ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCNAMARA BEFORE THE JAMES FORRESTAL MEMORIAL AWARDS DINNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200150015-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 23, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

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~`~~~.~ ,' N , CQNGRISSIONAL RECORD - SENt~TE - 14283...
_ _
thg atersYle ro~ectlon an F1~o~Preven ~Tn~er thQ'Water~hed l?xotecton and_~'lood , sloxa that any kind of major attack soon
-'ti9ii .f~Pt fl1'~ugust` 4 1954 ~$6 Stat 08~ `as Prevention Act the local sponsoring organs- -fs not likely. In the long run," he added,
a'xne~dell (i "f7 ~C.A 100i" et set) "for the zation is required to make arrangements sat- ."it is of Course difficult to sa He also
ixl~ixltel~allste by ysaid 3ocaI organizations lsfactory to the Secretary of Agriculture for y'~~
eStkiex dir~:y or incTirectly t~irougl mutually defraying cost: of operating and maintain-' 'offered his opinion that the broad Chi-
T nese aim "is to give the,.im r
satisfactory maintenance agreements with ing the works of improvement. The bill p esSion that
-
rithexs including the ~Jnlted Stales, of all" would retain this requirement providing see- -She is the biggest and most powerful na-
thps~ ilooti_ry ar~gYo sediment control dams cifically that the arrangements made under Lion in.f~Sia.'f
together wi h al related woriCS hereafter the bill must be satisfactor to the Secre- _
installed cQn;; l~ted ~ y - - With respect to Pakistan, he said he
ter " ~~h~~~ ~x~xls~e, taxy of Agriculture. __ _ ..was much impresesd with the statement
waterslaeci l~~twser~ Cabana: ' an~T7~1 ~~~o,: of President Ayub offering a warm hand
Texas in accordance w~h sa Act and which 'The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
-~~- ?r.- of friendship to tl a people of India.
are necess~r~, in tfie opinion of'sala' Coirimis- is -open to further amendment. If there
sioiaer, to ,facilitate and im,~lemert: the op- be no further amendment to be proposed,y President Ayub also xeferred to Mr. Shas-
eratioxi auc?=#}~~lialxitexianpe iif,~said project:" ~~ question is on the engrossment and tri's election as "a good augury for Indo-
~uch,m~?i3,~ena~~e agreementsbetween the third reading of the bill. Pakistani relations." The two men -will
io~al organization and the'C7nited States shall ...The bill was ordered to be engrossed meet in London next month at the con-
provide the extent of contribution by` the _ for a third reading, read the third time, ference of Commonwealth Prime Min-
, t1`~?ited S~~te's a,~~nay he mutually ~a~ree~ lay., and passed. asters.
the. two parties, based on the degree of bene-
worl~s; ba idethee ontr but ona'by the Vn3ted r`A bill taultholazing m ant"enance of `fio d 'shouts the significance of Mru Nehru's
~tates:m~y be either in the form of funds and_arroyo sediment control slams and death and the transfer of power to his
or perf`ormapce of the actual operation `arid re],atQd works to facilit&te R,io Grande successor. Whoever guides -this the
maintenance. ~ _ _ ~,. - .. .: ,. _canalization project and authorizing ap- world's largest Republic, must cope with
Coxxtrol'gates shall not be installed on any propriations for that purpose." an array of problems none of Which Can
by the .dams which, in the` opinion of the be solved except over the long term.
-U'Ilited States Cgminissio,~e~ International., ;, '
- -? - ~ These include separatist tendencies, an
$oun~ry and `Vltater ~ommissCon, United PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI, OF economy barely able to keep pace with
~13tates and ~ex3cQ are necessary to facilitate
a~ifl implement tlie_ operation and _mainte- , INDIA population,"high illiteracy, low foreign
'riane~ o~ Ihe~tip. Clraxid~ capallzgtion; project: ~, FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in exchange earning, and pervasive.poverty.
,Arrabgements made between the_ United.,, recent days we have heard from every The burden, in short, is heavy. But the
~tat~s an~J al?e 1~~,1 organizations`shaii be part of the world eloquent and richly first signs offer encouragement that it
eatlsfact9ry to the Secretary of Agriculture has been shifted to moderate a~ reli-
fox defraying cost,of maintaining such work deserved tributes to tiTe late Prime Min-
im improvement in accordance with? regula- aster Nehru. But the greatest tribute to able hands.
rations prescribed by said sec`re'tary. his memory, I think, lies in the contin- _ _
These ai~l~ereliy authorized to be aggro- uit~ of Indian political processes that
priated such suxiis -as may_:be_`se~utred for u~as rcfieCted in the _orderly transfer of ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF DE-
1~oYTtributio~e to snaintenanee autt~grlZed. by .power to the new Prime Minister, Mr. FENSE McNAMARA BEFORE THE
phis Act ~ Shastri. _. the fgt?nal. and l~ncontested ?JAMES FORRESTAL MEMORIAL
~, -
'I'he ~.me~dments were ~~reed to election o~ Mr. Shastri by the Congress !1"`'(~ARDS bfl~T1;R~-_ ,
. _.y _
Mr IYL+~~SIiI~LD 112r,, Pr@sldent,'_I Party took -place just 5 days after Mr Mr. LAUSCHE Mr. President, I ask
~k. unar~~lll~ ceiit,th~t,~i~ explana- I~ehru's death. - unanunous consent to have printed at
tors statement o_ tl}q b~llrbe 3,nserted jTn It has never been certain-that India s
~y_ ?~_____ _~ ~,___ _ __~,:.:...,.~;.,.u_-.:_~ .......:,.:~ a....;:~~.,,._.. this paint in the RECORD an address de-
?ii~ers gQi~lg' no?op~ectiona the extract coma survive intiacL tine loss ai iLS Human S. McNamara before the James Forrestal
RECOan,_' symbol. But the signs a`re-that it has
tfi~aS gxderec~ to b~,pruited?fin the
-
Memorial Awards Dinner on Thursday
-
.
-
,
~s ~:gllows; and that it will. The Indian people ?._?March 26, 1964.
Water i must be proud and encouraged by this In the address
The Is~terizarloxial ~opxid~ry and
he rather precisely sets
.
,
- Commissioxi,~Jnitea states and Mexico using demonstration of the strength of their -_forth his views on our problem in South
'Ofnri......, #,:?a.. .... ..i.,.i~3:.:_ av- r.:_ s...'::+: L..at....... ml?_ __-.v...,_ r~?_
Y ~..v" y.v~v ~a.s ~~ "? z~ arc ut~y ~~~ curd elluvurage uciiei that it ougkit to~ be included in the
b3llatrol major iioocTs'-entering the l~;io
Granae newly independent societies attracted by
_
'below Elephant Butte ]baxn,, convey reservoir. democratic forms but beset by many of RECORD.
"discharges aria'uncontronedocal #loodwaters There being no objection, the address
'
_. with. a iz}inizr}um 9i l~s tq;lansts evtLh~n_ the the same problems that confront India
s was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
_GR:;? Nra,,,io ,,,.,,,o?+ .,,,., Ae .:...... ........:_ ,,, leaders. -- ?-~~------
-
- - ...~....,n..,,. n..~.~,.a .......~.n ~r ~n~ .,~...,.,~..
-
streamfioW, ,'docking irrigation facilities, and s9rb himself. ill the task of giving his SECURITY INDII9TarAI. ASSOCIATION, Wesx-
adjoining laxids. Maintenance of the Rio " 61"""~ 1AO1"~"~' iuao uc ~,~uguc ou ?1?nis evening 1 want Lo alscuss ~outn viet-
Graxide project requires removal. of this sedi- aChleVe mainly by nurturing India's cen- Ham with you. in South Vietnam, as you
" ' - `" ~; "''-"' '_ ened by Communist aggression and ter-
bsttex tQ prevent the sediment from entering AS the idol of_ the Indian masses and &
rorism. In response to requests from the
$he,,rive~, but_ the, Intelnatiggal 13~A}lntlary world figure even before iridependerice, Government of South Vietnam, the United
and
V~~r
~Qmmlisston
ha
to
~ao
auyt~
x~t
,
_
v
.
?
p
y
Mr. Nehru was uniquely qualified for this States since 1954 has been providing as-
tixidertaT~e _pxojects outside the canalization r~io sr;~ ..~~r;,,,. ,,,~., .,i-? r;.,,,,.,, +w,. .-.-___ _ .. -_. ,_
"'~ p "` ""-'~`"~"""~""' ""`"" """`" ? ~""" t"""`?"'? as General Taylor and I found it on our
TQtermhed ~ otwe~e,}~ C,akrailA~~xq antl~l, ~9 are internal. In this and his other state- rP~Pn+. trir,? a,,,; nr,An,. + .,,,r.,s?a ,,, ,,r?a~,
element the operation and maintet?aq,Ce Qf j"y"`~?' `"jl' "'~~aa~aa uu~ savcu cue uuNrca- terms the plans which have been worked out
the c~}nallzat~oxi project ,The U S, partici- Sion of approaching his t&sks With mod- With General Khanh for achieving our mu-
eration and responsibility. With regard
tual ob]ectives in south Vietnam.
p5.tion in s>acp maintenanc
~vy~klJ
~j.~~
pA~eSl
_
,
,
?
,~_-
bit tie degree of iienefita.to be derived trgal. to:~hixia, he expressed doubt that Chin& , _... _ _ x, DESCRre~roNarr,D;Ex~sTO$Y .
the_vvo kfi, ana might ~~~~~~ 1 ]q~ ~} er,,,~*,, ' Q~
br" aCtu~l o eration a ~"9~@~ ~ 7itZrd, 0~ GPltl~~fl4 ~ ~~ ~~?~~g You of some
. p , . -_ " :,, ,~ ,,.,.? . . _ ~.,,_ . _ as offering an `fmpres- d_e~ai9s?a~out South_ Vietnam that narrow
 14284
Approved Est` R~be~~~Q~18~(~~: ~~g~P~6B~~~00200150015-6
strip of rich coastal mountain 'and deltra
lands running 900 miles in the tropics along
the South China Sea to the Gulf of Siam. It
contains the mouth of the Mekong River, the
main artery of southeast Asia. It has apop-
ulation of about 14 million-almost that of
California-in an area slightly larger than
England and Wales. South Vietnam does not
exist by itself. Mainland southeast Asia
includes Laos, Cambodia, and the two Viet-
nams, together comprising former French
Indochina. It also includes Thailand, Bur-
ma, and part of Malaysia. The southeast
Asian peninsula is a richly endowed land area
of over 800,000 square miles--roughly the
size of the United States east of the Mis-
sissippi-and containing almost 100 million
people. And immediately beyond to the east
are the Philippines, not far to the west is
India, to the north is Communist China, and
to the south is what the Chinese Com-
munists may consider the greatest prize of
all-Indonesia's resources, territory, and the
world's fifth largest population, whose stra-
tegic location straddles and dominates the
gateway to the Indian Ocean.
The Vietnamese lost the independence they
had enjoyed since the 15th century when, a
hundred years ago the French assumed con-
trol in what is now Vietnam. A,quarter cen-
tury ago> during the Second World War, the
Vichy regime yielded French Indochina to
the Japanese. In the power vacuum- of the
war's end, the Communist Vietminh moved
rapidly to enhance their position and to build
their bases for a power grab in North Viet-
nam.
The attempt by the French., ioliowing
World War II, to restore their xule-to buck
h in
own
Jnne ~3
President Diem an October 25, 1954: "The This aggression against South Vietnam was
purpose of this offer is to assist the Govern- a major Communist effort, meticulously
ment of Vietnam in developing and main- planned and controlled, and relentlessly pur-
taining astrong, viable state, capable of re- sued by the Government in Hanoi. In 1961,
sisting attempted subversion or aggression the Republic of South Vietnam, unable to
through military means." The United States contain the menace by itself, appealed to the
therefore provided help--largely economic. United States to honor its unilateral declara-
On the basis of this assistance and the tion of 1954. President Kennedy responded
brave, sustained efforts of the South Viet- promptly and affirmatively by sending to that
na.mese people, the 6 years from 1954 to 1959 country additional American advisers, arms,
gave concrete evidence that South Vietnam and aid.
was becoming a success story. By.the end of z. vs, ossacTrvEs
this period, 140,000 landless peasant families
had been given land under an agrarian re-
form program; the transportation system
had been almost entirely rebuilt; rice pro-
duction had reached the prewar annual av-
erage of 3.5 million metric tons-and leaped
to over 5 million in 1960; rubber production
had exceeded prewaa totals; and construc-
tion was underway on several medium-size
manufacturing plants, thus beginning the
development of a base- for industrial growth.
In addition. to such economic progress,
school enrollments had tripled, the number
of primary school teachers had increased
from 30,000 to 90,000, and almost 3,000 medi-
cal aid stations and maternity clinics had
been established throughout the country.
And.the South Vietnamese Government had
gone far toward creating an effective ap-
paratus for the administration of the nation.
A National Institute of Administration had
been established with our technical and
financial assistance-a center for the train-
ing of a new generation of civil servants
oriented toward careers of public service as
opposed to the colonial concept of public
rule.
the trend toward independence ass
For South Vietnam the horizon was bright.
Burma, India, and the Philippines-failed. Its success stood in marked contrast to
The returning French encountered a strong
military resistance movement which gradu- development in the north. Despite the
ally fell more. and more under Communist vastly larger industrfai~ plant inherited by
oontrol. For 8 years France sought to con- Hanoi when .Vietnam was partitioned, gross
trol the country while at the same time national product was considerably larger in
gradually granting increasing autonomy to the south-estimated at $110 Uer person in
nori-Communist Vietnamese. Such actions, the south and $70 in the north. While per
however, were not enough. In 1954, after capita food production in the north was 10
the fall of the French stronghold at Dien percent lower in 1960 than it had been in
Bien Phu on May 7, the Geneva agreements 1956, it was 20 percent higher in the south.
of July 20 were signed ending the hostilities It is ironical that free Vietnam's .very
and ending French rule in Indochina. The achievements in these 5 years brought severe
country was roughly cut in half at the 17th new problems. For the Communists in
parallel, creating the Communist regime of North Vietnam, like many others, had be-
Ho Chi Minh in the North and anon-Com- lieved that South Vietnam would ultimately
munist state in the south. `Although the collapse and call under Hanoi's control like
United States was not a party to those Gen- ripe fruit from a tree. But by the end of
eva agreements, the United States unilater- 1959, South Vietnam was succeeding, de-
allp declared that it would not violate them spite all predictions; and the Communist
and that it would regard any violation 'by leaders evidently concluded that they would
.other parties as a serious threat to interns- have to increase pressure on the south to
tional peace and security. make the fruit fall.
Under the Geneva agreements, it was hoped At the Third National Congress of the Lao
that South Vietnam would have an oppor- Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi, Septem-
tunlty to build a free nation in peace-un- ber 1960, North Vietnam's belligerency was
alined, and set apatt from the global power made explicit. Ho Chi ,Minh stated, "The
struggle. But the problems confronting the north is becoming more and more consoli-
new Government were staggering: 900,000 dated and transformed into a firm base for
refugees who had fled their homes in the the struggle for national reunification." At
north at the time of partition Sn order to -the same Congress it was announced that
escape Communist rule; along-term military the party's new task was "to liberate the
threat from the north which had emerged Soutri from the atrocious rule of the U.S.
from the war with large military forces; a imperialists and their henchmen." In brief,
government nearly paralyzed by 8 years of Hanoi was about to embark upon a program
War and lacking sufficient trained ofllcials for of wholesale violations of the Geneva agree-
effective self-government; acute economic ments in order to wrest control oP South
dislocation and lack of Government reve- Vietnam from its legitimate Government.
nues; and persisting pockets of southern To the Communists, "liberation" meant
territory that had long been held by Commu- sabotage, terror, and assassination; attacks
nists and other dissident groups. In the on innocent hamlets and villages and the
Lace of such problems, hopes were not high coldblooded murder of thousands of achool-
jectives in South Vietnam. The United
States has no designs whatever on the re-
sources ar territory of the area. Our na-
tional interests do not require that South
Vietnam serve as a Western base or as a
member of a Western Alliance.
Our concern is threefold.
First, and most important, is the simple
fact that South Vietnam, a member of the
free world family, is striving to preserve its
independence from Communist attack. The
Vietnamese have asked our help. We have
given it. We shall continue to give it.
We do so in their interest; -and we do so
in our own clear self-interest. For basic
to the principles of freedom and self-deter-
mination which have sustained our country
for almost two centuries is the right of
peoples everywhere to live and develop in
peace. Our own security is strengthened by
the determination of others to remain free,
and by our commitment to assist them. We
will not let this member of our family down,
regardless of its distance from our shores.
The ultimate goal of the United States in
southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world,
is to help maintain free and independent
nations which can develop politically, eco-
nomically, and socially, and which can be
responsible members of the world commu-
nity: In this region and elsewhere, many
peoples share our sense of the value of such
freedom and independence. They have taken
the risks and made- the sacrifices linked to
the commitment to membership in the fam-
ily of the free world. They have done this
in the belief that we would back up our
pledges to help defend them. It is not right
or even expedient-nor fs it in our nature-
to abandon them when the going is difficult.
Second, southeast Asia has great strategic
significance in the forward defense of the
United States. Its location across east-west
air and sea lanes flanks the Indian subcon-
tinent on one side and Australia, New Zea-
land, and the Philippines on the other, and
dominates the gateway between the Pacific
and Indian Oceans. In Communist hands,
this area would pose a most serious threat
to the security of the United States and to
the family of free world nations to which we
belong. To defend southeast Asia, we must
meet the challenge in South Vietnam.
And third, South Vietnam is a test case for
the new Communist strategy. Let me ex-
amine for a moment the nature of this stat-
egy.
Just as the Kennedy administration was
coming into office in January 1961, Chairman.
Khrushchev made one of the most important
speeches on Communist strategy of recent
decades. In his report on a party conference
entitled "For New Victories of the World
Communist Movement," Khrushchev stated:
"In modern conditions, the following cate-
gories of wars should be distinguished: world
wars, local wars, liberation wars, and popular
uprisings." He ruled out what he called
world wars and local "wars as being too dan-
That autumn, a decade ago, President Ngo who had the misfortune to oppose the Com- gerous for profitable indulgence in a world
Dinh Diem, of the Republic of South Viet- munist version of "liberation." In 1980 and of nuclear weapons. But with regard to
nom, turned to the United States for eco- 1961, almost 3,000 South Vietnamese civilians what he called liberation wars, he referred
nomic assistance. in and out of Government were assassinated specifically to Vietnam. He said, "It is a
President Eisen ower underst od the gg~r'a- and another 2,500 .were kidnaped. The sacred war. We recognize such wars."
vity of the aitua~iQl~/B~Cld~i~S~~@~~~~? ~R ~ on other occasions the
give direct American aid to the new govern- who served as liaison o cer e n ea- ~ ox~ii's s~r~~clear power which the
meat to enable its survival. He wrote to tional Control Commission. United States has developed to cope with
 Apraroved"For Reese z~E~5/01/0 CIA=~CSPfi"5'BOU403R000'f50U15-6
~"~~~,~__~~ ~ _ _.CGNGRESSii7kVAi. 1ZEC:UKll-S,v1VA"l~
. ,., .
w tl~,e ~frst q~ l~l'r, ~ihrushchep's types. of wars; cess in Vietnam would be .regarded by
'
s views, in
,tieterrQnce_ of deliberate, aa1cl~Iated nuclear Peiping as vindication for China
at~a~k seems as assured as ~it can`~e ~itli the worldwide ideological struggle.
~f~spsect to our general purpose" force"s''de= Taking"'into account the relationship of
signed 'especially :for local -wars w~thkn the Vietnam to Indochina-and of both to sauth-
.-past, 3 years we have incieasecl the number east Asia, the Far East and the free world as
of o$r'combat ready Army"c~iivfsions by about a whole-five U.S. Presidents have acted to
~~46 percent; tactical air squadrons by 3b per= preserve 'free world strategic interests in
cent alrIi~~ capabilities by '75 percent, with the -area. President Roosevelt opposed Jap-
a 100 ercent increase in ship construction anew pelietration in Indochina; President
P ?_.
an=d conversion. in conjunction with -the Truman resisted Comixiunist aggression in
forces ot, olir allies, oiir_ global"posture for Korea; President Eisenhower backed Diem's
deterreno'e and cfefens~eis s~1ll not all that it efforts to save South Vietnam and undertook
skoyic~, e, $ut it "is~ood' " "' "'. to defend Taiwan; President Kennedy
Pxesixit "Kennec'iy and`Presicfent Johnson stepped up our counterinsurgency effort in
Have recognized `however that our`forcesl'or Vietnam; and President Johnson, in addi-
_
d
h
'
""
'
at the Unite
be tion to reaffirming last week t
might not
s
r
the first tyao types of wa
'applicable, or "effective against what 'the States will furnish assistance and support to
is properly called covert aggression or in- ' to bring Communist aggression and terrar-
dertaken Ism under control, has approved the program
fiV`e have therefore u
tc
~a
lrgei
n
~
y.
}
slid continue to~ress a variety o3 programs - that I shall describe in a few minutes.
tP develg~p~skffIe specialists, equipment arid' - The U.S. role in. South Vietnam, then, is:
techniques to enable fitis to help our allies First, to answer the. call of the South Viet-
caurf-tgr th threat of msurggenc~. iiamese, a member nation of our free world
Cofl~iRi~st i~iterest in "insur~eiicy tech- family, to help them save their country for
,nlques did not begin"with` Khrushohev, for _ themselves; second, to help prevent the
ter that matter with Stalin Lenin s works strategic danger which would exist if com-
&ke full" of tac~icaf instruetlons which were munism absorbed southeast Asia's people
ail~pted" very sucoess?'ully`by `lt~ao~`Iise-l=ung, "and resources; and third, to prove fn the
"`n writin` s on. uerrIIIa warfare Vietnamese test case that the free world can
`o'~g ~ y ~ g co a with Communist wars of liberation as
have beconfe classic references 2ndeed, Mao p
claps to.be the true heir of ly,enin's original we have coped successfully with Communist.
' ?" ~ a resslon at other levels.
presCr~ptf'ons For the worldwide 'victory oF' gg
-Cp}n~}n,{dri~5x~I The North Vietnamese have 3. THE CURRENT SITUATION
tak~~i a Iea~ or tyro from Mao s book as well : I referred_yearlier~ to ,tile progress in South
as,TyfosCO"w'~ and added some o3 thel'r own Vietnam during 1954-59. In our concern
',~ius to~ay in Vietnam we are, not deal- over the seriousl?ess~oX_the V1etcRng insurg-
with factional disputes or the remnants ency, we sometimes overlook the fact that a
~.._
, , a cglonial struggle against the French but _fayQr$ble. comparison still exists between
, ~athex ~i~h a ma'ar test case of.communisin's :,progress in the South-notwithstanding
;}left! gt"rategy. ~at strategy has so far`beeii _ nearly 15 years of bitter warfare-and the
" ~ursue`t`i 3n G"~uba, may be beginlfing m Africa, -relative stagnation in North Vietnam.
~_#1$ failed fn '1C~,a3aya and the Philippines _q'he ssi-pa110sir~.?exnpcxatic.~tepublc_of Viet-
~_ _~ 'because of a lon~'and arduous struggle nom, with a greater population than the
'~~ the~eo le of these coutnrkes with assist- south and gnly a marginally smaller area, ap-
aYlc ~fi~o'ted`by the t#ritish and the'CTriited pears to be beset by a variety of weaknesses,
~tCa~~s - tl~e most prominent of which is its agricul-
'' rn souteast laa the _ ommunists .have , tural failure. lY~,isznOnagement some poor.
ta7cen j`ixl advantage of geography-the Weather, and a.lack of fertilizers and nsecti-
:proximit~* to the communist 'base of opera- sides have le~l to a, serious? ricp_, sl}orttige.
"bons and.. tide rugged remote and lieavil~ The
195$ per capita output of rice was about
,
'"~oliat~d ;Character, of the border regions. 20 percent lower than 1960. Before the June
`I'fiey Have uttTizeci tlie~cfiverse ethnic reli- 1864 harvests, living standards will probably
" gious and trilia~ ~raups; and exp~loftecf fac- decline further
in the cities
and Critf}c~;l j~qd
,
..
tionalisita .and 'leg timate aspirations whet- shortages may appear in some. of the villages.
eyex ~sosslile. land, as I said earlier they Furthermpre, prospects for the J_une? rice
hive reso;