PROF. KLANS PRINGSHEIM ON U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH VIETMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200130030-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: March 9, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A1I90
be determined only by a survey of each of
the third class cities, but the Pennsylvania
Bureau of Social Security for Public Em-
ployees is receiving communications from
such municipal employees inquiring whether
they can now elect social security coverage.
These single coverage members did not
choose social security coverage for a number
of reasons:
1. They had social security coverage
through other employment than in the
schools, State or municipality.
2. They would become eligible for social
security benefits as dependent wives or wid-
ows through their husband's coverage.
3. They were not sure of the benefits of
their being covered by social security be-
cause of their husband's membership in the
Railroad Retirement System.
4. They could not acquire sufficient quar-
ters of coverage at the time of establishment
to be eligible for a benefit.
5. They resented the reduction of public
employees retirement allowances because of
the offset established in the joint coverage
plan.
In fact, the offset reduction played a sig-
nificant role in the, decisions of many of
those who did not elect social security cover-
age. Under the joint coverage plan when a
public employe retired at an age, when he
could and did receive social security bene.-
fits, his retirement allowance is reduced by
40 percent of the social security benefits he
receives. For example, 13 his retirement al-
lowance were $300 and his social security
benefit were $100, his retirement allowance
would be reduced by $40 (40 percent of $100)
and he would receive only $260 as his reduced
retirement allowance together with his social
security benefit of $100.
In many cases there was so little differ-
ence between the employees total retirement
income from social security under joint cov-
erage in the public employees retirement
system plus his retirement allowance reduced
by the offset and his total retirement in-
come from social security under other cover-
age (or as a dependent of a covered spouse)
plus his full retirement allowance without
offset that it was not to his financial advan-
tage to elect social security coverage in the
public employees retirement system.
For example-a male employee with'a re-
tirement allowance of $300 per month and a
social security benefit of $100 under joint
coverage in the public employees retirement
system would have a total retirement income
of $360: Reduced retirement allowance-
$260 ($300 minus 40 percent of $100) plus
$100 social security benefit; $360.
If the same male employee had social se-
curity coverage through employment outside
of his public employment which entitled
him to a social security benefit of $50, his
total retirement income would be $350. Un-
reduced retirement allowance of $300 plus
his social security beenfit of $50.
In the above example electing joint cov-
erage would have meant only an additional
$10 per month. It would take a number of
years of retirement during which he would
be receiving an additional $10 per month to
recover the additional social security taxes
he would have to pay if he elected social
security coverage under the public employ-
ees retirement system.
Now legislation has been enacted in Penn-
sylvania which creates a new class of mem-
bership called dual coverage and joint cover-
age members may elect to eliminate the off-
set reduction in their retirement allowance.
This legislation becomes effective on July 1,
1964, and those who so elect will, upon re-
tirement, receive the full retirement allow-
ance without offset reduction and the full
social security benefit to which they are en-
titled.
It now becomes financially advantageous
to virtually every single coverage member
to elect social security coverage. Without
the offset reduction the total retirement in-
come from public employees retirement and
social security will be increased so substan-
tially that it will be to their advantage to
elect coverage even though they will have
to pay the social security taxes retroactive to
January 1, 1956.
For example, in the case of the male em-
ployee in the example above-if he elects
social security coverage under the public
employees' retirement system his total re-
tirement income would be $400-uinduced
retirement allowance of $300 plus social se-
curity benefit of $100-rather than the.$360
he would receive under the previous State
legislation. This will be $50 per month
more than the total retirement he would re-
ceive through his coverage outside his pub-
lic employment of $350. At $50 a month in
additional benefits he would recover the cost
of the additional social security taxes in a
very short period following retirement.
In addition every amendment to the So-
cial Security Act since social security cover-
age became effective for public employees in
Pennsylvania in 1956 has made it increasing-
ly more advantageous for single coverage
members to elect social security coverage
under the public employees retirement sys-
tem. All these are capped by the recent
Pennsylvania legislation permitting the
elimination of the offset reduction.
H.R. 9650 makes it possible for "single
coverage" public employees in Pennsylvania
(and perhaps other States) to greatly im-
prove their total retirement income.
The Pennsylvania State Education Asso-
ciation supports passage of this legisla-
Prof. Klaus Pringsheim on U.S. olicy in
South Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
OF KANSAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 9, 1964
Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, in
the Lawrence (Kans.) Daily Journal-
World's well known weekly feature,
"Opinions From the Hill," Prof. Klaus
Pringsheim has set forth a thoughtful
and penetrating analysis of U.S. policy
in South Vietnam. I commend it to my
colleagues here in the Congress:
OPINIONS FROM THE HILL
(EDITOR'S NOTE.-Klaus H. Pringsheim was
born in Berlin, Germany; emigrated as a 9-
year-old boy to continue his education in
England, and at 16 moved on to Japan
where he stayed until the end of World
War II. 'For 12 years he was a teacher of
the German, Japanese, and English lan-
guages, spending 4 of these years at the
U.S. Army Language School in Monterey,
Calif., as an assistant professor of Japanese.
He served in the U.S. Army for 4 years and
became a U.S. citizen in 1952 in Richmond,
Va. Later he entered UCLA and there ob-
tained his A.B. in political science, graduat-
ing Phi Beta Kappa. Subsequently he ob-
tained five consecutive Ford Foundation fel-
lowships to do graduate work in East Asian
studies at the East Asian Institute of Co-
lumbia University, He obtained the certifi-
cate of the Institute and an M.A. in com-
parative government at Columbia University
in 1959. He, is currently completing his
Ph. D. dissertation in the department of
public law and government at the same in-
stitution. He was lecturer in German at
the University of Hong Kong and lecturer
in comparative government at New York
City College and has also widely lectured in
Europe, Asia, and the United States. Spe-
cializing in contemporary Chinese politics
and foreign policy, he went to Hong Kong in
1959 for dissertation research and came to
Kansas University from Hong Kong in Sep-
tember 1961. He is now an instructor in
Kansas University's Department of Political
Science and a member of Kansas University's
East Asian Studies Committee. He has pub-
lished one book on Sino-Soviet relations, and
a series of articles and monographs on Jap-
anese and Chinese politics in scholarly
journals in the United States, Europe, and
the Far East. He married Mrs. Hsiuping
Pringsheim, a Hong Kong girl, in 1962 and
now lives at 700 Indiana Street in Lawrence.)
Next to the cold war confrontation with
the Soviet Union and our humiliating In-
ability to banish communism from Cuba, the
most vexing foreign policy problem faced by
the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson ad-
ministrations during the past 10 years, has
has been their failure to enable successive
governments of South Vietnam to achieve
the defeat of Communist insurgency in that
country. The continuing frustration of this
South Vietnamese-American common aim
has recently been dramatized by the an-
nouncement on February 26 that Mr. Roger
Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State
for Par Eastern Affairs, has suddenly
resigned his important position in the
Johnson administration. It is generally
known in Washington that Mr. Hils-
man felt that his policy recommenda-
tions were frequently overruled or ignored
or that he was not even consulted when im-
portant decisions in the area of his respon-
sibility were taken. His resignation is there-
fore almost certainly a reflection of his dis-
satisfaction and/or disagreement with the
Johnson administration. To this we add
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's
various contradictory statements on the state
of affairs in Vietnem when, in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, he
continued to insist that things were going
well. However well intentioned, these have
contributed to the general public loss of
confidence in the Johnson administration's
ability to handle our Vietnamese commit-
ment successfully. While President John-
son does reaffirm that we shall not abandon
our friends in Vietnam and that the Com-
munists are playing a dangerous game in
their stepped up guerrilla operations and
anti-U.S. personnel terror, the Senate ma-
jority leader, MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana,
on February 19 urged the Johnson ad-
ministration "to encourage rather than spurn
French efforts to negotiate with Communist
China for the neutralization of southeast
Asia. Senator MANSFIELD added that a major
commitment of American lives to the 10-
year-old guerrilla war is not now justified
and that we should therefore welcome a ne-
gotiated settlement, at a time when it has
become abundantly clear that the war can-
not be won by the methods now being em-
ployed and that it is probably slowly but
surely being lost.'
The Government's lack of candor in regard
to the Vietnamese situation has been a dis-
service to millions of Americans who have
been led to believe that our efforts have been
progressing successfully, and that by 1965 (or
as the latest McNamara release puts it "* *
before the end of 1965") we will be able to
go home and leave the rest of.. the task to
the Government and army of South Vietnam.
One rather suspects that if present trends
continue neither the army nor the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam are likely to survive
until 1965. But, whatever the objective situ-
ation in South Vietnam may be today (and
the contradictory reports which emerge seem
to indicate that no one can really be too
sure about this), it is surely time that Presi-
dent Johnson went beyond his vague gen-
eralizations at UCLA last week, and took us
into his confidence, so that we will be better
able to understand precisely what our policy
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX March 9
now is, and what, if any, realistic alternatives
are open to us. A continuation of the pres-
ent policy of equivocation, self-contradiction,
and propaganda can only be helpful to the
enemies of the United States, who seize every
opportunity to use our own words against us.
It would also be helpful to the Republican
cannildates and noncandidates who hope to
unseat President Johnson in the upcoming
presidential elections. The "mess in Viet-
nam" has been a favorite topic for all lead-
ing Republican spokesmen for months, and
as Senator DnmsEN stated on February 27
will be used as a major foreign policy issue
In the presidential campaign. The sooner
President Johnson reveals what the Govern-
ment :s policy will now be and why, the easier
it should be to gain substantial support for
such a policy, before it becomes too much of
a domestic political football. The following
are generally regarded as the five major
policy alternatives open to the Government
at this time:
1. Complete American withdrawal from
Vietnam; this would most likely result in a
complete Communist takeover and the con-
sequent loss of U.S. prestige all over Asia and
the world, plus the complete loss of Cam-
bodia, Laos, and possibly the rest of South-
east Asia. It is therefore not a realistic alter-
native.
2. A continuation of the present policy of
military and economic aid, with some 15,000
U.S. military advisors attempting to help
the South Vietnamese Army to defeat the
Communist Vietcong. It is difficult to sur-
mise why such a policy should be any more
successful in the future than It has been
in the past, but given the unacceptability
of the other four alternatives. It is the most
likely policy for the immediate future.
3. The commitment of major U.S. military
forces (Marines, Army, Air Force, Navy) in
an all-out attempt to achieve military defeat
of the Vietcong guerrilla units. Some mili-
tary men shudder at this prorpect, pointing
out that the French tried this and failed
and that it is unlikely that we could do any
better, even if we could find the enemy
which it has been virtually Impossible to do
whenever large-scale operations against the
Vietcong have been undertaken. The John-
son administration also seems to fear adverse
domestic reaction to the dispatch of troops
at this time.
4. A massive attack by U.S. naval and air
units on the "privileged sanctuary" of North
Vietnam where the Vietcong supposedly de-
rive their supplies, manpower, weapons, and
the organizational direction for their opera-
tions. An alternative suggestion along this
line is an "American blockade" of the North
Vietnamese, similar to our "quarantine" ac-
tion against Cuba, in an attempt to strangle
North Vietnam by economic pressure. Apart
from the fact that a Sino-Soviet "airlift"
and ta-uck convoys could nullify a blockade.
observers on the scene frequently point ottt
that the principal support for the Vietcong
is derived from captured U.S. weapons and
supplies, and from hundreds of thousands
of Vietcong sympathizers among the rural
population of South Vietnam, rather than
from North Vietnam. The use of South
Vietnamese guerrillas in North Vietnam has
also been suggested as a potentially helpful
measure, but South Vietnamese ineffective-
ness against Vietcong guerrillas even in terri-
tory nominally controlled by the South
Vietnamese Government makes this a most
doubtful proposition.
5. the neutralization of South Vietnam,
along lines similar to Laos, with the possible
mediation efforts of Gen. Charles de
Gaulle to secure Communist China's agree-
ment to such neutralization. Few observers
expect. "neutralization" to be anything more
than a temporary face-saving device for the
West. so that we can exit gracefully from the
scene. knowing full well that a Communist
takeover by infiltration, subversion, or coup
d'etat would follow fairly closely upon our
departure. Such a decision would be poli-
tically disastrous for the Johnson adminis-
tration right now.
When I recently submitted the above five
alternativesto some one hundred of my stu-
dents at the University of Kansas they voted
as follows:
Percent
1. For withdrawal-------------------
4 4
2. For continuation of the present
policy----------------------1----
-8'/4
3. For U.S. military intervention In
South Vietnam-----------------
451,
4. For U.S. military action against
both South and North Vietnam--
31/2
5. For neutralization________________
12
If these sentiments are representative of
how the majority of Americans feet about
the Vietnamese dilemma, and that may well
be, President Johnson will increasingly be
pressured to take vigorous military action.
If he expects to beelected President in 1964,
he must then either yield to this pressure
or come up with convincing arguments why
he rejects alternatives 3 and 4. In my view,
only an almost total collapse of the South
Vietnamese position would persuade Secre-
tary McNamara and President Johnson that
risking greater U.S. Involvement would be
justified. We may therefore soon be told the
hard, sad facts of life in regard to the Viet-
namese situation: that there is-no military
solution to a 20-year-old dilemma which Is
basically social and political; that we are
not prepared to commit a large military
force to a jungle war which provides little
chance for decisive military engagements;
that President Johnson's economic program
does not provide for another Korea, and that
we do not consider victory in Vietnam to be
so vital to our world position, that it would
be worthwhile to risk Chinese or Soviet Rus-
elan large-scale Intervention.
A recent Moscow Tass report warned that
U.S. military action of the kind contemplated
above was "a venture fraught with the most
serious consequences." President Johnson
thus probably feels that It would be In-
expedient during a presidential election
campaign to start what would undoubtedly
soon be called "Johnson's war" by the Presi-
dent's Republican opponents. Messrs. Nixon,
Rockefeller, Goldwater, et al., could then
offer to "go to Vietnam" If elected. Since
It Is not possible to ascertain at this moment
whether a particular policy choice led to Mr.
Hilaman's resignation and Senator MANS-
FIELD'S trial balloon, the President can now
no longer afford to keep us In the dark or
leave us to the mercy of Secretary Mc-
Namara's erudite equivocations. The time
for greater candor on Vietnam has come, and
-I for one hope that for the sake of his
own political future President Johnson will
find the courage to tell the American people
the unvarnished and unequivocal truth. If
he does. this will gain him our respect and
-in some cases, our support, which he surely
needs at this critical juncture. If nothing
else, the President must make it clear to the
panacea-hungry public that there are no
"easy solutions" to the staggering problems
of the global war against communism and
that our failure to act vigorously is a matter
of prudence rather than of indecision or the
inability or unwillingness to face a challenge.
In his televised press conference on Febru-
ary 29 President Johnson stated that too
much speculation on the situation In Viet-
nam did our cause there a disservice. I
could not agree more and would add that
the best way to terminate such speculation
is by fully and candidly informing the
American people of our assessment and our
plans there (within the limits of security) as
soon as Secretary McNamara returns from his
latest fact-finding mission to the area.
Resolutions Adopted by the New York
Board of Rabbis
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JAMES C. HEALEY
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 9; 1964
Mr. HEALEY, Mr. Speaker, under
permission previously granted, I wish to
call the attention of my colleagues in the
House to several very significant resolu-
tions adopted at the annual meeting of
the New York Board of Rabbis, on Jan-
uary 29, 1964. This association of Jewish
spiritual leaders is one of the largest of
its kind in the world. In addition to con-
ducting a chaplaincy program in hospi-
tals, homes for the aged, youth shelters,
and correctional institutions, the board
devotes its efforts toward social and civic
betterment. I heartily and personally
endorse their stand in their battle for
human rights.
The resolutions follow:
CIVIL RIGHTS
The New York Board of Rabbis calls upon
the Congress of the United .States to adopt
President Johnson's civil rights program.
We urge the President and his colleagues in
Government, as we* as the citizens of the
land, to do all they can through enforcement
and through the power of leadership to see
to it that the evil of segregation be removed
and the deprivation of civil rights be ended
as speedily as possible.
RACIAL JUSTICE IN SYNAGOG;UE POLICIES
Cognizant of the failure of our country to
confer full and equal rights for all its citi-
zens, and recognizing the special role that
religious groups play to help in the correc-
tion of this failure, we call upon the syna-
gogues of our city and State to confront the
issue of race and to bring to bear upon it the
religious principles enunciated by their na-
tional movements.
We urge the synagogues of New York to
continue to implement a program of action
to achieve the following goals: (1) To teach
the principle of racial justice in the congrega-
tions' educational, cultural, and worship pro-
grams; (2) racial justice in the congregations'
cooperative relations with otter institutions;
(3) racial justice In the lives of individual
congrega n ts.
IMMIGRATION
The New York Board of Rabbis welcomes
the recent statement of our President in sup-
port of changes in our immigration laws
which will remove the discriminatory legis-
lation based on the national, ethnic, and
racial origins of prospective immigrants.
FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION
America's system of public education is
not fully meeting the needs of our citizens,
or of the Nation as a whole. Outmoded
school facilities, understaffed school person-
nel, and the lack of adequate material en-
danger the quality of education for our
society.
Throughout American history there have
been programs of Federal aid to public edu-
cation. Because we regard our system of
education as crucial to the preservation of
democracy, we urge the enactment of legis-
lation that would provide for increasing
Federal assistance for this purpose.
MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AGED
In a time of rapidly Increasing longevity
and rising- medical coats, our society cannot
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