THE CUBAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200220021-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 15, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

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79?63 ON ESSIQN.IRECORD - SENATE
and the danger he constituted to his own
people and to, the._ hemisphere, that I
made special calls to Assistant Secretary
of -State Roy Rubottom. I urged him,
and subsequently secretary of state
Herter, not to recognize any government
set .up by Castro until that government
had held at least.-one free election.
I shall never forget being advised by
Mr. Rubottom that .the American public
demanded recognition of Castro's. re-
gime,. and this recognition was blithely
given on January 7. My records reflect
that 2 days later, on January 9, Mr. Ru-
bottom and I had , further discussion
about Castro in,my office, and on Jan-
uary 11, 1 met :with a, State Department
delegation in still further. discussion, of
the subject of Castro, communism, and
Cuba. However, the act had been done
and frankly met with overwhelming ap-
proval.
I took a,_trip around central and
-South America from January 19 until
- 'ebr'tlary 10, 1959,. and wherever I went
in mY. talks , with .labor: leaders, clergy-
men, government officials, and others,
there was quiet but nonetheless great
apprehension as to the quality of Cas-
tro's intentions.-,
I remember well my personal dismay
when Castro was invited to address the
American Society of Newspaper Editors
here in, Washington in April 1959. I
recall that he subsequently was invited
and did appear before the Foreign Re-
lations Committee of the Senate.
The chairman was kind enough to in-
vite me to listen in, and I particularly
remember the general warmth with
which Fidel Castro was received. I en-
deavored to ask him a few questions, but
had little success as he realized I had
Some doubts about him. When I kept
asking him when he was going to have
an election, I recall he responded that
"the people of Cuba don't want an elec-
tion." When I pressed him further on
the question of elections, ' he said, "I
might have one in 3 ,or 4 years."
Despite his ominous statements, sup-
port for him was so overwhelming that
I began to have doubt in my own judg-
ment about this man.
According to my files, that very day
after his appearance before the Foreign
Relations Committee, I stated in a writ-
ten press release that-
Serious trouble is brewing in the Carib-
bean area. The source of danger is centered
in Cuba,, a country which historically has
always been our friend. Cuba could easily
become a prisoner of the Reds. Fidel Castro,
during a meeting today with several Sena-
tors, told me, that elections in Cuba were
3 or 4 years away. That is not very hearten-
ing news., I asked him about his anti-Ameri-
can statements and he denied having made
them.
I went on to say:
It is clear that he has not yet learned you
can't play ball with the Communists for he
has them peppered throughout his govern-
ment.
.In early April 1959, even more distur-
bing news began to come, Because I had
expressed doubt about Castro, others
who had doubt began to call me about
their concern. I received two cable-
grams from the President of Haiti ex-
4137
pressing fear over an anticipated inva- great revolutionary, despite the fact that
sion from Cuba. I came to the Senate his drumhead courts-martial had exe-
floor and stated: cuted close to 600 of his fellow country-
The President of Haiti appealed to me for men-including some who had fought
help by cablegram to help forestall an in- alongside him in the hills against
vasion of his country. I sent today, April 17, Batista-and despite the fact that he
1959, a telegram to Dr. Jose Mora, Secretary- had completely flaunted the rights of
General of the OAS, urging that he take U.S. citizens and property owners and
immediate action to set up a voluntary po-
lice force to keep the peace in Latin Amer-
ica. I suggested this police patrol be made Nicaragua..
up of the 21 member states of the OAS On June 14 and June 20, 1959, inva-
including the United States. We have to sion forces organized in Cuba were
relieve tension in the Caribbean and put a directed against Santo Domingo. These
halt to Communist troublemaking. An in- were stopped and,- from the sketchy
ter-American police force could do the job reports, it appeared that every' member
but
'
h
we don
t have muc
time to act
.
It was shortly after this warning of
April 17, specifically on April 24, that
Castro sent against the Republic
of Panama an invasion force that he
had permitted to be organized and
,trained in Cuba. Even after this act of
aggression, I don't recall any concern
having been expressed by any of the
Senators or news commentators who are
so loudly and persistently talking today.
I do recall the late Senator from New
HaMpshire, Styles Bridges, talking about
the danger of Fidel Castro to Central
and South America, and all he got for
his trouble was criticism.
However, there began to be some rip-
ple of criticism of Castro in May of 1959
when he confiscated the property and
assets of 117 companies, the bulk of
which were American-owned. I recall
at that time making a statement to the
press and on television that we should
not sit idly by-that the confiscation of
American property should not be ignored
and that immediate and effective steps
should be taken to stop it.
A month later, in June 1959, the State
Department began for the first time to
express some concern about Castro's acts
and specifically about the need of having
adequate compensation paid to those
Americans who had lost their property.
On May 26, 1959, I offered, on the floor
of the Senate, amendments to the Mutual
Security Act which were designed to
create an Inter-American Police Force,
and Inter-American Court of Justice.
No action was taken by the committee
to which referred.
On the 31st of May 1959, after Fidel
Castro and his Communist cohorts had,
through executions and the use of raw
power, subdued all resistence in Cuba, he
again turned his eyes toward new con-
quests and launched an invasion of the
country of Nicaragua.
That invasion was successfully turned
back and incontrovertible evidence was
obtained by the defenders of Nicaragua,
proving beyond the shadow of a -doubt,
that the invasion had been financed,
organized, and launched by Castro from
the,Island of Cuba. So far as I have been
able to ascertain there was no protest or
outcry about the invasion of Nicaragua
by the State Department or anyone else
of that expeditionary force from Cuba
was exterminated. Once again, sufficient.
evidence was recovered from the bodies
of the invaders to establish that these
forces were sent on their mission by
Fidel Castro and the Communists. '
On October 13, 19,59" the little coun-
try of Haiti was invaded, again by
forces from the island of Cuba, and
again under the direction of Castro's
Communists. This. invasion was again
defeated by Haitians who had ~ been
trained in military tactics by a detach-
ment of 50 U.S. Marines.
On October 26 Castro, becoming ever
more arrogant and Contemptible in his
conduct toward the United States and
his neighbors in this, hemisphere, and
feeling ever .more secure in his relation-
ship with the Communists, accused the
United States of aggression.
He reestablished his drumhead mili-
tary courts and began to summarily exe-
cute political prisoners without recogni-
tion of any of the elementary personal
rights whatsoever. As of this date it
was estimated the Castro regime had
executed over 500 people. Later the
total was to reach well over 1,000.
In January 1960 and through the early
part of February I made another trip
to the Central and South American
countries and upon my return I out-
lined in a Senate speech on February
24 an eight-point program calculated
to limit the activities of Castro's Com-
munists in Central and South America.
Among other things, I asked that we
turn over to the OAS all the informa-
tion which the FBI, CIA, and our other
intelligence agencies had in their files
on communism in Cuba and Castro's
connection with it. -
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover had at this time-
and long before-a dozzier on Castro
and his Communist connections that
should have convinced the most ardent
fan of Castro's in the State Department,
of his allegiance to communism, but I
doubt if they ever asked for this in-
formation or saw it.
In that speech, I urged the United
States to urge the OAS to act. I said
the United States should not act uni-
laterally. I suggested that the OAS
should examine the possibility of im-
posing economic sanctions on Cuba, I
also said that "Castro has now identi-
few people in that particular time, the if not himself a Communist, is certain-
summer of. 1959, who were interested in lY doing the work of the Communists
clipping the wings of Fidel Castro, with the driect help of the Communists."
He still had the bulk of the American On March 5, 1960, Castro accused the
people's support. He still had many United States of complicity in the explo-
newsmen lyrically writing about him as a sion of a munitions ship in the Havana
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
4138
sumo the leaerahp for the ormation. The Bay of Pigs is now sad history. economic program in Latin America with
of an Inter-Oleric Police orce,. Had it succeeded, Cuba would have been our political goals; the establishment of
On January 7, 1961, I wrote a letter free and our problems would have been an Under Secretary of State for Latin
to `outgoing Secretary Herter and in lessened to a great extent, although, of American Affairs reporting directly to
coming Secretary of Statg,,Dean. husk course, not totally eliminated, the President; and again called for rec-
urging the baning of all Cuban imports Some, it is now revealed, counseled ognition of a Cuban Government-in-
to the United', ates, in order to. put an against the invasion before it occurred. exile, stating, "We are going to have to
economic squeeze on.Castro's government I thought, and still think, the "Go" sig-. .meet this Red challenge with determina-
and try to bring it down,, There was nal was the correct one, based on the tion, and I am confident we will do so."
criticism, of this by some Florida,indus- facts then available. On September 5, 1962, I made this
tries who depended ppon Cuban prod- I never did subscribe to, nor do I now, statement:
ucts, but I felt the situation called for the theory that the Latins would be ap- The presence in Cuba of 5,000 so-called
such action, palled by our impetuosity or by our show technicians from the Soviet bloc makes even
On February 15, 1961, after the change of strength. Latins like leadership and more compelling the need for an inter-Amer-
of administration, in another speech on strength; they always have, and they al- ican Police Force to back up inter-hemis
?the Senate floor, I said: ways will. pheric treaties based on the Monroe Doctrine
The time has come for action in the Cuban They have a history of 400 years of which pledges to keep communism out of
situation. Weshoiyld adopt an economic respecting, admiring, and looking up to this hemisphere.
embargo calculated to bring Castro to his strong leadership. That' is why they In addition, I urged, as I have time
knees and the Cuban people to freedom, still continue to admire strong leader- and again in the past, that the United
sRY ,o> rics slip. States recognize and support a demo
On April 17, 1961, we remember, less Everyone has 20-20 rear vision, cratic Cuban Government-in-exile,
than 4 months after this administra- That judgment on the Bay of Pigs can whose first purpose is the liberation of
tion had come into office, an attack was be debated a long time. But surely the the Cuban people from - Communist
launched by a group of 1,500 Cubans man who gave the word "Go; rescue tyranny. I said:
who had been trained, in the far reaches your homeland; defeat and overthrow Such a free Cuban regime could openly
of Guatemala under .the supervision of the Communists" cannot now in fairness receive support from the United States to
military experts recruited _in the United have it even suggested that he is tim- wards the accomplishment of this goal and
States. orousor afraid ,of action. Couple this the eventual restoration of their liberties to
This plan for the invasion at the Bay with the acts of October 1962, his quar- oppressed Cuban citizens.
of Pigs had not been some new develop- antine, his confrontation with Khru- On September 18, 1962, I introduced
ment of the new administration because shchev, and no man can fairly say that in the Senate two resolutions. One
we know that, as a shatter of fact, these this President is not always prepared to called for recognition of the Cuban Gov-
men were gathered together and sent act. ernment-in-exile and the other support-
to Guatemala for-training in 1960, be- But to continue with. the chronology, ing establishment of an inter-American
fore the change of, administration, before discussing broader concepts, on military alliance.
From my own personal knowledge I June 21, 1961, shortly after Castro's May Mr. President, some people may won-
know that these men bad been held and 1 declaration of Cuba as a Socialist, or der why I have gone to such lengths to
trained for so long a time in Guatemala Communist state, and some 2 months recite the record in such detail,
and other Central American countries after the catastrophe at the Bay of Pigs, My answer is that I am trying to point
that most of them had become discour- I -again warned that "to hope Castro out, among other things, why this prob-
aged, and some had .left. the ranks in communism will wither away and die on lem of Cuba is not now and never has
their belief that the _U.$, Government the vine is both woolheaded and dan- been the problem of a single political
would never permit them to try to win gerous. Western Hemisphere nations party, but instead, is the problem of both
back freedom for their own country. must act now to expel Castro before he parties and all Americans. It is the
Here in the United States there was wins his race with time." problem of the Nation as a whole.
great concern as to what. determination On July 20, 1961, in a speech on the It goes without saying that so far as
should be made with respect to these Senate floor I urged U.S. recognition of removing Castro and the Communists
Cuban Invasion forces, This .,occurred the Cuban Government-in-exile and the from Cuba is concerned, it would have
prior to the. beginning of the invasion, creation of an Inter-American Military been considerably easier to have done
Should they be returned to the United Force again, it in 1959 or 1960 than it would have
States and dispersed, or should they be I continued to urge on this adminis- been in 1961 or 1962, or than it will be in
permitted to make the effort to free tration the placing of an import embargo 1963 or 1964.
their own homeland? on trade with Castro, and I was highly For the Island has been continuously
While I was not consulted officially gratified when on February 3, 1962, this fortified and militarized, and more and
about this matter, my opinion was asked administration took such action. There- more modern and sophisticated weapons
for by some people in lower echelons of after, the many millions of dollars which have been emplaced..
the Government, and' it was. my, judg- they had been receiving in trade were But no programs were developed in
ment that the men should be permitted denied to them, and conditions were ob- 1959 or 1960; and in January 1961, at the
to make the effort to free. their country, viously made worse for Fidel Castro. change of administrations, the outgoing
for they would never be happy until they In a Florida speech on May 3, 1962, I one merely passed along the growing
Had made this noble effort; but, of stated that "Castro continued to work problem of Cuba to the incoming Ad-
course, it should be made only after full throttle against the hemisphere's ministration, as one passes a very hot
sound military judgment had been ob- free nations," pointing out that Cuba has potato from his own hand to that of
tained that the endeavor had some set up subversive schools, indoctrination his unsuspecting dinner partner.
chance of success. centers, and propaganda classrooms to I have recited some-and only some-
EvervnnP now knnw, of +,,- rn+ + +
f
ua~ca,cvuudl.7', o
the instances when 1 spoke in the
miscalculations and mistakes that were political leaders, and~f Vrevolutionaries Senate and elsewhere in 1961 and 1962,
made. from all over Latin America. I said: calling the attention of this administra-
I think the President, whose final The plan is to send these Communist- tion to the need for developing a program
decision it was, did the right thing when indoctrinated people back to their home- having for its'ultimate goal the freedom
he assumed- the full responsibility for lands and set them to work subverting their of Cuba.. While I have yet to learn of a
the fiasco, This was the manful and countries with the hoped-for communist long-range program, this administra-
courageous, thing, to do. But the fact takeovers scheduled 1, 5 or even 10 years tion did put into effect, in 1961, the eco-
remains that there was considerable mis- from now. nomic embargo which had as its result
judgment on the part of many agencies On June 18, 1962, I called for the es- the denial to Castro of the use of many
and. .persons- who. had a part in the deci- tablishment of a four-point program millions of dollars which he had pre-
sion. No one man-be he even the Pres- designed to make the policy of the United viously realized each year from trade
ident of the United States--can .make States toward Latin America, as I said, with this country.
correct judgments when he. is proceed- "one of realism and not romanticism." The administration also diligently
ing from inadequate information. I recommended the welding of our exercised pressure in an effort to get
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1963 ' ONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE 4143
it seems to me in searching for a plan treaties, conduct foreign relations, bor- and financial assistance. And under
of attack, we must face up to the fact row money, establish armed forces, and those provisions we and the other na-
that there is no easy or inexpensive enter into all activities of a regularly tions are legally and/or normally obliged
short-run solution to the problem of constituted 'government. As I under- to help.. With this military equipment,
Castro and communism. There was- in stand it, from international lawyers It might have still been easy in i wyers our they could begin to tighten the noose on
Y ng regularly with such matters, our Fidel Castro.
1960, but no longer. recognition of an exile government would The Cuban Government-in-exile would
'Realizing the problem: of Castro and be preceded by withdrawal of recogni- itself be able to, with the use of PT boats
communism will not be solved overnight tion of the present regime.' and other craft acquired from through-
I suggest, putting into action a lor1- The only argument I have heard out the hemisphere; place a selective
range ' plan which envisions only ulti- against such a government-in-exile is, type blockade on the Island of Cuba,
mately, and,'In the final analysis, if need How will it be formed when all the exiles cutting off the supply of oil and other
be, the use of force in order to get rid of are divided as to who or what group will essential supplies needed for Castro's
Fidel Castro. lead it? armed forces.
However, if it comes to force, the pro- _),First, I am certain that any govern- Simultaneously, it could foster defec=
gram envisions Latins and. Cubans, who ment selected by the Government of the tion within Cuba by providing arms and
believe in , freedom, leading that force United States' and announced as the munitions to those who would turn
against the Latin Con ubists, of Fidel exile Government of Cuba will, hr fact, against Castro. This, T submit, is the
Castro. In other words, the program be the Government-in-exile, However, only realistic course to follow for those
envisions Latins-for-freedom versus there is a more democratic method of Who rely on the defection from within
Latins-for-dictatorship. procedure if our officials want to follow alternative., Help from outside Cuba is
After all, the problems posed by Castro it,.. needed, and Cubans could supply it all.
are greatest with respect to the Latin The U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza- Propaganda barrages could be estab-
American nations, and as such it is the tion Service and Refugee Committee lished with Cubans talking to, Cubans.
Latin nations which should begin to bear have. the names and addresses of every The Government-in-exile could ask and
an increasing responsibility for bringing refugee in the United States and Puerto insit, under the treaties, that all Latin
about a solution. Rico. Why not send each one a ballot, American nations which had not already
More specifically, communism has es- asking him or her to write their first, done so, close their shores to Castro's
tablished Its hemispheric., fortress in second, or third choices down-sort of embassies. ' This would stop most of the
Cuba and, in the final analysis, it should like an absentee ballot here in all our subversive , propaganda now Rowing out
be, and can be the Cubans who assume States of the United States. of Cuba. The Cuban Government, act-
the leadership in what .will have to be It would be relatively simple to carry ing in the name of freedom, could ask
of necessity a joint undertaking.. out a: poll by mail and under the super- that all trade with Castro be stopped.
The value of turning to the Latins to vision of a group of prominent exiled They can, ask this, cooperation from all
provide the leadership and most of the Cuban jurists, in which each exiled members of the OAS', whereas the United
manpower required to do the job, re- Cuban, adult is asked for a free expres- States which is, technically, not directly
turns the problem to its proper place sion of who should head. an exile Gov- involved, could not.
as. a Western Hemisphere problem, to ernnient. No doubt, there would be some Cubans could easily smuggle goods to
be handled within the, framework of al- errors and duplication-this is inevi- the underground in Cuba without having
ready existing treaties and agreements table-but it would provide a consensus to run the gauntlet of the U.S. Immigra-
entered into by all the Western Hemi- and would give support to. the man or tion and Border Patrol officials, who now
.sphere countries.. men who finally act as the Government- stop them and defeat their major efforts.
. Furthermore, there is no sense in pur- in-exile. There is a, good chance that such an
posely bringing about a. situation in Once it was established who the Cuban exile Government, supported and, sup-
.which Mr. Khrushchev, already ignomin- people had selected to lead the fight to plied by all the nations of the Western
icusly removing his missiles: from Cuba, free their homeland, U.-S. recognition Hemisphere, could nourish sufficientde-
is required once again to either back should be immediate, fection within Cuba to topple Castro,
down or fight, because-of ,direct con- ' This would emphasize to the, other and, of course, that is to be desired.
frontation with our troops, ora specific hemispheric nations that the efforts of But, if in the final analysis it were
challenge from us,, free Cubans to expunge communism needed, that exile Government could un-
I do not know, and l.do not believe from Cuba have our full support and dertake the liberation of its home by the
anyone does, just how far Mr. Khru- lead to recognition of the exile Gov- force
shchev of arms. As a member of the OAS,
believes he, can back up before he ernment by other hemispheric nations. and under the provision of the treaties
destroys his own position, with his ally Moreover, there are nations In Latin of Rio and Caracas this Government
the belligerent Chinese, Reds, or with, his America which would act as host to`the could, call on other: member nations for
own "military leaders 'within the Soviet Government-in-exile. I will not bring w hatever assistance would be required-
Union, about their subjection to pressure and including. arms-to bring about a suc-
I see no point in plotting a course at harassment by mentioning their names cessful conclusion to their efforts. Un-
'this time . that does not afford Mr. here. But they have made it clear that der the commitments imposed on the
Khrushchev a door-through Whichhe can they would allow a Cuban Government- United States and the other hemispheric
move to avoid confrontation with us, if in-exile to operate from their soil. nations by longstanding treaties, we
he wants to. This, program which I I am not suggesting that the Govern- would be legally bound and acting within
shall suggest, in which the action taken merit-in-exile be the government which the dictates of our international obliga-
is called for and lead by Cubans and takes over the power of Cuba once the tions In answering the Cuban exile Gov-
Latins, in some measure avoids the con- freedom of the Cuban homeland has been ernment's request for help.
frontation and thereby lessens the pos- regained. On the contrary, it should be Surely, we and `the' other nations of
sibility that, if and when force comes into understood that the Cuban Government the Western Hemisphere would respond,
use, the encounter will escalate into total in exile maintains our recognition only just as we responded to the call of the
war or nuclear war, so long as it takes to free Cuba and, English and French in World Wars I and
If the Cubans and other freedom-lov- thereafter hold a democratic election on II. We would,-respond because we be-
ing Latins are to take charge. of the Cuban soil with all the people of Cuba lieve in freedom and the right of self-
Castro problem, there must be a rallying participating, determination, 'and it is just as precious
point for them, a central body which can Once formed and established, the and dead in this hemisphere as in the
focus and direct their efforts. I see no Cuban Government, under the Rio Continent of Europe or the far away
group which can do' this, which can 'Treaty of 1947, the Caracas Agreement reaches of southeast Asia.
speak in the name of all the Cuban peo- of 1954, the Punte del Este agreements The proposal is not a roadmap to
-Pie, except a ,fully constituted Govern- of 1961, and, in. fact, the basic provi- utopia. Liberation of Cuba by forces
went-in-exile which is recognized by us signs of the Organization of American directed by. a government-in-exile is a
and other hemispheric nations. We States, could call upon all the nations of long-range prospect. There would have
should acknowledge its power to make the Western Hemisphere for military to be a time-consuming buildup of
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 1963 Approved FqjJ"99SJQ"M/VFC
Qp WR000200220021-5 4137
f JK a
and, the. danger he constituted to his own pressing fear over an anticipated inva- great revolutionary, despite the fact that
people and. to the-:he. sphere, that I sion'from Cuba. I came to the Senate his drumhead courts-martial had exe-
made special calls to Assistant Secretary floor and stated: cuted close to 600 of his fellow country-
of State Roy Rubottom. J .urged him, The President of Haiti appealed to me for men-including some who had fought
and subsequently Secretary of State help by cablegram to help forestall an in- alongside him in the hills against
Herter, not to recognize any-government vasion of his country. I sent today, April 17, Batista-and despite the fact that he
set up by Castro until .that government 1$59, a telegram to Dr. Jose Mora, secretary- had completely flaunted the rights of
had held at least..one fr,,ee election. General of the OAS, urging that he take U.S. citizens and property owners and
I shall never forget being advised by immediate action to set up a voluntary po- had launched invasions of Panama and
Mr. Rubottom that the American public lice force to keep the peace in Latin Amerr
ica. I suggested this police patrol be made Nicaragua.
demanded recognition of. Castro's ?,re- up of the 21 member states of the OAS On June 14 and June 20, 1959, inva-
gime, and this recognition, was blithely including the United States. We have to siol~ forces organized in Cuba were
given on January, 7. My records .reflect relieve .tension in the Caribbean and put a directed against Santo Domingo. These
that 2 days later, on January 9,_Mr. RU- halt to Communist troublemaking. An in- were 'stopped and, from the sketchy
bottom and I had. further discussion ter-American police force could do the job reports, it appeared that every member
about Castrg in my office, and on ,Jan- but we don't have much time to act. of that expeditionary force from Cuba
nary 11 I met ,with. a, State Department It was shortly after this warning of was exterminated, Once again, sufficient
delegation in still further.discussioxi., of April 17, specifically on April 24, that evidence was recovered from the bodies
the subject of Castro? communism, and Castro sent against the Republic of the invaders to establish that. these
Cuba. However, the act bad been, done of-Panama an invasion force that he forces were sent on their mission by
and frankly met with,overwlaelming,ap- had permitted to be organized and Fidel Castro and the Communists.
proval. trained in Cuba. Even after this act of On October 13, 1959, the little coun-
I took a..trip around C.entral.,.and aggression, I don't recall any concern try of Haiti was invaded, again by
South America from January 19 until having been expressed by any of the forces from the Island of Cuba, and
February 10, _1959, . and wherever I went Senators or news commentators who are again under -the direction of Castro's
in my talks with labor leaders, clergy- so loudly and. persistently talking today. Communists. This invasion was again
men, government officials, and others, I do recall the late Senator from New defeated by Haitians who ? had been
there was. quiet, ,b4 t nonetheless.; great Hampshire, Styles Bridges, talking about trained in military tactics by a detach-
apprehension _as,to the., quality of Cas- the danger of Fidel Castro to Central ment of 50 U.S. Marines.
tro's intentions., --- and South America, and all he got for 'On October 26 Castro, becoming "ever
I remember well my personal dismay his trouble was criticism. more arrogant and contemptible in, his
when Castro was invited to address the :However, there began to be some rip- conduct toward the United States and
American Society of Newspaper Editors ple of criticism of Castro in May of 1959 his, neighbors, in this hemisphere, and
here in Washington in April 1959. I when he confiscated the property and feeling ever more secure in his-relation-
recall that he subsequently was invited assets of 117 companies, the bulk of ship with the Communists, accused the
and did appear before the Foreign Re- which were American-owned. I recall United States of aggression.
lations Committee of the Senate. at that time making a statement to the He reestablished his drumhead mili-
The chairman was kind enough to in- press and on television that we should tary courts and began to summarily exe-
vitc me to listen in, and I, particularly not sit idly by-that the confiscation of cute political prisoners without recogni-
remember the general warmth with American property should not be ignored tion of any of the elementary personal
which Fidel Castro was received. I en- and that immediate and effective steps rights whatsoever. As of this date it
deavored to ask him a few questions, but should be taken to stop it. was estimated the Castro regime had
had little success as he. realized I had A month later, in June 1959, the State executed over 500 people. Later the
some doubts about him. When I kept Department began for the first time to total was to reach well-over 1,000.
asking him when he was going to have express some concern about Castro's acts In January 1960 and through the early
an" election, I recall he responded that and specifically about the need of having part of February I made another trip
"the people of Cuba don't want an elec- adequate compensation paid to those to the Central and South American
tion."' When I pressed him further on Americans who had lost their property. countries and upon my return I out-
the question-of elections, he said, "I On May 26, 1959, I offered, on the floor lined in a Senate speech on February
might have one in 3 or 4 years." of the Senate, amendments to the Mutual 24 an eight-point program calculated
Despite his ominous statements, sup- Security Act which were designed to to limit the activities of Castro's Com-
port for him was so overwhelming that create an Inter-American Police Force, munists in Central and South America.
I began to have doubt, in my own judg- and Inter-American Court of Justice. Among other things, I asked that we
ment about this man. No., action was taken by the committee turn over to the OAS all the informa-
According to my files, that very day to which referred. tion which the FBI, CIA, and our other
- after his appearance before the Foreign On the 31st of May 1959, after Fidel intelligence agencies had in their files
R
elations Committee, I stated in a writ- Castro and his Communist cohorts had, on communism in Cuba and Castro's
ten press release that- through executions and the use of raw connection with it,
Serious trouble is brewing in the Carib- power, subdued all resistence In Cuba, he Mr. J. Edgar Hoover had at this time---
bean area. The source of danger is centered again turned his eyes toward new con- and long before-a dozzier ' on Castro
in Cuba, a country which historically has quests and launched an invasion of the and his Communist connections that
always been our friend. Cuba could easily country of Nicaragua. should have convinced the most ardent
,become a prisoner of the Reds. Fidel Castro, That invasion was successfully turned fan of Castro's in the State Department,
during a_ meeting today with several Sena- back and incontrovertible evidence was of his allegiance to communism, but I
tors, told me that elections in Cuba were obtained by the defenders of Nicaragua, doubt if they ever asked for this in-
3 or 4 years away. That is not very hearten=
ing news. I asked him about his anti-Ameri- proving beyond the shadow of a doubt, formation or saw it.
can statements and he denied having made that the invasion had been financed
In that s
eech
I
t
,
p
,
urged
he United
them. organized, and launched by Castro from States to urge the OAS to act. I said
I went on to say: the Island of Cuba. So far as I have been the United States should not act uni-
able ascertain was no is clear that be has not yet learned you outcry about thetinvas on of protest shouldlaterally exami eg possibilitythe of im-
can't play ball with the Communists for he by the State Department or anyone else posing economic sanctions. on Cuba. I
has them peppered throughout his govern- in position of authority. also said that "Castro has now identi-
ment.
r again emphasize that there were fled for what he is- ,
In early April 1959, even more distur- few people in that particular time,vthe If not i him elf a Communist, isncerta no-
bing news began to come. Because I had summer of 1959, who were interested in ly doing the work of the Communists
expressed doubt about Castro, others clipping the wings of Fidel Castro. with the driect help of the Communists."
who had doubt began to can me about He still had the bulk of the American On March 5, 1960, Castro accused the
their, concern, L, received two cable- people's support. He still had many United States of complicity in the explo-
grains from the President of Haiti ex- newsmen lyrically writing about him as a sion of a munitions ship in the Havana
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Because the Constitution of the United U.S. Military forces in direct confronta-
States puts into, the hands of the execu- tion with those of the Soviet Union.
976 brauchaa,the Government-or the As stated, I think this adds a new di-
President of the United States-the final mension of danger to our already difficult
authority,and responsibility for the con- problem.
duct of our foreign affairs, I think he I do not go so far as to say that we
should be permitted without personal should never act, or that we should not
harrassment or political attack to pro- proceed, even if some of the military of
teed along this logical. line of getting the Soviet Union stay there. I would
Soviet troops removed from Cuba, for emphasize, however, that the solution to
I would challenge anyone to suggest that the problem of Cuba, which means the
there is a more useful course of action elimination of communism from Cuba,
looking toward the total solution of the is infinitely easier without the Soviet
problem. of Cuba than that of removing forces there. I say that their removal
the troops andaechnicians of the Soviet will diminish greatly the prospects of
Union from Cuba. whatever action is.finally taken in Cuba
But, Mr. President, what of the future? escalating into a total world and nuclear
What. are our long-range goals? war. It has been the consideration of
Certainly, they are to see Cuba freed, this problem, the gravity of it, the enorm-
But do we have a program or a. Plan ity of it, the complexity of it, which has
of action? If the (resident has. of made me feel that the President is on the
course he does not have to tell it to right track in first getting removed from
anyone. 1 have net heard of any plan, Cuba the offensive missiles and bombers
and I think if we are to free Cuba and and, thereafter, insisting upon the re-
keep the respect of our Latin neighbors. moval of the Soviet personnel.
we have to have a, plan or a. program Furthermore; we must keep in mind
which we can logically follow to a final that today, when we suggest further ac-
and happy solution.of a, free Cuba, tion, either in the form of a blockade or
Now I would like to offer a program
a raid this invol th
,,vese use of force.
or plan of action, but before doing so And force, of course, means war. It guard troops?,
I want to make it clear I speak only for might be limited and small-or it might
field ces, They are fully equipped with tanks,.
myself. i speak only for the junior be unlimited and staggering in its con- o he arodern weapo antitank guns and ns. They senator from Florida. I. have not sequences. When we embark on a block- other modern force. and would be are afor-
cleared this speech with anyone. This ade of an island like Cuba, for it to. be' defen laand would ne us toll of
voice is speaking only for me. defensively, taking a tremendous toll of.
in the effective the blockader must make up any liberating force.
past I have recommended all his mind he may have to go to the length Once a beachhead for the liberating
sorts of programs of action. I have of shooting and sinking a surface ship as force was established how long would
talked about a combination of measures, one starts into Cuba with supplies and the battle for the island take?
embargoes, quarantines, economic meas-
emb, poll, qua measures; propaganda personnel, or of shooting down an air- How many casualties,. American
ures caplomeas s, oa craft which is loaded with supplies and casualties, would it cost to subdue Cuba?
meau col . But at diplomatic
time have I measures, and personnel: I have no. access. to contingency
otherrs. that the no time have recom- In any event, the act of shooting a but we hear figures such asamonth
war on Cuba or a United plane or a ship is an act of war and, and 100,000 casualties. I gather that our
own military rrcact e. unilaterally with our as the President said in his last news military planners see no quick, glorious
Since the buildup of weapons and men conference, erence, any such action on our part charge up San Juan Hill now. Rather
in Cuba he. fall probably call up an immediate they envision a, long,
by the Soviets, the response. bloody ost exha, and
situation has changed, We now have Furthermore, let us be sure when we and savage war waged in othe f most 2 eh century
a. new dimension to consider, the pos- talk of force and war we know what we a~ savage tradition of the 20th century
sibility of direct confrontation of Soviet are talking about. This use of force, world wars-
troops and United States troops. this war we are talking about, is not a And would the, war for the liberation
Furthermore, in the light of the cold war waged in the daily press and
enormous amount of military Cuba remain limited?
Y equipment over the conference tables. It is not a I challenge anyone to say he knows.
put into Cuba, we have a much more war of words in which our Secretary of We can carry, on some logical specula-
difficult situation to deal with than we Defense, corrects the blusterings of the tion. It might be a war confined to the
did in 1960 or 1961. Soviet Defense Minister on the number island of Cuba and the waters surround-
When we talk about strong measures of operative U.S. missiles or the size of ing it.
today, particularly when we imply our thermonuclear bombs. Not even a Or it might be a war which precipitates
force even though we may not say it, guerrilla. war in which railroad bridges a. Soviet move into Berlin with all- that
we are in, reality talking about a direct are destroyed and crops burned or sugar
confrontation.
confrontation of the military forces of
mills implies.
ll action Cuba might pre-
United States with the military sabotaged. cipitate full-scale conflict in southeast
the United Sees Union, unless we We are talking about a war in which Asia, particularly South Vietnam or
first are successful in troops storm a beachhead, where pla- Laos.
forces out of ces f. Such in gett confrontaing toons are sent to knock out a bunker, Or how do we know that the war to
firs bthe Soviet Uni
a on and the a war in which villages are destroyed by liberate Cuba, will not really touch off
United between
States forces have not had artillery fire, a war in which lives would the total thermonuclear conflict which
thus fdr in our history, be lost and men maimed and crippled for. each of us prays daily will not occur.
During the Korean war, while we less thousands of children.
fought the Red Chinese and undoubtedly will. Can we assume he does not
many Soviets, nevertheless they operated now is them time forowar. wSome who adt mean it?
clandestinely under color of the North vocate, rather Our Defense Secretary has said we will
Koreans and/or Red Chinese. How- forces turned quicklylon C str s Cuban defend n-and I a nuclear every man
ever, so long as the Soviet military troops and get the job over with. It may come nEthis Chamber approves this stand and
remain in Cuba, the. prospects of escalat- to that, but everyone should know ex- knows that Mr,. McNamara spoke for the
ing action in Cuba. into total war are actly what they are talking about. I President when he said it. We know the
infinitely greater because any unilateral hope they have given thought to not United States means it, that we will
action against Cuba, or even action led just the phrases but the consequences as defend West Berlin, and if necessary with
by U.S. forces puts, for the first time,, well.
1 4141
How many American troops, for ex-
ample, would be required to die in order
to land a large effective fighting force on
an island which has 150 coastal defense
missiles and operational sites for most
of them? These missiles can reach
troop ships 40 miles out. How many
troops, landing craft, and even trans-
ports could be sent to the bottom of the
Caribbean by a dozen operative missile
launching torpedo boats, whose launch
range is 15 miles, which the. Cubans now
have?
How many aircraft would be lost in
attaining air superiority over a small
island with 50(1 surface to antiaircraft
missiles and defended by 100 Migs, over
40 of them capable of matching our
F-104 Starfighter in performance and
all piloted, we must presume, by skilled
aviators and directed by 200 modern
radars?
How many soldiers would be lost in
subduing a force of" some 75,000 regular
and, we must presume, fanatically in-
doctrinated troops,, fighting on their
home ground,, and backed: by at least
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
sine tl?e leadership for the formation
of an Inter-American Police Force.
OP-January 7, 1961, I wrote a letter
to outgoing Secretary Herter and in-
coining Secretary of State Dean Rusk
wring the banning of all Cuban imports
to the United States in order to put an
ectiaomiG squeeze on'Castro's government
and try to bring it down. There was
criticism of this by some Florida indus-
tries who depended upon Cuban prod-
ucts, but I felt the situation called for
such action.
On February 15, 1961, after the change
of administration, in another speech on
the Senate floor, I said:
The time has come for action in the Cuban
situation. We should adopt an economic
embargo calculated to bring Castro to his
knees and the Cuban people to freedom.
DAY OF PIGS
On April 17, 1961, we remember, less
than 4 months after this administra-
tion had come into office, an attack was
launched by a group of 1,500 Cubans
who had been trained in the far reaches
of Guatemala under the supervision of
military experts recruited in the United.
States,
This. plan for the invasion at the Bay
of Pigs had not been'some new develop-
ment of the new administration because
we know that, as a matter of fact, these
men were gathered together and sent
to Guatemala for training in 1960, be-
fore the change of administration.
From my own personal knowledge I
know that these men had been held and
trained for so long a time in Guatemala
and other Central American countries
that most of them had become discour-
aged, and some had left the ranks in
their belief that the U.S. Government
would never permit them to try to win
back freedom for their own country,
Here in the United States there was
great concern as to what determination
should be made with respect to these
Cuban invasion forces. This occurred
prior to the beginning of the invasion.
Should they be returned to the United
States and dispersed, or should they be
permitted to make the effort to free
their own homeland?
While I was not consulted officially
about this matter, my opinion was asked
for by some people in lower echelons of
the Government, and it was my judg-
ment that the men should be permitted
to make the effort-to free their country,
for they would never be happy until they
had made this noble effort; but, of
course, it should be made only after
sound military judgment had been ob-
tained that the endeavor had some
chance of success,
Everyone now knows of the enormous
miscalculations and mistakes that were
made.
I think the President, whose final
decision it was, did the right thing when
he assumed the full responsibility for
the fiasco. This was the manful and
courageous. thing to.do. But the fact
remains that there was considerable mis-
The Bay of Pigs is now sad history.
Had it succeeded, Cuba would have been
free and our problems would have been
lessened to a great extent, although, of
course, not totally eliminated.
Some, it is now revealed, counseled
against the invasion before it occurred.
I thought, and still think, the "Go" sig-
nal was the correct one, based on the
facts then available.
I never did subscribe to, nor do I now,
the theory that the Latins would be ap-
palled by our impetuosity or by our show
of strength. Latins like leadership and
strength; they always have, and they al-
ways will.
They have a history of 400 years of
respecting, admiring, and looking up to
strong leadership. That is why they
still continue to admire strong leader-
ship.
Everyone has 20-20 rear vision.
That judgment on the Bay of Pigs can
be debated a long time. But surely the
man who gave the word "GO; rescue
your homeland; defeat and overthrow
the Communists", cannot now in fairness
have it even suggested that he is tim-
orous or afraid of action. Couple this
with the acts of October 1962, his quar-
antine, his confrontation with Khru-
shchev, and no man can fairly say that
this President is not always prepared to
act.
But to continue with the chronology,
before discussing broader concepts, on
June 21, 1961, shortly after Castro's May
1 declaration of Cuba as a Socialist, or
Communist state, and some 2 months
after the catastrophe at the Bay of-Pigs,
I again warned that "to hope Castro
communism will wither away and die on
the vine is both woo]headed and dan-
gerous. Western Hemisphere nations
must act now to expel Castro before he
wins his race with time."
On July 20, 1961, in a speech on the
Senate floor I urged U.S. recognition of.
the Cuban Government-in-exile and the
creation of an Inter-American Military
Force again.
I continued to urge on this adminis-
tration the placing of an import embargo
on trade with Castro, and I was highly
gratified when on February 3, 1962, this
administration took such action. There-
after, the many millions of dollars which
they had been receiving in trade were
denied to them, and conditions were ob-
viously made worse for Fidel Castro.
In a Florida speech on May 3, 1962, 1
stated that "Castro continued to work
full throttle against the hemisphere's
free nations," pointing out that Cuba has
set up subversive schools, indoctrination
centers, and propaganda classrooms to
instruct teachers, students, intellectuals,
political leaders, and revolutionaries
from all over Latin America. I said:
The plan is to send these Communist-
indoctrinated people back to their home-
lands and set them to work subverting their
countries with the hoped-for Communist
takeovers scheduled 1, 5 or even 10 years
from now.
judgment on the part of many agencies On June 18, 1962, I. called for the es-
and. persons, who had a part in the deci- tablishment of a four-point program
sion,,. No one man-be he even the Pres- designed to make the policy of the United
ident of the United States-can make States toward Latin America, as I said,
correct judgments when he is proceed- "one of realism and not romanticism."
ing from inadequate information. I recommended the welding of our
,, '4139
economic program in Latin America with
our political goals; the establishment of
an Under Secretary of State for Latin
American Affairs reporting directly to
the President; and again called for rec-
ognition. of a Cuban Government-in-
exile, stating,, "We are going to have to
meet this Red challenge with determina-
tion, and l am confident we will do so."
On September 5, 1962, I made this
statement:
The presence in Cuba of 5,000 so-called
technicians from the Soviet bloc makes even
more compelling the need for an inter-Amer-
ican Police Force to back up inter-hemis-
pheric treaties based on the Monroe Doctrine
which pledges to keep communism out of
this hemisphere.
In addition, I urged, as I have time
and again in the past, that the United
States recognize and support a demo-
cratic Cuban Government-in-exile,
whose first purpose is the liberation of
the Cuban people from Communist
tyranny. I said:
Such a free Cuban regime could openly
receive support from the United States to-
wards the accomplishment of this goal and
the eventual restoration of their liberties to
oppressed Cuban citizens.
On September 18, 1962, I introduced
in the Senate two resolutions. One
called for recognition of the Cuban Gov-
ernment-in-exile and the other support-
ing establishment of an, inter-American
military alliance.
Mr. President, some people may won-,
der why I have gone to such lengths to
recite the record in such detail.
My answer is that I am trying to point
out, among other things, why this prob-
lem of Cuba is not now and never has
been the problem of a single "political
party, but instead, is the problem of both
parties and all Americans. It is the
problem of the Nation as a whole.
It goes without saying that so far as
removing Castro Sand the Communists
from Cuba is concerned, it would have
been considerably easier to have done
it in 1959 or 1960 than it would, have
been in 1961 or 1962, or than it will be in
1963 or 1964.
For the Island has been continuously
fortified and militarized, and more and
more modern and sophisticated weapons
have been emplaced.
But no programs were developed in
1959 or 1960; and in January. 1961, at the
change of administrations, the outgoing
one merely passed along the growing
problem of Cuba to the incoming Ad-
ministration, as one passes a very hot
potato from his own hand to that of
his unsuspecting dinner partner.
I have recited some-and only some-
of the instances when I spoke in the
Senate and elsewhere in 1961 and 1962,
calling the attention of this administra-
tion to the need for developing a program
having for its ultimate goal the freedom
of Cuba. While I have yet to learn of a
long-range program, this administra-
tion did put into effect, in 1961, the eco-
nomic embargo which had as its result
the denial to Castro of the use of many
millions of dollars which he had pre-
viously realized each year. from trade
with this country.
The administration also diligently
exercised pressure in an. effort to get
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 1963
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD __ SENATE 4107
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, last Montana expressed the view that "much
year alone the Government spent $602.9
million supporting the price of milk, plus
$88.5, million for the school milk pro-
gram.
As I see it, the Congress must come
to grips with this problem. It cannot
any longer be ignored because the in-
dustry representatives cannot agree on
a new program.
In the past, when laws relating to
other commodities have developed weak-
nesses, Congress has seen fit to act. And
yet in the case of milk, which is the
most costly program of all, there has
been no action. This is intolerable.
There must be a change. For if there is
not, the taxpayers of this country may
well demand that the entire program
be "sacked."
Now, the bill which 'I have introduced
provides a basic framework for the de-
veloplnent of a sound, healthy, and pros-
perous dairy industry, and certainly one
that will be less costly to the Govern-
merit.
I want it clearly 'understood, and I
want to emphasize, that this legislation is
not designed to lower the income of dairy
farmers. Rather, it is designed to cor-
rect the inequities and shortcomings of
the present law.
For example, it will in no way-and
I repeat-positively in no way will it low-
er the price received by farmers for the
very wholesome ' milk produced for use
in fluid form by the consumers of this
country. This milk is produced under
the highest and strictest of sanitary re-
quirements at a very high cost to farm-
ers. Producers must receive a good price
for this milk. And 'under my bill they
will.
My bill will not in any way curtail
the production of milk which is required
for fulfilling the needs of the fluid mar-
kets. As a matter of fact, it will en-
courage farmers to gage their produc-
tion to fully meet market needs. My
aim is only to discourage the produc-
tion of unneeded milk-milk that is pro-
duced in excess of market needs.` This
excess milk is giving both the farm-
ers and the Government problems. This
is the milk that is costing the Govern-
ment money.
My bill is not designed to penalize
those farmers who produce for the
manufacturing markets. In my estima-
tion, proper corrections in the market
order areas will minimize the problems
in the manufacturing milk areas. In
addition, proper correction now of de-
ficiencies in the price support program
will preserve that program for the manu-
facturing milk producer. As a result,
both parts of the milk industry will bene-
fit and en.oy a pro perous future.
OUE CASTRO 'FIXATION VERSUS
THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr., President, last
Friday the distinguished majority leader
[Mr. MANSFIELD], one of the wisest and
most thoughtful Members of the Senate,
warned against irresponsible discussion
of American foreign policy and especially
the Cuban question. The Senator from
of the discussion of Cuba by Members of
the Congress is not helping this Nation;
it is hurting it. We have indeed had
discussions of Cuba," said the Senator
from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], "but a
discussion steeped in politics, panic, and
perversion of fact."
Recognizing that the late Republican
Senator from Michigan, Arthur Vanden-
berg, offered the Nation a classic example
of constructive bipartisanship during the
critical years after World War II. The
Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD]
quoted Senator Vandenberg's warning
to the Senate:
Only in those instances in which the Sen-
ate can be sure of a complete command of
all the essential information prerequisite to
an intelligent decision, should it take the
terrific chance of muddying the international
waters by some sort of premature and ill-
advised expressions of its advice to the
Executive.
As a freshman Senator, Mr. President,
I have been reluctant to add my voice
to the current clamor over Cuba and
Castro. I wholeheartedly endorse the
majority leader's warning that on this
and other foreign policy issues, no Sen-
ator should speak his mind until he has
though through the consequences of his
words. -
But keeping in mind the counsel of
Senator Vandenberg and the majority
leader, I am constrained to speak out
against what seems to me to be a dan-
gerous fixation on Castro that is not
worthy of this great Nation. I submit
that we have become so involved in
charges and countercharges about our
Cuban policy that we have come close
to losing sight of the real interests of the
Nation in the hemisphere. We have
ignored the biblical warning against
straining at a gnat and swallowing a
camel.
I have often wondered why the wily
khrushchev would invest so heavily in
both capital and personnel in the kind of
risky enterprise which Fidel Castro is
frantically trying to establish in Cuba.
If his purpose was to enhance the in-
fluence of Castro and Castroism in the
hemisphere, he must be bitterly disap-
pointed-with the results, for the Castro-
Khrushchev embrace has had the op-
posite effect. By turning his revolution
over to Moscow, Castro has sacrificed
much of his appeal to revolutionary
leaders and followers in other Latin
American states. No thoughtful ob-
server of Latin American affairs has
failed to note the decline of Castro's
influence in the hemisphere since his
marriage to the Kremlin.
But If Mr. Khrushchev's purpose was
to create in Castro a-gadfly designed to
divert the attention of the United States
from the real dangers and challenges
of Latin America, then he must indeed
feel that his investment has paid off
handsomely. For each day brings some
mighty blast at Castro from a highly
placed American politician or com-
mentator.
Meanwhile, the basic dangers to our
security in the hemisphere-the eco-
nomic, political, and social ills of Latin
America-continue to fester. The Unit-
ed States has atomic bombs in its secu-
rity arsenal, but on the side of insecu-
rity we have a smouldering blockbuster
on our doorstep to the south which
makes Mr. Castro appear like a mouse
trying to bring down an elephant.
I refer to the 200 million people of
Latin America who occupy a vast land,
potentially rich and fruitful but actually
beset by misery, sickness, injustice, illi-
teracy, malnutrition, and misrule. It is
a continent cursed by a social system
that concentrates enormous wealth in
the hands of the few and consigns the
malty to lives of desperate poverty. But
make no mistake about it, powerful so-
cial forces are stirring to the south of
us. Latin America is in a state of fer-
ment; it is, as one observer put it, "dy-
namite on our doorstep."
Neither Fidel Castro nor Nikita
Khrushchev nor international commun-
ism is at the base of this explosive situa-
tion. They are the exploiters and the
would-be beneficiaries of the tensions
and illness which threaten the security
of the-hemisphere, but they are not the
fundamental. factors. They are effects
rather than causes.
Castro climbed to power over the car-
cass of a decadent political and social
system which he shrewdly exploited, but
which he did not create. The appeal
of Castroism and communism in other
parts of the hemisphere springs from
the same corruption and social injustice
which paved the way for the collapse of
Batista and the triumph of Castro.
The real bombshells of Latin America,
are fused to the following conditions:
First, 2 percent of the people of the
continent own more than half of all its
wealth and land while most of the re
niainder of the people live in hopeless
poverty.
Second, 80 percent of the people dwell
in miserable shacks or huts.
Third, illiteracy grips well over half
the population.
Fourth, more than 50 percent of the
people suffer from hunger and disease
and most of them will never in their life
times see a doctor, nurse, dentist,' or
pharmacist.
Fifth, most of the peasants live under
primitive feudal conditions with no hope
.
for land ownership, reasonable credit, or,
escape to abetter life.
Sixth, several key countries depend on
one-crop economies afflicted by de-
pressed commodity prices.
Seventh, most governments are weak-
ened by unjust tax structures, excessive
military budgets designed to keep the
people under control, bad land owner-
ship and utilization, and indifference to
shocking social problems.
'Eighth, 'a population growth rate sev-
eral times faster than the production of
goods and services exists in several Latin
American countries.
Two years ago, at the request of theF
President, I led a food-for-peace mis-
sion to Latin America which took us to
northeast Brazil. In this benighted sec-
tion of the largest and most populous na-
tion of Latin America our mission came
face to face with the real challenge to
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of liistening to such an . able mai.dexi of 3 percentage points since 1958; the num-
speech as that delivered by my friend her of people with no opinion has dropped
from South Dakota, 4 percent. This suggests that the principle
Mr...1Vlod4Slgl N. .~ thank, 1110 S011a-, of foreign aid continues to draw supporters
for fr lm Pennsylvania for his very kind rather than opponents.
Public support for foreign aid is highest
and generous remark,.- among those who know more of the facts
Mr. McGOV,ERN, hS.ubsequently Said: about the program. More than 40 percent
Mr. President, in relation to my re- of the people polled think the foreign aid
marks made- a few minutes a 0 .about appropriations represent 10 percent of the
the, Alliance for Progress ..I- ask unan- national budget instead of 5 percent. More
imous consent tq llavi printelf at this than 80 percent did not know the approxi-
p01nt in the RECORDtWO articles, WrlttOn , irate amount appropriated.
by Roscoe Drummond. Which were pub- The humanitarian aspects of foreign aid
have the greatest appeal to t1V American
fished recently in the Washington, Post., .-people. More than 65 percent of the pro-
One article relates to the genet' &1 attitude foreign aid comments of those polled gave
of the American people toward foreign the;- humanitarian reason as the basis of
assistance; the other details some of the their. support.
advances made by the Alliance for On the other hand more than 40 percent
Progress. of those who were critical of the program
There being no objection, the articles were not opposed in principle-just felt it
were ordered to be print ed,in the RECORD, was not well administered.
Congress certainly ought to take a hard
as follows: look on a country-by-country basis to de-
LB,CK OF POPULAR SUPPORT fs A MYTH terlnine for itself hoop well the, program is
When Congress comes to vote on the. for- being administered, and wherein foreign aid
eigri aid program, it ought to, vote on the is being well or where badly utilized. I am
basis of fact, not on the basis of fiction, not defending any particular level of appro-
The greatest fiction of all, to which Presi- prlation. I am simply reporting that in ap-
dent Kennedy has unintentially made his proving the continuance of foreign aid Con-
own contribution, is that most American gress would be reflecting the judgment of
people are against it. the great majority of the American people,
The opposite is the truth. -
In his year-end TV interview, the., P;esi- LATIN REDS ARE DISHEARTENED
dent, thinking that he was speaking with in- Latin American Communists are becom-
gratiatfng candor cited the foreign aid pro- ing downright disillusioned-and disheart-
gram as crucial'- espite"the "fact" that it erred-by the Alliance for Progress. It isn't
is a large burden not popularly supported. failing adequately. For them it is succeed
This is not the fact. ing too well.
The truth is that the foreign aid program While some of its supporters in the United
is a relatively small burden, one-twentieth of States, who expected it to perform miracles
the budget, and is popularly approved, overnight, are disappointed that the Alliance
Here is the evidence: hasn't gotten off the ground faster, its Com-
A study of a whole sequence of findings of munist opponents are finding to their dis-
the Gallup polls from- 19551 to 1963; shows may that it has gotten off the ground too
that: well-for their comfort.
Popular support of the foreign aid pro- I am not suggesting that the first year's
gram is at a hi
h
oi
t
th
e
g
p
n
for
e entir
9-year work of the 10-year Alliance for Progress has
period. alone thrown the Communists on the defen-
Today 68 percent of, the American people sive. It has helped, visibly helped. The
record themselves as approving foreign aid, Communists are most on the defensive where
30 percent oppose, and-12 percent are neither ,the Alliance has been most active. Here is
for nor against 3t. some of the evidence:
There Is no great variation between the In most of the Latin-American countries,
different sections of the country: in the notably in Venezuela and the Dominican
South 55 percent approve; East, 60 percent; Republic, the Communists are abandoning
Midwest,56 percent; Far West, 59 percent. nearly all effort at peaceful persuasion and
Public backing of foreign aid is 7 percent turning to violence and subversion as the
higher than it was in 195.8, 2 percent higher only means of attaining their ends. They
than in 1955. can't win converts from people who see even
In recent years,, despite the appropriation modest progress in the present hope in the
of about $4 billion annually, popular sup- future.
port has `not, as widely believed, been de- 'The Latin American Communists are con-
clining; voter approval has been going up tinuing to lose their influence in the labor
and voter opposition has been going down. movement where they thought their pros-
Most of those who question foreign aid pects were best. Today the International
think that the appropriation is much higher Confederation of Free Trade Unions in South
than it is, America embraces 8 million workers; the
This, I think, gives afar different picture Red-dominated labor organization, not over
of American public opinion than the wide- one million.
spread myth that foreign aid is unpopular, Through Alliance aid 37 U.S. universities
even resented, by the great majority of the are now working with 57 Latin institutions
people. in 18 countries to improve education. There
The nearest thing to a national referendum is already evidence of a trend away from
is this 9-year sequence of Gallup polls. It longtime Communist control of the univer-
shows that Mr. Kennedy has been making a sities in Central America.
mistake by talking about the unpopularity All the ravages of a long-outdated eco-
of the program. He should be talking about nomic system cannot be repaired In 12
its popularity. months or 12 years, but the evidence is now
An examination of the exhaustive. backup sufficient to report that the Alliance is mak-
statistics and individual responses which lie ing a sturdy and steady beginning-and can
behind-the public reports of the Gallup find- succeed.
ings justify these factual conclusions: Hero are some of the things that are right
The principle of foreign aid is more with the Alliance for Progress and show that,
strongly supported today than in 1958, and after an understandably slow beginning,
at least as strongly as any time since 1955. more can be expected:
The percentage of people opposed to the Fourteen Latin-American countries have
principle of foreign aid has shown a drop eithe' passed new and tighter tax _legisla
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tion. or improved their tax collections; in
seven of these countries the reforms are on
a major scale.
The Alliance is pursuing a rational and
constructive course on agrarian reform. It
is not promoting a casual, ineffective pro-
gram of just cutting up large estates. It
is promoting a modernizing of agriculture.
Venezuela has succeeded in resetting nearly
60,000 farm families. Since last spring hun-
dreds of families in the Dominican Republic
have been resettled. In Chile, Colombia, Bo-
livia and elsewhere, similar programs are
getting under way.
The Alliance is enlisting new financing
for Latin America from Western Europe and
from Japan and is carrying forward a posi-
tive campaign to attract more and essential
investments by U.S. private business with
guarantees against the risk of expropriation,
inconvertibility and war.
I am not relying merely on Government
figures to justify the report that the Alliance
for Progress is beginning to make itself felt,
is starting to pay dividends. The latest re-
port on "Latin-American Business" from the
Chase Manhattan Bank cites economic prog-
ress in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and
Venezuela as improving and encouraging.
No wishful thinking from that source.
There is no doubt in my mind that the
Latin American Communists would breathe
a sign of relief if we would give it up,
RATIFICATION OF ANTI-POLL-TAX
AMENDMENT
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I am
happy to announce that two additional
States have ratified the anti-poll-tax
amendment which is presently being
considered by the legislatures of the re-
spective States of the Union. The two
new States are Washington and Ver-
mont, bringing to 22 the total number
of States which have ratified the
amendment.
I was informed late yesterday by my
distinguished colleague, the senior Sen-
ator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON],
that the House of the Washington Legis-
lature on February 26, 1963, approved
the amendment unanimously by a vote
of 95 to 0, and that the Senate on yester-
day, March 14, also approved the amend-
ment unanimously by a vote of 44 to 0.
I salute both of my friends from Wash-
ington, Senators MAGNUSON and his dis-
tinguished colleague, Senator JACKSON,
each of whom not only cosponsored my
resolution in the 87th Congress which
proposed submission of the amendlpent
to the States but vigorously supported
its approval by the Senate and then
followed through aggressively to obtain
its ratification by the legislature of their
State.
Mr. President, it is most interesting
to note for the record that when Sen-
ator MAGNUSON was a Member of the
House of Representatives in the State
of Washington in 1933, just 30 years
ago, he introduced and vigorously sup-
ported a memorial in the Washington
Legislature aimed at removing the poll
tax as a requirement for voting, in an
effort to start a movement whereby those
States which had the poll tax require-
ment would eliminate it.
I believe that at the time there were
11 States in which a poll tax or other
tax was a requirement for voting in Fed-
eral gleetlorls, T, aymly congratulate