For lEisliteigt.51/8.Ma: akt 66B00401qi00200150045-3
TABLE a-Suggested appropriation reductions by departments and agencies
Em thOusauds Of dollars]
June 3
DePartmentsand agendas
-
Pbeal year
1963 actual
Fiscal year
1961 esti-
mated
Fiscal year
1965 January
request
Suggested
reduction
Fiseal year
1965 after
reduction
ittecutive Office of the President
uu,ds smoskiletes to Preshimit (except foreign ald)
_
arMitar
, assistance, Department of Defense
eiconomiC aSsist,mee' Fluids appropriated to I'resdent:
Grants and loans
Xntcrngtional financlalinstitutians. -
Peace corps '
Otherprograms: Depart ni6t Its of Agriculture, Qua i titre? and State
relJarfantlit Of k gru6dttue
23,601
879,200
1, 325, 000
2, 603, 000
2, 121, 656
58.556
279, 297
7, 781, T20
800, 580
49, 7015,250
1, 092, 274
5, 333, 019
I, 133, 862
316, 521
361,911
840,241
405,912
11, 046, 296
3, 134, 776
755, 139
821,812
7M, 259
3, 673, 041
5, 533, 700
,
Eli, 122
102, 283, 326 ,
1
24,996
04,100
1,Yr.,...
000, 000
1, 9149, 680
111, 656
95, 964
236. 001
7,049.449
791,410
50,000,000
1.150,074
6.102,389
I,_154,319
*44.562
470,456
654,399
421,510
11, 874, 357
2, 742, 669
811, 206
634,549
2, 203, 238
3, 240, 966
5, 562, 807
1, 575, 070
222, 879
102, 553, 608
26,872
26,300
I, 000, 000
2 392, 100
267. 536
115.000
276, 200
5, 691, 952
919,219
49, 880,000
1,213,020
7, 649, 096
1, 213, 244
368, 138
830.510
660,400
368, 401
-32,284, 042
2, 693, 000
751, 250
632.25'S
749, 054
5. 301, 000
5, 443. 771
2, 768, 691
271,591
103, 768, 585
10,086
5,240
600,000
1,435, 260
, 205, 880
115.000
I, 220
30, 133
298,913
I 525,000
127,915
2, 265, 610
139,477
35,956
516,913
650,700
70,910
92, 588
273,000
31,309
93,472
207, 469
035,960
193,8418
1, 950, 527
17,861
21,06
000,001
9541,844
. 61, 654
274. 98(
5, 661, 81(
620. 304
49,355. 00(
1, 085, OR
5,383, 48t
1, 073, 767
332, IBC
313,597
297, 491
12, 301, 454
2, 420, 000
719, 941
538,826
- 541, 585
4, 665, 000
5, 339, 903
808, 161
271,591
Department qf Commerce -
Departmeqt of Defense, military functions
Department 01 Dr rm... eh il runcuoas
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare_
Department of Interim
Department oi Justice-
Department of Lanr
Post ?Dee Department-__
Department of State_
Department of the Treasury
Atomic Energy Csausissisa__-
'Federal Aviatn
General Services IrAt rat Ina
P101,5166 and Dome Eintmee _Agency
National Aeronautics and Space A dmi,,baration
Veterans' Administration--
Other executive branch--
Legislative and jutifrial brandies--
. ,
Grand total
. .
'
-
10, 226, 338
93, 562, 247
, ella prop000(1n for military perticumel pay raises and unifornwitionst
TABLE 3,--Feaera4 expr enditures, fiscai years 1.954-45, showing military functions; and nonmilitary functions broken categorically
fDimtdoflas
Actual .
Estimate
1955
1966
1967
1908
1969
1630
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
,
Wilt , fullet5IT",
40.326
3,031
3,629
1,611
35,531
2,872
2,282
1,9430
35, 792
2,321
2,811
1,813
88,436
2, 572
2,353
1,6g3
35,070
2,977
5,187
1,910
41,203
2, PA
2,340
3,4(85
41,215
2,867
1,609
1,477
43,277
5,817
1,449
5,128
46, 725
2, 988
1,390
2,372
45,049
2,001
1,721
2,041
50, 750
3,147
1,400
1,897
49,856
2, 929
1,200
1,705
-
. , ,, it tary hinctichs:
Natinn51 security related__
Foreign. aid:
1,411itary assistance
XCAnerrl16 and other,-
,
? Subtotal, foreign aid_
International affairs-
,
Domesticreivilian:
Space research and technology
Agriculture -agrleultural resources..
Natural resources
Ccamneree and transportation--
Rowing and ,tylpnonnity develok
talent-
Health labor. and welfare
Education--
Veterans' benefits and servirea.--
' Interest
Generalgoverwnent
Allowances for -
"Attack on poverty"
Civilian pay raise
Contingencies
Subtotal, domestic-civi1ian_
Tata nonmilitarifunctious
Deduct interfund transact ion.
5,140
2-21
4,252
221
4,224
240
4,933
290
4,097
822
5,743
376
3,006
354
3,575
sa
3, 762
446
3,782
547
3, 297
550
2, 905
642-
90
2,573
1,317
1,210
-628
2.122
326
4,341
6,470
1,228
74
4,383
1,203
1,223
136
2,163
377
4.522
6,431
1,166
71
4,8611
1.103
1,802
-10
2,402
343
4.810
6,846
1,576
76
4,546
1,298
1,313
-118
2,632
437
4.870
7.307
1,738
SD
4,419
1,644
1,631
30
8,059
841
6,1114
7,689
1,284
145
8,500
1,070
2,01'
970
3,877
732
5,287
7,671
1,466
401
4,882
1,714
1,963
In
3,690
866
6,266
0.266
1,242
744
14,172
2,006
2,573
323
4,244
943
5,414
9,060
1,709
1,257
8,88!
2,147
5,774
349
4,638
1,076
5.493
9,196
1,876
2,552
5,954
2,352
2,843
-87
4,7119
1,244
6,188
9,980
1,979
4,44)0
5,070
2,483
3,151
-191
5,533
1,348
6,382
10,701
2,238
250
4,000
4,907
2,588
3,069
-317
5,832
1,691
Soil
11, 101
2,238
253
544
300
19,024
21,691
23,963
24,100
25,470
10,426
29,711
32.176
34,499
37,813
41,346
42,274
27,446
-235
29,03'm
-181
30,747
-315
30,9547 32,806
-467 -507
80,474
-355
38,018
-694
36,942
-654
41.695
-633
43,106
-613
48,340
-685
48,650
-600
Total.
27,211
26.864.
30, tuft
30,03032,299
39,110
86,324
38, 288
41,062
44,593
47,655
48,054)
Total, including military functits
.... 1
65,137
64,389
66.274
08. 908 71,369
80,342
76,539
--
441,515
87,787
_
92,642
98,405
97,9)0
IvIcNAMARA'S W IN SOUTH reverse, that I have .in the State of
VIETNAM Oregon.
Ever since 1952, when I resigned from Senator Wassa L. Moasz, of Oregon, is
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President. on MaY the Republican Party, this yellow sheet sounding the depths of demagoguery in his
_
23, the Portland Oregonian published baa periodically and with consistency daily diatribes demanding U.S. withdrawal
another one of Its many editorials pay- and persistency stooped to the type of from South Vietnam.
Ing Its disrespects to me. This mouth- In seeking election as an Oregon delegate
? editorial which it wrote on May 23, 1964.
piece ia yellow journalism, owned by the The Demagog."editoriaIl is entitled "Oregon's to the Democratic National Convention Sen-
ator Moasz used the ballot slogan: "All the
ask unanimous consent to
Newhouse eastern chain, which con-Way With President Johnson."
have this editorial printed in the RECORD.
times to represent itself as an Oregon There being no objection, the editorial Now, he says on the Senate floor that Pres-
ifkijpitGsvEltinIfin,Releesee12405/01/05 : CI-RD
news-newspaper but is one only in loca- was ordered to be
tion, is one of the gl printe AY'i_thacoan 00. ouzo
B4 -.1111.t4 for U.S. military
gan
ident Johnson's budget request for an addl-
Z?123outh Vietnamese
1Prom the Oregonian, May 23, 19641
Oasootr's DEMAGOG
proved rormfeAgpsyD5 .DAiR101P66ROMMOW00150045-3
1964 L Rtwito ?
ill ,th0,,r4.1ght Oorninunist conquest
- S, pr:.00511:iy the--Preeideht-Of the united
8t4tes to liAll More _American- boys."
-'41111.4.14$41941W14.* Of --,WA*-14:C:1\10R",
' "gP11:444Ap.L..)3-.E.:,Ta?270*',1:,10,TA9
yiTar :7; the President is ,oraering Amer-
ican bOYS *`tO'tfieji death"; pursuit of 'Coin-
ninniStS )54.74 .0-cross the horders to their
sanctuaries in North, Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia,, Says_ MORSE, be outright
aggregien."
The virvilielicj- ot-Ae.na-.Etor-KoaS0. attack
on the prCai.:debt, bedie-G,Fy 13atense,
and the State IsePartnienf /Or carrying Out
what is esSential4r )iipartisan policy in
Southeast Asia is almost beyond belief. One
hopes' the Nation'understands that Senator
Mos n does ,not, speak, for_ the people of Ore-
goa in thia ,poisorious. campaign. to undercut
foreign polIcy._
Mr. MQ13SE. Nix% President,'some of
My friends in the Senate "josh" me,
now ,alld then, because I am the Only
Senator Who puts in the CONGRESSIONAL
RiCORD editorials and al-061p against
himself: They raise the query as to why
I do it, because they wonder if i do not
know that the newspapers always have
the last word. My reply always is that if
they do, that is the fault of the politician,
because I am. perfectly willing to get this
_
kind of support, in reverse, from this
yellow Sheet, but,I always set the record
straight. _
Yesterday, I sent the following tele-
gram to the editor of the Oregonian,
because the editorial reached rny, atten-
tion only yesterday.
I stated: ,
Your 9clitoild Saturday, May 23_, entitled,
,"Oregon's Demagog" has just reached my
attention. It is, injteeping with your yellow
journalism. I stand on my ballot slogan
the Way With President Johnson" in
seeking election as Oregon delegate to Demo-
cratic National Convention. I ibalt _sUp-
port President Johnson's nomination _en-
thusiastically and work hald for his election.
liowever, every voter knows that my ballot
slogan was not synonymous with pledging
to he "a rub)per stamp /or President John-
son," Prequsntly the best service a Senator
can render in supporting the President of
his party` is to disagree with him when he
thinks, some,, Presidential policy is wrong.
U.S. foreign .policy In South Vietnam is wrong
and it cannot be reconciled with,our?ob_ilga-
tions under Internationetlaw, It you think
it can, start writing editorials trying to jus-
tify McNamara's war in South Vietnam. If,
you think that-the Oregonian Speaks for
the people of Oregon on U.S. policy in South
Vietnam, you couldn't be more wrong.
-.WAYNE IVIoseE.
;
Mr. Pr e,sident, that is a, fitting intro-
duction kor speech today dealing with
IVIcNaniara'S War ,in South Vietnam, al-
though the name of th,e war should be
enlarged a 'bit, to include all the mem-
bers of the War, council that met in, Hono-
lulu a few days ago.
Today, however, I wish to make vorn-
ments upon the, ,position taken lay the
President of the United States Yesterday
in respect to, IVIcl?Jarnarg's war in South
Vietnam.
The President's news conference state-
ments' yesterday about our policy in Asia
were in reality a sad admission that the
10-year-old policy of unilateral iirtlerican
intervention, in Indochina, has been a
failure.
President Johnson's reliance upon a
10-year-old letter frcAlpilitoslati lEbrReltiagine21305idiStO5of ClArRIDA6C2E140411,1RON2 for the rule of
hower to Premie: Diem bespeaks nothing
but the bankruptcy of the policy which
that letter sets forth. That letter was
not a treaty. That letter did not legally
bind the American people or the Ameri-
can Congress. It was only the statement
of one President's intentions toward an-
other President. The Conditions which
existed then do not exist today.
The commitment President Johnson
spoke about yesterday was the alleged
commitment in the Eisenhower letter of
1954. However, I say most respectfully
to my President that that was no com-
mitment of the United States to South
Vietnam.
It was the expression of the then
President of the United States asto what.
he proposed to do. However, a Presi-
dent of the United States cannot com-
mit this Republic in respect to conduct-
ing a war. Let us never forget that.
I repeat to-Cy what I have said many
times on th, .00r of the Senate, in
speaking agan.6 the U.S. unconstitu-
tional war in South Vietnam, that that
unconstitutional war cannot be recon-
ciled with a single principle of interna-
tional law; that the United States is at
war in South Vietnam illegally; and that
any reference' by the President of the
United States to a so-called commitment
contained in the Eisenhower letter of
1954 never was and is not now binding
upon the people of the United States.
I repeat that the foreign policy of the
United States does not belong to the
President of the United States, but to
the American people. I also say most
respectfully that in my judgment the
President of the United States ought to
laring the foreign policy, as far as his
administration is concerned, in line with
the views of the people of the United
States. If the President of the United
States thinks that the illegal war of the
United States in South Vietnam has the
support of the American people, let him
take it to the country.
Mr, JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I believe the Sen-
ator's position is that at the present time,
since there has not been a declaration
of war, we are not properly in a state
of war.
Mr. MORSE. My position is that no
President of the United States has the
constitutional authority or power or
right to send American boys to a battle-
field in the absence of a treaty obligation
or a declaration of war.
-0, Article I, section 8, of the Constitution
vests the power to declare war in Con-
gress, not in the President. This Presi-
dent as any President before him, before
he sends any more boys to the battleline
in South Vietnam to be killed?and they
will be killed in increasing numbers?
ought to ask for a declaration of war.
He should not attempt, as this President
is attempting, indirectly to get an ap-
propriation of $125 million to support an
illegal U.S. intervention in South Viet-
nam, an intervention which has violated
the Geneva accords ever since 1954. The
aid which President gisenho sub-
neutral council found South Vietnam
guilty of violating the Geneva accords.
It also found North Vietnam guilty. It
based a part of its charge establishing
the guilt of South Vietnam on the fact
that the United States, contrary to the
Geneva accords, was sending kinds and
amounts of military aid to South Viet-
nam, in violation of the Geneva accords.
When President Eisenhower sent that
aid and put the United States in the posi-
tion of violating the Geneva accords,
charges ought to have been filed before
the United Nations to have this matter
thrashed out within the United Nations.
That is where it ought to be now, in-
stead of having Adlai Stevenson read a
speech, which obviously had been pre-
pared for him, setting forth the unsound
position of the U.S. State Department
before the Security Council a few days
ago. He ought to have resigned as Am-
bassador to the United Nations rather
than to lend his lips to reading such a
shocking speech. That speech cannot be
reconciled with the international law
obligations of this Republic.
Having Adlai Stevenson, in effect, beat
his breast before the world and say that
we were going to do what we thought was
necessary to be done in South Vietnam,
was a serious blow against the United
Nations Charter itself, of which, as our
Ambassador, he is supposed to be one
of the trustees.
I do not yield to Adlai Stevenson or
anyone else in this country in my dedi-
cated support of the United Nations. I
represented this Government in 1960 as
one of its delegates to the United Na-
tions. I am convinced as much today
as I have always been that the United
Nations offers mankind's only hope of
establishing permanent peace in this
world.
The sad thing is that today, the United
States, probably more than any other
nation in the world, is undercutting the
United Nations Charter,_ The great dan-
ger is that if we do not stop the program
of the United States vis-a-vis the United
Nations we may well see the liquidation
of the United Nations as mankind's best
hope to preserve peace in the world.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE, Let it he Understood at
the beginning of my speech today, as I
have said time and time again, I am
not only criticizing the foreign policy of
the United States;' I am also offering a
substitute. In my 20 years in the Senate
I have never criticized American foreign
policy without at the same time offering
what I considered to be an affirmative,
constructive substitute for the policy
that I was criticizing.
I say to my President again today, as
I said yesterday, on the floor of the Sen-
ate: "When are you going to lay the
whole southeast Asia crisis before the
United Nations under the procedures and
in keeping with the procedures of the
United Nations Charter for the settle-
ment or attempted settlement of that
threat to the peace riot only of Asia but
also the peace of the world??
When we signed the United Nations
sequently sent to South Vietnam violated Charter, waledadelaurselves to seek to
Approveliii*Ogl or Releas_e 2005/01/05 ? CIA-RDP6614181403R000200150045-3
12184 CONGRESSIONAL 12:ECORD ? SENATE J une 3
s military might. The United States of
America, in South Vietnam today, is
seeking to. substitute the rule of Ameri-
can military might for right.
In all the history of the world any
country that has attempted to do that
has finally fallen. If the United States
follows the rule of the jungle, the United
States, in due course of time, will fall.
The world will not long tolerate a na-
tion that takes the position which Adlai
Stevenson took before the Security
Council of the United Nations, when, in
effect, he announced to the world that
we intended to do exactly what we choose
to do in South Vietnam, and that the
rest of the world could like it or not.
Not even the United States, in the course
of history, can get away with that threat
to the peace of the world.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I commend the,
? Senator from Oregon on his position.
/t Is entirely right from a constitutional
atatuipoint for us to stay out and to
-have this matter left in the hands of
the United Nation,s. If we go in there,
- 'without sisbmitting the matter to the
United Nations, we are really, in a way,
tearing down the 'United Nations, and
we say to the nations-of the rest of the
world, "You have the right to do like-
wise.' That belt* so; there Is no need
for the United Nations to be in the field.
. ..,
Mr. MORSE. We have already greatly
damaged the United Nations. I pray
that we have not tirreParably damaged
It, because the opportunity is still avail-
? able to the PrLsiderit?tb- lake this case to
? the 'United Nations, to ask the United
Nations to take jirlialli ,ask
of it, just
as we support the Itnited Nations in
? three, other troubre spots of the world
where the peace is threatened: the Mid-
dle-East, where there is a United Na-
tions Peacekeeping corps that we sup-
? port; in Cyprus, wliere there is a 'United
Nations peacekeeping corps that we sup-
port; and in the Congo, where there is
a United Nations peacekeeping corps
. that' we support. Why not in South
Vietnam? Could it he for the ugly rea-
son that we think we are too powerful
? to he challenged?
I
I yield to the Senator from Alaska.
_ . -
Mr. ORM:IC:NG. - Again I wish tO' ex-
press my cortiplete accord With the mag-
nificent stand that the senior Senator
from Oregon has taken for many 'weeks
on 'the, subject of our illegal involve-
ment in the civil war in southeast Asia.
? I commend him for ? his constructive
proposal to take the problem to the
United Nations. I invite attention to
the fact that only this morning, when
-?I spoke on this sublect. I urged that the
United Nations oak or an immediate
cease-fire. / assure senator from
Oregon?and I feel ce' in he will agree
with me?that such a,Secinest by the
President of the United, States would
meet with the loudest cheer from the
American people that he could possibly
hear. - -
i'
My mail continues to run it the rate
of 100 to 1 in favor o; the wgrin6ialift
American troops tpoopra e
There is no excuse whatever for the eon-
tinued killing of our own boys and the
killing of Vietnamese on the sole pre-
tense or pretext or argument, which has
been advanced bi the Washington Post
and the New York Times, that in order
to negotiate, we must be much strong-
er; consequently, we must sacrifice more
American lives and more Vietnamese
lives in order to arrive at the conclu-
sion Which we ought to know by now is
inevitable, namely, peace by negotiation.
Mr. MORSE. I completely endorse
the proposal of the Senator from Alaska
that the President call upon the United
Nations to ask for a cease-fire in Asia?
in Laos, in South Vietnam, or wherever
the fighting is going on.
The Senator from Alaska is very kind
to make reference to the position I have
taken these many weeks on the floor of
the Senate in opposition to what I con-
sider to be the illegal. unconstitutional
U.S. war in South Vietnam. But 'no
Member of the Senate has, been more
courageous, more farseeing, more
statesmanlike in Opposition to American
policy in South Vietnam than the Sen-
ator from Alaska [Mr. GROENING]. It
has been an honor that I shall always
appreciate, an honor that.' shall be
proud to have my descendants read
about. that I stood shoulder, to shoulder
with the Senator from Alaska during
this period of time when so many Mem-
bers of Congress ware tioncommittal,
when so many apparently hoped that the
trouble would blow away; that in some
way, somehow, it would Vanish. But it
will not vanish. Affirinative action will
be necessary on the part of this country.
. .
During that period of time we have
listened to brilliant speeches by the
distinguished Senator from Alaska, and
they have been supported ,by the dis-
tinguished Senator from Louisiana IMr.
ELLENDER) and the distinguished Sen-
ator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHN-
sToza, who commentesi on-the subject on
the floor of the Senate a few moments
ago.
During these weeks the American peo-
ple have not had an.accoiniting from the
kept press of the country in regard to
the position that has been taken on the
floor of the Senate in.opposition to U.S.
Policy in South Vietnam. , The gentle-
men who sit in the gallery above the
clock, and who repyesent the major news-
papers of the country, are not to be
blamed, for frequently they submit such
articles. Some of them have shown me
copies of their articles. However, there
put them in the RECORD, for I am really
more, modest than those letters might
seem to indicate as a result of my inser-
tion Of them. But I placed them in the
Ricotta, just as the Senator from Alaska
also Placed a similar number of letters
In the RECORD some days ago, because it
is important, from the standpoint of his-
tory, that we record at the time of this
historic debate on South Vietnam that
there is a large body of American public
oPiniOn that is against the policy of our
Government That body of opinion will
become larger and larger as more and
more people begin to understand the
factaabout U.S. policy in South Vietnam.
I am-proud of the letters I placed in the
Rscoka yesterday.
The Senator from Alaska said that his
mail, for many weeks, has been running
at the rate of about 100 to 1 against U.S.
policy. I have said that mine is running
at least 9 to 1 against it. I know it is
much larger, so 9 to 1 is a gross under-
statement. However. I have placed in
the RECORD letters from such great his-
torians as Professor Commager, one of
the greatest living historians in this
country. All those letters constitute a
cross section of American public opinion.
I say to my President that latent at
the grassroots of America is aghastness
at the policy of the United States in mak-
ing war and killing American boys in
South Vietnam. I have heard the Sena-
tor from Alaska say on the floor of the
Senate, time and time again, that South
Vietnam is not worth the life of a single
American boy. And it is not. We cannot
iustify the killing of a single American
boy in South Vietnam.
In one of my earlier speeches I said?
and I repeat it today?that I am waiting
for the long list of honorary pallbearers
that I assume my administration will ap-
point. consisting of the top echelon of of-
ficials of the United States, to be ready
to meet the ships laden with flag-draped
coffins of fallen American boYs returning
from South Vietnam, if we do not stop
the killing. There can be no possible end
result but an increasing slaughter of
American boys. Not only are American
boys being killed. Our course of action
is resulting in the killing of thousands of
other human beings. That is why I spoke
a few days ago about the spiritual values
and the moral obligations involved in
this situation, for all those people are the
children of God.
When I think of all the pratings of my
Government, when I think of the
speeches of Adlai Stevenson from 1952
is a deliberate design on the part of thqs until his unfortunate speech of the other
kept press of Anierica to conceal from day, and the hope that is to be found in
the Atferican People the facts about the symbolism and procedures of the
South Vietnam and America's uncon- United Nations. I, too, am aghast at what
scloritibie,-Inexcusable, illegal course of has happened to my country. Instead of
adtion in South Vietnam. making peace, we are making war. In-
It is quite interesting to observe that stead of stopping bloodshed, we are spill-
the American people are lieginning to lag blood. Reconcile that, with the
realize that only through radio and church pews we occupy on Sunday; for
television newscasts can they begin to get as a religious person I would have my
at, least some conception of the other side fellow Americans remember that basic in
of the South Vietnam issue, a side that this foreign policy crisis are great ques-
disagrees with the policy ,of the U.S. tions of morality.
Ooverrunent. ' ? Of course I do not accept the attempt-
Yesterday I placed in the risme', at the ed rationalization, "We are in it,,and
clue _steeds:Dottie
4 a
02tRONck: ou
get t, to S we
there is no w f
1605A4 'TS MI Maid-4 with it save
subject. I would have preferred not to face?'
1964,
lease, 20Q5J01195,?- Gli-ETARly140*(500200150045-3
ESSIONAL 12185
Mr. President, whose face'? 'Until We ceptance from the United States of large One 61 the inexcusable arguments ad-
got into this situation, I never knew supplies of military aid. The council also vanced by some is that we are there be-
that face saving?Which some call "pres- found North Vietnam to be in violation cause we were asked to go there by Diem;
tige"?was ever More important than of the Geneva accords. Furtv...rmore, I but the fact is that we set up the puppet
to do right, for there is no substtiute believe that both Laos aria Red China Diem, and also two other puppet die-
for following. 'What we know is the hon- have been violating the Geneva accords; tators there. We have no more right to
est and the right thing to do. and very possibly Cambodia has been argue that our forces belong there be-
So those who talk about "face saving" violating them, too. I believe that situa- cause our own puppet asked us to send
Impliedly admit that they do not at- tion should also be examined, them there than Khrushchev has a right
/ tempt to sustain the program on its The proper procedure for the United to argue that his forces are in East Ger-
Merits. States to follow is to file a complaint with many because his puppet dictator in
I repeat ?the suggestion I made the the United Nations. The United States East Germany invited him to send them
other day to the "face-savers": I have had no business setting up itself as a there.
heard of "throwing out the baby with unilateral enforcer of the Geneva ac- Mr. President, we ought to wash our
the bath Water/' but never before have cords. After all, the United States did hands of puppetism in South Vietnam.
I heard it suggested that we should blow not even sign them. We ought to ask the United Nations to
Off heads to save face. Yet we are blow- In 1954, President Eisenhower wrote come in and maintain peace and order.
Ing off heads hi South Vietnam, and of the need to stabilize the Government We ought to get out. I have said before,
some attempt to justify it on the ground of South Vietnam. That is the letter and I repeat now, that I am not an over-
" ? f from which President Johnson quoted nighter. Our SEATO allies ought to
come in and help to try to maintain the
peace until the United Nations can move
in. The United States should stay there
with a peacekeeping mission for a period
of time until the issue could be debated
and passed upon in the United Nations.
But our SEATO allies?Australia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philip-
pines, Great Britain, and France?
ought to be in there with us. If they
come in, it might help us to stop the kill-
ing. But obviously they have an allergy
against involving themselves in a situa-
tion that might kill any of their boys.
Great Britain is perfectly willing to
urge us to continue our operations in
Asia. Great Britain applauds publicly
the flying of American planes over Laos,
which is obviously in violation of the
Geneva accords. But we do not see any
British planes There. The British are
very clever in persuading others to do
their dirty work for them.
Mr. President, I am not interested in
sacrificing the lives of American boys in
South Vietnam because that might
strengthen the colonialism of Great Brit-
ain in Malaysia. I say to the American
people, "Do not forget that that is back
of this picture, too." What is behind
the scenes is very ugly; and so far as I
am concerned, not only should the prob-
lem of South Vietnam be made a ques-
tion of United Nations jurisdiction, but
if Malaysia becomes a threat to the peace
of the world, I am for taking that issue
to the United Nations as well?unless we
wish to tear up the charter?for we can-
States helped as much as any party to
not read the charter, as I shall show be-
step upthat war, and today we are prom- It is dead and gone, and urunourned, fore I finish my speech, without realiz-
!sing the same peaple the same war con- both at home and abroad. Its successors ing that that was the commitment of the
ditions "forever," to use the word of our have been no more "enlightened in pur- signatories thereto.
Secretary of Defenie. pose and effective in performance" than Mr. President, the President's state-
JJ.
I respectfully submit, Mr. President, yesterday.
that the statesmanlike course? of action Ten years later, despite the huge
Is to lay the problem before the United amount of money we have put into the
Nations, and thus put Russia on the stabilization effort and despite the large
spot, for I believe that in the Security American military force on the scene,
Council, Russia would veto it; but under the Government of South Vietnam is a
the United Nations Charter there is an- tottering instrument, held up only by
other course, which is to have an ex- the United States itself. It is less
traordinary session of the General As- capable of resisting "the attempted sub-
sernbly of the United Nations called, and
there , lay the -problem before all the
Members of the United Nations. Let
them,take up the problem of this crisis,
Which in ,my judgment is fast threaten-
ing the peace of the world and is rapidly
destroying the effectiveness and the
hopefulness Of the United Nations itself.
return to my discussion of the Eisen-
hower letter of 154, because, have
said, the statements made yesterday by ?
thy President of the United States, at his
news conference, have given me the im-
pression that he must be laboring under
the delusion that the Eisenhower letter
of 1954 in sonic Way, semehow, creates
a binding commitment on the part of the
Government of the United States; but
there is no basis in fact for such a con-
clusion.
? In 1954, President Eisenhower wrote
of the Geneva Conference; in the 10 sub-
sequent years tWe United States and
South Vietnam have violated with in-
creasing impunity the Geneva acoords.
Ten years ago,' President Eisenhower
arioke of the long exhausting war through
Which the peOle of South Vietnam had
lived; in the next 10 years the United
version or aggression through military
means" of which President Eisenhower
spoke than ever before.
I cannot understand how any Amer-
ican, not to mention the President of the
United States, can read that letter today
and not appreciate that it sets forth a
futile, dead end course for the United
States. To quote it again, President
Eisenhower wrote to Diem:
The Government of the United States ex-
pects that this aid will be met by perform-
ance on the part of the Government of Viet-
nam in undertaking needed reforms. It
hopes that such aid, combined with your
own continuing efforts, will contribute effec-
tively toward an independent Vietnam en-
dowed with a strong government. Such a
government would, I hope, be so responsive
to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so
enlightened in purpose and effective in per-
formance, that it will be respected both at
home and abroad and discourage any who
might wish to impose a foreign ideology on
your free people.
The government to which that Eisen-
hower letter was addressed collapsed in
an aura, not of reform and respecta-
bility, but of terror and corruption. It
delivered nothing that was expected of
it by President Eisenhower 10 years ago.
In 1954, President Eisenhower spoke was the Diem government. ment of American objectives in Asia is
of the need of South Vietnam for aid; in The successive governments of South not borne out by the facts. President
the 10 years to follow, the United States Vietnam have failed to hold up their end Johnson said, "First, America keeps her
,
Would spend around $5 billion to aid of the bargain President Eisenhower en- word."
South Vietnam, and in 1964 would find tered into 10 years ago. Today the What word? Does he mean that the
itself committed to an ever-rising level United States is upholding both ends? letter of President Eisenhower, which
of such aid. ' ' ' ' our own and that of South Vietnam. was never sanctioned by the Congress of
When our Government began VoUring As I have said before of the Eisen- the United States, becomes America's
its military aid nto south 'ViOt?am, it hower letter, unless the policy it began word, binding upon succeeding Presi-
violated the Geneva accOrdS of 1054, for is quickly changed, American Presidents dents? He could not be more wrong.
,that is prohibited Under the Geneva, will be reading it 30 and 50 years from The question is not what President Eisen-
words. The'neutral council, composed now to explain why we are spending bil- hower said 10 years ago in a letter that
of representadves Of fndiaTCanada, and lions of dollars and thousands of Amer- he sent to Premier Diem, the American
Poland found South Vietnam to be in lean military personnel to maintain what puppet in South Vietnam. The question
is nothing but an American puppet in is, How sound is the policy that was ne-
.
violation of the Geneva accords,and
cited, as one of 'the vfiiiiibirovtf
cor-ReltgalterM5(101/0 ?
5 ? CIA-RDP66B0001k6130111,16t1
5-y the policy is
No. 110-16
121,0 Approved For Relearme,20.051Mi
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CARDP661400 000200150045-3
*lune 3
not in our_national self-interest, that
policy should be repudiated and no long-
er folloived.
So When the President said, "America
beeps 1.*r word," I ask, "What about
SoutVana's word?"
The_ vemment of South Vietnam
144_14 fulfilled the 1954 conditions for
aid laid down by President Eisenhower.
The United States has kept her word to
South Vietnam far beyond any reason-
able expectation, even to the extent of
violating the Geneva agreement. What
we are doing now is furnishing South
Vietnam with a type and amount of mili-
tary aid that was barred by the Geneva
word. To throw billions of dollars and
the lives ,of American soldiers into the
noilataral fulfillment of an Executive
agreeMent under these conditions is not
a marled honor but of folly.
President Johnson continued:
&Toad, the issue is the future of south-
east Asia as a whole.
I respectfully ask: "Since when is the
future of southeast Asia something for
an American President to decide all by
himself') Mr. President, the future of
southeast Asia is not the exclusive prop-
erty of the Presidency and not even the
exclusive property of the United States.
The people most concerned with the fu-
ture of southeast Asia are the people who
live there, and that excludes the United
States altogether."
If the Presid,ent _thinks the future of
Southeast Asia is at stake, then he has
no alternative but to confer with the gov-
ernments of southeast Asia, not only with
South Vietnam, but With_North Vietnam,
Cambodia, Burma, 1.406, Thailand, and
the neighbors who also have a more di-
rect interest than does the United
States?India and China.
For President Johnson to create the
Impression that the United States in-
tends tn determine the future for mil-
lions of people 7,000 miles away is not
even a thinly disguised kind of imperial-
ism. It is stark, ugly imperialism,
Third?
Said the President?
our purpose is peace.
But Mr. President, why do we help
make war when you say our purpose is
peace? The one agency of mankind de-
signed and created to tuaintin peace in
the world is the United Nations. If we
sincerely wish to bring peace to south-
east Asia, why has the American Govern-
ment shunned United Nations jurisdic-
tion of the whole conflict in southeast
Asia? Why, too, do American military
planners discuss the use of nuclear weap-
ons to defoliate trees, the selection of
targets for air and sea bombardment of
North Vietnam and Laos, and possibly
China? What kind of doubletalk is it
to say that we seek peace when our Sec-
retaries of State and Defense openly
threaten other nations with hints of these
contingent war plans to expand the war?
Mr. President, our purpose in south-
east Asia will not truly be peaceful until
Said President Johnson yesterday?
this Is not just a jungle war, but a struggle
for freedom on every front of human ac-
tivity.
Freedom for whom? The people of
South Vietnam? I have not heard any-
one make the case in private conversa-
tion that the United States is bringing
any kind of freedom to the people of
South Vietnam. we are not bringing
communism, as is the Vietcong, but we
are not bringing freedom, either.
We are supporting a military dictator-
ship. We are supporting a police state.
We are supporting a tyrant under whom
there is no freedom for the people of
South Vietnam. That is one reason why
that country is in great turmoil.
Mr. President. I wish to see freedom
in South Vietnam. I desire to see free-
dom everywhere where police state re-
gimes rule. That is why I have always
been counted on the side of those who
wish to take to the troubled spots of the
world economic freedom, because with-
out it, political freedom for the people
cannot take root and grow. But bring
it into the United Nations, and then the
senior Senator from Oregon will be
among those who will urge that we do
everything passible to bring economic
freedom to the rank and file of the peo-
ple of South Vietnam which, when once
established, will make it possible for po-
litical freedom to develop.
The fallaciousness and unsoundness of
the 1954 Eisenhower letter were spelled
out clearly in today's New York Times by
C. L. Sulzberger. writing from Paris. He
states:
When Foster Dulles fathered SATO a dec-
ade ago he admitted its principal purpose
was to provide our President legal authority
to intervene in Indochina.
That was also the reason why Foster
Dulles put the backing of the American
Government behind Diem, and prevailed
on Diem not to put South Vietnam's sig-
nature to the Geneva accords.
Dulles wanted to keep South Vietnam
as an American protectorate. He wanted
an American "handle" in Asia, and Diem
was it. But he at least recognized at the
beginning the limitations the Geneva
accords put upon the American protec-
torate. He told Sulzberger on February
22, 1955:
The French have a substantial military
force in South Vietnam. That Is France's
principal role. The Geneva (1954 partition)
accord bars the importation into Indochina
of new military aid. The United States can't
increases the number of its military advisers.
That places a strong dependence on France.
In my speech of a few weeks ago, in
which I discussed at length the inter-
national law principles that are involved
In this case?all of which are against
the position of the United States?I re-
counted for the Senate that sad chapter
In American history when John Foster
Dulles, the American Secretary of State,
went to London and to Paris, and in
London tried to persuade Anthony Eden
and Winston Churchill to pledge them-
we bring the United Nations in. Until selves to Join the United States and
the American Government does that. France in maintaining in Indochina,
purpose are a B
shameful hYPc'crisApproved For Releaser200EdiastP35 oiEt4A
words of our peaceful British, and American tr 0340
Fourth? war in Indochina. His proposal was the whole
that if we could get that agreement be-
tween the British Government and the
French Government, he, speaking for the
United States, then would announce it
to the Congress.
Who protected the United States at
that sad international diplomatic con-
ference? Winston Churchill. For Win-
ston Churchill. said, in effect, that that
would be a deception of the Congress of
the United States, and he turned Dulles
down. Dulles was not successful in
keeping the French involved, for they
had already lost 240,000 of the flower of
French youth in the Indochina war.
They had had enough.
If this country follows the course of
action it is now following in South Viet-
nam, if the mess does not lead to a third
world war conflagration, it will not be
many years before history will record the
tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of
American boys that will be sacrificed in
the same area of the world in which the
French sacrificed 240,000 in total casual-
ties.
When France declined to play the role
Dulles had laid out for her, we began
to violate the Geneva accords by send-
ing in the very military aid and advisers
that Dulles admitted were prohibited un-
der the Geneva accords.
That is the kind of deceitful program
that President Johnson seems to think he
Is required to carry out 10 years later.
The Diem government has dissolved.
Yet the American President is embarked
on an open-ended task of propping up his
tyranical successors. That is not a mat-
ter of keeping an ex-president's word; it
Is a national stupidity.
As Sulzberger makes clear, we are not
acting today in Asia in our capacity of a
SEATO member. SEATO is defunct.
SEATO has specifically declined to act
or to intervene in South Vietnam.
SEATO as an organization wants no part
of the South Vietnamese war.
The United States is going it alone.
And we are going alone down the path
to war.
Next time President Johnson reads the
Eisenhower letter aloud, I would hope he
will also read aloud certain articles of
the United Nations Charter, to wit:
Article 2, section 3: All members shall set-
tle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not en-
dangered.
Section 4: All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.
Article 33, section 1: The parties to any
dispute, the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security shall, first of all,
seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, medi-
ation, conciliation, arbitaration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies, or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice.
Article 37, section 1: Should the parties to
a dispute of the nature referred to in article
33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in
that article, they shall refer it to the Security
Council.
bprder problem is a
-Nations action, then
conflict that gave rise to the
A ;
? 1 .
1964
Carnhes ro Tem is even MOre
approPitateTiOr tm
tion, -IIIS71,P1SOZPOSReiii7Olinacdi to
lay the whole VietrianieaCiiiebleinhefOre
Vnited:Nat-04,:lest T1 --e-rignIf the
United $tateon a?wsgSe diSaSter than "e,
one We are already, in in Southeast Asia.
?, Finally, although most American heWS-
ptinera have studiously avoided any real
presentation of the criticisms and al-
ternative? many of Us hai,e-beeri offering
to present Policy In Aga, the -St. Louis.
Post-DisPatohnet One a them.
- - , ,
I ask unanimous consent that three of
its recent edit6riala on this subjeCt. be
printed in the CoiicRissibiTAL' EC0RD at
the conclusion of my reinarls, and that
they be `fellowed by today's column by
C. L. SUlzlierger from the New 'Veit
Times. I do not share whatSe?ealS
Mr. .5ulzherger's conclusion that hav-
ing embarked on a-fatal foreign policy,
we have to follow it 'bitter end.
But just how fatal a,policy it "is; Clear
from Mr Sulzberger's excellent aCcOiiiit.
On June 1, Mr. Sulzberger also wrote a
perceptive column, and I ask that it, too,
be printed at the conclusion of these re7
? marks. call attention to his_COnOlUSiGn;
One of the IMs purposes Is d Uhap-
ing ground for Insoluble questions and a face-
saver for loSt, causes. Now would be the
beet time to involve U.N.?before Peiping
and its satellites are members.
The
PRBSIDINO,OFFICER, (Mr. *-
OovERN in the Chair) Without, objec-
tion, it is so ordered.
,
- (See exhibit 1.)
Mr. mORSE. Mr. PreSident, I am also
Impressed with the editorials ,being
Written by John Knight of the Knight
newspapers. One of them was placed,
in. the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD yesterday
by the Senator from Florida IMr. Si,m-
vnERsT. AS Mr.,Knightput
As we look with reverence upon the graves
of our hero dead and contemplate their
sacrifices, what an appalling thought it is
that More Of our youth may soon be joining
them in eternal r t
And?one may ask?why, and for what?
Mr, President, I close my speech with
that question on my lips to the President
of the united mates: "Why and for
what? Mr. President, why do you per-
sist infollowing_ a course of action that
was set out in the Eisenhower letter of
10 years ago, which has proven to be
so wrong and so muell against the na-
tional interest of this, Republic? Why
do you persist in following a course of
action that constitutes a failure on the
part of this Republic to live lip to its
solemn obligations under the charter of
the United Nations?"
Mr. President, I shall continue to pray
that my country will change its course of
action from warmaking to asking the
United Nations to take over jurisdiction
of the threat to, the peace of the world
In southeast Asia, and seek to use the rule
of law as the best Instrumentality which
has been devised by man to maintain
peace and to prevent war.
? Mr. President, ,I yield the floor.
[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch,
? May 18,1964]
_
4-14)" AMID cYNApproved For..
There is something cynical and at the r
same time faintly hopeful in the statement
se_ZQQ5/01L05 ?clADrRDP66B00_,403R
SS1oNAL RECOR ? SENATE
12187
of American policy on Southeast -Ada Pre- government. It Is difficult to escape the con-
tented to the U.N. Security Council by Am- elusion that this is mainly a gesture in-
bassa,dor Stevenson. He indicated that all tended to assure potential election-year
-the United States wants is to restore the critics of the administration that everything
Geneva agreement of 1954. He said our possible is being done to hold back commu-
Government has "faithfully supported' that nism in southeast Asia.
.political solution, and the reason for our Mr. Johnson told Congress the Communist
military intervention will be removed once Vietcong guerrillas "have intensified terror-
'the Communist forces stop violating it. The ist actions" against the South, and that "this
fighting can be ended overnight and Amen- increased- terrorism requires increased re-
'can military "advisers" can go home, he sug- sponse." But is more money the answer?
gested, if the peoples of the Indochina Penin- Within a limited framework, the answer is
sula are just left to themselves; the United increased confidence of the South Vietnam-
States "has no, repeat no, national military ese people in their Government and an in-
objective anywhere in southeast Asia." creased will to fight. That has not been
We say this is a cynical statement because, evident, and we do not see .how more money
as Ainbassador Stevenson well knows, the will bring it into being.
-United' States participated in negotiation of U.S. aid has been running at the rate
- the Geneva agreement of 1954 but refused to of $500 million a year. About 2 months
sign it (as did our client Government of ago it was announced this would be in-
South Vietnam) and has violated it repeat- creased by 10 percent to enable Premier
edly. The agreement has also been violated Nguyen Khanh to enlarge and strengthen his
.:_hy China, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong. armed forces. Mr. Johnson's request?$55
Aila it has been violated_ by South Vietnam, million for military uses and $70 million for
acting on American advice. ?economic ? .aid?represents an increase of 25
Ambassador Stevenson neglected to percent. Yet General, Khanh said. several
thin that the -Geneva agreement called for weeks ago he was satisfied with the aid he
elections to be held in 1956 for a unified gov- was getting.
? ernment that would bring together North The administration is undoubtedly sen-
and South Vietnam. The elections were sitive to criticism stemming from the Ameri-
never held because South Vietnam, acting on can casualty lists in Vietnam, where some
American advice, declined to permit them. 16,000 U.S. troops are acting as advisers. Mr.
Mr. Stevenson omitted mentipuing that the Johnson acknowledged as much when he oh-
1964 accord contemplated the military neu- served that, "Duty requires, and the Amer-
tralization of the whole peninsula, including lean people demand, that we give them the
both Vietnams, Cambodia, and Laos.. Both fullest_ measure_ of support." This is fair
the -North and S-nith, by that agreement, enough, and yet it conveys the notion our
' Were barred from eceiving any arms rein- troops are regarded as something more than
lorceMents, froth 6';tablishing any new mill- advisers. This is a guerrilla war, and only
tary bases under foreign control, from adher- the Vietnamese can, or should, fight it.
ing to any military alliance. This part of the Even if the increased aid increased the em-
agreement has been thoroughly violated on clency of the South Vietnamese effort, what
bath tides:- Certainly the enormous Amen- could be accomplished? The news from Laos
, can aid program has violated it; only hypoc- is an obvious warning that success in South
riscy can pretend otherwise. Vietnam would mean increased Communist
The simple truth is that after the Com- pressure in Laos, where there is a shaky
munist Vietminh. arove the French opt of rientrasnalition, or in Cambodia, where the
Indochina, the United States undertook to neutral Sihanouk government has been
keep a military foothold there by building up edging toward Red China. Which suggests
a military satellite in South Vietnam, and that a solution must be found collectively
China undertook to capture that satellite by for the three states of the old Indochina, as
civil war. The truth is that after 10 years French President De Gaulle has noted with
we have been unable to establish a firm gov- his proposal for neutralizing the whole area.
ernment with solid roots among the people It is increasingly clear that no solution can
of South Vietnam. Our policy of military be developed in the absence of some sort of
intervention is at dead end. We need a new United States-Red China accommodation.
policy. This idea is implicit in the U.S. request to
. One new .policy would be to support the several friendly governments to use their
Objectives of the Geneva agreement of 1954; influence with Red China to save the Laotian
namely, military neutralization of the whole coalition. It is duite likely that Red China
peninsula, with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, is in a more commanding position now than
and Cambodia left free to determine their it was 2 years ago, when the Laos coalition
own political future. The slightly hopeful was established. It will be recalled that the
element in Mr. Stevenson's speech is that if coalition was possible because President Ken-
our Government means what It says about nedy and Premier Khrushchev agreed in
restoring the Geneva agreement, then a way Vienna on a neutral and independent Laos.
May be open for an ultimate solution. Our Since then Russian influence in Asia has
Officials still, however, talk against the idea diminished.
of neutralization, and against a new Geneva If Red China is calling the tune it is Red
conference, as suggested by France, to ex- China with which we must deal. If our
plore that possibility. Just what do they policy, and our increased aid, were somehow
mean? directed toward that end, it would be under-
The Laos crisis has reinforced the need for standable. But our policy amounts to just
n,ew,American policy. We accept neutrali- more of the same, with no attainable goal
zation for Laos and Cambodia; why not for proclaimed except a nebulous "successful
Indochina as a whole? We accept a recon- campaign against the Communists."
vaned Geneva conference for Laos; why not No doubt the administration believes that
for Indochina as a whole? We accept a U.N. any move toward neutralization, or any sug-
presence for the Cambodian border; why not gestion of agreement with mainland China,
for Indochina as a whole? We accept the would be dangerous in an election year. If
aims of the 1954 Geneva accord, says Am- this is a motive, it is unworthy. It may not
bassador Stevenson; why not then support even be good politics. We believe a majority
them, as we have not done up to now? of the American people would welcome a way
to withdraw honorably . from Vietnam.
T_Froni the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, The -14-nation Geneva Conference that
May 18-24, 19641 opened just 3 years ago to discuss the Laotian
coalition included both the United States
NEEDED: A REAL VIETNAM POLICY and Communist China. Why would it not
No recent event has underlined quite so be possible to convene another such confer-
4142QAMItictirtkale0 Bfft4gliVirg
_ _ _ e _. __119,41Tega psWhaYt Catfi.e.
equest for an additional $125 million in Geneva Conference's request, he brought into
economic and military aid for the Saigon the picture? Why should the United States
. -
12188
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE June 3
think it necessary to direct and finance vir- out Indochina as the man who broke French If we are going to try to save southeast
tually alone a Western operation in Vietnam? power there. Although Ho originally sided Asia from Communist control we are going
The feeling of our allies may be discovered with Moscow. it Is believed that the pres- to have to do so virtually alone. France
In the profound silence that so far has rinse of Red China on his border has forced won't help; Britain will only go along to the
greeted Secretary Rusk's proposal to bring him to compromise. degree that we back its Malaysian experi-
25 other nations in at our side. But there is a strong surge for independ- ment against Indonesia. Pakistan considers
It is time that a positive, rational program, ence In North Vietnam, more so, perhaps, India, which we arm, more menacing than
leading toward a permanent political solu- than in the south, and the United States China.
tion, be established for Indochina. The should aim at ererting conditions which SEATO was a classic example of closing
United States need not take overt moves in will enable that spirit 1.... prevail. An Indo- the barn door on a missing horse. In this
this direction, if it fears to destroy the china neutrality guaranteed by the United case the horse was the Anglo-French empire.
vestiges of Vietnamese morale. The pro- States, Russia, Red China, Britain, and SEATO was written on the assumption of
poeals can be made by others. But we France. with provisions for the free elections British and French armed strength that
-should work actively to see that they are that were promised for 1956 but blocked by didn't exist.
made, discussed, and acted upon. the United States, might bring stability to France and Britain, increasingly excluded
?
the area. from Ada as military powers, feel diminish-
[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Perhaps that is not the best of all pos- Ing interest In the area. They admit Asia is
June 1,19641 sible ends to the 11.8. investment of men and strategically important, but less vital to the
Goea Yon HoNotvau money in Indochina, but there does not ap- West than the Atlantic world. The SEATO
? The Important meeting of U.S. military pear to be any other answer. So the Ameri-
allies have no passion for the kind of holy
*Teen and diplomats at Honolulu is an effec- cans meeting in Honolulu should agree to war the United States wishes to carry on
lave Way of impressing the world with this confer. perhaps at a lower level at first, and against China.
Country's corium over the deteriorating eventually at a major conference to effect a These are the uncomfortable facts con-
Western position in Indochina. But it permanent settlement.
cerning our southeast Asian crisis. We got
should be something more than that. it ----
into South Vietnam to save that rump state
should set a Connie leading to a political so- !From the New York (N.Y.) Times. June 3. despite both the spirit and the letter of the
1954 Geneva accord that created it. And
19641
lution In Vietnam, Camboria, and Laos.
As Walter Lippnaann p of continued French and British military
ointed out the other ALONE WITH OUR ASIAN CRISIS we based on commitment on the assumption
day, "there never his been a time when a (By C. L. Sulzberger) strength that was then already disappearing.
'minter), victory, or anything like a military
victory, has been Possible." It is not possible PAR/S.?Whatever the U.S. Government de- During the pactomania phase of American
"now. The best that increased military ac- cities to do about Indochina need not be t,00 policymaking, we allowed ourselves to be de-
' tivity can accomplish is to hold the line and carefully strained through the fabric of our calved by shadowy illusions. We believed
thus prevent a decrease in the Western SEATO alliance. For, if SEATO ever truly such organizations as SEATO and CENTO
bargaining position at some future confer- existed as a coherent pact, it certainly doesn't were realities, but they weren't.
, ettee table. Even this risky course may not exist today. We must therefore face the problem of
be possible. When Foster Dulles fathered SEATO a salvaging our Indochina crisis on the basis
_ What is possible. and necessary, is that decade ago tie admitted its principal purpose of what we consider right. There is no point
was to provide our President legal authority allowing ourselves to be bound, for example,
the United States recognize the mistake it
made when it -tried after 1954 to replace to intervene in Indochina. But Dulles had by Paris' insistence that while France will
strange visions concerning the pact's other fight for Berlin, it won't fight for Saigon.
French power and-Cieata a Western bastion implications. In southeast Asia we must honor our corn-
that it formulate a Jolley that contains the
on the borders of Communist China, and He thought it would assure us active allies mitments and respect our interests. Con-
hope of honorable withdrawal. The time Is in a vital area. He fancied SEATO was one fusion cannot be coordinated.
of three connected Oriental bastions, directly
late and this will not be easy, but It were
better done now than Iater. linked to South Korean and Formosan [nom the New York (N.Y.). Times, June 1.
stsongpoints. Our allies never accepted this 19641
Would the withdrawal of the United States tidy assumption.
from Indochina bring about the comMuni-
?fsation of that area/ Eventually perhaps It Dulles also had misconceptions concerning No EASY EXIT FROM THE JUNGLE
French and United States commitments in (By C. L. Sulzberger)
Wbuld, but that does not mean that the Indochina, over which SEATO unilaterally peers.?In Indochina we have persistently
strategic interests of the United States extended its protection, On February 22, violated the four cardinal maxims of foreign
(Which keeps the 7th Fleet in Asian waters 1955. tdae late Secretary of State told me in policy which are: (1) always keep the initia-
and maintains a huge air base at Okinawa) Ssurgkok, on the eve of a SEATO conference: tive; (2) always exploit the inevitable; (3)
would be seriously affected. "The French have a substantial military always stay in with the outs, and (4) never
It,-might be effected if communism were force in South Vietnam. That is France's stand between a dog and a lamppost.
a monolithic world enovemena but it is not principal role. The Geneva [1954 partition] Above all we have lost the initiative and the
The Chinese-Russian quarrel, the independ- accord bars the importation into Indochina inevitable is exploiting us.
enee of Yugoslavia, the slowly growing inde- of new military aid. The U.S.A. can't in- Our present function seems to be that of
peridence of the Eastern European satellites, crease the number of its military advisers, popular whipping boy and guerrilla pin-
demonstrate that national interests always That places a strong dependence on France." cushion in South Vietnam. To escape this
In the end take precedence over ideological On February 25, when S'EATO's meeting embarrassment, two alternative formulas
similarities. had ended, Dulles added: "We are operating have been proposed: (A) that we cease play
Too many Americans equate communism, on a basis where more and more we treat ing the war game according to Communist
Which they quite naturally abhor, with the atomic weapons as conventional. It doesn't rules and attack guerrilla arsenals, commu-
national interests of countries with which . make sense to use TOO shots or bombs to do nications, and safe havens abroad; or (B)
the United States Must deal Though both exactly the same job as one atomic weapon that we negotiate the neutralization of South
China and Russia are Communist countries and it Is much more expehsive. Throughout Vietnam and then abandon it. Washington
their national interests are not identical. In history there has been a steed), development seems to oppose formula A as unacceptable
time the United States and Communist of more powerful explosives." to the Saigon regime and the American
R118838 may be allied against Communist WHERE DULLES ERRED people.
Chink for example; indeed, Chinese propa- Formula B. generally associated with De
Dulles was wrong in all his SEATO ob-
guide criticizes the Russians for that veryGaulle, assumes the United States cannot
tendency. ' eervataons save the congressional blank check
?? given the President. Be was wrong in link-
Impose a military solution in Vietnam and
What this means is that while Indochina tog SEATO with South /Corea and Formosa therefore must seek the least bad terms for
might eventually go Communist it 'wouldpolitical surrender. This is, of course, an
which the other allies wouldn't accept. He
not necessarily go Chinese Communist. unpalatable suggestion to an American ad-
was wrong about the position of Prance unpalatable
Vietnaraeee, the Cambodians, and the lie was wrong about the freeze on TVS. "mill-
ministration facing reelection,
Tatottatis have ;differences among themselves, tary advisers" and nuclear deterrence. The French proposal is often inaccurately
but all dislike the Chinese. There are re- SEATO never checked Communist sub- described. It is said France proposes neu-
sponsIble experts who hold that had the version and it never produceti an alliance tralization of all Indochina and that it is
United Statesbacked the North Vietnamese community or forces structure. France Is clearly impossible at this juncture to nego-
leader, Ho Chi Minh a decade ago, rather militarily out of the area; France and Pakis- tiate neutralization of North Vietnam. Fur
than the late President Dlem,- Indochina tan are diplomatically disengaged. Laos has thermore, Washington claims a political
would now have e stable independent COM- been removed from SEATO protection and solution cannot be attempted by negotiation
=mist governrneht, like 'rites Yugoslavia. neutralized In theory; in fact it is being de- until military stalemate has first been
It should not be forgotten that during the voured by Communist forcer. Cambodia achieved.
war the United States did back Ho Chi Minh professes to consider SEATO a greater danger In fact, the French approach deals only
as the meet effeekieriassagereld Illei?erpeissitarataaatna
IF9oInciCatgaPrOteeVIMCgitUartketr5/ a battleifiellel st7i. -
the occupying - ..flifa-r&e. -Comnetinifff ?ffi--nWfffirltd th
not he Is still universally admired through- has been growing ever since. ndoff.
The French wish to slave what is left of their
ase 2005/01/05 CIA-RDP66B00403114)0200150045-3
1964 SSIONAL REtORD --- SENATE 12189
own Indochina .investment extensive eco-
nomic Interest P South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia, Awl they are convinced that if we
pursue present policy, the entire area wil
Inevitably be communized. They also think
if we attempt formula A, we will merely
accelerate_ the process by insuring Chinese
occupation of North Vietnam.
L , _
, ,
'1110 gagNcii APPROACH
? Paris doesn.'t "pretend that neutralizing
South Vietnam 40 agreeable or that it would
antamatically facilitate neutralization of
North Vietnam, It does claim, however,
that its formula ,accords witP. the 1954 Ge-
neva agreement to partition Vietnam and
that it is preferable either to enlarging the
Indochina war or continuing the present
dead end policy.
Prance see no reason, why military stale-
mate must precede negotiation. France be-
gan secret parleys with the Algerian rebels
while it dominated the battleeld. Although
militarily it seemed to be winning the war,
Prance s,aw it Was downed to lose the peace.
And in Indochina we aren't even winning the
wa&.i the basis of its own grim experience
Paris believes we should now eneOW'age our
South Vietnam clients to seek contacts with
their enemies and start to parley while fight-
ing. The French feel this would offer the
least terrible way out of a hopeless morass
and maybe save something in the wreckage.
Obviously, this is not a happy solution for
Washington or Saigon. But it should at
least be considered and, if neutralization of
South Vietnam is, Inevitable, we had better
face the fact now, while we have a measure
of control and might influence its form.
In 1954 Washington feared Vietnamese
partition was but a first step to its com-
munization. What VMS true then is still
probably true. And, in merely delaying this
trend, we hav,e eemmitted immense power
and prestige. Our entire world posture
would suffer if we now, abandoned an area
into which we probably never should have
intruded, ?
This space reluctantly concludes that we
have foolisniy forced ourselves into a posi-
tion where we must attempt formula A. But
if we are unready to do so, and are unwill-
ing to accept formula B, we must still re-
place our presenk unsuccessful policy. Not
even the most m'Uortstruck pentagon spokes-
Inen pretend any longer that it is succeed-
ing.
There is only one other possibility and that
Is to try and dump the problem on U.N.
This would be extremely difficult to arrange
and the Organization is already short on
manpower and money. Nevertheless, one of
17,N.'s purposes Is to be a dumping ground
for insoluble questions and a face saver for
lost causes. Now would be the best time to
involve U.N.?.Defore Peiping and its satellites
are members.
' CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (HR. 7152) to enforce the
constitutional right to vote, to confer
jurisdiction upon the district courts of
the United States to provide injunctive
relief against discrimination in public
accommodations, to authorize the Attor-
ney General to institute suits to protect
constitutional rights in public facilities
and public education, to extend the
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent
discrimination in federally assisted pro- t
grams, to establish a Commission on
Equal Employment Opportunity, and for d
other purposes. Ii
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, ozimJeata, - N
uary 20, 1961, in the cOUrseitar eF
most stirring inaugural addresses ever F
made by an American President, the lat
John F. Kennedy accepted for all Amer
icans the responsibilities of leadership in
a time of troubles. He said:
In the long-history of the world, only
few generations have been granted the rol
of defending freedom in its hour of maxi
mum danger. I do not shrink from the re
sponsibility?I welcome it. I do not believe
that any of us would exchange places with
any other people or any other generation,
e every American's life. This bill seeks, in
- a responsible and moderate way, to as
sure to all Americans the rights which
most of us simply take for granted.
a Title I of the bill seeks only to insure
e to each American, regardless of the coloi
- of his skin, that most precious of rights?
the right to vote. We all know that
countless thousands of qualified Ameri-
can citizens are denied that right be-
cause they happen to be Negroes. The
evidence is clear, substantial and per-
suasive beyond doubt that in many
States qualified Negroes are not per-
mitted to vote. This fact has not been
seriously disputed even by the opponents
of this bill. In fact, it cannot be dis-
puted. For we, know that in the State
of Mississippi, only 7 pereent of the
eligible Negroes are registered to vote.
We know that in 100 counties across the
South, a little over 8 percent of the
eligible Negroes are registered. And
so the statistics go, in county after coun-
ty, State after State.
The pertinent question which we face
as we consider the merits of title I is
this: Should a qualified American citizen
be denied the right to vote just because
?
Although he could not at that time
have foreseen the precise nature of this
current civil rights controversy, John
Kennedy's words are fully applicable to-
day. To the Members of the U.S. Sen-
ate has come the responsibility and the
rare opportunity to act decisively for the
common good in a time of crisis. Let
there be no mistake about it, Mr. Presi-
dent, this bill can be, and will be, a ma-
jor outpost in our defense of freedom in
this, a time of maximum danger.
There is?in every corner of Amer-
ica, on every continent in the world?a
seething restlessness. It is the impa-
tience of those who for years?even cen-
turies?have suffered unfairly under the
crushing yoke of poverty, discrimination;
and exclusion. That restlessness, that
impatience will not be dissipated by
words of promise and counsels of yet
more patience. It will disappear only
when firm action is taken; action which
will tear up and cast aside forever the
roots from which have sprung this blight
on the face and conscience of America.
Mr. President, I find it hard to believe
that there is a single American who
really believes, deep down in his heart
and soul, that another American citizen
should not have the right to vote just be-
cause he is a Negro; or that he should not
have the right to eat in a public place
just because he is a Negro; or that he
should not have the right to equal job
opportunities just because he is a Negro.
All the torrent of words, all the legalistic
arguments, all the appeals to the Consti-
tution cannot obscure this basic, simple
truth: Every American citizen has the
right to equal treatment--not favored
treatment, not complete individual
equality?just equal treatment.
This bill has been described by some of
its opponents as a mad grab for dicta-
torial power by the Executive. I have
heard it called "Fabian socialism, a hand
reached out to grasp the hand of com-
munism." Sqme have protested that it
would give the President and the Attor-
ney General almost unlimited personal
power aver the details of our everyday
lives," or that it will "take away, the per-
sonal and property rights of nearly every
individual in the United States."
Dictatorship, socialism, total Federal
control?the slogans are catchy, but they
do not describe this bill.
The thrust of the opposition to this
bill is grounded upon the belief that this
bill wantonly extends the power of the
Federal Government into every aspect of
our lives in an effort to give favored
reatment to a small minority.
A careful examination of this bill
emonstrates clearly>. that this is simply
ot true. No favoritism is asked for the
egiftwatowto .1votwi 'e66
ederal force will coerce and regiment
ne a Negro?
Title II would prohibit discrimination
in certain places of public accommoda-
tion.
As President Kennedy pointed out in
his original message to the Congress pro-
posing this legislation:
Negro citizens are being arbitrarily denied
equal access to those facilities and accom-
modations which are otherwise open to the
general public. This is a daily insult which
has no place in a country proud of its heri-
tage?the heritage of the melting pot, of
equal rights, of one nation and one people.
Mr. President, I suggest to each Mem-
ber of the Senate to try^ to place him-
self in the position of the Negro, daily
facing incident after incident of hu-
miliation and insult: Uncertain as to
whether or not he should try to get a
room in this or that motel or hotel. won-
dering which restaurant will admit him
,,and which will not. Again we must ask
ourselves: Should an American citizen
be denied access to an establishment
which holds itself out as dealing with the
public, simply because he is a Negro?
Title III would hasten the elimination
of segregation in certain truly public fa-
cilities?hospitals, libraries, museums,
parks, playgrounds?owned or operated
by a state, city or other governmental
unit. Surely no form of segregation is
less defensible than that which excludes
Negroes from public facilities built, oper-
ated and maintained in part with their
tax dollars. Should an American citi-
zen be refused admittance to a public
hospital, be unable to take a walk in a
public park, not be able to go swimming
ata public beach, just because he hap-
pens to be a Negro?
Title IV of this bill provides for tech-
nical and financial assistance to public
school officials in preparing and carrying
out desegregation plans, and also au-
thorizes the Attorney General to bring
desegregation suits in certain cases.
B II'03R1110021047/150045-3he story:
in 1 southern States, less than 1 per-
cent of all Negro children attend inte-
?
Approved r>o Releeseingn0A5L: aftNeTS6BA1/400200150045-3
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