USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ( PRELIMINARY STUDY )

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000100380003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 119
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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88TH CONGRESS I HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session J
USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Preliminary Study)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
30-023 WASHINGTON : 1964
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WILLIAM L. DAWSON, Illinois, Chairman
CHET HOLIFIELD, California
JACK BROOKS, Texas
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
PORTER HARDY, JR., Virginia
JOHN A. BLATNIK, Minnesota
ROBERT E. JONES, Alabama
EDWARD A. GARMATZ, Maryland
JOHN E. MOSS, California
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
HENRY S. REUSS, Wisconsin
JOHN S. MONAGAN, Connecticut
RICHARD E. LANKFORD, Maryland
TORBERT H. MACDONALD, Massachusetts
J. EDWARD ROUSH, Indiana
WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD, Pennsylvania
CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER, New Jersey
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
R. WALTER RIEHLMAN, New York
GEORGE MEADER, Michigan
CLARENCE J. BROWN, Ohio
FLORENCE P. DWYER, Now Jersey
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
GEORGE M. WALLHAUSER, New Jersey
JOHN B. ANDERSON, Illinois
OGDEN R. REID, New York
FRANK J. HORTON, New York
BILL STINSON, Washington
ROBERT McCLORY, Illinois
ALBERT W. JOHNSON, Pennsylvania
CHRISTINE RAY DAVIS, Staff Director
JAMES A. LANIGAN, General Counsel
MILES Q. RGMNEY, Associate General Counsel
J. P. CARLSON, Minority Counsel
RAYMOND T. COLLINS, Minority Professional Staff
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE
JOHN E. MOSS, California, Chairman
PORTER HARDY, JR., Virginia GEORGE MEADER, Michigan
HENRY S. REUSS, Wisconsin ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
JOHN S. MONAGAN, Connecticut OGDEN R. REID, NewJYork
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
SAMUEL J. ARCiBALD, Staff Administrator
BENNY L. KASS, Counsel
JACK MATTE9ON, Chief Investigator
WILLIAM E. BARNABY, Investigator
HELEN K. BEASLEY, Clerk
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CONTENTS
Page
I. Preface------------------------------------------------------ 1
II. Summary of Federal polygraph use------------------------------ 5
A. Purposes for using polygraphs___________________________ 5
1. Security---------------------------------------- 5
2. Criminal--------------------------------------- 5
3. Misconduct------------------------------------- 5
4. Personnel screening______________________________ 5
5. Medical measurements___________________________ 5
B. Extent of polygraph use-------------------------------- 6
C. Polygraph tests conducted during fiscal 1963 -------------- 6
D. Polygraph tests requested during fiscal 1963--------------- 7
E. Polygraphs owned by the Federal Government ------------ 7
F. ? Authorized polygraph operators within the Government- _ _ _ 7
G. Other annual costs_____________________________________ 8
H. Safeguards for individuals_______________________________ 8
1. Effect of refusals________________________________ 8
2. Weight accorded polygraph test results ------------- 9
3. Review of polygraph use______________ _________ 10
4. Availability of results to individuals tested---------- 10
5. Appeals of polygraph test results ------------------ 10
6. Consideration of physical and mental conditions---__ 11
I. Qualifications of Government polygraph operators --------- 11
1. Minimum age----------------------------------- 11
2. Educational requirements_________________________ 11
3. Grade or rank----------------------------------- 11
4. Investigative experience__________________________ 12
5. Agency check or character investigation------------ 12
6. Training program-------------------------------- 12
7. Other requirements______________________________ 12
J. Illustrations of polygraphs:
1. Apparatus and furnishings________________________ 13
2. Marine Corps interrogation room_______________ _ 14
III. Table of agency replies------------------------------------- Facing 115
5
IV. Agency replies------------------------------------------------ 16
Agriculture Department-------- --------------------------
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency_____________________ 17
Atomic Energy Commission________________________________ 18
Central Intelligence Agency________________________________ 21
Commerce Department____________________________________ 22
Defense Department_______________________________________ 24
Office of the Secretary of Defense_______________________ 24
Air Force-------------------------------------------- 24
Army------------------------------------------------ 43
Navy------------------------------------------------ 61
Office of Naval Intelligence_________________________ 61
Marine Corps------------------------------------- 68
Defense Atomic Support Agency________________________ 71
Defense Supply Agency________________________________ 76
National Security Agency______________________________ 78
District of Columbia_______________________________________ 81
General Services Administration_____________________________ 83
Health, Education, and Welfare Department----------------- 85
Interior Department_____________________________________ 86
Justice Department: Federal Bureau of Investigation---------- 88
National Aeronautics and Space Administration_______________ 92
Post Office Department____________________________________ 95
State Department----------------------------------------- 98
Treasury Department______________________________________ 102
Coast Guard------------------------------------------ 102
Internal Revenue Service_______________________________ 109
Narcotics Bureau______________________________________ 111
Secret Service----------------------------------------- 112
U.S. Information Agency___________________________________ 115
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[COMMITTEE PRINT]
USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Preliminary Study)
1. PREFACE
The Federal, Government's use of the so-called lie-detector device,
more properly referred to as the polygraph, has become a topic of in-
creasing controversy in recent years. Serious questions have been
raised both by public officials and private citizens regarding the re-
liability of the device and the propriety of its use.
Consultation with the Library of Congress disclosed that no study
of the Federal Government's use of polygraphs has ever been made by
the Congress, -iby. any`_agency of the executive branch or by private
researchers. In April 1963, Congressman il1mm ~awson, chair-
man of the House Government Operations Committee directed the
Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee to
study the Federal Government's use oLpo_ lygraphs. After an analysis
16f the- vailable polygraph rapes iterature and interviews with experts, . the
subcommittee prepared a questionnaire which was sent to 58 Federal
agencies. Some advisory boards and semipermanent committees
whose limited organization and functions obviously precluded the
use of polygraphs were omitted from the inqquiry. The subcommittee's
questionnaire and letter transmitting it follow:
FORPiIGN OPERATIONS ANp,.GOVI t~niLNT,.
INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C., June 11, 1963.
DEAR MR. -: The Foreign Operations and Government In-
formation Subcommittee, at the direction of House Government
Operations Committee Chairman William L. Dawson, is looking into
the use of polygraphs by Federal agencies. The survey is being under-
taken in keeping with the committee's duty to study the operation of
Government activities at all levels with a view to determining econ-
omy and efficiency.
In this connection, please furnish full and complete answers to
each item in the enclosed questionnaire which is being sent to the
heads of all executive departments and independent agencies. Re-
sponses are to cover all subordinate organizations within each agency.
Within some individual departments and independent agencies more
than one major subordinate organization may use polygraphs for
different purposes or under different procedures. In that event,
please break down the requested data by major subordinate organi-
zations in addition to providing an agencywide compilation.
If any portion of the questionnaire seems unclear, please contact
the subcommittee staff for advice or explanation.
In order that the subcommittee can prepare a timely report on the
matter, please provide the requested information by July 31, 1963.
Sincerely,
JOHN E. Moss, Chairman.
1
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2 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
QUESTIONNAIRE ON POLYGRAPH USAGE
1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs or other
so-called lie detection devices? (If major subordinate organizations
within your agency engage in such activity, please list all those
organizations.)
2. Briefly explain your agency's general procedures governing the
use of such devices and answer the following specific questions.
(Please explain procedures and indicate if they are covered by regula-
tion--in connection with each question. If more than one major
'subordinate organization --within the agency is affected, provide
separate responses for each.)
(a) For what specific purposes are these devices used (i.e., employ-
ment interviews, security clearance processing, suspected improper
conduct of duties, or other. purposes)?
(b) Are the devices used in every instance involving those purposes
listed in answer to question (a)?
(c) What weight is given the data resulting from tests by these
devices, or refusals to take such tests, in relation to other types of
investigative information?
(d) Who makes the initial determination to use such devices, and is
this initial determination subject to review by higher authority in
each case?
(e) Is the physical and mental condition of each person to be tested
considered to determine suitability to take such a test?
(f) What disposition is made of data derived from such tests given
to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained in affected
individuals' personnel files, retained separately, etc.)?
(g) Are the findings of such tests made available to the individuals
who take the tests?
(h) Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse findings?
(i) Is access to such data restricted and, if so, what classification or
other designation is applied to the data?
(j) If a person connected with your agency refuses to take such a
test, is that refusal reflected in any way whatsoever in the individual's
personnel records?
(k) Does your agency maintain special facilities, such as specially
designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly describe
such facilities and how they are equipped. Furnish photographs,
if available.
(1) How many polygraph tests or examinations involving similar
devices were conducted by your agency in fiscal 1963?
(m) How many such tests were conducted by other agencies, public
or private, at the request of your agency during fiscal 1963?
3. Please enumerate, by job title and grade, all employees of your
agency who are authorized to conduct polygraph or similar tests and
list their salary costs for fiscal 1963. In addition, please answer the
following:
(a) How many of these persons have, as their primary duty, the
conducting of such tests?
(b) What are the minimum qualifications required of those persons
within your agency authorized to conduct such tests?
(c) Describe any training program your agency provides to train
its own employees, or employees of other Federal agencies, in con-
ducting such tests.
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(d) Does your agency send employees to outside agencies or schools,
public or private, for training in such testing? If so, please provide
the name and address of the training facility.
4. How many polygraphs and other so-called lie detection devices
are the property of your agency?
'(a) Please list the total acquisition cost of all such devices.
(b) Please estimate the total annual maintenance costs of such
devices and indicate whether maintenance is performed by agency
personnel or by outside sources.
(c) If your agency leases such devices, or contracts with other public
or private agencies to perform such tests, please provide the total costs
for such activity during fiscal 1963.
(d) Please estimate all additional expenses attributable to such
testing, such as travel expenses for examiners to and from location of
tests, internal and external training programs, and all other costs.
5. Please -provide two copies each of all intra-agency directives,
adrinistratiye orders, rules, regulations and/or instructions governing
the use of such devices within your agency.
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II. SUMMARY OF FEDERAL POLYGRAPH USE
In response to the subcommittee questionnaire, 19 Federal agencies
reported that their policies permitted the use of polygraphs in carrying
out Government business. The replies of these 19 agencies, broken
down by their constituent units which use the device, are shown in
tabular form at the end of this section. The following narrative
explains the terms used in the table and provides a general analysis of
the data.
A. PURPOSES FOR USING POLYGRAPHS
1. Security.-Cited by 14 of the 19 agencies, the most frequently
reported purpose for the Government's use of polygraphs involves
security matters. In this context security ranged from investigation
of security leaks to operational uses in intelligence and counterintelli-
gence activities.
The number of defense organizations included among the 19 users
underlines the important role the instrument plays in the many-sided
efforts to safeguard the Nation's security. Each of the military
services was accounted for, with the Intelligence Corps and the
military police both reporting polygraph use within the Army, and the
Marine Corps and naval intelligence answering the roll within the
Navy Department. The Office of Special Investigations was the sole
reported Air Force user. Civilian components of the Defense Estab-
lishment also were well represented. The Central Intelligence
A enc~ reported extensive polygraph use, as did the National Security
gA ency. AIso within the Defense Department, the Defense Atomic
owledged use of
Support Agency and the Defense Supply Agency ackn
the instrument. Several nondefense agencies also indicated that their
activities in the security field involved use of polygraphs.
2. Criminal.-Investigation of criminal law infractions was listed
by 10 agencies as an area in which polygraphs are employed. Private
citizens as well as Federal employees came within the scope of such
investigations. The Agriculture Department, for instance, has considered
the results of polygraph tests conducted outside the Government in
investigating cases of alleged fraudulent transactions with the Agricul-
tural Marketing Service.
3. Misconduct.-Investigation. of employee misconduct was a
reason given by eight agencies for utilizing polygraphs. This
category included offenses not considered to be criminal violations.
4. Personnel screening.-The Central Intelligence A enc and the
National Security Agency indicated tha,t.polygr-aph testing is included
as a routine part of reem,plo ment personnel screening. The armed
-
~"_
services__ -aITsorepportic ep a__... simi ar-use- - -
- uring fiscal 1963 in connection
with the program of enlisting Cuban refugees. This was a unique
situation, however, since the military normally does not employ the
device in recruitment or induction processing.
5. Medical measurements.-The Health, Education, and Welfare
Department reported that three of its bureaus-the National In-
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6 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
stitutes of Health, the Public Health Service, and St. Elizabeths
Hospital in the District of Columbia-used polygraphs for medical
purposes. As a device which measures pulse rates, respiration rates,
and blood pressure, the polygraph has been used to record the reactions
of patients under anesthesia.
The device also has found use in cases involving patients with
mental or neurological disorders. More frequently, it has been
employed on animals undergoing experiment.
B. EXTENT OF POLYGRAPH USE
Except for the personnel screening category, the user agencies
declared that polygraphs were not used in every case. The Atomic
Energy Commission, for instance, said that the device was involved
in processing only 1 of 29,300 security clearances processed during
fiscal 1963. Similarly, the machine was employed in 0.14 percent of
the FBI investigative matters handled in fiscal 1962.
The frequency of polygraph use in Air Force investigations varied
from once in every 43 cases in 1959 to once every 18 cases in 1962.
The Internal Revenue Service, which restricts polygraph tests to
employees who request them, reported such tests were used in fewer
than 10 cases in the last 10 ears.
Other agencies indicated investigative techniques affected
the extent of polygraph use. The Defense Atomic Support Agency
said the device is used normally "to gain information not otherwise
attainable by other investigative techniques." The Coast Guard
replied that polygraph tests are administered when "there is con-
flicting evidence, [or] the subject requests an examination, or it
appears that an examination would materially aid the investigation."
The Post Office Department limits the device to "cases of more than
average importance where the investigation is at a standstill because
the inspector cannot prove a suspect guilty or eliminate him from
suspicion even though he has exhausted all normal investigative
techniques."
Several agencies referred to the polygraph as an investigative "tool"
or "aid" which was used "seldom" or "on rare occasions."
In the area of personnel screening, the two agencies concerned-
theCYA and the National Security Agency-were notclear as to the
exact gxtent of poly -rash utilization. The CIA flatly answered that
"all applicants and employees are affordecolygraph examinations as
park of security-screening "procedures" while also implying a less-than-
mandatory practice by saying that a refusal to take a test would be
considered along with other information developed in processing an
applicant." The NSA advised that polygraph interviews are a re-
quired part of preemployment processing for all civilian applicants.
After becoming a NSA employee, however, a person is subjected to
such a test only in connection with matters "extensively investigated
but difficult to resolve." In the past, polygraph examinations have
not been required of military personnel before their acceptance for
assignment to NSA.
C. POLYGRAPH TESTS CONDUCTED DURING FISCAL 1963
The Federal Government conducted 19,122 polygraph tests during
1963, according to the answers to the subcommittee's questionnaire.
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USE OF POLYGR
And this amount did not include the thousands of tests which the
CIA-and NSA gave to "i l applicants and employees," since the
agencies claimed the number of tests must be classified as "security"
information.
The information compiled by the subcommittee showed the Army
to be the heaviest Government user of polygraphs. During fiscal
1963, the Army conducted roughly 12,500 tests or more than half of
all those reported by the Government. Screening of Cuban enlistees,
a situation presumably unique to the period reported, accounted for
3,494 Army tests with the polygraph. The Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation reported 2,314 tests.
D. POLYGRAPH TESTS REQUESTED DURING FISCAL 1963
Not all Government units using polygraphs maintain their own
specialized staffs and facilities to carry out the tests. On some
occasions, agencies do not have their own equipment or operators
available at the scene of investigations.
During fiscal 1963, these conditions led to 322 polygraph tests
Post
accounted for requested 134 yreqFeeral uests hile ncies. The
Servicecreque ted 110
tests.
Although there was uniform reluctance to specify the agencies to
which the requests were directed, it was generally implied that such
matters remained within the Federal Government. The General
Services and indicated Administration, aan unspecified ~number requested these wee perf rthe med by
local law enforcement agencies.
E. POLYGRAPHS OWNED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A total of 512 polygraphs or other so-called lie-detection devices
were reported as owned by the Federal Government at an estimated
acquisition cost of $428,066. This does not include the CIA and
NSA which claimed that the number and acquisition value of tie
poly gra~__ is Ih_eyy possess 1 s c sssi ed as security in ormation.
-TIie~xmy led the statistics in this department, possessing 261 de-
vices which cost an estimated $182,700. The Navy Department was
next with 86 machines, including 9 owned by the Marine Corps,
followed by the Air Force with 72 and the FBI with 48. The Post
Office Department reported they own 17 "lie-detection" devices, 13
of which were acquired more than 10 years ago and employ only a
one-phase, skin resistance detection procedure. The Post Office De-
partment stated that they intend to dispose of these one-phase instru-
ments in the current fiscal year.
F. AUTHORIZED POLYGRAPH OPERATORS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT
Federal agencies reported 639 employees are authorized to conduct
polygraph tests. Their salaries during fiscal 1963 amounted to slightly
more than $4.3 million. However, administering polygraph examina-
tions is only one of many assigned duties to the great majority of these
Federal workers. For example, the FBI. reported that the 46 special
agents authorized to perform polygraph tests spend an estimated 6
percent of their time on such activity. Accordingly, the FBI con-
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S F gOLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
tended that only 6 percent of the agents' $616,667 annual salaries-
or $37,000 per year-can be directly attributed to work involving the
polygraph. On this same point, authorized Army military policemen
devote less than 5 percent of their time to polygraph activities, averag-
ing 1.8 tests per month for each examiner. Post Office Department
inspectors reportedly average less than 3 percent of their total effort
with the device and the Secret Service attributes less than 1 percent
of the total operators' salaries to work involving the machine.
The National Security Agency and the CIA are the only_organi-
zations indicating that handling
_polygra i tests is the primary duty
of any employees.
Numerically, the Army again was highest, reporting 358 polygraph
operators on its rolls in fiscal 1963. The Navy Department followed
with 106 examiners-86 assigned to naval intelligence and 20 to the
Marines. Next on the list was the Air Force with 73 authorized
operators.
Once more the.9,c_ures do not include CIA and NSA which claim
they nu are exe . __ regarding
i bcr-an c rtes oTtteir 1 lo - ees.
C d 1A p y IA c____ as authority
50 U. U.S.C. 403(g),1 an claims as authority section 6 of Public
Law 6-36 (50 U.S.C. 402 note).'
G. OTHER ANNUAL COSTS
More than $56,000 a year in costs related to polygraph use was re-
ported by the 19 agencies. This figure is a bare minimum, as such
costs were very sketchily estimated due to widely varying record-
keeping. Intended to be included in this category were training and
travel expenses of polygraph operators, maintenance of the polygraph
machines, and similar recurring costs. In addition, the Air Force
reported an expenditure of $24,953 during fiscal 1961 for a contract
with Fordham University (N.Y.) on studies in lie detection.
II. SAFEGUARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS
Included in the subcommittee questionnaire were several queries
designed to reveal the steps taken to safeguard the rights of individuals
who undergo polygraph tests. In this regard the agencies were
asked what relative weight is accorded polygraph test results or
refusals to be so tested, whether the use of polygraphs is subject to
review, whether tests results are available to the individual, whether
an avenue of appeal exists, and whether an individual's physical and
mental condition are considered.
1. Effect of refusals.-In response, every agency provided assurances
of one form or another that polygraph tests are given only with volun-
tary consent from the person to be tested. Even in the employment
cxeelliug p ro ;rams of___the CIA and the NSA, where polygraph tests
150 U.S.C. 403(g) states: "In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United
States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 403(d)(3) of this title that the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of section 654 of Title 5, and the provisions
of any other law which require the publication or disclosure of the organization functions, names, official
titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, T=hat in furtherance of this
section, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in connection with
the Agency under section 947(b) of Title 5."
2 SEC. 8(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, nothing in this Act or any other law ind
t
first
and
section
Act of
t shall be co struedtto rrequi eethe d e sclosurelof the organs ationtoroany functions of 28he19Na35 al SSecur ty
Agency, of any information with respect to the activities thereof, or of the names, titles, salaries, or number
of the persons employed by such agency.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 9
UTroach the point of being mandatory, applicants may refuse to sub-
mit to oTyraph testing. Whether a refusal would dim a job appli-
cant s c antes is not clear. The QJ Ar-yiiply said that refusals would be
"considered along with other information developed * * * "while the
NYui icate an appl%c?ant s refusal-would require "more exhaustive
investigation."
A number of agencies expressly declared that refusals do not
prejudice the outcome of an investigation. The Air Force, for
example, stated "no inference is or may be made from * * * refusals"
while the Army military police assured that "failure to volunteer for
an examination is not construed as a tacit admission of guilt." Simi-
larly, the Defense Atomic Support Agency said that a refusal "cannot
be construed as an admission or even a partial admission of guilt" and
the Post Office Department asserted the refusals cannot form the
"basis for any recommendation."
While the Marine Corps went along with most agencies in saying a
refusal "is not considered as proof or evidence of facts sought to be
confirmed," the Office of Naval Intelligence thought otherwise. "It
is safe to say," stated ONI, "that this Office realize [sic] that some
subjects refuse to submit to examination on the basis of moral scruples
which they consider valid, in other cases a refusal may be considered a
tacit admission of guilt."
The Defense Supply Agency also had some doubts about refusals.
"While only limited significance is attached to data developed by the
polygraph test," DSA said, "in a clear-cut `did-you-or-didn't-you'
situation refusal * * * is considered as an unfavorable reflection on
the credibility of the individual's statement."
A member of the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police
Department can be ordered to take a polygraph test, and be subject
to disciplinary action if the order is disobeyed, but for any other
suspect a refusal "can be given no weight as to guilt or innocence."
With the exception of the District of Columbia Police Department,
all agencies reported that refusals by employees to take polygraph
tests are not noted in their personnel records, although such matters
might be mentioned in investigative reports.
2. Weight accorded polygraph test results: No agency admitted
attaching great significance to the results of polygraph examinations,
abut there were indications that such tests influence at least the course
of investigations.
The Atomic Energy Commission reported that polygraph test results
alone were not conclusive but if they were at variance with the findings
of field investigations, additional fieldwork would be carried out to
resolve the discrepancies. The Defense Atomic Support Agency and
the General Services Administration stressed that they attached no
weight to such test results without confirmation by subsequent
admissions.
The results are not used by the National Security Agency in "reach-
ing any finding" but only to "identify areas in which the individual
should be questioned further." In a similar vein the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration said the device is used "for
formulating additional investigative coverage."
A balanced statement on this point was issued by the FBI, which
said the "polygraph can be helpful to implement an interrogation and
provide investigative direction but it must not be relied on solely or
used as a substitute for logical investigation."
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10 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Internal Revenue Service seemed inclined to give the individual
being tested the benefit of the doubt. "Where such test is favorable
to the subject, it might be given considerable weight," IRS said.
"When the test is unfavorable, it would simply be considered with
all other information * * *."
The polygraph was felt to be "an invaluable investigative aid" by
the Office of Naval Intelligence, which also cautioned that "an
accuracy rate of 70 percent is considered optimum.."
3. Review of polygraph use.-Almost all of the 19 agencies indicated
that use of polygraphs is subject to review by authorities higher than
those persons immediately involved in handling investigations.
One reported exccption_...ko_this review practice was the CIA. That
Agency apparently considers asystem of review for each instance of
c~o~l graph utilization as unnecessary since __the Director of Central
Irtlligence has established the policy that "all applicants and
employees will be afforded polygraph examinations as part of security
screening procedures."
Likewise, polygraph tests are a required part of the National
Security Agency's preemployment processing of civilian applicants,
and there is no process to review each applicant's case to determine
whether the testing is appropriate. However, there is a system for
reviewing the decision to test NSA employees.
While the Defense Supply Agency maintains a review process for
all recommended tests in criminal investigations, security operations
are handled differently. The use of polygraphs in DSA security
matters is decided, without subsequent review, by the intelligence
officer in charge at the field activity concerned or at DSA headquarters
in Washington.
4. Availability of results to individuals tested.-Five agencies-
Central-Intelligence Agency, Defense Supply Agency, Department of
the Air Force, National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation-indicated they do not make known the results to indi-
viduals, undergoing polygraph examinations. All other agencies
using the machine said they either routinely advise the individual
tested of the results or provide the information upon request.
5. Appeals of polygraph test results.-A number of agencies reported
that they have-no. system permitting the appeal of adverse polygraph
test results. Most of these agencies reasoned that an appeal limited
to the results of polygraph tests is unnecessary since no action is taken
against individuals solely on the basis of such examinations; however,
these agencies went on to say that any administrative action resulting
from an investigation would be subject to appeal.
The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department an-
swered that the right of administrative appeal does not apply in its
uses of the machine "since all criminal cases must ultimately be
presented to a court of law and the results of polygraph examinations
are not admissible in these courts."
But a sizable number of agencies and their components said they
provide a means of appeal, usually by conducting a new test with a
different operator. Agencies allowing an appeal or reexamination of
some sort are the Army, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the
Internal Revenue Service, the Secret Service, the U.S. Information
Agency, and the U.S. Park Police of the" Interior Department. `
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 11
6. Consideration of physical and mental conditions.-Each agency
reporting the use of polygraphs, and all of their affected units, informed
the subcommittee that consideration is given to the physical and
mental conditions of individuals to be tested.
A few agencies, including the Air Force, the Commerce Department,
the Defense Atomic Support Agency, the National Security Agency,
and the State Department, said they obtain professional medical
advice when there is a question of physical or mental suitability to
undergo polygraph tests.
While most other agencies simply indicated that consideration is
accorded, few further details were volunteered. The Post Office
Department, for example, noted that "susceptibility tests are given
to determine * * * mental suitability." Similarly, Naval Intelli-
gence said: "It is well understood the physical-mental conditions of
many subjects will render them unsuitable as testing subjects either
on a temporal or permanent basis."
The U.S. Information Agency was slightly more specific, stating
that the matter "is left to the professionalization of the [polygraph]
operator."
I. QUALIFICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT POLYGRAPH OPERATORS
In order to ascertain the qualifications of the polygraph operators
within the Federal Government, the subcommittee asked those 11
agencies that employed polygraph operators for a breakdown of the
minimum requirements for the operators. Included among the
criteria were age education, grado or rank, years of investigative
experience, any cflaracter investigation or agency check, and type of
special polygraph training.
1. Minimum age. Although most agencies have set 25 years as the
minimum age for a polygraph operator, the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department allows a policeman aged 21 to
conduct the polygraph tests. The Coast Guard minimum age is 22,
while CIA "prefers'.' -their operators- to be_ 30 years old. There is no
minimum age requirement in the FBI- but all examiners must be
Special Agents and the minimum age for such an agent is 23 years.
2. Educational requirements.-The educational requirements for
polygraph operators in the Federal Government vary from agency to
agency. The minimum requirement is a high school degree, although
an Army military policeman must have 2 years of college education
before becoming eligible to perform polygraph tests. CL'IA, NSA, FBI,
Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Secret Service all require college,
degree.
rade or rank.-The minimum grade or rank requirement for
ppolygraph operators varies greatly throughout the Government.
The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department has no
special requirement, while the Central Intelligence Agency requires
its _polygra h operators to be a GS-11 Lwith base annual salary of
,,,.0044. The FBI requires its polygraph operators to be a Special
Agent, which has the grade of GS-10 ($8,450). Other grade or rank
requirements include: Army Intelligence, E-5 ($4,738); Army Military
Police, warrant officer ($6,632), NSA, GS-11 ($9,004); and Post
Office` Department, PFS-13 ($12,639).'
3 Salaries derived from tables found on p. 13415, Congressional Record, Aug. 6, 1963.
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4. Investigative experience.-Three agencies-the District of Colum-
bia Metropolitan Police Department, the FBI, and the Marine Corps-
have no minimum requirement for years of investigative experience.
The remainder of the agencies employing polygraph operators vary
in their requirements from 1 year to 5 years.
5. Agency check or character investigation.--All prospective poly-
graph operators within the Federal Government must be given either
an agency check or a background investigation prior to approval as
an operator. NSA reports that all applicants for polygraph operator
must pass a polygraph screening test.
6. Training program.-The majority of agencies that employ poly-
graph operators train them at the Army Provost Marshal General
School, Fort Gordon Ga. The Coast Guard and the Post Office
Department also ma~e use of a private source of instruction-the
National Training Center of Lie Detection in New York. CIA
rewires polygraph traie to take an internal academic course for
5 tn- a d itiomil_ 4 oth on thejob trai i The FBI
also conducts an internal training course and advanced training
seminars.
7. Other requirements.-No one agency can be compared with any
other, in their "other requirements" for authorizing a polygraph opera-
tor. The requirements range from a thorough understanding of
communism (NSA), forre_ign_lanQa e fluency and physical ability to
travel extensively (CIm )A to emotionaTstaUility and lack of distracting
mpediments (Air Force).
scars or impediments-
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERA 0
The Polygraph Apparatus and Specially Adapted Furnishings-The machine
is installed in the desk. Special arm rests on subject's chair are designed to
lessen movement from. lack of comfort.
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14 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Marine Corps Polygraph Interrogation Room-As recommended, room is rela-
tively bare and free of distractions. Acoustical wall surface indicates sound
proofing. Two-way mirror on left. Subject's chair is turned away from. the
window, a possible source of distraction.
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IV. AGENCY REPLIES
The following 39 Federal agencies reported that their policies or
practices did not provide for the use of polygraphs:
American Battle Monuments Commission
Bureau of the Budget
Civil Aeronautics Board
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission
Export-Import Bank
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Aviation Agency
Federal Coal Mine Safety Board of Review
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
Federal Power Commission
Federal Reserve Board
Federal Trade Commission
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
Housing and Home Finance Agency
Indian Claims Commission .
Interstate Commerce Commission,
Labor Department
National Capital Housing Authority
National Capital Transportation Authority
National Labor Relations Board
National Mediation Board
National Science Foundation
Office of -Emergency Planning
Railroad Retirement Board
Renegotiation Board
St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation
Securities and Exchange Commission
Selective Service System
Small Business Administration
Smithsonian Institution,
Subversive Activities'Control Board
Tariff Commission
Tennessee Valley Authority
Veterans Administration
The replies of the agencies reporting the use of polygraphs follow.
15
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16 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
REPLY FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
Hon. JOHN E. Moss, Washington, August 1, 1963.
,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government
Information, Committee on Government Operations, House of
Representatives.
DEAR MR. Moss: Pursuant to your request of June 11, 1963,
regarding use of polygraph by the Department of Agriculture, we
have completed a survey of each agency and staff office in the Depart-
ment. This survey disclosed that no agency or staff office either
owns or possesses polygraph equipment nor do they have qualified
polygraph operators. Neither the Department nor subordinate
agencies or staff offices have issued directives, administrative orders,
rules, regulations, and/or instructions concerning polygraph utilization.
Our survey disclosed only two instances in which the polygraph
has been used. Both instances occurred in connection with Agri-
cultural Marketing Service (AMS) investigations as follows:
1. An investigation by AMS in September 1959 involved a federally
licensed weighlnan who admitted falsifying a truck grain receipt
which resulted in the issuance of a fraudulent U.S. warehouse receipt.
At the request of his employer, the weighman submitted to a poly-
graph examination which was performed on July 21, 1959, by John
E. Reid & Associates, 600 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill.
The results of this examination were included in our report; however,
it was performed prior to our active participation in the investigation'
and was neither at our request nor expense.
Criminal prosecution was declined by the Department of Justice
since there was no loss to the Government; the Federal license was
revoked, and the subject individual lost his position with the firm.
2. An investigation by AMS in March 1960 involved a licensed
grain storage warehouse in St. Louis, Mo. It was developed that
the warehouse had lost about $85,000 through falsely represented
grain deliveries; i.e., less grain was delivered than was recorded and
paid for. Information developed indicated that employees of the
firm may have been in collusion with persons operating outside the
firm and polygraph examinations were given a number of these em-
ployees. These were given by a George Haney, reportedly a qualified
polygraph operator, and were given at the suggestion of AMS Internal
Audit Division. However, we did not incur the expense of these
examinations although the results were made available to us and were
used in our report.
An analysis of this case by the Office of the General Counsel deter-
mined that sufficient evidence for successful prosecution had not been
obtained and the file was closed.
Sincerely,
JOSEPH M. ROBERTSON,
Administrative Assistant Secretary.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 11
REPLY FROM THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
Washington, July 29, 1963.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee, House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As requested in your letter of June 11, 1963,
there is enclosed herewith the response of the Agency to the question-
naire on polygraph usage submitted by your subcommittee.
Sincerely yours,
WILLIAM C. FOSTER.
REPLY TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON POLYGRAPH USAGE SUBMITTED BY THE
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOM-
MITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DATED JUNE 11, 1963
1. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) does not
possess a polygraph or any other of the so-called lie-detection devices.
Since its establishment in September 1961 the Agency has not had
occasion to arrange for the use of any such devices.
2. ACDA has had no occasion to arrange for the use of any of these
devices and it has neither formal procedures nor plans for establishing
formal procedures in this area. If an occasion were to arise where
the use of a polygraph examination appeared to be in the best interests
of the Government, the Agency would request the Department of
State, which performs many administrative services for ACDA, to
arrange the interview.
(a) The only situation in which we can conceive using this type of
equipment would be an instance in which an employee has been
accused of committing a serious act of security interest and investiga-
tion has failed to resolve the issues of doubt.
(b) No. As indicated above, a polygraph examination would be
considered in specific serious cases of security interest on a voluntary
basis to assist in the resolution of particularly difficult employee cases.
It would be undertaken only if authorized by the Director.
(c) If the result of the examination indicated the employee has
lied and may have committed the act as alleged, but the employee
continues to deny having done so, further investigation of the issue
would be scheduled. In this type of case the employee undoubtedly
would be assigned to the least sensitive position available in the
Agency, pending completion of such investigation.
Since arrangement for polygraph examination would be undertaken
only on a voluntary basis, there could be no refusals per se.
(d) In appropriate instances, the Agency security officer would
submit recommendation to the Director that the Department of
State be requested, under section 41 of Public Law 87-297, to arrange
for a polygraph examination under that Department's practices and
procedures.
(e) Whatever the current practices of the Department of State
are concerning the physical and mental condition of the employee
would govern. Since the Department of State is also submitting
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1$ USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
responses to this questionnaire, we have not attempted to describe
its procedures herein.
(f) The report of findings furnished by the Department of State
would be filed in the Agency security file of the employee.
(g) As a matter of general practice the Agency would advise the
employee of the result of the examination unless requested by the
Department of State not to do so.
(h) As indicated in item (c), there would probably be no adverse
action taken solely on the basis of an adverse polygraph examination.
Under such circumstances there would, of course, be no necessity for
appeal.
(i) Results of polygraph examinations would be classified by the
Department of State and honored by ACDA.
(j) No.
(k) No.
(1) None.
(m) None.
3. There are no employees of ACDA authorized to conduct poly-
graph or other similar tests.
(a) Not applicable.
(b) Not applicable.
(c) Not applicable.
(d) Not applicable.
4. As indicated previously, ACDA has no polygraph or other of the
so-called lie-detector devices.
(a) Not applicable.
(b) Not applicable.
(e) None.
(d) None.
5. As indicated previously, ACDA has no directives, administrative
orders, rules, regulations, or instructions governing the use of such
devices.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., August 2, 1963.
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Repre-
sentatives.
DEAR MR. Moss: Reference is made to your letter of June 11,
1963, enclosing a, questionnaire concerning the use of polygraph
techniques by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
Attached are the responses of each numbered item of the
questionnaire.
Sincerely yours,
A. It. LUEDECKE, General Manager.
1. The Atomic Energy Commission does not own or lease polygraph
equipment or other so-called lie-detection devices. The Commission
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 19
does however, make infrequent and carefully restricted use of the
polygraph examination in security cases, as set forth more fully below.
2. The polygraph may be used, on a voluntary basis (i.e., with the
consent of the individual involved), only after the General Manager
approves its use in a particular case in connection with making a
determination as to an individual's eligibility for access to classified
information (security clearance). Use of the polygraph is controlled
within the framework of procedures established for determining eligi-
bility for Atomic Energy Commission access authorization (security
clearance). Such procedures require that in those cases where infor-
mation-received through investigation, interview, or otherwise-
raises a question concerning an individual's eligibility for access
authorization, the Atomic Energy Commission Office concerned refers
the case to the Director, Division of Security, AEC Headquarters, for
further consideration. Normally, this consideration will consist of
authorizing an interview to inquire into specific areas of concern or
initiation of further investigation to extend certain information.
Should these procedures fail to provide adequate information, and the
Director of Security believes that lie-detection techniques will assist
in the resolution of certain information or allegations contained in
the case, based on a recommendation from the office concerned, he
may recommend the use of this technique to the General Manager,
AEC Headquarters. If after review of the entire record, the General
Manager approves this recommendation, he may authorize the use of
a polygraph device.
The authorization is forwarded to the AEC office concerned by the
Director of Security after he has satisfied himself as to the reputation,
experience, and capability of a testing operator.
The use of this technique is so limited within the program and since
control thereof is governed within the framework of existing pro-
cedures, no special regulations have been issued.
(a) The Atomic Energy Commission makes use of the polygraph
examination solely for security-clearance purposes.
(b) The device is not used in every case involving a determination
of access eligibility. On the contrary, in fiscal year 1963, it was used
in only 1 out of a total of 29,300 cases that were processed (see 2(l)
and 2(m) below).
(c) In applying AEC security criteria, the decision as to access
authorization "is a comprehensive, commonsense judgment, made
after consideration of all the relevant information, favorable or un-
favorable, as to whether the granting of access authorization would
endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly
consistent with the national interest." (10 C.F.R., pt. 10, sec.
10.10(a).) In this light, polygraph findings furnished by a competent
and qualified polygraph examiner are not regarded by the Commission
as conclusive evidence. Instead, they are treated as relevant informa-
tion whose weight is determined in the light of other information
developed during the security investigation as a whole. If the data
obtained by the polygraph examination are at variance with informa-
tion developed during the initial field investigation, additional field
investigation is generally sought in an attempt to resolve the discrep-
ancy. Where test data indicate that an individual is willing to make
certain admissions, a written statement is obtained immediately
following the test. As stated above, the test is administered solely on
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20 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
a voluntary basis; i.e., with the consent of the individual. Refusal on
the part of an individual to take such a test is not considered deroga-
tory and does not prejudice the further processing of his case in any
way.
The security director of each field office, through the field
manager, may initially recommend use of the polygraph to the
Director of Security, Headquarters, who may endorse such recom-
mendation to the General Manager. Only the General Manager has
authority to approve its use.
(e) The physical and mental condition of an individual to be tested
is considered. In the past fiscal year 1963, which saw only one case
where the polygraph was employed (see 2(b) above), the examination
was postponed to a later date because of these considerations.
(f) The data derived from such tests are retained in the individual's
security file which is stored in the offices of the Division of Security.
Dissemination of the security file and information contained therein
is carefully controlled.
(g) The findings resulting from the examination are made known to
the individual.
(h) Should an adverse finding, coupled with other information
evaluated as being of a substantially derogatory nature, raise doubt as
to an individual's eligibility for access, such individual would be
notified by letter of the specific grounds giving rise to such doubt.
Upon receipt of the notification letter, the individual may request a
hearing before an Atomic Energy Commission personnel security
board. The right to a hearing and general procedures relating thereto,
including appeal, are set forth in the Commission's rules and regula-
tions, part 10 "Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility
for Access to Restricted Data or Defense Information," a copy of
which is enclosed.
(i) Access to such data is limited as indicated in paragraph 2(9,
above; the data is treated as privileged information between the
individual involved and the AEC.
(j) No record concerning an individual's refusal to undergo a lie-
detector examination is made in the individual's personnel records.
(k) The Atomic Energy Commission has no such facilities. The
facilities and personnel of other Government agencies or departments
are utilized by the Atomic Energy Commission.
(1) No tests or examination of this type were conducted by the
Atomic Energy Commission during fiscal year 1963.
(m) One such test was conducted by another Government agency
at the request of the Atomic Energy Commission during fiscal year
1963. The test was favorable and the individual retained his access
authorization.
3. The Atomic Energy Commission has no employees authorized
to conduct polygraph or other similar-type tests.
4. As indicated. previously in paragraph 1, the Atomic Energy
Commission possesses no such devices.
5. Two copies of the "Atomic Energy Commission Criteria and
Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Restricted Data
and Defense Information" within which the use of the polygraph is
controlled are attached.
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U'St OF POLYGRAPHS BY HE FED O
REPLY FROM THE CENTRAL INTFLLIOENCE : AGENCY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., August 8,1963.
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Repre-
sentatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In reply to your letter of June 11, 1963, I
am forwarding herewith answers to your questionnaire on polygraph
usage.
Our response to the questionnaire has been prepared in close collab-
oration with the subcommittee staff whose assistance has been most
helpful. As discussed with the staff, we have not included the infor-
mation roue-" she`d in paragraph 5, however, I can assure you t aFi tt ~t~ie
proco wires referred to in answer to questions 2(a), 2(f), 2(h), 3(a),
and _. are set forth in detail in appropriate Agency regulations and
directives..
Four cooperation and understanding. in this matter is sincerely
appreciated.
Faithfully yours,
MARSHALL S. CARTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Acting Director.
1. Yes under the Director of Security.
2 (a) Au applicants and employees are afforded polygraph examina-
tions as a part of security screening procedures. They, are asked
questions concerning possible membership in the Communist Party,,
past or present Communist sympathies or associations, past and
present foreign connections, falsification of their personnel history
statement, and a category of questions dealing with blackmail
potential.
(b) Yes.
(c) The results of polygraph interviews or the refusal to take such
tests are considered along with all other information developed in the
processing of an applicant for employment.
(d) The Director of Central Intelligence established the policy that
all applicants and employees will be afforded a polygraph interview
as a part of the security clearance process in support of his statutory
responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.
(e) Yes.
(f) The data derived from polygraph interviews are maintained in
special security files apart from the regular security files and under no
circumstances made a part of or referred to in any way in the personnel.
files.
(g) The findings or conclusions are not made available to the
individual.
(h) Adverse personnel actions are subject to appeal under the pro-
visions of the Agency personnel regulations.
(i) Access to all polygraph information is severely restricted to
senior officials with action responsibility.
(') No.
O Yes, they are designed to enable an interview to be conducted
under as close to the ideal situation as possible; i.e., privacy, in an
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USE. OF POLYGRAPHS.BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
uncluttered area with no telephone or other distrubances which might
interrupt the course of the interview.
(1) See final paragraph.
(m) The Central Intelligence Agency conducts all its own tests.
3. See final paragraph.
(a) All.:who are authorized to conduct polygraph tests do so as a
full-time job.
(b) Qualifications for candidates:
(1) College degree or its equivalent in work experience in one
or more of such closely related fields as investigative, police
administration, psychology, political science, and physiology.
(2) Preferably of a maturity consistent with about 30 years
of age.
(3) Preferably with oral fluency in one or more foreign
languages.
(4) Physically qualified to meet Agency requirements including
extensive travel.
(c) The Central Intelligence Agency, under its centrally controlled
program, trains its own polygraph examiners. The training course
covers-
(1) History and introduction to polygraph.
(2) Mechanics, of, the polygraph.
(3) Chart interpretation.
(4) Interview techniques.
The academic phase of Central Intelligence Agency's training
covers 5 weeks with approximately 4 months on-the-job training.
(d) No.
4. See final paragraph.
The numbers, job assignments, and duties of employees of the
Central Intelligence Agency are classified information. In keepin
therewith answers to questions 2(e), 3, 4, 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d)
have not been provided herein.
REPLY FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Washington, D.C., June 26, 1963.
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommit-
tee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in further reply to your letter of
June 11, 1963, to Secretary Hodges concerning the use of polygraphs
in Federal agencies.
There are set forth below answers to the questionnaire on polygraph
usage. The answers have been numbered to correspond to each
numbered question, the questions not being repeated for the sake of
brevity.
1. The Department of Commerce does not possess a polygraph or
any other so-called lie-detection device, nor as a general practice do
we make use of such devices.
2. We have no written procedures or regulations covering the use of
such devices. However, a check of our records for the past 10 years
reflects that on the basis of specific requests made by the employees
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FED
involved, a polygraph was used in four cases involving either security
or suitability matters.
(a) A polygraph was used by this Department in two cases involving
security clearances and two cases involving allegations of personal
misconduct.
(b) No.
(c) The results of the tests in the cases where a polygraph was used
were considered in the light of other information developed during
the investigation of the employees involved. Final action taken in
no instance was based solely on the result of the polygraph test.
(d) In. the cases where a polygraph was used in this Department,
the employee involved in the individual case initially requested that
he be permitted to submit to such a test. Final decision and approval
for the use of the device was made on secretarial level.
(e) No professional advice was sought in any of the cases mentioned.
However, if there had been any indication of physical or mental
weakness or disability, or the need of such advice, it would have
been arranged.
(f) The actual machine tapes reflecting the results of the tests are
retained by the agency giving the test. The summary report setting
forth the conclusions reached, which is received by this Department,
is filed in the investigative file in our Office of Investigations and
Security
(g) Yes.
(h) In the event adverse action is taken on the basis of the overall
file, including the polygraph test, the employee would have the right
of appeal to which he is entitled under the removal proceedings used.
(2) Such data would be protected in accordance with the classifica-
tion placed on it by the agency giving the test. If no classification
has been assigned by that agency, the Department administratively
restricts its use to authorized departmental officials only.
(j) We have never directed or requested an employee to take such
a test.
(k) No.
(l None.
(m) Two.
3. No employee in the Department of Commerce is trained or
authorized to conduct polygraph or similar tests.
(a) Not applicable.
(b) Not applicable.
(c) Not applicable.
(d) Not applicable.
4. None. See 1, page 1.
(a) Not applicable.
(b) Not applicable.
(c) The Government agencies giving the test referred to above
have done so on a courtesy basis at no cost to the Department of
Commerce.
(d) Not applicable.
5. See 2. page 1.
If you desire any further information concerning this matter,
please do not hesitate to call upon me.
Sincerely yours,
HERBERT W. KLOTZ.
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REPLY FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
August 5, 1963.
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommit-
tee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reply to your request of June 11,
1963, for detailed information on the use of the polygraph in the
Department of Defense.
The military departments and other concerned components of the
Department of Defense have provided answers to the survey ques-
tionnaire which was enclosed with your letter.
In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a polygraph may be used
only with the personal consent of the Secretary of Defense. The
polygraph was not used in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency during
fiscal year 1963. None of these organizations possess any polygraph
or other lie-detection devices.
We trust that the enclosed materials will satisfy the requirements
of the subcommittee.
Sincerely yours,
DAVID E. MCGIFFERT,
Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative Affairs).
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs or other-
so-called lie-detection devices? (If major subordinate organizations
within your agency engage in such activity, please list all those orga-
nizations.)
Comment. Within the Air Force the agency which primarily
employs the use of the polygraph is the Office of Special Investigations,
the Inspector General, USAF.
2. Briefly explain your agency's general procedures governing the
use of such devices and answer the following specific questions.
(Please explain procedures and indicate if they are covered by regula-
tion in connection with each question. If more than one major
subordinate organization within the agency is affected, provide
separate responses for each.)
Comment. Within the Air Force the general procedures governing
the use of the polygraph are set forth in chapter 2, "Office of Special
Investigations Manual 124-1." There are no other Air Force publica
tions or regulations setting forth the manner in which this technique
will be employed. Attached are two copies of the OSI directive
pertaining to the use of the lie detector.
(a) For what specific purposes are these devices used (i.e.,
employment interviews, security-clearance processing, suspected
improper conduct of duties, or other purposes) ?
Comment. The Air Force use of the lie detector is outlined by
paragraphs 2-2-3 and 2-2-13 of OSIM 124-1. It will be noted that
OSI utilizes this technique primarily in criminal and counterintelli-
gence investigations. It is not the policy to utilize this technique
I Attachments referred to throughout the Department of Defense replies, which are not included in this
committee print, are available in subcounuittee files.
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USE. OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
for preemployment or interim employment interviews nor is it utilized
for routine security clearance or background processing or investi-
gations.
(b) Are the devices used in every instance involving those purposes
listed in answer to question (a) ?
Comment. The application of the technique is not used in every
OSI investigation. In fact, the ratio of use of the lie-detector tech-
niques for the preceding 5 years by OSI, in substantive cases is as
follows: 1958, 1 in 27 cases; 1959, 1 in 43 cases; 1960, 1 in 32 cases;
1961, 1 in 23 cases; 1962, 1 in 18 cases.
(c) What weight is given the data resulting from tests by these
-devices, or refusals to take such tests, in relation to other types of
investigative information?
Comment. The Air Force considers the application of this tech-
nique as an investigative aid and no legal evidentiary weight may be
given to the results of these examinations. In regard to those indi-
viduals who decline to be administered polygraph examinations, no
inference is or may be made from such refusals.
(d) Who makes the initial determination to use such devices, and
is this initial determination subject to review by higher authority in
each case?
Comment. The OSI policy as set forth in paragraph 2-2-13,
OSIM 124-1, gives the determining authority for the employment of
lie-detector examinations to the Director, OSI, his Deputy Directors,
and the OSI district commanders. In general, the district com-
manders have been delegated the authority to authorize lie-detector
examinations in all criminal investigations within their geographical
jurisdictions with several minor exceptions (e.g., cases involving
children). Paragraph 2-2-4, OSIM 124-1, sets forth those cases in
which the specific approval by the OSI Directorate is required prior
to administering lie-detector examinations. In essence, all counter-
intelligence and personnel investigations come within this category
of obtaining prior approval from the OSI Directorate.
(e) Is the physical and mental condition of each person to be tested
considered to determine suitability to take such a test?
Comment. Consideration of the examinee's physical and mental
condition at the time of the examination is of definite concern to the
examiner. All OSI examiners follow the tenets of the U.S. Army Lie
Detector School, Fort Gordon, Ga. The subject of each examinee's
mental and physical well-being is thoroughly inquired into prior to
each examination. Further, embodied into each examination are
questions designed to determine the individual's physical and mental
ability to react. If the examiner believes that an individual is not
mentally or physically capable of rendering adequate responses to the
questions to be asked, or of undergoing the testing generally because
of some limitation, the examination is not administered. (For further
reference on this subject note par. 2-2-15, OSIM 124-1.)
(f) What disposition is made of data derived from such tests given
to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained in affected
individuals' personnel files,. retained separately, etc.)?
Comment. All lie-detector charts.and allied data .containing the
questions asked, the statement of consent signed by the testee and
the examiner's opinion are retained in the OSI investigation case file
to which the examination pertains. Dissemination of the charts and
.allied data are never made outside OSI channels. However, a sum-
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26 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
mart' of the examiner's opinion is incorporated into the OSI investi-
gative report and this report is forwarded to the commander con-
cerned with the total investigation. (Note pars. 2-2-25 and 2-2-26,
OSIM 124-1.)
(g) Are the findings of such tests made available to the individuals
who take the tests?
Comment. It is OSI's policy that generally the lie-detector ex-
aminer's opinion will not be given to the individuals taking the
examination. (Note par. 2-2-25D, OSIM 124-1.)
(h) Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse findings?
Comment. The Air Force does not consider lie-detector examiner's
opinions as legal evidentiary material. Consequently, there would be
no cause for appeal since the test results do not affect the status of an
individual examined.
(i) Is access to such data restricted and, if so, what classification
or other designation is applied to the data?
Comment. The lie-detector charts and allied data may assume the
same security classification as that assigned to the entire investigative
case. However, as stated above, lie-detector charts and allied data
are not disseminated outside of OSI channels.
(j) If a person connected with your agency refuses to take such a
test, is that refusal reflected in any way whatsoever in the individual's
personnel records?
Comment. The results of lie-detector examinations are not entered
on personnel records. The refusal of an individual to be adminis-
tered an examination likewise is not entered on personnel records.
The only notation of the results or the refusal of any individual to
take a lie-detector examination would be embodied into the report of
investigation concerning the matter under inquiry.
(k) Does your agency maintain special facilities, such as specially
designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly describe
such facilities and how they are equipped. Furnish photographs, if
available.
Comment. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations does not
maintain any specially designed lie-detector interview rooms. Most
OSI offices maintain rooms for the purpose of interviewing personnel;
however, none of these rooms are equipped with permanent lie-
detector equipment. OSI utilizes only portable lie-detector equip-
ment which may be set up on a desk or table in any room which
affords the necessary privacy and quiet, at any Air Force installation.
(1) How many polygraph tests or examinations involving similar
devices were conducted by your agency in fiscal 1963?
Comment. The statistics for fiscal 1963 cannot be compiled at this
writing since fiscal 1963 total statistics are not available as yet.
However, for the calendar year 1962, OSI examined 1,238 individuals
in 725 separate substantive investigations.
(m) How many such tests were conducted by other agencies, public
or private, at the request of your agency during fiscal 1963?
Comment. The OSI does not maintain statistics on the number of
examinations conducted for them by other agencies. The number of
such requests would be minimal since all but one of the OSI district
offices have assigned lie-detector personnel. Further, such examina-
tions if conducted by other agencies would probably involve criminal
investigative cases. (Note par. 2-2-7, OSIM 124-1.)
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3. Please enumerate, by job title and grade, all employees of your
agency who are authorized to conduct polygraph or similar tests and
list, their salary costs for fiscal 1963. In addition, please answer. the
following:
Comment. The following is a breakdown of all OSI agents who are
authorized to administer polygraph examinations and their salaries:
Salary
Assigned to the United States:
Special agent_____________________
Major-----------------------------
$11,119
$111,190
Do---------------------------
Captain---------------------------
9,079
45,395
Do---------------------------
Chief warrant officer______________
7,313
51,191
Do---------------------------
Chief master sergeant-------------
6,565
6,665
Do---------------------------
Staff master sergeant--------------
5,798,
11,506
Do---------------------------
Master sergeant___________________
6,408
59,488
Do---------------------------
Technical sergeant----------------
4,793
67,102
Total--`--------------------
Assigned to U.S. Air Forces inEurope:
Special agent_____________________
Major -----------------------------
11,119
11,119
Do---------------------------
Chief warrant officer--------------
7,313
7,313
Do---------------------------
Chief master sergeant_____________
6, 565
6, 565
Do---------------- ----------
Master sergeant___________________
5,408
10,816
Do---------------------------
Technical sergeant----------------
4,793
38,344
Total----------------------
Assigned to Paoifle Air Forces:
Special agent_____________________
Major -----------------------------
11,119
22,238
Do----------------------------
Chief warrant officer ______________
7,313
14,626
Do---------------------------
Master sergeant___________________
5,408
21,632
Do---------------------------
Technical sergeant________________
4,793
9,586
(a) How many of these persons have, as their primary duty, the
conducting of such tests?
Comment. None of the above agents have as their primary duty
the administering of lie detector examinations. All of the above
agents have been trained as lie-detector examiners and utilize this
specialized training in conjunction with their assigned primary in-
vestigative duties. All of the above agents, with the exception of
one, are special agents assigned to OSI operational field offices in
which they perform assigned investigative duties. The one excep-
tion as stated above is a captain assigned to the staff of the OSI
directorate as the polygraph supervisor. He is responsible for the
staff supervision of all lie-detector activities conducted by OSI world-
wide. He insures through comprehensive analysis, study, training,
research, and liaison that OSI has the best available lie-detector
operation, equipment, and trained professional personnel to provide
effective and efficient worldwide service.
(b) What are the minimum qualifications required of those persons
within your agency authorized to conduct such tests?
Comment. OSI applicants for lie-detector examiners training must
meet the following minimum requirements:
(1) Staff sergeant through captain.
(2) Not less than 25 years of age.
(3) High school graduate and a graduate of the basic USAF
special investigations course.
(4) Five years diversified investigative experience, three of
which must have been with OSI.
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28 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(5) Have signed an indefinite statement or have 2 years re-
tainability after graduation.
(6) Must have demonstrated a definite interest in complaint
type investigations.
(7) Must have demonstrated proficiency as an interrogator by
actual case experience.
(8) Must have a practical understanding of human nature, be
able to "get along" with people and should be generally well liked
by associates.
(9) Must be mature with an even temperament, emotionally
stable, capable of making intelligent decisions, and have demon-
strated the ability to assume responsibility.
(10) Must have a good command of the English language and
be free of visible scars, tics, speech impediments, etc.
The administration of lie-detector examinations by OSI personnel
is restricted to those special agents who have successfully completed
the U.S. Army lie detector examiner's course of instructions, Fort
Gordon, Ga., and who are currently listed in the records of the OSI
directorate as being qualified lie-detector examiners.
(c) Describe any training program your agency provides to train
its own employees, or employees of other Federal agencies, in conduct-
ing such tests.
Comment. All OSI examiners receive their basic or primary lie-
detector training at the U.S. Army Lie Detector School, Fort Gordon,
Ga. In addition, the OSI conducts an annual seminar, of 1 week
duration, for its examiners. This course is designated to acquaint
and familiarize the examiners with the latest developments and tech-
niques in the state of the art. Additionally, examiners attend various
regional courses and seminars offered by universities and other recog-
nized schools.
(d) Does your agency send employees to outside agencies or schools,
public or private, for training in such testing? If so, please provide
the name and address of the training facility.
Comment. Selected OSI examiners have attended short courses
offered on lie detection by the University of Oklahoma, Norman,
Okla., the National Training Center of Lie Detection, New York,
N.Y., and the Academy for Scientific Interrogation, secretary, Post
Office Box 1042, Madera, Calif.
4. How many polygraphs and other so-called lie detection devices
are the property of your agency?
Comment. The OSI possesses a total of 72 polygraph instruments.
(a) Please list the total acquisition cost of all such devices.
Comment. Total acquisition cost of the 72 instruments presently
in use, $82,185.
(b) Please estimate the total annual maintenance costs of such
devices and indicate whether maintenance is performed by agency
personnel or outside sources.
Comment. The total cost of repair of the assigned lie-detector
instruments is estimated at $3,600, annually. Minor repairs such as
replacing tubes, are performed by the individual examiners. Intricate
repairs are performed by electronic shops at various Air Force bases to
which examiners are assigned. As part of the maintenance program,
the United Testing Laboratory, Monterey, Calif., has a contract to
repair 12 of the older model instruments, for $75 per unit. Fiscal
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1964 procurement contracts have been let for the purchase of 10 new
instruments at an approximate cost of $1,215 per unit. These instru-
ments will be for replacement of the older nonrepairable models.
(c) If your agency leases such devices, or contracts with other public
or private agencies to perform such tests, please provide the total
costs for such activity during fiscal 1963.
Comment. The Air Force does not lease any lie-detector instru-
ments, nor does it contract for the performance of examinations.
(d) Please estimate all additional expenses attributable to such
testing, such as travel expenses for examiners to and from location of
tests, internal and external training programs, and all other costs.
Comment. The travel expenses for all examiners for fiscal 1963 in
the performance of the OSI lie detector program is estimated at
$12,150. The basic and advanced training curriculum costs for the
lie-detector examiners during fiscal 1963 is estimated to be $12,547.
5. Please provide two copies each of all intra-agency directives,
administrative orders, rules, regulations, and/or instructions governing
the use of such devices within your agency.
Comment. Attached are two copies of chapter 2, OSIM 124-1,
entitled "Lie Detection" and a handbook entitled "Lie or Truth."
NOTE.-Regulation on "Lie Detection" follows and handbook "Lie
or Truth" is available in the subcommittee file.
[Ofrice of Special Investigations Manual 124-1, September 1, 1662]
CHAPTER 2-LIE DETECTION
SECTION A-INTRODUCTION
2-2-1. General
The lie-detection instrument, commonly referred to as the
"lie detector," is designed to record a subject's breathing
pattern, blood pressure, pulse rate, and his resistance to a
very small electrical current. Additionally, it records
changes and variations in these facts which may occur
during a test-the degree and nature of the changes being
the criteria for detecting deception.
(a) The theory and art of lie detection is predicated upon
the principle that individuals usually have certain physio-
logical reactions when not telling the truth, particularly if
the truth might produce a serious or undesirable effect on
their personal welfare. The reactions are primarily invol-
untary in character and usually cannot be controlled. This
theory presupposes that the subject is mentally and physi-
cally capable of reacting to the implications of an incriminat-
ing question.
(b) The lie-detector equipment currently used by OSI
records on chart paper certain physiological manifestations
which accompany these reactions. From a study of these
recordings, the examiner can give one of four opinions:
(1) That the examinee was truthful in his answers to
all questions.
(2) That the examinee was untruthful in answers to
certain questions.
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(3) That the truthfulness in answers to certain
questions could not be determined.
(4) That the charts failed to reflect sufficient sig-
nificant information upon which to base an opinion
and, therefore, were inconclusive.
(c) Because of the human factors involved, investigators
are cautioned that the lie-detector examination is not infalli-
ble. Although the examiner may conclude that a particular
examinee was truthful or untruthful in his answers to
pertinent questions about the offense under investigation,
the investigator should, nevertheless, carefully consider and
develop any additional information which has a bearing on
the guilt or innocence of the examinee.
(d) Examination.-Those procedures subsequent to the
time the subject is introduced to the examiner by the
investigator until dismissed, generally consisting of the pre-
test interview, test(s), and post-test interview phases.
(e) Test.-The charts produced from any one set of
questions. A test may consist of two or more charts,
dependent upon the number of times the same set of questions
is asked.
2-2-2. Components of the Lie Detector and Their Functions
The lie-detector instrument normally used by OSI has
four components:
(a). Pneumograph.-This component records the breathing
pattern of the subject. A rubber convoluted tube is fastened
around the subject's upper trunk. One end of the tube is
sealed and the other end is connected to the instrument by
means of a rubber tube. As the subject inhales and exhales,
the tube stretches and contracts. This movement produces
pressure changes which are transmitted to a tambour con-
sisting of hollow stacks, or bellows, constructed of thin metal
and situated below the panel of the instrument. These
pressure changes cause the tambour to contract or distend;
the motion of its free end is transmitted to a pivot shaft,
the upper extremity of which carries a recording pen.
(b) Galvanograph.-This component records the changes
in the skin resistance to electricity. The component con-
sists of an electrical device for recording the changes or vari-
ations in the conductance of external current between the
palmar and dorsal surfaces of the subject's hand or fingers,
to which are attached electrodes charged with a very small
current of electricity.
(c) Cardio-sphygmograph.-This component, commonly
referred to as the "cardio component," records the pulse
rate and blood pressure changes of the subject. A blood
pressure cuff, similar to those used in the medical profession
is fastened around the upper arm. The cuff is then inflated
with air. The undulation of the blood vessels, during the
pusle cycle, causes corresponding changes in the air pressure
inside the cuff. These changes in pressure are transmitted
through a small rubber tube to the recording apparatus,
which in turn records the rise and fall of the pressure on the
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chart paper. Some instruments are also equipped with a
smaller blood pressure cuff which is designed for use on the
wrist rather than the upper arm. The principle of operation
of the wrist cuff is identical with that of the arm cuff.
(d) Kymograph.-This component is a motor driven ap-
paratus. Its function is to move the chart paper under the
recording pens at a regulated rate of speed.
2-2-3. Uses of the Lie Detector
The primary purpose of the lie detector is to detect and
record those physiological changes in the body which are
indicative of deception. As such, the lie detector is used as
a technical aid in the investigation. Among the more com-
mon circumstances in which the lie detector would be used
are the following:
(a) To aid in determining whether a person has pertinent
knowledge of a particular offense under investigation.
(b) To determine the truthfulness of statements made by
a suspect, victim, complainant, informant, and/or witnesses
in connection with a particular offense.
(c) To obtain information leading to the location of
evidence, individuals, or sites of offenses.
2-2-4. Examinations Requiring Directorate Approval
(a) The specific approval of the Washington Directorate
Staff or the appropriate oversea Deputy Director will be
obtained for all proposed lie detector examinations in con-
nection with the following:
(1) Personnel security investigations.
(2) Children (See par. 2-2-9).
(3) Other than OSI investigations. (See par. 2-2-10.)
(4) Examinations of individuals subsequent to trial
by court-martial for the offense in question. (See par.
2-2-11.)
(5) To assist Article 32 investigating officers and
administrative boards other than court-martial review
Boards (See par. 2-2-12.)
(b) The specific approval of the Washington Directorate
Staff will be required in all counterintelligence investiations
with the following exceptions:
(1) In counterintelligence investigations being con-
ducted at the request of the commander in chief,
USAFE/PACAF, the oversea Deputy Directors may
authorize approval.
(2) If during the conduct of a counterintelligence
investigation immediate approval is required, and
cannot await Washington Staff approval, the oversea
Deputy Director may authorize such action.
(3) Counterintelligence investigations in which the
oversea district and the Deputy Director concerned
have been notified by the Washington Staff that the
Deputy Director has received specific supervisory
responsibility.
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(4) 70(33) and 71 case type investigations.
(c) Specific approval of the Director is required prior to
administering an examination to Air Force Academy Cadets.
2-2-5. Authority
Authorization for lie-detector examinations in matters
other than those set forth is the personal responsibility of the
district commander.
2-2-6. Persons Authorized to Conduct Examinations
Lie-detector examinations by OSI personnel will be
restricted to those special agents who have successfully
completed an approved course of lie-detector training and
are currently listed in the records of the Directorate as being
qualified.
2-2-7. Use of Facilities of Other Agencies
When use of OSI facilities is not practical, the lie-detector
services of duly constituted law-enforcement agencies may be
used provided such services have been determined to be
reliable and do not entail the payment of a fee by the Air
Force. The use of these services in connection with OSI
matters, however, is subject to the restrictions outlined
above, and AFR 205-1.
2-2-8. Examinations of Female Subjects
Whenever possible, a female witness should be present
during all phases of the examination of a female. (See par.
2-1-19.) This includes the pretest interview, the test and
the post-test interview as well as any other time the exam-
iner is with the female. The witness may observe the exam-
ination through a two-way mirror, if available. The exam-
ination room should be wired for sound, so that the witness
may also hear. If a two-way mirror is not available, the wit-
ness may be seated in the examination room out of the sight
of the subject, but within hearing distance of the subject
and the examiner. The witness must be afforded the oppor-
tunity of hearing and seeing the procedures utilized by the
examiner; this principle will apply in every case.
2-2-9. Examination of Children
Children are not, ordinarily, fit subjects for lie-detector
examination. Only under most unusual circumstances, and
then only after approval has been obtained from the Direc-
torate, will children be examined by OSI lie-detector exam-
iners. OSI has a special responsibility in the questioning of
children, particularly when they are principals or victims in
serious crimes. Under no circumstances should question-
ing or examination of a child be undertaken prior to soliciting
advice of a competent medical officer. (See ch. 3, pt. 2,
OSIM 124-2.) The Directorate approval will contain spe-
cific instructions as to the manner in which the test is to be
administered.
2-2-10. Use of Lie Detector in Other Than OSI Investigations
District commanders within ConUS may authorize the
temporary utilization of OSI lie-detector equipment and per-
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sonnel to provide assistance to investigative or law enforce-
ment agencies within the Department of Defense (DOD),
to members of the IIC and to other Federal and State investi-
gative and law-enforcement agencies in instances where
there is a specific DOD interest. When a district com-
mander is requested to furnish lie-detector services in mat-
ters in which there is no specific DOD interest, except IIC
members, he will diplomatically decline the request unless
he determines that there are unusual or cogent reasons for
acceding to the request. In the latter event, he will immedi-
ately transmit the request, pertinent facts, and his recom-
mendation to the Directorate, ATTN: AFISIG. The re-
quester will be advised by the district commander that
Directorate approval is required. Upon receipt of a decision
from the Directorate, the district commander will notify the
requester promptly.
(a) Outside the ConUS, requests by foreign military, se-
curity, law-enforcement, or investigative agencies for the
use of OSI lie-detector services or demonstrations will be
first discussed with the local CAS Station Chief for his com-
ments. Such requests, pertinent facts, CAS comments, and
recommendations will then be forwarded to the appropriate
oversea Deputy Director for final approval.
2-2-11. Lie Detector Examination of Individuals Subsequent
to Trial by Court-Martial
Only in rare instances, and then only with prior directorate
approval, will a district office honor a request for lie-detector
examination of an individual after he has been court-martialed
for the offense in question. A district commander should
diplomatically decline such requests unless he determines
there are cogent reasons for acceding to the request. It is
the policy of the Directorate to coordinate such matters with
The Judge Advocate General, USAF, before a determination
is made as to whether approval should be granted. An ex-
amination by OSI in such an instance has a tendency to
create in the minds of individuals concerned a feeling of
"cleared or not cleared by OSI," irrespective of the decision
rendered by the Court. In a recent Air Force JAG Bulletin,
The Judge Advocate General, USAF, has stated the following
relative to post-trial lie-detector examinations and similar
tests:
"Recent developments in military law have emphasized the
requirement that convening authorities must apply a correct
standard of proof in acting upon court-martial findings. In
essence, this standard requires that convening authorities
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a finding
of guilty is established by competent evidence of record.
Post-trial requests for approval of lie-detector tests or the
administration of truth serum or similar tests to an accused
relative to the adjudicated issues of the case, made by a
convening authority prior to taking his action, might well be
construed as indicating that he is not satisfied as to guilt of
such accused beyond a reasonable doubt. If a convening
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34 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
authority has a doubt of serious enough proportions to cause
him to take action of the kind discussed herein, he should
take action to disapprove the findings of guilty and dismiss
the charges. Staff Judge Advocates are requested to bring
this subject to the attention of convening authorities in order
that they may be apprised of the possible legal effect of
requests of this nature in the circumstance stated above."
(AF JAB Bull. No. 186, February 28, 1958.)
2-2-12. Use of Lie Detector Facilities To Assist Article 82
Investigating Officers and Administrative Boards Other
Than Court-Martial Review Boards
Requests from Air Force commanders to assist Article 32
investigating officers and administrative boards (other than
Court-Martial Review Boards) by conducting lie-detector
examinations will be referred to the Directorate for approval.
Requests to assist court-martial reviewing authorities
through conducting of lie-detector examinations subsequent
to trial is discussed in paragraph 2-2-11.
2-2-13. Determining the Need for the Lie Detector Examina-
tion
The determining authority (e.g., Director, oversea Deputy
Director, or district commander), being personally respon-
sible, must thoroughly review all aspects of the case before
making his decision to use the lie detector.
(a) Seriousness of the Offense.-Except in very unusual
circumstances the use of the lie detector will be reserved for
serious offenses and counterintelligence matters. Serious
offenses include murder, rape, robbery, housebreaking, arson,
assault involving serious bodily harm, and most serious cases
of larceny. Although homosexuality is not normally con-
sidered to be a serious offense from a criminal viewpoint, it
is to be considered as a serious offense from a security view-
point and should be included in the list of serious offenses.
(b) Necessity for the Examination.-The lie detector will
not be used as a substitute for other logical investigative
procedures. The determining authority should evaluate all
aspects of the matter and assure himself that the use of the
lie detector is justified, prior to authorizing the examination.
(c) The Proposed Subject.-Only those persons believed to
possess information necessary to the resolution of the main
issue should be considered for the examination.
2-2-14. Responsibility of the Investigator
The investigator is normally the first person to realize that
a lie-detector examination may be helpful to the investigation.
In this regard, it is important that he understands certain
aspects of lie-detector examination procedure. He must bear
in mind, however, that the final decision or whether to use
the lie detector will be made by the determining authority.
(a) Being Aware of Existing Policies.-It is necessary that
each investigator be fully aware of all existing policies con-
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERN NT
cering the use of the lie detector. The criteria expressed
above will serve adequately as a basis for the initial deter-
mination as to the need for the examination.
(b) Obtaining the Consent of the Proposed Subject.-A per-
son cannot be forced to submit to a lie-detector examination
and his voluntary consent must be obtained. However,
before the investigator attempts to determine whether the
person will consent, the investigator must ascertain whether
the determining authority approves the need for the examina-
tion. After the need for the examination has been approved,
the investigator will then ask the person whether he is willing
to take a lie-detector examination; if feasible, his consent
should be obtained, in writing, at this time.
(c) Determining the Proposed Subject's Availability.-If
there is to be a delay in giving the examination, the investi-
gator should advise the proposed subject's commander and
ascertain whether the subject will be available for the exami-
nation. This will assure the presence of the subject when
the examiner arrives for the examination.
(d) Furnishing Background Information Relative to the
Investigation.-Prior to the lie-detector examination, the
investigator should personally brief the examiner concerning
all pertinent facts in the case and the results of the investi-
gation to date. The lack of this information by the examiner
may preclude the examiner from detecting deception on
some point important to the solution of the case. Without
this information the examiner might become involved in
nonessential and irrelevant matters.
(e) Furnishing Background Information Concerning the
Subject.-The investigator must furnish background infor-
mation concerning the subject to the examiner prior to the
lie-detector examination because this information will assist
the examiner in engaging a reticent subject in conversation.
It will also create a decided psychological advantage in favor
of the examiner if the subject recognizes that the examiner
possesses detailed knowledge of his background. Without
the subject's knowledge the investigator should attempt to
develop the following items of background information and
furnish same to the examiner before the examination:
(1) Name, grade, service number, and organization.
(2) Date and place of birth.
(3) Duty assignment and specific information concern-
ing same.
(4) Extent of formal education (include location of
schools).
(5) Marital status to include the names of the spouse
and children, if appropriate.
(6) Names of mother and father and whether living
or deceased.
(7) Permanent home address.
(8) Civilian occupations.
(9) Hobbies and sports interests.
(10) Information relative to any derogatory informa-
tion, however trivial, in his background.
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36 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(11) Information regarding any illnesses, particularly
those which might affect the circulatory, respiratory, or
nervous systems.
(12) Information regarding any medical or psychiatric
treatment or consultation.
(13) Other information which the investigator feels
might be useful to the examiner.
(f) Being Available During the Examination.-An investi-
gator who is thoroughly familiar with the investigation,
preferably the agent to whom the investigation is assigned,
should be present, to assist the examiner. The investigator
will be available to take any statement which the subject
may elect to give after the examination is concluded.
2-2-15. Mental and Physical Fitness of the Subject
Persons to be examined should have had adequate food
and rest before the examination; should be in good physical
condition; and mentally capable of distinguishing right from
wrong. They should be free from ailments such as colds
which may affect the respiratory system. They should not,
at the time of the examination, be under the effects of alcohol,
narcotics, drugs, stimulants, or sedatives. If there is any
doubt as to the mental or physical condition of a person, he
should be examined by a doctor prior to the lie-detector
examination. If such a medical examination of a member of
the military be deemed advisable, arrangements should be
made through the appropriate commander. If medical
examination of a civilian is deemed advisable, arrangements
should be made through appropriate commander or civilian
authorities. (See also sec. C, ch. 1, this part.)
2-2-16. Test Question Construction
Choice of words in preparing lie-detector tests is of cardinal
importance to a successful examination. The questions must
be clear, simple, direct, and understood by the subject. They
must be in keeping with his cultural and intellectual back-
ground. Strict attention must be given to the phrasing and
selection of control questions which are used for determina-
tion of subject's mental and physical ability to react. Exam-
iners will not use, as questions in examinations, inquiries
dealing with subject's sexual activities with members of the
opposite sex, nor will degrading or absurdly worded questions
of any nature be used. Questions of this nature are not
necessary to the successful conduct of a lie-detector exami-
nation.
2-2-17. Use of Interpreter
When a language barrier exists between the examiner and
the person to be examined, a qualified interpreter will be
utilized during the examination. The interpreter must be
briefed on the case and trained by the examiner in these du-
ties. During this training, the importance of the provisions
of paragraph 2-2-16 should be stressed in order that the in-
terpreter may assist the examiner in the formulation of the
test questions.
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2-2-18. Administration of the Lie Detector Facilities
The OSI lie-detector program is administered by AFISIG
and it is that office's responsibility to assure that districts
are provided adequate lie-detector equipment and examiners.
Districts not authorized, or temporarily not possessing such
facilities, may request lie-detector service from the nearest
district having such facilities or utilize the facilities of other
agencies in accordance with paragraphs 2-2-7 and 3-1-22.
Technical inquiries or those concerning allocations of lie-
detector examiners, equipment, training, or support, other
than supplies or repair, will be made directly to AFISIG.
2-2-19. The Examination Room
The primary consideration for a lie-detector examination
room is privacy. Privacy is a key psychological factor con-
tributing to a successful examination. An examinee is
more likely to divulge factual data if the examination is free
from interference. Generally, a suitable interrogation room
is satisfactory for lie-detector examinations.
2-2-20. Requests for Directorate Approval
Requests for directorate approval of lie-detector examina-
tions as required in paragraph 2-2-4 will include the title
of the case, district, Directorate or appropriate oversea
Deputy Director case file number, a summary of the pertinent
facts, the name, age, and sex of the person to be examined,
the reason the examination is considered necessary, and any
special factors, pro and con, which should be considered by
the Directorate or oversea Deputy Director in determining
whether approval should be granted.
2-2-21. Interdistrict Requests
When a lie-detector examination service from another dis-
trict is desired, the district commander will communicate
with the appropriate district possessing such facilities.
Telephonic requests are authorized in urgent cases; how-
ever, such requests will be confirmed in writing. The re-
questing district should furnish the following information:
(a) Title of case and case file number.
(b) Number of persons to be examined.
(c) That such persons have consented to submit to exami-
nation.
(d) That the commander concerned has assured the
presence of the person(s) for the examination.
(e) Brief summary of the investigation to include the
nature, scope, and the basis for determining the need for the
examination.
Directorate approval when applicable.
(g) Any other information which would be useful to the
district receiving the request, as, for example, unusual time
requirements.
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~iZS USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
2-2-22. Scheduling and Responsibility for Adequacy of Exami-
nations
The preferred time of the day and the amount of time ex-
pended to administer a thorough examination is contingent
on many variables. However, examinations will normally
be administered only during daylight duty hours, night-
shift workers excluded, and all the actual testing will be
conducted in as brief a period of time as is technically feasi-
ble. Pretest and post-test interviews will conform to the
provisions of part 2, chapter 1, of this manual. The assigned
examiner will assume the responsibility for the proper sched-
uling as well as insuring that all technical and legal aspects of
the total examination conform to established OSI policy and
procedures.
2-2-23. Emergency Need for Lie Detector Service
If a district is unable to obtain lie-detector service in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter, within the
ConUS, the concerned district will contact the Directorate,
districts within USAFE will contact District 70, and dis-
tricts within PACAF will contact AFISI-C.
2-2-24. Case Credit and Filing of Reports
Each time a Lie Detector Examination Report is rendered,
a case type number 72 will be opened by the district office to
which the examiner is permanently assigned. In all instances
the district office to which the examiner is permanently as-
signed will be the permanent repository for the filing of charts,
graphs, interrogation logs, statements of consent, and other
documents allied to a lie-detector examination. Since the lie-
detector examination is considered a technical service, case
credit for a 72 case will be taken by a district on its Monthly
Activity Report only when the lie-detector examination is the
sole investigative effort expended. In such instances, the
district to which the lie-detector examiner is permanently as-
signed will be considered the office of origin, and it will be that
district which will take case credit. In the event there is other
investigative effort expended in addition to the lie-detector
examination, then only the regular type number will be used
for the purpose of obtaining case credit, and the 72 file will be
opened and closed administratively for the purpose of pro-
viding a permanent repository for the lie-detector files. The
administratively opened and closed 72 files will be cross-
indexed with the investigations to which they pertain, and
one copy of the Lie Detector Examination Report, without
charts and allied data, will be filed as a serial of the related
case file.
2-2-25. Lie Detector Examination Report
(a) A Lie Detector Examination Report will be prepared
by the examiner on all persons examined. Sufficient copies
of the report will be prepared to comply with the distribution
outlined in (9) below. The Lie Detector Examination Report
will serve as a permanent record of the examination as well
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as a means of informing persons of the results of the exami-
nation. A detailed discussion of the report follows:
(1) Format.-The general format of the sample reports
(attachments 6, 7, and 8) will be followed for the purpose of
uniformity. Form letters will not be used. While brevity is
desirable, the report must contain all the facts necessary to
reflect an accurate. description of the examination.
(2) File Number.-When an active investigation is being
conducted by a district, the case file number of the examiner's
district will be listed as shown in the sample report. In the
event a lie-detector examination is the only investigative
effort expended, a type 72 rather than another type number
will be shown, followed parenthetically by the identity of the
agency for which the examination was administered. Ex-
ample: 72-(6)-10 (Army-MPCI).
(3) Examinee.-The name and identifying data of the
person(s) examined will be listed. A separate examination
report must be prepared on each examinee whose charts re-
flect specific reactions indicative of deception. A consoli-
dated report may be submitted if the examinations pertain
to the same matter and all of the listed examinees' charts
disclosed no untruthful reactions to basically the same ques-
tions (attachment 7).
(4) Reference.-The reference will normally consist of that
data which is set forth in the Title block of an investigative
case file to which the examination pertains. However, if the
examination does not relate to an OSI investigation, the
communication requesting the lie-detector examination will
be listed as the reference to include complete identifying data.
(5) Administrative.-Under this heading the following
information will be set forth: Identity of the requester; date
of the request; date, time, and place of the examination;
identity of the observer, if any; statement concerning the
reading and advising of the examinee's rights; statement
that the examinee executed a Statement of Consent; location
of the Statement of Consent, charts and related data together
with a statement that these items may be obtained by com-
petent authority upon request.
(6) Background Data.-Under this heading a brief sum-
mary of the investigation to include the nature, scope, and the
basis for determining the need for the examination will be
set forth.
(7) The Examination.-Under this caption a brief resume
of the examination to include the pretest interview and
type examinations conducted will be set forth. Relevant
questions and answers given thereto during the examination
must be listed.
(8) Results of the Examination.-This paragraph will state
the opinion of the examiner based on the examination. This
opinion will be limited to one of the four opinions set forth
in paragraph 2-2-1b. An opinion that the examinee was
untruthful in his answers to certain questions will be ex-
panded to indicate the specific questions to which his
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40 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
answers indicated deceptive reactions. This paragraph will
also include the degree of cooperation of the examinee and
the results of any pre- or post-test interrogation. Other
information or comments may be included in this part of
the examiner's report if they pertain to the examiner's
analysis of the charts.
(9) Distribution.-
(a) In cases where examiner's district is office of origin:
Two copies of report to examiner's district with all
charts, statement of consent, allied papers, and inter-
rogation log.
One copy of report to directorate with copy of state-
ment of consent and list of all questions asked.
(b) In cases where examiner's district is not office of
origin:
Two copies of report to office of origin with original
statement of consent.
Two copies of report to examiner's district, with copy
of statement of consent, all charts and allied test papers.
One copy of report to directorate with copy of state-
ment of consent and a list of all questions asked.
(c) When only "72" case files are involved:
Two copies of report to requesting agency with copy
of statement of consent.
One copy for examiner's district with original copy of
statement of consent, all charts, allied papers, and in-
terrogation log(s).
One copy to directorate with copy of statement of
consent and list of all questions.
Information copies will be included at the discretion
of the district commander.
(d) Under no circumstances will the subject of the exami-
nation be promised or furnished a written report of the re-
sults of the examination, and only to the extent required in
conducting post-test interviews will be informed orally of
the results of the examination.
(10) Signature.-Each copy of the report will be signed by
the examiner. The report will be forwarded to the requester
by letter of transmittal signed by the examiner's district
commander.
(b) OSI Form 76, "Lie Detector Examination (Examiner's
Data)," will be prepared on all persons examined and at-
tached to the charts for filing purposes (attachment 11).
2-2-26. Reporting Lie Detector Examination in an OSI In-
vestigation
It will be the responsibility of the examiner to provide an
insert for the report of investigation to the controlling agent.
This insert will be copied in toto into the report of investiga-
tion. The insert will include the examiner's name, date and
place of examination, the opinion of the examiner based upon
the results of the examination(s), the results of any post-test
interrogation, the location of the Lie Detector Examination
Report and related data, and a statement that the report will
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be made available to proper authority upon request. The
Lie Detector Examination report will not be copied verbatim
in the investigative report. Only those relevant questions
asked and the answers given to which specific responses were
noted and which are pertinent to the investigation will be set
forth in the investigative report.
2-2-27. Lie Detector Examiner's Monthly Statistical Report
OSI Form 77, "Monthly Report of Lie Detector Exam-
inations" (see attachment 9) is designed to include sufficient
information upon which to base future requirements for
lie-detector facilities and/or personnel and further serves to
indicate the effectiveness of the lie-detector program. A
single copy of the report will be submitted to the directorate
(ATTN: AFISI). The report will be submitted by each
district and Directorate irrespective of whether or not an
instrument and/or examiner is assigned. Only one report
will be submitted by each district, regardless of the number
of examiners assigned. Negative reports are required.
The form (attachment 9) is self-explanatory and is designed
to furnish the maximum information on all examinations
conducted either by or for OSI. The Remarks Section of
this form may be used to report difficulties encountered,
new techniques, cases of special interest, and any other
information which may be considered of interest to the lie-
detector program in general.
2-2-28. Travel of Lie-Detector Examiners
The district commander concerned will issue blanket
travel orders on a monthly basis authorizing his lie-detector
examiners to travel, with excess baggage, anywhere within
the area served by the district to which he is assigned.
Travel by military or commercial transportation or private
automobile is authorized. Funds from an Advance of Funds
Account may be utilized when necessary in accordance with
the provisions of AFM 124-3. Examiners on TDY will
always personally "hand-carry" their lie-detector instru-
ment. While travelling via commercial or military trans-
portation the instrument will normally not be checked with
regular baggage.
2-2-29. Supplies and Repairs
(a) Lie-detector examiners will be responsible for main-
taining lie-detector equipment in proper operating condition.
Insofar as possible, component parts and expendable supplies
required for the operation of the lie-detection set should be
requisitioned through the logistical support base. If the
logistical support base cannot furnish the necessary supplies
requested, immediate action should be taken to advise the
1005th Special Investigations Group, AFISIME. The
request for assistance to the 1005th SIGp should include
the reason supplies could not be obtained from the logistical
support base and indicate the complete nomenclature and
other pertinent information of the supplies required.
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42 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(b) The following procedures are established for depot
repair and/or calibration:
(1) District offices will advise 1005th Special Investi-
gations Group, AFISIME, when a lie detector is beyond
the repair capabilities of the host support base. Infor-
mation submitted will include the instrument model
number, serial number, nature of malfunction, and parts
which may require repair or replacement.
(2) The 1005th SIGp, AFISIME, will make necessary
arrangements with the repair facility for repair and/or
calibration as required and furnish the district office with
appropriate instructions for shipment of the lie detector.
(1) District offices will advise 1005th Special Investiga-
tions Group, AFISIME, when a lie detector is beyond
the repair capabilities of the host support base. Informa-
tion submitted will include the instrument model number,
serial number, nature of malfunction, and parts which may
require repair or replacement.
(2) The 1005th SIGp, AFISIME, will make necessary
arrangements with the repair facility at Olmstead Air Force
Base for repair and/or calibration as required and furnish
the district office with appropriate instructions for shipment
of the lie detector.
2-2-30. Admissibility of Evidence
The following legal principles apply to lie-detector exami-
nations of persons who have committed or are suspected of
having committed an offense under investigation.
(a) Examiner's Opinion.-Generally, opinion testimony
of lie-detector examiners is not admissible as evidence in a
criminal prosecution, civilian or military.
(b) Written Statements.-Written statements obtained
during a lie-detector examination are admissible provided
the provisions of Article 31, UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution have been satisfied.
(c) Oral Statements.-Oral starements obtained during a
lie-detector examination are admissible provided the pro-
visions of Article 31, UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution have been satisfied.
2-2-31. Rights of Persons Under Article 31, UCMJ, or 5th
Amendment
The lie-detector examiner will advise the examinee of the
nature of the offense and will read and explain Article 31,
UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which-
ever is appropriate, to the examinee prior to a lie-detector
examination. In addition, the examinee will be advised that
he is under no obligation to submit to a lie-detector exami-
nation and that his consent to do so must be entirely volun-
tary. See chapter 1, this part for detailed information.
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2-2-32. Statement of Consent for Lie Detector Examination
Prior to the examination, the subject will be asked by the
examiner to execute OSI Form 75, "Statement of Consent"
(see attachment 10) attesting to his voluntary submission to
examination. Under no circumstances will the examination
proceed until such statement is accomplished and subject has
agreed to reply orally and audibly to the questions asked.
Examinations will not be administered to individuals who
agree to take the examination only under the condition that
they be permitted to remain mute during the testing. The
execution of the Statement of Consent must be witnessed,
preferably by the investigator. A Statement of Consent will
be obtained by the examiner even though such a statement
had been previously obtained by the investigator. State-
ment of Consent (attachment 10) will be utilized in all lie-
detector examinations.
(a) Prior to the examination of foreign personnel a state-
ment of consent, patterned after OSI Form 75 in the
individual's native language will be obtained. A subsequent
change to this manual will reflect an approved format for
this purpose.
2-2-33. Required Reference
Throughout every stage of the examination and the
pre-test and post-test interviews there must be full com-
pliance with all pertinent provisions of chapter 1, this part.
In this connection, particular attention is invited to section
C (Special Precautions), section D (Interrogation Log), and
section F (Legal Matters and OSI Policy) in the cited chapter.
2-2-34. Selected References
The following references are provided for those who wish
to broaden their knowledge of the subject:
W. M. Marston---
Richard R. Smith, New York,
1938.
"The Instrumental Detection of De-
D. C. Lee_________
Charles C. Thomas, Springfield,
ception."
Ill., 1953.
"Lie Detection and Criminal Inter-
Inbau and Reid -__
The Williams & Wilkins Co.,
rogation."
Baltimore, Md., 1953.
"Academy Lectures on Lie Detec-
V. A. Leonard ----
Charles C. Thomas, Springfield,
tion," vol. I and vol. H.
Ill.
"Lie or Truth, a Lie Detector Hand-
AFISIG___-___-__
OSI.
book."
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Question 1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs or
other so-called lie detection devices? (If major subordinate organi-
zations within your agency engage in such activity, please list all
those organizations.)
Answer. The Department of the Army does possess polygraphs.
The Army uses these machines in the Army Intelligence units and the
Military Police units attached to each continental U.S. army and
each major oversea command.
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44 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Question 2. Briefly explain your agency's general procedures
governing the use of such devices and answer the following specific
questions. (Please explain procedures and indicate if they are
covered by regulation in connection with each question. If more
than one major subordinate organization within the agency is affected,
provide separate responses for each.)
Answer. Army Intelligence: Army Intelligence units employ the
polygraph as an aid to investigation in connection with personnel
security investigations, complaint investigation (suspected espionage,
sabotage, and subversion), the screening of military personnel to
determine eligibility for training which requires access to cryptologic
material, prerecruitment examination of Cuban enlistees, tactical
operations, and as a means of assisting in operations with counter-
intelligence personnel. It is used only on a voluntary basis. The
policies and procedures governing the use of the polygraph by Army
Intelligence are contained in FM 30-17, "Counterintelligence
Operations" (tab A).
Military Police: The procedures which govern the use of the lie
detector by the Military Police are prescribed in AR 195-21,"Criminal
Investigation" (tab B), and in TB PMG-22, "Lie Detector" (tab Q.
The polygraph is used as an aid in determining deception in the course
of a criminal investigation. It is used only on a voluntary basis only
after all other investigative techniques have been exhausted. The
circumstances of each case or incident are evaluated to determine
whether a polygraph test should be made. All tests are conducted.
under the supervision of provost marshals and Military Police
commanders.
Question 2(a). For what specific purposes are these devices used?
(i.e., employment interviews, security clearance processing, suspected
improper conduct of duties, or other purposes).
Answer. Army Intelligence., Army Intelligence units use the poly-
graph for the following purposes:.
(1) Personnel security investigations:
(a) As a means of attempting to resolve conflicting suita-
bility or loyalty information when the exploitation of leads
through other investigative techniques has been exhausted.
(AR 381-130, "Counterintelligence Investigations Super-
vision and Control" (tab D) ; AR 604-5, "Clearance of
Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information and
Material" (tab E), and AR 604--10, "Military Personnel
Security Program" (tab F)).
(b) Investigation of aliens being cleared for access to
defense information. A polygraph examination is used to
cover those portions of a background investigation which
cannot be investigated because of geographical or political
considerations (e.g., relatives or previous residence in a
Sino-Soviet bloc country) (AR 604-5 (tab E) and AR 614-
280, "Assignment and Supervision of Enlisted Aliens"
(tab G)).
(2) Screening of military personnel: The polygraph is used to
assist in selecting eligible personnel for training which requires
access to cryptologic material.
(3) Complaint investigations: The polygraph is used to in-
vestigate acts or alleged acts or incidents of espionage, sabotage,
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USE OF POLY R
treason, sedition, or subversion, primarily in oversea areas.
(AR 381-130 (tab D) and AR 604-10 (tab F).)
(4) Tactical operations: As an aid to investigation, the poly-
graph examination can be used in the interrogation of prisoners of
war, refugees, displaced persons, and local enemy sympathizers
who have been selected for specific intelligence exploitation.
(FM 30-15, "Intelligence interrogation" (tab H) and FM 30-17
(tab A).)
(5) Prerecruitment examination of Cuban enlistees: In support
of the Department of the Army Cuban enlistment program the
polygraph is used to verify personnel data of Cuban enlistees
prior to their acceptance into the Army, since ordinary means of
verifying such data are unavailable.
(6) As a means to. assist in the counterintelligence program.
Military Police: The polygraph is used by the U.S. Army Military
Police as a technical aid in criminal investigations.
Question 2(b). Are the devices used in every instance involving those
purposes listed in answer to question (a)?
Answer. Army Intelligence: No. As an aid to personnel security
and complaint investigation, the polygraph is used selectively and
only on a voluntary basis when all other investigative leads have been
exhausted. It is used for screening of military personnel for deter-
mining eligibility for voluntary training for certain cryptologic
specialities. Polygraph examinations were administered to all Cuban
enlistees. The polygraph is used on a selective voluntary basis in
tactical operations and in the counterintelligence program.
Military Police: No. A polygraph examination is used only on a
voluntary basis when all investigative leads have been exhausted and
it has been established that such an examination would be materially
important in the conduct of a criminal investigation.
Question 2(c). What weight is given the data resulting from tests
by these devices, or refusals to. take such tests, in relation to other
types of investigative information?
Answer. Army Intelligence: No special weight is given to data
obtained from a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination
is only considered a part of an investigation. A security clearance is
never denied or revoked solely because of the result of a polygraph
examination. Failure to volunteer for a polygraph examination is
never used as a basis for denying or revoking a clearance. Further,
no adverse determination of any kind is made against a person solely
because he has not volunteered to submit to a polygraph examination.
Military Police: No special weight is given to data obtained from a
polygraph examination. The polygraph examination is only con-
sidered a part of an investigation. Failure to volunteer for an exami-
nation is not construed as a tacit admission of guilt.
Question 2(d). Who makes the initial determination to use such
devices, and is this initial determination subject to review by higher
authority in each case?
Answer. Army Intelligence: Determination to use the polygraph:
(1) General: Normally, it is the senior intelligence officer of
the command acting on behalf of the commander who authorizes
the use of the polygraph after an individual requests or volunteers
for an examination. Where the initial determination to use the
polygraph is made by the senior intelligence officer of the com-
30-023-64-4
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46 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
wand, review of this decision is not usually made since it is one
of this officer's delegated authorities. If a polygraph examination
is conducted pursuant to Department of the Army directive or
is performed at the request of a major commander, the initial
determination is made at that level.
(2) For cases listed under answer 2 (a) (1) (a) and 2 (a) (3) the
G-2 (the senior intelligence officer) of the major command author-
izes the use of the polygraph.
(3) For cases listed under answer 2 (a) (1) (b) and 2 (a) (5) the
Intelligence Corps units conduct polygraph examinations in
accordance with the policy established by the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel or Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Opera-
tions, DA.
(4) For cases listed under answer 2(a)(2), the Intelligence
Corps units perform polygraph examinations based on the
request of the Commanding General, USCONARC.
(5) For cases listed under paragraph 2 (a) (4) and 2 (a) (6), the
determination to conduct polygraph examinations is made by
the senior Intelligence Corps officer acting on behalf of the tactical
commander.
Military Police: The criminal investigator assigned to the case,
normally at a particular phase of the investigation, makes the initial
recommendation that a polygraph examination be given to a subject
of the investigation. Each recommendation is reviewed by the
commander or his authorized representative, normally the provost
marshal, a commissioned officer, who, on the basis of facts available,
makes the determination whether or not a polygraph examination
should be conducted in the investigation concerned.
Question 2(e). Is the physical and mental condition of each person
to be tested considered to determine suitability to take such a test?
Answer. Army Intelligence and Military Police: Yes. The physi-
cal and mental condition of each person to be examined is considered
before a test is administered (see FM 30-17, par. 81, "Selecting Test
Subjects" (tab M), AR 195-21, par. 3, "Procedure" (tab B), and
TB PMG 22, par. 7, "Selecting Test Subjects" (tab C).
Question 2(f). What disposition is made of data derived from
such tests given to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained
in affected individuals' personnel files, retained separately, etc.)?
Answer. Army Intelligence : A narrative report of an examination
made in connection with personnel security, complaint investigations
or a prerecruitment testing program is forwarded to the requesting
agency which, in turn, incorporates this report with all other reports
of investigation. These investigative files are eventually forwarded
to the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Records Facility, but do not
become a part of an individual's personnel records. When the poly-
graph is used in tactical operations or used in connection with certain
foreign employees, the results of the polygraph examination are nor-
mally retained in the investigative files of the Army Intelligence unit
conducting the examination, but do not become a part of an indi-
vidual's personnel records.
Military Police: Data derived from polygraph examinations is
recorded in the Military Police or CID office responsible for conducting
the investigation. In addition, the polygraph examiner prepares a
brief report of his findings which is included with and remains part of
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the basic investigation report. Such data is not filed in personnel
records. The investigation report itself is eventually forwarded to
the U.S. Army Military Police Repository for Criminal Investigation
Reports.
Question 2(g). Are the findings of such tests made available to
the individuals who take the tests?
Answer. Army Intelligence : Normally, the findings of such tests
are not disclosed to the individual taking the test unless it serves the
purpose of futhering the investigation. However, there is no prohi-
bition against the disclosure of findings of a polygraph examination
to the person examined. The results will be disclosed to the person
tested if he requests them.
Military Police : Same answer as Army Intelligence.
Question 2(h). Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse
findings?
Answer. Army Intelligence and Military Police: A polygraph ex-
amination is considered only a part of an entire investigation. No
special weight attaches to the polygraph results. Adverse action in
any particular case is a product of the entire investigation, of which a
polygraph examination (if administered) constitutes only a part.
Therefore, it cannot be said that adverse findings which one would
appeal are ever based solely on the result of a polygraph test. How-
ever if a person tested objects to the manner in which the test is
conducted or, having obtained the test results, disputes their accuracy,
he can request a reexamination by the same or another examiner. If
the product of an entire investigation, of which the result of a poly-
graph examination is a part, becomes the basis for adverse action
against an individual, that individual may, if he chooses, pursue what-
ever channels of appeal are normally available to any person against
whom similar adverse action is taken, whether a polygraph examina-
tion was employed in the course of the investigation or not.
Question 2(i). Is access to such data restricted and, if so, what
classification or other designation is applied to the data?
Answer. Army Intelligence and Military Police: Polygraph reports
are classified in accordance with the classification given the matter
investigated. All reports are strictly controlled, and use of these
reports or any material therefrom is based on an appropriate clearance
(if the classification of the material investigated requires classification
of the report) and a need to know.
Question 2(j). If a person connected with your agency refused to
take such a test, is that refusal reflected in any way whatsoever in the
individual's personnel records?
Answer. Army Intelligence: No. Reports of refusal are not placed
in any personnel files. The investigator will include a statement of
this fact in his investigation report. The investigation report itself,
after it becomes part of a completed investigative file, will be for-
warded to the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Record Facility.
Military Police: No. A person's refusal of a polygraph examina-
tion is not reflected in personnel records. The investigator would
include a statement of this fact in his investigation report. The in-
vestigation report itself is eventually forwarded to the U.S. Army
Military Policy Repository for Criminal Investigation Reports.
Question 2(k). Does your agency maintain special facilities, such
as specially designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly
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48 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
describe such facilities and how they are equipped. Furnish photo-
graphs, if available.
Answer. Army intelligence and military police: Yes. Polygraph
examinations are conducted in private, in a room which is normally
soundproofed and equipped with simple furnishings. (A photo of a
typical polygraph examination room is attached as tab I.)
Question 2 (1). How many polygraph tests or examinations involving
similar devices were conducted by your agency in fiscal 1963?
Answer. Army intelligence: There were approximately 1,500 poly-
graph examinations conducted in conjunction with the personnel
security program during fiscal year 1963. There were an additional
3,100 examinations conducted in the screening of military personnel
to determine eligibility for training which requires access to cryp-
tologic material and the counterintelligence programs in fiscal year
1963.
Military police : The total fi ures for fiscal year 1963 are not avail-
able at this time. However, during the first three quarters of fiscal
year 1963 a total of 3,387 polygraph examinations were conducted by
the U.S. Army Military Police.
Army intelligence and military police: In addition, there were 3,494
polygraph examinations conducted by Army Intelligence and Military
Police Corps in conjunction with the Cuban enlistment program.
Question 2(m). How many such tests were conducted by other
agencies, public or private, at the request of your agency during
fiscal 1963?
Answer. Army intelligence and military police: None.
Question 3. Please enumerate, by job title and grade, all employees
of your agency who are authorized to conduct polygraph or similar
tests and list their salary costs for fiscal 1963.
Answer. Army intelligence: From among Army intelligence per-
sonnel, 43 officers, 44 warrant officers, and 65 enlisted m.en have been
trained to conduct polygraph examinations as an additional duty in
connection with counterintelligence activities. Based on available
data, the grade breakdown of these 152 examiners is as follows:
Grade: Number
Grade-Continued Number
Lieutenant colonel-----------
4
Warrant officer (W-1)--------
4
Major---------------------
18
Sergeant major (E-9) --------
3
Captain--------------------
13
Master sergeant (E-8) --------
37
1st lieutenant---------------
7
Sergeant 1st class (E-7) - - - - --
20
2d lieutenant----------------
1
Staff sergeant (E-6) ----------
3
Chief warrant officer (W-4) - - -
15
Sergeant (E5)--------------
1
Chief warrant officer (W-3)---
22
Corporal (E-4) --------------
1
Chief warrant officer (W-2) - - -
3
The annual salary cost for the personnel listed above totals $799,836.
This salary represents the annual base pay of the 152 Army intelligence
personnel who periodically conduct polygraph examinations in. con-
junction with counterintelligence operations and investigations.
Since most of these 152 personnel do not have the administration of
polygraph tests as a primary duty, what portion of their salary cost is
attributable to the administration of polygraph examinations cannot
be accurately estimated.
Military Police: There are 150 warrant officers and 56 enlisted men
authorized to administer polygraph examinations in connection with
criminal investigation. These persons are full-time criminal investi-
gators, who have been especially trained to administer polygraph
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 49
examinations as an additional duty, when and if required. Based on
available data, the grade breakdown of these 206 examiners is as
follows:
Rank: Number
Rank-Continued
Number
Chief warrant officer (W-4) _ _
_ 19
Warrant officer (W-1) --------
30
Chief warrant officer (W-3) -
46
Specialist, 7th class (E-7)
-----
35
Chief warrant officer (W-2) _
55
Specialist, 6th class (E-6)
-----
21
The annual salary cost for the personnel listed above totals $988,300.
However, these personnel do not have administration of polygraph
examinations as a primary duty and spend less than 5 percent of their
overall duty time in conducting polygraph tests. (During fiscal year
1963, examinations conducted averaged 1.8 examinations per exam-
iner per month.) Therefore, what portion of the salary cost is at-
tributable to the administration of polygraph examinations cannot
be accurately estimated.
Complete Army pay tables are enclosed at tab J.
Question 3(a). How many of these persons have, as their primary
duty, the conducting of such tests?
Answer. Army intelligence : The Army intelligence units worldwide
have an authorized strength requirement for 146 polygraph examiners.
However, Army intelligence units use only 25 polygraph examiners
on a full-time basis. The other qualified examiners have additional
investigative duties.
Military Police : None of the Military Police who operate poly-
graphs have the administration of such tests as a primary duty. All
Military Police criminal investigators receive primary assignments to
criminal investigation duties.
Question 3(b). What are the minimum qualifications required of
those persons within your agency authorized to conduct such tests?
Answer. Army intelligence : Minimum qualifications for personnel
selected for polygraph training at the Provost Marshal General School,
Fort Gordon, Ga., are-
(1) U.S. citizenship.
(2) No history of mental disorder, including pathological
personality disorders.
(3) Suitable character, loyalty, integrity, reputation, sobriety,
discretion, and stability as established by a character investiga-
tion.
(4) No convictions by a civil court for offenses other than minor
traffic violations.
(5) No convictions by a general or special court martial.
(6) Minimum age, 25.
(7) Education: High school graduate, preferably a college
graduate with training in psychology.
(8) Military grade, E-5.
(9) Military experience: Minimum of 3 years interrogation
or investigative experience in the Intelligence Corps and must
have superior to outstanding ratings for the previous 3 years.
(10) Language proficiency: Passing scores on the Army lan-
guage aptitude test, or a rating of fair on Army language pro-
ficiency test in one or more languages.
Intelligence Corps personnel must successfully complete the PMG
polygraph course at the PMG School prior to being assigned in an
authorized examiner position. New operators will receive on-the-job
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50 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
training under the supervision of an experienced operator before being
permitted to conduct an unsupervised examination.
Military Police: The minimum standards of qualification for poly-
graph examiners are prescribed in AR 195-11, "Criminal Investiga-
tion, Accreditation of Military Police Criminal Investigators." Some
pertinent prerequisites are as follows:
(1) U.S. citizenship.
(2) No history of mental disorder, including pathological
personality disorders.
(3) Suitable character, loyalty, integrity, reputation, sobriety,
discretion, and stability, as established by a character investigation.
(4) No convictions by a civil court for offenses other than minor
traffic violations.
(5) No convictions by a general or special court-martial.
(6) Minimum age, 25 years.
(7) Minimum of 3 years military service.
(8) Successful completion of the criminal investigation course
at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Ga.
(9) Minimum of 1 year experience as an accredited criminal
investigator.
(10) Successful completion of the lie-detector examiners course
at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Ga.
Question 3(c). Describe any training program your agency provides
to train its own employees, or employees of other Federal agencies, in
conducting such tests.
Answer. Army Intelligence and Military Police: A syllabus of the
training program required for accreditation as a polygraph examiner,
administered at Fort Gordon, Ga., appears at tab L.
Question 3(d). Does your agency send employees to outside
agencies or schools, public or private, for training in such testing?
If so, please provide the name and address of the training facility.
Answer. Army Intelligence and Military Police: Neither Army
intelligence nor the military police send personnel to outside agencies
for polygraph training.
Question 4. How many polygraphs and other so-called lie-detection
devices are the property of your agency?
Answer. The Department of the Army presently owns 261 poly-
graph sets. Of these Army intelligence employs 143 sets and the
military police employ 118.
Question 4(a). Please list the total acquisition cost of all such
devices.
Answer. The total acquisition cost of the Army's polygraph units
cannot be accurately determined, because these units have been
procured at various times throughout a 15-year period of generally
declining costs. A precise acquisition cost estimate would require an
Army-wide inventory. However, based on current procurement
costs (about $700 per set), the total cost of acquisition of the Army's
261 polygraph sets would be $182,700.
Question 4(b). Please estimate the total annual maintenance costs
of such devices and indicate whether maintenance is performed by
agency personnel or by outside sources.
Answer. Army intelligence and military police: The estimated
annual cost of maintenance on the polygraph is not made a matter of
specific record since the polygraph instrument is an item of signal
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equipment. As such, any repairs are done by the local U.S. Army
Signal Corps and handled in the same manner as any other U.S.
Army electronic device requiring repair. However, total annual
maintenance cost per machine can be reasonably estimated to be
about $70, based on field experience.
Question 4(c). If your agency leases such devices, or contracts with
other public or private agencies to perform such tests, please provide
the total costs for such activity during fiscal 1963.
Answer. The Department of the Army does not lease polygraphs
or contract with other public or private agencies to perform polygraph
tests.
Question 4(d). Please estimate all additional expenses attributable
to such testing, such as travel expenses for examiners to and from
location of tests, internal and external training programs, and all
other costs.
Answer. Army Intelligence and Military Police: The specific
expenses attributable to travel of examiners and other miscellaneous
costs associated with conducting examinations are not available as
such statistics are not maintained. All official duty travel and mis-
cellaneous costs associated therewith are subject to statutory and
budget limitations.
Question 5. Please provide two copies each of all intraagency
directives, administrative orders, rules, regulations, and/or instruc-
tions governing the use of such devices within your agency.
Answer. The requested regulations and exhibits are attached.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE CORPS
US ARMY
Section II. Evidence
Chapter 3
26d. Other forms of evidence.-Not all items of evidence can
be categorized as exclusively documentary, physical, or
testimonial. Scientific tests and lie-detector or truth-serum
results are examples of such items. Photographs and sound
recordings also may be treated as special forms of evidence.
26d(2). Lie detectors and truth serums.-The results of lie-
detector and truth-serum examinations are generally inad-
missible as evidence. These two items are useful as investi-
gative aids but courts reject them as evidence.
Section III. Interviews and Interrogation
46. Lie detector.-The lie detector is frequently used as an
aid to interrogations in complaint investigations and special
operations. A brief discussion of its application is included
in chapter 5. It is discussed in greater detail in FM 30-15
and in TB PMG 22. Trained lie-detector examiners are
assigned to counterintelligence units in accordance with
appropriate TOE or TD.
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52 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Chapter 5
Section I. General
64e. Lie detection.-The use of the lie detector as an aid to
investigation, particularly in the interrogation of suspects, is
a technical investigative technique of growing importance.
Lie-detector examiners are provided in the TOE and TD
for counterintelligence units at most levels of operation.
Section V. The Lie Detector
78. General.-The lie detector is an investigative aid and
should never be used as a substitute for good interrogation.
It may be used to further the interrogation or investigation
and furnish an indication as to attempts at deception.
The lie detector itself is only an instrument which records
physiological responses as stimulated by emotion. How-
ever, through the employment of proper investigative and
interrogation techniques, the examination of the average
subject will produce valuable information. Through the
use of the lie detector certain physiological phenomena
such as blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and electrodermal
(skin) response can be scientifically recorded. When prop-
erly diagnosed by a competent examiner, these findings may
indicate whether a person is telling the truth or not. As
such, and as an aid to interrogations, this instrument has
been of considerable value in the field of counterintelligence.
The psychological impact on a guilty person, deriving from
anticipated employment of the lie detector, is often a valuable
aid to the interrogator in the pretest stages of interrogation.
All personnel engaged in investigations should be familiar
with the lie detector's capabilities and limitations. Trained
lie-detector examiners are provided in the TOE and TD of
most counterintelligence units. See AR 195-21, TB PMG
22 and FM 30-15.
80a. General.-The test consists of a series of questions
asked a person and the simultaneous recording by the lie-
detector set of the person's body changes in response to
these questions. The test is based on the fact that physical
changes occur in a normal person who lies. The test does
not actually detect lies, but rather it produces a record
(chart) of the physiological byproducts or a person's emo-
tional responses during the test. Through examination of
this chart, the trained examiner may detect a person's
attempt to tell a lie and to conceal it.
80b. Emotional factors.-Numerous emotions may be in-
volved and appear on the charts as physiological responses.
In detection of deception the emotion which is particularly
involved is that of fear-fear of being detected in the telling
of a lie. For such responses to appear during the exami-
nation, there must be an awareness or consciousness of
guilt.
80c. The guilty person.-
(1) Aware of the fact that he is attempting deception,
the guilty person responds emotionally, causing a
physiological reaction which appears during the exami-
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nation. Here, the subject may fear being caught in a
lie, ruined socially, or imprisoned.
(2) The guilty person may feel certain that the test
will reveal his attempt to lie, but he may not want to
appear guilty by refusing to take the test. When he
is in this frame of mind, he may tell the truth, even
before the test begins.
(3) During the test, the guilty person's fears usually
tend to increase to a certain point, beyond which his
responses decrease.
80d. The innocent person.-
(1) Generally, the innocent person tries to cooperate
because he wants to prove his innocence. He may be
curious and volunteer just to find out what the test is
about. He may sometimes want to attract attention to
himself.
(2) During the test an innocent person may respond
to certain questions, but the responses will not be of the
same degree or duration as those of the subject who
attempts deception. Those responses which do occur
will tend to diminish as the test continues.
81. Selecting test subjects.-Certain mental and physical
conditions may influence a person's suitability as a test
subject and affect his reactions during the test. The lie
detector examiner decides whether or not a person is fit to
take the test, but does not attempt a psychiatric or medical
examination of the subject. It is important that he consider
the following:
81a(1). Permanent physical illness.-Certain heart condi-
tions and breathing disorders sometimes make a person unfit
to take the test. The condition may be recognized during
the early part of the test.
81a(2). A highly nervous or excitable person may be unfit.
81b. Temporary physical illness.-A person who is intoxi-
cated, injured, or suffering pain or discomfort is unfit to be
tested. Extreme physical or mental fatigue and certain ills,
such as colds, coughing spells, hay fever, asthma, hiccups,
and severe allergies, may influence a person's suitability as a
test subject.
81c. Mental illness.-Mentally deficient and insane per-
sons cannot be tested. Persons of very low intelligence may
be difficult to test successfully. Often they display little
moral sense or fear of being caught in an offense or lie, or to
understand the purpose and procedure of the test. If the
examiner believes a subject is mentally deficient, insane, or
physically ill, he should so inform the agency or office
requesting the examination so that action can be taken to
have the subject examined by competent medical authorities.
81d. Other considerations.-A person who has been treated
or questioned improperly prior to the test may not be a fit
subject for the test. A person who is emotionally upset or
under the influence of a sedative should not be tested while
he is in such a condition. A person who is unduly afraid of
the test may also present a problem. Proper treatment and
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54 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
a clear explanation of the test will usually overcome these
difficulties.
81e. Pretended ills.-Some persons may seek to evade or
postpone the test by pretending a mental or physical illness
or some other defect which they feel will make it difficult or
impossible for them to be tested.
81f. Use of drugs.-The use of certain drugs by a person
may affect his reaction on the lie detector. The examiner
should be alert for symptoms which may indicate that sub-
ject is under the influence of such drugs. When the investi-
gator has advance knowledge that subject has ingested drugs,
he should so advise the examiner prior to the test.
82. Treatment of the subject.-Success of a test depends in
part on how the subject was treated before he was asked to
take the test, the manner in which he was asked to take the
test, and his treatment while awaiting the test.
82a. Routine questioning.-A proper interview seldom af-
fects the test results. However, the investigator should use
commonsense about the length and persistence of question-
ing. The subject should be made to feel that he is suspected
because of the evidence rather than because of any personal
factors. The investigator should not reveal details of an
offense to a person who may be asked to take the test.
Tricks and bluffs should not be attempted during interro-
gation prior to a lie detector examination. If the subject
discovers a trick or bluff, he may become so upset and
suspicious that the purpose of the test may be defeated
even before it is started.
82b. Asking a person to take the test.--The investigator
should-
(1) Learn enough about the test so that he can de-
scribe it to a person who has been misinformed or knows
little or nothing about it.
(2) Suggest the test as a means for the suspect to
indicate his innocence.
(3) Stress the test's capability of indicating, through
recorded responses, whether a person is attempting
deception.
(4) Assure each person that the examiner is qualified
and impartial toward all involved in the case.
(5) Avoid any claim for the machine or the examiner
that is not supported by fact.
83a. Preparation for the text.-
(1) Planning test questions: The examiner prepares
the test questions based on information obtained from
the investigator. General facts, theories and suspicions
are not enough; the examiner needs detailed, verified
f acts.
(2) Whenever possible. the investigator should inform
the examiner of the unpublicized facts of the offense,
particularly those known only to the victim, the offender,
and the investigator.
83b. The examination room.-
(1) The examination must be conducted in a quiet,
private place. In this regard the examination room is
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U 0 POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 55
very important. If possible two rooms should be pro-
vided; one as the examination room proper, the other
as a combination waiting room and office. The exami-
nation room should be plainly furnished and contain
only a desk, chair for the subject, and a chair for the
examiner. The subject's chair should face a wall which
is blank or otherwise free from distractions. Further,
this room should be soundproofed to eliminate extra-
neous noises. If located in a warm climate, air-condi-
tioning should be installed. A two-way mirror should
be placed in one wall to allow for observation when a
witness is needed.
(2) The waiting room should contain comfortable
chairs, a desk for the examiner, and other equipment
which creates a professional impression.
83c. Arrangements for witnesses.-Normally, only the
examiner and subject should be present in the room during
the test, but there should be witnesses to the test particularly
when a woman is being examined (AR 600-110). Witnesses
should observe the tests through two-way mirrors and listen
through concealed microphones.
83d. informing the subject of his legal rights.-Before sub-
jecting him to the test, subject should have expressed a
willingness to take the examination. He also should have
been advised of his legal rights against self-incrimination.
84a. Use of interpreters.-At times, the examiner must
resort to the use of an interpreter. The interpreter must be
fluent in the two languages used so that his translation will
be accurate and in the proper idiom. He should also be ex-
perienced in investigative questioning.
84b. The interpreter should possess a security clearance
equivalent to the security classification of the facts surround-
ing the examination and the information that may be revealed
as a result of the examination.
84c. The interpreter should understand how the test works
and what can be accomplished by it. The test should be
practiced, in private, until the interpreter understands the
procedure. The interpreter should be briefed on the facts
of the case.
84d. All test questions should be prepared and translated
before the test. Procedures for using an interpreter during
the test are similar to those followed in interviews and inter-
rogations, except that the interpreter asks the prepared
questions at a predetermined signal from the examiner who
is operating the machine.
85. Avoidable mistakes.-Most unsatisfactory lie detector
examinations are due mainly to unfitness of the subjects
and lack of preparation by examiners and investigators.
The investigator should keep the following in mind:
(a) Do not wait until the last minute to ask a person
to take a test. The test should not be used as a last
resort after all other methods have failed.
(b) Do not tell a suspect everything known about
the offense or about him.
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56 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(c) Do not fail to research and analyze the case before
asking a person to take the test. Faulty or incomplete
preparation is a pitfall. The background information
on each subject should be as complete as possible.
(d) Do not fail to consult the examiner when in
doubt about a person's fitness to take the test. If
there is still a doubt, the examiner should consult a
medical officer.
(e) Never describe the lie detector as infallible.
(f) Never tell anyone that the lie detector set will
decide whether lie is innocent or guilty. The courts
will make that decision. The lie detector is used to
help detect deception, not to determine guilt.
86. Reports, records, and charts.-
(a) Lie detector examiner's data and question sheet
(DA form 19-63): The investigator will coordinate with
the examiner to aid in the preparation of that portion
of the form headed "Details of Incident" and will assist
the examiner in preparing questions for the examination.
The examiner will complete the remainder of the form.
Data and question sheets will be filed in the office to
which the lie detecting set is issued. They will be
maintained for 2 years after date of examination and
then destroyed, unless the office of file is instructed
otherwise by the control office.
(b) Test charts: Lie detector charts will be inter-
preted only by the examiner who conducted the examina-
tion. They will not be made a part of the investigative
report and will be maintained for 2 years after date of
examination and then destroyed, unless the office of file
is instructed otherwise by the control office.
(c) Card-index file: The examiner should keep a
card-index file on all persons he tests. The file should
be compact and easily portable. It should include date
and circumstances pertaining to each examination,
together with identity and location of all related reports.
(d) Statement of consent (DA form 19-85)-
(1) When this statement of consent form is used,
subject should be advised of his existing rights prior
to signing. The United States citizen will be
advised of his rights under Article 31 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, or the fifth amendment
to the Constitution, as appropriate.
(2) Two copies of this form should be signed by
the subject, one copy transmitted with the lie
detector report to the headquarters requesting the
test, and the other kept by the examiner for his files.
(3) When deemed necessary this form may be
modified for use in areas outside the continental
limits of the United States. When modified, it will
be in the language in which the examination is con-
ducted, as well as in English.
(e) Agent reports: The use of Agent Reports to record
the results of a lie detector examination is discussed in
Chapter S.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 57
Chapter 8
Section II. The Agent Report
136. Lie detector examination report.-A lie-detector
examination report will be prepared by the operator con-
ducting an examination. When the examiner is a Special
Agent, an Agent Report will be used. This Agent Report
will be designated with the heading "LIE DETECTOR
EXAMINATION." The report will begin with the report
heading in upper case letters in parentheses. When the
examiner is not a Special Agent, he will prepare his own
report of the examination which will be attached as an
exhibit to an Agent Report prepared by the Special Agent
requesting the examination. The lie-detector examination
report will include, but not be limited to the following:
136a. Introductory element.-First include the report
heading; date of examination; name of subject of examination
(if other than Subject, add all possible identifying data
concerning the person examined); and the place of examina-
tion. Next include the purpose of the requesting agency.
In addition, when deemed necessary, the introductory
element will also include comments relating to-
(1) The Subject being advised of his rights and
agreeing, in writing to submit to the test (par. 86d).
(2) The language in which the test was conducted.
(3) The identity (including nationality and position)
of the interpreter, if used.
Sample.-(Lie-detector examination) On November
12, 1959, a lie-detector examination of Helmut Schmidt,
born June 11, 1901, in Leipzig, Germany, was con-
ducted in Frankfurt a/Main, Germany, at the request
of CO, Region III, 66th CIC Group, Frankfurt.
Schmidt who was advised of his rights, and who agreed
in writi,ng (Exhibit II) to submit voluntarily, was
examined on a (specify machine used) to determine his
association with * * * . The test, conducted in the
German language, proceeded as follows:
136b. Pre-Test Interview.-This next paragraph of the
report will begin on the second line below the introductory
element. This portion of the report should contain the
pertinent information developed by the examiner.
136c. The Test.-Here should follow a listing of all relevant
questions used during the test, and the subject's answers.
When the examination is conducted in a foreign language,
the test questions will be recorded in that language with the
English translation.
136d. Results.-The final paragraph or paragraphs of the
report should include the examiner's opinions of the test
results. This includes his analysis of the chart and his
observations of the subject during the test. When deception
is detected, additional paragraphs should contain the results
of a post-test interview and of the reexamination on the lie
detector.
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58 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT B: ARMY REGULATION-195-21, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
May 31, 1957
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION-UTILIZATION OF LIE DETECTING SET
AN/USS-2 ( )
General------------------------------------------------- 1
Supervision---------------------------------------------- 2
Procedure----------------------------------------------- 3
Operators----------------------------------------------- 4
Statement of consent-------------------------------------- 5
Charts and reports--------------------------------------- 6
Maintenance and replacements----------------------------- 7
1. General. (a) These regulations govern the utilization of
the Lie Detecting Set AN/USS-2( ), hereinafter referred to
as the set, used in the Criminal Investigation Program of the
Military Police Corps.
b. The set may be used as an aid in determining deception
in the course of an investigation. It will not be used as a
substitute for approved criminal investigative techniques.
2. Supervision. Provost marshals and military police
commanders are responsible for the proper utilization of the
set as prescribed herein. It will be operated only by personnel
who have been accredited as operators by The Provost
Marshal General.
3. Procedure. (a) An examination will not be given until
sufficient facts of the investigation have been established to
enable the operator to construct adequate objective and
comprehensive questions.
(b) The operator will concern himself solely with the
detection of deception that is pertinent to the investigation
and will not attempt a psychiatric or physical diagnosis of
the subject.
(c) An explanation of the nature of the examination will
be given to the subject prior to beginning the examination.
(d) No person will be required to submit to a lie detecting
set examination without his consent. No indication will be
given to an individual that refusal to submit to an examina-
tion will be construed to mean a tacit admission of guilt.
(e) Criminal investigators should not subject a person to
prolonged interrogation just prior to an examination.
(f) An examination will not be given when it is apparent
that the subject is mentally or physically fatigued.
(g) No person will be examined with the set while
obviously emotionally upset, intoxicated, under the influence
of a sedative, or is known to have a mental disorder or to be
addicted to drugs or marihuana.
(h) No person will be examined with the set while experi-
encing physical discomfort of significant magnitude or while
possessing physical disabilities or defects which, by them-
selves, might cause an abnormal response to be recorded.
(i) Under no circumstances will operators allow themselves
to be identified as other than military police personnel.
4. Operators. (a) Only selected warrant officers, noncom-
missioned officers, and specialists will be authorized to
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~S O POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 59
operate the set and then only after successfully passing a
course of instruction in the operation of the set approved by
The Provost Marshal General.
(b) Personnel who are selected for training will-
(1) Be warrant officers (MOS 9322), master sergeants,
or master specialists (MOS 953.1).
(2) Be currently accredited by The Provost Marshal
General as criminal investigators.
(3) Have attained a minimum age of 25 years.
(4) Have been assigned to criminal investigative
duties for a period of 1 year prior to selection for training.
(c) Waivers for any of the requirements set forth in (b)
above may be granted by The Provost Marshal General.
(d) Personnel who satisfactorily complete the prescribed
course of instruction may be accredited by The Provost
Marshal General to operate the set.
(e) A new criminal investigator credential card with an
appropriate entry will be issued by The Provost Marshal
General to all personnel authorized to operate the set.
(f) Authority to operate the set will be withdrawn when
an operator-
(1) Has his criminal investigative credentials with-
drawn for cause or administrative reasons.
(2) Uses or permits the set to be used for an unauthor-
ized purpose.
(3) Indicates a lack of ability or aptitude to operate
the set.
(4) Fails to maintain the set properly.
5. Statement of Consent. DA Form 1985 (Lie Detector
Examination Statement of Consent) will be read and signed
by each person prior to submitting to a lie detecting set
examination. The statement of consent will be listed as an
exhibit of the report of investigation concerned. One copy
will be attached to the local file copy of the report. The
remaining copy will be attached to the copy of the report
forwarded to the United States Army Military Police
Repository for Criminal Investigation Reports.
6. (Changed June 20, 1958) Charts, Data and Question
Sheets, and Reports. a. General.
(1) When applicable, records generated as a result of
a request for a lie detector examination will be protected
in accordance with AR 345-15 or classified in accord-
ance with AR 380-5.
(2) Lie detecting charts will be interpreted only by
the operator conducting the examination. They will
not be made a part of the criminal investigation report
and will be destroyed 1 year after the end of the calendar
year in which the report of investigation to which they
pertain has been closed or completed.
(b) Lie Detector Operator's Data and Question Sheet (DA
Form 19-68).-The investigator will prepare that portion of
the form headed "Details of Incident" and will assist the
operator in preparing questions for the examination. The
operator will complete the remainder of the form. Data
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60 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
and question sheets will be filed in the office to which the lie
detecting set is issued and destroyed 1 year after the end of
the calendar year in which the report of investigation to
which it pertains has been closed or completed.
(c) Lie Detector Examination Report (DA Form 19-64).-
A lie detector examination report will be prepared by the
operator and will be attached as an exhibit to the pertinent
military police report of investigation. This report is
exempt from reports control under the provisions of para-
graph 17s, AR 335-15.
7. Maintenance and Replacements.-(a) The set is a stand-
ard Signal Corps item of issue. Spare parts and expendable
supplies will be requisitioned through normal Signal Corps
supply channels.
(b) Lie detecting sets will be maintained only by author-
ized operators to the extent of, and in accordance with, the
instructions they have received during their training. All
maintenance and/or repairs above organizational level will
be accomplished by Signal Corps field and depot maintenance
personnel.
(c) When the set is being moved or transported, precau-
tions will be taken to reduce shock and avoid damage.
[AG 413.6 (29 April 57)PMGT]
By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the
Army:
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.
EXHIBIT C.-ARMY REGULATIONS 604-5, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY, 21 MAY 1962
PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE
Clearance of Personnel for Access to Classified Defense
Information and Material
Section I. General
1. Purpose.-These regulations prescribe the policy and
establish the procedures for the granting, denial, suspension,
or revocation of security clearances to Department of the
Army personnel for access to classified defense information
including Restricted Data and cryptographic information
4. Definitions.
(n) Lie detecting set examination.-For the purpose of
these regulations, a lie detecting set examination is an ex-
amination of an individual on a voluntary basis conducted
by qualified operators using the Lie Detecting Set AN/USS-
2(C) or other lie detecting instruments or equipment ap-
proved by the Department of the Army. The examination,
as a minimum, will consist of verification of questionable
and critical information contained in the Statement of
Personal History (DD Form 398) or Immigrant Alien
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Questionnaire (DD Form 49). The lie detecting set may
be used to verify other pertinent information available or
to provide leads for further investigations.
EXHIBIT D-DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TECHNICAL
BULLETIN
INSPECTOR GENERAL GUIDANCE MATERIAL, APRIL 4, 1963
TB IG 4, 31 March 1961, is changed as follows:
25. Techniques for Investigators.
h. (Superseded) Use of the Polygraph ("Lie detector").
The polygraph, commonly termed "lie detector," will not be
resorted to by Inspectors General in the conduct of Inspector
General activities. This device is normally associated with
criminal type investigations conducted by agencies or indi-
viduals other than Inspectors General. An Inspector Gen-
eral investigator will seek factual information through overt
methods and by resorting to skillful interrogation of witnesses
paying close attention to all pertinent details of the case,
however minute, and thus arriving at his conclusions and
recommendations.
If during the course of an investigation an Inspector
General develops information which indicates the appro-
priateness of referral to another agency for further investiga-
tion, such a recommendation should be made to his com-
mander. Reference paragraph 10, Selecting the Investigating
Agency.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
EARLE G. WHEELER,
General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.
61
Subject: Polygraph Questionnaire on Polygraph Usage
Enclosures: (1) ONI Notice 3870 ser 3780P92 of 15 Oct 54
(2) ONI INST 5520.72 of 2 Oct 61
(3) ONI INST 5520.73 of 9 Oct 61
(4) Article from July 1951 issue of ONI Review
Reference subject questionnaire from the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, House of Representatives. In response thereto,
the following information was compiled by the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence. The numbers correspond to the numbers in the questionnaire.
1. Polygraph machines are utilized by the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence during the course of investigations and are distributed through-
out the organization both within and without the continental United
States.
2. Within the Office of Naval Intelligence the polygraph technique
is used as an investigative aid, in conjunction with interrogation/
investigation, not in lieu thereof. (Par. 2, enclosure (3).)
30-023-64-5
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(a) Specific employment of the technique is in connection with
criminal investigations (95 percent). Another use of the technique
is in connection with special programs as directed by higher naval
authority or the Department of Defense; e.g., screening of Cuban
recruits in the fall of 1962 and early months of 1963. Assistance is
rendered on a selective basis to other agencies (Federal, State, and
municipal) upon request. Such requests always fall within the
criminal field or suspected misconduct of employees (5 percent).
(Par. 12, enclosure (3).)
(b) Used selectively in accordance with established policy as set
forth in 2(a) above.
(c) The polygraph is considered by the Office of Naval Intelligence
to be an invaluable investigative aid. An accuracy rate of 70 percent
is considered the optimum. Weight given to the data and to a
refusal to submit to examination can only be assayed in the light of
the particular investigation and other data developed. It is safe to
say that this Office realized that some subjects refuse to submit to
examination on the basis of moral scruples which they consider valid;
in other cases a refusal may be considered it tacit admission of guilt.
In neither case, however, would such a refusal by itself be considered
grounds for personnel or disciplinary action. (Par. 3, enclosure (3).)
(d) Only the duly authorized and qualified operator may make the
decision as to whether or not the technique is applicable to a particular
investigation/situation. In case of dispute between the operator and
his superior regarding the applicability of the technique, the matter
must be referred to Headquarters, Office of Naval Intelligence, for
decision. (Par. 4, enclosure (3).)
(e) Affirmative. It is well understood that the physical/mental
condition of many subjects will render them unsuitable as testing
subjects either on a temporal or permanent basis. (Par. 5, enclosure
(3).)
(f) Polygraph charts are retained in separate folders by the operator
who conducted the examination. (Par. 6, enclosure (3).)
(g) The opinion of the polygraph operator is made known to the
individual tested. (Par. 5, enclosure (3).)
(h) The individual tested retains the right to disagree with the
opinion of the operator. As stated above, personnel or disciplinary
action would never be based solely on data developed by the polygraph
technique.
(i) Affirmative. Normally no classification is assigned unless the
contents of the questions are classified in nature. Access is restricted
to persons having a legitimate need to know. (Par. 6, enclosure (3).)
(j) Negative. His refusal is recorded in the investigative report,
along with all other data developed.
(k) Affirmative. The Office of Naval Intelligence interrogation
room measures 10 by 30 feet, has one entrance and two windows.
Its temperature is controlled by steam radiation and one air condi-
tioner (window unit type). It is walled with fiber accoustical tile
and is floored with wall-to-wall carpeting. Lighting fixtures include
three incandescent lamp units situated on the ceiling. The interroga-
tion room contains two desks, one swivel chair, one side chair, one
leather easy chair, and one Keeler polygraph machine. It further
contains two telephone instruments, one of which is the property of
the Office of Naval Intelligence and which serves as. a microphone
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 63
terminating with a second microphone, mounted in the wall and of
the dynamic type. Mounted on the wall of the interrogation room
is a two-way mirror, through which an interrogation or polygraph
examination might be witnessed. Throughout the naval intelligence
organization, interrogation rooms are along the same basic lines.
The wires observed in the attached photographs are the power source
for flash bulbs used to obtain the photographs.
(1) From 1,000 to 1,200, approximately. Exact figures are not
available as each office keeps its own statistics. This figure arrived
at by scanning files which indicate each office having a polygraph
machine conducting an average of 8 to 10 examinations a month.
(m) None.
3. There are a total of 86 agents authorized to conduct polygraph
examinations. Grades and salary costs are as follows:
Continental United States:
Investigator general---------------------------------------------------
GS-14.
Do
--------------------------------------------------------------
GS-13.
----
Special agent----------------------------------------------------------
GS-13.
Do
----------------------------------------------------------------
PG-12.
--
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Do
PG-11.
-
Do-----------------------------------------------------------------
PG-10.
Do------------------------------------------------------------------
PG-9.
Overseas:
Special agent -----------------------------------------------------------
PIG-13.
Do-------------------------------------------------------------------
PO-12.
Do
-------------------------------
-
PG-11.
------------------------ -------
---
Do
--
------------------------- ---------------------------
PG-16.
----------
-
Do--------------- ---------------------------------------------------
PG-9.
NOTE.-Total of 67 polygraph operators in continental United States. Salary cost, $602,985.
Total of 10 polygraph operators overseas; salary cost, $162,300.
Total of 86 polygraph operators in the Office of Naval Intelligence; total salary cost, $765,285.
(a) None. All Office of Naval Intelligence polygraph operators
have as their primary duty, the, conduct of investigations.
(b) Operators must be thoroughly indoctrinated and experienced
agents of the Office of Naval Intelligence who have demonstrated over
a minimum period of 18 months outstanding ability as interrogators.
Enclosures (1) and (2).
(c) Training is conducted at the Headquarters, Office of Naval
Intelligence over a period of 5 to 8 days, depending on the size of the
class. (Usually restricted to four to six candidates.) Students are
drilled in mechanics of the machine, attachments, chart marking,
testing procedures, preexamination and postexamination interro-
gation, criteria, and policy, caveats, and limitations of the Office of
Naval Intelligence in connection with and on the use of the technique.
(d) Not applicable.
4. 77 polygraphs.
(a) $62,525.
(b) $750.
(c) Not applicable.
(d) $4,659 for fiscal year 1963, training. It is impossible to
accurately isolate travel expenses in connection with the use of the
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64 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
polygraph from other travel expenses incurred during the course of
investigations in which the polygraph is not used.
5. Attached.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
For Official Use Only.
ONI instruction 552072.
Washington, D.C., October 2, 1961.
From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Distribution list.
Subject: ONI polygraph operators; policy pertaining to.
1. Purpose.-To define the policy of Naval Intelligence concerning
the training and authority of agents and special agents who are
polygraph operators to conduct polygraph examinations.
2. Background.-In the past several months, the Office of Naval
Intelligence has received requests from several district intelligence
offices/intelligence offices that certain agents or special agents be cer-
tified as polygraph examiners. Inquiries have also been received con-
cerning the status of special agents who have completed a course of
instruction in the polygraph technique at the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence.
The Office of Naval Intelligence has utilized the polygraph as an
investigative technique since July of 1948. The Office of Naval In-
telligence views on the polygraph technique, particularly in respect to
its capabilities and limitations in connection with security clearances
was published as an article in the ONI Review of July 1951. An
ONI instruction setting forth the current ONI policy for the use of
the polygraph technique will be promulgated in the near future.
From 1948 to 1951, ONI polygraph operators were trained at the
Leonarde heeler School in Chicago, Ill. From July 1951 onward,
the Office of Naval Intelligence has conducted its own training course
for polygraph operators. This step was taken principally to insure
selection of personnel with at least the minimum qualifications for
such training and to stress an understanding of the Office of Naval
Intelligence views in relation to polygraph techniques.
The Office of Naval Intelligence has never certified agents or special
agents as polygraph examiners. Individuals selected by the Office of
Naval Intelligence for training at the Leonarde Keeler School or at the
Office of Naval Intelligence Training School have been authorized by
the Director of Naval Intelligence to conduct polygraph examinations
but not to provide training in polygraph operation. Wording of this
authorization which is forwarded to the appropriate officer in charge
and also placed in the trainee's personnel file is as follows:
"Special Agent Doe is qualified as a polygraph operator and not as
an expert. Although he has been given basic training which will lead
to proficiency by the addition of experience continued study and
analysis of charts run by comparison with objective evidence where
such is available, he is not considered sufficiently competent to provide
training in polygraph operation."
This authorization may be withdrawn at the discretion of the Di-
rector of Naval Intelligence for good and sufficient reason therefor.
3. Policy.-The Director of Naval Intelligence authorizes polygraph
operators who are trained at the ONI school or who were trained at
the Leonarde Keeler School under ONI orders prior to July 1951 to
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conduct polygraph examinations when the technique is applicable to
investigations being conducted by the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Operators who have received such authorization may be required to
qualify at the Office of Naval Intelligence periodically in order to
retain this authorization. The authorization may be withdrawn at
anytime by the Director of Naval Intelligence. Other investigators
currently employed by or on duty with the Office of Naval Intelligence
who are trained in the use of the polygraph will not be authorized by
the Director of Naval Intelligence as operators but may be au-
thorized to conduct polygraph examinations by the officer in charge,
district intelligence office/intelligence office. 'these operators may be
issued letters of authorization by the Director of Naval Intelligence
after attending a refresher course and/or demonstrating an acceptable
degree of proficiency in operation and understanding of ONI rules for
employment of this technique, at the Office of Naval Intelligence.
F. A. KLAVENESS
(By direction).
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
For Official Use Only.
ONI Instruction 5520.73.
Washington, D.C., October 9, 1961.
From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Distribution list.
Subject: Polygraph technique; ONI policy and rules for employment
of (U).
Reference:
(a) ONI Instruction 5520.72 of October 2, 1961, subject: ONI
polygraph operators; policy pertaining to.
(b) DNI FOUO letter of September 8, 1960, subject: Additional
polygraph notes; forwarding of (all DIOs/IOs except
15ND).
Enclosure: (1) Sample waiver form for polygraph testing.
1. Purpose.-To disseminate policy and rules of the Office of Naval
Intelligence for application of subject technique to investigative
matters.
2. Background.-The polygraph technique has been employed in
investigative matters by the Office of Naval Intelligence since 1948.
The machine used in the application of this technique is commonly
called a "lie detector" which is a misnomer. Correctly stated, the
polygraph is a machine which is capable of producing a record of
physiological phenomena which may be used as a reasonably reliable
indicator for the detection of deception. The machine will be in-
effective with certain individuals for either physical or mental reasons.
Included in this group will be mental deficients, alcohol or narcotic
addicts while under the influence, many hardened criminals, etc.
The experience of the Office of Naval intelligence has indicated that
the correct application of the subject technique is as an investigative
aid. It should be restricted, if used at all, to cautious use by skilled
operators and considered as merely one of the many techniques of
investigation rather than as a substitute therefor. The polygraph
technique is an invaluable aid to investigations provided conditions
for valid testing are present. The correct application of this tech-
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 roveinto&F ffA?M5R4qJF RM BP~g~JM~W00100380003-5
nique is as an aid to further investigation and/or interrogation. The
polygraph itself does not have the property of evoking confessions;
this remains the task of the skilled interrogator.
As set forth in reference (a), polygraph operators within the Naval
Intelligence organization are trained at the Office of Naval Intelligence
and authorized to use the technique by the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence. There is no objection generally to the utilization of persons as
operators who have been trained elsewhere; however, where done, it is
the responsibility of the respective officer in charge.
3. Policy and rules.-The following regulations comprise the general
policy and rules of the Office of Naval Intelligence in respect to applica-
tion of the polygraph techniques:
(1) The technique will not be used as the sole determinant for
eligibility for security clearances. The conditions under which
this technique may be used in this connection are described in
reference (b). Even in those cases where no other avenues of in-
quiry are available, e.g., an escapee from an Iron Curtain country,
the use of this technique alone to determine eligibility for security
clearance is strictly prohibited.
(2) The technique is to be used in conjunction with and as an
aid to investigation/interrogation, not in lieu thereof. It should
not be restricted to use as a last resort, after all other techniques,
particularly prolonged interrogation have failed; conversely, it
should not be used prematurely; rather, its use should be applied
as any investigative aid at the appropriate time relative to case
development.
(3) Subjects cannot be compelled to submit to the examination
and it is the operator's responsibility to insure that the subject
realizes he cannot be ordered or forced to submit to the examina-
tion. A waiver, setting forth the subject's agreement to submit
to polygraph examination should be obtained in each instance.
Enclosure (1) is the suggested waiver form.
(4) The responsibility for determining whether the technique
is applicable to a particular case and/or whether the issue is sus-
ceptible of resolution by the polygraph technique, is that of the
duly authorized polygraph operator. Local irreconcilable dif-
ferences of opinion as to the applicability of the technique in a
given situation should be referred to the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence for decision.
(5) Polygraph operators shall submit opinions only. It should
not be stated as a fact that "the individual told the truth" or
"the individual lied." In the opinion of the operator, results
may be positive, negative, or indeterminate. If an individual is
considered unsuitable for testing, either temporarily or perma-
nently, for some physical or mental reason, this also should be
stated as opinion only.
(6) Charts obtained by operators will be retained by them.
Opinion of more experienced operators within the district may be
sought but charts should not be given nor shown to operators who
may be engaged by a subject to refute the opinion of the ONI
operator. It is to be noted that ethical and experienced operators,
as a general rule, will decline to venture an opinion or diagnose
charts resulting from examinations conducted outside their
presence.
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(7) When the investigating agent is other than the polygraph
operator, he will furnish to the operator all information he, pos-
sesses concerning the case. The investigating agent will indicate
to the operator what information is sought and the operator in.
turn will compose the questions. Questions must be posed with
the utmost possible precision. They should be short, avoid the
injection of extraneous matter, worded so as to eliminate false
responses caused by word association and capable of being an-
swered with "yes" or "no" responses.
(8) Different categories of issues or offenses should not be
combined in one examination but each should be made the sub-
ject matter of separate examinations; for example, when an indi-
vidual to be tested is suspected of both unauthorized disclosure
of classified matter and sexual deviation, separate examination
on each offense should be conducted rather than including ques-
tions about both offenses in the same examination. In con-
sidering the order in which the issues are to be handled, consider-
ation must be given to which of the issues is liable to have the
stronger emotional impact on the subject, rather than to which
of the issues is the more important from an investigative or se-
curity viewpoint. Thus in the example included herein, even
though the compromise is the more serious offense, the subject
himself is apt to be more concerned about the sexual problem.
Accordingly, this issue should be handled first, in effect to
"sanitize" the subject so that concern about the sexual issue on
the subject's part does not becloud or distort his reactions in
response to questions concerning the compromise.
(9) The technique is not to be used as a "hunting license."
Pertinent questions will be restricted to those which are germane.
to the issue or issues on which the subject has agreed to be tested.
Control questions may be used only as required to determine if
the subject is capable of reaction to the technique or to determine
the presence of a "guilt complex."
(10) In order to be valid, a reaction must be repeated. A min-
imum of two charts should be run in each case.
(11) The operator shall include as part of his report (or shall
prepare a memorandum for the investigating agent to include
with his report) the date and place of the examinations, number
of tests administered, a list of all questions, relevant or irrelevant,
employed, responses of the subject and a statement as to his (the
operator's) opinion of the results of the examination.
(12) Requests for polygraph assistance may be received from
other Federal, State, municipal, or even private agencies, e.g.,
telephone companies, Navy contractors, etc. In the interest
of improved liaison and cooperation, such requests should be
serviced on a selective basis as a reciprocal gesture, and provided
that circumstances are in all respects favorable to employment
of the technique and provided further that such tests are not
precluded by local (municipal, State, etc.) ordinances. The
request should be obtained/confirmed in writing in each instance
and a waiver obtained from the subject(s) to be tested. The
DIO/IO or his delegated representative should be aware of each
such request before any commitment is made. Operators shall
not solicit requests for polygraph service from other agencies nor
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arrangements to do polygraph work for other agencies, even on
their own time, without the knowledge and expressed consent
of the DIO/IO.
The foregoing are intended as general guidelines and rules for em-
ployment of the polygraph technique in connection with investigations
conducted by ONI. They are not intended to be all-inclusive in
scope. Detailed instructions covering most situations which will be
encountered are given during the course of instruction at the Office
of Naval Intelligence.
4. Action.-A copy of this instruction should be made available to
each polygraph operator.
F. A. KLAVENESS
(By direction).
I, --------, ----------, have been informed of my
rights and do freely and voluntarily agree to submit myself
to examination by polygraph (lie detector). I have been told
that I do not have to submit to such an examination unless
I wish to do so. I further agree to cooperate voluntarily and
fully with the operator of the machine during this exami-
nation.
Signature---------------
Date-------------------
-----------------------
(Witness)
From : Commandant of the Marine Corps.
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-921D).
Subject : Questionnaire on polygraph usage.
Reference: (a) General Counsel of the DOD memo of June 20, 1963.
Enclosure: (1) Answers to subject questionnaire.
1. Information requested by enclosure (1) to reference (a) concern-
ing the use of polygraphs in the Marine Corps is furnished herewith
as enclosure (1). Answers are numbered the same as questions posed
by reference (a).
ROBERT A. SCHERR
(By direction).
1. Yes.
Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, S.C.
Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N.C.
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, Calif.
Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro (Santa Ana), Calif.
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, Calif.
Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, Calif.
2. The polygraph is used as an investigative aid in interrogations
of suspects and witnesses in criminal cases to assist in the evaluation
of their testimony.
(a) Polygraph tests are used in counterintelligence, felony investiga-
tions, disclosure of classified information investigations, personnel
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 69
security investigations, and may be authorized for use in misdemeanor
investigations.
(b) No. Only a small percentage of investigations involve the use
of a polygraph.
(c) The polygraph data is used for the limited purpose of evaluating
the credence of statements made by the examinee. Indication of
deception on the polygraph is never considered as evidence of guilt,and
neither legal nor administrative action is based upon such indications.
Under no circumstances may a person be subjected to a polygraph
examination without his consent. Refusal to be examined with a
lie-detector device, is not considered as proof or evidence of facts
sought to be confirmed.
(d) This headquarters has delegated authority to field commanders
to control the use of polygraphs. Whereas the orders vary among the
several commands, use of the polygraph is not permitted without the
express permission of the field commander or a designated staff officer
after consideration of the factors involved in the particular case.
(e) Yes.
(f) Charts of polygraph examinations are retained in the files of
the office of the provost marshal. The examination charts are not
furnished to any other agency. The report of the examiner is fur-
nished to the requesting authority. There is no requirement that a
record of a polygraph examination be kept in an individual's personnel
file. In rare instances these reports may become a part of an
independent investigative or administrative proceeding.
(g) Yes. In addition, a copy of the examiner's report is normally
furnished to the individual's counsel, where applicable.
(h) Normally there is no provision made for appeals. However,
should circumstances justify, a reexamination may be conducted.
Since no action is ever based on an indication of deception on the
polygraph, there appears to be no necessity for an appeal provision.
(i) Charts are normally maintained in the files of the office of the
provost marshal and are not made available to personnel other than
the qualified examiner on a need-to-know basis. The examiner's re-
port is furnished to the requesting authority. Information contained
in the examiner's report is available only on a need-to-know basis.
No security classification is assigned to either the charts or the
examiner's reports.
(j) No. See subparagraph (f), above.
(k) Yes. Each command which utilizes polygraphic equipment
maintains a separate room in which examinations are conducted.
While not standardized, these rooms are generally similar in that
they contain only the polygraph, which is built into a desk, and chairs
for the examiner and examinee. Some of these rooms are equipped
with one-way observation mirrors, all are well lighted and ventilated.
Pictures of typical rooms are attached.
(1) 812.
(m) 1.
3. One major, $9,988; 2 E-8, $6,240; 8 E-7, $5,167; 5 E-6, $5,040;
3 E-5, $4,560; 1 GS-12 (investigator), $9,790.
(a) None.
(b) Minimum qualifications for polygraph examiners are: pay grade
E-5 or above, experienced in military police duties, no convictions
by special or general court-martial, no civil convictions with the ex-
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ception of minor traffic violations, GCT score of 110, high school
graduate or equivalent, normal color perception, appropriate security
clearance, minimum age of 25, with demonstrated mental and moral
stability and be a graduate of the criminal investigations course, U.S.
Army Provost Marshal General's School, Fort Gordon, Ga. In addi-
tion, operators receive training in military justice, investigative
methods, military police criminal investigation program, military
police organizations and functions, scientific aids to investigation,
military police raids, provost marshal statistical reports, military law,
introduction to the field of lie detection, lie detector examination,
mechanical training, physiology, psychology, and techniques for
detecting deception.
(c) None.
(d) Yes. Lie detector course, Provost Marshal General's School,
Fort Gordon, Ga., and in one case, the Gormac, polygraph examiner
course, Alhambra, Calif.
4. 9.
(a) $13,060.52.
(b) $360 maintenance normally performed by assigned personnel.
(c) None.
(d) None.
5. Two copies of CMC letter DK-inps of July 5, 1960, are attached.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS,
Washington, D.C., dune 24, 1954.
From: Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Subject: Lie-detector equipment, use of.
1. The lie-detecting set, model AN/USS-2 O, has been adopted as
a Marine Corps item for use at certain designated posts and stations.
This equipment should be available in the very near future.
2. It is realized that lie detecting equipment when used in capable
hands is of valuable assistance in investigative work. The following
instructions will be complied with in the use of lie-detecting equipment:
(a) The equipment will be used only in investigations involving
serious offenses. By serious offenses it is meant those offenses
punishable under the authority of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice by confinement for more than 1. year.
(b) Only those persons will be subjected to the test who voluntarily
agree to such examinations.
(c) In the examination of any person the provisions of article 31,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the fifth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States will be adhered to.
R. II. RIDGELY, JR.
(By direction).
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS,
Washington, D.C., July 5, 1960.
From: Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Subject: Lie-detector equipment, use of.
Reference (a) CMC letter of June 24, 1954, same subject.
1. Reference (a) placed restrictions on the use of lie-detector
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 71
2. These restrictions have been reviewed and are considered no
longer necessary with the exception that only those persons who
voluntarily agree to the examination will be subject to testing with
lie-detector equipment.
3. Reference (a), accordingly, is canceled.
A. LARSON
(By direction).
DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY
(The following paragraph numbers correspond to the numbered
questions on the committee's questionnaire form.)
1. The following organizations within Headquarters Field Command
possess polygraph equipment:
(a) 901st Intelligence Corps Detachment (901st INTO DET)
(b) 46th Military Police Detachment, Criminal Investigation,
(46th MP DET CI)
2. In general, the polygraph is used in furtherance of complaint and
background investigations. Results of polygraph examinations are
used to assist in establishing the veracity of statements or degree of
implication of individuals involved in investigations. Prior to a
polygraph examination, the subject of the examination is advised of
his rights under the fifth amendment to the Constitution or article 31,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and must complete a lie detector
examination-certificate of consent (DA form 19-85). The subject is
then apprised of the questions to be asked during the examination to
insure that he fully understands them. Upon completion of the
examination, a post-examination interview is conducted. If deception
to any of the questions asked during the examination is indicated, the
post examination interview is used to gain additional information
about the circumstances surrounding the questionable area. If no
deception is indicated, the post-examination interview is used to advise
the subject of the results of the examination. The procedures utilized
in the conduct of polygraph examinations indicated above are in con-
sonance with FM 30-17, FM 30-15, AR 195-21 and TB PMG 22.
(See exhibit IV.)
(a) The polygraph is used in cases involving:
(1) Falsification of statements of personal history (DD form
398).
(2) Falsification of sworn statements made during the conduct
of an investigation.
(3) Homosexual activity.
(4) Persons suspected of having committed a crime punishable
under Uniform Code of Military Justice.
(5) To obtain leads to the facts of an offense, the location of
stolen goods and the whereabouts of wanted persons.
(6) Disaffection.
(7) Association with criminal elements.
(8) Communist affiliation.
(9) Lost classified documents.
(10 Suspected sabotage.
(b) The polygraph is not used in every investigation indicated in
referenced paragraph 2(a). Normally the device is used to gain
information not otherwise attainable by other investigative techniques.
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72 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(c) No weight is given data resulting from polygraph tests unless
they are confirmed by admissions or other investigative procedures.
A person's refusal to take a test cannot be construed as an admission
or even a partial admission of guilt. (Reference par 3(d), AR 195-21.)
(d) The initial recommendation for employment of the polygraph
is made by the agent in charge of the investigation. Determination as
to its use is made by the commanding officer of the detachment, and
is subject to the approval of higher authority. Occasionally, higher
authority will direct that, with the consent of the subject, a polygraph
examination be conducted.
(e) During the pretest interview conducted by the polygraph
operator, the subject is questioned regarding his physical and mental
condition and history and the medical history of his close blood rela-
tives. In the event it appears that the subject's physical or mental
condition might not be conducive to an examination, the subject is
referred to competent medical authority for a determination as to the
advisability of the polygraph examination. (See par. 81, FM 30-17
and pars. 3(e)-(h), AR 195-21.)
(f) 901st INTC DET: The results of the polygraph examinations
are recorded in Agent Reports (DA Form 341). Included with the
report as an exhibit, is the lie detector examination-certificate of
consent. The report with exhibit is forwarded to the requesting
agency for ultimate inclusion in the subject's intelligence and security
file. Other reports, records and charts pertaining to the examination
are retained by the examining agency in accordance with paragraph
86. FM 30-17. (See pars. 86 and 136, FM 30-17.)
46th MP DET CI: The results of the polygraph examination are
recorded on DA form 19-64, lie detector examination report and,
when applicable, included in the military police report of investigation,
DA form 19-65, as an exhibit. Also attached as an exhibit is the lie
detector examination certificate of consent, DA form 19-85. This
report is forwarded to the commanding officer of the unit concerned
for his information only, with an information copy furnished the Field
Command Security Office. Other reports, records and charts per-
taining to the examination are retained by this office in accordance
with paragraphs 5 and 6, AR 195-21.
(g) Findings of the polygraph examinations are made available to
the subject.
(h) There is no appeal to the findings of polygraph examinations,
since such findings are not, used as a basis for administrative or
punitive action. The polygraph examination is an investigative tech-
nique used to lead to evidence which is legally sufficient.
(i) As a nuniinum, reports of polygraph examinations are afforded
a protective marking of "For Official Use Only" to limit dissemination
to persons who have an official need to know (AR 345-15). In the
event the examination contains defense information it is marked with
the appropriate security classification and protected accordingly (AR
380-5 and par. 131, FM 30-17).
(j) Refusal to take polygraph examination is recorded on an agent
report (DA form 341) and is included in the subject's intelligence and
security file maintained by FCSO. In the case of criminal investiga-
tions a record of refusal is made in the report of investigation.
(k) The 901st INTC DET has two rooms (exhibits I and 11)
measuring approximately 12 by 12 feet which are used for the conduct
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of routine interviews and polygraph examinations. These rooms are
soundproofed, carpeted, and equipped with an observation mirror
and sound recording equipment (see par. 83, FM 30-17).
The 46th MP DET CI has one room (exhibit III) measuring
approximately 12 by 15 feet which is used for the conduct of routine
interviews and polygraph examinations. This room is semisound-
proofed, carpeted, and equipped with an observation mirror and sound
recording equipment. (See par. 10, TB PMG 22.)
(1) During the fiscal year 1963, 901st INTC DET conducted 37
polygraph examinations. Of this number, two examinations were
conducted for the 112th Intelligence Group, Albuquerque, N. Mex.;
two for the Office of Naval Intelligence, Albuquerque, N. Mex.; one
for the Atomic Energy Commission, Albuquerque, N. Mex.; and six
for Army Materiel Command (Wingate Army Depot).
During the fiscal year 1963, 46th MP DET CI conducted 103
polygraph examinations. Of this number, five examinations were
conducted for the Office of Naval Intelligence, Albuquerque, N. Mex.;
five for Army Materiel Command (White Sands Missile Range); one
for Air Police, Holloman Air Force Base; and one for 112th Intelligence
Group, Albuquerque, N. Mex.
(m) No polygraph examinations were conducted by other agencies
at the request of these organizations.
3. (a) Personnel authorized to conduct polygraph examinations in
the 901st INTC DET are as follows:
Salary per
annum
Officer in charge, operational control, S2/S3
Military intelligence specialist ____________________________________________
CWo, W3__
S. Sgt, E6=__
$7, 800
4, 640
(b) Personnel authorized to conduct polygraph examinations in
46th MP DET CI are as follows:
Salary per
annum
None of the personnel listed above has the primary duty of poly-
graph operator.
Minimum qualification for polygraph operators is successful com-
ppletion of the Lie Detector Course, Provost Marshal General School,
Il ort Gordon, Ga. (See par. 4, AR 195-21.)
(c) No unit training program for polygraph operators is conducted
in these organizations.
(d) In addition to the training at the school indicated in referenced
paragraph 3(b), detachment polygraph operators attend the annual
Soutiwestern Polygraph Clinic sponsored by the University of Okla-
homa, Norman, Okla. Purpose of the clinic is to acquaint operators
with the latest equipment and techniques.
4. The 901st INTC DET is authorized two polygraphs, one Stoelt-
ing Deceptograph, AN/USS 2D, and one Stoelting Deceptograph,
AN/USS 2B. (See TA 95, FC, DASA, 30 Apr 63, and letter AGAO-S
413.6, G2-M, DA TAG, Washington 25, D.C., 5 Apr 52.)
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46th MP DET CI is authorized one lie detector AN/USS 2B,
Stoelting Deceptograph. (Reference TOE 19-500D, line item num-
ber 6239.10.)
(a) Total acquisition cost of the Deceptographs for 901st INTO
D T is $2,270.00. Total acquisition cost for the Deceptograph for
46th MP DET CI is $1,170.00.
(b) Maintenance of the polygraph is performed by 901st INTO
DET personnel at an estimated cost of $75 per annum. Estimated
total maintenance cost per annum for 46th MP DET CI is $50.
Maintenance is performed by detachment personnel. (Reference
paragraph 7b, AR 195-21.)
(c) These organizations do not lease polygraphs nor do they con-
tract with other agencies for the performance of polygraph exami-
nations.
(d) Average annual additional expenses attributable to polygraph
examinations are as follows:
901st INTO DET:
Attendance at the polygraph clinic-------------------------------
$232
Travel incident to examinations at other locations-----------------
425
Transportation and per diem expense for training of operators at the
Provost Marshal General School-------------------------------
420
Total------------------------------------------------------
1
077
46th MP DET Cl:
Attendance at polygraph clinics---------------------------------
,
277
Expendable supplies-------------------------------------------
25
Travel incident to examinations at other locations-----------------
45
Transportation and per diem for expenses for training of operators at
Provost Marshal General School (1 man returned July 1, 1963)----
420
Total---------------------------------------
---------------
767
5. Two copies of all intraagency directives, regulations and in-
structions governing the use of polygraphs within DASA are attached
as exhibit IV.
.1. References
(a) AR 195-21
(b) AR 600-110
(c) TM 11-5538
(d) TB PMG 22
2. Procedure:
(a) The lie detecting set will be used as an aid to inter-
rogation in the course of an investigation and not as a sub-
stitute for employment of other investigative techniques.
(b) The lie detector operator will conduct lie detector
examinations in accordance with policy outlined in AR
195-21 and TB PMG 22.
(c) No person shall be required to submit to a lie detector
examination without his written consent. This consent
will be recorded on a lie detector examination statement of
consent form (DA Form 19-85) in two copies. In addition
to the above, female personnel will be treated in accordance
with AR 600-110.
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(d) An examination of a suspected homosexual will not
be undertaken unless there is an allegation of an overt act
of homosexual behavior.
(e) No person will be examined who is significantly
fatigued, emotionally upset, intoxicated, under sedation,
mentally disordered, addicted to drugs or experiencing
physical discomfort, or who possesses physical defects such
as extreme high blood pressure, which might cause an
abnormal response. The lie detector examiner will deter-
mine whether or not the conditions under which the examina-
tions are conducted meet the criteria necessary to conduct a
successful test.
(f) Lie detector operators will not examine anyone solely
for the purpose of assisting civil police investigating a crime
concerned solely with civilians (ref. pt. III, par. 2). How-
ever, anyone may be examined in connection with any case
that is within the jurisdiction of the CID detachment, or
any investigation for an official military purpose (ref. pt. I,
par. 2).
(g) The person who requests the examination will be in the
observation room during the entire test so as to be readily
available during the examination to clarify questionable
points. He will also be prepared to take a written statement
from the subject. This person will also complete the front
side of the lie detector operator's data and question sheet
(DA Form 19-63), except for the lie detector file number.
The personal data and background of the subject will be
obtained from the subject's personnel files.
(h) Only persons authorized by the provost marshal
general will administer lie detector examinations.
3. Charts and reports:
(a) A lie detector examiner's report (DA Form 19-64)
will be rendered on each examination. This report will be
attached as an exhibit to the pertinent military police report
of investigation.
(b) Lie detector reports, charts, and all allied papers will
be classified according to existing regulations.
(c) A copy of each lie detector examiner's report (DA
Form 19-64) together with the original lie detector chart,
lie detector operator's data and question sheet (DA Form
19-63) and second copy of statement of consent (DA Form
19-85) will be filed in the lie detector report file.
(d) The original statement of consent (DA Form 19-85)
will be attached to the copy of the pertinent report of investi-
gation which is forwarded to the repository.
(e) First echelon maintenance of the lie detector set is the
responsibility of the lie detector operator. A record of this
maintenance will be kept on file in the lie detector room.
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DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY
(The following paragraph numbers correspond to the numbered
questions on the committee's questionnaire form.)
1. The Defense Supply Agency does not possess any polygraph
equipment nor does it conduct polygraph examinations. Results of
polygraph examinations conducted by a military department or law-
enforcement agency are used during the course of specific criminal
investigations and considered in isolated cases by DSA in making
security determinations.
2. Polygraph examinations are requested and employed as an inves-
tigative aid supplementing normal criminal investigative techniques
which develop basic facts. The lie detector operators are governed
by the administering agency's rules and regulations. Individuals are
warned of their rights prior to any form of questioning and may be
requested to take a lie detector examination where facts or information
have been developed indicating the individuals may possess pertinent
information. Individuals are asked to sign a statement agreeing to
this type of examination before it is given. All counterintelligence
investigations of DSA personnel are performed by Army, Navy, and
Air Force investigators. Polygraph examinations of DSA personnel
are not a routine aspect of such investigations but are only undertaken
when this agency specifically requests them. In those cases polygraph
examinations of DSA personnel are requested only as a means of
resolving conflicting statements made by a person under security
investigation or to determine the credibility of such statements when
they do not conform to facts or allegations developed in the course
of an investigation. Such examinations are used as an ancillary
check, and not as a means of ascertaining information which was not
otherwise developed in the course of the routine investigation. The
only instance in which polygraphs are used in a primary rather than
ancillary role is as a means of investigating such persons as immigrant
aliens for whom, because of geographical, political, or other considera-
tions, it is not possible to complete a routine background investigation.
(a) Polygraph examinations are used as an aid in criminal, counter-
intelligence, and security investigations.
(b) Polygraph examinations are not used in every instance or in a
routine manner, but only as an aid in those cases where DSA specifi-
cally requests the examination.
(c) The Defense Supply Agency's experience with polygraph exam-
inations as an aid in security and intelligence work has been unsatis-
factory because of difficulty in interpreting the results. The more
vague the charge, the more inconclusive the results. Wherever possi-
ble, more reliable information is used. While only limited significance
is attached to data developed by the polygraph test, in a clear-cut
"did-you-or-didn't-you" situation, refusal of an individual to submit
to a polygraph is considered as an unfavorable reflection on the
credibility of the individual's statement. In criminal investigations,
physiological responses recorded during the examination which indi-
cate the possibility of knowledge concerning a given situation serve
as the basis for further normal investigation.
(d) In security operations the intelligence officer at Headquarters
DSA and at a major field activity normally determines when to
request a polygraph test. Such determinations are not reviewed by
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 77
higher authority. In criminal investigations an examination would
normally be recommended by the investigator and approved by the
provost marshal or similar staff officer of a major field activity.
(e) DSA relies on the judgment of the personnel of the department
or agency administering the polygraph examination in determining
the physical and mental condition and suitability of the person to
be tested.
(f) Polygraph examination data is retained in the investigative or
security file, never in the individual's personnel file.
(g) The findings of the polygraph examination are not made
available to the individuals who take the test since the results of an
examination are generally used in connection with further criminal
investigation rather than as the basis for administrative or criminal
action.
(h) No specific "appeal" procedures are provided for persons who
take a polygraph test since the results are generally used in connection
with further investigation. To the extent, however, that results of a
polygraph examination are used in criminal proceedings or adverse
personnel actions they are subject to the rules of procedure, evidence,
challenge, refutation, etc., governing the proceeding in which they
are used.
(i) Polygraph examination results are marked "For official use
only" and are made available only to those who have a need to know
in the performance of official duties. In the case of security examina-
tions, this is normally restricted to the intelligence officer and the
commanding officer of the activity.
(j) Refusal to take a polygraph examination is not reflected in the
individual's personnel records.
(k) No special facilities are maintained by DSA for the performance
of polygraph tests.
(1) No polygraph tests were conducted by DSA in fiscal year 1963.
(m) Seven polygraph examinations were conducted by other agen-
cies at the request of DAS during fiscal year 1963.
3. No DSA employees are authorized to conduct polygraph tests.
4. DSA does not have any polygraph devices.
5. Since DSA does not conduct polygraph examinations but relies on
other agencies for this assistance, the regulations and procedures of
the administering agency are followed as a guide. DSA Regulation
5210.6 does, however, mention the use of polygraph examinations in
connection with the clearance of DSA personnel for access to defense
information. Paragraph IV, B, 3, c (p. 6) provides that lie-detector
examinations may be used for the purpose of determining an alien's
eligibility for limited access to classified information when a back-
ground investigation cannot be completed in all its aspects.
(An excerpt of this regulation follows):
c. Investigation.-The minimum scope of the investigation
to be conducted for the purpose of granting a limited access
authorization under the provisions of the DSAR's will
include:
(1) Such components of a background investigation
(par. III, enclosure 1, DSAR 5210.2) that can be accom-
plished, plus a check of the files of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
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78 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERN
(2) A lie detector examination to cover that portion of the
individual's life which cannot be investigated because of
geographical, political, or other considerations.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
1. The National Security Agency does possess and make use of
polygraph equipment as an aid to certain interviews. These inter-
views are conducted by personnel of the Office of Security.
2. The extremely sensitive nature of the information and work of the
National Security Agency requires that most careful appraisal be
given to the employment and clearance of its personnel. An inter-
view with the aid of a polygraph conducted by a professionally trained
operator is required of all prospective civilian employees as one step
in the preemployment processing designed for the collection of data
upon which an appraisal may be made of the individual's eligibility
for employment and access to classified information. The conduct of
interviews with the aid of a polygraph is prescribed by regulation.
(a) The primary purpose of the interview in which the polygraph
is utilized is to provide data which may be used with that collected
from other sources in an appraisal of an applicant for employment to
determine his eligibility for access to sensitive classified information.
In rare instances, the polygraph may be utilized during interview of an
employee with regard to a matter of security concern which has been
extensively investigated but difficult to resolve. In instances of this
nature, the polygraph is employed only as a last resort with the ap-
proval of the Director of Security or higher authority and the willing
consent of the employee.
(b) A security interview with the aid of a polygraph is required of
all candidates for the sensitive positions within the National Security
Agency as part of preemployment processing. With respect to inter-
views of employees, use of the polygraph depends upon the circum-
stances, the willingness of the employee to consent to such an interview,
and the approval of the Director of Security or higher authority.
(c) To be favorably considered for employment and access to
sensitive classified information, each applicant must successfully com-
plete a security interview with the aid of a polygraph. Recordings of
physiological reaction made by the polygraph machine in the course
of an interview are not utilized in reaching any finding with respect
to the questions for which an individual is providing a response.
The recording by the machine assists the interviewer in identifying
areas in which the individual should be questioned further. In-
formation furnished by the individual to the interviewer prior to,
during and subsequent to the utilization of the polygraph machine is
considered along with that from all other sources in the appraisal of
the individual's eligibility for employment and access. The refusal
of an employee to be interviewed with the aid of a polygraph is not
considered to be prejudicial to the employee in any way. Informa-
tion obtained from an applicant or employee during the course of such
an interview is utilized in connection with other investigation action as
appropriate. for all
(d) The use of an interview with the aid of a polygraph civilian applicants as one preemployment step is a requirement of the
National Security Agency with the approval of the Department of
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Defense. The determination that an employee may be interviewed
with the aid of a polygraph may be made by the Director of Security,
subject to review by the Director of the National Security Agency.
In the case of employee interviews, the employee himself must also
freely and voluntarily consent before such, an interview may be
conducted.
(e) In connection with each interview with the aid of a polygraph,
the physical and mental condition of the person is a definite considera-
tion. The Agency's Medical Center is available and utilized for
professional consultation whenever there is any question in this area.
(f) Supplementary personal history data and other information
furnished by the individual to the interviewer is incorporated into a
written report of the interview which is maintained in the individual's
security file under strict control.
(g) The individual is not specifically advised of the results of the
interview with the aid of a polygraph. The information obtained
during the security interview with the aid of a polygraph is combined
with all that which is collected from other processing and investigative
sources and utilized in making a determination of the individual's
eligibility for employment and access.
(h) An adverse finding regarding the qualifications of an applicant
for employment and access is based upon an appraisal of all the infor-
mation collected through the various preemployment processing
procedures. There is no finding based on the recordings of the in-
strument during interview conducted with the aid of a polygraph,
although the information furnished by the individual to the inter-
viewer is utilized. Appeal procedures are not provided for applicants.
In the case of employees, any adverse finding is based upon the com-
plete results of all investigative processes. Disciplinary action
resulting from an adverse finding may be appealed under the provisions
and protection of applicable statutes and regulations.
(i) Reports of interviews conducted with the aid of a polygraph,
as such, are not classified unless specific information is contained
therein which warrants a security classification on its own merit.
However, all reports of such interviews are treated as privileged in-
formation and their release is strictly controlled.
(j) Before an employee of the National Security Agency may be
interviewed with the aid of a polygraph he must voluntarily consent
to such an interview. Refusal by the employee to consent to such
an interview may not be used in a manner prejudicial to the indi-
vidual. While notation as to the circumstances of an employee's
refusal to consent to an interview with the aid of a polygraph may
be made a part of the investigation being conducted, no reference
to the refusal is reflected in any way in the employee's personnel
file. Normally, refusal to assent to such an. interview will require
more exhaustive investigation.
(k) The National Security Agency has several interview rooms,
identical in size, decor, and equipment. Every effort is made to
establish and maintain a professional atmosphere free of outside
distractions.
(1) The number of interviews conducted with the aid of a polygraph
during fiscal year 1963 must be considered as classified security
information.
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80 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(m) No other agency, public or private, conducted interviews at
the request of this Agency in fiscal year 1963.
3. The number of persons authorized to conduct polygraph inter-
views is considered to be classified security information. Section 6
of Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) exempts the Agency from
requirements to disclose the organization or any function of the
Agency, any information with respect to its activities, or the names,
titles, salaries, or numbers of persons employed by the Agency.
(a) The number of persons who have as their primary duty the
conduct of polygraph interviews is considered to be classified security
information and also falls within the exemptions cited above.
(b) The Agency's minimum qualifications for persons conducting
interviews with the aid of a polygraph are: At least 25 years of age;
a degree from an accredited college or 2 years of college plus 4 years
of military or civilian experience as an investigator, interviewer, or
employee in other allied fields which require meeting the public;
satisfactory completion of a course in polygraph training at an ac-
credited polygraph school; clear demonstration of traits of maturity,
good judgment, tact, objectivity, and the ability to conduct an
unbiased interview. The minimum grade level in this Agency for
polygraph examiners is GS-11. GS-12 represents the journeyman
level, and GS-13 the senior specialist level of polygraph examiner.
(c) The National Security Agency does not conduct its own basic
training program in techniques of interview with the aid of a poly-
graph. However, each Agency employee who is to be utilized in
the conduct of such interviews must satisfactorily complete a course
in polygraph training at an accredited school and a 6-month period
of on-the-job training. During this period the employee is critically
observed and closely monitored by supervisors and is furnished
appropriate guidance, direction, and assistance.
(d) During the fiscal year 1963 the National Security Agency
utilized the instructional program at the National Training Center
of Lie Detection, suite 404, 165 West 45th Street, New York, N.Y.,
and the Provost Marshal General School, Fort Gordon, Ga.
4. The information as to the number of polygraph equipments
possessed by the National Security Agency is considered classified
security information and was covered by the exemption cited in
response to question 3, above.
(a) The cost of acquisition of these equipments is considered classi-
fied security information.
(b) Minor cleaning, adjusting, and repairs of instruments are per-
formed by personnel of the National Security Agency. Instruments
requiring major repairs are returned to the manufacturer for that
purpose.
(c) The National Security Agency does not lease polygraph instru-
ments nor does it contract other private or public agencies to conduct
interviews with the aid of a polygraph.
(d) The information regarding the expenses attributed to testing
is considered classified security information.
5. The National Security Agency has an extensive program of
controls with respect to the utilization of the polygraph in connection
with security interviews, including policy statements, regulations,
and operating procedures. These documents are classified in accord-
ance with established security requirements for defense information
which must be protected in the interest of national security.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 81
REPLY FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Washington, D.C., July 19, 1963.
Mr. JOIIN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House Office
Building.
DEAR MR. Moss: This is in reply to your letter of June 11, 1963, in
which you requested information on the use of polygraphs in the
District government.
The only agency in the District government using polygraphs is the
Metropolitan Police Department. A copy of Chief Murray's replies
to your questionnaire is enclosed for your information and disposition.
Sincerely yours,
WALTER N. TOBRINER, President.
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
July 10, 1963.
Mr. CLIFFORD K. DODD,
Personnel Office.
DEAR MR. DODD: In compliance with your request of June 24,
1963, relative to the use of the polygraph by this Department, the
following information is supplied, being keyed to questions in the
subcommittee questionnaire.
1. Yes. Use limited to certain qualified criminal cases.
2. The polygraph is used by this Department as an investigative aid
in the criminal cases reported to the Department. It is never used as
a substitute for a thorough and complete investigation.
(a) The primary purpose is as an investigative aid in criminal cases.
It is not used for job screening, as a prerequisite for job employment
or security clearance processing. It has also been used in a few in-
stances where members of the Department have been suspected of
improper conduct that could in itself be a criminal violation.
(b) No.
(c) The weight given to the results of such tests varies from case
to case, depending on the reason for the giving of such an examination
in any criminal case. As to refusal to take such an examination, all
persons are fully advised of their right of refusal and any refusal can be
given no weight as to guilt or innocence. The testing requires coop-
eration by the subject and a form indicating voluntary taking of the
test and prior advice regarding refusal, is used. Such tests supple-
ment other investigative procedures.
(d) The individual polygraph examiner reviews the facts of each
criminal case with the investigator who makes a request and deter-
mines if the need for such an examination is present. All requests for
examinations and polygraph examiners are controlled by and subject
to review by the Chief of Detectives.
(e) Yes.
(f) Results of each examination are given to the investigating
officer who made the request for the test. All charts and other data
are kept on file in the polygraph section, separate and apart from any
other records in the Police Department.
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82 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(g) Yes.
(h) The right of "administrative" appeal does not apply in the use
made by this Department, since all criminal cases must ultimately
be presented to a court of law and the results of polygraph examina-
tions are not admissible in these courts.
(i) Access to all polygraph data is restricted to authorized persons
only. No classification as such is attached to this data. Existing
laws and departmental regulations govern the actions of officers (all
polygraph examiners are police officers) as to discussing any case
currently under investigation, or prior to its presentment in a court
of law.
(j) Members of the Department are not requested to submit to a
polygraph examination, unless a criminal violation or a serious
breach of conduct has occurred, and then only after a thorough in-
vestigation has been made and the need for a polygraph examination
has been determined by an official of such rank as designated by the
Chief of Police to conduct the investigation. Departmental regula-
tions require members to obey the order of a superior officer and it
is possible that an officer could be cited for refusal of an order to
submit to an examination.
(k) The giving of a polygraph examination has, as a basic premise,
that it be conducted under controlled conditions. This means sound-
proofed rooms and complete privacy. This Department has such a
room, sound proofed, air conditioned, and with a rug on the floor to
further reduce noise. The room is equipped with microphones and
a two-way mirror to an adjacent observation room. This permits
observation by sight and hearing and is particularly appropriate in
any examination given to a female witness.
(1) 350 examinations.
(m) None.
3. Lieutenant, general assignment squad, $9,475; detective ser-
geant, narcotic squad, $9,390; detective sergeant, safe squad, $8,790;
detective, homicide squad, $7,590; detective, check and fraud squad,
$7,590; detective, general assignment squad, $7,590.
(a) All polygraph examiners are assigned to detective division
squads and their primary duty is that of every other member of that
squad. Their giving of polygraph examinations is in addition to
their other duties. They are not given any additional compensation
for their polygraph examinations, many of which are given on the
officer's own or off-duty time.
(b) All examiners must be police officers of this Department.
All must be experienced investigators. The Chief of Detectives
selects applicants based upon their ability as investigators, education,
character, understanding of human relations, and after successful
completion of a recognized course in polygraph training they are
authorized to conduct examinations.
(c) This Department does not train any polygraph examiners.
(d) This Department has sent all of the past and current examiners
to the Provost Marshal General's School at Fort Gordon, Ga. This
course runs for 9 weeks, and covers not only the fundamentals of the
instrument, but such related subjects as physiology and psychology.
4. This Department owns two desk model Stoelting "Deceptograph"
polygraph instruments, and one portable Stoelting "Deceptograph"
polygraph. All three of these instruments have a minimum of
three components, and are true poly ra hs.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 83
(a) The portable instrument was purchased in 1951 at an approxi-
mate cost of $500. Each of the desk models cost $1,300 each and are
2 and 3 years old, respectively.
(b) In 10 years, approximately $100 has been expended for the
maintenance of these instruments, or about $10 per year. All
maintenance is performed by the examiners, who are trained in
instrument repair.
(c) Not applicable.
(d) The only other cost necessary for the operation of the poly-
graphs is the purchase of the chart paper used, which amounts to
about $50 per year.
5. As previously indicated, use of the polygraph by the Metropolitan
Police Department is as an investigative aid in criminal investiga-
tions and no administrative orders or intra-agency directives have
been issued relating specifically to use of these instruments. In-
vestigations are conducted in compliance with general rules and
regulations of the Department and in accordance with procedures
acceptable in our courts.
Trusting this will be satisfactory for your purpose, I am,
Very truly yours,
ROBERT V. MURRAY, Chief of Police.
REPLY FROM THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, D.C., July 22, 1963.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-
committee, Committee on Government Operations, I-louse of Repre-
sentatives.
DEAR MR. Moss: Further reference is made to your letter of June
11, 1963, concerning the use of polygraphs or other so-called lie detect-
ing devices by General Services Administration. The information
and data requested have been assembled in the attached memorandum
report, which conforms to the format of the two-page questionnaire
which accompanied. your letter.
The memorandum report indicates that GSA has only one polygraph
in its possession. This machine, which was recently acquired as
excess property, is not in working condition and has never been used
by GSA. Details regarding it are furnished in the memorandum
report under paragraph 4.
There are no GSA employees authorized to conduct polygraph or
similar tests. Polygraphs are not used in connection with employ-
ment interviews. The personnel files do not contain any data
derived from such tests, or record. the refusal of an employee to take
such a test.
The Compliance Division, Office of Finance and Administration,
is the only segment of GSA which has requested other agencies to
conduct polygraph tests. Such requests were made on 10 occasions
during fiscal year 1963 incident to investi'ations of alleged mis-
conduct by GSA employees. On one occasion, prior to fiscal year
1963, a polygraph test was requested in connection with a security
clearance processing. All data resulting from polygraph tests remain.
in the possession of the Compliance Division.
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84 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
I trust the information in the memorandum report may be helpful
to you.
Sincerely yours,
BERNARD L. BOUTIN, Administrator.
1. The Compliance Division, Office of Finance and Administration,
is the only segment of General Services Administration which possesses
or makes use of polygraphs or other so-called lie detection devices.
The only polygraph in the possession of the Compliance Division is
one which was acquired recently after being declared excess by another
Government agency. Further details regarding this machine appear
under paragraph 4 below.
The Compliance Division has, on a few occasions, requested other
agencies to conduct polygraph tests. These are the only requests of
this nature which have emanated from GSA.
2. As GSA, except for the Compliance Division, does not possess
nor make use of polygraph or other so-called lie detection devices, no
general procedures have been established. The Compliance Division
regards the polygraph test as one of many investigative techniques.
The procedures of the Compliance Division are outlined in detail
below in the answers to specific questions.
(a) Polygraph tests are not used in connection with employment
interviews.
On only one occasion has a polygraph test been used during a
security clearance processing.
Polygraph tests have been used during investigations of alleged
improper conduct by GSA employees on infrequent occasions.
(b) Polygraph tests are very seldom used for any purpose. There
are no occasions when the use of a polygraph is mandatory.
(c) No weight is given the data resulting from a polygraph test
unless there is a subsequent admission from the person taking the test.
(d) The initial determination to request a polygraph test is made
by the special agent in charge of a Compliance Division regional
office, subject to review by the Director of the Compliance Division.
A request incident to a security clearance processing may be initiated
by a security specialist subject to review by the GSA security officer.
(e) The physical and mental condition of a person is always con-
sidered prior to requesting the individual to voluntarily take a poly-
graph test.
(f) The data derived from polygraph tests is always retained in the
files of the Compliance Division. It is never placed in any employee's
personnel file.
(g) The persons who have taken polygraph tests are informed orally
of the results during subsequent interviews.
(h) Employees always have their administrative right of appeal in
cases of adverse findings.
(i) The data resulting from polygraph tests is not given a security
classification but is considered administratively confidential.
(j) Refusal to take a polygraph test is never reflected in any way
whatsoever in an individual's personnel record.
(k) GSA maintains no special facilities for polygraph tests.
(l)`'No polygraph tests or examinations involving similar devices
were conducted by GSA in fiscal year 1963.
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(m) On 10 occasions during fiscal year 1963, the Compliance Divi-
sion requested other agencies to conduct polygraph tests in connection
with investigations of alleged misconduct by GSA employees.
3. There are no GSA employees authorized to conduct polygraph
or similar tests.
(a) Not applicable.
(b) Not applicable.
(c) Not applicable.
(d) Not applicable.
4. The one polygraph in the possession of the Compliance Division
was declared excess by another Government agency and has not been
in working condition since it was acquired. It is being examined to de-
termine if it can be repaired. The machine, if repaired, will be avail-
able for the use of qualified personnel of other agencies who may
conduct tests at the request of the Compliance Division. Some may
prefer, of course, to use their own equipment.
No attempt will be made to qualify GSA personnel to conduct
polygraph tests. The expense involved would not be justified by the
few occasions such tests are required. The cooperation received from
.other agencies is very satisfactory.
(a) GSA acquired the one polygraph in its possession after it was
declared excess by another Government agency. The transfer papers
indicate the original acquisition cost was $1,170.
(b) The above polygraph was acquired on March 28, 1963, and is
being examined to- see if it can be repaired.
(c) GSA does not lease polygraphs nor contract for other agencies to
perform polygraph tests.
On the few occasions when the Compliance Division requested
polygraph tests they were performed gratis by local law enforcement
agencies, investigative units of the armed services and other Govern-
ment agencies.
(d) No expenses are attributable to polygraph tests requested by
GSA. No travel expenses have been involved in the tests requested
to date.
5. No intraagency directives, administrative orders, rules, regula-
tions, and/or instructions governing the use of polygraphs or similar
devices have been issued by GSA.
The personnel of the Compliance Division have been orally in-
structed to contact the Director of the Compliance Division before
requesting a polygraph test. All facets of the individual case being
investigated are thoroughly discussed and appropriate instructions
are then issued by the Director. The use of polygraphs has been dis-
cussed at conferences of the special agents in charge.
REPLY FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, ANDAWELFARE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
Hon. JOHN E. Moss, Washington, D.C., July 26, 1963.
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reply to your letter of June 11,
1963, concerning the use of polygraphs or other so-called lie detec-
tion devices.
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The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare does not use
polygraphs or similar instruments which may serve as lie detectors
for any administrative purpose such as employment interviews,
security or misconduct investigations, etc. Lie detector tests are
never given to employees or prospective employees. We have there-
fore not completed the detailed questionnaire attached to your letter
since we do not carry on activities of the kind contemplated.
The function of lie detection is only one specialized use to which
polygraphs or similar instruments which record certain physiological
processes such as pulse rate, respiration rate, blood pressure and so
on may be put. Instruments of this kind have a more
use in experimental medicine. Three units in the Department: the
National Institutes of Health; St. Elizabeths Hospital; and the Public
Health Service Hospital at Fort Worth, Tex., have polygraphs or
related instruments. These instruments are used most frequently on
animals undergoing experiment. They are also used on human beings
to record the physiological reactions of patients under anesthesia, and
in some cases in connection with patients with mental or neurological
disorders who are under study. They are never used as lie detec-
tors. In every case whether involving animals or humans the use
of the instrument is directed by physicians or professional psychologists.
The Department owns a total of eight polygraphs which are used
for the purposes stated above. They were acquired at a total cost of
approximately $20,000. In addition, we own nine instrumentaloscillographs which can be used for the same purposes as polygraphs.
The total acquisition cost of these instruments was approximately
$27,000. Routine maintenance of these instruments is usually done
by the staff of the laboratory in which they are used. Costs for
outside servicing have been minimal.
Please let me know if there is any additional information which you
need.
Sincerely,
ANTHONY J. CELEBREZZE, Secretary.
REPLY FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D.C., July 8, 1963.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations.
DEAR MR. Moss: This is in response to your letter of June 11, 1963,
requesting information concerning the use of polygraphs or other lie
detection devices in the Department of the Interior.
The U.S. Park Police of the National Park Service is the only agency
in this Department which makes use of polygraph tests and then only
on a very limited basis. These tests are conducted by other Govern-
ment agencies at the specific request of the U.S. Park Police in each
instance.
Enclosed, in the format of the questionnaire transmitted with your
letter, is our report describing in detail the usage made of polygraph
tests in the Department of the Interior.
Sincerely yours,
D. OTIS BEASLEY,
Administrative Assistant Secretary.
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1. The U.S. Park Police does not possess any polygraph or other
lie-detection devices. They do occasionally request polygraph tests
through other agencies who have such equipment.
2. Requests to have polygraph tests made received from members
of the force are submitted to the Chief of U.S. Park Police. If the
Chief approves the request, arrangements are made by the U.S. Park
Police with other Government or enforcement agencies to conduct
such tests. Tests conducted for U.S. Park Police are made in accord-
ance with the regulations of the cooperating agency who conducts
the test.
(a) Polygraph tests are sometimes requested in connection with
investigation of criminal offenses and occasionally for investigation
of serious personnel complaints.
(b) These devices are not used in every instance listed in question
(a). Polygraph tests are seldom used by Park Police, and they are
used only with consent of the person to be tested.
(c) Polygraph tests are used to corroborate statements made in
previous interrogation. Results of the tests are never used as evidence
in court. Refusal to take such tests is not constructed to be an
indication of guilt.
(d) The initial determination to request a polygraph test is made
by the officer conducting an investigation. The request must be
submitted to the Chief of U.S. Park Police for approval.
(e) The physical and mental condition of each person to be tested
is considered. Requests for tests of persons obviously not in good
physical or mental condition would not be made. Final determina-
tion as to suitability of the person's condition to undergo polygraph
testing would be made by the expert administering the test under
rules of his agency.
(f) Data derived pertaining to a criminal offense is filed in the
criminal case folder. Data pertaining to investigation of a members
conduct is filed in the affected member's personnel folder, or separately,
if deemed appropriate.
(g) Findings of such tests are made available to individuals who
take such tests.
(h) The right of appeal would be honored in the case of adverse
findings upon request.
(i) Access to such data is restricted. Such information could be
obtained only by duly authorized agency requesting such, by going
through proper legal procedure. Such information included in
personnel files is restricted to officials authorized to inspect such
files.
(j) The fact would be noted in investigative reports pertaining to
the incident.
(k) The U.S. Park Police have no facilities nor equipment for
conducting such tests.
(1) No polygraph tests were conducted by the U.S. Park Police in
fiscal 1963.
(m) One test in connection with a criminal case was conducted by
another Government agency not affiliated with the Department of
Interior-at the request of the U.S. Park Police during fiscal 1963.
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88 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
3. Question No. 3 and subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), do not apply
to the U.S. Park Police personnel. The force has no polygraph
equipment nor operators.
4. No polygraphs or other so-called lie detector devices are possessed
by the U.S. Park Police.
(a) This paragraph does not apply.
(b) This paragraph does not apply.
(c) The U.S. Park Police do not lease or contract with either public
or private agencies for the performance of such tests. Such tests
are made upon request as a cooperative service by other Government
agencies. No costs are incurred.
(d) No expenses are incurred by the U.S. Park Police in the con-
ducting of polygraph or lie-detection tests.
5. The Department of the Interior has no internal directives,
regulations, or instructions governing the use of polygraph devices.
The Park Police operate under standing verbal orders to clear requests
for polygraph tests with the Chief of the Park Police Force.
REPLY FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., July 16, 1963.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Repre-
sentatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This refers to your letter of June 11, 1963,
addressed to the Attorney General, requesting information on the use
of polygraph equipment in the Department of Justice.
This is to advise you that the only branch of the Department
which owns or uses polygraph machines is the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The Director of that Bureau has advised me that he
has been in communication with your subcommittee and has furnished
information concerning the FBI's use of the polygraph.
Sincerely,
S. A. ANDRETTA,
Administrative Assistant Attorney General.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington, D.C., July 22, 1963.
1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs or other
so-called lie-detection devices? (If major subordinate organizations
within your agency engage in such activity, please list all those or-
ganizations.)
Yes.
2. Briefly explain your agency's general procedures governing the
use of such devices and answer the following specific questions.
(Please explain procedures and indicate if they are covered by regula-
tion in connection with each question. If more than one major sub-
ordinate organization within the agency is affected, provide separate
responses for each.)
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 89
(a) For what specific purposes are these devices used? (i.e., em-
ployment interviews, security-clearance processing, suspected im-
proper conduct of duties, or other purposes.)
The FBI uses the polygraph as an investigative aid, in carefully
selected cases involving criminal and security violations in which the
FBI has primary jurisdiction. All persons interviewed with the
polygraph sign voluntary waivers indicating their willingness to be
interviewed with this device. The FBI does not use the polygraph
in interviewing job applicants or general personnel screening.
(b) Are the devices used in every instance involving those purposes
listed in answer to question (a) ?
No; only selected cases. During fiscal year 1962 the FBI handled
637,090 investigative matters. Polygraph technique was utilized in
912 investigative matters. Therefore, use of the polygraph is 0.14
percent of total investigative matters.
(c) What weight is given the data resulting from tests by these
devices, or refusals to take such tests, in relation to other types of
investigative information?
The FBI's official position with regard to polygraph results is that
although the polygraph is often referred to as a "lie detector," it is not
in fact such a device. The instrument is designed to record under
proper stimuli emotional responses which may indicate and accompany
deception. It must be clearly understood that emotional disturbances
observed during a polygraph test can and may be prompted by anger,
fear, violent dislike, et cetera. The polygraph operator must be
extremely skilled, conservative, and objective. The FBI feels that
the polygraph technique is not sufficiently precise to permit absolute
judgments of guilt or nonguilt without qualifications. The poly-
graph is used as an investigative aid and the results must be considered
within the context of a complete investigation. The polygraph can be
helpful to implement an interrogation and provide investigative
direction but it must not be relied on solely or used as a substitute for
logical investigation.
(d) Who makes the initial determination to use such devices, and is
this initial determination subject to review by higher authority in each
case?
Requests to use the polygraph originate from the special agent in
charge of the field division where the subject resides. These cases are
reviewed and passed on by the assistant director level at the seat of
government and reviewed at assistant to director level.
(e) Is the physical and mental condition of each person to be tested
considered to determine suitability to take such a test?
Yes.
(f) What disposition is made of data derived from such tests given
to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained in affected
individuals' personnel files, retained separately, etc.) ?
As pointed out above, the polygraph is not used for personnel
screening.
(g) Are the findings of such tests made available to the individuals
who take the tests?
During the course of a polygraph examination, the Examiner may
inform the testee that he appears to be deceiving with regard to a
question or questions to allow follow-up interrogation. However,
the person is not informed of the final opinions or results of the
examination.
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90 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(h) Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse findings?
The FBI does not use the polygraph for personnel screening and
in this context the right of appeal is not applicable. However, in
our usage of polygraph, if a person requests a re-examination, it
would be given if a logical reason existed.
(i) Is access to such data restricted and, if so, what classification or
other designation is applied to the data?
Polygraph data is maintained in substantive investigative casefiles
and, therefore, is of a confidential character under departmental
order 260-62 dated January 19, 1962 (previously DO 3229).
(j) If a person connected with your agency refuses to take such a
test, is that refusal reflected in any way whatsoever in the individual's
personnel records?
As indicated above the polygraph is not used for applicant and.
general personnel screening.
(k) Does your agency maintain special facilities, such as specially
designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly describe
such facilities and how they are equipped. Furnish photographs, if
available.
No.
(1) How many polygraph tests or examinations involving similar
devices were conducted by your agency in fiscal 1963?
During fiscal year 1963, the Bureau utilized the polygraph tech-
nique in 1,030 investigative matters and examined 2,314 individuals
(June 1963 estimated).
(m) How many such tests were conducted by other agencies, public
or private, at the request of your agency during fiscal 1963?
None.
3. Please enumerate, by job title and grade, all employees of your
agency who are authorized to conduct polygraph or similar tests and
list their salary costs for fiscal 1963. In addition, please answer the
following :
During fiscal year 1963 the Federal Bureau of Investigation had 46
trained polygraph operators, but only 40 actually conducted polygraph
examinations. Only a portion of the time of the 40 who actually
conducted polygraph examinations was spent on this work, at an
estimated cost of $37,000, or 6 percent of the total annual salary cost
of the 46 trained operators.
(a) How many of these persons have, as their primary duty, the
conducting of such tests?
None.
(b) What are the minimum qualifications required of those persons
within your agency authorized to conduct such tests?
(1) Age. No minimum. age for polygraph examiners has been
set; however, all examiners must be special agents. Minimum
age for special agents in 23 years. In actuality the minimum
age of agents trained has been 30 years.
(2) Education : All special agent examiners have a minimum
of a 4-year resident college degree and many have advanced
degrees.
(3) Grade or rank: Special agent.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 91
(4) Years of investigative experience: No minimum years of
investigative experience has been set; however, in actuality the
minimum experience has been 5 years. Most examiners had at
least 10 years investigative experience prior to polygraph training.
(5) Agency check or character investigation required: Yes.
(6) Type of special polygraph training: Internal training course
and advanced training seminars.
(7) Other requirements: All candidates for polygraph training
have to be recommended by their field special agent in charge
and must have demonstrated excellent interrogation ability. In
addition the following written qualifications have been furnished
our field offices when selecting Agents for polygraph training:
Broad investigative experience with demonstrated ability for
thorough interrogation; Marked proficiency in planning and con-
ducting interviews with particular reference to alertness and
facility in thought; Academic training in psychology, physiology,
law, social sciences or previous training and experience with the
polygraph; Ability to gain confidence of others and handle people
under difficult circumstances with such personal characteristics
as maturity, stability of temperament, good judgment and
initiative; Genuine interest in receiving training and developing
skill in scientific interrogation techniques; Other considerations
such as fluency in speaking a foreign language.
(e) Describe any training program your agency provides to train
its own employees, or employees of other Federal agencies, in conduct-
ing such tests.
The initial training is given by our own agency and lasts approxi-
mately 2 weeks following which the examiners undergo on-the-job
training for approximately 1 year under close supervision of the seat
of Government during which time each of their examinations is
reviewed by a qualified supervisor. The polygraph serves as a supple-
mental tool to assist the already high interrogation skill of our
examiners.
(d) Does your agency send employees to outside agencies or schools,
public or private, for training in such testing? If so, please provide
the name and address of the training facility.
No.
4. How many polygraphs and other so-called lie detection devices
are the property of your agency?
The FBI presently has 48 polygraph instruments, 8 of which repre-
sent experimental, research, and training equipment.
(a) Please list the total acquisition cost of all such devices.
Total acquisition cost of all instruments is approximately $38,426.50.
(b) Please estimate the total annual maintenance costs of such
devices and indicate whether maintenance is performed by agency
personnel or by outside sources.
Estimated annual maintenance cost: $125. Maintenance per-
formed by own personnel.
(c) If your agency leases such devices, or contracts with other
public or private agencies to perform such tests, please provide the
total costs for such activity during fiscal 1963.
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92 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The FBI does not lease polygraphs or contract with other public
or private agencies to perform such tests.
(d) Please estimate all additional expenses attributable to such
testing, such as travel expenses for examiners to and from location of
tests, internal and external training programs, and all other costs.
For the selected agents this training is part of regular agent re-
fresher courses. Since their polygraph assignments are incidental to
their other duties as special agents, no cost breakdown is maintained.
5. Please provide two copies each of all intra-agency directives,
administrative orders, rules, regulations, and/or instructions governing
the use of such devices within your agency.
Set forth below, which for the most part has been furnished in our
reply to the above questions, is a summary of instructions governing
use of the polygraph within the FBI.
Lie detectors are instruments for recording physiological changes
such as blood pressure, pulse, respiratory, and electrodermal responses.
Conclusions from polygraph tests are not admissible as evidence;
statements made while polygraph utilized are admissible evidence.
Polygraphs and agents trained as examiners are located in key
offices.
Polygraph used in selected cases consistent with investigative
requirements.
Headquarters must authorize polygraph use in every instance.
All persons interviewed with polygraph must give voluntary written
consent.
FBI will not authorize polygraph use by outside agency in Bureau
case or make available Bureau polygraph to outside agency.
REPLY FROM THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, D.C., July 26, 1963.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-
committee, Committee on Government Operations, House of
Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in further reply to your letter of
June 11, 1963, concerning the study the subcommittee is making on
the use of polygraphs by Federal agencies and enclosing a question-
naire on polygraph usage.
We have had a thorough investigation of this matter made at
headquarters and field installations of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. I am advised that the answers to your
questions are as follows:
Question 1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs
or other so-called lie detection devices? (If major subordinate
organizations within your agency engage in such activity, please list
all those organizations.)
Answer. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
does not possess polygraph or other so-called lie detection devices.
Since its creation in 1958, NASA has utilized polygraph examinations
on two occassions. On one occasion, the NASA-Flight Research
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Center used the polygraph services supplied by a private fit-in. On
the other occasion, NASA Headquarters utilized the polygraph ser-
vices of another Government agency.
Question 2. Briefly explain your agency's general procedures
governing the use of such devices and answer the following specific
questions. (Please explain procedures and indicate if they are covered
by regulation in connection with each question. If more than one
major subordinate organization within the agency is affected, provide
separate responses for each.)
Answer. Use of the polygraph by the NASA-Flight Research
Center in 1961 was without prior headquarters knowledge or approval.
It resulted in oral instructions to security personnel in all NASA
installations, requiring that future use of the polygraph must be
justified to, and approved by, NASA Headquarters. In practice, the
Director of Security or the Director of Inspections is authorized to
disapprove the use of such devices, or to forward the recommendation
to use the device to the Director of Administration or higher head-
quarters authority for final determination. No regulations have been
issued in this area.
Question (a). For what specific purposes are these devices used?
(i.e., employment interviews, security clearance processing, suspected
improper conduct of duties, or other purposes.)
Answer. The device has been used, as an investigative aid only,
in one case involving suspected intentional damage to Government
property at the Flight Research Center, and in another case at NASA
Headquarters invorving suspected theft by NASA employees.
Question (b). Are the devices used in every instance involving those
purposes listed in answer to question a?
Answer. No. Only two cases in the history of NASA.
Question. (c) What weight is given the data resulting from. tests
by these devices, or refusals to take such tests, in relation to other
types of investigative information?
Answer. Neither the data resulting from polygraph examinations,
nor refusal to take such examinations, constitute bases for manage-
ment actions. Polygraph data are utilized for formulating additional
investigative coverage.
Question. (d) Who makes the initial determination to use such
devices, and is this initial determination subject to review by higher
authority in each case?
Answer. Security officers or inspectors to their division directors,
and upon the director's concurrence the recommendation is made to
the Director of Administration or higher headquarters authority for
final determination.
Question. (e) Is the physical and mental condition of each person
to be tested considered to determine suitability to take such a test?
Answer. Yes.
Question. (f) What disposition is made of data derived from. such
tests given to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained in
affected. individuals' personnel files, retained sepaartely, etc.)?
Answer. Original test data and the examiner's report, supplied by
a private firm, are maintained in the NASA investigative files. Orig-
inal data derived from tests given by another Government agency
are retained by that agency. Copies of the examiner's reports are
maintained in the NASA investigative files.
30-023-64-7
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94 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Question (g). Are the findings of such tests made available to the
individuals who take the tests?
Answer. Original test data and the examiner's report are not
made available to the individual who takes the test. The results of
the test are discussed with the individual by the examiner and, on
occasion, by NASA investigative personnel.
Question (h). Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse findings?
Answer. Examiners' reports reflecting adverse findings as a result
of polygraph examinations do not constitute the basis for adverse
management actions. The findings have been utilized only as one
of several investigative tools in conducting investigations.
Question (i). Is access to such data restricted and, if so, what
classification or other designation is applied to the data?
Answer. Access to such data, and to reports derived therefrom, is
severely limited on a strict "need to know" basis, to appropriate
security, investigative, and management officials. No security classi-
fication is assigned unless the information revealed warrants security
classification under the standards of Executive Order 10501, as
amended, which was not the case in the examinations referred to
above.
Question (j). If a person connected with your agency refuses to
take such a test, is that refusal reflected in any way whatsoever in
the individual's personnel records?
Answer. No, it would not be.
Questions (k). Does your agency maintain special facilities, such as
specially designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly
describe such facilities and how they are equipped. Furnish photo-
graphs, if available.
Answer. No such special facilities are maintained.
Question (1). How many polygraph tests or examinations involving
similar devices were conducted by your agency in fiscal 1963?
Answer. None.
Question (m). How many such tests were conducted by other
agencies, public or private, at the request of your agency during fiscal
1963?
Answer. None.
Question 3. Please enumerate, by job title and grade, all employees
of your agency who are authorized to conduct polygraph or similar
tests and list their salary costs for fiscal 1963.
Answer. No NASA employees are authorized to conduct such tests.
Accordingly, the remaining questions in this paragraph are not
applicable.
Question 4. How many polygraphs and other. so-called lie-detec-
tion devices are the property of your agency?
Answer. NASA does not possess polygraph or other so-called lie-
detection devices, and has not leased or contracted with other public
or private agencies to perform such tests during fiscal year 1963.
Accordingly, the remaining questions in this paragraph are not
applicable.
Question 5. Please provide two copies of all intra-agency direc-
tives, administrative orders, rules, regulations and/or instructions
governing the use of such devices within your agency.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 95
Answer. No written regulations, directives, etc., have been issued.
If we can be of further assistance to you, please let us know.
Sincerely yours,
JAMES E. WEBB, Administrator.
REPLY FROM THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
House of Representatives.
Washington, D.C., Jvly 26, 1663.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN: Further reference is made to your letter
of June 11 concerning the survey being conducted by the Foreign
Operations and Government Information Subcommittee about the
use of polygraphs by Federal agencies.
Attached are two copies of the list of questions received with your
letter. An answer has been inserted after each question on the lists.
With kind regards.
Sincerely yours,
J. EDWARD DAY,
Postmaster General.
1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs or other
so-called lie-detection devices? (If major subordinate organizations
within your agency engage in such activity, please list all those
organizations.)
The Postal Inspection Service is the only agency in the Post Office
Department which uses lie detectors.
2. Briefly explain your agency's general procedures governing the
use of such devices and answer the following specific questions.
(Please explain procedures and indicate if they are covered by regu-
lation in connection with each question. If more than one major
subordinate organization within the agency is affected, provide sep-
arate responses for each.)
General procedures governing use of lie detectors are set forth in
response to question No. 5.
(a) For what specific purposes are these devices used? (I.e.,
employment interviews, security clearance processing, suspected im-
proper conduct of duties, or other purposes.)
Investigation of violations of postal laws.
(b) Are the devices used in every instance involving those purposes
listed in answer to question (a) ?
No, only as set forth in regulations (answer to question 5).
(e) What weight is given the data resulting from. tests by these
devices, or refusals to take such tests, in relation to other types of
investigative information?
Refusal to take a test does not in itself carry any weight or become
the basis for any recommendation. Where a test indicates guilt, the
postal inspector will frequently be able to elicit an admission. In a
substantial number of instances, tests confirm other investigative
information.
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96 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(d) Who makes the initial determination to use such devices, and
is this initial determination subject to review by higher authority in
each case?
Postal inspector charged with the investigation of the case, except
that authority to give tests to postal employees must first be cleared
with the postal inspector in charge, who is his immediate supervisor.
(e) Is the physical and mental condition of each person. to be
tested considered to determine suitability to take such a test?
Yes. Susceptibility tests are given to determine the mental
suitability to take a lie-detector test.
(f) What disposition is made of data derived from such tests given
to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained in affected
individuals' personnel files, retained separately, etc.)?
Results of any test given a postal employee are retained in the
files of the case, which is treated as confidential.
(g) Are the findings of such tests made available to the individuals
who take the tests?
Yes.
(h) Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse findings?
Not applicable. No adverse action against a postal employee is
based solely on the findings of a lie-dectector test.
(i) Is access to such data restricted and, if so, what classification
or other designation is applied to the data?
Results of tests are kept in the case files of the investigation which
are treated as confidential.
(j) If a person connected with your agency refuses to take such a
test, is that refusal reflected in any way whatsoever in the individual's
personnel records?
A postal employee's refusal to take a test in connection with an
investigation of a postal law violation would not be reflected in his
personnel records.
(Ic) Does your agency maintain special facilities, such as specially
designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly describe
such facilities and how they are equipped. Furnish photographs,
if available.
No.
(1) How many polygraph tests or examinations involving similar
devices were conducted by your agency in fiscal 1963?
Three hundred and thirty-eight.
(m) How many such tests were conducted by other agencies,
public or private, at the request of your agency during fiscal 1963.?
One hundred and thirty-four.
3. Please enumerate, by job title and grade, all employees of your
agency who are authorized to conduct polygraph or similar tests and
list their salary costs for fiscal 1963.
In fiscal year 1963, the Director of the Bureau Identification Labora-
tory, who is in GS level 14 with a salary of $14,120, 12 postal inspectors
in PFS level 14 with salaries of $13,545, 1 with a salary of $13,190,
1 with $12,125, and 1 in PFS level 16 with a salary of $15,965
gave lie-detector tests as part of their regular duties. On an average
less than 3 percent of their time was spent on such examinations.
In addition, please answer the following:
(a) How many of these persons have, as their primary duty, the
conducting of such tests?
None.
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(b) What are the minimum qualifications required of those persons
within your agency authorized to conduct such tests?
Under present procedures, a postal inspector must meet the follow-
ing requirements before being considered as qualified to conduct
polygraph tests:
(1) Experience and demonstrated ability in criminal investiga-
tion work.
(2) Completion of a formal course of training at a recognized
school, such as the U.S. Provost Marshal General's School,
Fort Gordon, Ga.
(c) Describe any training program your agency provides to train
its own employees, or employees of other Federal agencies, in conduc-
ting such tests.
None.
(d) Does your agency send employees to outside agencies or
schools, public or private, for training in such testing? If so, please
provide the name and address of the training facility.
U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Ga.; National
Training Center of Lie Detection, 165 West 46th Street, New York,
N.Y.; Gormac, Pasadena, Calif.
4. How many polygraphs and other so-called lie-detection devices
are the property of your agency?
Seventeen; however, 13 of these machines were acquired more than
10 years ago, and employ only a one-phase detection procedure, i.e.,
skin resistance. It is intended to dispose of these machines in the
current fiscal year. Our program contemplates eventual use of six
machines which would be three-phase instruments, measuring skin
resistance, respiration patterns, and blood pressure.
(a) Please list the total acquisition cost of all such devices.
About $5,500.
(b) Please estimate the total annual maintenance costs of such
devices and indicate whether maintenance is performed by agency
personnel or by outside sources.
About $100 by outside sources.
(c) If your agency leases such devices, or contracts with other
public or private agencies to perform such tests, please provide the
total costs for such activity during fiscal 1963.
Not applicable.
(d) Please estimate all additional expenses attributable to such
testing, such as travel expenses for examiners to and from location
of tests, internal and external training programs, and all other costs.
About $1,000.
5. Please provide two copies each of all intra-agency directives,
administrative orders, rules, regulations and/or instructions governing
the use of such devices within your agency.
The following instructions to postal inspectors govern the use of
lie detectors :
"The major use of the lie detector should normally be in criminal
cases of more than average importance where investigation is at a
standstill because the inspector cannot prove a suspect guilty or
eliminate him from suspicion even though he has exhausted all normal
investigative techniques.
. "The foregoing will also apply to cases involving postal employees;
however, requests for such examinations. will continue to be cleared
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98 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
through the inspector in charge, or in his absence, his deputy or
assistant."
REPLY FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 30, 1963.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Rep-
resentatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am again pleased to refer to your letter to
the Secretary forwarded on June 11, 1963, and to which I made an
interim reply on June 19, 1963. Since my last letter to you, a com-
plete study has been made and the following data are offered in direct
response to the questions of interest to your committee:
For your convenience we shall repeat the questions you proposed
with a definitive answer to each.
QUESTIONNAIRE ON POLYGRAPH- USAGE
Question 1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs or
other so-called lie detection devices? (If major subordinate organi-
zations within your agency engage in such activity, please list all these
organizations.)
Answer. The Department of State does not possess or maintain
polygraph devices or other so-called lie detection devices. On rare
occasions, and concerning incumbent employees only, polygraph facili-
ties are employed on a consulting basis with other agencies of the
executive branch. The Office of Security is the organization which
handles these matters on behalf of the Department when necessary.
Question 2. Briefly explain your agency's general procedures govern-
ing the use of such devices and answer the following specfic questions.
(Please explain procedures and indicate if they are covered by regula-
tion in connection with each question. If more than one major sub-
ordinate organization within the agency is affected, provide separate
responses for each.)
Answer. When an investigation being processed by the Office of
Security, Division of Investigations, reaches the point where resolu-
tion is not possible with normal investigative procedures the use of
polygraph testing is considered. Initial consideration normally falls
within the purview of a branch chief (GS -13) who discusses and
reviews the full implications of the investigation concerned with the
Chief, Division of Investigations (GS-15). If the Chief, Division of
Investigations feels that the polygraph testing procedure is not ad-
visable he may independently impose a negative decision. If the
Division Chief has a positive reaction he takes the entire file which
contains all investigative reports to the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Security and briefs that officer fully on the details at hand. The
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security may decide the next action
independently on a positive or negative basis or, at his discretion,
may take the matter to a higher echelon which would be the Deputy
Under Secretary for Administration. When a positive decision is
made the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, or his designee,
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reviews the need for polygraph testing with a substantive official of
another executive agency and asks for the assistance of a qualified
polygraph operator who will provide operational equipment owned
and maintained by the consulting agency. When agreement on timing
is established the proposed polygraph operator is briefed on the
background of the investigative situation and concerning the indi-
vidual involved. The briefing of the polygraph technician is normally
done by the branch chief, Division of Investigations, who originally
recommended the polygraph testing procedure, and who has personally
directed or otherwise become acquainted with all other facets of the
investigation. The final arrangements of timing for the tests are
made at this time. The branch chief then obtains agreement of the
person to be tested as to the time and date for the test. There are
no written regulations pertaining to the procedure which has been
described and the Office of Security is the only subordinate organiza-
tion within the Department of State which is concerned with poly-
graph testing.
Question (a). For what specific purposes are these devices used.?
(i.e., employment interviews, security clearance processing, suspected
improper conduct of duties, or other purposes).
Answer. Polygraph tests are conducted when incumbent employees
are charged with or suspected of improper conduct which may be
in violation of law or, more frequently, which may be in violation of
regulations under the Foreign Service Act or civil service regulations.
The polygraph procedure may also be employed when allegations are
received which point to possible penetration or compromise of classi-
fied information by a foreign government through or concerning an
individual incumbent.
Question (b). Are the devices used in every instance involving those
purposes listed in answer to question (a)?
Answer. No.
Question (c). What weight is given the data resulting from tests
by these devices, or refusals to take such tests, in relation to other
types of investigative information?
Answer. The data obtained by polygraph testing, or an individual's
refusal to take such a test, is weighed on an equitable basis in relation
to all other investigative material in the possession of the Office of
Security.
Question (d). Who makes the initial determination to use such
devices, and is this initial determination subject to review by higher
authority in each case?
Answer. An initial recommendation pertaining to the employment
of a polygraph procedure is normally made by a branch chief func-
tioning under the Chief, Division of Investigations, Office of Security.
In each case where the recommendation is made, a referral is made to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security who may make a final
determination or refer the matter to a higher echelon (Deputy Under
Secretary level) if he deems such action to be necessary.
Question (e). Is the physical and mental condition of eachpers on
to be tested considered to determine suitability to take such a test?
Answer. Yes, if there is any question of a physiological or psycho-
logical problem a referral is made to the Department of State Medical
Division or to other competent medical authority.
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100 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Question (J). What disposition is made of data derived from such
tests given to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained in
affected individuals' personnel files, retained separately, etc.)?
Answer. The test data are retained in a separate and restricted file
within the Office of Security and are not included as a part of the,
affected individuals' personnel file.
Question (g). Are the findings of such tests made available to the
individuals who take the tests?
Answer. There are no written reports concerning the findings made
available to the tested individuals. The polygraph operators discuss
test results with the affected individuals and inconsistencies would be
discussed further with them by security officers who are processing
the action concerned.
Question (h). Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse findings?
Answer. Adverse findings are not made based solely upon a poly-
graph test. As indicated earlier in this report the testing procedure
relates only to incumbent employees and, therefore, any action which
a tested person might consider adverse and related to the polygraph
procedure would be subject to appeal under civil service or Foreign
Service regulations.
Question (i). Is access to such data restricted and, if so, what
classification or other designation is applied to the data?
Answer. The access to such data are restricted within the Office
of Security. If the data relates to morals information it is separately
maintained in the secure files of the Chief, Special Investigations
Branch, Division of Investigations, Office of Security. If a penetra-
tion or compromise type of case is involved that file is maintained in
the secure files of the Chief, Special Assignments Branch, Division of
Investigations, Office of Security. The minimum classification given
to such material is the administrative control of "Limited Official Use."
However, in the majority of cases handled material of defense clas-
sifications would be involved and the instant results of the polygraph
testing therefore would most often range from "Confidential" through
"Secret" classifications.
Question (j). If it person connected witli your agency refused to
take such it test, is that refusal reflected in any way whatsoever in the
individual's personnel records?
Answer. The refusal to take it polygraph test is not in any way
reflected in the individual's personnel file nor is the refusal to take a
test noted in the personnel file of the individual concerned. The
information is retained in the restricted security files as described in
our answer to question (2i.)
It should be noted that a polygraph examination is not given to an
incumbent employee unless lie or she voluntarily agrees to submit.
In each individual case, a signed and witnessed statement of voluntary
agreement is obtained from the person to be examined. Two copies
of that statement are attached as exhibit I for your examination.
Question (k). Does your agency maintain special facilities, such as
specially designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly
describe such facilities and how they are equipped. Furnish photo-
graphs, if available.
Answer. No special facilities are maintained within the Department
of State for polygraph testing. A normally designed conference room
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USE' OF POLtGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERI4MENT 101
within the Department of State is used for the polygraph testing pro-
cedure. We have no photographs available.
Question (1). How many polygraph tests or examinations involving
similar devices were conducted by your agency in fiscal 1963?
Answer. During the fiscal year of 1963 a total of 17 tests were
given which included 16 subjects, 1 testing procedure was done a
second time. In each of these cases the tests were conducted on a
consultant basis with other Federal agencies.
Question (m). How many such tests were conducted by other
agencies, public or private, at the request of your agency during
fiscal 1963?
Answer. All 17 listed in the aforegoing question were conducted
by other Federal agencies on a consultant basis.
Question 3. Please enumerate, by job title and grade, all employees
of your agency who are authorized to conduct polygraph or similar
tests and list their salary costs for fiscal 1963. In addition, please
answer the following:
Answer. The Department of State does not employ persons who
function as polygraph operators or as operators of any other "lie de-
tection" device. This answer will automatically respond to questions
a,b,c,andd.
Question'-4. How many polygraphs and other so-called lie detection
devices are the property of your agency?
Answer. None, which automatically answers questions a, b, and d.
Question (c). If your agency leases such devices or contracts with
other public or private agencies to perform such tests, please provide
the total costs for such activity during fiscal 1963;
Answer. There is no charge to the Department of State on the
occasions that consulting services are done by other executive agencies
on a favor basis.
Question 5. Please provide two copies each of all intra-agency
directives, administrative orders, rules, regulations and/or instruc-
tions governing the use of such devices within your agency.
Answer. In that any poi graph testing done on a consulting basis
has the individual approval and direction of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Security relating to each case, the Officer of Security
has not issued any broad directives in this regard. We do note,
however, that under date of April 15, 1959, we did send an office
letter instruction to our special agents in charge throughout the
United States under the subject "Polygraph Examinations." We
quote that instruction for you.
"Under certain circumstances incumbents of the Department are
offered the opportunity to volunteer for a polygraph (lie detector)
examination in cases where a question of sexual deviation develops.
Such examinations are generally conducted under the supervision of
the Special Investigations Branch of SY/I. Only in rare instances
are such examinations administered outside the Department and then
only with the specific concurrence, including approval of the facilities
and operator to be utilized, of headquarters.
"Department policy precludes administering polygraph examina-
tions to applicants for employment."
Please let me know if I may be of any further assistance to you.
Sincerely,
FREDERICK G. DUTTON,
Assistant Secretary.
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102 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
I --------------------
-----------------------------------
----------- - ---------------, an employee of
--' -------------------------- of my own free will and
volition, without any duress, promises, or influence, hereby
volunteer for a polygraph examination. The polygraph
operation has been thoroughly explained to me. I have beef,,.
.informed that if I refuse to take a polygraph examination,
this refusal would in no way be held against me nor would
any opinions be formed with reference to my guilt or inno-
cence in the current investigation by reason of such refusal.
I have been informed also that the polygraph machine, more
commonly known as a lie detector, is solely a scientific aid to
determine scope of any further investigation that might be
necessary, and that the results of the test are not considered
as conclusive evidence either for or against inc.
Signed: --------------------
REPLY FROM THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
lT'ashington, July 31, 1963.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-
committee, House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : This is in reply to your letter of June 11,
1963, regarding the survey being undertaken in the use of polygraphs
by Federal agencies by the Foreign Operations and Government
Information Subcommittee.
.- Attached are the answers to the items in the questionnaire which
you enclosed on this subject. These responses cover all subordinate
organizations within the Department of the Treasury which possess
or make use of polygraph or other so-called lie-detection devices.
Sincerely yours,
A. E. WEATHERBEE,
Administrative Assistant Secretary.
U.S. COAST GUARD,
July 19, 1963.
Memorandum to Administrative Assistant Secretary. -
From: Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.
Subject: Use of polygraphs by the Coast Guard.
In response to Administrative Bulletin No. 63-38 dated June 14,
1963, requesting information on the use of polygraphs, the following
are answers to the questionnaire, numbered to conform with the
questions :
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-USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1.The Coast Guard possesses and utilizes polygraphs iti nine
intelligence offices located in Boston, New.York,Norfolk, Miami, New
Orleans, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Seattle, and. Honolulu. Polygraph
equipment of other agencies is utilized as circumstances warrant in
five intelligence offices in St. Louis, San Francisco, Juneau, Baltimore,
and Washington.
2. The polygraph is used as a scientific investigative aid. During
an, investigation if it appears that a polygraph examination' will be-use-
ful and serve a definite purpose, the investigator discusses the possi-
bility with the polygraph examiner and the intelligence officer.
Should an examination be indicated, the subject is asked to consent to
the examination and is advised of his constitutional rights.
(a) The polygraph is. primarily used as an investigative aid, when
indicated, in cases of suspected violations of the Uniform : Code of
Military Justice. On a few occasions it has been used on civilians
who held merchant mariners documents who were primary suspects
in shipboard misconduct.
(b) The polygraph is not used in every case above but only in
cases where there is conflicting evidence, the subject requests an
examination, or it appears that an examination would `materially aid
the investigation. The, examination is then only given after the
subject has been fully advised of his constitutional rights and, has
given his written consent.
(c) No weight is given directly to the polygraph examination.
It. is used as an investivative aid and gives direction to the in.vesti-
gation. For example, emphasis may be directed in one area of an in-
vestigation duo' primarily to the results of the examination. No
weight is given a suspect's refusal to take an examination.
(d) The determination. to conduct a polygraph examination for
Coast Guard personnel rests with the Chief, Intelligence and Law
Enforcement Branch in each office. The Chief, Operations Division,
makes the determination when persons other than Coast Guard per-
sonnel are examined.
(e) The physical and mental condition of the subject is considered
in every case to determine the suitability to take the test.
(f) The data derived from polygraph examination is incorporated
into the report of investigation of the case.
(g) Generally, the individual who takes the polygraph examination
is apprised of the results.
(h) Although the polygraph examination is used only as an investi-
gative aid and precipitates no personnel action, the subject has the
right of appeal in all cases.
(i) Results of polygraph examinations become part of a report of
investigation which is generally marked "For Official Use Only."
There are some cases where. the report of investigation would be
classified "Confidential" or "Secret" depending on the content of
the remainder of the report.
(j) A. person's refusal to take a polygraph examination is in no way
reflected in his personnel records.
(k) Some units.have specially equipped rooms and others use regular
offices. In all cases where an examination is being administered only
the examiner and the subject are present. The specially equipped
rooms are usually about. 8 by 8 feet and void of all triminin,gs
except the polygraph equipment and chairs for the examiner and the
subject. Photographs of a typical room are enclosed.
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104 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(1) During fiscal 1963, the Coast Guard conducted 161 polygraph
examinations for its own use and 10 at the request of other agencies.
(m) The Coast Guard had 18 polygraph examinations conducted
for it by other agencies during fiscal 1963.
3. The Coast Guard has 13 polygraph examiners; 1 pay grade, E-9,
salary $7,630; 3 pay grade, E-7, salary $6,280; 7 pay grade, E-6,
salary $5,460; and 2 pay grade, E-5, salary $4,760.
(a) Conducting polygraph examinations is a collateral duty for the
13 investigators trained for this duty. There are none with this as
a primary duty.
(b) Polygraph examiners are required to be selected investigators
who have first graduated from the Treasury Law Enforcement Insti-
tute and then successfully passed the course of instructions at an
accredited polygraph training institution.
(c) The Coast Guard has no program to train its own personnel in
the operation of polygraph equipment.
(d) Coast Guard investigators are trained in the operation at
either the National Training Center of Lie Detection, 165 West 46th
Street, New York, N.Y., or the U.S. Army Military Police School,
Fort Gordon, Ga.
4. The Coast Guard owns nine polygraphs.
(a) The acquisition cost of the Coast Guard-owned polygraphs was
$1,350 each.
(b) The annual maintenance cost of these polygraphs averages
about $15 per year. The maintenance is performed by the manu-
facturer's representative.
(c) The Coast Guard does not lease polygraph equipment, nor does
it contract with public or private agencies to perform polygraph tests.
(d) There are no expenses directly attributable to polygraph exam-
inations since they are all conducted as a part of an investigation.
Tuition at the National Training Center of Lie Detection is $525.
There is no cost to the Coast Guard for training at the Army school at
Fort Gordon. This training is received on a space avaiable basis
only.
5. Enclosed are two copies of Commandant Instruction 5520.2
governing the use of polygraphs.
E. J. ROLAND.
U.S. COAST GUARD,
April 17, 1961
Commandant Instruction No. 5520.2
Subject: Polygraph machines, use and operation of.
Reference: (a) Allowance Instruction No. 37-59.
1. Purpose.-To promulgate the Commandant's policy with regard
to the use and operation of the polygraph machine.
2. Discussion.-Reference (a) authorized procurement of the poly-
graph (commonly but erroneously called lie detector) machine by
district intelligence and law enforcement offices. This authorization
recognized the value of the polygraph as a scientific, diagnostic aid
to interrogation. The polygraph machine is an electrical-mechanical
device used to detect and record various physiological changes which
are induced in an individual by his emotional responses to certain
questions, these responses being involuntary for the most part.
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Through proper use of the polygraph machine the qualified examiner
can diagnose truth or deception through his interpretation of the.
physiological changes recorded by the machine. The machine itself
cannot "detect" a lie or the truth. The usefulness of the machine is
proportionate to the capability of the operator in both organizing and
conducting an interrogation as well as interpreting the readings of
the machine. It is not possible to assign percentages of accuracy to
the polygraph machine, since it is the sum of the training and experi-
ence of the operator that determines the degree of success of the exam-
ination. The possibilities for misuse of a machine such as the poly-
graph are obvious, particularly if the operator is lacking in basic
integrity. Even without dishonest intent, there may. be a human
inclination to rely too heavily on the polygraph to "make" a. case"or
to. "prove" guilt since the use of the polygraph is frequently easier
than the long, arduous, and often boring legwork connected with a
thorough investigation.. The reliable operator then must have the
basic integrity to insure that the machine and the results of his
examination are not misused with either an honest or dishonest intent.
Therefore the controlling factors in the polygraph technique; are the
ability, training, experience and integrity of the operator and not the
quality, make, size, or complexity of the machine. It is apparent that
misuse of the machine,:;or unreliable determinations made by poorly
qualified operators could justifiably lead to adverse criticism of the
machine and its use.
3. Competency of polygrapk operators.-Because the polygraph tech-
nique is a diagnostic technique rather than an exact science wherein
"truth" or "deception" can be read directly from a scale, there has
been and is some controversy among those who have studied, operated;.
researched, and built polygraph machines for.many years, as to the
best techniques to be used, when various techniques should be used,
the amount and types of training required for operators, etc. There
are no uniform standards or minimum requirements of training and
experience for operators, which are accepted on a national or inter-
national level. Therefore it is riot possible to set inflexible. standards
of competence for polygraph operators in this instruction. A study
of the training available in the nationally recognized schools on the
polygraph technique indicate that at least 150 to 250 hours of instruc-
tion are given in a variety of subjects which usually include the
following:
(a) Mechanics and operation of the polygraph machine.
(b) Anatomy and physiology.
(c) Psychiatry and psych goloy.
(d) Specific study : of the human circulatory, respiration,
nervous and endocrine systems.
(e) Formulation of questions.
(f) Interrogation techniques.
(g) Chart interpretation.
(h) Abnormal reactions.
(i) Pretest interviewing.
(j) Practice and actual use of the polygraph under super-
vision of .instructors:
(k). Legal aspects. of the polygraph.
(l) Test forms.
(m) Polygraph interrogation techniques..
(n) Professional ethics.
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106 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
In addition, there is usually an arrangement whereby the student
can obtain advice, instruction, or assistance in interpretation of the
actual polygraph charts which he may run after leaving the school,
and while obtaining his initial solo experience as a polygraph exam-
iner. It is considered essential that Coast Guard personnel operating
the polygraph machine receive actual instruction in the polygraph
technique at least comparable to that set forth above. For this reason
all courses for the training of polygraph operators must be approved
by the Commandant before being utilized to train Coast Guard poly-
graph operators.
4. Selection of polygraph operators.-From paragraph 1 it is apparent
that considerable thought and care must be used in the selection of
polygraph operators. Either of the two following qualifications may
provide a good basis for a competent polygraph operator-a good
basic education (college level); or considerable experience in investi-
gative and interrogation techniques. In addition to having at least
one of the above attributes a Coast Guard polygraph operator should
possess the following qualifications:
(a) Be of unimpeachable integrity.
(b) Have good basic intelligence.
(c) Be mature and possessed of good judgment.
(d) Have a minimum of 1 year of investigative experience.
(e) Possess an (XI) designator if enlisted.
(f) Be currently assigned to intelligence duty.
Waivers of one or more of the qualifications listed under (d), (e),
and (f) may be granted in cases where adequate justification exists.
5. The polygraph machine.-There are a number of different makes
and models of polygraph machine available on the market. They
vary from a simple galvanometer type which measures psychogalvanic
skin reflex (electrodermal response) to a five-graph machine which
records blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, psychogalvanic skin
reflex, and muscular . activity. By far the most common machines
in use are three-element machines which record blood pressure, respira-
tion and psychogalvanic skin reflex. In order that there may be some
degree of standardization, machines purchased and used by the Coast
Guard should be of this three-element variety. Many operators differ
in opinion on the usefulness of the recording of psychogalvanic skin
reflex-some relying almost wholly on this element for their conclu-
sions and others disregarding it entirely. In many cases this latter
extreme approach seems to stem from a lack of understanding of the
use of this element and a lack of the patience necessary to obtain a.
satisfactory recording. Most experienced polygraph operators agree
that the recording of the psychogalvanic skin reflex is useful in arriving
at their conclusions and particularly so on certain types of subjects.
It is expected that Coast Guard polygraph operators will become fa-
miliar with and master the techniques necessary to utilize the psycho-
galvanic skin reflex recording element. There are numerous makes
and models of the three-element machine. Among them are several
which can be fitted into a desk for stationary use, or removed and
easily carried and transported as & 'portable machine. This type
machine appears to be the most satisfactory for general Coast Guard
use but no restriction is placed on procurement of any conventional
type of three-element machine which will best serve the office for
which it is purchased.
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6. Use in investigations- 1lUU
(a) The polygraph is not a substitute, for other investigative tech-
niques, nor should its use be substituted for a thorough investigation
using the more conventional techniques. In most cases the use of the
polygraph should follow the remainder of the investigation done on a
particular case. In some instances where there are several suspects,
the evidence or circumstances indicate that one or more is guilty, but
the evidence points equally to all, the polygraph may be used to
eliminate the innocent. Even in such a case the knowledge that the
guilty party is one of a relatively small and definite group implies that
a considerable amount of investigation has already been done. The
use of the polygraph for mass screening of large numbers of personnel
at a unit is not desirable from a morale standpoint and should not be
done. This rule might of course be waived where "all" of the per-
sonnel consist of only a few men at a small unit, and it is reasonably
certain from facts developed in the preliminary investigation that one
must be guilty.
(b) It is essential that the polygraph operator be thoroughly
briefed. in all aspects of a case and that he have all available informa-
tion on the subject at his disposal. The investigators assigned to the
case must assist the operator in 'this regard.
(c) During the course of an investigation, an investigator should
never, except under very unusual circumstances, ask a person if lie is
willing to take a polygraph examination until the matter has been
first discussed with the polygraph operator to determine whether such
an examination. is practicable under the circumstances.
(d) No person may be required to submit to a polygraph examina-
tion and an investigator must make it clearly understood to the person
involved that, submission to, polygraph examination is a purely volun-
tary procedure.` Investigators must further be extremely careful not
to draw conclusions from. therefusal' of a person to submit to. a poly-
graph examination since in many cases such refusal may result from
reasons having nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of the person.
(e) Whenever a person is offered the opportunity to take a poly-
graph examination during an investigation, ,this fact ' should be in-
eluded in the investigative report together with a` statement as to
whether the person?`.`agreed to" or "declined" the test., If he agreed,'
the results of the test should be set forth in the investigative report
or if not set forth,: the reason for the omission should be given. For'
instance, the results might be appropriately omitted if, tie operator
decided that the test.was inconclusive.
(f) The results of, a. polygraph examination are not acceptable ,as
evidence i1i most curt jurisdictions. In 'those jurisdictions' where
polygraph results are adn~rtted it rs. usuall ,, by prior stipulation
between opposing counsel that such results will e accepted There-:
fore y.rhere other tauaible evidence doesnot'exist,'the use of the poly-'
graph might 'be futife and its used be, omitted, unless it is f elt, that
additionlil facts will develop in time polygraph `examination which will`
lead to further 'productive investigation..
(g) The use` of the polygraph technique for what it is, a scientific
aid to interrogation, is encouraged.' However; in each'rndividual,cars
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1118 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FED
the advisability of its use should be carefully considered. In making
such determination the following questions should be considered:
(1) Is the person being considered for polygraph examination
probably an acceptable subject for the polygraph technique?
(2) Is it probable that the polygraph examination will produce
useful and/or usable results?
(3) Is other evidence already available, or obtainable, to sup-
port the polygraph examination results?
(4) Will the use of the polygraph in the particular case arouse
an unacceptable amount of criticism from any source?
7. Polygraph examination report.-
(a) Coast Guard polygraph operators shall prepare a report over
their own signature of each polygraph examination conducted. When
the examination is conducted in connection with a Coast Guard
intelligence investigation a signed copy of this report should be made
an "exhibit" in the report of investigation to support and supplement
the investigator's remarks as required by paragraph 6(e).
(b) The polygraph examination report prepared by the polygraph
operator maybe brief and should be placed on Coast Guard letterhead
stationery or appropriate locally prepared forms. It should contain
as a minimum the following information:
(1) Time and date.
(2) Place (including city, State, address and/or name of build-
ing).
(3) Name and "agency represented" of person who requested
that the examination be given.
(4) A notation to the effect that the person being examined
had signed a "voluntary consent" statement to take the examina-
tion.
(5) A list of relevant questions asked during the examination
and the subject's answers thereto.
(6) The conclusions of the examiner as to the truthfulness of
the answers.
(7) Remarks describing briefly the circumstances of the case,
conditions under which the examination was given, etc.
(c) Each district office which has a polygraph machine shall main-
tain a file of the above described reports for future reference. This
file shall also contain "voluntary consent" statements signed by the
subjects of the polygraph examinations, signed acknowledgements of
warning under article 31 of the U.C.M.J., and other papers relating
to the examination.
8. Use of polygraph examination results.-(a) The results of poly-
graph examinations are not admissible in evidence before military
courts-martial. However, the U.S. Military Court of Appeals has
ruled that a "convening authority" may utilize polygraph examina-
tion results in determining as a matter of discretion to set aside
findings of "guilty" ; but where the record of trial has generated a
doubt in the mind of the "convening authority" as to a finding of
"guilty," lie may not use the results of a polygraph examination to
support a determination to approve the doubtful findings.
9. Use of "other agency" equipment.-(a) In those areas where the
investigative workload does not justify the procurement of Coast
Guard polygraph equipment and the training of operators, arrange-
ments may be made to utilize the polygraph equipment and operators
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~I'T BRYTFIE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 109
of other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies. When
outside equipment is utilized the same considerations should attend
its use, as if it were Coast Guard equipment. The criteria of para-
graph 6 should be applied and reasonable assurance obtained that
the operator of the equipment is well qualified.
10. Providing polygraph services to outside agencies.-(a) Polygraph
examinations may be conducted for other Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agencies when requested. However, considerable care
should be observed when providing assistance to State or local law
enforcement officials, that the particular circumstances of the case
will not invite criticism from the aspect of using military forces or
equipment to enforce civil law.
11. Action.-
(a) All intelligence and. law enforcement officers will insure that
the guidelines and principles set forth in this instruction are observed
in the operation of Coast Guard polygraph machines, and in the
selection and qualification of Coast Guard polygraph operators.
. (b) All intelligence investigative personnel shall become familiar
with the contents of this instruction.
12. E 'ective date.--(a) This instruction is effective upon receipt.
J. A. KERRINS,
Chief, Office of Operations.
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
INSPECTION SERVICE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
The questions presented in the questionnaire dated June 11, 1963,
from the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Government Operations, are answered as
follows:
Question 1. The Inspection Service does not possess any "lie detect-
ion" devices. They have been used on rare occasions at the request
of the person being interrogated.
Question 2. Since 1956, the Inspection Service has exercised a
strict centralized control over the authorization of the use of lie
detector tests. The most recent national office issuance on this
subject, which was directed to all technical personnel of the Internal
Saciuity Division, national office and field, on January 11, 1,963,
reads as follows:
"No inspector is to initiate discussion of polygraph examinations
with the subject of the investigation. If the individual under
investigation brings up this subject and requests a polygraph exami-
nation, it should be explained that lie must submit a written request
for such examination.
"If the subject submits a written request, it will be forwarded to
the national office with a transmittal memorandum from the regional
inspector containing the following information:
"(a) A brief summary of the facts in the case;
"(b) A statement of justification for the use of the polygraph;
"(c) Name of the agency whose polygraph facilities can be used ;
and
"(d) The name and technical qualifications of the operator.
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110 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
"After review of the information submitted, the national office
will make a decision to approve or disapprove the use of the
polygraph."
Question 2(a). As indicated in the above quoted instructions, the
lie detection devices are used only when requested by the individual.
Such devices could be used in investigations involving security clear-
ance processing or suspected improper conduct.
Question 2(b). No. Inspection has had fewer than 1.0 cases in
the last 10 years in which lie detectors have been used.
Question 2(c). Data from polygraph tests is evaluated together
with all oki.ier pertiirent, information. Where such a test is favorable
to the subject, it might be given considerable weight. Where the
test, is unfavorable to the subject it would simply be considered with
all other information, favorable and unfavorable, concerning the
subject.
Since polygraph tests are given only if requested by the subject
of the investigation, we do not have the situation where a subject
refuses to take such a test.
Question 2(d). As indicated above, polygraph tests are used only
at the request of the subject of the investigation and upon approval
of the national office. The Assistant Commissioner (Inspection)
makes deteranination 'as to,wliether the request by the subiect for a
polygraph test should be granted.
Question 2(e). Yes, always.
Question 2()). Data derived from a polygraph test is incorporated
into the investigative report on that case. After any necessary
referral to the regional commissioner or other official responsible for
administrative decision in the case, such report is returned to in-
spection and retained in its files. -
Question 2(g). Yes.
Question 2(h). Yes.
Question 2(i). Data concerning polygraph tests or any other
investigative data is restricted to Government officials or employees
on a strict need-to-know basis only.
Question 2(j). See answer to question 2c.
Question 2(k). No.
Question 2(l). None.
Question 2(m). :Noire.
Question .3. No inspection service employees are authorized to
conduct such tests.
Question 4. None.
O.S. GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM
JANUARY 11, 1963._-
To: Regional inspectors and chiefs of national, office internal security
branches.
From: Office of Assistant Commissioner (Inspection) I.S. Instruc-
tional. Memo 63-1.
Subject: Use of unusual investigative techniques and referral of cases
to U.S. attorney..
The purpose of this memorandum is to establish uniform procedures
to be followed in presenting cases to the U.S. attorney, in the use of
lie detectors-polygraph machines-and in surveillances.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 111
1. No case will be presented to a U.S. attorney for prosecutive
opinion without first clearing with the regional inspector or assistant
regional inspector (I.S.).
2. No inspector is to initiate discussion of polygraph examinations
with the subject of the investigation. If the individual under investi-
gation brings up this subject and requests a polygraph examination,
it should be explained that he must submit a written request for such
examination.
3. If the subject submits a written request, it will be forwarded to
the national office with a transmittal memorandum from the regional
inspector containing ..the following ;information:
(a) A brief summary of the facts in the case;
(b) A statement of justification for the use of the polygraph;
c) Name of the agency whose polygraph facilities can be used;
and
(d) The name and technical qualifications of the operator.
After review of the information submitted, the national office will
make a decision to approve or disapprove the use of the polygraph..
4. Physical surveillances of all types must be approved by the
assistant regional inspector (I.S.) or group supervisor. Permissible
technical surveillances must have the approval of the regional in-
spector.
W.,,;A., KOLAR,
Director, Internal Security Division.
BUREAU or NARCOTICS
JULY 31, 1953.
To: A. E. Weatherbee, Administrative Assistant Secretary.
From: George H. Gaffney; assistant to Lite Commissioner.
Subject: Use of polygraphs by the Bureau of Narcotics:
In reply to Administrative Bulletin No. 0-38 , the following are
the answers to the questionnaire which `vas attached to the bulletin
1. The Bureau of Narcotics does iiot otwii anjr polygra.pli devices
although we occasionally make use of such devices.
2(a). The Bureau of Narcotics `irifrcquentlS uses' pclygraphs
connection with " its criminal ' iiivestiga,tion activit:ies.' It does not
use them in connection with any. eniplovee actions.
(c) In.view of the general: inadroissibilit' of polyv iij It evidence n
criminal courts, the question is`not applicable.
(d) The initial determination is inade kby the rove ~,i stung ar_-
cotic agent, subject to the review of the district Sul')p;ei'visor'
(e) Yes
(f) Normally the graphs are retained by the ei aininer: A brief
irierriorandum `regarding the results of the test itiaj be,filed` in the
case jaclket.
(h) Not applicable.
(i) The data is restricted
file:
(') Not applicable.
'k) No.
(1) Not applicable.
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112 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(?m) Less than 20.
3. None.
4. None.
5. None.
JULY 16, 1963.
To: Mr. A. E. Weatherbee, Administrative Assistant Secretary.
From: James J. Rowley, Chief, U.S. Secret Service.
Subject: Use of polygraphs by Federal agencies.
The following report is submitted in accordance with the request
in Administrative Bulletin No. 63-38 of June 14, 1963.
For purpose of clarity, the questions listed on the questionnaire
of the subcommittee are repeated with answers immediately under
each question.
1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs or other
so-called lie-detection devices? (If major subordinate organiza-
tions within your agency engage in such activity, please list all those
organizations.)
Yes.
2. Briefly explain your agency's -general procedures governing the
use of such devices and answer, the following specific questions.
(Please explain procedures and indicate if they are covered by regula-
tion in connection with each question. If more than one major
subordinate organization within the agency is affected, provide
separate responses for each.)
General procedure for use entirely related to investigative activities
of the Secret Service. Considered a valuable aid to other tech-
niques in seeking solutions to cases, with consent of person involved.
(a) For what specific purposes are these devices used? (i.e.,
employment interviews, security clearance processing, suspected
improper conduct of duties, or other purposes.)
Secret Service uses pol graph only in criminal cases. On oc-
casion, it is made available to other Federal agencies in cases of
alleged or suspected improper conduct when the consent of the
person is obtained.
(b) Are the devices used in every instance involving those purposes
listed in,, to question (a)?
No, oy in selected cases where the circumstances indicate it may
be useful in finding the truth.
(c) What weight is given the data resulting from tests by these
devices, or refusals to take such tests, in relation to other types of in-
vestigative information?
Results are considered with all other factors in a case. The device
is considered an aid to the investigation, not an end in itself.
(d) Who makes the initial determination to use such devices, and
is this initial determination subject to review by higher authority in
each case?
The initial determination is always made by the special agent in
charge of the office where the test is given. His determination is sub-
ject to review by Secret Service inspectors, Deputy Chief, Chief, or
other staff members.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS RY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 113
(e) Is the physical and mental condition of each person to be tested
considered to determine suitability to take such it test?
.Physical and mental condition of each subject is always considered
as both have an important bearing on the test.
(f) What disposition is made of data derived. from such tests given
to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained in affected in-
dividuals' personnel files, retained separately, etc.)?
Tests are not given to persons connected with the Secret Service..
(g). Are the.findings of such tests made available to the individuals
who take the tests?
Yes.
(h) Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse findings?
The opinion of the examiner is conclusive, but the subject always
has the right to request another test by a different examiner or on a
different machine.
(i) Is access to such data restricted. and, if so, what classification or
other designation is applied to the data?
Access is restricted in that Service files are not available to anyone
except Secret Service employees, or by permission of them.. Such
data, is not classified unless the case is classified.
(j) If a person connected with your aggency refuses to take such a
test, is that. refusal reflected in any way whatsoever, in the individual's
personnel records?
No.
(k) Does your agency maintain special facilities, such as specially
designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly describe
such facilities and how they are equipped. Furnish photographs, if
available.
Yes. A small room with sound absorbing walls is used since the
nature of the test requires a quiet place, free from outside distractions,
for best results. Such a room ordinarily contains only the polygraph,
a desk, and chairs.
(1) How many polygraph tests or examinations involving similar
devices were conducted by your agency in fiscal 1963?
Sixty-one, all in criminal investigations.. In addition, four exami-
nations were conducted for other agencies in connection with alleged
misconduct.
(m) How many such tests were conducted by other agencies, public
or private, at the request of your agency during fiscal 1`963?
One hundred and ten.
3. Please enumerate, by job title and grade, all employees of your
agency who are authorized to conduct polygraph or similar tests and
list their salary costs for fiscal 1963. In addition, please answer the
following:
This Service has 1S ualified polygraph operators whose grades
range from GS-ll to GS-14, but none of these employees are pri-
marily engaged in this type of work. Job title, grade, and fiscal year
1963 salary costs are shown in the following list:
Special agents in charge of offices: 1
2, GS-13;2, GS-12------------------------------------------ $42,440
Assistant special agents in charge of offices:
1, GS-14; 2, GS-13; 1, GS-12--------------------------------- 45, 360
Special agents:
5, GS-12; 5, GS-11------------------------------------------ 97,660
These employees received their training while special agents and have since been promoted.
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I1,4 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Less than 1 percent of the above total annual salaries'was expended
for polygraph examinations.
The Secret Service does not have any employees whose primary
duty is related to the use of the polygraph machine. This activity
is it collateral duty of a limited number of special agents whose
primary- responsibilities relate to criminal investigative and protective
duties.
(a) flow many of these persons have, as their primary duty, the
conducting of such tests?
None.
(b) What are the minimum qualifications required of those persons
within your agency authorized to conduct such tests?
The Secret Service selects only special agents for training and use
of the polygraph machine.
(c) Describe any training program your agency provides to train its
own employees, or employees of other Federal agencies, in conducting
such tests.
The Secret Service does not provide training for its own employees
or employees of other Federal agencies in the use and operation of the
polygraph machine.
(d) Does your agency send employees to outside agencies or schools,
public or private, for training in such testing? If so, please provide
the name and address of the training facility.
All training of this kind for special agents of the Secret Service is
furnished by the Provost Marshal General's School, U.S. Army, Fort
Gordon, Ga.
4. plow many polygraph's and other so-called lie detection devices
are the property of your agency?
Four.
(a) Please list the total acquisition cost of all such devices.
$4,980.
(b) Please estimate the total annual maintenance costs of such
devices and indicate whether maintenance is performed by agency
personnel or by outside sources.
Estimated $150 annual maintenance cost. Maintenance by outside
sources, usually the manufacturer.
(c) If your agency leases such devices, or contracts with other
public or private agencies to perform -such tests, please provide the
total costs for such activity during fiscal 1963.
We have no such leases or contracts.
(d) Please estimate all additional expenses attributable to such
testing, such as travel expenses for examiners to and from location of
tests, internal and external training programs, and all other costs.
No additional expense is involved in testing or travel expenses for
examiners. The only expense involved in the external training pro-
gram is about $400 per diem and travel costs ranging from $50 to $175,
depending on the location from which the special agent travels to
Georgia.
5. Please provide two copies each of all intra-agency directives,
administrative orders, rules, regulations and/or instructions governing
the use of such devices within your agency.
Instructions governing the use of the polygraph are set out in the
Secret Service operating manual. This manual is required reading
for every investigative employee and during his attendance at Secret
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Service 'schools, each employee is7 given an examination, on his knowl-
edge of its contents.
The following is quoted from the Secret Service manual:
"The polygraph has been used with remarkable success by many
police departments and other law enforcement agencies. It is one of
the many modern scientific means to more efficient law enforcement.
"Because of the intricate nature of the polygraph, it cannot be
operated efficiently by any person who has not undergone an intensive
training period under the guidance of experts. Certain special agents
have been so trained and card. be assigned to operate, the.ar}strument
in the questioning of important suspects or offenders. Special agents
in charge will consider the advisability of using the polygraph in
important cases, bearing in mind that it is. especially valuable in
obtaining information as to the location of a plant or cache from any
individual possessed of such information. It is necessary, however,
that the subject consent to the polygraph test, and a written waiver
in ,the .following form will be obtained: `I, (name), having been duly
advised concerning my constitutional rights and with the full under-
standing that I need not subject myself to a polygraph examination
do hereby waive any and all such rights and freely consent and agree
to a polygraph examination, ordinarily known as a lie detector test.
In granting this consent, I do so without fear or throat,and no promises
have been made to me.' The waiver will be signed and witnessed by
two persons."
JAMES J. ROWLEY.
REPLY FROM THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
U.S. IN1ORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, July 9, 1963.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Government Operations, IIo-uss of
Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Responding to your letter of June 11, 1963,
concerning the survey your subcommittee is making of the use of the
polygraph by Federal agencies, the following is my reply to your
enclosed questionnaire. My answers will coincide with the numerical
breakdown of your attachment:
1. Our Agency makes use of the polygraph but does not possess
one nor do we have any other so-called lie detection devices. It is
used exclusively by our Office of Security in certain rare instances.
2. There are no Agency written procedures covering the use of the
polygraph. It is used in certain cases where the employee under
investigation categorically denies substantial charges of a security
nature. The device is used only as a last resort to assist in resolving
such conflicts and then only with the personal approval of the Director
of the Office of Security.
(a) Employee security .matters of alleged or suspected misconduct
after all other investigative avenues have been explored.
(b) No. Only on rare occasions is the polygraph used.
(c) Our Office of Security is aware of the limitations of the poly-
graph but requests the employee to voluntarily undergo the test as
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116 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
a useful investigative aid in cases where the veracity of the employee
may be at issue. In no instance is his possible refusal to take the
examination permitted to influence the Agency's ultimate decision
in the case. The voluntary nature of the examination is stressed in
our discussions with the person under investigation.
(d) The initial recommendation is made by the Assistant Chief
of the Investigations Division and in each instance is reviewed by the
Chief of the Investigations Division, the Deputy Director of the
Office of Security, and the final determination is personally made
by the Director of that Office.
(e) No medical examination by a physician is administered, and the
suitability determination of the employee to be tested is left to the
professionalism of the operator.
(f) The data derived from a test is placed exclusively in the in-
dividual's security file.
(g) Written reports of such tests are not made available to indi-
viduals who submit to the tests but in most cases the operator of the
machine or a member of the staff of our Office of Security verbally
informs the employee of the results.
(h) Yes. The employee may appeal directly to the Director of
the Agency if he desires to do so.
(i) Access to such data is restricted to the Office of Security and the
Director, and the classification of the data would be dependent upon
the material developed in relation to the national security interests.
(j) No.
(k) No.
(1) None.
(m) One polygraph examination was administered by a U.S.
Government agency at our request.
3, 4, 5. The answer to each of these paragraphs is "no," for none
is applicable to this Agency. We have no polygraph equipment and
no persons trained in its use. As indicated above, in the rare instances
where a polygraph is used in connection with one of our security
investigations, it is administered at our request by another agency
of Government which has persons authorized and expert in its use.
Sincerely,
DONALD M. WILSON, Acting Director.
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