WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO MORE THAN 700 MILLION CHINESE HIDDEN FOR FIFTEEN YEARS BEHIND A BAMBOO CURTAIN?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000100030003-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1964
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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Tung Chi-ping (above) is the
first Chinese defector to have
been raised and educated under
communism. He schemed seven
years for freedom, finally seized
it in Central Africa with a five-
minute taxicab ride. Now learning
English here, he hopes to
continue his education at an
American university.'
By TUNG CHI-PING as told to QUENTIN REYNOLDS
HY DID I defect? Why,
on May 26, 1964, did I
give up a coveted career
as a Red Chinese diplo-
mat in Central Africa
for a future of uncer-
tainty? The official pro-
test by the Red China Embassy to Burundi
claimed that I was "kidnapped and held by
members of the United States Embassy in
Burundi." The news of my "kidnapping" was
also carried by the Shanghai and Peking
newspapers. They lied.
1 am telling the true story now in the
hope that it will reach my family in China.
I arrived in Bujumbura, the capital of
Burundi, on May 25, 1964, to take up my
duties as assistant cultural attache of the Chi-
nese Communist Embassy. Eighteen hours
later, I walked into the United States Em-
bassy and pleaded for political asylum. Now,
I am in the United States. For seven long
years, I had dreamed of this, and everything
I had done back in Shanghai and Peking was
directed toward this end.
I have been in this new country of mine
almost four months, and if I am warmed by
'the friendship of many Americans, I am just
as often bewildered because so few of those I
meet seem to realize the enormous threat Red
China poses to the new African nations. Most
people concentrate on the Chinese Commu-
nist threat to Southeast Asia. There i4 a, say..
ing in Peking and in the Communist diplo-
matic world that Mao Tse-tung can take over
Southeast Asia any time he wishes by making
six phone calls. Mao is wasting little money
and little propaganda in that part of the
Africa today has the highest priority,
and that is why I, a very junior 21-year-old
diplomat, was sent to Burundi, where the
official language is French. The most impor-
tant part of my seven-year program to get
out of China was to master the French lan-
guage. Very few Red Chinese diplomats
speak any language but their own, and I felt
.that, once I knew French, I might be sent
abroad at least as an interpreter.
Not many Americans to whom I have
spoken have ever heard of little Burundi.
Geographically, it lies between the Congo
Basin and East Africa, and because it is the
gateway to the Congo, this small, hilly, under-
developed, overpopulated nation is impor-
tant in Mao's long-range plan to dominate as
much of Africa as be can. Before I was sent
to Burundi, I had been thoroughly briefed
on the progress being made there and. the
plans for the future. Again and again, my
superiors repeated Mao Tse-tung's statement:
"When we capture the Congo, we can pro-
ceed to capture the whole of Africa. Burundi
is the stepping-stone for reaching the Congo."
Months earlier, the plan to take over
Burundi had been put into operation by Kao
Liang, whose credentials identified him as a
reporter for the New China News Agency.
He was, in fact, an experienced agent who
had formerly been active in India. He inter-
viewed government officials in Burundi and
was careful to mention the many advantages
that would accrue to Burundi if it were to es-
tablish friendly relations with Red China.
This is the standard beginning for Red Chi-
nese infiltration of a new state.
Kao Liang, persuasive and skillful, had
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 Red China has boldly infiltrated the erupt in Africa. For example, Zanzibar, the island
Africarl~BtriR~i~4~fF~~irs c398 01/05 : CIli 0i 6i 0T3148U0'i 303tos-wion, is
now almost completel
under the domination of
y
where the Soviet Union failed. pro-Peking Communists.
Ever since the break between the Soviet Union
French diplomatic recognition, says and Red China, we had been taught to believe that
we had two diabolical enemies-Russia and the
the author, has given the Chinese United States-and we were ordered to hate them
their best propaganda weapon with equal fervor. I was encouraged to ask questions
while preparing for my African trip and, naturally,
in Africa. "Agents" of the I asked how influential Russia was in Africa. To
my surprise, I was told that the Soviet Union had
American Peace Corps have given little influence there. Russia's efforts to infiltrate the
them their biggest headache. new nations were sneered at by the African Affairs
officials of the Foreign Ministry.
"A political vacuum exists in Africa," they
said. "And we intend to fill it. Our enemy inAfrica
Red China. When lie cabled word of his success to is not Russia, but the United States. American
the Foreign Office Ministry in Peking, his job was agents under the name of the Peace Corps are the
clone. Immediately, Chang Yen, one of Mao's trust- agents
dangerous opposition we have."
ed lieutenants, was hurried to Burundi with an in- (This was the first time I had ever heard the
terpreter, a clerk, a radio engineer and a large expression "Peace Corps." When I arrived in the
amount of money. Chang Yen soon discovered that United States, I was anxious to learn more about
money could buy just'about any Burundi official, this organization. I asked Lu Tseng-yu, a former
and he passed it out with a lavish hand. He even Shanghai University professor who had escaped
found he could buy an army. He made contact with from Red China in 1957. He soon told me all about
Gaston Soumialot, chief of the local rebel army and the Peace Carps. Not only Lu Tseng, but some gov-
a follower of the late Congolese Communist leader, ernment officials were surprised at the fear Red
Patrice Lumuniba. Soumialot moved into Chang's China has of the Corps. Perhaps the effect of this
hotel, and, in effect, Chang became the quartermas- dedicated organization has been vastly underrated -
ter of the rebel army. It was easy to gain recruits as by the American press and public.)
soon as they learned that each man who enlisted
was given a year's pay-in advance. China's ambassadors are all soldiers
Next, the Red Chinese Embassy was set up, I was taught many other things about Africa
and Chang began to rain money upon the bewil- during my brieftraining period in Peking. I dis-
dered but grateful citizenry. He even put checks counted much of it, mainly because of the stupidity
into envelopes and distributed them in church pews. of Ma Wen-sen, director of the Department for
All the lucky worshipers had to do was go to the African Affairs. He seemed to know little about
Embassy and cash the checks. Few had ever heard. Africa and had never even been able to memorize
of Mao'1'se-Bing (many had never heard of China), the names of the new African nations. He was ap-
but when Chang spread the word that all this mu- pointed to his position only because he had fought
nificence came from their great friend Mao, they under Mao Tse-tung and was a loyal party mem-
began to feel an affection for their benefactor-and her. Party loyalty-not experience, knowledge or
to be susceptible to the flow of propaganda that - skill-is the requirement for advancement or for
clever Chang Yen now unleashed. appointment to high position. Mao Tse-tung trusts
Conditions in Burundi were ideal for props- only old party comrades who "ate their belts" with
ganda purposes. Poverty, unemployment, ignor- him during the days of the LongMarch in 1934-35,
ance and anti-European colonialism were weapons or who fought by his side when he drove Chiang
that only had to be picked up and used. Kai-shek out of mainland China. That is why the
The pace of infiltration was accelerated last -30 Red Chinese ambassadors abroad are all mili-
January when France recognized Communist tary men, with no training in diplomacy and no
China. Later, an embassy with a staff of 200 was language other than their owns'. Most of them were
set up in Paris. Funds were transferred from Swit- - with Mao on the Long March.
zcrland to Paris, and the capital of France, rather As I say, I had to discount much of what I was
than Bern, became the advance post for the Chinese told during my training, but when I reached Bu-
infiltration of Africa. All propaganda literature rundi, I found that everything I had learned about
used in Africa was now printed in Paris. the infiltration of Africa was the truth. I was in the
The Chinese Communists constantly heap Embassy only 18 hours, but several of those hours
praise on President Charles de Gaulle and use his were spent with Ambassador Chang Yen, who told
recognition of Red China to intengify their activ me gleefully how he was subverting Burundi with
ties in any section of Africa where France has in-" money from Peking. He also repeated Mao Tse.
fluence. I learned all this at the Foreign Ministry's tung's dictum that Burundi was the gateway to the
Department for African Affairs before I left on my - Congo and that once the Congo fell, all Africa
Burundi assignment. I also learned that, when Pre- would fall. He was supremely confident that this
mier Chou En-lai visited Egypt a year ago, he gave hope would be realized in the foreseeable future.
President Gamal Abdel Nasser $50 million and the Is he right? I cannot say, but I do know this: Right
Algerian rebels the sargrr:am rnh
_Amnrn'ta tar a aaca X
1 ins 'lat'h ? ~l~ i ~dtamrta ntattt4amr Red
05/
9
%
The
coming apparent,as, week after week, new troubles I have been told that only 12: defectors from
 Red China ever managed to reach the United 5 granaries were bursting with grain and rice. That
States, and thAp1 1.15 dl Felt t*I 2 55't01 i05 : CIA-RDP ~ WE rmere broke into
ment official. No one knows how many have at- two o t em. of were empty.
tempted to escape, but failed. I was surprised to I noticed that when party members came to
find. that my case was unique: I was the only de- our school to lecture on the benefits of commu-
fector who had been brought up since childhood nism, they invariably carried watches and had
under the Communist educational system. Obvi- fountain pens in their pockets. I asked my father
ously, the. Foreign Ministry felt when it sent me to why he didn't own a watch. He was a man who
Africa that I had been thoroughly indoctrinated. never criticized the party. He merely said that it
Outwardly, the education system of Red would take six months of his salary to buy the
China resembles the American system. Red China cheapest watch. I began to realize that there was a
has grade schools from which students go on to strong caste system in Shanghai. Only the party
high schools. Then, if a student passes a competi- leaders wore good clothes, looked well fed and
tive examination, he is permitted to attend a uni- carried watches and fountain pens. This, too, seemed
versity. But now that I've learned something about a contradiction of everything we were being told.
American education, I realize that any similarity We had been brought up to venerate Stalin
between the two systems is superficial. only to a lesser degree than we worshiped Mao
I attended grade school in my native Shang- Tse-tung. When Nikita Khrushchev, in his report
hai from 1949 through 1953. I learned to read, to the 20th Congress of the Communist party in
write and do simple arithmetic. The only history February, 1956, startled the world by detailing
we were taught was that of Mao Tse-tung and his what he called the crimes of the Stalin era, our news-
revolutionary movement. We learned little about papers printed his indictment. They also printed
. Europe or the United States. Religion, of course, , comments from foreign Communist newspapers. I
was a word we never heard. Children of grade- was completely bewildered. Until.the Sino-Soviet
automatically accented evervthingwewere told. We we had been taught concerning Stalin and such
under which we lived. It was in 1957 that I definitely decided there
a care- a better and more dignified way of life. In Febru-
students. Discipline was harsh. Bad grades
,
less anti-Communist remark. or stealing food were ary of that year, Mao Tse-tung made a speech that
"
ne caned
The Correct Handlin of Contradictions
punished by expulsion. Those expelled were sent g 1 1
setter than it had been doing in China. --.t,et a nun-
, t- , ,
stupid, but because they were especially hungry.
and
I would-see classmates thought contend," he cried. He insisted that only
but slow-witted. Everyday
,
and I knew that these by hearing from a hundred schools of thought
dropping off to sleep in class
,
h to eat could arts, culture and science flourish. Theteachers
were the ones who weren't
ettin
enou
g
g
g
at home_ Every family had ration bnnlcc but only at my high school took him at his word. Each arose
on the
of
_r,.__.- -. _ --
c..._,
more bitter in criticizing the regime.
g
communism as interpreted by Mao Tse-tun
Now
g.
,
have dn?bts. The strict I What happened? One day, we arrived atschool
I heads to
for the first time
,
Communist dogma we were taught seemed to be to rand a new group of teachers. Au or those who
h
d
a
accused Mao Tse-tung of being less than per.
flatly contradicted by the realities all around us.. :
feet had been branded as "rightists" and sent to
We were told that our standard of living was high
.
- rural sections to work as farm laborers. What hap-
If this were so. why were most of the students con
munism could there be anything g but one school volunteer for agriculturaral l labor in th a e f farm anni ng re- !
volunteer
pions. But. every day. we met former high-school thought. This incident finally crystallized my de-
_....._
We- they had deserted to drift hark _ into th,e citty v_ mathematics.'.Co begin with, I somehow had to pre-
In doing this, they committed political and eco- pale and educate myself for a position that would
k
f
h
e me out-o:
t
e country. I would also have to
nomic suicide. Thcy could not get a job or a ration ta
ort them and give as much lip service to the Communist cause
book Their families had to su
pp
"Not r eventually passed them and was allowed to enter.
He answered bitterly, as much as you
L I
f F
oref n Langualges to Shanghaa.
here in Shan gltgt~ t e nstftute o
Fl ~~~'a ~l105 : CIA-RDP66BQM@ ppgls rvg~Q eitrate on French.
of trees. One ay a eeturer came from a ing to
tell us how well off we were. He said that our I knew that French was considered the official dip
 lomatic language and that not too many students 6 he refused, there was no apparent punishment, but
~ and
elected to AP fjroN+e r9 # 1e~[?b + Q 1 105 ~~~, t~~$ be a
studied French at least four hours a day, but unwort iy o ever o mg a e
realized that there was something else equally During my last year at the Institute, a new law
30
important that I had to do. I had to join the Young
Communist. League, which was often a stepping-
stone to membership in the Communist party. This
was not easy, as the whole life and mind of a candi-
dat+! were put under microscopic examination be-
to
forbade any girl under 25 or any man under
marry. If a married woman l:,ecame pregnant., she
was given 56 days off from her job-with pay, if
she became pregnant a second time, she wr.,u ,I be
given the same. The third time, she was given no
:fore he was accepted into the League. pay and usually lost her job.
1 l
of the eight was a member of the Young Commu-
nist. League, who made out weekly reports on the
behavior and thinking of his roommates. I care-
fully watched every word I said, but even so, sev-
eral adverse reports about me prompted the League
to turn me down the first time I applied.
Student informers reported our dreams
Once a week, we all had to write a confession
detailing even the slightest acts, words or thoughts
we had had that might be construed as critical of
communism. I made my reports as bland as pos-
sible, but then I was criticized for not being frank.
F inal:ly, I thought of something that might satisfy
the l.caf.ue without involving me in serious trouble.
I confe,~sed I had - bought a pair of shoes that I
,lie+n't r~~!afly need as I already had one pair. This
the part of either male or female Stu ents at i re
Institute were so dreaded that I often used to think
that we were the most circumspect scholars in the
world. Desire is not an emotion that flourishes
under fear. This campaign against overpopulation
worked fairly well in the cities, but 80 percent of
China is rural, and in the country, the kind of dis-
cipline enforced in Shanghai was impossible to
invoke. The sons and daughters of farmers, whether
married or not, ignored what they felt to be absurd
restrictions against a normal way of life.
In Shanghai, rape and seduction were coat id-
ered serious offenses, unless the act was cornmitie 1
by a visiting African. We all heard the story 14 an
exchange student from Somaliland who had se-
duced seven girls. He had pron:rised to 111317y each
one and eventually take her back to Africa a s,ith
dered to be an example of bourgeois be- him. The tears of the seven girls ~,phare r f ly
or si
,t <
ti +
.
u
.
Jun inf. 1, was contrite in my self-criticism, but the touched the heart of the young man, and in a
offo,nsc ~va~ more heinous than I had anticipated. I
churches remaining in Shanghai and confessed
his sins to a priest. He did not know, however, that
the few "priests" in Shanghai were in reality gov-
wan mu ed to a different part of the dormitory. It
was another room for eight, but instead of one,
there were two Young Communist League members :
to report our actions, our conversations and, I ernment agents. The youth's story was immediate-
Th
l
ff
i
found, even our dreams. I was reported for talking
in my sleep and for saying things that could be con-
strued as criticism of the party. Shortly after this,
I made a second application for membership in the
League, hut again was rejected.
I had little life outside my studies, and I didn't
care for any. As I learned more and more French,
my determination to get out of China was intensi-
fied. Occasionally, I was able to, find a book, a
newspaper or a pamphlet in French, and I de-
voured these as greedily as I devoured the corn
husks, sweet potatoes and occasional spoonful of
rice we were given for dinner. I learned a little,
but not much, about the outside world. I learned
something about the United States from our daily
newspapers, which were, of course, constantly
vilifying that country. I began to long to go to
America for the very reasons for which it was
being criticized. By now, I felt that anything that
Mao Tse-tung hated must be good.
Life in Shanghai had changed considerably
from the time my father was a young man. In those
far-off days, every man yearned for a big family.
It was different now. Mao Tse-tung was doing
ossible to reduce the population. 111
thi
ng p
every
artment stores and govern= them into powder that could be used as fertilizer.
de
factories
h
ols
p
,
,
sc
o
ment agencies gave out birth-control information . It was natural that the villagers should protest
and contraceptives, and abortion was made legal against using the remains of their grandparents
and inexpensive. In fact, any pregnant girl could to help grow rice and corn. But the Chinese Com-
go to the nearest hospital and have an abortion per- munists are resourceful in some ways; if one plan
formed without cost. At any university, a girl who does not seem to work, they always come up with
became l ;''a boti' 1. rn te. In this case, the mere] asked vol-
p.99% Q i~~~ of those
mediately e fFa man~'ad-made rtfO o'14i~if ' C ~ ~ rug
the
Th
i
B
f Vill
a
s
..
age
pregnant, he was "encouraged" to be sterilized. If buried in the graveyard o
' lived eight in a room at the Institute. One The penalties for extramarita u At 0111, on
'X
d 1
ey
s.
ic
a
ly forwarded to local Communist o
considered the case and then decided :to forget the
whole thing. But because the seven girls had. done
some talking, the story became public property.
I asked a classmate why the Somali student
had not been punished. "Don't you know?" he
laughed. "All Africans must be treated with kid
gloves. Our leader has great plans for Africa, and
nothing must be done to hurt the feelings of any
African." It was the first inkling I had that Africa
was to be Mao's No. 1 target.
During my last year at the Institute, I was
becoming more conscious than ever of the loss of
dignity every citizen suffered under communism.
Reports coming to Shanghai from the rural dis-
tricts emphasized this fact. Ancestor worship has
always been part of the Chinese philosophy. Per-
haps "ancestor worship" is too dramatic a term.
Chinese children, nevertheless, have always been
brought up to respect their parents, their grand-
parents and, for that matter, their great-grand-
parents. Now, small groups of Peking agricultural
experts were going from village to village asking
for volunteers to dig up the ancient graveyards,
gather the bones of their ancestors and help grind
 farmers didn't mind ddoingg;; after all, the dead in
the gIawt-sl5-~ oua repo mar r s~ rowiu
unrest in Red China and that it is only a matter of
time until the people rise up and overthrow Mao
T, e.-tong and his regime. But if I said that, it would
be just wishful thinking. There is unhappiness, un-
rest and discouragement among the people, but
there is apathy too. Mao is not quite the revered
war hero that he was a few years ago. Millions hope
that he will be replaced eventually by someone less
stern, less attached. to the inflexible dogma of com-
munism. Their hopes rise no higher than this.
I know that many of my former classmates at
the Institute envy me because I managed to break
away, but I know, too, that they will never do any-
thing to jeopardize the small but relatively safe
sinecures their graduation from the Institute af-
forded them. I know that there have been anti-
Communist cliques at various universities, but I
know, too, that they have always been infiltrated by
Young Communist League agents, reported to the
authorities and their members set to work on
farms. Thousands of intellectuals feel sullen re-
sentn-tent toward a system that does not allow then
to fully realize their intellectual potential, but there
is nothing they can do to change conditions.
Many people in the United States have great
hopes that Chiang Kai-shek will eventually land an
army on the mainland. If he ever does, millions
will ask in bewilderment, "Who is Chiang Kai-,
shek?" Because of strict censorship by the Peking
government., it is seldom that one sees his name.
Mainland Chinese who remember Chiang view him
now as the puppet ruler of Taiwan, an armed
American colony. And they are told that when
Chiang acts, the Americans pull the strings.
There are no "graduations" in China
But let me return to my story. When I finished
my four years at the Shanghai Institute, I applied
for permission to join the Commission for Cultural
Exchange in Peking. Incidentally, there is no such
thing as a "graduation ceremony" from a univer-
sity; that is considered a bourgeois affectation.
Upon completion of your studies, you are sent to
work on the farms for, one year, and I fully ex-
pected that this would be my fate. I still hadn't
been allowed to join the Young Communist League,
and as a rule, only its members were given prefer-
ential treatment and government jobs.
To my amazement, I was accepted by theCom-
nr,ission for Cultural Exchange. I had nothing but
my good record in French to recommend me, but
when I reached Peking, I discovered there were
very few in the Cultural Commission who spoke
French. My job was to act as interpreter at various
international meetings. This wasn't very challeng-
ing work, but it did,enable me to meet a great many
foreigners, to learn more about the world outside
China, and it improved my French.
Then, the opportunity unexpectedly arrived.
I was selected to go to Burundi with the diplomatic
rank of assistant cultural attache. My new supe-
rior, Shen Chun, was the cultural attache at our
Embassy there. A careful, balding party member
in his m*Wlaff~sd~lyiatr~
preter because he, of course, spoke no French.
After creeks of intensive briefing from our Chinese
The Communists have made China
CIA~QQOsQ~Ba~Oporld.
Mothers with more than two children
are penalized. Extramarital sex brings
harsh reprisals. Students cannot
marry, and the government promotes
free abortion and sterilization.
Those who do not submit to birth
control are branded as "rightists."
"experts" on Africa, I went on a furlough to see
my family in Shanghai. The farewell I bade then,
was more final than they realized.
Back in Peking, I took my clothing allowance,
about $400, and bought myself sonic suits, shirts,
a couple of pairs of shoes and a suitcase. I tucked
away five pounds of sterling, about $14, for even-
tual escape funds. On May 19, Shen Chun and I
flew from Peking to Canton on a government plane.
In Canton, we boarded an Air Pakistan air-
liner bound for Karachi. We had to wait two days
there for a connecting flight. Shen remained by my
side, and I 'worried that I might give myself away
by talking in my sleep. I had thought about Ilefect-
ing in Karachi, but I spoke no English, and was
afraid that no one there would speak French. So I
decided to wait and see just how far away from
Red China I could get.
From Karachi, we flew to Aden, Nairobi and
then Kampala, in Uganda, close to Burundi. As the
miles from my homeland multiplied, I became
more and more preoccupied with escape. I won-
dered if my companion, Shen, was becoming sus-
picious of my silence, and tried to chat about trivial
things, like the weather. I even debated asking; him
to defect along with me.
We landed in Bujumbura on May 25. I had
half-hoped to make a break at the airport, but one
of our diplomats was there to escot't us to the Em-
bassy's temporary headquarters in a wing of the
Paguidas-Haidemenos Hotel. I kept watching for
the right moment to escape.
It came early the next morning. I awoke about
6 a.m, and found Shen already gone from our
room. I put on a shirt, trousers and bedroom
slippers to look as casual as possible, and took an
elevator to the lobby. Across the street, I could see
a taxi stand. I went to our private dining room and
gulped down breakfast. The others were still eat-
ing as I got up to leave. I sauntered out of the hotel
and crossed the street. No one seemed to be watch-
ing. I jumped into a taxi and told the driver to rush
me to the American Embassy. I had learned my
French well, for he understood. We drove through
Bujumbura, still cool in the quiet morning. The
American Embassy was only five minutes away.
I got out of the taxi and looked at the stone
building where all my hopes would culminate. Still
wearing bedroom slippers, I shuffled in to the sur-
CVJ*5 &04031W0de4w ctsd3Pnt my
request for political asylum: " e vaus ,ia,ttan.de
l'asile politique aux bats-Unis.",I was ,free.
 Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP66B00403R000100030003-3
BY T GEORGE HARRIS
MAO TSE-TUNG, poet-dictator of the biggest nation I:
-in history, looks, to some like a stupid peasant in
a morality play. With''evil pride, while his family
starves, he buys an expensive firecracker to im-
press the neighbors. In this make-believe, you don't
wonder what Mao can, in fact, do with his bomb.
He may have plans. But the leaders and press'
of the Western world., responsible men, have taken
pains to prevent public panic over the new menace. 1,
We hear their reassurances before we hear the
worries that prompt them. The thin Red economy,
we are told, will need several hard years-any-
where, estimates say, from five to twenty-five-to I
build nuclear-armed ICBM's to threaten us.
Whatever comfort this calendar offers, it im-
plies a harsh reality that has to be faced : The nu-
clear thunder out of China announced a newly
formidable foe among nations. A hungry giant has
grasped the science and technology of modern
power. In the rush to explain China's weaknesses,
Most reports have, in our "be calm" mood, j
wildly understated Chinese advance and ambition.
Diplomats tend to declare that China's main use of
the bomb will be as a status symbol in Southeast
Asia. But China's imperialistic ambitions reach
far beyond Asia-into troubled Africa. ;
Never mind, one diplomat told me, the Afri-
cans are superstitious about radioactive damage to
their manhood. As dedicated bomb-banners, he i
said, they will hold the Chinese responsible.
Even the military menace has been giver.-the
once-over-lightly in public. Though the Chinese
is
announced an "atom bomb," U.S. experts first put
it down as a rudimentary test "device" made of
plutonium. The implication: China could not yet
produce fuel enough for more than a blast or two,
had not built the ordnance to make its device port-
able. The fallout proved to be from a bomb as
advanced as our Hiroshima "Lean Boy." More
surprises may follow. In 1959, when the Chinese
went all-out for the bomb, they knew what they
needed. They also knew their bomb would never
be considered a weapon, even for defense, if they
did not develop a way to transport it to a target.
So? Key scientists who study atomic-intelli-
gence think the Chinese started on these lesser jobs
years ago--and are now very close to a workable
weapons system. "It's too dange.rous," says a care-
ful strategist, "to assume otherwise."
Obviously, they are years behind the U.S.
in ICBM's, but this smug comparison leaves out
something. They do not need ICBM's to put a bomb
on Taiwan, or South Vietnam, or India-or, as the
Russians know, Outer Mongolia. They can threaten
their neighbors, already under pressure, with crude
rockets (they have a U.S.-trained specialist) or re-
built IL-28 bombers (Russian-contributed),
Mao Tse-tung, who acts with more caution.
than he talks, may only rattle his atoms. He would
be hard put to find an A-bomb target that would
not trigger H-bomb retaliation. Our policy-makers
automatically assume that any attack upon a non-
Communist nation requires us to destroy all of
China's nuclear machinery bypush-button missiles.
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hardly foolproof. "Our superiority is overwhelm-
ing, and we will make it damn clear to the Chi-
nese," says a policy-maker. Then he goes on to his
deeper worry. "They are the first nation to have,
this power that is not concerned about what hap-
pens to its people." Elderly Mao, he knows, may
.one day be replaced by a less cautious man.
In this context, possession'of atomic potential
ended the era when China was only a regional
power. On his way to the bomb, Mao knocked out
the No. One Russian, Nikita Khrushchev, and took '
over as chief Communist. Counterpressures against
him lost force. He need no longer even be fretted.
by Chiang Kai-shek's faded dream of reconquest.
Red China has become the major menace to a
nervous world. The West has its hands full.
Behind such military and diplomatic results,
already visible, stands the scientific and techno-
. logical cause. China's atomic explosion cannot be
treated, though some try, as an isolated achieve-
ment of an otherwise primitive society. We made
that mistake once before. After Russia first tested
an atomic device in September of 1949, the U.S.
foolishly underestimated its expanding potential.
We wasted years on internal wrangles over
whom to blame. You remember the big debate at
home: How had our atom secrets fallen into enemy
hands? But for traitors, many were persuaded, the
backward Russians would never have produced
A-bombs or H-bombs. Scientists argued with the
witch-hunters, but shared their mistaken estimate
of Russian technology. The bomb, many felt, was
a one-shot act put on at great cost by a country that
could do little more for years. Experts explained
that the Soviets had no "broad base of secondary
scientific and technological resources." They talked
as they now talk about China.
Only a few men saw the deeper error. Dr.
M. H. Trytten, director of scientific manpower for
the National Academy of Sciences, worried over a
remark he had heard all too often from free-world
researchers who watched their Russian counter-
parts. "I know the Russians can't be doing much
along other lines," each would tell him, "but in my
part of science, they're moving up fast." Trytten,
a methodical Minnesotan, compiled an index of
specifics. Be organized Library of Congress and
CI.A teams to study Soviet publications.
As his evidence confirmed his worst fears,
Trytten ran into widely held and complacent myths.
Many scientists, devoted to free inquiry, could not
accept the idea that science could make general, if
uneven, progress, under a dictatorship. Science
writers shared the dogma. Without public warn-
ings from the press, Government officials were
slow to consider Trytten's evidence on its merit.
I happened to know Dr. Trytten. during those
years-1952 and 1953-when he first tried to sound
the alarm. "He was like a man who saw his house...-.-
afire, but could not rouse the fire department. Ile
eventually persuaded President Eisenhower's Na-
tional Security Council to read his report on Rus-
si a's massive training for scientists and technicians.
But the U.S., which depends upon the spon-
ntiI the .
next shock. In 1957, we looked up to see Sputnik I
and dog-toting Sputnik II soaring across our skies.
Then the missile race turned serious, and, more to
the point, we sensed the total challenge to our tech-
nological supremacy-dangerously late.
The. recent Chinese blast sent me back to
Trytten, who still advises the Government on sci-
ence. Surely, I said, we aren't back in the same
situation. "Well," he answered mildly, "I have
thought so for quite a while. It is much harder to
get reports on what the Chinese are doing than it
was on the Russians. But we know some of it. In
one area, micromolecules and cell biology, we sus-
pect that they may become world leaders."
Behind the bamboo curtain, it now appears,
the Chinese technological drive overrides all other
considerations, except, perhaps, Mao's yen for sus-
picion and tyranny. The West had its first informed
peep in the late 1950's when Canadian geophysi.
cist J. Tuzo Wilson was allowed to visit research
centers. In Peking, he found efficient new labs for
100,000 teachers and students. He rode new rail-
roads over the interior plains to a vast new re-
search complex in Lanchow. This center, special-
izing in physics, probably supervised the recent
nuclear test' The technology poured into the bomb
represents major resources brought into use in
spite of economic disasters.
Why? A fanatic lust for technology has been
a standard trait of communism. In Russia during
the Battle of Leningrad, when old women dug
trenches in the bitter cold, healthy young men
never missed a day's study at the technical insti-
tute. In China, the Marxist adoration of science is^
compounded by a specific national experience.
The ancient Chinese intellectual tradition, which
produced gunpowder, turned decadent and lost
out to the science-minded vigor of the West. This
historic loss of face may explain why Americans
of Chinese descent feel deeply about the sciences
and contribute far more than their share to U.S.
scientific advance. They fill about 2,000 key-re-
search and teaching jobs. In Red China, where the
hate of "foreign devils" survives in daily "kill
Americans" ritual, dictator Mao uses the built-up
anger of the centuries to justify investing in tech-
nology while millions go hungry. Even in a crude
and wasteful economic system, the monster effort is
apt to pay off better than it did for the Russians.
Said Tuzo Wilson: "The science in this wild
and frenziedly growing outpost of Asia. is, though
limited by [lack of trained] manpower, unques-
tionably up-to-date both in technology and theory."
Mao Tse-tung's passion for nuclear power
was the decisive factor in recent Communist his-
tory and in Khrushchev's rise and fall. On the way
.up, Khrushchev moved to solidify his satellite em-
pire by mollifying its most independent element.
,He?gave China, on October 15, 1957, a treaty
'promising economic 'assistance and nuclear re-
sources. Capital goods, and technicians poured
across the border, in two years completed 200 eco-
nomic projectsphis nuclear-reactor facilities.
Khrushchev became wary of Mao's prime de-
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MAO TSE-TUNG, SCULPTURE BY JACK GREGORY PHOTOGRAPH[:n BY SLYMlblllt MEONICK
of its consequences. On l alloween o.l 1961., the
wancl not for peaceful atoms, but for war wcap Spirit of Camp David turned into a ghost. Russia.
ons. The technicians began to drag their feet, and triggered a 58-megaton H-bomb, the closest thin-
the Chinese, in retaliation, made life "unbent to a doomsday device ever to foul the earth's at-
able" for their brig brothers. On June 20, 1959,ithe mosphere. The 1961 tests, and a 1962 series, wcre
Chinese later charged, Khrushchev "unilaterally probably a bid for a decisive lead over the U.S.
scrapped the agreement concerning defense tech- We resumed testing. But the Russians' perform-
nol.or;y [and] refused to supply China with atomic- ance, though in the Arctic, was staged in such a
bomb samples and technical materials." China's way as to remind their Chinese allies how a big
explanation: Khrushchev, in the "Spirit of Camp radioactive bomb set off along their border one
David," broke the treaty "apparently as a gift" to spring would drift its poison over most of the land.
bring t: President Eisenhower. Soviet technicians if mushroom smoke signals sent 'rude mes
decam PPI9 fa41`Il& Jease 2005/01/05 CIA-RD A?6P"41Q3MDAMOQ13 fl31-3ssia and China
The West rejoiced at the split, but notatsotne were advanced Marxist cussing. The Chinese ac-.
 Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP66B00403R000100030003-3
au%rd Khrushchev of marching into a "revisionist
aluagrnirc." Khrushchev called them "madmen."
The West listened with understandable self-interest
to tftc argument's main theme. Not often do we
hear tvon monster nations in formal debate over
whether. for the sake of ideological purity, they
mutt jointly abolish the rest of us with nuclear
weapomc. No comparable dialogue has been re-
ported since ancient Greece, where, according to
'rhucydides, the Melians failed to persuade the
;Athenians, by logic, not to enslave or kill them.
By this fall, the Red Chinese seemed, like the
Athenians, to be winning on points. Khrushchev
called this December's international meeting of
.Communist leaders from 26 countries. His purpose:
to ban madmen from the Soviet bloc. But he found
lie did not have the votes. Many other Communist
groups, while not eager for nuclear war, objected .
to the spin-off of China, The monolithic unity of
the Soviet empire was whirling into "polycen-
trism." To avoid total Russian embarrassment,
Khrushchev's hand-picked subordinates pushed
old Nick aside-only hours before Mao's bomb
went off near the Russian border.
Since then, the Communists have sweated
over new alignments. Most Sovietologists believe
Russia and China will try to heal their split, but
fail. If the bear and the dragon wrestle on E:he In i ok
of nuclear war, no human can sleep safely.
For the free world, Red China's new power
and ambition can only be a menace. But, as Rcrssia
found, such ambition brings new discipline,:md i he
beginnings of restraint. China's heavy trade with
Japan is jeopardized by fallout. China's infiltra-
tion project in Africa would be blown to bits by
further atomic explosions. Aware of the stakes,
Mao accompanied his boast of his bomb with a,
pledge "never at any.time and under any circum-
stances to be the first to use nuclear weapons."
To force him to keep that promise will be the
business of U.S. policy. The job demands, as Lyn-
good sense." Our ultimate weapon, the loyalty and
initiative of free men, is blocked off by China's
total isolation. We must break through. The dragon,
now growing nuclear teeth, cannot be left to hide
behind its bamboo curtain. The close,in struggle
with Russia has proved that, while we cannot end
the Communists' drive to rule the world, we can
make each piece of it too costly for them to try to
take. In time, the war urge of the Chinese may be
turned, like that of the Russians, toward scientific
and economic competition for the respect of the
nations caught between them and us. END.
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