IN THE PAST, THE CONDUCT OF OUR POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000100240055-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: September 11, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

.21346
Approved For Rc:O GRESSIONAL R CORD6B S~VATE 0100240055-3 September `Y1
Inter-American Affairs; the U.S. Co-
ordinator of the Alliance for Progress;
ahd the Special. 4 dviser to the Presi-
dent. The President said:
We expect to speak with one voice on all
matters affecting this hemisphere, and Mr.
Mann will be that voice.
In the past, the conduct of our policy
In Latin America has suffered from a
chorus of different and often discordant
voices. There was no office, no agency,
no man-below the President or the Sec-
retary of State-who could speak with
authority for all our agencies-financial,
cultural, technical, and diplomatic-to
the often confused governments of Latin
America.
I remember when I visited Tom Mann
in 1961, while he was our Ambassa-
dor to Mexico, he was distressed by the
division of authority-especially with
regard to the application of aid funds-
which tended to work at cross-purposes
with our Nation's political objectives. To
Tom Mann's way of thinking, politics
and economics are indivisible in today's
world, and they must go, hand in hand
in the conduct of our foreign policy.
Mr. President, I heartily approve of
this approach. In a speech on the Sen-
ate floor on August 16, 1958, I strongly
urged a change in our existing divided
policy and the adoption of the central-
ized authority approach. But then, my
words went unheeded; so it was a source
of satisfaction to me that President
Johnson, within a few weeks after as-
suning office, clearly recognizing the
need for such centralized authority,
brought about the reorganization within
the Latin American Division of the De-
partment of State which funneled power
for immediate and final decisions on both
political and economic matters into the
capable and experienced hands of Tom
Mann,
Tom Mann has-and will continue to
have-many difficulties in dealing with
the complex and challenging problems of
countries that are chronically bedeviled
by political instability, social injustices,
illiteracy, poverty, and a population ex-
plosion.
But he is qualified for his delicate and
difficult job, for he is a man who is thor-
oughly American, deeply committed to
the heritage and Ideals of the United
States, and intimately familiar with
Latin American affairs and, most im-
portantly, Latin American thinking.
Tom Mann has spent almost all of his
22 years in Government service in posi-
tions, both here in the United States and
abroad, directly connected with Latin
America.
He was a U.S. representative at the
Chapultepec Conference, which estab-
lished the bases for hemispheric defense
later Incorporated in the Rio Treaty of
1947.
Later, As Ambassador to Mexico, Mann
earned high praise when he successfully
negotiated the Kennedy-Johnson settle-
ment of the Chamizal dispute between
Mexico and ti}e United States. In this
historic settlement, the United States
ceded back to, Mexico a long-disputed
portion of the city of El Paso, which
Mexico lost during a shift of the Rio
Grande River., The return of the the negotiating room. President John-
Chamizal to Mexico signaled the willing- son and Tom Mann Indicated clearly
ness of a great power to rectify its past that the United States would negotiate
errors in policy, end Mann's name will fairly and forthrightly, on an equal foot
always be identified with this treaty by ing. They did not adopt the false post-
a grateful Mexican people. tion, as some of our own people sug-
Behind Secretary Mann's indisputable gested, of assuming that because we were
record of achievement lies a sure and big, because we were strong, we were
comprehensive understanding of Latin somehow wrong.
American reality. He recognizes that Rather, understanding that it is not
this area cannot be treated as a package in the Latin temperament to admire a
deal. Each of the 20 nations south nation that would capitulate to those
of the border is a distinct entity; each who slap it in the face, the Johnson-
has its own heritage, traditions, and Mann team used skilled diplomacy to
problems. Each must be treated accord- calm a dangerous conflict without com-
ingly. As Mann himself says: promising our basic rights.
Cultures, conditions, and problems vary In short, they maintained our dignidad
from 'country to country, and exact con- while remaining simpatico.
formity is neither practical nor desirable. If the world learned from our response
Each country has to be studied as an indi- in Panama that we will be firm in the
vidual case with individual idiosyncracies right, it later learned, in April of this
and approaches. year, that firmness does not mean inflex-
Tom Mann's sensitivity toward the ibility.
many-sided Latino is facilitated by his Take the case of Brazil. I recall our
fluent knowledge of Spanish. This all- concern a few months ago when it ap-
too-unusual linguistic ability has enabled peared likely that the Brazilian giant,
him to grasp the hidden implications with its 70 million people and untold nat-
behind the sometimes elaborate Spanish ural resources, would be carried Into the
phraseology. In tradition-minded Latin Communist camp by the demogogic and
America, where the highest premium is Communist-oriented Joao Goulart.
placed upon dignidad, where the mainte- Such an occurrence would have been
nance of face is an ingrained social more, catastrophic for the cause of freedom in
frankness is often mistaken for boorish- this hemisphere and, indeed, throughout
ness and frequently creates the embar- the world. Had Brazil gone Communist,
rassments and occasionally tragic mis- it would have become the Red Pied Piper
understandings that have plagued our of the hemisphere, working with Castro
lesser equipped envoys. Mann is keenly to lead the other Latin American nations
sensitive to these cultural subtleties. into the Communist camp.
Thus, while he considers himself a But the Christian and democratic ele-
pragmatist and takes a realistic ap- ments in Brazil were not prepared to ac-
proach in his dealings with Latin Amer- cept such a fate. At the risk of bloody
icans, he is careful to gear it to their cul- civil war, they deposed Goulart, ousted
tural framework. This primary em- the Communists from their midst, and
phasis on a correct tactical approach, reestablished a democratic, fiscally re-
and his firm adherence to his own motto sponsible government in April of this
"Lo Cortez No Quita Lo Valiente"- year.
"Courtesy is not inconsistent with I am proud to say that the Johnson-
valor"-have been important intangibles Mann team did not hesitate in extending
in enhancing the effectiveness of our its full moral and material support to the
Latin American policies. new constitutional Government of Brazil.
The first major crisis in this hemi- It quickly tailored policy to the new de-
sphere to test the Johnson-Mann team velopments. On June 24, the United
was the explosive dispute with the Re- States, through the Alliance for Progress,
public of Panama. Significantly, this granted a $50 million loan to Gen.
was the first major foreign policy crisis Humberto Castello Branco's government
to face the Johnson Administration and to help to ease Brazil's financial crisis.
was therefore of special concern and in- At the same time, the payment of much
terest to the world at large. Everyone of Brazil's outstanding long-term debt
watched to see how our new President was renegotiated.
would respond in this difficult situation. As President Castello Branco, in an
President Johnson promptly sent Tom eloquent address to the graduating class
Mann, along with then-Army Secretary of the Brazilian Foreign Service Acad-
Cyrus Vance, to discuss the situation emy on July 31, 1964, pointed out, his
with Panama's Chief Executive, Roberto government and his country have made
Chiari. The story of the protracted a fundamental commitment and have
negotiations which led to the final res- declared their cultural and political loy-
toration of normal and friendly rela- alty to the democratic system of the
tions without jeopardy to our position, Western World. And as our actions
our legal rights, or our continued use of demonstrated, the United States of
the canal needs no detailed retelling America stands ready to help them ful-
here. What is of the utmost signifi- fill their commitment. .
cance, however, is that the United States Undoubtedly, the Brazilian revolu-
firmly but politely refused to accept any tion is one of the great anti-Communist
preconditions to the resumption of our victories of our time. It represents an
relations or our negotiations with the emphatic repudiation by a free people
Republic of Panama. of Communist totalitarianism. It has
Yes, our stand was firm, but it was just. significantly bolstered the ground swell
We did not shoot from the hip, nor did of resentment against Castro-commu-
we permit others to shoot their way into nism which Is sweeping the Americas.
Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP66B00403R000100240055-3
 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 CIA-RDP66B00403R000100240055-3
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 21345
I wish to say, too, that the Senator
from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], who is
necessarily away from the M amber to-
day on official business, was instrumental
in evolving and establishing these safe-
guards which have proved to be so prac-
tical and sound.
I wish to underscore, too, the coopera-
tion that we have had from the armed
services, the Defense Department, the
Atomic Energy Commission, and other
related agencies of Government. They
have cooperated toward carrying out
these safeguards in a fine way.
The other members of our subcom-
mittee, the Senator from Maine [Mrs.
SMITH] and the Senator from Arizona
[Mr. GOLDWATER] could not be present
in the Chamber at this moment, but they
have had briefings on this subject, and
they have been interested in It.
I see that the Senator from South
Carolina [Mr. THuRMOND], a member of
the subcommittee, is present. I know he
is interested. I am glad that he is in the
Chamber at this time.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield.
Mr. THURMOND. I wish to commend
the able Senator from Mississippi for
the great work he has done in connection
with the subject referred to in the report
he has made to the Senate today. I have
had the pleasure if working with him in
the Preparedness Subcommittee for sev-
eral- years. It has been a very fine ex-
perience to be with him on the sub-
committee.
I should like to propound to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Mississippi a
few questions concerning what appears
to be the one outstanding inadequacy
in the administration's implementation
of the safeguards which were promised
as an inducement to the Senate to ratify
the Moscow Treaty.
First, is it not true that the Prepared-
ness Subcommittee found, and so re-
ported to the Senate, that one of the
greatest disadvantages to our defense
effort which would result from the treaty
was the impairment of the U.S. ability
to test for weapons effects?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes; the Senator is
correct. That is what we called. I believe,
the soft area or the soft spot. That is the
most difficult area in the opinion of the
Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not a fact
that not one underground test solely for
weapons effects has been conducted by
the United States since the ratification of
the treaty?
W. STENNIS. There have been some
tests which Involved weapon effects ex-
periments. This phase of the safeguards
has been most difficult and the slowest
in getting started. It should be em-
phasized, in fairness, that it is a very
difficult area. We found, too, that they
have begun to move, and it is believed
they are now on the way. We have had
underground tests to develop weapons,
but, the effect on weapon systems is what
the Senator has in mind andabout which
he is concerned. We are continuing our
surveillance and hope that that part of
the program will move f aster.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not also true
that the Defense Department has still
not completed its personnel reoi`ganiza-
tion and staffing which were planned to
expedite weapons effects testing for
which the Department of Defense is re-
sponsible?
Mr. STENNIS. Generally, that is
true. To get the right man in the right
place and to implement this kind of pro-
gram has proven to be very difficult.
Some progress has been made in that
field, and it is believed that the eff orts
will continue.
Mr. THURMOND. My last question is
this: Is it not also true that the $22.6
million requested by the Department of
Defense for funding the testing in fiscal
year 1965 is clearly inadequate to finance
a vigorous program of weapons effects
testing, and is inadequate even to finance
the programed underground testing for
weapons effects?
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from
Mississippi does not have the exact fig-
ure in mind at this time.
I understand that they are able to draw
funds from other sources by reprogram-
ing and otherwise. I know that the Ap-
propriations Committee intended that
there would be no lack of funds if they
should be needed.
I know that we made inquiry along
these lines.
Even though I cannot give the Senator
a figure that I could stand on firmly
as to the total,, I believe we have ar-
ranged for the funds to be available.
Mr. THURMOND. I know the Sen-
ator's generous interest in this matter.
Iwish to commend him for his work in
protecting our national security.
Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Sen-
ator's assurance. That assurance is
backed up by deeds. The Senator has
been very helpful in the past. I know
he will continue to be so in the future.
He has a very thorough knowledge of
the subject matter.
I yield the floor.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
MONDAY
Mr. P ELL. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent that when the Senate
concludes its business today, it adjourn
to meet at noon on Monday next.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
PRESENT CONDITIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA
Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, since
the dark days of the Cuban missile crisis,
we have witnessed in Latin America a
breakthrough of brilliant sunlight.
What was, just 2 years ago, an ominous
and threatening area has quickly under-
gone a metamorphosis and is now enter-
ing that bright future historians prom-
ised.
Some of the steps in this remarkable
change-suchas the April revolution in
Brazil and the recent OAS sanctions
against the Castro regime in Cuba-have
been more dramatic than have others.
But these and the others, which I shall
shortly cite, have all served to further
the cause to which our Nation has dedi-
cated itself in this hemisphere; that is to
say, the establishment of social justice
and economic prosperity within inde-
pendent, enlightened, and humane po-
litical frameworks.
This is a great cause, a noble cause,
rooted in our devotion to the cherished
democratic ideals, and to the moral pre-
cepts for life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness which inspired our independ-
ence and guided our growth.
It is shared by the people of this hemi-
sphere and has the greatest meaning for
all of us, because it constitutes a strong
and enduring bond between our Nation
and the nations of Latin America.
One of President Johnson's first acts
upon moving into the Presidency was to
make it unmistakably clear that Latin
America is of major concern to him. He
quickly and vigorously recommitted this
Nation to a defense of the Western Hemi-
sphere and to a continuation of the noble
goals and programs of the Alliance for
Progress.
In his first major address to Congress,
the President said:
Let all the world know, and none misun-
derstand our determination to strengthen
freedom in the Americas.
He subsequently reiterated this pledge
on January 8, 1964, in his State of the
Union message, when he said:
We must become better neighbors with the
free states of the Americas, working with the
councils of the OAS, with a stronger Alliance
for Progress, and with all the men and women
of this hemisphere who really believe in
liberty and justice for all.
He stated this Nation's commitment to
Latin America again on March 16, when
he spoke to the Ambassadors of the Orga-
nization of American States; again, on
April 20, in an address to the n embership
of the Associated Press; agaI on May
11, at the White House to Latin Ameri-
can Ambassadors and to the leaders of
the Alliance for Progress; but he ex-
pressed it most eloquently in a letter of
last December 15, when he said:
Next to keeping the peace-and maintain-
ing the strength and vitality which makes
freedom secure-no work is more important
for our generation of Americans than our
work in this hemisphere.
President Johnson has said and done a
great deal in connection with this area.
He has put his personal stamp on many
aspects of our policies there. He couples
compassion and sympathetic under-
standing with unquestioned firmness in
dealing with problems affecting our na-
tional interests in that area.
But nothing better shows the Presi-
dent's understanding of the situation in
Latin America, nor is there a better dem-
onstration of his judgment of men, than
his appointment of Thomas C. Mann as
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs. This was the first
major appointment of the Johnson ad-
ministration.
It was of great significance because it
was a departure from previous practice
in that it vested in one person, Tom
Mann, complete authority over all three
Latin American bureaus: the Bureau of
Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP66B00403R000100240055-3
 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 CIA-RDP66BQ0403R000100240055-3.
'21344
CONGRESSIONAL 4RECORIS SENATE September 11 a
From time to time we will give fur-
ther reports to the Senate on the facts
developed during the course of our sur-
veillance.
(The additional word. A great deal of
work has been done by an added member
of the staff of the Preparedness Investi-
~j Col Glenn Smith,
who is very conversant I. this field and
who has a background of raining and
`
knowledge with a Army an wI sev-
era other agencies. lie has done a re-
r a e o in the last or months
or us. Our conclusion an report are
ase mare Part upon his excellent an
fine woric,
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from Massachusetts, who
has taken a special interest in this mat-
ter and has given much attention to it.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
I merely want to add a few words. First,
I commend the distinguished Senator
from Mississippi, who, as chairman of
the Preparedness Investigating Subcom-
mittee, has directed the efforts of the
staff in maintaining a watchful surveil-
lance over the implementation of these
safeguards by'the executive agencies in-
volved. The chairman of the commit-
tee has done, a responsible and thorough
job.
It has been almost a year since the
Senate voted to give consent to the nu-
clear test ban treaty, by which the test-
ing of nuclear weapons in the atmos-
phere, in outer space, and underwater
would be denied to those nations which
would agree to be bound by its terms.
The relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of becoming a party to t treaty
in xati n September 24, 19$3.
-----"Although the provisions of the tr, ,ty
would restrict us somewhat in the full
military application of our nuclear tech-
nology, nevertheless the Joint Chiefs of
Staff unanimously recommended that
the treaty be approved-an approval,
however, that was conditioned upon the
vigorous implementation of the treaty
safeguards which were considered to be
essential.
As the chairman of the subcommit-
tee pointed out, those safeguards were
four in number.
Underground testing is perhaps one of
the most difficult of the safeguards to
carry out and further our knowledge of
advanced nuclear technology, but we are
making progress on it.
Mr. STENNIS. Particularly, the ef-
fects tests which affect our ballistic mis-
sile systems. These are as important as
on develo ment tests
p
a
We are informed' that perhaps the radar on Beau fighters, the Germans
readiness to test in the atmosphere has would have had largely a free hand over
not gone on quite as well and that we Britain at night, and possibly won the
are not as ready as we had hoped to be; Battle of Britain.
but that phase is going forward. It is also interesting to note that radar
Finally, improving our detection sys- was discovered on about the same day by
tem is difficult, but we believe progress three different countries-England, the
has been made in that field. United States, and Japan.
I commend the chairman of the com- Therefore, followup work of this char-
mittee and the whole committee, includ- acter, properly supervised by a committee.
ing the Senator from Missouri [Mr. of this character, is essential to the se-
SYMINGTON], and others, upon their curity of the country.
commendable interest in seeing that Shortly after Pearl Harbor I can re-
these four safeguards are vigorously member Admiral Davidson telling me
maintained in order to have our support that we did not know the Japanese had
of the treaty effective, in the interest of hundreds of Zero fighters. For many
preparedness and readiness and secur- weeks and months they gave us a bad
ity for our country and peace in the time.
world. Later the British and all the rest of
I thank the Senator from Mississippi us were greatly upset at inauguration
for making his statement. by the Nazi of the V-1 buzz bombs. If it
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator had not been for a lucky picture taken of
from Massachusetts. I think he has suc- Peenemunde, the later second genera-
cinctly stated the points involved, the tion missile, the V-2-the first ballistic
work of the subcommittee, and our ex- missile in world history-this new
pectations for the future. weapon, a clear technological break-
I am glad now to yield to the Senator through, might have changed the course
from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] who is of World War II, or at least prolonged
quite conversant in this field and who it.
has shown an interest in this subject for I again wish to commend the able Sen-
many years. ator from Mississippi for the care he
Mr. SYMINGTON. - Mr. President, I takes in recalling the warnings the mil-
have the honor to serve on the committee itary made at the time the Joint Chiefs
of which the distinguished Senator from of Staff agreed to the signing of the
Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] is the chair- test ban treaty. One cannot imagine
man, and the distinguished Senator from anything more important to the future
Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] the of the country than the work being done,
ranking member. It is a privilege to as outlined in the- able address he has
serve on a committee that has the type made on the floor today, as emphasized
and character of staff the chairman has by the able senior Senator from Massa-
built up. Typical of the way we operate chusetts.
is that when we get into a particularly Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
technical subject of this character, where will the Senator yield?
it is relatively difficult for laymen to Mr. STENNIS. I yunderstand the scientific details.
iel The Senator
chairman gets someone comparable Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.
t- has emphasized the fact that the Senate
Colonel Smith in this instance one oro
oughl conversant with the technical ratified the treaty and gave its approval
NO ems invo ve . to it. I know that the Senator agrees
Without exaggeration, this committee with me that the reason or the under-
ortant committee of lying foundation, for such approval was
st im
th
ld b
p
e mo
e
cou
its kind in the country today. the fact that the four military conditions
When the question came up as to were put on and we wanted to insure
whether we should have or should not their implementation. Does the Sen-
have a nuclear test ban treaty, for many ator agree that the four conditions which
months we discussed that problem; and were made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
later the Senate ratified the treaty. really assured the ratification of the
However, anyone who has read the REC- treaty?
ono knows that the ratification was made Mr. SYMINGTON. Without reserva-
with reservations-the four points the tion. Speaking for myself, I would not
able chairman of the committee brought have voted for the treaty if it had not
up this morning. been for these four recommendations,
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, and am confident my able friend from
will the Senator yield at that point? Massachusetts would not have voted for
Mr. SYMINGTON. I shall be glad to it either. Nor do I believe a majority of
yield in a moment. the Senate would have voted for it with-
Those of us who have had some expe- out the four points in question. There-
rience in this field know the apprehension fore I think their emphasis is of sig-
p
are we
Mr. SALTONSTALL. One of the that comes into the minds and hearts of
points that concerned us when the ques- many, including the fighting forces,
tion of voting on the treaty was before when they realize that a weapons break-
us, was the matter of maintaining our through has been made by a possible ad-
nuclear laboratories. That has gone for- versary in the technological field.
ward, satisfactorily from the testimony We all know about the first use of
that has been given to us. The person- gas in World War I.
-lie! there have been maintained to a bet- During the Battle of Britain, it is fair
ter degree than we had thought they to say that if it had not been for a tech-
could be maintained. The people have nological breakthrough in the radar field,
stayed on. Their work is going on. through which they were able to put
nificance.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
from Missouri for his fine remarks and
his advice and counsel. As in many
other matters, they have proven them-
selves highly valuable and effective in the
subcommittee's work generally, and par-
ticularly in connection with the test ban
hearings and the planning and carrying
out of the surveillance, as well as our
findings on it.
Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP66B00403R000100240055-3
 Approved For Release 2005/03/15_: CIA-RDP66B00403R000100240055-3
7 9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
'of the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiro-
shima in the last war. This means that just
one of these modern tactical bombs has a
,force equivalent to 100,000 tons of TNT.
There are other less powerful tactical nu-
clear weapons in Europe today-'antidemoIi-
tion weapons, air defense weapons, etc.--with
a force of 18 kilotons, or approximately the
force of the Hiroshima bomb, yet he proposes
that these tactical nuclear weapons be
"thought of in terms of conventional weap-
onry" and controlled not solely by the
President but by the NATO commander.
The Republican candidate has also been
concerned that much of the Nation's nuclear
power would be lost by 1970 unless rwe pro-
duced new delivery systems. He has charged
that "deliverable nuclear capacity may be
cut by 90 percent," in the next decade under
present plans, and he has issued detailed
figures to sustain his point.
Yet the odd thing about this is that his own
friend, Gen. Curtis LeMay, gave him accu-
rate figures on this problem, which he ig-
nored in favor of his own Inaccurate figures.
There is a powerful case to be made against
the foreign and defense policies of this ad-
ministration, but Senator GOLDWATER is spoil-
ing it by shooting from the lip.
THE OTHER QUESTIONS
The real question about Cuba is not, as
GOLDWATER suggests, that we didn't go far
enough at the Bay of Pigs but that we got
involved in it against our treaty commit-
ments in the first place.
The telling charge in Vietnam is not, as
GOLDWATER implies, that the administration
is too timid in attacking the Communist
supply lines, but that it plunged into a war
on a misconception and has misjudged the
problem and misled the country most of the
time ever since.
The really important question about the
atomic power of this Nation is not, as GOLD-
WATER asserts, that it is declining, but that
it is piling up at astronomical cost long
after we already have enough explosive power
to incinerate the entire human race, several
times over, and contaminate the earth in
the bargain.
GOLDWATER is certainly right on one thing:
foreign policy, as he said this week. is an
issue and should be debatod, but he is not
likely to benefit from that debate unless he
gets the available facts and asks the right
questions.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there further morning business?
If not, morning business is closed.
AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSIST-
ANCE ACT OF 1961
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (H.R. 11380) to amend further
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, and for other purposes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The question is on agreeing to
amendment No. 1234, proposed by Mr.
MCCARTHY (for himself. Mr. JAVITS, and
Mr. HUMPHREY) as a substitute for the
so-called Dirksen-Mansfield Amendment
No. 1215.
Debate is in order on the amendment,
but, under the unanimous-consent agree-
ment entered Onto, a vote thereon is not
in order until 2:30 p.m. September 15.
IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR
TEST BAN TREATY SAFEGUARDS
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I
should like to report to the Senate on the
activities of the Preparedness Investigat-
ing Subcommittee regarding the imple-
mentation of the nuclear test ban treaty
safeguards. The Senate will recall that
last year the subcommittee held extensive
hearings on the military aspects and im-
plications of our various nuclear test ban
proposals. The latter portion of the
hearings focused on the treaty subse-
quently ratified by the Senate.
During the course of these hearings,
several of the 24 witnesses heard, in-
cluding the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ex-
pressed a need for positive action on the
part of the United States which, would
tend to reduce to a minimum the adverse
effect of the test ban treaty. These vari-
ous expressions achieved a formal status
during the testimony of the Joint Chiefs
when their support of the limited treaty
was conditioned on the effective imple-
mentation of some safeguards. Subse-
quently, on a motion by the distinguished
Senator from Washington [Mr. JACK-
SON], unailimously adopted by the sub-
committee and approved by all the mem-
bers of the Committee on Armed
Services, assurances on safeguards
implementation were received from the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Later, the late President Kennedy gave
similar assurances to the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate.
The four treaty safeguards are:
First. The conduct of comprehensive,
aggressive, and continuing underground
nuclear test programs designed to add to
our knowledge and improve our weapons
in all areas of significance to our military
posture for the future.
Second. The maintenance of modern
nuclear laboratory facilities and pro-
grams in theoretical and exploratory nu-
clear technology which will attract,
retain, and insure the continued appli-
cation of our human scientific resources
to these programs on which continued
progress in nuclear technology depends.
Third. The maintenance of the facil-
ities and resources necessary to institute
promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere
should they be deemed essential to our
national security or should the treaty or
any of its terms be abrogated by the So-
viet Union.
Fourth. The improvement of our capa-
bility, within feasible and practical
limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty,
to detect violations, and to maintain our
knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activ-
ity, capabilities, and achievements.
The Senate will also recall that the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommit-
tee, in its interim report on the treaty
hearings, said:
To permit the U.S. Senate to monitor the
treaty safeguards it is necessary that the
expressed good intentions be supplemented by
definitive programs against which progress
can be compared. * * * If the treaty Is rati-
fied it is the Intention of the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee to monitor the
implementation of the safeguards.
The staff of the subcommittee has
made an extensive review of the activ-
ities of the Department of Defense and
the Atomic Energy Commission in im-
plementation of the safeguards. This re-
view covered the first year of the
safeguards operation. During the course
21343
Eof the safeguards review, numerous meet-
'ings, briefings, discussions, and visits oc-
curred between the staff and the respon-
sible officials of the Department of De-
fense, the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the Central Intelli ence Agency.
and the nuclear laboratories.
I might say at this point that one of the
most encouraging aspects of the review
was the expression by many of these offi-
cials of deep gratification that the Senate
had established safeguards and was
maintaining a continuing interest in
seeing that they are implemented ade-
quately.
By and large, although a few soft spots
are evident, the safeguards implementa-
tion program carried out in fiscal year
1964 and planned for fiscal year 1965 ap-
pears to be extensive, vigorous, and effec-
tive. The large number of underground
nuclear tests directed to the development
of nuclear weapons which have been pub-
licly announced make it clear that this
area is receiving a great deal of em-
phasis and attention. The end result
should be a strengthening of the military
preparedness segment of our national
security.
The soft spots appear to be in the area
of underground nuclear testing which is
directed to obtaining additional infor-
formation on nuclear weapons effects.
As the report of the Preparedness In-
vestigating Subcommittee which was is-
sued last year indicates, this Is a vital
and important area. At the same time,
there is a clear and manifest difficulty
in mounting underground tests which
will yield meaningful information in this
field. In any event, it does not appear
that this area has been pursued as vig-
orously as has the area of underground
testing directed to the development of
nuclear weapons.
However, the information available to
us indicates that these soft spots in the
program have been identified and that
corrective action has been initiated by
the responsible officials. The efficacy
of these corrective actions is yet to be
determined. The subcommittee will
maintain a continuing interest in and
surveillance over the problem areas and
all other areas in an effort to insure that
the maximum benefits are obtained from
all phases of the underground nuclear
testing program.
The underground testing program that
has been carried out-coupled with a fine,
large, and imaginative laboratory re-
search program-has added significantly
to our nuclear weapons knowledge. The
plans which have been made and imple-
mented for the resumption of nuclear
testing in the atmosphere, if this should
become necessary, appear to be satis-
factory and adequate.
The capability to monitor the terms
of the treaty and to detect possible viola-
tions has been improved. In addition,
the surveillance of the intelligence agen-
cies has been increased to carry out the
fourth safeguard.
The subcommittee will continue to give
close attention to this matter. We be-
lieve that it is important to insure that
the "euphoria" which the Joint Chiefs
warned against does not develop.
Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP66B00403R000100240055-3
 ed F6 As -
1002400 E 5.
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Mr. Elder 7D5617
/
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks: Attached is an extract from the Record
of 11 September 1964 containing a report to the
Senate by Chairman Stennis of the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee on the nuclear test
ban treaty safeguards. Items of particular
interest have been marked.
Assistant Legislative: Counsel
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Legislative Counsel, 7D01
Iv
4 Sept
5
FORM NO. 23 7 Use previous editions
2-61 LJ
25X1