BRIEFING NOTE CUBA - - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000400080020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 15, 1963
• Content Type: NOTES

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BRIEFING NOTE 15 February 1963
CUBA -- POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
I. The most significant discernible change in Cuban
policy since the missile crisis is the greatly
increased attention being given to subversion in
other Latin American countries.
A. While this has always been an element in
Castro's program, indications are multiplying
that it is now a high priority Cuban objective.
B. Castro himself stressed, in his two speeches
in January, the importance of guerrilla war-
fare in the "people's struggle for liberation"
and ridiculed all thought that "liberation
from imperialism" can be accomplished except
through violence.
1. This was his strongest statement on
this theme in at least two years.
2. Castro's speeches were followed by similar
public expressions on the subject by
leading veteran Cuban Communists.
C. In all these speeches, it was made abundantly
clear that Cuba's leading target in Latin
America is Venezuela.
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1. Leading veteran Cuban Communist Blas
Roca stated this most explicitly in
his 23 January speech honoring the
anniversary of the ouster of Vene-
zuelan dictator Perez Jimenez in
1958.
2. Roca stated flatly that "we shall
continue to give our support, each
day in greater proportions, to the
Venezuelan people" in their struggle
for "liberation from imperialism."
3. He praised the Venezuelans for the
acts of sabotage in the Venezuelan
oil fields during the crisis and
called this an example of "prole-
tarianinternationalism."
4. Roca closed his speech with the pre-
diction that "when the Venezuelan
revolution takes place, then all Latin
America will be ablaze" and this will
be "a tremendous boost for Cuba...we
will have a nation on the continent
to back us."
a. Roca may have been thinking of
the fact that until mid-1960 Cuba
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got the bulk of its oil from
Venezuela; now it is wholly
dependent on the USSR.
Reasons for the increased Cuban aggres-
siveness on this issue are probably
several.
1. It could be a reaction against So-
viet "betrayal" last fall. The Cuban
statements appear much closer to the
Chinese than to the Soviets on this
issue and there may be an element of
competition between Castro and Khrush-
chev for control of Latin American rev-
olutionaries.
2. Castro needs the kind of "boost" which
a successful pro-Castro revolution in
another country would give him and his
prestige.
3. The issue is one of the few left to
Castro to give his people a sense of
mission and distract them from domestic
problems.
E. One of the most effective Cuban tactics is
the training and indoctrination of Latin
American "students."
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1. We estimate that between 1,000 and
1,500 people from other countries
received guerrilla warfare training
and ideological indoctrination in
Cuba last year.
25X1
25X1
F. The Cubans have stressed to would-be
Latin American revolutionaries that on
their return home they should establish
self-sustaining guerrilla bands not de-
pendent on external support.
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1. The Latin Americans are trained, for
instance, to operate US weapons since
as guerrillas they will have to cap-
ture and use the weapons of "the
enemy" and in their countries the
authorities use US weapons.
2. There is the possibility, however,
that Cuba may deviate from the rule
of not supplying weapons to subversive
groups in other countries if Cuban
leaders conclude that a particular
situation is "ripe" and a little
Cuban aid might swing the balance
in favor of a pro-Castro revolt.
3. We are therefore carefully studying
recent reports that Cuba is shipping
weapons to Venezuela by way of Brit-
ish Guiana.
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Anti-Castro Activity
II. There has been an increase in hit-and-run at-
tacks on Cuban installations by anti-Castro
activists since early this year.
A. Most of the guerrilla raids have occurred
in the mountains of central Las Villas prov-
ince, but recently they have spread to other
provinces.
1. The attacks generally involve small
groups of activists, usually under 20
men, who ambush militiamen, burn govern-
ment warehouses, set fire to canefields.
2. These anti-Castro activities are more of
a harassment than a threat to the regime,
but they point out the inability of the
regime to eliminate pockets of resistance.
3. Canefield fires always increase this time
of year as the harvest gets underway.
The cane can still be milled but must be
sent to the mills immediately to avoid
loss of sugar content.
B. Castro's internal security network pervades
all parts of society and inhibits open re-
sistance except by a small minority.
1. Instances of passive resistance such as
work slowdowns continue.
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Cuban Economy
III. The Cuban economy continues to deteriorate and
there are no signs of significant improvement
in the foreseeable future.
A. Inadequate supplies and poor distribution
of food and other consumer goods are major
irritants among the public.
1. Food rationing, begun last March, has
not solved these problems.
2. While there is much grumbling among
the public, shortages at this point
do not appear to be an inducement to
open revolt.
B. Present indications are that this year's
sugar crop--the mainstay of the economy--
will be even less than last year's poor
crop of 4.8 million tons.
1. This compares with an average annual
crop in earlier years of close to
6 million tons.
2. Other crops are doing badly too; on
2 February Cuban agricultural chief
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was moved to
blast rice farm managers and workers
for poor organization and insufficient
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spirit for permitting the-rice crop
to fall below expectations.
C. Cuba is unlikely to benefit greatly from
the very high current prices for sugar
on the world market.
1. A good portion of Cuban production
is bartered for needed imports from
the bloc.
D. Negotiations underway most of December and
January in Moscow on this year's Cuban-
Soviet trade finally ended on 7 February
with the signing of the 1963 protocol to
the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement.
1. The agreement also involved a Soviet
credit of unstated size to cover
Cuba's deficit in its trade with the
USSR,
2. Cuba's commerce with non-bloc countries
continues to decline, which makes it
even more expensive for the Soviet
Union to keep Cuba afloat.
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