A REPORT ON VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200170003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 6, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
the maritime unions have made on this
There being no objection, the text was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
We must advise you of our concern over
indications that profiteering interests may
succeed in excluding American-flag ships
from carrying wheat sold to Soviet Union.
Claims are being made and apparently lis-
tened to by administration officials first that
.American flag ships are not available and
second that they are not available at what
these profiteering interests call a fair price.
Both claims are false.
There are many American flag vessels
suitable for carrying grain now in temporary
inactive status. This does not include ves-
sels in government boneyards. Success of
this attack on American flag participation
in wheat deal will mean more ships in our
boneyards and more unemployment and
hardship among American seamen.
On the matter of costs no one yet has ap-
proached' any sea union to discuss special
problems for which special arrangements
.;night be worked out. American runaway
flag, operators and other foreign flag ship-
owners want to take over transport of this
wheat for their own profit. Communists
would like to see them take over. They do
not want-American-flag vessels and Ameri-
can crews bringing this cargo into their ports
because that would make Soviet people real-
Izethat our great democracy working under
a free system is the only one that can supply
them with this food.
If the principles on use of American flag
ships which you set-in approving this sale
to the Soviets are scuttled the National Mari-
time Union will be forced to picket in protest
and will call on our brothers in other unions
tct, support our protest against those who
would exploit this wheat deal for their own
profit sacrificing American ships and seamen
and aiding the Communist cause.
OBSERVANCE OF AMERICAN ART
E`EFi
Nt . P$LL. Mr. -President, I wish' to
Call our attention to the fact that Amer-
lean Art Week is being celebrated during
these 'days between November 1 and
November 7.
Observance of American Art Week is
of particular significance to me as chair-
man Of the Senate Special Subcommit-
tee on the Arts, which has just conclud-
ed 5 days of hearings on the two bills we
have, before the Senate to develop and
enhance our" Nation's cultural resources,
S. 1310sponsored by Senator HUMPHREY
and S. 165 sponsored by Senator JAVITS.
I am privileged to be a cosponsor of these
two bills. I believe them to be the most
comprehensive and constructive legisla-
tion In the arts area, which we have ever
had an opportunity to consider in the
Senate:
Testimony presented at the subcom-
mittee hearings clearly 'demonstrates
that the ar`ts in the United States are in
a ferment of growth, potentially healthy
and capable of producing a true renais-
sance of artistic achievement, but that
they are also In a state of crisis because
of inadequate support.
I will have much more to say on this
subject at a later date; but today I would
like to leave 'the thought with you that
throughout the hearings witnesses em-
phasized the urgent need for cooperation
.andpartrership as we strive toward our
goals--a coordinated, dynamic approach
to artistic encouragement from individ-
ual, civic, foundation, corporate, and
government sources. The Federal Gov-
ernment, it was stressed repeatedly, has
a vital role to play in this area.
At the hearings-through the testi-
mony of nearly 40 distinguished wit-
nesses-I was impressed once again by
the immense variety of our artistic and
cultural life. It is the very essence of
our democracy and its supreme expres-
sion. I think we would do well to bear
this in mind during American Art Week,
which began by fortuitous coincidence
on the final day of the subcommittee
hearings.
A CALL TO ACTION
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
have been impressed with the lead article
in the November 1963 issue of Guide-
posts, an-inspirational monthly magazine
for men and women of all faiths which
is edited by Dr. and Mrs. Norman Vincent
Peale. The article is entitled "Is There
a Conspiracy Against God: A Call to
Action." It was written by Dr. Bella V.
Dodd, formerly a professor at Hunter
College and now a practicing attorney
in New York City, Mrs. Dodd is known
all over America as a former Communist,
who having seen the error of her ways
in an earlier time has dedicated her life
to exposing Communist fallacies and
Communist tactics for all the world to
see and better understand. She has just
written a book entitled "School of Dark-
ness: A Personal Record of Communism,
U.S.A." which has been published by the
Devin-Adair Co.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi-
dent, that this eloquent and effective
article be printed in the RECORD at the
conclusion of these remarks.
~.T pre being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
A CALL TO ACTION
(By Bella V. Dodd)
The day the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that the use of the regents' prayer in New
York schools was unconstitutional, I was in
a New York court on other matters. News
of the decision passed through the room in
excited whispers. Sitting next to me was a
young lawyer, obviously fresh out of law
school.
"Good," he muttered. Then he pointed to
the words on a plaque over the judge's
bench-In God We Trust-and he added:
"That's the next thing that has to go."
I was stunned. "Young man," I said, "I'm
old enough to be your grandmother, and
you can take my word for it: when that sign
comes down your career will be over because
there will be no real law for you to practice."
This, I believe, is the heart of the matter.
This is the great danger which faces America
if we pursue our present course of removing
the acknowledgment of God from our daily
lives. Without God, I am convinced, we will
have no law and order, no morality, no
conscience.
Since that day the momentum of our
drive in this direction has rapidly increased.
Here are examples:
A Maryland atheist who says "My child
shall not pray" has brought about a Supreme
Court decision that your child and mine shall
not pray In school either. This same per-
son has since started a school for atheism in
Kansas which is to include a university, radio
station, and printing plant.
'20185
A Pennsylvanian who opposes Bible read-
ing in classrooms has been able to have this
Bible exercise eliminated` from every class-
room in the country.
A court case is pending in California to
remove the words "under God" from the
Pledge of Allegiance.
Under attack are the motto "In God We
Trust" on our coins, the use of chaplains in
the armed services, and prayers before Gov-
ernment and public gatherings. The objec-
tive: to make America officially a godless
nation.
It is disheartening to see the submissive-
ness of school authorities, teachers, and pub-
lic officials who are going even beyond the
Supreme Court edict in removing all refer-
ence to the Deity. The New York State Edu-
cation Commissioner, for example, declared
that the recitation of the fourth stanza of
"America"-which refers to God-cannot be
used as a part of the opening school exercise.
In Sacramento County, Calif., It was ruled
unconstitutional for schoolchildren to say
this grace with their milk and cookies: "God
Is great. God is good. Let us thank Him
for our food."
Behind the scenes are forces at work whose
purpose is to remove God as an important in-
fluence in the life of our Nation, Billy
Graham was right when in his recent Los
Angeles crusade he said, "the effort to re-
move God and moral teachings from our
schools is a diabolical scheme."
For several years, I was a member of this
anti-God crusade myself. Like many mis-
guided idealists, I went through a period
when I put the brotherhood of man above
the fatherhood of God, and, as so often hap-
pens, this led me into the Communist Party.
As early as 1936, 1 was a disciplined Com-
munist; between 1944 and 1949, I was in the
top echelon of the Communist Party of the
United States.
I thought I was fighting for social justice,
but eventually I discovered that the party
did not even have a file on various social
reforms. The Communist Party exists not
to improve conditions in America but to con-
trol them, and not to control them for the
benefit of the people but the benefit of the
party. It was this realization that finally
drove me from communism and, after years
of seeking, back to God.
Even in those days there was a well-orga-
nized campaign to eliminate God from our
education. I was active in this area: I had
been a college professor and an organizer of
teachers' unions. I knew from experience
that students look to their teachers for per-
sonal guidance more often than to their
parents, and for this reason I labored to re-
cruit as many teachers to communism as I
could. ,
These days, as then, it Is not the Com-
munist Party alone which seeks to remove
from schools all incidents of a religious na-
ture, whether prayer, Bible reading, or the
reference to God in the pledge of allegiance.
But whatever they call themselves these
groups have the same goal: the displace-
ment of the law of God by the law of
man.
It is not surprising that those against God
should aim their biggest weapons at our
schools. Our school years are our most
impressionable. Eliminating the concept of
God from education leaves the student with
no basis for determining right from wrong.
Therefore, I feel that the argument pre-
sented by some political'and religious lead-
ers that the Court's decisions put religion
back where it belongs-in the church and
the home-is unrealistic. American young-
sters between 7 and 21 spend more waking
hours at school and school activities than
they do at home and church combined.
They need more-not less--emphasis on
spiritual values in school.
The instigators of the school controversy,
moreover, have not fought their cause on the
basis of religion but rather on the basis of
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196.
coNGRESSIONAJ,,. RECORD SENATE
Province rehab litation executes Pr i
o
-,,20187
v rice-.- RESULTS Army communications and electronics
prepared and s natoiaally approved civil-mil- The military events of this past year in the equipment.
itary plans providing financial and Supply Republic of Vietnam have contributed sub- In the field of Army aviation, there have
h mport for the establishment of strategic stantially both to the development of im- been significant evaluations of the operation
proved counterinsurgency techniques and to- of armed helicopters, Mohawks, and Cari-
Those. portions of the ,CI1),Gprogram as- ward ultimate victory for the Republic of bous. It has been found that these aircraft
sociated with the strategic hamlet program Vietnam.
are designed to develop home-defense units substantially enhance the operational capa-
for strategic hamlets. In order that its training advice to the bilities of the ground forces and that they
Republic of Vietnam AF ay be effective
strategic hamlets, originally conceived as can survive in a counter-insurgency -
defense against VC attack, now have be- and timely, MAAG-Vietnam publishes a ment, that indeed the losses have been been re-
,a de : megai for eh attack political, eco- series of "Lessons Learned," which are the markably low when measured against sorties
come , and Is g progress. The Govern- after-action distillate from both the extol- and hours flown or missions successfully
norm of Viesocia has.ress' The this rn- lable and deplorable experiences of actual accomplished.
vela merit and cons-iderrecogt,_the.strate combat. In the main they reiterate and re- Perhaps the most interesting test con-
e strategic emphasize the timetested fundamentals ducted to date has been that of the armed
hamlet is primarily the point of impact of taught in current U.S. military doctrine at helicopter, along the lines of the film just
a political .and sopii xe,v~luttQn ,which will Y
serve as a oundatfon fox.ecoxromic progress, our service schools. With content particu- shown. ComUSmac has on numerous oc-
rveid pperatfons are directed variously at larly derived from counterinsurgency experi- casions paid tribute to the outstanding ac-
securing sfor staaeedic hamlets, destroy- ence in Republic of Vietnam are lessons complishments of Army and Marine heli-
Ing the sites i iogistic structure, killing or cap- learned about U.S. Army helicopter opera- copter units, both armed and transport, in
turing VC's, or gaining or regaining control tions, M-113 operations, Vietcong ambushes, support of the counterinsurgency.
of Gof V etnam territory. They organization and employment of artillery, The testing of the Mohawk in target ac-
are of Government
three basic types: province rehabilitation operations, psy war m, continues in the southern part of
(1) Clear and ype operations, executed and civic action, the limitations of para- Vietnam, following the completion of initial
in, direct support of the strategic hamlet pro- military forces such as the CG, SDC, and tests in a surveillance role in the north. The
gram, with the mission tocear an lets o- hamlet militia, and guidelines to U.S. ad- tests have demonstrated that a limited num-
arid dewy it h mispC during l the area of, visers with Allied forces. her of Mohawk aircraft, decentralized and
tin J phase of a strptegic hamlet. MAAG-Vietnam also has published and placed under the control of the division, are
2) Fix and destroy operations, based on keeps current a manual on the "Tactics and compatible with ground operations and that
specific intelligence, with the mission to Techniques of Counter-Insurgency Opera- this aircraft is well suited for the aceom-
contact, and destroy VC forces or installa- tions," which is excellent. plishment of the full range of counterin-
tions; and Under the Commander, U.S. Military As- surgency reconnaissance missions, excepting
(3) Search and clear operations, with the sistance Command Vietnam (Comusmacv) those requiring large area coverage,
.mission to destroy or clear VC from an area there is a Joint Operations Evaluation Group, Caribou's, as used in. RVN for tactical
of suspected activity. In addition, an
area (JOEG-V), whose director has two transport of troops and materiel, have proved
recon-
naissanc security, and search and rescue functions: first, to represent the U.S. Ad- to be exceptionally versatile because of their
operations and ambushes are conducted, vanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in capability to take off and land on short, Un-
Psychological operations and. civic action the combined U.S.-RVN Combat Develop- improved runways without damaging them.
each consist of two related programs. psy_ ment and Test Center-Vietnam (CDTC-V); At Present the Caribous in the Republic of
each C operations are aimed, first, at sup- and, second, to evaluate from the U.S. joint Vietnam are assigned to the southast Asia
portin the strategic hamlet program by ra- viewpoint the results of tests conducted by
g airlift system but so far some of them have
tionalizith the need, for rural citizens to CDTC-V and the two U.S. service test invariably been further allocated to the di-
'move to, or at least to organize into, citizens more agencies in RVN: the U.S. Army Concept rect support of the U.S. senior corps ad-
secure locality and .by providing them a the Team in Vietnam (ACTIN) and the U.S. Air visers. These Caribous are proving to be
incentive toward self-development for politi- Force Test Unit (AFTU). The more signifi_ effective in both the forward area transport
cal, social, and ecorxoxnic improvement. The cant of their tests of equipment and tactics cs and centralized airlift roles.
other aspect of psychological operations is are the following: In the field of armored personnel carrier
directed, at t4Q softer strata of the VC, to In May of this year test was completed of Utilization, both M-113's and M-114's were
whom radio and loudspeaker broadcasts and a version of the C-123 aircraft, modified to tested. M-113's are used in Republic of Viet-
hompped or artillery-fired leaflets are shorten landings. This aircraft demon- nam both for their intended purposes
aimed, - primarily to induce them to avail strated improved capabilities to carry heavy and in the role of tanks, which is feasible be-
themselves of chieu hof, the "open arms" loads into short fields. cause the Vietcong lack armor and antitank
or "welcome home" amnesty program. Another test project completed by the Air weapons. However, numerous modifications
Civic action is aimed at improving the Force, in which the Army was interested, was have had to be made to transform the M-113
socioeconomic welfare, political integration, that of the U-10B hello-courier plane. Its into a more suitable counterinsurgency fight-
.and h Federal security
support, education, and slfy evaluation benconducted to select ean aircraft mountedi on it, the M-113 has een modified
through Federalhelp, Its two basic,programs are civic action better suited to perform the counter- with a gun shield and cupola. The M-113
proper and based civic action. Civic ac- insurgency mission. has performed well, particularly in the flat
tion proper advises, trains, and assists ham- The AR-15 Armalite rifle is still being rice paddies of the Mekong Delta, where its
let ,inhabitants in Setting up local govern- tested in the Republic of Vietnam. Pros- cross-country mobility was hampered only
merit and trains, both-the hamlet adminis- pects for its wider use are favorable. by the many canals. To overcome this
tratoxs and citizenry in building and estab- Motor convoys in RVN are frequently sub- obstacle, several techniques have been de-
trat rig physical facilities such as market- jected to costly ambushes, in some of which veloped, among them brush fill, block and
places, schools, dispensaries, information V.S. advisors have been killed. These am- tackle, capstan and anchor, aluminum balk
centers, chapels, pagodas, and water supply bushes are extremely short in duration and bridging, and push bars. On the other hand,
points and, 1 formulating and ater strat- characterized by murderous fire from VC the M-114, although present in Republic of
ing programs of self-help and scientific fm- automatic weapons. Countermeasures are Vietnam, has not been employed near-'
provement in education, agriculture, stock- being developed to enable troops to survive lY so extensively as the M-113. As a first
raising, and disease control. Medical civic the withering fire of these ambushes and to generation vehicle, several changes will be
action trains local nurses and directly treats launch a superior barrage of area fire in required before it will achieve full opera-
local people. To date almost 600,000 treat- return. New techniques for moving and es- tional compatibility with the M-113, a third
merits have been given by medical civic ac- sorting convoys are being explored and new generation vehicle.
Lion teams at all average cost of $1 each. weapons systems are being developed. Among the most productive of ACTIV's
Coordinated with the-
he supporting U.S. mill- Communications are often a problem in evaluations has been the test of U.S. Army
tary medical civic action program are the RVN because the terrain or atmospheric con- engineer teams, called engineer control and
tar medal vic acts as well as Medithe ditions tend to limit the range and perform- advisory detachments (ECAD's), which have
CARE and Hope, ance of standard radio sets. A new family been introduced to provide engineering as-
RE and tactical principles and techniques of radio antennas, which can be fabricated sistance and direction for small construction
which are proving successful n the counter- locally and used with the standard radio sets projects of benefit to the rural population.
which arey are proving sec essentially l in the
especially issued, is -being developed to over- Materials for the ECAD's projects were sup-
of small-unit . esse, which thos been taught come this problem. plied by ACTIV, USOM, and the local gov-
. The tactical The U.S. Air Force Test Unit is also in the e
In V.S. serviceschools#ar years rnmerit at minimal cost and labor was praproblm remains to fino, fix, and destroy the process of testing a tactical air positioning vided by local civilians. During the 120-day
enemy. Of prime importance in the tactical system (TAPS) and a tactical air control period of the test, 2 ECAD's supervised the
operations of the counterinsurgency is the system (TAGS), the results from which are construction of 96 projects ranging from
operations strike. To explain this here is the still pending. simple pigsties. to a 200-foot bridge. It has
short film. a The ACTIN test program so far has been been concluded from their activities, as well
(SB-6: U.S. Army Hej licopter Operations c once A Aed With foueneral areas of rmy airc aft, armoed personne scar- Navyo Seabe ettrainin g of the parallel U.S.
in Vietnam," edrted to3%z minutes.) tiers, Army engineering know-b- advisory teams
-r ? and (STATS? _
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX November 6
favoring a coup, and the other opposing? sample of the futile twaddle talked in the coup. Otherwise, the plan would never have
Does there not seem indeed to be a need U.S. Embassy in Saigon at that critical mo- been made for this Lodge trip to Washing-
for a Joint Congressional Committee on meat, it is only necessary to record one fact. ton, which was so abruptly forestalled when
k into these matters? When the war began In bloody earnest, the coup took place.
Intelligence
is incCe to hope th'at Members of Con- President Diem decided to arm the civil Until the very eve of the coup, moreover,
guard. whose members have suffered more Ambassador Lodge continued his fruitless
gress and the Nation will soon be given casualties by now than any other force effort to persuade President Diem to set his
the answers to these questions in order fighting the Communists Yet for months house in order. His last attempt was made
to restore faith in the executive depart- on end, this decision of Diem's met with on Sunday, October 27, when Diem Invited
ments. angry, obstinate American resistance, on the Lodge to loin him on a visit of inspection
Mr. Joseph Alsop, in two recent col- singular ground that an armed police force in the countryside.
umns, has raised some interesting ques- did not conform with the best and highest The long day with Diem gave the Ambas-
tlons and made some pertinent observe- principles of Asian democrary. sador the opportunity to -discuss both the
The recent tragedy was directly rooted in state of affairs in Vietnam, and Its effects on
tions on the coup in Vietnam. I com- that time before President Kennedy im- United Stater-Vietnamese relations, in de-
mend the attention of my colleagues to posed more order and realism on U.S. policy tail and at great length. He offered a list
Mr. Alsop's columns of November 4, in Vietn-im. Ngo Dinh Nhu. in particular, of modest but significant steps which Diem
"Farewell to Diem," and November 6, was permanently warped by his memories could take to relax the tension in Saigon,
t
"Blood on Our Hands?"
The articles follow:
FAREWELL TO DIEM
(By Joseph Alsop)
What happened in Saigon was bound to
happen, for the tragically simple reason that
Ngo Dinh Nhu finally lost all grip on reality,
while President Ngo Dinh Diem though sane
enough himself, nonetheless saw the outer
world through the half-mad eyes of his
brother.
on.
of the earlier period. He could never take and to improve the climate in Washing
advantage of the new opportunity that was Every item on the Lodge list was categori-
offered to him in 1961, because he could cally vetoed by Diem.
never quite believe the opportunity was real Lodge then arked Diem whether he had
in view of what had gone before. In the any suggestions of his own about possible
conduct of the war, the team of Ambassador means of escape from the impasse. Diem
Frederick Nolting and Gen. Paul Harkins merely gave the Ambassador "a blank look
made great progress. But in the politics of and changed the subject," as Lodge subse-
Saigon, and In his dealings with the United quently reported. Yet on Monday Lodge re-
States, Nhu plunged onward from folly to turned to the attack with Diem's intelligent
folly, always dragging Diem behind him. and flexible Minister of Defense, Nguyen
And so the end came at last for both Nhu Dinh Thuan.
and Diem-the end which might well have Thuan, who described the program pressed
world, it is easy to imagine the climate of been averted by more practical common- by Lodge on Diem as "extremely moderate,"
the last days and weeks of the Diem regime. - sense at the outset. promised to go to Diem and see whether his
As long as 2months ago, when this reporter The question now, it must be added. Is persuasions would have any effect. His first
was in Saigon. the army leaders were al- whether practical commonsense or the out- report was decidedly encouraging. But the
ready beginning to rally around Gen. Duong cries of the breastbeaters are to prevail in second report from Thuan, the next day, was
Van Minh, because they had already con- Washington. As was unavoidable, the Diem a gloomy, final negative. Diem's brother,
cluded that President Diem's government was regime has been supplanted by a military the all-powerful and half-mad Ngo Dinh
no longer viable. junta. Procuring efiiclent, honest. energetic Nhu, had had his say in the interval.
Even then It was clear that if Diem did not government from a military junta is not easy In short, there was no way to save Diem
take the "needed steps to make his govern- at the best of times. and Nhu from themselves. Or rather, there
went viable once more," the army leaders This difficult task will be rendered all but was only one way. It was indicated to Sec-
would eventually take steps to find a new impossible if Washington uses its vast le- retary McNamara just before he left Vietnam
government. From that time until the grim verage in Saigon to satisfy the breastbeaters, by the able Englishman, Prof. Patrick Honey,
climax, the preparations for the coup d'etat by seeking to stage a virtuous comedy of who is the unusual expert on Vietnam with-
went forward without Interruption, spurred civil government. Creating a workable civil out a personal nx to rrird.
onwards in recent weeks by the cuts in Amer- government in Vietnam is simply not feast- "You must understand," Honey told Mc-
icanaid to'Vietnam. ble In the midst of civil war. Let the war be Namara, "that the Diem regime will surely
The tension must have been all but un- won first, as it can be won, and let the Viet- be destroyed by a coup unless the U.S. Gov-
bearable in the last fortnight or so. For namese settle their own political affairs ernment makes a ringing reassertion of con-
by then Ngo Dinh Nhu, of course, knew thereafter. These are the practical rules to fidence in Diem and support for his govern-
that something was afoot, yet dared not follow, whatever the breastbeaters may say, ment as soon as you get bacif to Washing-
strike preventively for fear of causing a ton."
eounteratrike; while the coup leaders, of BLOOD ON Ovs HANDS?
course, knew of Nhu's knowledge, yet neither (By Joseph Alsop)
dared nor desired to turn back. So each d but
side continued without flinching, like mere The purgative coup American in role a In in South the Vietnam bloodstaiinea abut
the final the hard grip of fate, until ect demanding serious Inquiry. if only be-
This is a roar se sad of end. artillery. cause so much bosh is sure to be talked about nowadays, is to forget orget the . debt The
owed to fashion.
Ngo hion, Dinh Diem. It unless the facts are understood.
Yet Diem alone had the guts to put down the Beginning, then, at the beginning, the
gangster "sets" that the French had used as American Government was of course aware
allies In the Indo-China war. And Diem that the leaders of the Vietnamese Army
alone had the sturdiness and determination were talking with one another about ways
that assured South Vietnam's survival in and means of displacing President Ngo Dinh
the first chaotic years. Without Diem, In- Diem. Indeed, there was no way to avoid
deed, Saigon today would almost certainly be being aware of this.
ruled from Hanoi. The Communists them- As long as 2 months ago, when this re-
selves for years expected South Vietnam to porter was In Saigon, he was taken into the
fall to them automatically, like a ripe fruit. confidence of one of the most active organiz-
They only launched the present civil war era of the coup. This member of the future
when Diem lent them nq room for doubt that junta listed the other generals who had al-
their happy "expectations would never be ready placed themselves under the leader-
realized. ship of Gen. Duong Van Minh; he said the
In those early days, when this reporter coup would come soon: and he actually asked
was also in Saigon, Diem, the brave na- that the Information be transmitted at once
tionaiist, was the hero of the breastbeaters, to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.
and the target for the breastbeaters' In- Long before the coup occurred, therefore.
dignation were the wicked French colonials, it was quite clear there was trouble ahead.
who then hated Diem. But as breastbeaters The expectation of early trouble In fact led
always need someone or something to be in- Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to
dignant about, and as the French faded. send his personal plane to Saigon, so that
from_the scene and only Diem was left, the Ambassador Lodge could make his planned
breastbeaters naturally turned on Diem at visit to Washington without the extra days
last. away from his post required for travel by
In truth, the breastbeaters played a ma- the commercial airlines.
or role in this tragedy, not least because That simple fact in turn reveals another
they strongly Influenced the first American aspect of the story. While aware that trou-
reaction, when the Communists finally gave ble was brewing, the U.S. Government was In
the signal for a full-scale civil war. As a no sense a party to the preparations for the
McNamara gave Honey's judgment to Pres-
ident Kennedy as his own judgment. But
no reassertion of eonfldenc& in the Diem re-
gime was possible, simply because the U.S.
Government had quite rightly lost confi-
dence In the Diem regime.
Such are the facts. They constitute an
interesting moral problem. On the one hand,
the U.S. Government had foreknowledge that
a coup was being considered. In addition.
the U.S. Government could have forestalled
the coup-by stultifying itself. But the U.S.
Government refused to stultify itself. Diem
refused to put his house in order. And so
the coup took place.
Resolution Adopted by the Board of
Trustees of t':e Unitarian Universalist
Association on October 14, 1963
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. NEIL STABLER
Or MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, November 6, 1963
Mr. STAEBLER. Mr. Speaker, the
board of trustees of the Unitarian Uni-
versalist Association on October 14
adopted a resolution urging that Con-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-APPENDIX November 6
oned our car up to the front door of the
palace. Frank and I got in and sat there
for about 10 minutes while Bill Hearst
gabbed at the door with Diem's press chief, a
Saigon editor. Occassionaily. we'd yell for
Bill to come along). and in time he did.
"I was telling him," Bill said, "that his
boss ought to think a little more about bet-
ter public relations."
It didn't seem very important as we drove
away In the ralri.
Mr. Speaker, I also insert In the
RECORD the following paragraph taken
from an article in the New York Times
of November 6, 1963, written by David
Halberstam:
The Buddhist centers of worship, the pa-
godas, then became centers of political as
well as religious unrest.
Here is an .admission that the Bud-
dhists were involved in political activi-
ties. I ask, Should the action taken by
the former Diem regime be attributed to
religious persecution when the houses of
worship of the Buddhists were used for
political activities against a common ob-
jective---:a war against the Communists?
I bring to the attention of my col-
leagues the fact that President Diem
had built for the Buddhists over 1.100
pagodas during the last 8 years of his
regime. Do you call that religious per-
secution?
May I bring to theattention of my col-
leagues my remar$ss which appeared in
the RECORD of August 15, 1963. I hope
the Members will reread this address and
compare those statements with those
which are now appearing in the press.
I am sure that no matter what my
Government does, it is our earnest hope
that we can assist in winning the war
against the Communists for the people
of Vietnam so that one day they may
be able to select a government of their
own choosing.
So-Called Working Cruise in the Carib-
beau by Nine State and Federal Legis-
lators
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
HON. ADAM C. POWELL
Or NEW PORN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, November 6,1963
Mr. POWELL. Mr. Speaker, under
leave to extend my remarks in the
RECORD, I include the following editorial
broadcast by Mutual Radio:
According to the New York Herald Tribune,
nine State and Federal legislators recently
went on a 7-day so-called working cruise in
the Caribbean. Yesterday they returned
and, says the Trib, at least three of the law-
makers, all of whom were accompanied by
their wives, admitted all their expenses had
been paid by the New York State Savings
Bank Association.
Most of the lawmakers. in one way or an-
other, are concerned with legislation direct-
ly affecting savings banks. Most, when asked
by Tribune reporters, denied any wrong-
doing, and also denied their votes on bank-
ing legislation would, in any way, be af-
fected by their cruise, even though they were
accompanied by some 925 savings bank ex-
ecuUves, their wives, and guests. This may,
.And probably Is. true.
However. the public would have every right
to raise its eyebrows at such behavior. It
unfortunately places the recipient of such
gratuity under a vague cloud of suspicion,
no matter what his motives may have been.
In politics and government, one can never
be too careful or too prudent.
Knifing the U.S. Lunar Project
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
HON. GEORGE P. MILLER
Or CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, November 6, 1963
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr.
Speaker, under leave to extend my re-
marks in the RECORD, I submit herewith
an article by the well-known columnist,
William S. White, entitled "Knifing the
U.B. Lunar Project."
Mr. White points up the fact that the
Nation which becomes first in space will
undoubtedly become first on the earth
and goes on to call Khrushchev's recent
statement concerning the Soviet lunar
efforts "one of the most successful of all
Soviet propaganda strokes."
The article follows:
KNIFING THE U.S. I,uNAs PROJECT
(By William S. White)
One of the most successful of all Soviet
propaganda strokes has been Nikita Khru-
shchev's theatrical withdrawal from the race
to the moon. The American space program,
Is, in consequence. In grave trouble.
in Congress and among the people-many
of whom Mr. Khrushchev Is plainly fooling
most of the time In this matter-there is a
clearly diminished interest in pushing that
program, even though never has so vast and
so potentially rewarding an enterprise been
open to mankind. But would it not cost
many billions? Of course, It would; but so
did the development of the airplane, of
atomic energy, of radio, and television.
Mr. Khrushchev's reasons for his alleged
retirement are endlessly debated. But not
often has there been a more irrelevant de-
bate, as has been pointed out by one of the
most trustworthy experts in this field, Rep-
resentative OLIN. E.'TEAcus, of Texas. For
it does not really matter why Mr. Khru-
ahchev has done what apparently he has
done. And, parenthetically, if he really has
done it, It probably Is In simple acceptance
of the basic fact that the Russian economy
is vastly Inferior to that of the United States.
UNDESCUTS U.S. EFFORTS
What is truly and desperately important
is the danger that we are about to be talked
out of that maximum American effort which
Is the most vital need of the 20th century
and perhaps even of the century to come.
To begin with, the nation which becomes
first in space will undoubtedly become first
on the earth we inhabit, probably In position
to begin to control the weather and possibly
even to begin to dominate some part of the
Infinity which has thus far lain beyond
man's understanding.
And, to proceed with the obvious, the ef-
fort to reach the moon-as only the current
symbol of man's search Into these outer
mysteries.-is already showering out col-
lateral benefits In science which are in them-
selves beyond price.
Grand and seemingly gradios schemes of
this kind, though easy to attack with the
jeering slogan of unlettered cynicism, almost
invariably produce returns which a few years
later we learn we could not have lived with-
out, Often, these returns are wholly unex-
pected.
For a relatively small example: The as-
signed mission of the Eighth U.S. Air Force
in England In the Second World War was to
destroy German industry with daylight
bombing raids. A part of this job was done;
but a far more immediately vital and quite
unplanned thing was done, too. This was
the virtual destruction of the counterat-
tacking German fighter air force-a bonus
that may well have saved our D-day invasion
from disaster.
LIDS ANTILUNAR BLOC
Mr. Khrushchev's claim that he is getting
out of the moon contest has reduced the
drama of the thi=ng-which too many people
in any event had seen as a kind of high
school footrace. But, more damagingly, it
has greatly assisted the old coalition against
the moon attempt. One of the strangest
coalitions we have ever known, it Is made
up of some conservatives whose proper desire
to save money Is sadly misplaced here, and
some liberals who can rarely lift their minds
above welfarist plans for spending every
dollar at hand "right here on earth," to use
their happily demagogic phrase.
Nothing will change the minds of these
liberals. The conservatives, however, ought
to ponder what they are about here. For
apart from the almost indescribable strategic
and scientific significance of this program,
there is the bottom fact that it is already
nearly indispensable to the American econ-
omy and may later become indispensable In
the absolute tense.
Automation, when fully launched, will
create huge pools of unemployables. Politi-
cally, these must and will be cared for, un-
der any foreseeable regime, Republican or
Democratic. Is it not better to spend the
money for space than to speed the day when
all this money and more will have to be
thrown about for the most gigantic-and
also permanent-leaf-raking schemes in the
world's history?
The space program Is the precise opposite
of economic crackpotism. It is sensible con-
servatism's greatest future weapon against
just such crackpotism.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
HON. STEVEN B. DEROUNIAN
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, November 6, 1963
Mr. DEROUNIAN. Mr. Speaker, the
Kennedy administration has two stand-
ards: an anti-Communist overthrow by
the. government is met with coolness and
disdain but when an anti-Communist
government is overthrown President
Kennedy wants to give immediate recog-
nition. A case in point is the immediate
cutoff of aid to Honduras, one of our
allies.
A very disturbing article by Dan
Kurzman in a dispatch from Honduras
follows:
CUTOFF OF U.S. AID A BLOWTO HONDURAS
(By Dan Kurzman)
TEGUCIGALPA.-The U.S. decision to cut
off aid to Honduras in the wake of the mili-
tary coup is likely to have a drastic effect on
the Honduran economy.
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A6900
CONGRESSIONAL 'RECORD - APPENDIX November 6
favoring a coup, and the other opposing?
Does there not seem indeed to be a need
for a Joint Congressional Committee on
Intelligence to look into these matters?
It is my_ hope that Members of Con-
gress and the Nation will soon be given
the answers to these questions in order
to restore faith in the executive depart-
ments.
Mr. Joseph Alsop, In two recent col-
umns; has raised some interesting ques-
tions and made some pertinent observa-
tions 'on the coup in Vietnam. I com-
mend the attention of my colleagues to
Mr. Alsop's d81umns of November 4.
"Farewell to Diem," and November 6,
"Blood on Our Hands?"
The articles follow:
FAREWELL TO DIEM
(By Joseph Alsop)
What happened to Saigon was bound to
happen, for the tragically simple reason that
Ngo Dinh Nhu finally lost all grip on reality,
while President Ngo Dinh Diem though sane
enough himself. nonetheless saw the outer
world through the half-mad eyes of his
brother.
Even in Washington, halfway around the
world, it is easy to imagine the climate of
the last days and weeks of the Diem regime.
As long as 2 months ago, when this reporter
was In Saigon, the army leaders were al-
ready beginning to rally around Gen. Duong
Van Minh. because they had already con-
cluded that President Diem's government was
no longer viable.
Even then It was clear that if Diem did not
take the "needed steps to make his govern-
ment viable once more." the army leaders
would eventually take steps to And a new
government. From that time until the grim
climax, the preparations for the coup d'etat
went forward without interruption, spurred
onwards in recent weeks by the cuts in Amer-
ican aid to Vietnam.
The tension must have been all but un-
bearable In the last fortnight or so. For
by then Ngo Dinh Nhu, of course, knew
that something was afoot, yet dared not
strike preventively for fear of causing a
Countetetrike; while the coup leaders, of
course, knew of Nhu's knowledge, yet neither
dared nor desired to turn back. So each
side continued Without flinching, like mere
automatic In the bard grip of fate. until
the final roar of tack artillery.
This 1$ a and end. The fashion. nowadays.
into forget the debt owed to Ngo Dinh Diem.
Yet Diem alone had the guts to put down the
gangster "sets" that the French had used as
Gilles in the Indo-China war. And Diem
alone had the sturdiness and determination
that assured South Vietnam's survival in
the first chaotic years. Without Diem. In-
deed, Saigon today would almost certainly be
ruled from Hanoi. The Communists them-
selves for years expected South Vietnam to
fall to them automatically, like a ripe fruit.
They oily launched the present civil war
When Dtem left them no room for doubt that
their happy expectations would never be
-realized.
In those early days. when this reporter
Was also in Saigon, Diem, the brave na-
tionalist, was the hero of the breastbeaters.
and the target for the breastbeaters' in-
dignation were the wicked French colonials,
who then hated Diem. But as breastbeaters
always need someone or something to be in-
dignant about, and as the French faded
from the scene and only Diem was left, the
breastbeaters naturally turned on Diem at
last.
In truth, the breastbeaters played a ma-
jor role in this tragedy, not least because
they strongly influenced the first American
reaction, when the Communists finally gave
the, signal for a full-scale civil war. As a
sample of the futile twaddle talked in the
U.S. Embassy in Saigon at that critical mo-
ment, it is only necessary to record one fact.
When the war began in bloody earnest.
President Diem decided to arm the civil
guard, whose members have suffered more
casualties by now than any other force
fighting the Communists. Yet for months
on end, this decision of Diem's met with
angry, obstinate American resistance, on the
singular ground that an armed police force
did not conform with the best and highest
principles of Asian democrary.
The recent tragedy was directly rooted in
that time before President Kennedy im-
posed more order and realism on U.S. policy
in Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Nhu, in particular.
was permanently warped by his memories
of the earlier period. He could never take
advantage of the new opportunity that was
offered to him in 1961. because he could
never quite believe the opportunity was real
in view of what had gone before. In the
conduct of the war, the team of Ambassador
Frederick Nolting and Gen. Paul Harkins
made great progress. But in the politics of
Saigon, and in his dealings with the United
States. Nhu plunged onward from folly to
folly, always dragging Diem behind him.
And so the end came at last for both Nhu
and Diem-the end which might well have
been averted by more practical common-
sense at the outset.
The question now, it must be added. Is
whether practical commonsense or the out-
cries of the breastbeaters are to prevail in
Washington. As was unavoidable, the Diem
regime has been supplanted by a military
junta. Procuring efficient. honest, energetic
government from a military junta is not easy
at the best of times.
This difficult task will be rendered all but
inlposolbie If Washington uses its vast le-
verage in Saigon to satisfy the breastbeaters,
by seeking to stage a virtuous comedy of
civil government. Creating a workable civil
government in Vietnam is simply not feasi-
ble in the midst of civil war. Let the war be
won first, as it can be won, and let the Viet-
namese settle their own political affairs
thereafter. These are the practical rules to
follow, whatever the breastbeaters may say.
BLOOD ON Ova HANDS?
(By Joseph Alsop)
The American role in the bloodstained but
purgative coup in South Vietnam Is a sub-
ject demanding serious inquiry, if only be-
cause so much bosh is sure to be talked about
It unless the facts are understood.
Beginning, then, at the beginning, the
American Government was of course aware
that the leaders of the Vietnamese Army
were talking with one another about ways
and means of displacing President Ngo Dinh
Diem. Indeed, there was no way to avoid
being aware of this.
As long as 2 months ago, when this re-
porter was in Saigon, he was taken Into the
confidence of one of the most active organiz-
ers of the coup. This member of the future
junta listed the other generals who had al-
ready placed themselves under the leader-
ship of Gen. Duong Van Minh; he said the
coup would come soon: and he actually asked
that the information be transmitted at once
to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.
Long before the coup occurred, therefore,
it was quite clear there was trouble ahead.
The expectation of early trouble in fact led
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to
send his personal plane to Saigon. so that
Ambassador Lodge could make his planned
visit to Washington without the extra days
away from his post required for travel by
the commercial airlines.
That simple fact in turn reveals another
aspect of the story. While aware that trou-
ble was brewing, the U.B. Government was in
no sense a party to the preparations for the
coup. Otherwise, the plan would never have
been made for this Lodge trip to Washing-
ton, which was so abruptly forestalled when
the coup took place.
Until the very eve of the coup, moreover,
Ambassador Lodge continued his fruitless
effort to persuade President Diem to set his
house in order. His last attempt was made
on Sunday, October 27, when Diem Invited
Lodge to join him on a visit of inspection
In the countryside.
The long day with Diem gave the Ambas-
sador the opportunity to discuss both the
state of affairs In Vietnam, and Its effects on
United State--Vietnamese relations, in de-
tail and at great length. He offered a list
of modest but significant steps which Diem
could take to relax the tension in Saigon,
and to improve the climate in Washington.
Every Item on the Lodge list was categori-
cally vetoed by Diem.
Lodge then asked Diem whether he had
any suggestions of his own about possible
means of escape from the impasse. Diem
merely gave the Ambassador "a blank look
and changed the subject," as Lodge subse-
quently reported. Yet on Monday Lodge re-
turned to the attack with Diem's intelligent
and flexible Minister of Defense, Nguyen
Dinh Thuan.
Thuan, who described the program pressed
by Lodge on Diem as "extremely moderate,"
promised to go to Diem and see whether his
persuasions would have any effect. His first
report was decidedly encouraging. But the
second report from Thuan, the next day, was
a gloomy, final negative. Diem's brother,
the all-powerful and half-mad Ngo Dinh
Nhu, had had his say in the interval.
In short, there was no way to save Diem
and Nhu from themselves. Or rather, there
was only one way. It was indicated to Sec-
retary McNamara just before he left Vietnam
by the able Englishman, Prof. Patrick Honey,
who is the unusual expert on Vietnam with-
out a personal ^x to arird.
"You must understand," Honey told Mc-
Namara, "that the Diem regime will surely
be destroyed by a coup unless the U.S. Gov-
ernment makes a ringing reassertion of con-
fidence in Diem and support for his govern-
ment as soon as you get back to Washing-
ton."
McNamara gave Honey's judgment to Pres-
ident Kennedy as his own judgment. But
no reassertion of confidence in the Diem re-
gime was possible, simply because the U.S,
Government had quite rightly lost confi-
dence in the Diem regime.
Such are the facts. They constitute an
interesting moral problem. On the one hand,
the U.S. Government had foreknowledge that
a coup was being considered. In addition,
the U.S. Government could have forestalled
the coup-by stultifying itself. But the U.S.
Government refused to stultify itself. Diem
refused to put his house in order. And so
the coup took place.
Resolution Adopted by the Board of
Trustees of t`::e Unitarian Universalist
Association on October 14, 1963
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. NEIL STAEBLER
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, November 6, 1963
Mr. STAEBLER. Mr. Speaker, the
board of trustees of the Unitarian Uni-
versalist Association on October 14
adopted a resolution urging that Con-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE November 6
several weeks they have been berating the
United States for supporting the repressive
Diem government and now berate the
United States for bringing about its down-
fall.
The candid and factual answer Is this,
Neither the CIA nor the Embassy In Saigon
nor any American official planned or plotted
the coup. It could not have been seriously
begun nor successfully completed unless the
circumstances within South Vietnam had
been ripe for revolt.
American policy unquestionably gave en-
couragement and Incentive to the revolt.
The Kennedy administration welcomes the
outcome in the conviction that the repres-
sive policies of the Diem regime had lost it
the loyalty of many Vietnamese people, and
that it was thereby dissipating the vast
American aid in its war against the Com-
munist guerrillas.
President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean
Rusk and influential Members of Congress
made It evident that military assistance
could not continue indefinitely under these
circumstances. Some reduction In aid was
beginning to be carried out.
This confronted the South Vietnamese
military leaders, who unitedly joined in the
anti-Diem revolt, with a point-of-no-return
decision. They either had to accept the con-
tinuance of the Diem-Nhu regime with all
its autocratic shortcomings or see the was
lost to the Communists for lack of Ameri-
can assistance.
The decision which Gen. Duong Van Minh
and his associates made was that the fate of
their nation depended upon freeing it from
the divisive Diem-Nhu regime.
What next? Obviously no one can be sure.
Government by military junta can go in any
direction. But the beginnings are encourag-
ing. It has elevated Vice President Nguyen
Ngoc Tho, a figurehead under Diem. It has
freed the Buddhist monks and other anti-
Communist critics of Diem. It has lifted
the censorship and has promised elections.
Undoubtedly the new government will step
up the battle against the Vietcong. The
generals In the revolt are not neutralists.
They have no intention of negotiating away
the independence of their country in some
amorphous deal with the North Vietnamese
Communists. They have the will to win.
There are two reasons why they will now
have more means of winning. First, the
United States will have the Incentive to lend
the maximum aid because it will be effec-
tively used. Secondly, many security forces,
which could have been deployed to the fight-
Ing areas, were hoarded by Diem for his own
protection. They will now be available
against the Communists.
Why are we doing all this-putting lives
and treasure and troops into such a distant
battle? We are doing it because the safety of
all southeast Asia is at stake on this front of
the anti-Communist struggle. Laos and
Cambodia, Thailand and Burma would be
next.
South Vietnam is the crucial place to turn
back the Communist aggression by guerrilla
warfare. The evidence Is mounting that it
can be done.
(From the Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1983]
MATTER Or FACT: BLOOD ON OUR HANDS?
(By Joseph Alsop)
The American role in the bloodstained but
purgative coup in South Vietnam is a subject
demanding serious inquiry. If only because
so much bosh is sure to be talked about it
unless the facts are understood.
Beginning, then, at the beginning, the
American Government was of course aware
that the leaders of the Vietnamese Army were
talking with one another about ways and
means of displacing President Ngo Dinh
Diem. Indeed, there was no way to avoid
being aware of this.
As long as 2 months ago, when this re-
porter was in Saigon, he was taken Into the
confidence of one of the most active or-
ganizers of the coup. This member of the
future junta listed the other generals who
had already placed themselves under the
leadership of Gen. Duong Van Minh; be said
the coup would come soon; and he actually
asked that the information be transmitted
at once to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge,
Long before the coup occurred, therefore,
it was quite clear there was trouble ahead.
The expectation of early trouble in fact led
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to
send his personal plane to Saigon, so that
Ambassador Lodge could make his planned
visit to Washington without the extra days
away from his post required for travel by the
commercial airlines.
That simple fact in turn reveals another
aspect of the story. While aware that trou-
ble was brewing, the U.S. Government was in
no sense a party to the preparations for the
coup. Otherwise, the plan wouldnever have
been madefor this Lodge trip to Washing-
ton, which was so abruptly forestalled when
the coup took place.
Until the very eve of the coup, moreover,
Ambassador Lodge continued his fruitless
effort to persuade President Diem to set his
house in order. Me last attempt was made
on Sunday, October 27. when Diem Invited
Lodge to join him on it visit of inspection
in the countryside.
The long day with Diem gave the Ambas-
sador the opportunity to discuss both the
state of affairs in Vietnam, and its effects on
United States-Vietnamese relations. In de-
tall and at great length. He offered a list of
modest but significant steps which Diem
could take to relax the tension in Saigon.
and to Improve the climate in Washington.
Every Item on the Lodge list was categorically
vetoed by Diem.
Lodge then asked Diem whether be had
any suggestions of his own about possible
means of escape from the Impasse. Diem
merely gave the Ambassador "a blank look
and changed the subject," as Lodge subse-
quently reported. Yet on Monday Lodge
returned to the attack with Diem's Intelli-
gent and flexible minister of defense. Nguyen
Dinh Thuan.
Thuan, who described the program pressed
by Lodge on Diem as "extremely moderate,"
promised to go to Diem and see whether
his persuasions would have any effect. His
first report was decidedly encouraging. But
the second report from Thuan. the next
day, was a gloomy, final negative. Diem's
brother, the all-powerful and half-mad Ngo
Dinh Nhu, had had his say in the Interval.
In short. there was no way to save Diem
and Nhu from themselves. Or rather. there
was only one way. It was indicated to
Secretary McNamara just before he left
Vietnam by the able Englishman, Prof.
Patrick Honey, who is the unusual expert on
Vietnam without a personal ax to grind.
"You must understand." Honey told
McNamara, "that the Diem regime will
surely be destroyed by a coup unless the
U.H. Government makes a ringing reassertion
of confidence In Diem and support for his
government as soon as you get back to
Washington"
McNamara gave Honey's judgment to
President Kennedy as his own judgment.
But no reassertion of confidence In the Diem
regime was possible, simply because the
U.S. Government had quite rightly lost con-
fidence In the Diem regime.
Such are the facts. They constitute an
interesting moral problem. On the one
hand, the U.S. Government had foreknowl-
edge that a coup was being considered. In
addition, the U.S. Government could have
forestalled the coup-by stultifying itself.
But the U.S. Government refused to stultify
Itself. Diem refused to put his house in
order. And so the coup took place.
LEAVE OF ABSENCE
By unanimous consent, leave of ab-
sence was granted to:
Mr. BATES (at the request of Mr.
PRICE). on account of official business.
Mr. PIRNIE (at the request of Mr. HAL-
LEeK), for today, and for the balance of
the week, on account of official business
as a member of the Committee on Armed
Services.
Mr. HOLrFIELD (at the request of Mr.
PRICE), on account of official business.
Mr. Hosaixa (at the request of Mr.
PRICE), on account of official business.
Mr. ANDERSON (at the request of Mr.
PRICE), on account of official business.
Mr. RrvERs of South Carolina, for No-
vember 6, 1963, through November 15,
1963, on account of being a delegate to
the NATO Parliamentarians Confer-
ence.
Mr. HARDY (at the request of Mr.
ALBERT), for today, November 6, 1963,
on account of death in the family.
SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED
By unanimous consent, permission to
address the House, following the legisla-
tive program and any special orders
heretofore entered, was granted to:
Mr. WILSON of Indiana, for 15 minutes,
on Tuesday next.
Mr. WILSON of Indiana, for 15 min-
utes, on Wednesday next.
Mr. LAIRD for 20 minutes, today, and to
revise and extend his remarks.
Mr. UTr, for 45 minutes, on November
7.
Mr. PATaiAN, for 30 minutes, today, to
revise and extend his remarks and to
include extraneous matter.
Mr. SCHADEBERG (at the request of Mr.
RErrEL), for 60 minutes, on Thursday,
November -7, 1963.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
By unanimous consent, permission to
extend remarks in the Appendix of the
RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks,
was granted to:
Mrs. KELLY and to include extraneous
matter.
Mr. HUDDLESTON in five instances and
to include extraneous matter.
Mr. ZABLOCKI in two Instances and to
include extraneous matter.
Mr. GROSS in two instances and to In-
clude extraneous material.
Mr. Frio.
Mr. MCINTIRE and to include extrane-
ous matter, notwithstanding the fact it
exceeds the limit and is estimated by the
Public Printer to cost $225.
Mr. WICKERSHAM and to include ex-
traneous matter.
Mr. ROBERTS of Alabama and to in-
clude extraneous matter following the
vote On the District bill today.
Mr. FRASER and to include extraneous
matter.
Mr. STAEBLER.
Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr. REi-
FEL) during debate on conference report
on H.R. 6143.
Mr. BOLAND (at the request of Mr.
BOGGS) during debate on conference re-
port on H.R. 6143 and to Include extra-
neous matter.
Approved For Release 2003/10/10 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200170003-1