UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY SUMMARY PRESENTATION TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 88TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000400240007-7
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• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Summary Presentation to
THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
88th Congress, 1st Session
WILLIAM C. FOSTER
Director
State Dept. review completed
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Summary Presentation to the House Foreign Affairs Committee
88th Congress, 1st Session
TABLE OF CONTENTS aat
Preface: Status of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
Legislation
I. Why the Agency Was Established 1
II. International Negotiations 3
Test Ban 6
Direct Communications Link 8
What Lies Ahead 9
III. Research Program 11
What Has Been Done 12
Future Research 14
IV. Impact of Senate Budget Cut 18
Appendix E1EL
Status of FY 1963 Research Program
Table: FY 1964 Contract and Grant Studies by Category 7
1 - Contents
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
Page
Specific Research Studies Proposed for FY 1964
I. Concept Studies:
A. Regional Security and Arms Control and Disarmament 8
B. Preliminary Measures for General Arms Control and
Disarmament 9
C. Substantial Measures for General Arms Control and
Disarmament 11
D. International Security Arrangements for Disarmament
and the Preconditions for Disarmament 12
Supporting Studies:
1. Inspection System Studies 14
2. Studies of Elements in an Inspection System 15
3. Verification of Specific Armaments and Activities 17
4. Legal and Political Aspects of Inspection, Violation, and
Response 19
5. Inspection Field Test Program 22
6. Strategy of Negotiations 24
7. Relationship Between National Political Environments and
and Arms Control 25
8. Historical Studies of Arms Control and Disarmament
Experiences 27
9. Technical and Economic Dislocations Resulting from
Arms Control and Disarmament 29
10. Arms
2 - Contents
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'_d)
II. Supporting Studies (Cont'd)
Page
10. Arms Control Implications of Technical Developments 31
11. Computer Services and Methodological Studies 32
12. Bibliographic Studies 34
Summary of Obligations 35
ACDA Organizational Chart 36
Table: Permanent Staff by Organizational Unit 37
Transmittal Letter to The Honorable, John W. McCormack, Speaker 38
of the House of Representatives--ACDA Legislative Program
Administration Bill 42
* * *
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Status of Legislation
(88th Cong., 1st Sess.)
FY 1964 Budget Request $15,000,000
Senate Action:
Authorization (S. 777, passed June 17, 1963)
Effect: FY 1964 budget reduced by one-third (from
$15 million to $10 million).
Comment: S. 777, the bill passed by the Senate, also
included the amendment supported by ACDA to
modify the personnel security procedures for
contractor employees. In addition, the Senate
added several other amendments to the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act.
House Action:
H.R. 7063, the appropriation bill for the Departments of State,
Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related agencies,
(passed June 18, 1963), included $1.6 million for ACDA which,
in the language of the Committee report accompanying the bill,
is "the full amount remaining of the present authorization /out
of $10 million originally authorized in the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act/. No additional sum is authorized to be appro-
priated until such time as substantive legislation is enacted."
(H. Rep. No. 388, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.).
$20,000,000
for FY 1964
and FY 1965
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WHY THE AGENCY WAS ESTABLISHED
Since the end of World War II, the United States has been engaged in a T..iad
It. ternational agreement to control and limit armamht-s aF., a means of aviei-tim.2:
stengthening world peace and security. The threat of nuclear devastation
any question faring our nation pnd the worl, thid
7u conferences and meetings, some of theemao.?
the Soviet Uion and other county:,.....?
? lE
. one s s:&:. or
ultimate goal. of eniest State is a i3 n)L.
the scourge of war and the Oangurs and burdens of ar=ents: in wt.icn
use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; ant. in whiic'd.
national adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. It 16
the purpose of this Act to provide impetus toward this goal by creasi.
new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control o
armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament.
"Arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of
foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a
whole. The formulation and implementation of United States arms control
and disarmament policy in a manner which will promote the national security
can best be insured by a central organization charged by statute with
primary *responsibility for this field." (Sec. 2, P.L. 87-297)
In the
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In the same section of the Act, Congress assigned the Agency the following primary
functions:
(a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms
control and disarmament policy formulation;
(b) The preparation for and management of United States partici-
pation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament
field;
(c) The dissemination and coordination of public information con-
cerning arms control and disarmament; and
(d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction
of United States participation in such control systems as may become part
of United States arms control and disarmament activities."
Thus, the Agency was created to explore, develop, recommend and, if approved by
the President, negotiate possible alternatives to the arms race in order to enhance
our national security. Our Government cannot participate in discussions on arms control
and disarmament without jeopardy to our security unless it is well-prepared to answer
Soviet arguments and to judge those proposals which could weaken our security and those
which would strengthen it. A vast fund of technical information must be available to
our negotiators if we are to participate intelligently at the conference table. So that
this important objective could be realized, Congress, in the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Act, charged the Agency with consolidating and coordinating our research in this
field. The Act also provided for more clearly defined Congressional supervision over
our Government's activities in this area than was the case prior to the passage of the
Act.
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
Just prior to and at the time this Committee held hearings on the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act in August and September 1961, the United States and the Soviet Union
were engaged in a series of bilateral talks to explore the basis for a new effort toward
disarmament. The United States was represented by Mr. John J. McCloy, then the
President's Disarmament Adviser, and the Soviet Union by Deputy Foreign Minister V. A.
Zorin. The primary objective of these talks was to reach agreement on basic principles
for disarmament negotiations and the composition of the negotiating forum.
On September 20, 1961, agreement was announced on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement
of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations. It states, among other things, that
measures for general and complete disarmament must include:
1. " . . . establishment_of_reliable procedures for the peaceful
settlement of disputes . . . to strengthen institutions Epr maintain-
_ _
ing peace."
2. " . . . disarmament . . . in an agreed sequence, by stages . .
/-....n_d/ balanced so that at no stage . . . could any State . . . gain military
advantage."
3. " . . . strict and effective international control . . . /To7
_ _
provide firm assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations
. ? . the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements
for verification . . . in each stage."
4.
. . an International Disarmament Organization . . . assured
/of/
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3.
0
0
0 Lot!/ unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for
the purpose of effective verification."
0
0 Out of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions also arose the decision to establish the
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ce present Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva as an appropriate negotiating
co forum. Eight additional nations, representing different areas of the world, were added
0 to the five Western and five Communist nations which had taken part in the previous nego-
0
tiations, thus reflecting the principle of equitable geographical representation which
cg' the U.S. had advocated.'
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O
Highlights of the negotiations since the McCloy-Zorin talks and the present time
U
"
January 16, 1962: American and British delegations at Geneva rejected the Soviet
0 proposal of the preceding November for a ban on nuclear explosions in the atmosphere,
c? outer space, and underwater, with an unpoliced moratorium on underground tests pending
0
w conclusion of a general disarmament agreement.
March 2, 1962: In a nation-wide radio-TV address authorizing a new series of atmos-
? pheric tests, President Kennedy stated that the U.S. would not carry out test plans if
o the Soviets would sign the comprehensive test ban draft treaty proposed by the
U.S.
and
< 1/The previous U.N. Ten-Nation Committee was composed of the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and
Rumania. The nations added were: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria,
Sweden and the United Arab Republic.
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and U.K. before the latter part of April. In urging agreement, the President said:
0
. . our ultimate objective is not to test for the sake of testing. Our real objec- 0
0
tive is to make our own tests unnecessary, to prevent others from testing, to prevent
the nuclear arms race from mushrooming out of control, to take the first steps toward 0
0
general and complete disarmament."
March
0
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March 14, 1962: The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference held its first meet- m
co
ing at Geneva.
0
0
April 18, 1962: The U.S. introduced at the ENDC an "Outline of Basic Provisions
0
a
of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.
May 25, 1962: The U.S. and the U.S.S.R., taking into consideration the views of 5
other ENDC members, agreed on a draft declaration against war propaganda. Four days
inter, however, the Soviet Union, in an abrupt turnabout, refused to approve the draft
declaration and insisted upon new amendments which were unacceptable to the U.S.
0
0
August 27, 1962: The U.S. and U.K. introduced two new draft test ban treaties
(described below) at Geneva.
December 12, 1962: Ambassador Dean submitted to the ENDC a six-point working
paper on measures to reduce the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure o
of communication, and recommended establishment "at the appropriate time" of informal
technical-military groups to study various methods for implementation of these measures. >
For the purpose of allaying fears of aggression, the paper suggests advance notification t
of major military movements, installation of permanent observation posts at major trans-
portation centers, and establishment of additional types of observation. Further sugges-
tions are: the exchange of military missions to promote improved communications and
understanding,
5.
N. understanding, the establishment of communications links
0
0 rapid and reliable communication in times of crisis, and
0
A national commission on reduction of the risk of war to
8 in which modern weapons and techniques may increase
0 steps which states might reduce the
0
0
take to
risk
of
between major capitals to insure
the establishment of an inter
consider such matters as the ae
or reduce the risk of war and the
war.
December 1962 - January 1963: Soviet re-acceptance
2 inspections prompted new
0
m and U.S.S.R.
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April 1. 1963: The U.S. and
currant position on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.
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LETI_LEIL_LItl: President Kennedy announced high-level Moscow test 1:61C._
I.: in o_ly.
2
0 June 20 1963?
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N between Washington and
July
-0 A.
Negotiations for a nuclear test ban agreement
m Washington. The need for an adequate number of
ground tests continued to be the principal area
test ban talks
of the principle of on-zite
in New. York and IT L4 betwPen the
U.K. submitted a memorandum at the ENT,C
Conclusion of U.S.-Soviet agreement for a direct co= n
unicatios
Moscow.
15 1963: Harriman mission begins discussions in Moscow.
More extensive consideration of some of the most important highlights follows:
Test Ban
were held
in
Geneva,
New York and
,
on-site inspections with regard to under
-
of disagreement.
Indicative of their interest in reaching a test ban agreement, the United States
and the United Kingdom introduced two new draft treaties on August 27, 1962: (1) a
comprehensive
6.
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one providing for a total ban on nuclear testing in all environments based on internation-
ally supervised, nationally manned control posts and on-site inspections, and (2) a
limited ban ending nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space,
without the need to establish any international verification machinery. President
Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, in a joint statement, emphasized the preference of
their two governments for prompt action on the comprehensive treaty. However, if early
agreement on a total ban was not possible, then they were prepared to conclude a partial
agreement.
On April 1, 1963, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted a memorandum of
our current position concerning the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. No draft treaty,
however, has yet been tabled at the ENDC reflecting this position.
Under the present United States proposal for a treaty banning all nuclear tests,
inc3 ding those underground, the verification system for monitoring underground nuclear
explosions inside the Soviet Union would be based primarily on a network of seismic sta-
tions operated or supervised by the United States and the United Kingdom and located
outside the Soviet Union. In spite of an apparent disadvantage of greater distance,
actually this permits effective long-range detection throughout the entire area of the
Soviet Union by strategically placed stations in other parts of the world. This system
would be supplemented by unmanned seismic stations in the Soviet Union, and by more than
one hundred seismic observatories operated by other countries all over the world. On-
site inspection within the Soviet Union would be required to discriminate between some
of the tremors caused by earthquakes and those caused by nuclear explosions.
Under the present United States proposal for a treaty banning tests in the atmos-
phere, in the oceans, and in space, the verification system would also consist primarily
of control posts outside the Soviet Union which were operated or supervised by the United
States. On-site inspection within the Soviet Union would not be required.
This
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This is the kind of treaty which Chairman Khrushchev's July 2 speech refers to and
the kind which is being discussed in Moscow by the Harriman mission.
B. Direct Communications Link
On June 20, 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to
establish a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow. This was one of
six measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communi-
cation which were recommended in the Treaty Outline on General and Complete Disarmament.
It was also recommended in the working paper on measures to reduce the risk of war which
Ambassador Dean submitted to the ENDC on December 12, 1962.
The direct communications link was designed for the quick exchange of messages in
time of emergency and will consist of:
(1) Two terminal points with telegraph-teleprinter equipment between which com-
munications are to be directly exchanged;
0
0
(2) One full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit, routed Washington-London-CopenhagEn-
m
m Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, which shall be used for the transmission of messages;
(7)
(3) One full-time duplex radio telegraph circuit, routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow,
u_ which shall be used for service communications and for coordination of operations between
-0
the two terminal points.
a The terminal points of the link shall be so equipped as to provide for the trans-
< mission and reception of messages from Moscow to Washington in the Russian language and
from Washington to Moscow in the English language. To preserve security, special equip-
ment at the terminal points of the circuits will scramble outgoing messages and unscram-
ble incoming messages. C. What
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C. What Lies Ahead
0
0
0 Although neither a general disarmament agreement nor a safeguarded test ban agree-
ment has been concluded, a valuable beginning has been made toward solving many and
0
0 varied problems in the field of arms control and disarmament.
0
0
0
Our Government has no illusions that progress on general and complete disarmament
co would be swift. Provisions of the treaty outline such as those requiring that nations
0 settle all their disputes peacefully would necessitate major changes by the Soviet bloc
0
m countries in their outlook toward world affairs. The Soviet Union has, however, indi-
0 cated its concern over the need of control limitations on nuclear delivery vehicles and
a
O ? has somewhat clarified its position on inspection requirements related to comprehensive
ci disarmament proposals. Even though progress has been limited, the United States, never-
theless, believes it useful to continue to let the world know the ultimate goal of its
- disarmament proposals and how it proposes to achieve that goal. The goal has been
^ described as a "free, secure and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common
? standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the
0 rule of law."
0
The negotiations in Geneva have provided the United States with an unusual oppor-
tunity to communicate this goal and its views to other nations of the world. The over-
? simplified Soviet propaganda slogan of "General and Complete Disarmament in 4 Years" has
o sometimes sounded impressive to other nations in the United Nations debates because pro-
? cedural limitations prevented a probing analysis. At the Geneva Conference, however,
c) adequate opportunity is provided for full analysis and lengthy debate by our negotiators_
As a result, non-Soviet bloc participants at the Conference have been able to perceive
< the wholly unrealistic and superficial context of the Soviet slogan. The United States
Treaty Outline for General and Complete Disarmament represents a comprehensive, realis-
tic and specific series of proposals through which we have communicated to the other
nations present our sincere desire for a meaningful disarmament agreement.
The
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The Geneva Conference will continue to serve a useful purpose in providing a forum
0 for the discussion of comprehensive disarmament as well as more limited agreements such
0
0 as those to reduce the risk of war. The recent agreement on a direct communications
" link was in fact negotiated and concluded at Geneva. As the White House statement of
0
0
.cr June 20 said: "This agreement on a communications link is a limited but practical step
0
0 forward in arms control and disarmament. We hope agreement on other more encompassing
0
ce measures will follow. We shall bend every effort to go on from this first step.
co
0
0
0
a
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
RESEARCH PROGRAM
In accordance with the Congressional mandate to conduct and coordinate research in
0
A the field of arms control and disarmament, as a basis for negotiations consistent with
o our national security, the Agency has embarked on an expanding research program. For
0 fiscal year 1962, the Agency's budget provided $600,000 for contract research, approxi-
0
2 mately one-third of its total budget. For fiscal year 1963, Congress provided $4 million
co for contract research; this was roughly two-thirds of the Agency's total budget. For
o fiscal year 1964, $11 million, or almost three-quarters of a recommended budget of $15
m million, has been requested for contract and grant research.
0
0
a
0 In order to assist him in administering this expanding research program, the
ci Director established on September 20, 1962, the Agency's Research Council. The Council
Eiadvises the Director on the three elements of the Government's program of research in
"
c4 the field of arms control and disarmament:
1. Studies undertaken by the ACDA staff;
0
2. ACDA contract and grant research studies; and
71) 3. Staff and contract studies by other agencies in the field of
arms control and disarmament.
-0 The Council has been useful in giving direction to the Agency's research effort and
c)in preventing duplication of effort in this field as between agencies.
A. What
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A. What Has Been Done
During the first months following the establishment of the Agency, in September
1961, research activities consisted almost entirely of ACDA staff studies. Careful plan-
ning was required for the initiation of the research program. Staff research has con-
tinued to serve as the framework for the Agency's research program; in general, research
conducted under contracts and grants is intended to support and supplement the in-house
research program of the Agency. The purpose of the total research program, of course, is
in support of our international negotiations on arms control and disarmament.
A complete list of the contracts and grants let by the Agency during fiscal year
1963 is contained in the Appendix to this booklet. All of these external studies have
been designed either as springboards to further conceptual thinking within the Agency or
to supplement, with detailed substantive research, conceptual planning in process within
the Agency. Some of the more important studies contracted for since the creation of
the Agency include:
(a) A study to develop techniques for monitoring declared production and for
detecting clandestine production of strategic delivery vehicles within the framework of
an arms control agreement to discontinue or limit such production. This study was the
first step in an over-all project to design an inspection system for monitoring the pro-
duction and deployment of strategic delivery vehicles. Other contracts have been let in
furtherance of the project.
(b) A study to determine the suitability of zone-by-zone techniques of inspec-
tion to verify compliance with a disarmament agreement of general territorial application.
(c) A study of the application of statistical techniques for use in inspecting
arms
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arms control arrangements. The purpose of this effort is to identify means of making
0
inspections effective on a sample basis despite attempts of an inspected country to 0
0
thwart the system.
0
0
(d) A study of verification arrangements for arms control and disarmament 0
0
measures that prohibit the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and restrict 0
the flight testing of missiles.
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0
0
(e) A study of verification methods for arms control and disarmament measures
0
a
(f) A study to survey and assess data collection equipment and devices that c5
could be used to verify arms control and disarmament measures. The starting point of U
the study is those elements subject to inspection which can be identified through
physically measurable phenomena by sensors (devices that can detect, or "sense" tell-tale
clues) used either in airborne or ground inspection systems. An index will be prepared 0
of available equipment. The contractor will then suggest how various combinations of 0
0
such sensors can be used in Project CLOUD GAP, a joint Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and Department of Defense undertaking designed to conduct field tests of arms control
and disarmament inspection and verification concepts.
which limit conventional armaments and forces.
(g) A study, related to the preceding contract, of automated data processing
methods. Based on available data processing equipment and techniques, as they relate to
decisions which might have to be made as a result of inspections under current U.S. dis-
armament proposals, the study will recommend the development of mobile or transportable
systems which could be field tested by July 1964. This study will also be used by the
joint A DA/DOD Project CLOUD GAP in the conduct of field tests of verification concepts.
As the
13.
As the ACDA research program has acquired more clearly identified goals, contracts
0 and grants have been let at an increasing pace. The Agency was, however, limited in
0
0
incurring contractual obligations during the first part of fiscal year 1963 since the bill
0 containing our appropriation for that fiscal year was not enacted until October 18, 1962,
0
and the funds were not apportioned until November 16. This, in fact, was the principal
0
0 reason for the greater rate at which Agency funds were obligated during the latter part
0
? of fiscal year 1963.
co
0
? B.
0
a As previously indicated, $11 million of the $15 million budget request for fiscal
year 1964 is for contract and grant research. The remaining $4 million is for "in-house"
research by Agency personnel, for operating the machinery of our program, and for utiliz-
ing the results of research and study through informed negotiations.
There are sound reasons why the ACDA contract research program should be growing at
0
the present time. The Agency is less than two years old. During much of this time, we
0
? have been planning the direction of the research program. Early work in the development
of our program was, of necessity, exploratory and did not involve much detail, since
114
specific concepts had not been developed and the specific technical problems had not been
identified. However, as the concepts become more specific, a great deal of detailed
supportive research and analysis is required to provide sound technical bases for U.S.
LL negotiating positions.
To illustrate, it takes time, effort, and detailed technical information to plan a
a good detection system which will protect our security. If missile production, for
^ example, is the thing one wants to detect under an agreement, one must first identify
the "indicators" of foreign missile production. Then one must design a system which
correlates the relevant indicators, devise a method of testing the system preliminarily,
and
Future Research
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? and finally, conduct actual field tests. Generally speaking, each of these successive N.
0
N. 0
0 steps costs more money than the last. In each, ACDA employs the capabilities of agencies 2
0
.1 such as CIA and DOD, as well as utilizing private contractors. The final step, the 0
N0
0 actual field test, may require "hardware research" and is likely to be expensive. But, .1
0 0
.1 it is also essential to prove out the system. ACDA will be getting into that kind of 0
0 0
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research during fiscal year 1964 in cooperation with DOD. ACDAs budget of $11 million ce
0 m
ctco
for fiscal year 1964, to include that kind of research, is modest in comparison with
m m
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m other comparable research efforts. 0
0 M
0 0
M W
0 Thus, while the costs of the ACDA research program are going up, the increased a
w 0
a appropriation we have requested is neither inconsistent with our stage of work nor extrav-
? agant,If we are to produce sound disarmament plans that are consistent with the securityck
ci of the United States, we must be able to plan verification systems and test them. Other- ?
U
- wise much of the effort that has gone into basic research would be wasted. N
%-
N 10
0 The tendency of ACDA research to become more detailed and specific is clearly evi-
denced by the contracts let in fiscal year 1963, particularly in the latter half of the 0
0 N
0
N fiscal year. Some of the most important of these contracts have been previously noted w
m
w in this statement. Even more indicative of the continuing development of the contract m
m w
m Tv
w research program, and its increasing emphasis on specifics and details, is the appended
(7)ct
ct list of proposed contract and grant studies programmed for fiscal year 1964. &_
o
&_ LL
o
LL Included in this list is the field test research project ACDA has programmed in -0
w
-0 >
w cooperation with DOD. Out of the $11 million requested for research during fiscal year o
> &_
o 1964, we planned to allocate $2.4 million to cover ACDA's share of the cost of this field st
"
m ct
m test program. The program would involve undertakings of the following three types:
<
a. "Field
15.
0 a. "Field Test Design Study"
0
0
The field test design study is intended to provide detailed recommendations for
q the design of a large-scale inspection field test. It will be one in which a number of
0
0 alternative inspection concepts are tested and compared in a simulated environment where
0
ce evasion teams are endeavoring to deceive the inspectors. The test design would be plan-
ned to cover an extensive geographic area including large military installations and ex-
tensive highway and railroad networks, commercial and military air facilities, and
IT industrial production installations. The organization around which the inspection would
0. be planned should include airborne integrated sensors, ground inspection teams and a
ce ? command and control unit to coordinate the functions of these two major elements of the
ci system.
"
b. "Field Test Data Processing"
0
The allocation for this project is to cover the estimated cost of utilizing a
0
2 data processing center. While the DOD will carry the responsibility for the operational
o aspects of the early tests, ACDA is responsible for the planning, analysis and evaluation
2 of the test. Large quantities of data will be collected which must be analyzed. In
Tv ? addition, in some of the tests it will be desirable to process data concurrently with the
&_ test operation to give the inspection teams a more rapid means of utilizing data acquired
LL to plan later inspection operations. ACDA does not itself possess a data processing
-2; center and the equipment in the hands of DOD and other Government agencies is being util-
> i
2 zed to its maximum capacity.
0.
0.
c. "Field Test Research"
In fiscal year 1964, ACDA will conduct a series of small field tests and exper-
iments designed to test concepts on a limited scale. These tests in some cases will
provide
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16.
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provide information needed for the design of larger scale tests. In other cases, they
will allow the testing of sub-elements that it is not practical to include in a large-
s?cale test. In addition, ACDA will sponsor a certain number of technical study contracts
that are required for the development of future test plans.
Still other field tests, especially those for the inspection of retained levels of
armaments, will be planned and conducted as joint exercises with the DOD.
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17.
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
IMPACT OF SENATE BUDGET CUT
If the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is to carry out effectively the function
g of seeking safeguarded alternatives to the arms race, it will need more than the $20
g million for two years authorized in S. 777.
The main impact of limiting available funds to $10 million per year for the next two
co
2 years would be on the Agency's research program. Even if staff increases above the
@ fiscal year 1963 level were restricted, $3.7 million, as compared with the $4 million
requested, would still be required for program operations in fiscal year 1964. Thus, a
a
0 $10 million authorization for fiscal year 1964 would leave the Agency with $6.3 million
cc for external research. $11 million was requested for fiscal year 1964 contract and grant
5 research.
A cut of this magnitude in our research program would require us to reduce the level
cp of support on some of our high priority projects and would require us to eliminate some
cp other projects which are important for a comprehensive, coordinated research program.
0
C?I Such a limitation would have an even greater adverse impact in fiscal year 1965 when more
m specific and more detailed research and analysis will be required.
71)
For example, during fiscal year 1964, the previously described Inspection Field Test
i5 Program would have to be substantially reduced in scope. This might well require the
u_
.0 elimination of technical study contracts for the design of future inspection tests. Some
(>) of this effort was planned to deal with monitoring types of production where clandestine
&- operations would be particularly threatening. In addition, the grant research program,
0.
to which ACDA looks for the development of some of its new ideas and concepts, would have
to undergo more than a two-thirds reduction. Moreover, in order to continue the most
urgent research related to major arms control concepts and inspection, we would be forced
to drop much of our contract and grant work which is directed toward more modest, but
perhaps
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18.
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perhaps more attainable, steps toward decreasing tension and reducing the risk of war by
accident or miscalculation.
0
The following projects illustrate some of the more valuable research endeavors which 0
0
would probably have to be eliminated if the Agency were limited to $6.3 million for
0
research in fiscal year 1964: 0
0
1. Operational Organization of an International Inspection Organization and the 0
Role of Intelligence
0
0
The United States position on the merits of adversary, as opposed to international, m
inspection, which has undergone recent changes in connection with test ban inspection, 0
a
presents an even more difficult problem of inspection under other types of arms control 0
and disarmament agreements. The central problem is how to maintain the inspection as
international. The study will deal specifically with the problem of handling informa-
tion developed by such inspection teams. This type of study is required not only to
clarify the United States position on the characteristics of inspection teams, but to
assure that planning for inspection field tests is realistic. 0
0
0
2. Arms Control Implications of Technical Developments in the USSR and
Arms Control Implications of AICBM and other Technical Developments in the
United States
There is an urgent requirement for funds to support ACDA research programs concern- 'a
ing the arms control and disarmament implications of anti-ballistic missiles, chemical
and biological weapons, and aerospace research and development. Future actions taken
by the
19.
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by the United States and the Soviet Union toward the development of a military capability
0
in the above areas will make the disarmament problems even more complex than those which 0
0
exist at the present time. It is extremely important that the implications of develop-
ments in these areas are understood and that means which might be utilized to control 0
these systems are identified and evaluated. 0
0
0
3. Preliminary Design and Feasibility Studies of Special-Purpose Inspection Equipment 0
0
0
Detailed contract studies presently are being conducted concerning the capabilities m
0
of existing physical sensors which are applicable and effective to carry out the prin-
cipal tasks of verification of arms control agreements. These contracts will result in 0
the recommendation of a number of sensors and techniques applicable for the verification
and inspection of a broad spectrum of arms control and disarmament agreements. There U
"
will, however, be a requirement for feasibility studies and the preliminary design of new
sensors to make verification and inspection even more effective. Support of research for
0
future special-purpose sensor equipment is urgently needed. Such studies are required
if we are to be increasingly able to assure safeguarded arms control and disarmament 0
0
agreements and if we are to derive maximum benefit from the previous research concerned
with verification and inspection requirements and techniques.
4. The Use of Economic Data as a Part of the Verification Process
Records inspection may be able to play an important supporting role in connection -0
with verification. In this study, it is proposed to analyze the nature, use, and relia-
bility of economic data monitoring with particular reference to limitations on armaments
production. The specific types of economic data required by various disarmament measures <
will be identified. Reliability will be assessed in terms of verifying compliance,
revealing clandestine production, or deterring evasion.
5. Study
20,
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5. Stud of Methods of Limitin Militar Man ower Com atible with Ins iection
Up to the present, no detailed consideration has been given to the problem of veri-
fication of declared levels of military manpower, partly because there is no very satis-
factory way of defining, in a treaty, what is meant by "military manpower." The purpose
of this study is to explore alternative ways of limiting military manpower; the study
will include consideration of the types of definitions most consistent with U.S. security
and of the feasibility of verification of manpower levels defined by the alternative
criteria. The study would also include an analysis of the effectiveness of alternative
verification techniques for the various types of manpower limitations.
The importance we attach to these projects of more modest priority emphasizes the
very high degree of importance we attach to the projects we would retain even though at
a reduced scope and level of effort. However, the impact of the Senate cut in authorized
appropriations cannot be measured solely in terms of individual contract reductionsand
eliminations. The reassessment and reorganization of our fiscal year 1964 research
program that would be necessitated by such a budget reduction will be reflected as well
in a reduced correlation among interrelated projects, many of which depend upon the suc-
cessful conclusion of other projects for optimum effectiveness.
Our experience with the nuclear test ban negotiations illustrates the contribution
a research program undertaken prior to negotiations could make to the formulation of
sound negotiating policies and positions. In 1958, when the nuclear test ban negotia-
tions began, and before the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, there
had been little research on the seismic techniques necessary to detect underground
nuclear explosions. American scientists went to Geneva at the beginning of the negotia-
tions and agreed to a report describing a detection system that was based on the best
information
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21.
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information available to them at the time. Later, when detection techniques were actually
tested in conjunction with underground nuclear weapon tests, concern developed about the
adequacy of the detection system to which our scientists had agreed. Clearly it would
have been preferable if research, much of which has since been conducted, had been com-
pleted or at least under way before the international situation required discussion of,
and agreement about, the details of a detection system.
We believe that most of the research tentatively proposed for fiscal year 1964 should
be carried on in the near future if the United States is to continue to participate in
international conferences on arms control and disarmament. This is not an area of en-
deavor in which we can engage safely without making every reasonable effort to assure our-
selves that our proposals, if adopted, would enhance our security. Since the end of
World War TI these conferences have continued at an increasing rate and they will
certainly continue in the future. Expanding world interest and activity in arms control
and disarmament negotiations indicate that constructive progress can be made. The United
States must be prepared to meet this challenge and be able to take full advantage of the
opportunities that present themselves.
The Agency hopes the Committee will agree that the expanded research program for
fiscal year 1964 is a sound investment in our future security.
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99,
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
APPENDIX
To
SUMMARY PRESENTATION TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
88th Congress, 1st Session
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Status of Research Contracts and Grants
FY 1963
July 9, 1963
A. CONTRACTS, AMENDMENTS AND GRANTS SIGNED
1. Techniques for Monitoring Production of Strategic
Delivery Vehicles - Contract ACDA-1 (Bendix)
(FY 1962)
Same - Amendment No. 3 to Describe U.S. Strategic
Missile Technology
19,000
2. Design and Evaluation of Inspection Systems for a
Ban on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Space and
for Restrictions on Missile Flight Tests - Contract
ACDA/ST-12 (Sylvania) 354,000
Same - Amendment No. 1 provided for special report
on Techniques of Verification for a Latin-American
Nuclear-Free Zone
Amendment No. 2 to provide for special report on
Arms Reduction and the Use of Potsdam-Type Military
Liaison Missions
5,726
2,632
3. Implications
1 - Appendix
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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
A. CONTRACTS, AMENDMENTS AND GRANTS SIGNED (Cont'd)
3. Implications and Inspection of Restrictions on
Missile and Military Space System Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT & E) Activity -
Contract ACDA/ST-13 (Aerospace) S 217,700
Amendment No. 1 to Analyze the Technical Problems
involved in Converting Sounding Rockets to Surface-
to-Surface Missiles ......... . ? ?
4. Progressive Zonal Disarmament - Contract ACDANFC-7
(Raytheon) (FY 1962)
. . .
Same - Amendment No. 1 provided for extension of
work to "Develop Planning Principles for Field
Tests of Inspection Techniques" ........... ? ? . ? ?
5. Evaluation of Combined Techniques for Monitoring
Levels and Production of Strategic Vehicles -
Contract ACDA/ST-16 ........... f 0 ? ? ? ? ? ?
6. Problems of Subversion and Peaceful Change -
ACDA/GC-11 (Richard A. Falk) (FY 1962)
4,418
78,120
218,500
Same - Amendment No. 1 to provide for Historical
and Documentary Appendices. . . . . IN ?????? 1,000
7. European
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2 - Appendix
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A. CONTRACTS, AMENDMENTS AND GRANTS SIGNED (Cont'd)
7. European View of European Security and thE
Present General and Complete Disarmament
Proposals - Grant ACDA/WEC-14 (Institute
for Strategic Studies)
? OOOOOOO 0
8. Responses to Violations of Arms Control
and Disarmament Agreements - Contract
ACDA/GC-17 (Historical Evaluation and
Research Organization). . . 0 4 * 4
?
9. Peace-Keeping Panel Study - Contract
ACDA/GC-19 (Johns Hopkins University;
Washington Center of Foreign Policy
Research)
10. Development of a Field Test Plan
Regarding Production of Strategic
Delivery Vehicles - ACDA/WEC-18 (Bendix
Corporation) ......... ? 0 ? ? ? ? 0 0 0 ? ?
$ 21,064
162,000
87,308
158,500
11. Verification for Retained Levels of
Ground Forces, Armaments and Tactical
Nuclear Delivery Vehicles - ACDA/WEC-22
(Sylvania) . .... . . ? ..... . ? ? . ? ? ....... 202,000
12. Studies
3 - Appendix
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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
A. CONTRACTS, AMENDMENTS AND GRANTS SIGNED (Cont'd)
12. Studies on Arms Control and International
Communism - ACDA/IR-15 (vi I T ) $ 65,000
13. Regional Arms Control Arrangements for
Developing Areas - ACDA/IR-24 ? ? ....... 145,000
14. Arms Control and Disarmament Concepts
and the Military Environment in the
European Area - ACDA/WEC-23 (Stanford
Research Institute)
15. Interaction of Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Measures with Capabilities of Ground
Forces - ACDA/WEC-21 (Research Analysis
Corporation)
267,688
177,300
16. Reciprocal Influences of Weapons and
Political Systems - Grant ACDA/IR-20
(Rutgers University - Eagleton Institute) 40,000
17. The Non-Military Aspects of CENTO -
Grant ACDA/IR-26 (Dr. Richard H. Pfaff) . ? ? ..... . ? ? 1,500
18. Psychological Factors in Soviet Disarma-
ment Positions - Grant ACDA/E-28 (Institute
for the Study of National Behavior, Inc.,
Princeton, New Jersey) . ? ...... II 0 0 0 0 0 0 w
10,704
19. Analysis
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4 - Appendix
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A. CONTRACTS, AMENDMENTS AND GRANTS SIGNED (Cont'd)
19. Analysis of Requirements for Automation of
Data Processing for Inspection Field
Tests - ACDA/WEC-29 (Burroughs Corporation) 203,999
20. Survey of Sensors and Techniques Applicable
to Arms Control Inspection and Verification -
ACDA/WEC-30 (North American Aviation) ... .. ? ? . ? ? 136,600
21. Factors Affecting Soviet Attitudes on Disarma-
ment (Summer Study) ACDA/DAS-25 (Columbia
University) ........
9 0
?
22. Ground Inspectable Features of Soviet Armament
Production Technology - ACDA/ST-31 (Arthur D.
Little, Inc ) . ....... ? . ?
91,000
159,000
23. Arms Control Concepts and the European
Political Environment - ACDA/IR-32 (Yale
University) 90,000
24. Enforcement of Arms Control and Disarmament
Measures by the Imposition of Sanctions on
Individual Officials - ACDA/GC-33 (President
and Fellows of Harvard College - Prof. Roger
Fisher) . . ? ? ? ? ........ d
9 0 9 ? * 0 S ? 0
25. Future
6,000
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5 - Appendix
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A.
CONTRACTS, AMENDMENTS AND GRANTS SIGNED (Cont'd)
25. Future Character and Role of Peace Observation
Arrangements Under the United Nations - ACDA/IR-34
(Johns Hopkins University, Washington Center of
Foreign Policy)
$ 139,000
Sub-Total
$ 3,064,759
B.
REIMBURSEMENT AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER AGENCIES
1. Soviet Fiscal System - Allocated to
Department of Conmierce ....
. .
10,000
2. CW - BW Study (DOD)
75,000
3. Technical Analysis and Planning for
Field Tests (DOD)
294,300
4. Preparation of New Digest of International
Law (Dept. of State) (Contribution for Arms
Control and Disarmament Section)
14,500
Sub-Total
$ 393,800
C.
REIMBURSEMENT TO CSC FOR CONTRACT SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
Amount Reimbursed
$ 100,450
Sub-Total
$ 100,450
TOTAL
$ 3,559,009
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6 - Appendix
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
FY 1964 CONTRACT AND GRANT STUDIES
General Classification and Amounts
I. Concept Studies (Contracts and Grants).
A. Regional Security and Arms Control and Disarmament . ....
B. Preliminary Measures for General Arms Control and Disarmament.
C. Substantial Measures for General Arms Control and Disarmament.
D. International Security Arrangements for Disarmament and the
Preconditions for Disarmament
$ 480,000
610,000
900,000
350,000
Sub-Total
8 2,340,000
II.
Supporting Studies (Contracts and Grants).
1. Inspection System Studies
5 750,000
2. Studies of Elements in an Inspection System
1,000,000
.
3. Verification of Specific Armaments and Activities. . . ? . .
1,300,000
4. Legal and Political Aspects of Inspection, Violation, and
Response
450,000
5. Inspection Field Test Program
2,400,000
6. Strategy of Negotiations
200,000
7. Relationship Between National Political Environment3and Arms
Control
250,000
8, Historical Studies of Arms Control and Disarmament Experiences
a ': C 7 '- 7 1: 1
J. Technical and Economic Dislocations Resulting from Arms
.
.
410,000
and Disarmament
350,000
10. Arms Control Implications of Technical Developments. . . . ? ?
?
.
400,000
11, Computer Services and Methodological Studies . . 4 4 0 4 0 41 ?
?
0
1,000,000
12, Bibliographic Studies. . .. ... ? ..... ? e ? ? ? 9 a 9
?
?
150,000
Sub-Total
$ 8,660,000
GRAND TOTAL
$11,000,000
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7 - Appendix
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
FY 1964 CONTRACT RESEARCH PROGRAM
I. CONCEPT STUDIES
A. E2z1.2-pal Security and Arms Control and Disarmament
"Analysis of Specified AC&D Proposals for the European Area"
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Justification. The European area continues to be a source of potential conflictii
and the origin of tensions. The search for negotiable and militarily and politically 0
0
desirable concepts for arms control and disarmament which apply to the European area will
0
be a continuing and high priority effort. Studies undertaken under the FY 1963 research 0.
0
contract program are expected to highlight certain AC&D measures which justify further
research effort. This program of study is intended to provide careful analyses of the
implications of such proposed concepts, including their effect on the European and on U
the over-all balance of power. The systematic study of AC&D in the European area should N
stimulate the development of new concepts, which on careful analysis, may be shown to be 'SI
0
militarily secure and conducive to a reduction of tension and the potential of the
0
European area for the initiation of an uncontrollable level of conflict. The study will 0
include limited as well as general approaches to arms control and disarmament.
Justification. The study initiated during Fiscal Year 1963 under the title
"Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas" (RFP #13) represents an initialle,
effort to consider the general character of political problems involved in limiting the g
emergence of possible regional arms races in the developing areas and the impact on
such areas of possible arms control and disarmament agreements among the major powers.
9. "Political Aspects and Impact of Arms Control in Developing Areas"
The
8 - Appendix
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The relevant factors in certain geographic areas will be identified and examined. During
FY 1964, it is planned to examine key aspects of these problems in greater depth (in
particular regional security aspects and the political pre-conditions for arms limita-
tions) and to cover additional regions or sub-regions.
SUB TOTAL $ 480,000
B. Preliminary Measures for General Arms Control and Disarmament
1. "Technical Aspects of Command and Control as Arms Control Measures"
Justification. A number of proposals designed to reduce the risk of nuclear
war through accident or miscalculation need to be examined from the technical viewpoint.
Sharing of information from satellites, cooperation in communications procedures, and
determination of requirements for a U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on command and control pro-
cedures are examples of possible measures that need analysis in detail.
2. "Studies of Steps to Improve the International Environment for AC&D (Grants)"
Justification. Analysis needs to be performed not only on concepts for general
and complete disarmament, but also on the development of a more propitious arms control
environment, primarily in the area of achieving more interaction and communication
between the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to arms control matters.
Study needs to be made of the feasibility of expanding the scope of the existing East-
West Exchange Program to include students, instructors, or researchers familiar with
arms controinproblems; the exchange of documentation inthe arms control area; and explo-
ration of the scientific and technical inspection bases of arms control measures. In
addition
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9 - Appendix
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
addition, in the light of a forthcoming exchange visit between a group of Soviet and U.Sri".
0
certified public accountants, a study might be undertaken as to the types of information 0
0
which would be most useful to ACDA.
0
0
0
0
0
Justification. The proposal is to evaluate the significance for the Soviet 0
0
economy of the release of specific resources through disarmament measures. It is pro-
posed to look at this not only in quantitative terms (the significance in relation to
a
economic deficiencies, alternative uses, and economic objectives), but also in terms of 0
the administrative and planning mechanism which would handle these shifts in the Soviet
Union. U
"
4. "Political Potentialities and Barriers to Limited Arms Control Arrangements"
0
Justification. Although experience has demonstrated the difficulties involved 0
0
in arriving at agreement on major programs of arms control and disarmament, it has also
shown that limited arms control measures are also difficult to design in a manner accept- 2
able to all countries concerned. The proposed study will examine experience in latter
efforts with a view to identifying more specifically political factors tending to
encourage or inhibit agreement on limited measures.
SUB TOTAL $ 610,000 8
3. "Economic Impact of Specific Arms Control and Disarmament Measures in the
U.S.S.R."
C. Substantial
10 - Appendix
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C. Substantial Measures for General Arms Contrc,1 and Disarmament
1. "Interaction of Specified AC&D Measures With Strategic Military Capabilities,
Including Analysis of Verification Requirements"
Justification. A key element in any major AC,sD proposal is the control of
strategic nuclear forces. Every such proposal must be thoroughly analyzed, both in
terms of verification requirements and in terms of their impact on the relative capabil-
ities of Western strategic nuclear forces, prior to any policy decision on its possible
use in AC&D negotiations. This contract constitut?s an extension and expansion of the
FY 1963 contract concerned with the capabilities of strategic nuclear forces.
9. "Interaction of Specified AC&D Measures With Capabilities of Naval Forces"
Justification. There are frequent AC&D proposals which in one way or the other
involve the naval balance of power. Every such proposal must be thoroughly analyzed in
terms of its impact on the relative strengths and capabilities of Western and Communist
bloc naval forces prior to any policy decision on its possible use in AC&D negotiations,
Such subjects as the impact of proportional reductions, the effect of the current GCD
Outline Treaty on future U.S. naval plans and programs, and the implications of destruc-
tion and conversion of naval armaments to peaceful uses need to be considered in detail.
3. "Interaction of Specified AC&D Measures With Capabilities of Ground Forces"
Justification. Almost any AC&D proposal to stabilize the strategic military
environment tends to put greater emphasis on the Western capability to provide an
adequate defense at the non-nuclear, or at least the tactical nuclear, level. Every
such proposal must be thoroughly analyzed in terms of its impact on the relative
strengths of Western and Communist bloc ground forces prior to any policy decision on
its
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- Appendix
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
its possible use in AC&D negotiations. This contract constitutes an extension and
expansion of the FY 1963 contract concerned with the capabilities of ground forces.
4. "Exploratory Studies of New AC&D Concepts" (Grants)
Justification. A program of grants to outstanding scholars and research organi
zations will be developed to insure that the intellectual resources of the nation are
applied to the search for arms control and disarmament approaches for a secure and more
peaceful world. These grants will support those qualified individuals and organizations
interested in disarmament research but requiring financial support for their activities.
The aim of this research is to develop new concepts and to illuminate the factors which
stand in the way of the successful path to negotiated agreements on AC&D.
SUB TOTAL $ 900,000
D. International Security Arrangements for Disarmament and the Preconditions
for Disarmament
1. "Role of Alliance Systems in a Disarming and Disarmed World"
Justification. Political-military alliance systems play a central role in
preserving security under existing world conditions. They are, in some cases, moving
toward an increased degree of integration, and the effects of anus control and disarma-
ment proposals must be measured not only in terms of the interests of individual members
of such alliances but in terms of potential impact on the alliance as a whole. It can-
not be assumed that the need for alliance systems would disappear in the presence of
arms control measures or that such systems would be made unnecessary by the achievement
of major disarmament programs (at least during some stages of disarmament they might be
more, rather than less, important). However, it is clear that the character of the
problems
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12 - Appendix
L-L00017Z0017000t1C8?00899dCltl-VIO : ZI./90/1700Z eseeieu JOd peACLICIdV
problems, confronting alliance systems will change as well as the conditions under which
new types of problems might have to be resolved through the alliance. The proposed
study will examine the changing forms and functions of alliance systems under assump-
tions as to varying degrees of arms control or disarmament.
2. The Legal Structure and Financial Support of an International Disarmament
Organization and its Relationships to the United Nations"
Justification. The United States Treaty Outline of April 18, 1962 proposes
the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization and outlines the composi-
tion of that body, its various organs, and its functions. The Outline deals only
briefly with the relationship between the IDO and the United Nations, and not at all
with the financing of the IDO. This study should consider, in great detail, three
areas:
a. The proposed organs that would comprise the IDO, their inter-
relationship in terms of checks and balances, and their individual
functions and procedures;
b. The relationship of the IDO to the United Nations and to various
existing United Nations subsidiary bodies; and
c. The financial requirements of the IDO and of the means of fulfilling
those financial needs.
SUB TOTAL $ 350,000
II. SUPPORTING
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13 - Appendix
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II. SUPPORTING STUDIES
1. Inspection System Studies
a "Development and Evaluation of Alternative Graduated Access Inspection
Concepts"
Justification. Preliminary evaluation of the concept of progressive zonal
inspection (the subject of a FY 1963 contract) indicates that present difficulties
(political and negotiating) with zonal inspection which arise because of the high degree
of access required in the first zones and the shortage of direct assurance concerning
activities in other zones, are sufficiently severe so that a major effort needs to be
concentrated on the development of the graduated access approach. In-house study of
the graduated access concept indicates a very large number of alternatives and a great
difficulty in selecting specific examples which can be analyzed in detail.
b: "Inspection Theory and Concept Studies (Grants)"
Justification. This category is intended to cover a substantial number of
separate research grants on this general subject. The specific content will be governed
in large measure by the nature of the proposals received. The purpose is to provide
ACDA with ideas and concepts which may be utilized in developing fresh approaches to
the inspection problem. These studies should serve to stimulate interest in this problem
outside ACDA and provide a larger fund of ideas from which to draw, particularly with
respect to inspection purposes and functions, the relation of inspection to the military
and political environment, and problems of access.
"Operational
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14 - Appendix
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c. "Operational Organization of an International Inspection Organization and
the Role of Intelligence"
Justification. The organization of an inspection commission must be studied 0
0
0
further in order to provide an adequate basis for conducting inspection field tess
and for making inspections as effective as possible with a limited number of inspec-
tors. This study is intended to deal with the dilemma of national versus international g
control, and to try to work out an appropriate and workable compromise. The study pill 8
deal specifically with the problem of handling information within the international
organization for use in providing guidance to the inspection teams.
0
0
SUB TOTAL $ 750,000 2
2. Studies of Elements in an Inspection System
a. "The Role of Electromagnetic and Mechanical Sensors in Inspection"
Justification. Many inspection techniques have been widely developed in con- 0
nection with normal military activities. ACDA therefore needs to proceed directly to
0
the quantitative evaluation of inspection capabilities of those techniques. The possi- 2
ble role of aerial photography, radar, and other techniques in inspection operations will,
require extensive analysis. This contract is provided to follow a FY 1963 study on in- 2
spection techniques related to measures affecting the use of outer space. It will pro- 12
vide a detailed evaluation of the potential utility of a variety of electromagnetic
and mechanical sensors in an arms control environment. LL
b. "The
0.
0.
15 - Appendix
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b. "The Use of Economic Data as a Part of the Verification Process"
Justification. Records inspection may be able to play a critical supporting 0
0
role in a verification system. In this study, it is proposed to analyze the nature, us,
and reliability of economic data monitoring with particular reference to the limitation 0
0
of armaments production in the context of the Soviet planning and record-keeping system,
0
0
The specific types of economic data required by various disarmament measures will be 0
identified. Reliability will be assessed in terms of verifying compliance, revealing
clandestine production, or deterring evasion.
0
0
"Analysis of Non-Physical Inspection Techniques (Grants)" 0
0
a
0
Justification. One of the most important unpredictable factors in any inspec-
tion effort concerns the effectiveness of non-physical inspection techniques which deal
U
with the information obtained whether purposely or inadvertently in conversation with
the local population. The effectivensss of this type of inspection could make a great
deal of difference in the amount of useful information obtained from any U. S. inspection 2
effort. This study effort is provided in order that an exploration of such techniques
0
0
can be undertaken.
0
0
171)
0
0
0
d. "Preliminary Design and Feasibility Studies for Special-Purpose Inspection
Equipment"
Justification. A detailed study of the capabilities of existing physical sen-
sors will have been completed in the FY 1963 program. It is anticipated that this
analysis will indicate a requirement for special studies concerning the feasibility or
the design of new special-purpose physical sensors for the inspection process.
SUB TOTAL $1,000,000
3, Verification
0.
0.
16 - Appendix
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3. Verification of Specific Armaments and Activities
a. "Inspection for Clandestine Military Activities"
Justification. Most of the previous inspection studies have dealt with the
detection of fairly large-scale military activities. However, in the later F'ages of
e disarmament agreement it can be expected that even rather small-scale clandestine
military activities would constitute a significant threat. This study therefore will
be concerned with the detection of clandestine military activities on a very small
scale, such as might be appropriate for guerrilla-type aggressive action in an envi_ro-i-
ment where all nations are mostly disarmed.
"CW/BW Verification and Control Problems"
Justification. The control of chemical and biological weapons and materials
has for some time been recognized as an extremely difficult undertaking. Because
(in the early stages of a disarmament program) it is less critical than the nuclear
program, it has been postponed until now. The proposed FY 1964 contract therefore pro-
vides for a study of the feasibility of verifying agreements affecting chemical and
biological weapons and materials.
c. "Study of Methods of Limiting Military Manpower Compatible with Inspection"
Justification. Up to the present, no very serious consideration has been
given to the problem of verification of declared levels of military manpower, partly
because there is no very satisfactory way of defining, in a treaty, what is meant by
'military manpower." The purpose of this contract is to explore alternative ways of
limiting military manpower; the study will include consideration of the types of defi-
nitions most consistent with U.S. security and of the feasibility of verification of
manpower
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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
manpower levels defined by the alternative r.iteria.
0
d. "Verification and Control of Nuclear Weapons Production and Stockpiles" 0
0
V
0
Justification. In connection with the monitoring of nuclear warheads and 0
nuclear materials, a considerable amount of work has already been done by the AEC in
0
the area of nuclear materials production. There has also been one small ACDA-sponsored
study group which dealt to some extent with the monitoring of the warheads themselves. 2
The work so far has not been encouraging about the feasibility of monitoring nuclear 0
warheads because they can be easily hidden with little requirement for maintenance over
a long period of time. However, the requirement to provide some reasonable verificatioi
procedure for the retained levels of warheads is so urgent that continued effort seems 0
to be required. This study will deal with the feasibility of monitoring records as a
verification aid and with the control of fabrication, storage, and maintenance of such 5
warheads in an attempt to determine which approaches might be most useful.
e. "The Structure of Soviet Industry With Reference to the Production of
Specified Weapons"
175
0
V
0
0
Justification. In planning and assessing proposals for the control of armameni
production, it is essential to be able to judge what a particular measure would mean in2
o
terms of the Soviet industrial structure. This study will analyze Soviet productive 11
&_
capacity and structure for the ten categories of armament in the U.S. Treaty Outline. o
u_
It will be designed to provide both specific information (location and description of .13
o
plants, sources of supply, etc.) useful in the design of an inspection system and an >
o
over-all summary of resource use (materials, management, capital, etc.) by which the &_
m
m
economic impact of production controls can be judged. <
f. "Feasibility
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f. "Feasibility of Control of RDT&E"
0
0
Justification. There has been considerable discussion about the desirability 0
of placing limitations on various aspects of research, development, and testing. Up to 0
0
the present time, it has been generally assumed that this is not feasible, with a few
0
possible exceptions such as controls on nuclear testing, on missile flight tests, or 0
0
over the development of prototype weapons systems. This study is part of a continuing
effort designed to investigate the feasibility and desirability of broader controls on
0
general research, development, and testing activities. 0
0
g. "Fiscal Systems of the Soviet Bloc with Reference to Military Expenditures" a
0
program which got under-
will expand the study
Justification. This project will continue a research
way in FY 1963 with specific reference to the Soviet Union and
to other countries of the Bloc. The plan is to investigate Soviet Bloc financial organi-
zation and record-keeping in such detail as to yield a blueprint of the mechanism of the
budgetary and fiscal systems. This information will guide the evaluation of design of
0
controls over military expenditures. 0
SUB TOTAL $1,300,000
The need for some amount of on-site inspection in connection
light of
4. Le,a1 and Political Aspects of Inspection, Violation, and Res2onse
a. 'Studies of the Legal and Political Implications of the Inspection of Industry"
Justification.
with nearly every arms control or disarmament measure is almost certain in
United
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United States policy on verification. It is equally certain that there will be some
degree of conflict between existing domestic laws of states and the rights of inspectors
In this connection, two studies are contemplated:
(1) "Legal and Political Aspects of Inspecting United States Industry"
Some analysis of the United States body of law relating
to search and seizure has been made. However, this preliminary
work could profitably be expanded by a more detailed considera-
tion of both the legal and political problems involved. Not only
the fundamental legal problems require analysis, but related
problems, such as the protection of proprietary rights and the
implications of local political autonomy, need to be dealt with.
(2) "Legal and Political Aspects of Inspection Under Foreign Legal
Systems"
It would be highly desirable for the United States, in
formulating the details of an arms control and disarmament
inspection scheme, to have more extensive knowledge of the
laws of other states which might conflict with, or inhibit,
the rights of inspections deemed necessary and appropriate
Consequently, a study of the bodies of law on search and
seizure of states other than the United States is also pro-
posed for Fiscal Year 1964. The scope of the study would
parallel (1) above.
b. "Response to Indirect Aggression and Subversion"
Justification. This study would, in effect be a follow-up to the present
general
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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
.z.eneral survey
ion. The more
ggression and
the following:
st7ddy being conducted _on the problem of inlrect
'tailed study of violations of an agr Lfl
et- to
version, and on responses thereto, might includ
An historical analysis of a number of
situations involving various types of
indirect aggression and subversion;
An analysis of appropriate procedural
mechanisms for determining whether there
has been a violation of an agreement not
to engage in indirect aggression and
subversion; and
(3) An analysis of possible unilateral and
multilateral responses to violations of
an agreement not to engage in indirect
aggression and subversion.
SUbVeY-
-frect
facets,
C. "The
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- Appendix
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
C. "The Development of Rules of International Law"
Justification. An important element of the study of violation and response is
the over-all context in which the pattern will take place, namely, with or. w,thout
recourse to the use of force or threats of force. To the extent that force, or threats
of force, may, by agreement, be eliminated as diplomatic devices, we may ass-lame 13-at
rules of international law will acquire greater import in the give and take 1-e-17w..on
nations iohen disputes arise. It will be impertant to know a great deal more about such
rulet. and the part they can and will play when nations have abjured force. Consequently,
a study of the rules of international law along two lines is contemplated:
(1) To identify with precision areas where the existing
substantive rules of international law are not
accepted or followed by many states; and
(2) To consider the establishment of any appropriate
mechanism or mechanisms for the development (as
contrasted with the codification) of rules of
international law.
SUB TOTAL 450,000
5. Inspection Field Test Program
a. "Field Test Design Study"
Justification. This field test design study is intended to provide detailed
recommendations
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recommendations for the design of a large-scale inspection field test. This test will be
one in which a. number of alternative inspection concepts are tested and compared in a
simulated environment where evasion teams are assigned to deceive the inspectors. It is
expected that by the end of FY 1963, ACDA will have acquired considerable experience tn
smell-scale field tests. This experience combined with the results from other inspection
contracts, should provide a sound basis for initiating the design of a large-scale field
test. This test would be planned for an extensive geographic area including large mil-
itary installations and extensive highway and railroad networks, commercial and military
air facilities, and industrial production installations. The organization around which
the inspection would be planned should include airborne integrated sensors, ground in-
spection teams and a command and control unit to coordinate the functions of the two
major elements of the system.
b. "Field Test Data Processing"
Justification. This allocation is to cover rental costs for a data processing
center. While the DOD will carry the responsibility for the operational aspects of the
early tests, ACDA is responsible for the planning, analysis and evaluation of the test.
Large quantities of data will be collected which must be analyzed. In addition, in some
of the tests it will be desirable to utilize the data processing concurrently with the
test to give the inspection teams a more rapid means of utilizing their own data to plan
later inspection operations. ACDA does not itself possess a data processing center
and the equipment in the hands of DOD and other Government agencies is being utilized to
its maximum capacity. No allocation of time for the use of these machines in other
Government agencies is currently possible.
c. "Field Test Research"
Justification. In FY 1964 ACDA will plan and conduct a series of field tests
and
23 - Appendix
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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
and experiments to develop information which will permit the design of an effective
inspection and verification system. Certain of these will be through contract:
(1) Control of the production of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles, and
(2) Control measures against clandestine production of con-
ventional arms.
Other field tests, especially those for the inspection of retained levels of arma-
ments, will be planned and conducted as joint exercises with the DOD.
SUB TOTAL $2,400,000
6. Strategy of Negotiations
a. "Political Factors Bearing on Abrogating, Renegotiating, or Extending Arms
Control Agreements"
Justification. One of the problems involved in designing effective measures
of arms control and disarmament is the impossibility of forecasting with precision all
the problems which might arise in implementing them. The world situation will continue
to be dynamic, and, even leaving aside the question of possible violations, it may be
desirable to effect changes in specific measures or programs which are being implemented.
Not all such changes would present political difficulties, but since some might, it is
important to obtain a better understanding of the international political pressures
working for or against change in such circumstances, and the manner in which reasonable
accommodations of interests might be reached.
b. "Tactics
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24 - Appendix
b. "Tactics and Techniques of Negotiating Arms Control and Disarmament Arrangements"
0
0
Justification. The process of negotiating arms control and disarmament arrange-
Nments proceeds simultaneously on many levels and presents many faces to the negotiators
0
.7 themselves, the governments they represent, and non-participating governments and obser-
vers, It requires interaction with allies, the Soviet Bloc, and the non-aligned coun-
? tries. It is in part an educational process and in part a bargaining process. It
waffects and is affected by negotiations (or the absence of negotiations) in other areas.
gAlthough the success or failure of specific negotiations is in many respects beyond the
control of the negotiating process itself, the effectiveness of the process is carried
on. Accordingly, the process itself merits objective examination. Studies of negotia-
tions frequently tend to adopt historical rather than analytical approaches, and some
such studies may be biased by the investigator's attitude toward the issues under nego-
tiation. In any case, no studies are available which take into account recent experience
N in arms control and disarmament negotiations. The proposed study would be designed to
171 fill this void.
0
0
0
m? 7. The Relationshis Between National Political Environments and Arms Control
Justification. During FY 1963, ACDA is initiating preliminary studies to
-43
()? clarify factors bearing on Soviet attitudes toward arms control and disarmament. The
? proposed study would supplement these initial efforts by examining such specific aspects
< of the problem as factors tending to facilitate or hinder changes of governmental
positions and policy within the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union's record of compliance
$ 200,000
a.
"Soviet Political Environment in Relation to Arms Control and Disarmament"
with
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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
with (in contrast with violation of) international agreeolents and the factors which ha
encouraged compliance in some cases but not others; and incentives and disincentives
0
0
b. "Arms Control and Disarmament Arrangements and National Expectations" 0
0
0
Justification. This study will analyze the differing views (both positive an
negative) of various nations toward determining how such nations believe their own 0
0
national interests would be affected by arms control and disarmament. The study shoull
lead to a clearer understanding of the types of arrangements which might be required t4E
meet such national interests, the degree of compatibility and incompatibility of con- R
flicting interests, and the possibility of reaching a reasonable accommodation of interci
ests in specific cases. The focus of this study would be on nations other than the
Soviet Union although the study would consider how the views of other nations toward th*
Soviet Union may affect their views concerning arms control and disarmament.
2
0
c. "Soviet Attitudes Toward AC&D" 0
Soviet compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements.
Justification. This study proposes to assess Soviet attitudes toward
ment and particular aspects of arms control through the systematic analysis of
over a specified period of time One objective r411 to
=,-erstandirz c.i western motives and official positions on disa.1,ent.
matic (0-n4:ant analysis mhy offer guides to misconceptions, c,biecl,,les, changes
tudes or preoccupations which could have a bearing on fon: most 'erfective eppr
to the Soviet Union in r_ne area of arms control,
SUB TOTAL
disarma-2
Soviet 1
evaluat
Syste- 2
in attiT
?aches 8
$ 250,000
8. Historical
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8. Historical Studies of Arms Control and Disarmament Experiences
a. "Analyses of International Disputes"
Justification. Most international disputes of significant proportions include
two elements: one relates to the interpretation of a legal rule or rules; the other
relates to the desire for a change in an existing legal or political situation. In
other words, disputes between states are likely to be a mixture of legal and political
issues. As a means of determining what mechanisms might be most appropriate to resolve
disputes peacefully, it would be useful to examine in detail a number of past and pre-
sent disputes in order to determine if any pattern exists in the mixture of legal and
political elements, and especially, if the legal issues can be decided, whether the
whole dispute might not be more readily resolved. At least four types of disputes would
be considered:
(1) Border disputes - e.g., India-China.
(2) Disputes over the status of colonial territories -
e.g., India - Portugal, re Goa.
(3) Expropriation disputes - e.g., United States - Cuba.
(4) Disputes over the status of individuals - e.g.,
the status of indigenous natives in South Africa.
"Interaction of the Post-World War II Arms Race With Political Tensions"
Justification. It is commonplace to say that the post-World War II arms race
has
1???
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Co
0
0
0
CD
173
0
0
0
171)
0
-0
0
<
27 - Appendix
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has both reflected and generated political tensions. However, it is important not to
take this truism for granted but to try to understand how this interaction has operated
in specific cases in the past and how it might operate in the presence of an arms race
continuing into the future. The proposed study will examine a number of specific
political-military events which have occurred during the post-World War IT period and
will seek to identify the manner in which such events have affected political tensions,
on the one hand, and the course of the arms race, on the other.
c. ''Historical Analysis of Issues in Disarmament Negotiations Under the League of
Nations."
Justification. There were extensive negotiations in the 1920's and 1930's on
disarmament under the auspices of the League of Nations. In addition to the discussions
in the principal League organs, which began as soon as the League was organized, these
included negotiations in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference
(1926-1930) and the Disarmament Conference itself (1932-1937). The issues and problems
in these inter-war conferences, as well as the attitudes and positions taken by various
governments, in many cases have similarities to those in current negotiations. A
detailed study of this extensive earlier experience, with careful analysis of the many
factors involved, is expected to furnish instructive guidance for present-day policy
formulation.
d. ''Analysis of Past AC&D Agreements (Organizations, Control, Compliance, Viola-
tions and Response)"
Justification. It is highly pertinent in formulating current proposals for
international arms control and disarmament agreements to examine those agreements of
the past with which there has been experience. These include a number of naval agree-
ments in the 1920's and 1930's, such as the Washington and London treaties, and other
arrangements
1???
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Co
0
0
0
CD0
0
0
171)
0
L. I-
-0
0
<
28 - Appendix
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arrangements like the Treaty of Versailles which contained arms cooLrol provisions. In
this study these and other agreements and arrangements would be given detailed examina-
tion in regard to forms of control organization, procedures and methods; the extent of
compliance with the agreement and the reasons therefor; the kinds and number of viola-
tions; the reactions of governments and peoples to the violations; and an analysis of the
general success or failure of the agreements. Such a study is expected to be instructive
in indicating what factors should be stressed and what should be avoided in framing
present-day proposals.
e. "Origin and Operations of the Armistice Organization in Korea"
Justification. One of the most important examples of an agreement with the
Coinmunists involving arms regulation and control is that for the armistice in Korea,
which has now been in operation for about a decade. It should be given close study
for the kind of conduct that might be expected from the Communists in negotiating and
carrying out an arms control agreement. Questions to which answers would be sought in
this study include: what international factors stimulated agreement, what problems
handicapped negotiations, why were certain types of arms control provisions included
and others omitted, what factors led to observance of certain parts of the agreement and
to violations of other parts. The study would also look into the control mechanism
established by the agreement: its structure, functions, achievements and failures. The
latter information is expected to be helpful in connection with t1 proposed establish-
ment of a control organization for general or partial disarmament.
SUB TOTAL $ 410,000
9. Technical and Economic Dislocations Resultin from Arms Control and Disarmament
a. "Effect of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Electronics Industry (U.S.)"
Justification.
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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65600383R000400240007-7
Justification. The essential purpose of this proieet is to examine the extent 0
0
and manner of the involvement of the electronics industry in defense production and the 0
possibilities for the industry to reallocate its resources to commercial production in N
0
the event of a disarmament agreement. The effects of disarmament on the aircraft 0
industry are reasonably apparent and there is considerable data available with which to 8
make a more precise analysis. Involvement of the ordnance industry in defense productiort
is obvious and pertinent data regarding the location of facilities and employment can ben
readily developed. Similar considerations apply in the case of the ship-building indus-
try, Of the principal industries involved in the defense program, the electronics
industry is the only one for which there is a very significant scarcity of information. T.
Furthermore, the industry's involvement in die program is complex and there is a large R
number of small suppliers in the field. Finally, the industry's production is roughly <
divided equally between defense and commercial so that the impact of disarmament is
more difficult to estimate. Given the nature of the product of the industry, there are N
substantial possibilities for reconversion to peaceful production which require evalua-
tion, To the extent feasible, the project should endeavor to identify the number, size,4
and geographical distribution of firms in defense electronics, with particular attention
to identification of employment and should analyze some of the possibilities for conver-w
b. ',Methods for Analyzing Defense Employment (a Feasibility Study)"
Justification: The general purpose of this study is to examine possible methodsE
of evaluating the impact of arms reductions on defense employment, taking account of
such considerations as the availability of data, limitations on data by virtue of
security or proprietary interests, feasibility from the viewpoint of economic analysis,
and manpower requirements. The project should endeavor to suggest alternative method-
ologies and to evaluate them in terms of the foregoing considerations.
C. "Regional
sion to peaceful production.
o_
o.
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c. "Regional Case Study (Economic Impact)"
Justification. The purpose of this study is to examine in detail the problems
of economic adjustment to a disarmament process for a particular region with a heavy
concentration of defense employment. It is intended that the project wo-ald examine such
problems as alternatives for economic development, the mobility of manpower, the possi-
bilities for conversion of defense facilities to commercial production, and the respec-
tive roles of the federal, state and local authorities in facilitating adjustments. The
study should be conducted in such a way as to provide information of value in consider-
ing adjustment techniques for other defense-impacted areas
10. Arms
Control Implications of Technical Developments
SUB TOTAL $350,000
a. "Arms Control Implications of Technical Developments in the U.S.S.R."
Justification. This study is designed to explore the implications, for arms
control policy, of the trend of technological development in the U.S.S.R. over the next
several years. Soviet progress in the AICBM field, in couliaunications, and in advanced
weapons 4i1l be assessed.
b. "Arms Control Implications of AICBM and Other Technical Developments in the
United States"
Justification. An in-house ACDA study of the problems and issues in the area
of future weapons technology has indicated that more intensive study should be given to
the significance of the development of various weapons systems such as the AICBM, ASW,
manned
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manned space forces, and all-fusion weapons. This contract is designed to further the r-r
study effort in this general area. 0
0
0
SUB TOTAL $400,000
0
0
0
11. Computer Services and Methodological Studies
0
a. "Computation Laboratory" co
0
0
Justification. The Computation Laboratory is a continuing facility which pro-
vides ACDA with the capability to carry out quantitative analyses as required for ACDA
in-house evaluations of the military implications of arms control and disarmament con- R
cepts. The facility allows ACDA to carry out both theoretical analysis and machine
simulations and computations. The facility may also be utilized to simulate and analyze0
specific proposals for verification and inspection in an arms control context.
0
The contractor provides a staff capable of developing the computational models,
Or.
conducting the analyses and performing the necessary programming and computing services.2
When the required computing equipment is not available in existing Government facilitiesp
the contractor also provides the necessary computing facility.
cTeu
b. "Development of a General Purpose Military-Political Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Game to Test Arms Control Concepts"
Justification. The use of gaming techniques has been found very useful as a
method of improving understanding of possible future military situations. The techniqueg:
has been used successfully within the Department of Defense to explore alternative
courses of action in various crisis situations. While such games in and of themselves
cannot provide reliable answers, they do sharpen concepts by providing an opportunity to
think
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think through possible consequences in a more realistic environment and they aid the
policy maker by illustrating plausible contingencies which might otherwise be overlooked.
There is at present no well-developed game approach which is appropriate for exploring
the strategy of negotiations or the kind of political military environment which might
exist following an arms control agreement. The purpose of this contract is to provide
for the development of a game concept and the compilation of necessary data to provide
a workable technique specifically designed to explore alternative arms control or
disarmament strategies. The game will be developed primarily to serve as an educational
tool for ACDA and for senior personnel of other Government organizations.
c. "Basic Research on Methodology for Analysis of Arms Control Problems (Grants)"
Justification. There is a widespread interest among military-political
analysts and behavioral scientists in improving the methodology which can be utilized
to analyze arms control concepts. This item will provide for the support of the basic
research which is required to improve our analytical capability in the future.
In connection with inspection problems, there is a need for the development of
appropriate statistical and psychological concepts that can be used to aid in the design
and evaluation of specific techniques. Similarly, there is a need for basic behavioral
studies in the psychology of conflict and the role of negotiations. This program thus
will provide for some of the basic research that is necessary to allow long-term growth
in our basic understanding of the international conflict arena.
SUB TOTAL $1,000,000
12. IliL1isTa'AILL1
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12. Bibliogyaphic Studies
a. "Maintenance of Bibliographic and Abstracting Services on Unclassified 0
0
Literature and Research Relating to Arms Control and Disarmament"
0
0
Justification. To carry on the Agency's in-house and contract research
program, as well as its policy formulation and negotiating functions, it is necessary 0
0
0
to have bibliographic control over the large amount of literature pertaining to arms
control and disarmament and many related subjects in the field of the social and co
physical sciences. This requires the identification, indexing and abstracting of books ?
articles, pamphlets, and other literature, past and current, as well as a systematic
survey of relevant research still in progress. This applies not only to output in the 0.
0
United States but also in other countries.
It is intended that this operation be mechanized (using data processing equipment) 5
to the extent that it is feasible.
0
SUB-TOTAL $150,000
0
0
TOTAL - Concept Studies $2,340,000
TOTAL - Supporting Studies 8 660 000
GRAND TOTAL $11,000,000
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Summary of Obligations Under FY 1963 Budget and FY 1964 Budget Request
1963
1964
Estimated
A.
1
Contract Research Program
$3,559,000
$11,000,000
B.
Operating Expenses
Personnel Compensation
and Benefits
1,761,000
3,074,000
Travel and Transportation
of Persons and Things
97,000
130,000
Printing and Reproduction
31,000
42,000
Administrative Support
Functions Performed by
State and Other Agencies
657,000
749,000
Supplies, Materials and
Equipment
2,500
5,000
TOTAL
$6,107,500
$15,000,000
1/ See pp. 1 and 8 (Appendix) for detailed analysis of FY 1963 and proposed
FY 1964 contract research programs.
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
JAN. 2.1963
DISARMAMENT
ADVISORY
STAFF
DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
111111.1111111
GENERAL
ADVISORY
COMM I TTEE
EXECUTIVE
DI RECTOR
REFERENCE
RESEARCH STAFF
SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
BUREAU
SECRETARIAT
WEAPONS
EVALUATION AND
CONTROL BUREAU
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ADVISER
GENERAL
COUNSEL
I NTERNATIONAL
RELATI ONS
BUREAU
ECONOMICS
BUREAU
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Permanent Staff by Organizational Unit
Actual No.
FY 1962
Estimated No.
FY 1963
Estimated No.
FY 1964
Office of the Director
12
12
12
General Counsel
5
10
13
Public Affairs Adviser
5
5
8
Executive Staff
10
17
21
Secretariat
16
21
25
Disarmament Advisory Staff
11
14
19
Reference Research
11
19
20
International Relations
26
32
32
Science & Technology
15
30
43
Economics
5
11
15
Weapons Evaluation & Control.
. ?
?
10
49
69
Totals
126
?220
277
Increase-
Decrease
-0-
+3
+3
+4
+4
+5
+1
-0-
+13
+4
+20
+57
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LETTER TRANSMITTING
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT
AMENDMENTS TO CONGRESS
January 31, 1963
The Honorable
John W. McCormack,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Dear Mr. Speaker:
Enclosed for your consideration and appropriate reference is proposed legislation
to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (1) to authorize appropriation of "such
sums as may be appropriate" to carry out the purposes of the Act, and (2) to revise
slightly the requirements for personnel security investigations of research contractor
personnel.
This Act became law sixteen months ago. Its purpose, as described in Section 2,
was to create "a new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control
of armaments . . " It authorized the appropriation of up to S10 million to establish
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and to provide it with operating and research
funds for an initial period.
During this period the Agency has been bringing together the elements of a
Government-wide research program to acquire a fund of knowledge, including knowledge
of
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of effective verification methods, which can form the basis for informed negotiations.
This knowledge has formed the basis for the new proposals made at the Geneva Disarma-
ment Conference which began in March of 1962. These proposals form a part of the
Agency's continuing search for realistic measures to enhance our security through arms
control and disarmament.
The period since the Agency was established has produced fruitful discussions
which have enhanced awareness of the complexity of the problems and isolated specific
areas where agreement may be possible. We did not expect progress toward agreement to
come quickly and it has not. However, common interests exist on both sides in curbing
the arms race and in specific measures to that end. We believe that it will continue
to be in the United States interests to seek realistic arms control and disarmament
measures.
To support this effort, additional appropriations for the Agency are needed. Of
the original $10 million authorization ceiling, $8.33 million has been appropriated and
only $1.67 million remains for future appropriations. The Budget for the next fiscal
year requests an appropriation of $15 million. Elimination of the $10 million ceiling
is obviously necessary. The first amendment contained in the proposed legislation would
remove this ceiling and authorize the appropriation of "such sums as may be appropriate".
This would place the Agency's funding on the same permanent basis as most other
Government agencies. A specific dollar ceiling implies a temporary or "one-time" activ-
ity. But, the experience in this field shows clearly that a long-term effort is neces-
sary if progress is to be made. The sincerity of our commitment as a Nation to the
goals stated in the Act can well be evidenced by Congressional authorization of a con-
tinuing effort without specific dollar limitation.
The
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The Bureau of the Budget has advised that the enactment of this, the first proposed
amendment, would be in accord with the President's program.
The second proposed amendment would change the requirements for personnel security
investigations for Agency contractor personnel while retaining the existing strict
requirements for Agency employees. Personnel of contractors and potential contractors
may not now have access to any classified information until they have been investigated
in accordance with the Act which provides for arrangements for full-field background
loyalty and security investigations by the Civil Service Commission or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. In many cases, contractor employees have current clearances
from the Department of Defense or other Government agencies based upon full-field inves-
tigations which were not conducted by the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. The purpose of the amendment is to permit clearance to be based upon
such investigations, if another Government agency has already granted clearance, rather
than arranging for new investigations by the Civil Service Commission or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The language is largely based upon language enacted by Congress 0
in 1961 to provide the Atomic Energy Commission with similar authority. /? 6 of P.L. 0
0
87-206, 42 USC ? 2165(c) (1958 ed. Supp. 1112/
This change would not result in investigations which are less intensive or complete o
than the Act presently requires. It would simply eliminate the requirement for a new
investigation in the case of contractor personnel who are already thoroughly investiga-
ted, and thereby eliminate needless delay and duplication of effort.
The security amendment would also authorize the granting of access to information
classified no higher than confidential to contractor personnel without a full-field
investigation but with a check of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, intel-
ligence agencies and other agencies maintaining personnel security files. This would
simply
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simply authorize the Agency to follow a practice commonly utilized by the Department of
Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission and other agencies. In many cases, such as
bidders' conferences, a quick clearance for low-classification material is essential to
initiate discussions to see whether potential contractors are interested or qualified
to perform a proposed contract research program. In other cases, low-classification
material is all that a contractor needs, and the Government's interests would be better
served by providing for a low-cost, expeditious national agency check rather than an
expensive and lengthy full-field investigation.
Neither of the changes in personnel security procedures would affect the requirement
of full-field loyalty and security investigations by the Civil Service Commission or the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for employees of the Agency. Neither would prevent the
Agency from continuing to maintain the highest standards with respect to personnel
security.
The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission
of the proposed amendments to change personnel security procedures for contractor per-
sonnel.
In submitting this proposed legislation may I urge it be given early attention so
that the appropriation hearings on the Agency's requests for the next fiscal year may
proceed in a regular course.
Enclosure:
Proposed legislation to amend the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
Sincerely,
sgnd. William C. Foster
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
A BILL
0
0
0
To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to
increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify 0
0
the personnel security procedures for contractor employees.
0
0
0
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
co
America in Congress assembled,
0
That Section 49(a) of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved 0
September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 639) is amended by striking out "not to exceed $10,000,000" La
and inserting in lieu thereof "such sums as may be necessary and appropriate,". a
c5
Sec. 2. Section 45 of the Act entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Act", approved5
September 26, 1961 (75 Stat. 637), is amended by re-designating Subsection 45(b) as
Subsection 45(c) and by inserting after Subsection 45(a) the following new subsection:
0
"(b) In the case of contractors or subcontractors and their officers or employees, .1
0
actual or prospective, the Director may accept, in lieu of the investigation prescribed 2
in subsection (a) hereof, a report of investigation conducted by a Government agency,
other than the Civil Service Commission or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when it 2
is deteLmined by the Directcr that the completed investigation meets the standards estabici
lished in subsection (a) hereof, provided that security clearance had been granted to the,5
individual concerned by another Government agency based upon such investigation and report.
The Director may also grant access for information classified no higher than confidential?
to contractors or subcontractors and their officers and employees, actual or prospective,2
on the basis of reports on less than full-field investigations, provided that such inves-li
tigarions shall each include a current national agency check."
42 - Appendix