'ERROR UPON ERROR' IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200140031-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: May 13, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For 6 1DRG41Q .&6lMQIU00200140031-9
for from Missouri [Mr,.,SXRiXXCJxoN] for Once Cannon Dam and Reservoir, intro-
the purpose of enabling. him to_introduce duced by Mr. SYMINGTON (for himself
a bill in memory of the late_IRepresenta- and Mr. LONG of Missouri), was received,
tive Clarence Cannon, of Missouri, and to read twice by its title, referred to the
make any remarks that he may- deem ap- Committee on Public Works, and ordered
prdpriate to make at this_tiute, with the to be printed in the RECORD as follows:
understanding that by so-doing I shall Be it enacted by the Senate and House
not lose my right to the floor, of Representatives of the United States of
The It QT'FI,P PER, Is there America in Congress assembled, That the
Objection'? The, Chair hers none, and Joanna Dam and Reservoir, Salt River, Mis-
it is S o O pied, sours, authorized by the Flood -Control list
Mr. SYMNGYON. 1VIr. President, I of October 23, 1962, in accordance with the
appreciate the gracious courtesy of the provisions of House Document Numbered
607, Eighty seventh Congress, shall here-
distinguished senior Senator from North after be known and designated as the Clar-
Caxoliria, eiice Cannon Dam and Reservoir, in honor
Mr. President, tomorrow afternoon, of the late Representative Clarence Cannon
the Honorable Clarence Cannpn, one of of the Ninth Congressional District of Mis-
the. great statesmen of our,time, will be souri. Any law, regulation, document or
taken to his last resting place in Els- record of the United States in which such
project Mo., his hometown in the north- the name e of f the the Joanna aor referred to under
the Dam and Reservoir,
east part of our State for all of his 85. Missouri, shall be held and considered to
years, refer to such project by the name of Clarence
The Nation will honor his, memory for Cannon Dam and Reservoir.
the some 53 years he served in Washing- Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
ton; and the more than J$ _years during thank the able and distinguished senior
which, with superb effectiveness, he car- Senator from North Carolina for yield-
ried the responsibilities of chairman of ing.
the House Appropriations Committee. Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, it was a
The people of northeast Missouri could privilege to yield to the distinguished
never forget Mr. Cannon's personal senior Senator from Missouri for the pur-
friendship, expressed during long and pose of introducing a bill to name a dam
devoted service to all of, themover .the and reservoir in Missouri in honor of the
years of his service in Washington. late distinguished Representative Clar-
One of the works which will stand as ence Cannon of Missouri. Representa-
a monument to Clare
ce Cann
i
,
n
e
or
a
on
s a
tive Cannon had a long and honorable was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
multipurpose dam and reservoir-the career in public life. All of us who were as follows:
first in north Missouri-soon to be built privileged to know him and to appreciate ALASKA. Am
In,Ralls County, not more than an hour's the fine work he did in behalf of his Senator WARREN G. MAGNUSON has joined
drive from, his farm home in Lincoln country over the years will be conscious Senator ERNEST GRUENSNG and this newspa-
County. of the fact that we shall not see his like per in criticism of the Small Business Ad-
Mr. Cannon's standard as chairman of again. He was a distinguished Member ministration for charging the maximum al-
the House Appropriations Committee was of Congress. lowed interest on loans to Alaska firms.
that public investment must be recovered The law allows the SBA to charge a maxi-
with ample- margin of benefit to the Mr. rSYMINGTON. from North I thank the able mum of 3 percent. The law also allows the
people; and when the project now known Senator from North Carolina for his SBA to impose less interest--or no interest
Jaannnd w th proved, to have met gracious remarks, especially because of at all, as in the care of many U.S. loans to
as J anna Dd, Mr._ Cannon became the high regard in which the Senator foreign governments.
c ha s a mpion and saw, it Cannon its
ap_ from North Carolina is held not only in But the SBA is imposing on Alaskans all
the Senate but throughout the Nation. the interest that the law allows. As Senator
proval by the Congress. I know that Mrs. Cannon and her two MAGN.USON Says, "There's no reason why the
Noncannot make the Interest rates ."
peSeveral year tl}fo, when It first ape gracious daughters will be most appreci- SBA
etheless Senator MAGNUSON ndl others
built, a number of leaders in his district ative of the Senator's statement. In Washington, D.C., defend the pace and
SuiL'P.Rt.P.d tha.f. if. hoar leaders in ham Mr. ERVIN. I thank the Senator from degree ?r-+,,e L,
d
.._ __ ____
e
eral
ii
Burin
?"
the Federal Government's action on Alaska's
his lifetime. MORE ABOUT THE INTEREST RATE plight is both slow and piecemeal. Alaska is
Because of his great interest in the ON ALASKA DISASTER LOANS a special case, our.youngest state and one
development of Missouri, especially its During the delivery of Mr. ERVIN'S with economic problems that predate the
rural areas, and because this dam, to speech, earthquake disaster.
Which he contributed so much will be That debate on the civil rights bill is inter-
whic to his permanent tasting place, be Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the fering with congressional attention to Alaska close behalf Of my Permanent Senator EDWARD Seattle Post-Inteiligencer, the long-es- is no excuse. The current announcement
V, LONG, of Missouri, and mtorl I ARD tablished morning daily of our northern- that four Federal agencies have agreed to
, in most major west coast seaport and State help e~laska homeowners only adds to the
troduce, fora
appropriate reference, a bill metropolis, a member of the Hearst less confusi will on be anday sin a a i that Alaska hpome-
to rename the Joanna Dam the Clarence newspaper chain, published this week an g. engaged usually game of buck ass-
Cannon Dam and Reservoir, as a perma- in That is e what happens when
nent memorial to the memory of our excellent lead editorial entitled "Alaska more than on Government agency is in-
honored and beloved colleague, a great Aid." volved.
d a ,great American, a Hon. It calls attention to the fact which I There should be a centralized effort on the
Missourian Cannon. have spoken of repeatedly-that disas- Alaska problem.
Clarence I ask unanimous consent that the text ter loans to Alaska are being made at AnTha effort should be fast.
dtit should be adequate.
of this bill be printed at this point in the the maximum rate allowable by the Dis-
RECORDis this , aster Loan Act. It contrasts, as I have, Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, may
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill with three-fourths of le percent made on time a on this same subject? statement at this
will be received and appropriately re- development loans' to private enterprise The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
ferred; and without objection, the bill in foreign countries under our foreign objection? The Chair hears none and
will be printed in the RECORD. aid program.
it is so ordered.
The bill (S. 2835) authorizing the Now, the Disaster Loan Act sets no Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I
change in name of the Joanna Dam and minimum rate of interest. The Admin- should like to inform the Senator from
Reservoir, Salt River, Mo., to the Clar- istrator of the program has confirmed Alaska-- .
No. 95-18
to me that he could make these loans
at any rate he chooses lower' than 3 per-
cent. He has, to be sure, indicated that
an these loans he would grant no repay-
ment of interest the first year, and no
repayment of principal for 5 years.
But, under the development loans made
to foreign. private enterprises, the Unit-
ed States not only grants a three-fourths
of 1 percent interest rate, but permits no
repayment of principal for 10 years-a
period twice as long as that granted our
domestic borrowers, who, moreover, have
suffered a disaster, which the foreign
beneficiaries of our loans have not. This,
to me, is an unfortunate example of "the.
double standard." I cannot see why our
American citizens--disaster victims-
should not be treated at least as well as
those in foreign lands, who have suf-
fered no disaster.
The Seattle Post-Intelligencer supports
my view and reports that the Senator
from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON],
chairman of the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee, who has had more familiarity
with Alaska than any other Member
of Congress from the 48 older States,
does also.
I ask unanimous consent that the edi-
torial, "Alaska Aid," published in the
May 11 issue of the Seattle Post-Intel-
ligencer, may be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection
the
dit
i
l
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Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I take it port has kept in office, would soon be ' on Israel to implement
that the statement which the Senator completely revealed as an ally and UN re resolchev solutions on called Palestine, which would re-
duce Israel's present frontiers.
from South Carolina [Mr. JoHNaxoxl associate of the ruler of the Kremlin, The assembly rose en masse in boisterous
new declaration of
may make will be covered by the same Mr. Khrushchev. cheering at Khrushchev's assembly rose en
unanimous-consent agreement just The news dispatches emanating from support for the Arabs.
made a moment ago. Cairo amply demonstrate that fact. The Israelis have announced that some
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without The Associated Press sent out a story time this summer they will begin diverting
objection, it is so ordered. from Cairo on May 11 which was printed waters of the AJord have threatened Negev
Mr. JOHNSTON. I invite the atten- in the New York Daily News, under the action to cut off the headwaters of the Jor-cou
tion of the Senate, and the Senator from heading: "K Backs Arabs in Row With dan.
Alaska in particular, to the fact that I Israel on Water." This is both a figura- The 70-year-old soviet Premier also as-
introduced the bill now known as the tive as well as a literal illustration of the sailed British occupation of military bases
Disaster Loan Act. It called for a lower way the rulers of the U.S.S.R. and of the in Cyrus and Aden. His government sup-
rate of interest. It went to the commit- United Arab Republic like to fish in ports the "Just and reasonable" demands of
tee and they discussed it. If the Sena= troubled waters. local populations for the evacuation of these
tor will read the act closely, he will see Israel, a tiny country, a large part of and all other foreign bases, the Soviet leader
that it provides that not more than 3 whose surface is desert, desperately needs said. "The presence of foreign armies is the
percent can be charged, but any rate water for irrigation. By an arrangement source of danger, tension, and disputes be-
lower than that may be charged. Up postulated years ago, it, as well as its tween countries," Khrushchev added.
until that time, the rate of interest could neighbors, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, He denied that there was any contradiction
go up to 5 percent. It had been raised are entitled to a share of the waters of between the Soviet Union's stated policy of
to 5 percent. That was about 10 years the River Jordan. Actually, the United seeking international of aarms to foreign trndingnd its
ago. Some borrowers were being States is, through our foreign aid pro- it Is true that we give foreign ms ou le spots.
charged a 5-percent rate of interest. We gram, paying most of the costs of Jor- file against imperialism giv and for the sacred
believed that was too much. So we put don's irrigation projects. struggle of national liberation," he said.
the figure 3 where the figure 5 had been, The Arab nations, under the leader- -our armaments will always be available for
with the u that borrowers ship of Nasser, and now even including peoples seeking self-determination."
could be charged ged even less than that Jordan, speaking through King Hussein, The 360 members of the assembly cheered
amount. intent on Israel's destruction, have al- and applauded throughout the speech, which
I h6pe the Senator will continue to ready served notice that they would op- Khrushchev delivered in Russian. It was
translated into Arabic by a Soviet interpreter
tell Senators about the problems In his pose Israel's legitimate right to its share whose polished Arabic has drawn awed praise
ar h ua a connect We should with the of these waters. Now. Khrushchev has from Egyptians,
re atecent especially
them earthquake there. ea as they lejoined them. This unholy alliance and Khrushchev warned the assembly against
have these loans as cheaply as its declared purpose runs directly counter "imperialist stooges" he said the colonial
can get them anywhere where else In the world. to the ideas on the subject expressed cor- powers left behind when they gave up their
Mr. GRUENING. I appreciate the rectly by President Johnson over 3 rule in Africa.
important contribution which etiate which the spun- months ago when, in a New York ad- In a veiled attack on Communist Chinese
sor of the Disaster Loan Act has made, he offered to assist any nations Asia, efforts to Khruahchev assume said "the leadership in unity of all Africa and
because It merit certainly has been of invutu- ndress. eeding water, adding: lutionary forces in the world * * ? can
able in cases disaster. But I Water should never be a cause for war; it never be supplanted by blocs based on color
still find find it impossible to understand should always be a force for peace. Peace and races" Moscow has accused the Chi-
why, when our citizens have suffered 1s first on our agenda. nese of seeking to bar the Soviet Union from
such a disaster, they should not get as African and Asian councils-on racial grounds.
low a rate of interest as is made avail- But, more clearly than ever, is it now Introducing his guest to the assembly,
able to hundreds of private enterprises apparent that if the United States wishes President Nasser pointedly cited the Russian
abroad to the extent of billions of dol- to preserve the uneasy peace in the Mid- revolution as a force in Asia,
lars, who have suffered no disaster. die East and avert a war there, it must "Khrushchev," Nasser said, "is one of the lead
sta I have called this a double standard. reverse iinnh cpoly ited of appheaassing and aiding vast andf unlimited transformaions of rthe
This is shocking example the idea-and it. world's continents, especially in Europe and
? I have e long held the it Nasser. Our financial aid has supplied and liberated millions of human
might be reactionary-that Americans him with the means to wage aggressive Asia beings
should have priority, but they do not warfare in Yemen, where he has been en- Nasser put. on a display of pageantry
even get equality In this field. gaged for 20 months at a cost of not less reminiscent of a Hollywood extravaganza -for
I am grateful to the Senator from than a half a million dollars a day. It his guest last night.
South Carolina for his contribution in may be conservatively estimated at $300 More than 100,000 exuberant Egyptians
calling attention to his authorship of million to date. Meanwhile, he is also j =mmed a ogiianntt German-built stadilsum p for a
this valuable act, and making clear the building up a tremendous armament n ab stallions, music clrnm a 380-man
legislative Intent that disaster loans of sophisticated weapons-missiles, Ing Ara bstal n the blare of 27 medieval
could be made at less that the maximum rockets, jet planes, tanks and subma- trumilita, mpets.
rate of 3 percent interest. rines. His pure which he has never Kbrushchev read the first and last parts of
ceased to declare, is to destroy Israel. his 20-minute speech and let an interpreter
I ask unanimous consent that the arti- give the rest. The speech praised Egyptian
NASSER AND KHRUSHCHEV-PEI.- cle published in the New York Daily News socialism and denounced colonialism in
ri a
i he close, fireworks erupted and fiery
LOW FISHERMEN IN JORt)AN'S of May 11, entitled "K. Backs Arabs in
flic me in Rus-
TROUBLED WATERS Row With Israel on Water," maybe lights spelled out slogans of
''1\~
1n the RECORD.
and Arabic
i
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i
.
an
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n
e
'
During the delivery of Mr. ERVINs pr
There being no objection, the article
RD
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speech, was ordered to be printed in the
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, yes- as follows: "ERROR UPON ERROR" IN SOUTH
terday in addressing the Senate, I called K BACKS ARABS IN Row Wrrn I.iRAeL ON VIETNAM
attention to serious developments- WATER During the delivery of Mr, ERVIN's
which were to me not surprising-in the CArno May I I.-Soviet Premier Khrushchev soh,
Middle East. In fact, I foretold them in gave his support to the Arab world today in Mr tRUENING? Mr. President, the
Wall Street Journal, a conservative and
my 472-page report, which I made to its opposition to diversion of the Jordan
the Senate last year after a 10-week River waters by Israel. well-edited publication , carries as its
study of our foreign aid program in 10 Speaking to the United Arab Republic's waded editorial the May 13 issue a
Middle Eastern countries. It was plain one-party National Assembly, Khrushchev leg in
to me, at the time, that Nasser, the dip- said Israel planned to "rob the Arab world discussion lof the U.S Upon role South Viet-
tator of Egypt, whom U.S. aid and sup- of Its own water."
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 Fo 91 -&1P2'i6A0000140031-9
I recommend its reading ' to ,the Con
gress and to those who would pursue and
continue the folly of our participationin
this civil war in southeast Asla,
The final paragraph is worth repeat-
ing and commenting upon at this time:
No nation should count on military suc-
cess, even `ii'mited, in the 'most unfavorable
circumstances. No piece'of territory is be-
yond all price, worth any cost, as the French
finally discovered 10 years ago after such
great cost. And the United States, for all its
F-,
great power; cannot forever police the world
alone and unaided:
How long is it going to take for our,
administration in office, which inherited
this mess, to ' f ace up to the realities?
Why should the United States, all by it-
self, rush into every troubled area in the
world, no matter how unfavorably situ-
ated, not merely with ourheavy financial
and material 'aid, but far more. tragic,
with the lives of our young Americans?
If the battle is worth fighting-which
I dispute-it is certainly not worth fight-
ing all alone Again and again I have
asked, as has `Senator MoRsE: "Where
are our SEATO allies?" Their boys are
not on the firing line. Our SEATO allies
are Great Britain, France, Australia,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand; did'
the Philippines, seven of them. tut we
see no British boys on the firing line.
The French, having learned by bitter ex-
perience that this is a lost cause, are cer-
tainly not sacrificing any more of their
young 'me`n to add to the tragic toll of
tens of thousands of Frenchmen whose
bones lie in the tropical infested jungles
of southeast-Asia.
The Australians have sent no contin-
gent to battle with us; neither have the
New Zealanders. The Philippines have
recently made some promise of a token
force of-believe it or not-75 soldiers.
That is hardly more than"a meaningless
gesture, although we should, perhaps,
applaud even this gesture if it is trans-
lated into action. The people of Thai-
land, right next door, who might be pre-
sumed to have a stake in whatever hap-
pens pens .in"southeast Asia, have sent not a
single soldier to` the South Vietnamese
front. As for the Pakistanis, to whom
we are giving large quantities of money
for military aid, to say nothing of hun-
dreds of millions of dollars for economic
aid, are using that aid to prepare to fight
.India over Kashmir, and not the Com-
munists, either from China or in south
east Asia.
Likewise, Mr. President, there is an'
article in the May 18 issue of U.S. News
& Wolrld .Report, entitled "True Story of
War in Vietnam." The various subheads
which appear throughout this article are
suggestive of what'a real mess our war
there is. Let me quote them:
First, "Lacking: A Will To win,,-that,
of course, refers 4to the Government of
South Vietnam forces,.
Second, "Advisers in Combat"-this
refers to the fact that our men who are
fighting and losing their lives are sup-
posed to be advisers-a piece. of totally
unjustifiable hypocrisy.
Third, "Officers Picked by Politics."
Fourth, "Luxury in Midst of War."
'Fifth, "Cowardice"and Laziness."
Sixth,' "Graft and Corruption."
Seventh, "Redtape and Delay."
Eighth, "U.S. Equipment Wasted."
Ninth, "Why Villagers Desert."
And what is the conclusion of the
writer of this article-Mr. Robert L.
Moore, Jr., who, U.S. News & World Re-
port says, lived 4 months with United
States and Vietnamese soldiers and went
on combat missions with them? His
conclusion is as follows:
Until the Vietnamese military develops
the will to win and the courage to face the
enemy unflinchingly by day or by night, even
if outnumbered, the war against communism
in Vietnam will not be won-no matter if
we pour in $3 or $4 or $5 million a day in
aid.
The only realistic solution that most
Americans see in Vietnam is for the United
States to take operational control of the war
away from the luxury-loving, coup d'etat
minded, casualty-fearing Vietnamese officer
corps until such time as they can develop
the leadership necessary to win the war. If
we do not take operational control, we merely
waste lives and money in a hopeless stale-
mate.
What a tragic prospect that is for the
American people. I am confident that
if a referendum were taken in the United
'States of our fellow citizens, the position
that I have upheld-that we should get
out of Vietnam-would be supported
overwhelmingly.
My mail continues to run, with im-
pressive unanimity, in favor of my rec-
ommendations, which I herewith repeat:
We should get out of South Vietnam,
make-the best possible arrangement; and
strive within the United Nations for a
negotiated settlement. We should not
sacrifice another American boy. I
strongly reiterate at this time my con-
viction that all of South Vietnam is not
worth the life of one of our fellow Amer-
leans. We have lost far too many al-
ready.
I ask unanimous consent, that the edi-
torial "Error Upon Error," which ap-
peared in the Wall Street Journal of May
13, as well as the article by Robert L.
Moore, Jr., appearing in the May 18 is-
sue of U,S. News & World Report, en-
titled "True Story of War in Vietnam,"
be printed in the RECORD at this point
in my remarks.
There being no objection, the editorial
and article were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, May 13,
1964]
ERROR UPON ERROR
Ten years almost to the day after the fall
of Dienbienphu, Secretary McNamara is in
Saigon-for the second time in the past
couple of months. Yet no matter how
many high officials visit Vietnam, or how
frequently, nothing gets clarified. Except,
that is, the continuing failure of U.S. policy.
Though the conjunction of the Secretary's
trip with the anniversary of the French de-
feat is accidental, it could be unpleasantly
symbolic. With a far greater force than
the United States has committed, the French
fought the Communists for some 8 grisly
years, and lost,
Vietnam was then divided North and South,
Korea-like, but unlike Korea the border
10481
was fluid and not patrolled by large contin-
gents of U.S. or any other troops.
The Communists predictably made the most
of their opportunity, first as infiltrators and
guerrilla fighters; now they are so strong
they can and do attack in force.
Today the French wonder aloud how the
United States expects to win at the rate it
is going. They are not the only ones; Amer-
ican servicemen and reporters have long been
saying we are losing the war. U.S. officials
are alternately reassuring and gloomy.
Part of the official attitude appears to be
that we are not supposed to win in a formal
sense; only help the South Vietnamese drive
the Communists out and keep them out.
But even this limited objective keeps going
glimmering. After all the U.S.-supported
fighting, the Communists are said to be in
effective control of sizable and important
parts of South Vietnam.
In vigw of that, it is almost impossible to
figure out what is the U.S. strategy, if any-
that is, how it thinks it can in fact drive
the Communists out and keep them out.
Not that anyone expects the Pentagon to re-
veal its war plans in detail; it is rather that
the evidence indicates the lack of any plan
which promises to be workable against the
varied and successful tactics of the Com-
munists.
Not even the commitment of many more
American soldiers or the bombing of Com-
munist bases in the north, which has been
talked of off and on, would be guaranteed to
accomplish the objective. In other circum-
stances perhaps, but not necessarily against
this particular enemy, in this particular ter-
rain, with this particular ally.
At the same time the French solution of
neutralizing all of Vietnam sounds like a
proposal in a vacuum, at least for the pres-
ent, Why should Ho Chi Minh, the dictator
of the north, want to neutralize when he is
doing so well as it is? Or if he did want to,
we may be sure he would see it as a means
of continuing the'congifest.
We do not rule out the possibility that
the United States may somehow someday
turn the tide, any more than we rule out
the possibility that the realities of the situa-
tion may finally dictate withdrawal. But
whatever happens, the U.S. involvement in
Vietnam reveals a series of clasic military
and political errors from which it may be
hoped the Government will eventually profit.
First, the United States drifted into the
war, initially intending only to advise. It
evidently overestimated the fighting capacity
of the South Vietnamese troops while under-
estimating the Communist Vietcong.
Second, the United States got into a war
where the enemy chose the field. The field,
moreover, is extremely disadvantageous for
us not only in terms of terrain but of dis-
tance from our shores.
Third, it got into a war without allies,
even though the interests of many nations
are affected. If its allies care at all, they are
willing to let the United States do it. Its
only ally, South Vietnam itself, has never
given an impressive demonstration of a will
to win, on the part of the people, the troops,
or the successive governunents.
To all this it may well be objected that
the alternative was to let South Vietnam go
down the Red drain, and perhaps the rest
of southeast Asia with it. The objection, we
think, begs the real issues:
No nation should count on military suc-
cess, even limited, in the most unfavorable
circumstances. No piece of territory is be-
yond all price, worth any cost, as the French
finally discovered 10 years ago after such
great cost. And the United States, for all its
great power, cannot forever police the world
alone and unaided.
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[From the U.S. News & World Report, May
18, 19641
From THE FRONT: TRUE STORY or WAR IN
VIETNAM
(Go out to the frontlinee, in the jungles
of South Vietnam, and you get a view of the
war that Secretary McNamara and other high
Washington officials do_ not see. One Ameri-
can writer did that. 'Robert L. Moore, Jr.,
lived 4 months with United States and Viet-
namese soldiers, went on combat missions
with them. What this writer saw raises im-
portant questions about the way that war
Is being fought. He found incompetence,
cowardice, graft-and no will to win-among
many of the Vietnamese officers and public
officials directing war operations. In this
report, he tells why he thinks the war will
not be won until the United States takes
over control.)
SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM.-"In his trips to
South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara -was never exposed to the bard,
unpleasant facts facing those Americans who
are actually fighting the war against the
Communist Vietcong."
These words were written by an American
who has spent 4 months living in the field
with the United States and Vietnamese fight-
ing forces-actually going with them into
combat.
Prom firsthand experience, this on the
spot American observer has reached these
conclusions:
"The basic problem that America faces in
Vietnam to not that of defeating the Viet-
cong Communists. That could be done in
a year or less.
"Our problem is to be allowed to win-to
be permitted by our Vietnamese allies to
prosecute this war aggressively and end it.
This does not necessarily have to involve
bringing U.S. battle groups Into Vietnam to
fight the war. Vietnam has the soldiers and
equipment to win.
"But, as U.S. advisers in the field say pri-
bately: The war can't be won under the
present ground rules because of the Inability
of most Vietnamese military leaders to lead."
The American who wrote these conclusions
is Robert L. Moore, Jr., from Boston, Mass.
He was an Air Force nose gunner in World
War IT. After graduation from Harvard in
1949, he worked in television and in public
relations and then turned to writing. His
output includes two books.
Last year Mr. Moore got the consent of the
Department of the Army to live among the
U.S. special forces In South Vietnam to
gather material for a book about them. In
preparation, he took parachute training at
Fort Benning, Ga., went through Special
Warfare School at Fort Bragg. N.C.
Now, after 4 months in Vietnam, Mr. Moore
is returning to write at length about what
he has observed there. But he feels that
some of his findings are so Important and so
timely that they should be published quickly.
So he has given U.S. News & World Report
permission to quote from the first draft of
one article that he is preparing.
The story that Mr. Moore tells is a story of
a war that Secretary McNamara has not seen.
Mr. Moore says:
"Many U.S. lighting men expressed dis-
appointment that the Secretary did not visit
American units In daily combat with the
Vietcong and find out at first hand from his
soldiers what their problems are.
"The U.S. high command in Saigon does
not encourage Its men to pass their problems
along to the Pentagon chief."
Following, from Mr. Moores report, are
some of those problems that Americans face
in Vietnam.
LACKING A WILL TO WIN
One major problem is the attitude of the
Vietnamese. Mr. Moore says:
"The will to fight, endure privations and
win is just not in the majority of the Viet-
namese military officers."
Mr. Moore questions whether some of the
high officials and military officers of that
country really want to see the war end.
Why? He writes this:
"Never before have so many Vietnamese
officers and public officials lived so well in
such a booming economy-injected as It Is
with a daily dose of almost 62 million of
American money.
"It is obvious to the Vietnamese who are
benefiting from this dole that when the war
Is over this maslsve aid will cease, or at least
be drastiacily modified."
ADVISERS IN COMBAT
The official role of U.S. Army special forces
in Vietnam is that of advisers to Vietnamese
combat forces. But Mr. Moore reports that
these so-called advisers have suffered more
than half the U.S. combat casualties, al-
though they make up only about 6 percent
of the total U.S. force in Vietnam.
Here, from Mr. Moore's account. Is how the
U.S. special forces actually operate:
"The basic special forces combat unit-
technically referred to as an advisory unit-
is a 12-man team known as an A team.
There are 42 such units, directed and sup-
ported by four-B teams, located in the four
military corps areas of South Vietnam. with
a headquarters unit known as the special
forces operating base in Saigon.
"Each A team is strategically situated in
an area dominated by the Communists.
Anywhere from 300 to 600 Vietnamese civil-
ians-trained by the special forces--are
quartered in an A-team camp and are used
to reconnoiter Vietcong positions and raid
their concentrations.
"Also in each camp there is a Vietnamese
special forces A team which, in theory, paral-
Iels the American team in capabilities, com-
position and organization-that is: 2 officers
and 10 enlisted men."
Actually, however, Mr. Moore lands a great
difference between the United States and
Vietnamese special forces.
OFFICERS PICKED BY POLITICS
-Mr. Moore gives this description of the
Vietnamese special forces-and of how they
are selected: "The Vietnamese special
forces-or Luc-Luong Dac-Biet. to use the
Vietnamese designation-were primarily a
unit of political troops organized under the
regime of the late President. Ngo Dinh Diem,
to serve as the President's private police and
riot squad.
"Coveted positions in this elite group were
given out as political favors to the stns of
friends and supporters of President Diem
and his family. To give the group status
and equip It with the finest U.S. military
hardware. Diem alined his special forces
with U.S. special forces-thus saddling the
Americans with Vietnamese teams made up
of youths who had no taste for combat and
whose only training was as palace guards.
"To make things worse, Instead of the
Vietnamese going out to learn from their
highly trained American counterparts, the
Vietnamese team captain was made camp
commander over the experienced American,
who can only advise.
"Despite the two recent coups. each sup-
posedly dedicated to a more aggressive war
effort, the character of the Vietnamese
special forces seems to be changing all too
slowly. Vietnamese officers move into and
out of jail as power changes hands, but their
overall quality still stands at A dismally low
level."
LUXURY IN MIDST OF WAR
You get this description of how officers of
the Vietnamese special forces live In the
midst of a war:
"Most of the officers have a batman to serve
them tea In bed in the morning. Frequently
they refuse to see their American counter-
part, particularly if they think he is going
to goad them into a combat operation. When
they do go out on operations, the officers
make their men carry all their equipment.
Americans carry their own gear.
"Many 35- or 40-year-old lieutenants and
captains-whose lack of political connec-
tions accounts for their lack of promotions
are sent to some of the most dangerous areas
where the majority of Vietnamese officers
refused to be posted.
"With Increasing effort by the Vietnamese
Government to make the army more effec-
tive, it Is usually possible now for a U.S.
special forces A-team captain to have his
Vietnamese counterpart relieved from corn-
-mand. Unfortunately, such officers are
merely transferred as camp commander to
another special forces team In another corps
area to begin anew the same cycle of em-
bezzlement of U.S.-supplied funds and de-
terioration of fighting efficiency."
COWARDICE AND LAZINESS
Mr. Moore tells of the difficulties often en-
countered In trying to get Vietnamese offi-
cers to go out and fight the enemy: "I
participated in six combat operations
throughout the four corps areas and the pat-
tern never deviated. As soon as it was as-
certained that a Vietnamese patrol was
closing In on a Vietcong concentration
antinolse discipline disintegrated. Shots
were 'accidentally' fired and canteens rattled
to let the enemy know that he was being
pursued.
"When, in spite of these precautions, the
Vietcong appeared ready to dig in and fight,
the Vietnamese commander inevitably came
up with some excuse for pulling back.
"One excuse for turning from the enemy
particularly sticks in my mind. It was ut-
tered by a Vietnamese officer In Tay Ninh
Province. We had to ford a river to get at
what we judged to be a platoon of Vietcong
on the other side. We had a full company.
The two American advisers were exuberant
at the opportunity of engaging a Vietcong
unit. But the Vietnamese officer turned to
the Americana and said his men could not
crass the river because there were too many
alligators In It.
"There are. of course, exceptions to the
general rule of cowardice and laziness in the
Vietnamese special forces.
"I spent some time in the camp of a U.S.
special forces officer who had nothing but
praise for his former counterpart, a Viet-
namese lieutenant in his early thirties. This
Vietnamese officer was an aggressive fighting
man, able to Inspire great courage and loyal-
ty among the civilian defense troops.
"The American officer wrote a letter of
commendation for the Vietnamese officer,
recommending that be be given a promo-
tion to captain. Two weeks later the lieu-
tenant was transferred to Saigon and re-
placed by a more typical Vietnamese officer-
a 22-year-old anti-American captain who
has failed to go out on a single operation
to date.
"U.S. special forces men can hardly be
blamed for their bitterness toward the Viet-
namese officers who make a difficult job al-
most impossible."'
GRAFT AND CORRUPTION
Among the things that make American
soldiers angry are the graft and corruption
that are widespread In Vietnam-even In
combat areas. Mr. Moore cites a few ex-
amples. Here is one:
"In April I visited several camps where
Vietnamese camp commanders had under
them 200 or 300 Montagnard troops. Mon-
tagnards are mountain tribesmen who are
the best fighting men in the Vietnamese
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Army. But the Vietnamese despise the
darker skinned and coarser-featured Mon-
tagnards. These Vietnamese camp com-
manders made the lives of their Montagnard
men so miserable by degrading punishment
and cutting down on their food'~that deser-
tions soared.
'The camp commanders failed to report
day: They col-
the desertefss untir:after pay,
lected from the Americans the pay for the
entire camp roster, indicating on the payroll
that all the deserters had been paid while
in actuality the commanders kept the de-
serters' pay for themselves.
"Yet if Americans object too strenuously
to such things they are severely reprimanded
for not being cooperative with their Viet-
namese counterparts."
Another dxample:
"On patrols, one Vietnamese commander
made his Montagnards hunt deer instead of
Vietcong. The commander drove out on
the patrols In a weapons carrier. After sev-
eral days during which he ate heartily while
refusing to give, the troops any of the meat
they provided, the commander drove his load
of deer carcasses into town and sold them.
This same camp commander had just tried
to jail the interpreter who had told the
American captain that the commander had
pocketed the pay of almost 100 deserters.
"Such stories are so common that Ameri-
cans begin to take it for granted that they
are expected to put up with Vietnamese
graft and cowardice as part of their job.
"One U.S. sergeant told me ruefully: 'They
took $1,700 out of my pay for taxes last
year, and I have to keep my mouth shut and
see it wasted over here.' "
Mr. Moore reports:
"There is little confidence among Ameri-
cans working at the combat level that cor-
ruption will be significantly diminished-by
the announcement of Maj. Gen. Nguyen
Khanh, the new South Vietnam Leader, that
he will .jail embezzlers of up to $1,000 and
shoot anyone who steals more than that."
REDTAPE AND DELAY
Mr. Moore says: "The biggest single fault
in the Vietnamese military system is its
chronic inability to react quickly." Be cites
"a heartbreaking example":
On March.; 26, two Americans were reported
overdue and presumed down on a flight over
'a jungle' area. Vietnamese - rangers were
asked to join the ground search.
It took 2 days just to get permission-first
from a Vietnamese general and then from
the district and provincial political chiefs.
Ranger officers then refused to move un-
til they got reserves to stand by in their ab-
sence-pnd a special round of field rations.
This cost 3 more days of delay.
On April 1, the rangers finally were flown
to a camp from which they were to start a
search. Then came word that a new Viet-
namese Commander was arriving the next
day for an Inspection-and the rangers had
to provide an honor guard.
,It was April 3-8 days after the plane went
down-when the search finally got underway.
HOW TO HANDLE SNIPERS: "WITHDRAW"
Here is an example, cited by Mr. Moore, of
how Vietnamese can turn'f7.S. military tac
ties into tactics of retreat: "Ii the Secretary
of Defense really wants to see at firsthand
some of the reasons we cannot win tp-lswar
in Vietnam without some policy changes, he
should spend a week at one of the special
forces b teams. They are truly microcosms
of the entire war, Most o our basic frus-
trations and quandaries are reflected in a B
team's daily incidents.
"At one j3 team I found the operations
officer laughing wryly over the translation
of a recent directive. Vietcong snipers
picking off a few men were routing whole
companies and battalions. U.S. advisers
showed the" Vietnamese how to . dispatch
squads to kill or drive off the snipers. The
Americans were pleased when a directive
on their methods of dealing with snipers
went out from corps headquarters.
"A few weeks later, however, the tactical
genius of the Vietnamese military mind came
forth in a new communique. It instructed
units coming under Vietcong sniper fire to
withdraw-leaving ambushes In case the
sniper charged."
V.S. EQUIPMENT WASTED
Here is another problem reported by Mr.
Moore, from his own observations:
"Secretary McNamara talks about sending
more supplies and equipment to help the
Vietnamese win their war against commu-
nism. This is fine, except that by and
large the Vietnamese have no concept of
maintenance, much less preventive mainte-
nance. Unless Americans are maintaining
the equipment here it quickly deteriorates
from sheer lack of care-and then the Viet-
namese ask for more."
from feeding the Communists or joining
them, either willingly or by impressment-
the tribesmen were taken from their villages
in the mountains and brought into new vil-
lages built around forts garrisoned by Viet-
namese troops. But the Vietnamese troops
refuse to leave their forts after dark. So
the Vietcong come into the villages at about
6 p.m. and stay the night, giving political
orientations, eating, imposing taxes, and
punishing villagers suspected of cooperating
with the Government. In the morning, the
Vietcong leave and the Vietnamese troops
take over until evening."
"Until the Vietnamese muster the courage
to go out at night and patrol the areas they
are supposed to be securing, the entire 'clear
and hold' concept is a joke.
"With no protection at night, the villagers
know that death and torture will be their lot
if they cooperate with the Government.
Hundreds of tribesmen are moving back into
the hills. As long as they are going to be
dominated by the Vietcong anyway, they pre-
fer to be in their own home mountains. And
RESCUE-OR FLIGHT? then, of'course, they are turned into hard-
Vietnamese pilots were taught to fly U.S. core Communists when the Vietnamese Air
helicopters, then eight helicopters were Force bombs and strafes their villages be-
turned over to them. The Vietnamese cause they deserted their Government ham-
painted parts of the helicopters yellow-the lets to go back to Vietcong territory."
color of their flag. Then the Vietnamese took SOLUTION: U.S. CONTROL
over the flying of rescue flights to evacuate After watching the war in Vietnam for 4
Vietnamese wounded from jungle combat months, this American writer has reached
areas. this overall conclusion:
Mr. Moore tells how this worked out: "Until the Vietnamese military develops
I had heard so many stories about the the will to win and the courage to face the
Vietnamese pilots' flying over the evacuation enemy unflinchingly by day or by night, even
site at 5,000 feet, well out of range of ground if outnumbered, the war against communism
fire, and then flying back without even try- in Vietnam will not be won, no matter if we
ing to pick up the wounded that I decided to pour in $3 or $4 or $5 million a day in aid.
go along on an all-Vietnamese evacuation
flight. "The only realistic solution that most
"For 15 minutes the chopper pilots circled Americans see in Vietnam is for the United
the clearing. Finally the chopper in which States to take operational control of the war
I was riding descended almost into the clear- away from the luxury-loving, coup d'etat-
ing. Then it popped up into the air like minded, casualty-fearing Vietnamese officer
a cork released under water. The crew chief corps until such time as they can develop the
examined the fuselage for bullet holes, leadership necessary to win the war. If we
There were none. So the chopper started to do not take operational control, we merely
drop In again. Lower and lower we hov- waste lives and money in a hopeless stale- ,~
ered. I saw a wounded man, smiling, being i mate," .-f
helped toward the helicopter. Then sud-
denly the helicopter began to rise again. AMENDMENT TO ALASKA
The last thing I saw was a sudden hopeless BUS ACT
expression wipe out the game smile on the
wounded man's face. Vietcong ground fire
had apparently frightened the Vietnamese
pilot off, although he later told me he was
afraid the clearing, was too small and the
rotor blades would hit the trees-this after
he was already less than a foot from the
ground."
"Over and over again," Mr. Moore says,
"U.S. advisers reported the terrible fall in
morale among the Vietnamese troops when
they realized that their own pilots were
afraid to come down in Vietcong-infested
jungles to pick up the wounded. The ground
troops automatically gave up hope when
they saw the yellow streak on the choppers
high above."
WHY VILLAGERS DESERT
Vietnamese strategy is to clear an area of
Vietcong Communist forces-and then try
to hold that area while clearing other areas.
'But Mr. Moore reports:
"So far, holding operations by the Viet-
namese alone have not been successful."
One instance is cited where Americans
trained thousands of mountain tribesmen,
cleared the area. Then the camp was turned
over to the Vietnamese. Result: "Less than
2 months after the Americans pulled out the
Vietcong attacked, drove the Vietnamese out
of the fort and destroyed it." Another ex-
ample:
"In a program to get the Montagnards
away from the Vietcong-preventing them
During the delivery of Mr. ERVIN'S
speech,
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate pro-
ceed to the consideration of Calendar No.
965, Senate bill 2772.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title for the Informa-
tion of the Senate.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S.
2772) to amend the Alaska Omnibus
Act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the present consideration of
the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill which had
been reported from the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs with an
amendment on page 1, line 6, after the
word "of", where it appears the second
time, to strike out "$22,500,000" and in-
sert "$23,500,000"; so as to make the bill
read:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That sub-
section (a) of section 44 of the Alaska Omni-
bus Act (73 Stat. 141) is amended by strik-
ing the word "and" following "1962" and
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ed Approved 3R 04wR00020014003l-9. May 13
the period at the end thereof and inserting
in lieu of the period "; and the sum of $23.-
600,000 for the period ending June 30, 1966."
Sac. 2. Subsections (b) and (c) of sec-
tion 44 of the Alaska Omnibus Act are
al~lended by striking "June 30, 1964" wher-
ever it appears therein and Inserting in lieu
thereof "June 30, 1966" and subsection (a)
of section 45 *of that Act is amended by strik-
ing "July 1. 1984" and inserting in lieu there-
of "July 1, 1966".
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, this
bill is an emergency measure to provide
urgently needed assistance to Alaska in
recovering from the earthquake disaster
of March 27. Consideration at this time
has been cleared with the distinguished
majority leader and the distinguished
minority leader.
The bill authorizes grants of up to
*23Y2 million to provide emergency as-
sistance to the State government of Alas-
ka and its local governmental entities.
There has been some discussion that
more than $231/2 million should be au-
thorized at this time. I wish to state
that the question was carefully consid-
ered by the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs at our public hearings on
S. 2772, and the members came to the
conclusion that the $231/2 million would
meet the State's essential needs at this
time.
I recognize the fact that subsequent
to our committee's action there has been
further discussion that the amount
should be larger. As our committee re-
port states, if more is required we will
give prompt consideration to the matter.
But I am convinced that the figure of
$23.5 million will meet the essential re-
quirements. for Immediate help to the
State government of Alaska. The State
government has lost about one-half of
Its sources of revenue as a result of the
Good Friday earthquake and accompany-
ing disasters, including tidal wave and
fire.
Mr.. President, S. 2772, which was re-
ported unanimously by the Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, is as I
stated an emergency measure to enable
the State of Alaska and its local govern-
ments to carry on local governmental
functions.
Never In all our history has the econ-
omy of a single State been as hard hit
by a natural disaster as that which
struck the 49th State 6 weeks ago.
PROMPT ACTION RY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Federal Government has moved to
promptly to help alleviate the suffering
and hardship of our fellow Americans.
The present bill, S. 2772, is a measure
designed to give emergency help to the
public sector, as distinguished from the
private sector, of Alaskan life. It would
authorize grants to the State of up to
$23.5 million to make up, in part, for
the revenues the State will lose as a re-
sult-of the disaster.
Technically, the measure amends the
Alaska Omnibus Act, which we enacted
In the 86th Congress, by increasing the
amount of transitional grants provided
in that law and by extending the time
for such grants for an additional 2 years,
or until June 30, 1966. The figures-
both as to the amount and the time-
are those submitted by the Bureau of the
Budget with the exception of an addi-
tional million dollars provided by the
committee amendment. This amend-
ment was necessary to offset a short-
term drop In the revenues of the Anchor-
age Independent School District which
has not been taken into consideration by
the Budget Bureau in submitting its
original $22.5 estimate.
The committee amendment was made
with the full concurrence of the Bureau
of the Budget.
ESTI KATS& OF AMOUNTS NEED) DIPPER
Mr. President, it should be emphasized
that the $23',/2 million Is the Budget
Bureau's figure for an 18-month emer-
gency period. It is not that of the State.
The State of Alaska has estimated that
it needs transitional grants amounting to
about $48'/2 million for a 30-month
period. However, if the State's estimates
are reduced to the same 18-month
base used by the Bureau of the Budget,
the State total would be about $27 to
$30 million.
The Interior Committee conducted
public hearings on S. 2772, which was
drafted by the Bureau of the Budget and
transmitted to the Congress by Presi-
dent Johnson. In its unanimous report
urging prompt favorable action on the
bill, the committee recognized the fact
that the amount. and the time period
were estimates. They may be too little;
more time may be needed. On the other
hand,. both figures may be more than
actually needed.
The Bureau of the Budget stated un-
equivocally that its position Is that there
Is no commitment, express or implied, to
request appropriations In the full amount
of the authorization. Rather, the
Bureau stated that initial appropriation
requests would be made only on its esti-
mate of the amount needed to carry the
State over until the beginning of the
calendar year 1965. At that time more
facts will be available and a better esti-
mate can be made whether, and in what
amounts, additional funds may be needed
to offset the State's temporary loss in
revenues.
Mr. President, prompt enactment of S.
2772 is urgently needed for the continued
functioning of State and local govern-
ments in a State of the United States. It
is an emergency measure for temporary
aid.
I urge immediate approval by the Sen-
ate of this emergency measure.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I
should like to make a statement at this
time.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I should
like to ask unanimous consent to yield
to the Senator from South Carolina [Mr.
JOHNSTON] and to any other Senators
who may wish to comment on this bill,
on the same unanimous-consent agree-
ment terms granted to we by the Sen-
ate a moment ago.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, if at
a later time the State of Alaska should
apply for loans, I believe the Senate
should look into the possibility of lower-
ing the 3-percent interest rate we have
established. I believe that borrowers In
an emergency such as that in Alaska
should have the very lowest rate of in-
terest possible under the circumstances.
I do not believe we should lend money
to other countries more cheaply than to
a State in the United States. For that
reason I believe the Senate at this time
should let It be known that we believe
Alaska and any other State suffering a
great disaster should have the lowest
possible rate of interest. That is what
I am urging.
Mr. BARTLE IT. Mr. President, I
should like to thank the Senator from
South Carolina for his comments.
This particular bill authorizes grants,
rather than loans, in the amount of
$231 million and there is no provision
for repayment by the State, but I think
the Senator's point is well taken.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The State of Alaska
may need to borrow more money at a
later time.
Mr. BARTLETT. The Senator Is cor-
rect and I believe he has in mind also
loans from the -Small Business Adminis-
tration-Mr. JOHNSTON. People in the Sen-
ator's State well may need to apply for
Federal funds through small business
loans, is that not correct?
Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, out of the
money already appropriated to that
agency.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The senator is cor-
rect. Funds are available in case of
emergencies such as the Alaska disaster.
I think interest rates should be as low as
possible.
Mr. BARTLETT. I agree with the
distinguished Senator, and I thank him.
With respect to S. 2772, the amount of
$22'/2 million was suggested by the ad-
ministration, and increased to $23.5 by
the interior Committee, with the under-
standing announced by the Bureau of the
Budget that should the State be in need
of further funds, the State could come
back and would have a prompt and sym-
pathetic hearing before the administra-
tion and the Congress. As the Senator
from Washington said, there is urgent
need for money right now to tide the
State and local governments over until
such time as they can recover themselves
in respect to tax revenues.
I Join the distinguished chairman of
the Interior Committee in urging prompt
passage by the Senate of this adminis-
tration-approved bill so that the State
of Alaska can get funds immediately.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, while
I highly approve the administration's
approval of a transitional grant to make
up for the State of Alaska's lost reve-
nue-lost because of the earthquake
disaster of March 27; a catastrophe un-
precedented and greater in magnitude
than has befallen any State since the
beginning of the Nation's history but I
feel the amount proposed is inadequate.
The loss of business and employment
wrought in Alaska's metropolis, Anchor-
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