STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010037-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 37
• Content Type: STUDY

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88th Congress i
1st Session f
STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
A STUDY
SUBMITTED BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 13, 88th Cong.)
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
98296 WASHINGTON : 1963
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
SAM J. ERVIN, In., North Carolina CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
ERNEST (IRUENING, Alaska JACK MILLER, Iowa
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, New Hampshire
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
WALTER L. REYNOLDS, Chief Clerk and Staff Director
ARTHUR A. SIIARP, Staff Editor
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, Chairman
HUBERT H, HUMPHREY, Minnesota KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine JACOB K. JAVITS, Now York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island JACK MILLER, Iowa
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
DOROTHY FOSDICK, Staff Director
ROBERT W. TUFTS, Chief Consultant
RICHARD S. PAGE, Research Assistant
JUDITH J. SPAHR, Chief Clerk
LAUREL A. ENGBERG, Minority Consultant
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The Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations
was established in May 1962 to review the administration of national
security, and to make findings and recommendations for improvement
where appropriate.
Early in its work the subcommittee concluded that it would be
useful to examine how certain nations of the Communist bloc recruit
and manage personnel in the making of national policy. The sub-
committee staff, in cooperation with the executive branch, was re-
quested to arrange for the preparation of the present study on staffing
procedures and problems in Communist China.
This study is a sequel and companion to the one entitled National
Policy Machinery in Communist China, published by the Subcommittee
on National Policy Machinery in January 1960.
We believe this present study will prove of special interest to
Government officials and to academic centers. It should contribute
to a deeper knowledge of the challenge confronting free societies and
free men.
MAY 15, 1963.
HENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security Staffing
and Operations.
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CONTENTS
Page
Foreword---------------------------------------------------------
III
1. Introduction-------------------------------------------------
1
II. Staffing the party------------------------- -------------
2
Staffing requirements at senior levels------------------------
2
The politburo and secretariat---------------------------
5
The second level--------------------------------------
6
The next generation-----------------------------------
7
The party and the state ------------------- -------------
8
The structure for staffing party organizations-----------------
8
The leading bodies ------------------------------------
8
The central departments --------------------------------
10
The control commission-------------------------------
11
Regional, provincial, and county posts-------------------
13
Party personnel administration-----------------------------
16
Admission-------------------------------------------
1.6
Appraisal and promotion -------------------------------
17
Party education -------------------------------------
18
Party incentives--------------------------------------
19
III. Staffing the government---------------------------------------
21
Staffing requirements for senior posts------------------------
21
Structure for staffing government offices---------------------
23
The state council-------------------------------------
23
The second level--------------------------------------
23
Specialized personnel------------------------ --- - -
25
Ministries and commissions ------------------------------
26
Government personnel administration-----------------------
26
Recruitment and assignment---------------------------
26
Transfer and promotion-------------------------------
28
Veterans' preference------------------------------- - --
20
In-service training -------------------------------------
30
Government incentives --------- ..----------------------
30
IV. The military establishment --------------------------------------
33
The military affairs committee ------------------------------
33
The general political department----------------------------
35
The Ministry of National Defense--------------------------
35
Overstaffing---------------------- ---------------- ------
36
Training------------------------------------- - ----------
37
V. Manpower and education--------------------------------------
39
The labor force------------- -----------------------------
39
The education system --------------------------------------
40
Graduate work-------------- ----------------------------
42
Use of Soviet schools--------------------------------------
43
Scientific manpower----------------------------------------
43
VI. The communication of ideas -------------------------------------
44
Classified channels--------------------------------------
44
The party press------------------------------------------
45
Meetings--------------------------------------------------
VII. An appraisal of the system-------------------------------------
45
48
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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a study of the theory and practice of personnel management
in Communist China. It endeavors to draw together information on
how Chinese skilled manpower and talent are selected, motivated,
advanced and organized in the pursuit of national goals. It begins
with a consideration of personnel requirements at the senior levels
of the party, surveying the broad functions performed and sketching
out the background and character of the incumbents. It then takes
a look at the mechanics for staffing various echelons of the party.
This is followed by an examination of how the party actually handles
its personnel.
These chapters are followed by a discussion, arranged along similar
lines, of the requirements for top government executives, the system
of government personnel administration and how it operates in prac-
tice. A special chapter is devoted to the armed forces.
Later chapters take up in turn the educational system and the
means used by the leaders to communicate with lower levels of the
administrative apparatus and the Chinese people. The concluding
section is a general assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the
whole system.
Several characteristics of the Chinese Communists' approach to
this problem are deserving of special mention.
1. A striking feature of the Chinese system, even in comparison
with its Soviet counterpart, is the pervasiveness of party control and
manipulation. Positions of real authority anywhere in China are
without exception held by party members. In fact, no level of gov-
ernment, no military, scientific, economic or educational organization,
no activity of any moment is without its party group, the members
of which effectively run the unit. Advancement is unlikely if the
party does not approve.
2. Stability in the highest reaches of the party has been unusual for
a system which in other places has bred frequent change. Mao
Tse-tung has been the dominant figure for nearly three decades. He
has kept around him a group of associates he trusts. Today, these
men are old and overworked. They present an all but immovable
roadblock against aspirants to high office. And it has also proven
a difficult matter to insinuate new concepts, especially in technical
fields, into the policymaking process. The leaders tend to turn for
advice to party figures who share the experiences and prejudices of
the leaders.
3. Personnel management is highly centralized. The system allows
the men who determine national security programs to commit avail-
able talent to these programs in complete freedom. There is no
outside competition for talent.
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4. China is, however, very short of topflight titlent,-administrators,
managers, scientific researchers, tutors for graduate students, tech-
nicians, etc. Still the Chinese leaders misuse what they do have by
it do atic refusal to trust fully those educated abroad, whether in
the U.S.S.R.. or the West, and by forcing everyone to spend much time
in political indoctrination.
5. These political indoctrination programs and the i bsolute control
of all media of communication permit, the leaders to disseminate only
such information as they think fitting. This has contributed to a
unity of purpose throughout the system and a. willi2igness to work
hard at tasks set by thieleaders, though the deb ee of dedication today
is not what it was several years ago.
National political policy in Communist China is directed to building
China over the shortest historical span possible into a strong, modern
leader of nations with all the paraphernalia of power that implies.
The goal is a China. respected for its military and -political power,
honored for its culture, turned to for its principled interpretation of
Communist doctrine: in short, a China restored to its rightful leading
role in the world. The present leaders arc dedicated to the proposi-
tion that this can only be done through the development of an autliori-
tarian, Communist system of government in China.
The Chinese Communist Party, in power throughout Inainland
China since 1949, is still in the early= phases of a big construction effort.
The attempts of the leaders in 1958-1960 to accelerate the process
through "leap forward" practices were a dismal failure. The country
is groping its way out of the rubble of that disaster. It did not,
however, shake the leadership out of the conviction that its cause and
course are correct. Nor has it shaken the present lei.ders from their
dominant positions.
STAFFING REQUIREMENTS AT SENIOR LEVELS
Ultimate power, in the Chinese Communist syste:cn, rests in one
Bran, whose qualities determine in great measure how the whole will
operate. That man now is Mao Tse-tung, father figure of the Chinese
Communist movement, The guiding principles and the programs
by which the. nation operates are in the final analysis his responsibility.
%lany issues can, of course, be settled short of ]NIao, but lie is the final
arbiter.
During time nearly three decades of Mao's stewardship, the Chinese
party has been transformed from a small, hunted band of revoltt-
t.ionaries fleeing to the barren hills of northwestern China into the
ruling element of the largest single group of people or the face of the
globe. This record of success leas made, and continues to make,
effective challenge of Mao a very difficult proposition.
To the Chinese party, Mao is the "greatest revolutionary and
statesman in Chinese History", and the most prominent Communist
"among all living contemporaries."
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 Interlocking positions of selected Chinese Communist leaders
) 15 Rank in
entral Committee
C
(1) Mao Tse-tung __--
(2) Liu Shao-chi-_____
(4) Teng Hsiao-ping--
(6) Chou En-lai__---_
(7) Tung Pi-wu--_--_
(8) Chen Yun__--____
(9) Lin Piao_-________
(13) Li Fu-chun_______
(14) Lo Jung-huan____
(16) Lu Ting-i___-.____
(17) Lo Jul-thing------
(21) Chen Yi_____-----
(24) L1 IIsien-nien---..
(26) Nieh Jung-then---
(29) Peng Chou ___-_-_
Chairman, CCP Central Com-
mittee; Chairman, COP Polit-
buro.
Member, Standing Committee,
CCP Politburo.
Member, Standing Committee,
CCP Politburo; Ranking Mem-
ber, COP Secretariat; Secretary
General, Central Committee.
Member, Standing Committee,
COP Politburo.
Member, COP Politburo; Secre-
tary, Central Committee Con-
trol Commission.
Member, Standing Committee,
CCP Politburo.
Member, Standing Committee,
CCP Politburo; Member, Mili-
tary Affairs Commission of the
Central Committee.
Member, COP Politburo; Mom-
ber, CCP Secretariat.
Member, COP Politburo; Mem-
ber, Military Affairs Commis-
sion of the Central Committee.
Alternate Member, CCP Polit-
buro; Member COP Secretariat;
Director, CCP Propaganda
Dept.
Member, CCP Central Commit-
tee; Member, COP Secretariat.
Member, COP Politburo; Mem-
ber, CCP Secretariat.
Member, CCP Central Commit-
tee; Member, CCP Secretariat;
Member, Military Affairs Com-
mission of the Central Commit-
tee.
Member CCP Politburo; Mom-
her, COP Secretariat; First Sec-
retary, Peiping Municipal COP
Committee.
Honorary Chairman, CPPCC; Deputy,
NPC.
Chairman, People's Republic of China;
Chairman, National Defense Council;
Deputy, NPC; Member, CPPCC.
Vice Premier, State Council; Vice Chairman,
National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC.
Premier, State Council; Chairman, CPPCC;
Deputy, NPC.
Vice Chairman, People's Republic of China;
Deputy, NPC.
Vice Premier, State Council; Member, State
Planning Commission; Deputy NPC.
Vice Premier, State Council; 1V1'inistcr of
National Defense; Vice Chairman, Na-
tional Defense Council; Deputy, NPC.
Vice Premier, State Council; Chairman,
State Planning Commission; Deputy,
NPO.
Vice Chairman, National Defense Council;
Vice Chairman, NPC.
Vice Premier, State Council; Deputy, NPC.
Vice Premier, State Council; Vice Minister
of National Defense; Chief of Staff, PLA;
Member, National Defense Council; Vice
Chairman, NPC.
Vice Premier, State Council; Minister of
Foreign Affairs; Director, Foreign Affairs
Staff Office, State Council; Vice Chairman,
National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC;
Vice Chairman, CPPCC.
Vice Premier, State Council; Director, Staff
Office for Finance and Trade, State Coun-
cil; Minister of Finance; Vice Chairman,
State Planning Commission; Member,
National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC.
Vice Premier, State Council; Chairman,
Science and Technology Commission,
State Council; Vice Chairman, National
Defense Council; Deputy, NPC.
Secretary General, NPC; Vice Chairman
CPPCC; Chairman, Peiping Municipal
People's Government.
GLOSSARY
CPPCC-China People's Political Consultative Committee.
NPC-National People's Congress.
PLA-People's Liberation Army.
COP-Chinese Communist Party.
Public speeches by Mao's foremost associates bristle with fulsome
tributes to Mao's insights, wisdom and knowledge. Practicing
experts in virtually any field-ideological, economic, military, lit-
erary, scientific-are advised to improve themselves by studying
Mao's works. Chinese policies in all these fields are presented as
owing much to the master.
Mao Tse-tung, born the son of a rich peasant, has been a member of
the Chinese Communist Party since it was formed in 1921, and has
been its leader since 1935. He is a man of supreme self-confidence.
For years he has shown an ability to adapt Marxist-Leninist formulas
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to suit his own purposes as well as a certain talent for making the
right decision at the right time.
This talent may per s be diminishin ; at least, his more recent
initiatives have nt been notably successful. The great leap forward,
the commune movement and the challenge to the Soviets have all
proved singularly inappropriate to China's needs at this stage of its
development.
Mao is widely read in the literature of Marxism-Leninism. He
writes well, frequently in a breezy style full of pithy 1_inguage which
appeals to Chinese. to has been able to attract and hold competent
subordinates, and has shown, an ability to balance them off, one
against the other.
Ho has been outside China only twice, in 1950 and 11,57 both times
to the Soviet Union. His knowledge and understanding of the outside
world are limited. His grasp of internal Chinese conditions may
be slipping. Rumors have been trickling out of China for the past
several years that Mao's health has been declining, Whatever the
state of his powers, Mao's speeches and writings have diminished
quite remarkably since about 1957. In recent years, ie has spent a
good deal of time in various vacation spots 'away from the levers of
power in Peiping.
Standing lust behind Mao in the power structure ire his six col-
leagues on the Standing Committee of the Politburo. This inner
circle of advisors joins Mao in developing, formulat_ng, and coor-
dinating China's domestic, foreign and defense policies.
Considerable figures in their own right., they are widely experienced
in party, state and military affairs. They are cxpec-.ed to look at
issues which come before them in a comprehensive, overall way.
They must watch the whole chessboard, not just one of the pieces.
Each of them, however, does appear to have a broad area. of special-
ization. Liu Shao-chi and Tong IIsiao-ping seem to give the greater
measure of their attention to the theoretical and practical concerns
of the party. Chou En-lai's chief concern is the goveinmcnt and its
foreign relations. Lin Piao concentrates on military affairs. Chu
Tell, generally inactive, sometimes serves as a spokesalan for Mao.
Chen Yun spends most of his time, on economic matti.rs, though he
has been out of the public eye for some time now.
These are men with a long history of devotion to the hierarch, men
who have thrived on decades of the vicious in-fighting which charac-
terizes the system, men who are tough and ruthless, men who speak
a common language and hold common views. They are men who
have been conditioned by many years of party work to understand
the time for debate and the limits placed thereon. The effective
operation of the entire structure requires that the men at this level be
tightly knit. They must know how and when to submerge differences
and show a common purpose to the other layers of the po.rty and to the
people at large.
The continuity of this group is remarkable for a sy3t.em which in
other countries and parties has bred freqquent. bloody change. Turn-
over has been limited. The five men who were on th3 party Secre-
tariat in 1945 are still formally in the inner circle today.
Ranking next to Mao is Liu Shao-chi. To some, he appears a
classic example of the faithful servant. They point t:) his speeches
with their many sychophantic passages, and speculate t'iat be will not
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long outlast Mao. However, Liu does wield great power in the party
organization. Mao has complete confidence in Liu's abilities and has
made Liu his heir apparent. The party presents him as its leading
theoretician, next to Mao. His 1939 work, How to be a Good Com-
munist, was recently re-issued and made the subject of a special party
study campaign.
Liu is a somber and a somewhat colorless individual. After he was
selected to succeed Mao as head of government in 1959, an attempt
was made by the party's propaganda organs to paint a more engaging
public picture of him. The campaign seems to have died away with
doubtful results.
Liu's closest collaborator in party matters is Teng Hsiao-ping, one
of the youngest members of the inner circle. Teng has risen rapidly in
favor and prestige since the mid-fifties. In recent years he has been
the party's chosen spokesman on a number of key issues, and in 1960
played a large part in the Moscow conference of Communist parties.
A short, bullet-headed man, Teng is said to be hard-driving and
aggressive. The party obviously regards him as a good organizer and
sound administrator. His several strategic positions in the central
apparatus give him powerful levers over party matters.
Chou En-lai, the only premier the Chinese Communist government
has ever had, is perhaps the best known of the Chinese Communists
in the West. Handsome and urbane, Chou for years was the principal
face which the Chinese Communists turned to the world. He has
traveled more than his colleagues in the inner circle and he may, as a
result, have a more sophisticated view of the outer world. He is by
all accounts a skilled and resourceful negotiator. He showed at the
Bandung Conference in 1955 and in an early visit to India that he is
quite expert at building up an aura of Chinese goodwill.
What should not be lost sight of is that Chou is also a veteran
Communist, a high-ranking member of the party for at least four
decades. He was once ranked ahead of Mao and has shown a remark-
able agility in getting along with whoever happens to be in power.
Chou's wife is the number two woman in the party.
The other active member of the inner circle is Lin Piao. He is the
youngest. A military man for his entire career, Lin had apparently
been ailing for a number of years. He leapt back into prominence
following the disgrace of Peng Teh-huai in 1959. Lin was one of the
most successful generals produced by the Chinese Communists in their
fight against the Chinese Nationalists. His return coincided with a
renewed emphasis on the supremacy of the party over the military.
The politburo and secretariat
Standing just outside this inner circle are the remaining full (voting)
members of the Politburo. This body has considerable importance as
an advisory board, a discussion group and, sometimes, as a voting
body. Decisions taken by the Standing Committee have the full
force of a Politburo decision, but Politburo sanction may well be
sought for major policy shifts. Meaningful voting in the Politburo
is probably restricted to issues on which Mao and his inner circle
have not staked out a definite position.
The advice of Politburo members is likely to be sought prior to
decision on a matter in which the individual member is expert. All
nineteen of the voting members are men with a record of thirty to
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forty years of faithful service to the party. They represent a variety
of backgrounds and are capable of providing advice in many fields.
Here appear the top specialists in various aspects of party work:
Peng Chen has long been in party organizational work i nd has repre-
sented the party at important Communist meetings abroad. Tung
Pi-wu is engaged in supervisory work, Tan Cheii-lin is concentrating
on agricultural matters, Lo Jung-huaa is a senior figure in party- con-
trol work in the armed forces. Chen Yi, Li Fu-shun Band Li IIsien-
nien are the part=y's top specialists, respectively, in the government's
foreign, economic'
conomic planning and financial affairs`. Ko Ching-Shill and
Li Ching-clluan are the top leaders in Past and Southwest China and
may bring regional points of view into the Politburo.
No additions to the. Politburo have been announced since 1958.
Good bets for election to the next Politburo are Tao Chu and Sung
Jen-chiung, heads of the Central-South and northeast party bureaus,
respectively.
Since Mao took over in 1935, only three men of Politburo rank can
confidently be said to have been purged: Chang ILuo-t.ao shortly after-
wards, Theo Iiang in 1954 and Peng Tell-huai in 1959. Several have
been demoted, others have died, but seven members of the present
Politburo were on the I1-man body elected in 1945.
The presence of a number of party elders in these key groups should
not be misconstrued. Though they are relatively inactive, they do
serve a definite purpose by providing automatic support, for Mao on
any matters put before theni.
Another key top level body is the Secretariat, the executive office
of the party for day--to-day- operations. It. is under the direction of
the Standing Committee and the Politburo, and differs from these
bodies largely in that it is, formally, a. full-tune body. Although the
counsel of its members is probably sought before new policy is finalized,
the Secretariat's main task is to monitor the execution of decisions
taken by its parent bodies. The Secretariat- may well Le the party's
instrumentality for directing and coordinating' the party's central
de artinents.
The ranking official on the Secretariat, is Teng IIsiieo-ping. His
four leading associates are all Politburo figures--,Deng Chen, Li Fu-
cliun, Li IIsien-Wien and Tan Chen-lin. Also included are Lo Jui-
cliing, who is Chief of Staff of the armed forces and a long-time
security expert; Bang Sheng, an intelligence man; Lu Ning-yi and
Hu Cliiao-mu, propaganda experts; Li Tlsueh-feng, industrial matters;
Liu Lan-tao, organizational and control niatters within the party;
Wang Chia-hsiang, who was once involved in liaison with other parties
but has not been active lately,; and, Yang Shang-kun, who holds several
top administrative positions. Lo Jui-cliing, Yang Sheng and Lu
Ning-yi were added to the Secretariat by the tenth plenum of the
Central Committee in September 1962.
The second level
The Central Committee itself, nominally 97 full and 95 alternate
members, has functioned under Mao as a rubber stamp body, convened
to be instructed concerning decisions taken by the done n.ant leaders.
By the time it meets the needs of the top command for expert advice
have been met and the line in all essentials has been set. It could, as
has happened in the Soviet party, emerge as an important deliberative
body if an issue arose on which the leaders were critically divided.
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An individual's rank within the Central Committee is important as
his mark of preferment.
The party's central departments provide the staff to prepare posi-
tion papers on matters coming before the policy makers and to oversee,
under the direction of the Standing Committee and the Secretariat,
the party's day-to-day operations. The men who run these depart-
ments are in charge of the party's interests in propaganda, police,
rural, industrial, finance and trade, communications, united front,
and party organization work as well as liaison with foreign parties.
They make many of the daily decisions on how party policies are to be
executed within their areas of competence. They are in a sense going
through the last and highest training course which the party offers its
future leaders.
The Committees (really sub-committees) under the Central Com-
mittee are on the same level as the departments but differ in that they
tend to meet irregularly as the occasion or the leaders demand. Like
other committees, they probably have permanent standing bodies.
Included are the Committee for Organs Directly Subordinate to the
Central Committee, the Committee for Central State Organs and the
Women's Work Committee.
Two important commissions, the Control Commission and the
Military Affairs Commission, also come just under the Central
Committee on party organization charts. They are discussed below.
The next generation
The top levels of the party are nicely layered according to age and
party seniority. Virtually all of the top leaders went through the
APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION IN 1956
CULTURAL AND
EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
(4%)
FINANCIAL
AND TRADING
ORGANIZATIONS
(5%)
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8 STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PRa L
crucible of the Long klarcli, a 6,000-mile hegira in 1934-1936 which
transferred the party's base from Kiangsi to Shens Province. The
Long Marchers are getting on. Mao is almost 70 and most of his
key advisers are over 60. The new generation will probably be
dominated by another brand of Communist whose formative years
in the party were in the fight against the Japanese.
After they tako over, it is possible that many o' the old Maoist
ways will go. The new group will very likely not have the remarkable
measure of cohesiveness of Mao's group. Most of the now men,
including its leading figures, will have made their nark in the party
apparatus. It is possible, however, that by the time the new group
gets entrenched officials who have made their mark in economic,
scientific, or other specialties will begin to exert greater influence in
high policy making levels.
The party and the state
In Communist China the party's field of direct interest and influence
extends into every nook and cranny of the government and military
establishment, of every economic or scientific installation, of every
education institution. "The party must, and can, bind all-the state
organs, the armed forces, the people's bodies," runs a typical instruc-
tion to party workers.
Party control is brought to bear by the assignment of trusted party
members to positions, usually of authority, in all non-party organiza-
tions. Called "leading members' groups," they are assigned by an
appropriate party committee. The Central Committee determines
the makeup of the "leading members' groups" in central government
offices; provincial committees do the same for the provincial govern-
ments, county committees for the counties. These' leading members'
groups" remain under the direction of their assigning committees,
not under a "leading member' group" in a superior non-party
organization.
the party has a number of full-time workers wLo perform no job
outside the party, but the. majority work in government offices, in
the military, in economic and cultural establislinients, or in people's
organizations. They remain under strict party discipline. Failure
to detect and report without delay the slightest shortcoming, from
the party's point of view, would open them to serious charges.
The pattern of party influence brought to bear by party members
is repeated at 'tile working level. Every basic level installation, be it
factory, mine, collective farm, or military unit, has its own party
organization appointed by an appropriate party committee. It is the
duty of the party organizations to transmit party policy and. see to
it that the policy is understood and implemented completely. They
must adapt the policies, as necessary, to local conditions.
THE STRUCTURE FOR STAFFING PARTY ORG. NIZATIONS
The leading bodies
The 1956 party constitution declares that the National Party
Congress is the "highest leading body" of the party. It is elected.
But the timing of its election, the number of delegates, and the
manner in which they are elected are controlled Ly the "in" group.
The "in's" reserve to themselves the right to run members of superior
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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 9
party organizations "who need to be elected" in local elections.
They also can cancel the election of anyone they deem "inadequate."
The present Eighth Congress was elected in 1956 for a term of five
years. It is still in office. Its opening session was attended by just
over 1,000 delegates. The party's first congress, in 1921, was
attended by twelve.
A party congress provides a forum for the airing of party policies,
but its most important task is to elect a Central Committee to act
for it when it is not in session. The importance of this provision
derives from the infrequency with which National Party Congresses
are convened. The Eighth has met but twice, in 1956 and 1958,
despite provisions in the party constitution, which it adopted, that
it meet once a year. In fact, during the six and one-half years it has
been in office it has met in session for a grand total of 32 days.
The present Central Committee, the eighth, came to office in 1956,
the result of a carefully contrived electoral process designed by the
party center to bring minimal disturbance to the then existing hier-
archical arrangements. It was an "election with leadership." The
top leaders decided on the number of candidates who would stand for
election, named them and arranged the electoral lists in proper order
of precedence.
All of this took a lot of arranging, and may have prompted a lead-
ing party figure to warn that "too many elections are unnecessary
and may handicap our work." The party has generally followed his
advice.
Theoretically at least, ultimate authority for the disposition of im-
portant personnel matters rests in the Central Committee. The 1956
party constitution spells this out: the Central Committee, it states,
"takes charge of and allocates party cadres." (The term cadre, in
Chinese kanpu, is applied by the Chinese Communists to officials and
functionaries in both the party and the government and is used in
either an individual or a group sense.) When the Central Committee
is not in plenary session, its powers and functions, including those
involving the disposition of cadres, pass to the Politburo, its Standing
Committee and the Secretariat, all elected by the Central Committee.
The Eighth Central Committee has met in plenary session 10 times
for a total of some 75 days since 1956.
In practice, therefore, its authority over cadre regulation is dele-
gated to its continuing bodies. The highest authority in personnel,
as in all other matters, doubtless rests with Mao Tse-tung. It is
likely that Mao still takes an active interest in assignments to key
positions, since any other course could carry grave dangers for him.
A number of lesser personnel actions may ultimately be referred to
him for decision. There is bound, for example, to be serious competi-
tion among various departments of China's national security setup
for skilled manpower and managerial talent, which are among the
nation's scarcest resources.
He is very likely assisted in his deliberations on these matters by
his four active assistants on the Standing Committee with Liu Shao-
chi and Teng Hsiao-ping representing the party's interests, Chou
En-lai the government's and Lin Piao those of the military establish-
ment. Communist China is not known to have a system, as do the
Soviets, which specifies just which non-party jobs require the stamp
of approval of what party body. The Chinese system is in general
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AND PROBLEMS LN COMMUNIST CHINA
highly centralized, and the Sta.uding Committee may well require
that it pass on all reconu iendations for appointments to key jobs in
the party central organs, in the government's top bodies, in economic,
cultural and scientific enterprises of national security significance, in
tlle armed forces and in the regions and provinces. The Standing
Committee doubtless reserves for itself the right to determine just
what constitutes a "ke y-" assignment requiring its O.K.
In acting on proposals for filling "key" jobs, Mao and the Standing
Committee rely heavily upon the Secretariat, through which related
personnel
personnel records and data are channeled. As the directing and co-
agency for the regular central organizations of the party,
the Secretariat can pirobably approve on its own nppointiiients to it
range of positions below those on which the Standing Committee and
Mite act. In any case, the principal figure oil the Secretariat, Teng
Ilsino-ping, is also in Mao's inner circle, a cireumsta.rice which doubt-
less gives him vast authority in the personnel field. Ile is, at a
minimum, the needle's eye through which a man must pass on his
way to a position of real authority.
Tong's assistants on the Secretariat oversee the work of one or
another of tlic party's central organs and through them exert con-
siderable influence on central government offices. These assistants
are very likely responsible for advising Teng and the Secretariat on
those aspects of it candidate's party standing and qualifications which
fall within the competence of their particular departments. They
can probably act directly on it certain level of position within their
own areas. most, of these secretaries have had lorg experience in
party organizational work.
'ike central departments
Neither tile, Standing Committee, the Politburo not the Secretariat
is sufficiently rich in personnel to discharge in detail (Le constitutional
rcharge which devolves on them "to take charge of and allocate cadres."
Tate size of this job is suggested by the fact that in 19.36, the last year
for which figures are at. hand, there were over 300,000 party cadres
at the county committee level and higher, The 1963 total is surely
hi-her. So, again, much of the function is delegated to bodies which
the Central C:on-in ttee has set up, and staffed, to be its executive
agents in its "diverse businesses." Among these are the Organization
Department, the Control Commission, the Committee bor Party
Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Committee, and the
Committee for Central State Organs. Other central departments
play lesser roles.
'I'1-e Organization Department, though no longer the power it
once was, still plays a strong Mail in the administration of party
cadres. Prior to 1954, it controlled most aspects of party personnel
management. It had responsibility for recruitment, (raining, assign-
ment, promotion, transfer of party cadres as well as the maintenance
of party personnel records, the collection of party dues and the
investigation of party members' reliability. In 1)54 the party
elders discovered that [lie (lien chief of the Organization Department,
Jao Sliu-shii-, had been attempting to use the office to unseat them.
Ile was removed forthwith, and the Organization Department was
shorn of many of its powers.
A 1959 study, written by the Research Office of the post-Jao
Organization Department for the use of its cadres, explains the role
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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 11
of the Organization Department as that of a "deputy and staff chief"
to party committees for cadre administration. The study is studded
with warnings that the Organization Department ought not "stick
its nose into the proper business of others." It must, rather, keep to
its "own share" of the administration of party cadres and party
members.
This share is not inconsiderable. The study explains that the
Organization Department remains active in the selection, promotion
and training of party cadres and in "developing" party members.
It still handles the records of party personnel. It probably still has
much to do with the placement of party men in positions which the
higher levels, the Secretariat and the Standing Committee, do not
keep in their own hands.
The present head of the Organization Department is An Tzu-wen
who was a deputy under Jao but definitely not his accomplice. An
was once Minister of Personnel of the Central Government, and
played a large part in the big initial effort to staff the new government
(1950-1954).
Some of the functions formerly given the Organization Department
have probably been entrusted to the Committee for Party Organs
Directly Subordinate to the Central Committee. Little has been
said about this unit, but its name suggests it was conceived to super-
vise the party's central organs, keep them informed on policy matters,
and, perhaps, to assist in handling their ordinary staffing needs. It
is headed by Yang Shang-kun, who is concurrently Director of the
Central Committee's General Office and an alternate secretary of the
Secretariat. Like An Tzu-wen, Yang is not a party heavyweight.
He has seemed, rather, to be a trustworthy administrative functionary
who sees to the routine office tasks of the Central Committee, handles
correspondence and maintains records.
Other of the old Organization Department's functions probably
went to the Committee for Central State Organs, which is believed to
regulate the work of party members who have been placed in jobs with
the central government. It is not known how big a role this com-
mittee plays in the assignment, promotion or transfer of party mem-
bers in the government. The pattern could possibly be an advisory
role for higher positions, a more assertive role for lower ones. The
committee is headed by Kung Tzu-jung, who is concurrently an
alternate member of the Control Commission, Yang's deputy in the
General Office and a Deputy Secretary General of the State Council.
The control commission
A principal element of Jao's power in the old Organization Depart-
ment, that of investigating the loyalty of party members, has passed
entirely to the Control Commission. The 1945 party constitution
had provided for the establishment of both central and local control
commissions, but prior to 1955 they were never set up. In their
stead, a system of discipline inspection teams was established. They
were empowered to deal with specific breaches of party discipline only
a ter they had occurred. The inadequacy of these arrangements was
c early exposed by the case of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, two
prominent party figures who were expelled from the party in 1954 for
trying to split the party and usurp supreme power, The party con-
ference which expelled the pair also decided to establish strong control
98296-63-3
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12 STAFFLNG PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
commissions, at both the central and local levels. The new commis-
sions were given the power to investigate a party m ember before a
breach of discipline took place. They were charged with preventing
a recurrence of so serious a case as the "anti-party alliance" of Kao
Kang and Jao Shn-ship. Unlike the earlier disciplsie inspection
teanis, the new commissions were specifically empowered by the
conference to check up on party organizations, though discipline was
to be meted out on an individual basis.
Working under the direction of party commit tees at the same level,
control commissions take disciplinary action against party members
and review sentences meted out by lower levels. They do not concern
themselves with the minor day-to-day derelictions still It mdled by the
Organization Department. Macy are interested in major disciplinary
problems like anti-Maoist plotting, and are obviously immensely
important in the party security setup. Their influence on cadre
selection is likely to be largely negative. A party member coming
under their purview is not a good candidate for further advancement.
The central Control Commission is an elite group. I is set some-
what apart from other of the party's central departments and com-
mittees in that its leading personnel tire elected. The Commission
was "strengthened" by the election of additional, but unnamed, new
members at the tenth plenum of the Central Committee, September
1962. It has a priority claim on personnel and its staff apparatus
appears to be one of Lite best developed of any central part y organ.
It has been headed since its inception developed Tung Pi-wu, the only original
founder of the Chinese Communist Party outside of Mao 'Tse-tung
stillactive. An aged though not inconsiderable figure, Ting is ranked
seventh in the Central Committee and is the first Vice Chairman of
the Government. Among Tung's principal deputies is Liu Lan-tao,
who combines a position on Lite commission with being t. member of
the powerful Secretariat. Another is a high ranking officer in the
General Political Department of Lite Army, the office charged with the
political indoctrination of the army. A third was until 1['60 Minister
of Interior (previously Minister of Supervision). The i:hree would
seem to be the principal figures in overseeing the conduct of members
working respectively, in the party, the military establishment and the
government.
Other central organs which play a role in personnel management
include the Propaganda Department, which handles the edication and
indoctrination of party members. This is an iniinense job on which
Lite Chinese party lavishes time, money and effort. The propaganda
Department is headed by Lu Ting-yi, who is also a member of the
Secretariat. The Social' Affairs Department plays a shadowy and
unexplained role in the never-ending job of policing the party. Li
Igo Hung was the head of this organ until his death in 1661. It may
have declined in importance since his death.
The Women's Work Committee keeps an eye on Lite interests of
feniale party nieinbers. Roughly 10 percent of party members are
women, although the percentage drops sharply as you move up in
the hierarchy, There are, for example, only four women on the
Central Committee. The ranking female comrade, Tsai Chang (Mrs.
Li Fu-chun), is also head of the Women's Work Committee. The
committee works to overcome ('discrimination" against women
cadres and see that they get the same opportunities for advancement
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as male cadres. "Some organizations," Tsai Chang once complained,
"tend to promote more men than women even when choosing between
persons of equal competence." The United Front Department takes
charge of the party's relations with cooperating organizations and
nationalities groups. It probably has some say in the selection of
individuals from such organizations for various posts.
Regional, provincial, and county posts
The constitution permits the Central Committee of the party, as it
deems necessary, to establish bureaus covering several provinces.
Such regional bureaus existed between 1949 and 1954. They were
abolished after the Kao-Jao incident and were not revived until
January 1961, when the need for a more coordinated regional attack
on some of the party's problems impressed itself upon the leaders.
The parallel government and military bodies which existed in the
1949-1954 period have not reappeared, at least publicly. Today
there are six regional bureaus of the Central Committee-the North-
east, North, East, Central-South, Southwest, and Northwest. Pei-
ping has been uncommonly sparing of detail concerning their re-
sponsibilities and makeup. The post-1961 versions appear to range
across roughly the same spectrum of interests as party committees
at other levels. Each of them apparently has the authority to create
such subordinate organizations as it feels are needed. Their staffing
patterns seem still to be in the developmental stage, though many
of them have begun to staff the usual run of subordinate departments
for propaganda, rural work, finance and the like. No regional
organization departments or control commissions have yet been
identified.
The leading personnel of the regional bureaus are selected directly
by the party center. The individuals named are probably then
allowed to fill out their own staffs. The present regional bosses
are senior party officials, drawn some from Peiping and some from
the provinces. The Northeast Bureau is headed by Sung Jen-
chiung, who was in charge of an important central government
ministry. The East China and Southwest Bureaus, on the other hand,
are headed by individuals drawn from the Shanghai municipal and
Szechwan provincial party apparati, respectively. Both are Polit-
buro members.
These bureaus probably do have certain personnel powers and func-
tions. They assist the party center in assessing job performance
of provincial leaders. Since responsibilities at the regions are broader
than in the provinces, the regional posts may be a proving grounds
for higher posts with the party center.
The staffing pattern at the provincial level is a virtual carbon copy
of that in Peiping. Autonomous regions and cities directly under
central authority (like Shanghai) are treated as provinces. A pro-
vincial congress is elected, and elects in turn a provincial committee
to act for the congress when it is not in session. The provincial
committee elects a standing committee to act in its stead when it is
not in session as well as a secretariat to handle its "daily work."
These provincial posts are important-10 of the 21 Chinese prov-
inces have populations of between 20 and 60 million-and the party
center takes no chances. It wrote into the constitution that the num-
ber of members of a provincial committee will be set by the Central
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Committee and that the members of a provincial standing committee
and secretariat must be approved by the Central Committee. So
must party committee members in key industrial cities and cities
with a population of over 500,000 (of which China has some '5).
Like its counterpart in Pciping, the provincial committee has the
constitutional authority "to take charge of and allocate party cadres,"
but the Central Committee establishes the controlling regulations.
In practice, effective provincial responsibility over cadres is most
like l exercised by the standing committee (for the higher provincial
jobs) and by the provincial departments (for lesser posts).
Provincial committees are empowered to set up their own depart-
ments. Most of them have an organization department, the duties
of which are determined by the provincial committees. Provincial
organization departments are involved, when local conditions and
their instructions permit, in the assignment and promotion of cadres
coming under provincial control. Provincial departments aro under
the authority of the provincial party committee, not under the
corresponding department at the party center. The hitter has only
what Peiping terms a "guidance relationship" with its provincial
counterparts.
The staffing of party organizations at the county level is similar
to the pattern at the more exalted levels.
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CCP MEMBERSHIP (1921 - 1961)
r
CLASS BACKGROUND
(Selected Years)
Other
Intellectuals
Industrial workers
1921 1933 1937
Founded Pre-Long Post-Long
. March March
800,000
i
10% 1,200,000 90%'
r
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ICES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
PARTY PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
The party constitution says that membership in the party is open
to any Chinese, age 18 and over, who works and does not exploit the
labor of others. The entrance process can be initiated by the indi-
vidual or by the party. He must be sponsored by two full members.
In either case, the individual involved must fill out a detailed applica-
tion. The most important entries involve his family and personal
background, communist works lie has been influenced by, a personal
evaluation of his good and bad points, and a statemnit as to why he
wishes to join the party. Ile must be approved by a general member-
ship meeting of a party branch. After being acccptel by the branch
meeting, the application is forwarded to the next higher committee
for review. This committee assigns a functionary to examine care-
fully the candidate's application form and to interview him in detail.
After approval by the committee, the applicant becomes a proba-
tionary member of the party. Ile stays in this statics for one year,
(luring which he is subjected to an "eleinentary party education" and
to the close observation of the party branch. Wlien the test year is
over, his case again conies before the branch meeting. His party
age is computed from the day he is accepted by the branch as a full
member, though he must still go through the formality of being ap-
proved by the next higher committee. At. any point in this process a
strong ob~cctioii by any one involved can kill the applicant's chances.
Admission into the Chinese Communist Party is achieved more
easily in the periods when the party runs drives to add new members;
for example, there was a big upswing in admissions during the com-
mune and "leap forward" movements in 1958-1959. These are fol-
lowed by periods of consolidation when entrancerequirenients are more
strenuously applied.
Since 1956 there no longer have been different procedures prescribed
for applicants of different class backgrounds. But. it is, nevertheless,
relatively easy for a Chinese with a. "clean" class background--parents
who were workers or peasants --to get into the party. Such an indi-
vidual would more likely be asked to apply, and lie mig'lt, even find his
probationary period shortened. On the other hand, it is not unknown
for an applicant with an "unclean" background to be met with delay-
ing tactics which might last several years. Indeed a bad back-
ground-a parent. who was in the Kuomintang, for exaIiiple could in
practice preclude admission.
Members in good standing of the Youth League a sort of junior
party organization, are accepted almost automatically. Another rich
source of party material is in the ranks of the nonparty "activist."
This is one of the very best ways for an outsider to conic to the favor-
able notice of a local party boss. An "activist" server the party by
leading the less active masses at. study meetings and during production
drives.
The qualities which the party wants in its members include an
unquestioning zeal, a. strong measure of asceticism, and a dash, no
more, of individuality. The party wants a man who will place the
interests of the party above his own, a- roan with no aims or ambitions,
indeed no life, outside the party. He must demonstrate instan-
tancous obedience to party discipline. It is his "holy duty" to carry
out party policy without reservation even if he disagrees with it,
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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST
though at the same time he is expected to be skilled in adapting the
policy to local peculiarities. He must in all things be an exemplar
to the masses, while sharing their "jobs and sorrows, their hard and
frugal life." He should display leadership potential.
Of course; not all Chinese Communist Party members measure up
to these high-flown standards. What the party gets in practice is
considerably more limited, especially at the basic levels. Here the
party is apt to settle for obedience and political reliability.
Appraisal and promotion
The basic party organization, the branch, makes periodic appraisals
of each of its members. The appraisal process begins with the indi-
vidual's own analysis of himself. This is then discussed by his branch
colleagues who have been observing him and forming views as to his
suitability. The "self-criticisms and criticisms" thus collected are
supplemented by regular personal interviews between the individual
member and one of his party betters. Another higher official may
collate and sum up all of this material. Branch appraisals are
supposed to take into account the member's personal history and work
record, his merits and demerits, his capabilities and limitations.
They become a part of a member's permanent party record.
Over a period of time those appraisals enable the party apparatus
to make judgments of a member's particular worth and identify those
who are ready to be moved to positions of higher responsibility. Al-
though there have been hints that a sort of rough grading system does
exist within the party, it is not apparently as firm and well-developed
a system as exists in the Chinese government and military. An indi-
vidual's rank in the party seems largely to be determined by the level
of the apparatus at which he works and his duties at that level. There
are references, for example, to party secretaries at the county level
which suggest that the party regards this as equivalent to a grade
designation.
According to party instructions, the selection of cadres for omo-
tion and transfer should proceed on the basis of a systematic plpran and
on a "unified"-that is, controlled by the higher levels-basis. The
entire history and work of the member being considered for reassign-
ment is to be taken into account. His party record, likely to be a
voluminous file for any but the newest recruit, will be studied, and the
opinions of his superiors, his equals, and his subordinates sought. He
may be brought in for a personal interview by a ranking member of
the office for which he is being considered. Even if he is not selected,
the party argues that this sort of screening is good. The individual
gains a better understanding of his strengths and weaknesses, while
the party is enabled to place him in his proper spot.
"In our fundamental evaluations of a member's work," Mao has
said, "we must establish whether his achievements amount to 30 per-
cent and his mistakes to 70 percent, or vice versa. If his achievements
amount to 70 percent, then his work should in the main be approved."
Most of the criteria advocated by the party to guide the selection
process are, however, highly subjective (e.g., a high degree of com-
munist consciousness) and leave the selectors without much meaning-
ful guidance. Hence, much to the party's professed annoyance, great
emphasis is put in practice on seniority and personal relationships.
A former party member has recalled that the prime requirement for
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most any post was to have served a certain length of time in the party.
The more responsible the post, the longer the period. Others have
testified that the prejudices of the higher cadres constituted a most
important factor.
Party writings make it very clear that the leaders want advance-
ment based on other criteria. Guidelines from the Organization
Department to party workers involved in the assignnien-. and promo-
tion process stipulate that they should resolutely avoid the practice of
assigning and promoLinP solely on the basis of seniority. Tang Ilsiao-
ping has called this reliance the most serious defect it the party's
cadre policy.
The party says it wants advancement to be based both on the mem-
ber's "virtue," meaning his ideological reliability, and "ability,"
meaning his technical qualifications. As the party's role has broad-
ened over the years, and especially since it took over the Chinese
mainland, the emphasis put on the second part of the aquat.ion has
increased, A recent party work, for example declared that pre-
ferment in the party will increasingly depend on low well the member
improves his technical skill. But the party has not, and probably
never will, permit the latter to outweigh the former.
Party education
Great emphasis is placed by the party leaders on their "education"
programs. Indeed a cadre's attitude toward and a titude for study
will be duly entered on his appraisal forms. "To he lazy about study
shows a defective sense of responsibility toward the party," runs a
party injunction, which adds that all cadres, old and new, in leading
positions or on the lower levels, must study.
Indeed, the. need is deep. The Chinese party is the largest in the
world. The general educational level of its members is low. At its
lower levels, literacy is limited. And the problem is complicated by
the fact that members with comparatively good educational back-
grounds are. not trusted as fully as the "good hearted" elements with
it sound class background but a poor education.
Cadre training programs are basically of two kinds, ideological and
technical. The aim is to educate the loyal and convert the educated.
The ideological par Lis the better developed. It is constant, pervasive,
repetitious, in all party organs, in schools, in offices, in the armed
forces. Wherever a party man goes, no matter how "virtuous" he
may be, be will be assigned to a study group. He will be required to
attend its regular study meetings, which may average to a week, to
discuss approvingly the latest twists and turns of the pai ty line.
These meetings are, from time to time as the party center directs,
supplemented by special study sessions of several weeks' duration.
One such series was conducted in the early part of 1962 on the duties
and rights of party members. Members are, of course, believers when
they join and these never-ending doses of indoctrination are intended
to prevent backsliding.
The first training offered a party member outside the scope of his
own study group is very likely to be at a short course run by one of the
basic level organs. Members are rotated through suel_ schools for
one, two or three months of instruction in the basic tenets of com-
munism. He probably will attend such courses a number of times
during his service at lower levels. Lecturers may be leading cadres of
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STAFFING PROLE
the unit giving the course, or they may be individuals whose only
duty is to provide this instruction.
At the county level, these courses are apt to be given at a regular
institution maintained by the county committee. Here leading
cadres of the county party organization receive refresher courses and
cadres earmarked for such positions receive a more sophisticated
version of the instruction at lower levels. For the party is convinced
that the higher a cadre rises, the broader his understanding of com-
munism needs be.
So his ideological education goes on, conceivably right up to his
being selected, if his future placement requires it, for a course of study
at one of the institutions run by the party's Central Committee, the
Higher Party School or the Central Research Institute. These train
high theoretical cadres or give them an opportunity for research in
the field. They may also give more generalized courses for cadres
destined for service in key posts with departments of the Central
Committee.
The Central Committee's Propaganda Department plays a big role
in all of this ideological training. It provides the study materials,
from basic texts by Marx, Engels, Lenin, to collections of Mao's works
and the relevant party documents. It is in direct control of the key
party publications, the newspaper People's Daily and the magazine
Red Flag. It may help by providing guidance on party schooling to
the lower levels.
However pressing the need for all of this ideological training, the
party also recognizes that party members must be given the oppor-
tunity to attain a measure of expertness in the work to which they are
assigned. In order fully to deserve the trust placed in them, the party
says, members must have more than a talent to "chatter away on
political subjects." If a cadre is assigned to work with the peasants,
he is expected to study farm technique; if sent to an economic installa-
tion, he is expected to learn something of its processes; if sent to
oversee scientific research, he is expected to sop up some scientific
knowledge.
In order to do this, he may be entered in a regular educational insti-
tution such as a middle school, university, or a technical, trade or
vocational institute, either as a full- or part-time student. One of the
wide variety of short courses, offering highly specialized and concen-
trated instruction in a narrow curriculum, may be the party's choice for
him_ He may be left to learn as much as he can on the job by picking
the brains of the experts working there. He may merely be strongly
urged to attend spare-time classes or devote himself to off-duty study.
Opportunities for technical training in today's China are limited, but
whatever is available is at the party's beck and call.
As an individual moves up in the party, he is expected to broaden
out. He will be assigned different duties, in accordance with the party
needs, and will probably receive related training. And he may in
time become one of the party's cherished "versatile hands," a trusted
party man with a variety of posts in his background who is ready for
bigger things.
Party incentives
The primary attraction of party membership is probably the fact
that the party runs things. This cannot escape the notice of anyone
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in China. Party membership opens doors to positions in government,
in the military, in universities, in fact everywhere. The -1ighest, or
at least the most powerful, positions are invariably occupied by party
figures. A young Chinese who wishes to get ahead will doubtless
regard party membership as the indispensable key and work for the
day of his admission. The party leadership regards this as a base
motive for joining.
Promotion is probably the main material incentive offerer the party
men. There are undeniable perquisites that go with party office,
The higher the office, the greater the perquisites. While di-eh wages
are Pe gad to equivalent non-party levels, advantages in housing,
medical care, and recreational facilities accrue to party officials. They
are also apt to &et a break on scarce items like neat, sugar, vegetable
oil, cloth, and cigarettes. It would be risky business for a _'cstaurant
to fail to pay special attention to a party boss.
But the roato the perquisites of this type is a long and arduous
one. On the way up, the party member will have to be sustained
largely by less material incentives, like the comfort of being one of
an acowledged elite which has a mission of doing sometLing about
building China. Beyond this psychological balm, there is the prac-
tical authority= which his membcrslaip confer on hint. There is always
some individual, some group, for the, party man to "lead."
If considerations of personal advantage over the long pull are not
sufficient to keep the party man bent to the party's will, there is the
constant threat of prolonged sessions of criticism and self-criticism.
These "educational" sessions can be long and unbclievablr} tedious.
It is, according to many who have gone through such sessions, most
difficult to withstand these partly mental, partly physical, onslaughts.
If an individual does resist., the party can move on to disciplinary
action. Punishments arc: (1) warning, (2) serious warning, (3) re-
moval from party posts, (4) retention for observation within the
party, and (5) expulsion from the party.
There is also the possibility of being sent down to a production unit,
usually a farm, for a period of labor reform. In fact, r,hc party
regards this as such a good scheme that a cadre, even a lead_ng cadre,
can find himself assigned to one of these periods of "proletarianization"
without his having done a thing wrong.
Other threats, of course, hang over the party member. lIe can be
turned over to the state supervisory apparatus, which can, if the
offense is serious enough, mete out more extreme forms of pu-zishment.
The dangers of running afoul of the control apparatus are partic-
ularly great when the party center is running one of it:. periodic
campaigns to "rectify" party members. Then they can conceivably
be charged with any one of a variety of vague, ill-defined sins. They
must beware and re-double their eforts to satisfy their party betters.
The utility of this sort of negative incentive should not be under-
estimated.
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Personnel responsibilities of key government offices in China
on
CHAIRMAN - Controls 60-odd to level
PREMIER }------ p government
appointments.
STATE COUNCIL------------------ Controls 2,000-odd second echelon exec-
utive positions.
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR --------- Administers state welfare programs,
veterans affairs, civilian labor for
public works.
PERSONNEL BUREAU -------- Implements welfare and wage policies,
processes and manages personnel ac-
tions and records.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECIINOLOG- Plans development and training pro-
ICAL COMMISSION grams in scientific and technical fields.
SPECIALISTS WORK BUREAU Controls assignment of scientists and
STATE PLANNING COMMl other highly trained technicians.
STATE ECONOMIC COMMJ ----- Determines job priorities among govt.
agencies.
BUREAU FOR THE ADMIN. OF Administers security and living accom-
GOVT. OFFICES modations of high officials.
FOREIGN EXPERTS BUREAU--__ Contracts for and assigns foreign tech-
nicians.
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION----_- Determines first job assignments of
college graduates.
III. STAFFING THE GOVERNMENT
The Chinese Communists conceive of the Government of the
People's Republic of China as the executive instrumentality for carry-
ing out policies decided by the party. The task they give the govern-
ment is to help formulate and then execute plans for the implementa-
tion of the party's general line. This is a huge job since the govern-
ment has to renulate not only such normal national security functions
as defense, diplomacy and peace and order, but also a wide range of
activities taken over by the communists, from industrial production
to domestic and foreign trade, sports and even radio broadcasting.
As a result, China's bureaucratic apparatus is immense.
The party organization remains separate and distinct from that of
the government. The party as an organization stays clear of actual
governmental administration. Party members are, however, spotted
all through the government, from top to bottom. It is through their
efforts that, in the words of a veteran communist, "the administrative
agencies of the government are made to accept policies of the party
and turn them into policies of the government."-
STAFFING REQUIREMENTS FOR SENIOR POSTS
The nominal number-one job in the government, the Chairman of
the Republic, is largely a procedural and ceremonial post. The
Chairman is the formal chief of state. He has no direct control, by
virtue of his government position, over the State Council or the minis-
tries, which together handle the real administrative chores of the
government. However, in Communist China, the chief of state has in
fact been a figure of commanding importance by virtue of his party
position. The first Chairman of the Republic, Mao Tse-tung, resigned
in 1959 and was succeeded by Liu Shao-chi.
Offices Functi
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The chief executive is the premier, the principal officer of the State
Council. The post is held by Chou principal The, Stat3 Council
includes 16 vice premiers (one, of whom, Peng ''cli-huai, is in disfavor
and inactive), and some 30 ministers and heads of commissions plus
a secretary general. This group has such authority as is given the
government to make high-level decisions necessary for cauTymg out
national security policies. The premier and 12 of the 16 vice premiers
are members of the Politburo; the other four are high ranking Central
Committee members.
Broad functional control under the State Council is exercised by
its six staff offices. These operate as more or less permanent co-
ordinating committees, with a varying number of related ministries
under their purview. They are the government counterparts of the
party's central departments. Besides these staff offices, the State
Council's Secretariat and the premier's office provide general co-
ordinative functions. The Secretariat serves as the official link
between the council and provincial and local administrations. The
premier's office contains his personal staff performing such functions
as he directs.
What does the party center look for in the men it assigns to jobs
on the State Council? Mao Tse-tung and his confederates are
doubtless looking for individuals who: 1) have a long and spotless
party history; 2) have a demonstrated competence in tTic i,dniinistra-
tion of complex problems and large numbers of people; and 3) have
some acquaintance and experience with the specific affairs of the office.
The deg Tee to which the. first qualification predominates is illus-
trated by the fact that 75 percent of the State Council membership
is made up of party men. These are, for the most part, members of
the party's Central Committee and are thus, in the party's judgment,
its best career officers and administrators. Menibersl_ip on the
Central Committee identifies a man who has spent virtually all his
adult life in the management of increasingly important affairs.
Since 1949 this experience has, for some of them, included nationwide
responsibilities in certain fields.
Non-Communists have been appointed to head ministries in the
ceentral government, but never to those involving national security
functions. Non-Communists head ministries which handle things
like water conservancy and postal services. Even then, the non-
Communist minister will inevitably have a first vice min-aster who is
a reliable party man and acts as it minister in everything but name.
Some ministries, such as the ministries of foreign affairs, public secur-
ity, and defense do not use nonparty members in any but the most
menial positions.
Party members predominate even at the second level. Over 80
percent of the 300 vice ministers and vice chairmen of commissions
are party men. Party members] ip~p for the bureaucracy as a whole is
more difficult to determine. An T .u-wen reported that in 1956 one-
third of the total number of cadres working at the county level or
above were either party or youth league members. It may be that
the proportion of party to nonparty cadres cited by An could apply
to the bureaucracy as a whole; the same proportion has been noted
in the U.S.S.R.
It might be noted that party membership accounts for only 4 per-
cent of the general population of over 15 years of age. The concen-
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tration of party members grows steadily heavier as you move up in
the governmental machinery until it reaches 100 percent at the level
of the vice premier and above.
STRUCTURE FOR STAFFING GOVERNMENT OFFICES
The state council
The 1954 constitution of the Chinese People's Republic declares
that the National People's Congress is the "highest organ of state
power." Its more than 1,200 deputies are elected. Sessions of the
congress have been short, less frequent than called for in the constitu-
tion, and confined to rubber-stamping actions taken elsewhere. The
congress elects the Chairman of the People's Republic of China as
well as a Standing Committee to be its "permanent working organ"
when it is not in session. The present Standing Committee has some
60 members.
The chairman formally appoints the premier, subject to the
approval of the National People's Congress. He appoints, on the
recommendation of the premier, the other members of the State-
Council-the vice premiers, ministers, heads of commissions and the
secretary general. After the premier's nominations have been
"decided" by a congress (or its Standing Committee), they are
formally appointed to their jobs by the chairman. The provisions
for congressional approval are no more than window-dressing for
decisions made at the party center.
The chairman appoints in addition a number of other ranking
officials in national security jobs, such as the Chief of the General
Staff, the directors of the main departments in the Ministry of Na-
tional Defense, the president and vice presidents of the Academy of
Sciences. While the standing committee is empowered to appoint
and remove ambassadors and heads of mission abroad, the chairman
dispatches and recalls these plenipotentiary representatives. Al-
though these appointments are the responsibility of the chairman,
they are likely made upon the recommendation of the premier. The
total number of top posts requiring the nomination and appointment
of the chairman and premier probably numbers less than 100, roughly
half of which are jobs controlling national security programs.
The second level
Selection of the second echelon of government executives is legally
the prerogative of the State Council. This second echelon includes
the directors of the important staff offices of the State Council, the
heads of specialized agencies of the State Council, the deputy ministers
and assistant ministers, the commission vice chairmen and members,
as well as all chiefs and deputies of the divisions, bureaus, and offices
which make up the ministries. In the military field, the appointing
responsibility of the Council extends to commanders and political
commissars at the division level (more than 300 positions). In the
foreign field it includes embassy counselors and consul generals.
The State Council appoints all key personnel in the important
financial, commercial, or industrial enterprises administered by the
25 economic ministries. Important administrative posts in the field
of higher education are also controlled by the State Council. Alto-
gether the State Council probably controls a minimum of 2,000
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executive jjobs in the government. All of them require reference to
the party before being finalized.
In addition to specific responsibilities for appointing administrative
personnel, the State Council is ultimately responsible for the govern-
ment's staffing policies. The State Council, for exariple, as a part
of each long terns and annual plan makes an allocation of manpower
resources according to nationally determined priorities and, in effect,
programs the development of new skills needed in China's industrial-
ization.
The Secretary General and Secretariat of the State Council are
key positions in the exercise of these council responsibilities. The
Secretary General is Ilsi Chung-lisun a high-ranking Central Com-
mittee member and a vice premier. 'Prior to moving to Peiping, lie
had been an important figure in party affairs in Northwest China.
He is assisted by ten deputies who are all party personalities. More
than half of them have concurrent responsibilities in the party per-
sonnel machine. One of them, Kung '1'zu-Jung, holdu the following
positions in the central departments of the party: head of the Com-
mittee for Central State Organs, member of the Control Commission,
and deputy director of the Party Secretariat's Staff Office. Five of
the deputies hold concurrent responsibilities in importa it State Coun-
cil personnel offices.
The Secretariat has a special Personnel Division which appears to
be responsible for enforcing personnel procedures, proconsing personnel
actions, and maintaining personnel files on the employees working
directly for the State Council. In addition, Premier Chou's own office
assists him in making personnel and policy decisions.
Government personnel administration on lower levels is highly
fragmented. The Ministry of Personnel, organized in 1950 shortly
after the government was first established, had comparatively broad
responsibilities for government personnel selection and assignment at
a time when the new regime was busy filling its offices. It was closely
tied with the party's Organization Department. Like the Organiza-
tion Department, the ministry has been downgraded. In 1954 it was
reduced to a specialized agency of the State Council; and in 1959 it
was placed under the 4?inistry of Internal Affairs. During the
erioct, other, more specialized organizations were created by the
Mate Council to handle aspects of personnel work, such as training,
job allocation, or various specialized groups of personnel, such as
scientists and technicians.
Today, the General Personnel Bureau of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs performs the following functions for the goverriment bureau-
cracy as a whole:
1. It implements the wage and welfare policies: of the State
Council and performs other personnel work assigned it by the
council.
2. It drafts personnel regulations and supervises the establish-
ment of tables of organization for offices of central government.
3. It processes personnel actions, including transfers, appoint-
ments and removals of personnel in government offices down to
the county level.
4. It maintains personnel records.
5. It processes the transfer and job placement c?f demobilized
military personnel.
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6. It maintains liaison with and evaluates the work of personnel
offices throughout the central government and in local govern-
ments at the provincial, autonomous region, and special munici-
pality level.
The subordination of the Personnel Bureau to the Ministry of
Internal Affairs in 1959 served to correlate the Bureau's general
responsibility, for control of the bureaucracy with the Ministry's
responsibilities for veterans affairs, the mass mobilization of civilian
labor crews for public works projects, and the administration of
state welfare and relief programs. At the time of the merger, the
Director of the Personnel Bureau, Chang Yi-pai, was made a Vice
Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Chang has been associ-
ated with high level personnel work since the government was set
up.
Specialized personnel
In 1956 the administration of government personnel was com-
partmentalized in an apparent effort to improve upon the use of
highly educated and trained Chinese-especially in high priority
programs. The administration of two kinds of personnel with critical
skills-"specialists" and visiting bloc technicians-was divorced from
the general administrative system in 1956 and turned over to inde-
pendent agencies of the State Council, the Specialists Work Bureau
and the Foreign Experts Bureau.
The Specialists Work Bureau is today part of the Scientific and
Technological Commission. It is responsible for the assignment,
promotion and transfer of "specialists"-defined by the Chinese
Communists as scientific workers, engineers, educators, doctors, and
health technicians, as well as important cultural and artistic workers.
The bureau may concern itself directly only with persons who have
actual work experience. The bureau may also have been charged
with carrying out a 1956 plan to register all scientific and technological
personnel, and with keeping it up to date.
Employment of "specialists" in China in 1955
Number
employed
Percent with
college
degrees
I. Teachers---------------------------------------------------- -----------
1,630,000
8
A. Professors and lecturers at higher educational institutions-------
18,000
96
II. Engineering and technical personnel____________________________________
600,000
16
A. Management personnel__________________________________________
15,000
6
B. Engineers-------------------------------------------------------
32,000
--------------
III. Medical ersonnel_____------------------------------------------ _.
370,000
8
A. Chinese or Western trained doctors______________________________
50,000
49
IV. Scientific and research personnel________________________________________
11,000
69
A. "Researchers" or assistants______________________________________
654
98
V. Cultural and artistic personnel __________________________________._______
88,000
10
Advisory functions of the bureau include:
1. To investigate unemployed "advanced intellectuals" and
place them in the state apparatus.
2. To investigate the assignment and working conditions of
specialists and make recommendations to the State Council for
improvement.
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3. To investigate the implementation of polieie3 and laws gov-
erning the use of specialists, and attempt to solve their problems
and promote their fullest use.
4. To work out plans with government departments for the
employment of students and specialists returning to China from
non-Communist countries.
The second bureau established in 195G by the State Council to
handle special personnel requirements, the Itoreign Experts Bureau,
was designed specifically to take care of bloc experas. Prior to 1960
such personnel numbered in the thousands. Tlne Doti net specialists
left China over two years ago, but a few hundred satellite technicians
have remained. The bureau still functions. It investigates the tech-
nical and scientific specialization of foreign countries (both Communist
and non-Communist) in the light of China's needs. It retains
responsibility for enga~ing foreign specialists, arranging their assign-
ment in China, providing living accommodations, and writing letters
of commendation at the termination of their service.
Another unit at the State Council level with important responsi-
bilities for personnel administration is the Bureau for the Administra-
tion of Government Offices. This agency provides living
and security for top level government. cadres, ichich probably
includes the 50 officials of the State Council and may well include
other important personnel in the ministries, commissions, and special
agencies.
.Ministries and commissions
Each ministry and commission has limited responsibility for
locating, training, assigning, and promoting its rank and file. The
ministries carry out this responsibility through personnel bureaus, the
directors of which, like every important administrative office in a
ministry, are appointed by the state Council.
The duties of a ministerial personnel bureau include the processing
of personnel actions, maintaining personnel records, arranging leave
and changes or assignment. They provide general services such as
briefing newly assigned people and arrana ng for their housing, cloth-
inm, and travel.
'in one of the most important national security ministries, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, virtually all executive positions in Peiping
(at least 100 and perhaps as many as 200 people) as well as responsible
officials in the foreign service (an additional 200 positions at a mini-
miumi) are administered by the State Council.
The ministry's personnel unit controls appointments and assign-
ments to middle- and junior-level posts as well as service positions.
The ministry's general services department, rather than its personnel
unit, negotiates with other government agencies for people trained in
security work and assigns and transfers the more than 200 people
working as couriers, code clerks, and physical security officers according
to needs as fixed by the ministry.
Recruitment and assignment
Although the staffing objectives and machinery of the U.S. and
Communist China contain many similarities, placement procedures
differ significantly. In a democratic system, the government must
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compete with other employers for an individual's services, and per-
sonal preferences play a large part in placement. In Communist
China professional, semiprofessional, and vocational school graduates
are given little alternative but to accept service in a job assigned
by the state.
Professionals entering the labor force from higher educational
institutions are assigned positions by the institutions on the basis of
rosters prepared by the ministry which administers the institutions.
The Ministry of Education administers general liberal arts schools,
and the Ministry of National Defense and economic ministries run
technical and scientific institutes.
Students earmarked for jobs in national security organs generally
have had their course of study sponsored by a specific organization.
Or they may have been hand picked before graduation for a special
assignment. For those not so chosen normal placement procedure
begins with the posting on its bulletin board of a roster of positions
which the institution is responsible for filling. Each student is per-
mitted t i indicate three choices. The institution in theory considers
the student's choice. In practice, however, the institution is guided
primarily by other considerations, such as the state's needs, the
student's class background and his scholastic rating.
Although acceptance of state assignments is virtually mandatory,
there is little need for compulsion. By the time a student graduates
from an institute of higher education in Communist China, he has
undergone a long process of mental preparation to put duty above
personal considerations. He will probably be either ambitious or
sincere enough to make personal sacrifices in the interest of furthering
his career. Even if he lacks such motivations, a student has no
ready alternative. The following account of a student's attempt to
refuse an assignment was written by an intellectual who fled China:
There was an actual case of a medical student who after
graduation did not go to the frontier area assigned to him but
went home instead to help his father keep shop. Ile was
free to go home, of course: "no one could force him to do any-
thing in a socialist country" * * *. He enjoyed several
weeks of leisure with his family which he could financially
well afford, but one day two classmates came to see him and,
after tea and remarks on the weather, they explained that
they thought he should "follow the leadership" and go to his
assigned work. "In socialist societies," they told him, "no
one should call his skill his own, because without the society
a man could not be what he was. The Government spent so
much money on the school we studied in. Therefore, * * *"
The next day two other classmates came to persuade him:
"In socialist societies no one can call his skill his own * * *";
the third day three others came: "In socialist countries no
one can call his skill his own * * *"; the fourth day one of
the two who came the first day came: "The government
spent so much on the school we studied in * * * " In any
society there are some people with exceptional tempera-
ments, and the Communists take care of them. This medi-
cal student persisted in shaking his head; and his classmates
persisted in coming. Every afternoon he was subjected to a
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rAYA",.~8r tPA%4Q,WAi, -Bp r3Fo@fh200010037-1
lecture which went on for hours: "In socialist societies no
one can call his skill his own * * * " At the end of two
months lie came- to think that this was worse than any
frontier region could be, and promised to report to the Com-
mittee of Party Members in the school.
Refusal to accept a job assigned by the state amounts to profes-
sional suicide, particularly for a young student just starting out. It
results in automatic isolation from an employment system which
controls all significant. job opportunities in the entire country.
Although an individual ma.y eventually find some kind of employ-
ment, he has in effect placed himself under governmental "super-
vision", which itself can be a serious matter. His original refusal to
accept a state assignment, has become a permanent part of his per-
sonnel record. Even if he relents, as the reluctant medical student
did, his future assignments, salary, and promotional opportunities
have been irreparably blighted.
Offices directly involved in national security have Cie highest
priority- in personnel recruitment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
for example, usually has first call on students in the social sciences, in
foreign languages and in area studies. It takes the larg.--st part of
the graduating class from the country's basic foreign service training
school. Those selected by the ministry from other insti_utions are
generally out of the top half of their classes. An assignment to the
ministry "must be complied with" and is accompanied by it thorough
security check. Almost all professional employees are believed to be
members of the party or the Youth League. The Ministry also
en oys a high priority in filling its personnel needs from other agencies.
The nation's scientific effort also gets priority attention in the
assignment of better students. This effort is planned ard overseen
by the 30--35 divisions, including divisions for atomic cnergx and
national defense, of the Scientific and Technological Commission.
Most of the actual scientific work is, however, handled by the Academy
of Sciences, in specialized academics run by individual ministries and
in industry or at the universities. The importance of the Academy
of Sciences in this effort. is indicated by the fact that a principal part
of the nation's research and development in such vlt.tl fields as
nuclear physics and missiles is carried out at various institutes of the
academy. The academy ensures a. supply of qualified personnel by
running its own training programs in its own schools. The academy
doubtless gets the pick of the. students trained.
Tran.. fer and promotion
Once assigned to a critical job or agency, an individua.1 has almost
no horizontal mobility-at least not on his own initiative. The system
which forces him into a niche, keeps him there. Transfers, like assign-
ments, are arranged largely on the basis of the state's -iced and to
refuse a transfer initiated by the state is likely to be detrimental to
one's career.
Good performance or personal contacts can bring an individual to
the attention of another agency with a clearly higher priority, and
transfers can usually be arranged at the instigation of such an organiza-
tion. Poor performance can result in a transfer either to less critical
agencies or to less important, responsibilities within the same agency-.
There are also lateral transfers from agencies respon3ible for de-
veloping particular skills. This kind of transfer occur: frequently,
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in the national security field, from military to civilian agencies.
Special police and security offices, for example, in the governmental
structure are usually staffed by military veterans with special training
in this kind of work. Organizations needing personnel trained in
secure communications procedures recruit almost exclusively from
the military. Other specialized agencies, such as the Bureau of
National Statistics and the Ministry of Public Security, train special-
ists on a continuing basis and make them available to other govern-
ment agencies as normal placement procedure.
Although it is not impossible to arrange one's own transfer in
Communist China, such transfers are not common. The government
does entertain requests from individuals for reassignment, though
probably not from the national security field. The best reason for
such a request, from the government's point of view, is that the
individual's specialty is not being used. Misplacement does occur.
For example, at one time a reported 10 percent of the "advanced
intellectuals" in the employ of one ministry were holding down jobs
which did not utilize their specialized training.
Promotional prospects in the governmental service depend on much
the same criteria as in the party. The first concern of the authorities
is in most cases likely to be political reliability. Like his colleagues
in the party, the non-party professional has to attend regular study
meetings. Though these are generally neither as frequent nor as
intensive as for the party man, the nonparty professional finds he
must also express his opinions on the issues under discussion. This,
of course, gives big brother in the party a chance to measure his po-
litical attitude. If it is judged inadequate, his other qualifications
will have to be outstanding before he will have a chance to be recom-
mended for promotion.
Still, professional excellence probably does count for more here than
it does in the case of the purely party man. A man could conceivably
advance quite high in an economic or scientific institution on profes-
sional merit. But lie would find, ultimately, that he was closed off
from the top posts unless or until he was accepted into the party.
Veterans' preference
Veterans from the armed forces are employed in large numbers
at all levels of responsibility in the Chinese government. Military
retirement laws dating from the mid-1950's provide that all demo-
bilized military personnel must, if they are physically fit and under
55 years of age, take job assignments arranged for them. These
assignments, like those of civilian professionals, are virtually com-
pulsory. High-ranking officers or personnel with special qualifications
are usually. assigned jobs before they leave the army. If an indi-
vidual has no particular skills of use to the government or the party
he is sent home. The personnel department of the government
in his local area is responsible for providing him with a job. Some
sort of employment is arranged, from a comfortable spot in an aca-,
demic institution to difficult manual labor in factories or on farms.
Ex-soldiers also receive special salary considerations. Their mili-
tary rank is converted to a roughly equal civilian grade. The actual
salary paid a veteran is determined by a combination of this grade
and his length of military service. A veteran can thus draw a higher
salary than a nonveteran in the same job. One other factor con-
tributes to veterans' preference in Communist China. The armed
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forces political indoctrination program is one of the regime's most
effective. It tends to make veterans, many of whom ar, party mem-
bers, especially reliable. Veterans are therefore likely to be con-
sidered for responsible positions ahead of nonveterans.
In-service training
Many of the ministries and commissions of the Chinese govern-
ment run inservice training courses for their personn-l, usually at
specialized institutions in which they have an interest. One such
institution is the Chinese Institute for International Relations in
Peiping. Financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Min-
istry of Education, it is under the operational control of the party.
It provides training in international affairs, foreign languages, and
area studies. Selection for study at the institute is considered a mark
of distinction and the herald of higher positions to come.
Most of the Institute's 600 students are drawn from party cadres
of the low and middle levels, foreign service officers who have already
had a tour abroad, or employees of the ministry, and employees of
other government and military offices-- all of whom receive their salary
while attending the school. It does accept some highly qualified
middle school graduates. Entrance requirements read like the re-
quirements for party membership--political reliability, f, family back-
ground untainted by wealth or political ties with the Kuomintang,
and no foreign connections.
The curriculum of the Institute is organized around a two- to
three-year program for foreign ministry officers who have already
served abroad, and a four- to five-year program for training language
and area specialists. It is based on the study program of the insti-
tute's Soviet counterpart. Studies include basic academic courses
(geography, History, law), political theory courses (Marxism-Leninism,
the history of the Chinese revolutions, dialectical materialism), foreign
affairs (history of international politics and economic relations,
international public and private law, the history of Chinese diplo-
macy), and foreign languages (English, French, Russian, German,
Spanish, and Arabic). The major emphasis of the institute is on
political theory. The major language effort is on English.
Government incentives
The promotional possibilities for professionals in Conmunist China
range from an entering grade 21 for a college graduate .o an effective
ceiling at about grade 11. A Handful of top executives hold the
ton super grades. The wage differential between grade 11 and grade
21 in Communist China is about the same as exists in the U.S. civil
service system between the professional entering grade, GS -5, and
the top regular grade, GS-15. Wage levels for professionals in the
government have been generally stable and promotions slow. The
government wage structure was last overhauled in 1956.
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 App SgVf&fl%?Vq
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT CATEGORIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
(Approximate job classification systems in civil service,
military, industrial, and academic posts)
Industry --I r- Academic ---I
Management Engineers 'Admin. Faculty
Chairman, CPR
LP1
g x
Staff
Offi
Minist
ce Heads
ers
6
7
8
Col. Ga.
Lt. Gen.
Sr. Cal.
Some University
Presidents
Some
V. Presidents
Prof....
Ast. ProFessors
Lecturers
.0
t5
14
15
Lr. Colonel
Office Heads
16
Major
Section Heads
Grade 5
17
Sr. Captain
D.P. Sect. Heads
Grade 6
18
Technicians
Captain
19
Sales Representatives and
Shop Foremen
20
1st Lt.
21
(Professionals)
2nd Lt.
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Appra ec$' `fat eaneMQ41P 9 !,QPtPNK` 5 PA W c2
A government professional gets certain perquisites which determine
his actual standard of living. Emoluments in hous;ng, food, and
clothing allowances are allowed high-level officials. Lesser officials
in certain kinds of wortc such as personnel whose jobs bring them
into frequent contact with foreigners receive better living allowances
than the average employee of the same grade. Welfare benefits in
the form of medical services and schools for dependents also are
linked to professional status and grade.
Housing is at a premium in China. The higher onie's grade the
better the chance of being able to live with one's family, to obtain
attractive accommodations, privacy, and enough equipment for
relative comfort.. For the ninny government employees whose jobs
do not permit them to live with their families, the regime has a leave
system which allows an individual to spend two to three weeks it
year, or four to five weeks every two years with his fan ilv.
Oil top of this, persons employed by organizations responsible for
national security reportedly receive special attention in the alloca-
tion of daily necessities. The armed forces receive excellent treat-
ment in comparison with the population at. large, and the relatively
high standard of living of employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
compared to other government functionaries has been noted by visitors
to Peiping.
The Chinese Communist regime employs to advantage certain non-
material incentives. It offers, for example, idealistic young people a
chance to participate in the vital find challenging job of modernizing
China. This factor is known to have played a large part in the return
of hundreds of educated Chinese from the U.S. and Europe in the
early 1950's. It is a factor heavily emphasized in university-level
indoctrination programs.
A second non-material incentive is access to literature that has not
been pre-masticated by the regime's propaganda apparat us.
The government's awards system seems designed more to promote
loyally to the regime than improvements in efficiency and performance.
This system now in use provides for the granting of commendations,
prizes, cash, grade raises and promotions on the following grounds:
1) loyalty to the job; 2) superior or model performan^e of duties;
3) observance of discipline; 4) suggestions, innovations, and inventions
which contribute to the national welfare; 5) actions protecting govern-
ment, property or preventing loss to the government; and G) fighting
illegal activity. Four out of the six are reflections of political reli-
abifity rather than outstanding professional achievement-3.
There are also regulations on the books which are spacifically de-
signed to reward outstanding professional achievement. Under
these, original contributions in both natural and social science are
afforded national recognition and cash awards. The only publicized
use of these awards occurred nearly six years ago.
Of course, there is the other side of the incentive coin. The gov-
ernment civil servant can fall afoul of the government's supervisory
apparatus quite as easily as a party man can he enmeshed in his,
and for equally capricious reasons. There is no legal code in Com-
munist China. There is a system of courts in China, but the courts
are not independent; they are only another arm of the executive.
There is also a system of public prosecutors, whose chief task it is to
check on government offices and employees to see that state regula-
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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PRO
tions are observed by all administrative agencies, officials and the
public at large.
The major responsibility for maintaining public order and policing
the governmental apparatus, however, rests in the Ministry of In-
terior and the Ministry of Public Security. Interior is believed to
take care of administrative cases involving government agencies and
officials, to investigate how government decisions are being imple-
mented, and to detect neglect of duty or violations of regulations.
The Ministry of Public Security performs the general police function
vis-a-vis the public. It has the largest and best trained investigative
force, which is apparently used from time to time by other supervisory
organs of party and government. These organs, primed to act at the
whim of the central authorities, provide an important, if negative,
slice of any government employee's incentive.
IV. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
The present leaders of the Chinese Communist Party clearly recog-
nize that the country's armed forces, the largest single component of
national security personnel in China, constitute the keystone of their
past and future power. They take elaborate measures to assure the
tightest possible party control over the military. They regard the
proper staffing of the military establishment as a vitally important
vehicle of this control. As Mao has remarked, "the principle is for
the party to direct the gun and not for the gun to direct the party."
The final say in party policy toward the armed forces rests with
Mao and his colleagues on the Standing Committee. The formulation
of general military policy for the party is, however, entrusted to the
Military Affairs Committee, one of the most potent of the party's
central organs. Key members of the committee hold the top posts in
the Ministry of National Defense, which stands at the apex of the
purely military chain of command. Trusted party men hold all top
military posts.
The party has provided itself with two further checkreins over the
armed forces at all levels. The first is the extension of party com-
mittees, similar to those in civilian organs, to the military. The
second is the system of political officers under the General Political
Department in the armed forces. Every military unit, at least as
far down as the company level, has both a party committee and a
political officer. This provides the party with both horizontal con-
trol, from civilian to military party committees on the same level, and
vertical control, through the General Political Department's political
officer system.
The military affairs committee
On this body Mao Tse-tung has gathered his most trusted old line
military leaders and political officers still active in the armed forces.
It is likely that the marshals who helped Mao to his successes in the
revolution are all on the committee. The names are a roster of old
revolutionary heroes: Lin Piao, Liu Po-cheng, Lo Jung-huan, Ho
Lung, Nieh Jung-then, Hsu Hsiang-Chien, Yeh Chien-ying. Mao
probably sits in on the more important committee sessions; Lin Piao
Is probably the effective operating chieftain.
Over the years this group of men scored many victories by following
the accepted Maoist precepts of party primacy. They still tend to
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look first and foremost to ideological purity and political dependability
in determining individual qualifications for military posts, and can
be expected to try to keep a firm lid on creeping professionflism in the
armed forces.
In at least one instance, however, the question of an individual's
political reliability crept right into the ranks of the committee.
Between 1957 and 1959 Peng Teh-huai, Minister of National Defense
and a leading figure on the commmittee, spearheaded a group which
attempted to "regularize" the armed forces, i.e., to emphasize profes-
sionalism in the officer corps in port at the expense of political sub-
servience. The party, considering this a "purely military point of
view," sacked Peng and his supporters. Peng's reported attempt to
elicit Soviet support contributed to his downfall.
Remnants of Peng's ideas continue to annoy the more orthodox
leaders. Sonic officers have apparently continued to argue that the
"suddenness and complexity" of modern warfare render the party
committee system in the armed forces dangerously cumbersome and
inefficient. Mao's supporters respond that officers holding such
views "estrange themselves from politics * * * and regard the army
as a thing above class and above politics." Even in fire present era
of military dependence on technology, Mao and his supporters say
it is possible for all military plans to be fulfilled by depending on the
traditional Communist officer's "courage, self-confidence, fighting
ability, esprit de corps." They conclude that, today's officer must
still be a "militant revolutionary" who subordinates himself to the
party and relies for inspiration and practical guidance on the military
doctrines expounded in Mao's works.
In an effort to strengthen the approved characteristics in the officer
corps, Peiping holds up as exemplars the present members of the Mili-
tary tlffau's Committee. Peiping has specifically excluded them
along with all senior generals from mandatory retirenmenet regula-
tions. Officers at all levels are encouraged to study the memoirs of
these leaders, and are given to understand that they should model
themselves and pattern their careers on the example of these old
heroes.
As attrition begins to remove these aging committeemen from the
scene, their replacements will doubtless be judged first on political
allegiance to the present party leaders, and secondly on military
qualifications.
Some observers have noted that apparently able Chinese Comm ii-
fist military officers fail to advance in grade and position as rapidly
as would normally be expected. There can be no doubt that a failure
to impress the party leaders who make the promotions with a proper
revolutionary spirit has in many cases been responsible. Testifying
to the importance of party-oriented thinking in advancement to the
top military echelons is the fact that more than Half of the present
members of the Military Affairs Committee were once political
officers in the armed forces. One of them, Lin Pine, who if- also the
current Minister of National Defense, possesses a brillian r combat
record but is also extensively experienced in political work in the
army; another, Lo Jui-Ching, who is also the present. Chief of Staff, is
a man who made his reputation in security work.
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The general political department
The other major organization through which the party exercises
control and surveillance is the General Political Department of the
armed forces. While organizationally under the Ministry of Defense,
the General Political Department in practice enjoys a rather special
position. As the senior party agency within the armed forces, it has
its own separate channels of command and administration. It is the
only organization on its level to which the party constitution devotes
a separate article. This article states that the General Political De-
partment will, under the direct leadership of the Central Committee,
"take charge of the ideological and organizational work of the party
in the army." In fulfilling this role, the General Political Department
is responsible for all propaganda, education, and cultural activities
within the armed forces. It also has a controlling say in personnel
matters.
The political officers which it assigns to each unit of the armed
forces are responsible only to the political department, not to any
military commander. Except in the most extreme combat emergency,
the political officer must approve an operational order before it can be
implemented.
One of the major ways in which the department effects the party's
will is through its powers in controlling promotions, transfers, leave,
and efficiency reports. It also is in charge of the indoctrination of
military personnel, a more thoroughgoing program than is inflicted
on other government workers.
The man last noted as head of the department, Tan Cheng, has been
out of favor for several years. Though not formally removed, he is
doubtless no longer trusted to administer the department's delicate
and vital functions. It is more likely that one of the senior figures of
the Military Affairs Committee does this. Either Lo Jung-huan, who
has had many years of loyal service as top political man in the military,
or Hsiao Hua, who is nominally the deputy director of the depart-
ment, probably now exercises real departmental authority.
The Ministry of National Defense
Operating the defense establishment under the direction of these
party bodies are the Ministry of National Defense and the central
departments-the General Staff Department, the General Rear
Services Department, the General Training Department and the
General Cadres (personnel) Department. The top jobs in all of these
organs are controlled by Mao and the party center, and the incumbents
are trusted party men.
Professional military qualifications, however, begin to play a
slightly more important role at the second level in the ministry.
There is, for example, a rough balance between men with preponderant
military experience and men with preponderant political backgrounds
among the vice ministers of national defense and the deputy chiefs of
staff. It is at this level that the s ecial representatives of the air
force and the navy begin to be heard.
No premium is put on formal academic education in the ministry;
indeed, the average is quite low. The rise of better schooled officers,
now at more junior levels, will inevitably alter the situation in the
future.
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fE&Q O rj2&AL P 5AgRM~0 A010037-1
Apprge rnFr t1 "
Below the deputy level in the central departaiients of the ministry,
changes in personnel and infusion of new blood since 1950 have been
sufficient to give a clearer picture of overall Chinese Communist
military staffing policies. Most of the officers now holding posts at
this level are longtime specialists in their fields--ar.nor, artillery,
training, logistics, etc. Still top party leaders, possibly acting on the
recommendations of party branch committees in the Peiping head-
quarters almost certainly pass judgment on appointments at this
level. Regulations provide for the command of military regions,
districts, and armies by officers of lieutenant general grade or above.
Divisions are commanded by major generals. They are appointed
by the State Council with te approval of the top party leadership
which naturally wishes to assure that the selections work against the
development of "independent kingdoms" reminiscent of the pre-
communist warlord period.
Regiments and battalions are commanded by colonels, and coin-
panics by captains. The appointment and transfer of all field grade
officers is officially the duty of the miiiistr r. Its selections are prob-
ably reviewed, prior to being formalized, by the general political
department and/or the unit party committees. Stafii.g at the com-
pany level is the responsibility of the regional military commander, or
the chief of the appropriate branch of the service, ar_d is probably
checked through the party apparatus.
Peiping keeps a full book on the training, experience, and qualifica-
tions of officers which is used along with political criteria as the basis
for promotion at field and company level. The regime has said little
about personal qualities desirable in an officer. It is clear, however,
that emphasis is put on men of action who have an ability to act
independently in it military situation and carry through actions once
started. Emphasis on these factors may be motivates in part by the
Fprobability that insistence on political acceptability :among of7icers
has caused many of them to adopt a play-it-safe attitude which in
some cases tends to sap needed military initiative.
Seniority is a factor of great importance in field and company
grade promotions. Advancement to the rank of senior colonel
requires a certain period of service in the next lower giade. A lesser
period is required for advancement to lower ranks. Time-in-service
stipulations are not immutable, however, and may be waived for
especially meritorious officers.
0rerstafng
Top-heavy staffs are a burden to both Chinese Communist field
and headquarters military units. The problem was made acute in
1955-1956 when the regime introduced some. Soviet staffing practices
alongside the existing Chinese structure. Although wholesale cut-
backs were made in 1957 and in 1960, the process amounted basically
to a reshuffling and reassignment of personnel and probably only a
token number of officers were actually retired or paced in reserve
status. The Poiping regime retains a high number of -,cneral officers
in proportion to total strength. The present ratio- some 2,000
generals to a total strength of 2,600,000 --is considerately higher than
the current, average in the better Western armies.
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Training
In the old days when the Chinese Communist army was still largely
a guerrilla force, military training was left almost entirely to the
whims of the individual commander. As a result it was piecemeal
and haphazard. By contrast, regular political indoctrination schools
have been a feature of the military scene since earliest days. In 1950,
Peiping set about to establish a centralized military training system
modeled for the most part on Soviet counterparts. It also expanded
political schooling. Judged by Western standards, the program is
still sketchy, elementary, and heavily political.
The closest equivalent to a Western command and staff college is
the Nanking Military Institute. -lore facilities for officer training
operated by the Chinese Nationalists have been taken over and ex-
panded. Promising upper rank field officers whom the regime con-
siders good prospects for advancement to general officer status
apparently form the main bulk of the student body. Both political
courses and military science subjects are taught. Courses run from
eighteen months to four years.
Several establishments in Peiping, the People's Liberation Army
Political Academy and the Academy of Military Sciences, appear to
constitute a very rough approximation of our own war college system.
The former is perhaps the top institution for political instruction con-
nected with the armed forces. Some formal academic training is
included in the curriculum, and regular classes are graduated. Both
senior political and military officers, including some general officers,
receive advanced training at the Institute.
The Academy of Military Sciences was set up in 1958 and charged
with bringing the latest scientific and technical developments into the.
study of military science in the Chinese armed forces. Its founding
was an obvious effort by the regime to try to prepare the Chinese
Communist armed forces to cope with the demands of modern
technological warfare, even if they were not yet equipped to fight such
a war. It probably supervises research into advanced weaponry and
doctrine on its use, and lectures senior military officers on these
topics.
Another organization apparently involved in this field is the
Military Engineering Academy which reportedly teaches a curriculum
heavily weighted with advanced technical subjects.
Each of the main branches of the army, such as the artillery and the
armored forces, has a separate system of schools. The air force and
the navy also have training setups which include academies for the
schooling of young officers similar to U.S. academies. Qualifications
for acceptance at such schools are determined in part by competitive
examinations.
Throughout the armed forces school system, both political and mili-
tary courses are offered. Political training is in the hands of the politi-
cal officers at the training establishments and takes up almost half of
a student's study time.
Insofar as regular in-service training is concerned, it was decreed in
1961 that the total amount of study time for officers was not to be
over 500 hours per year for officers above division level, and 300 to 400
hours per year for officers below this level. Sixty percent of this time
was to be spent on professional military subjects. The balance was
to be spent on political studios and on formal academic training.
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Specialized technical units were permit-nitto spend up to 70 percent
of their time on professional subjects.
From time to time, the regime has inaugurated "back to the ranks"
movements, the military counterpart of the civilian "down-to-the-
farm" drives. In these movements officers of all grades are required
to serve short tours of from two weeks to a month as enlisted men in
order to familiarize themselves with the problems and conditions at
basic levels. Although the emphasis on this program varies from tittle
to time, such tours are frequent enough to be considered it standard
and time-consuming Chinese Communist technique.
To provide new material for its ground force officer corps the
regime operates a number of basic officer training schools. R'on-
conimissioned officers selected by competitive examination receive up
to three years training at these institutions before obtaining their com-
missions. In lieu of attending basic officer institutes, highly qualified
non-corns may sometimes obtain c.onatuissions by passing it special
examination.
Peiping has begun to look increasingly during the past few years to
graduates of civilian college-level institutions as a source for officer
material. As early as 1955, a law provided for the establishment of a
system similar to the U.S. It0TC program to train reserve, officers in
tie universities. After graduation, persons who had been trained
under the system would, if needed, be directly commissioned and
placed on active duty. In this manner, and in the operation of the
normal graduate placement process, the armed forces draw perhaps
3 to 5 percent of an annual graduating class.
Low academic standards in the Chinese Communist officer corps
have been somewhat alleviated recently as it result of tougher regime
standards on schooling prior to induction. Today the typical o ficer
up to the rank of captain probably has the equivalent of a high school
education. In a bid to raise overall awned force academic standards,
Peiping announced a ten-year plan in 1959 to bring all officers up to
college level. Like other grandiose schemes introduced in the leap
forward period, little has been heard of the program subsequently.
It may have been discarded in the gencral training cutbacks announced
in 1960 by Defense Minister Lin Dino.
Enlisted men are schooled as non-corns through a pattern of special
battalions scattered through selected divisions. I'romisitag enlisted
men are sent to these battalions for courses lasting several months.
They return qualified as squad leaders or for higher noncommissioned
ranks. Candidates must have demonstrated their political accept-
ability as well as military aptitude before enrollment.
Since 1960 the Chinese Communists have started to shy away
from their near exclusive dependence on Soviet military training
manuals, a development doubtless spurred by the widening politicaI
breach between Peiping and Moscow. The regime clearly continues
to recognize the value of foreign military techniques, however.
For example, some U.S. doctrine leas been isguised as Chinese and
written into Communist training manuals.
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V. MANPOWER AND EDUCATION
One-quarter of the world's population lives in Communist China.
The rate of growth of this immense population showed a tendency to
rise during the early period of Chinese Communist rule, reaching a
peak of 2.5 percent per year in 1958. It probably fell thereafter to
1.5 to 2.0 percent as food shortages contributed. to a rise in the death
rate.
0-14 -------------
15-fig--------------
60-f----------------
Estimated population of Communist China by age and sex
[In millions at midyear]
Both sexes
706
231
296
321
372
31
38
The Chinese Communists made hesitant and ineffective efforts in
1956-1957 to encourage birth control. Thereaf ter the effort slowed,
and at present publicity on "family planning" is moderate and limited
in scope. It is directed almost solely towards the urban population.
The rural population snakes up over 80 percent of the total in China,
and rural births must be severely curtailed if a Chinese birth control
campaign is ever to be effective. Even if the regime were ener-
getically to prosecute a program for limiting births, a minimum period
of at least five years would probably be required before the program
would begin to reduce the national birth rate.
The labor force
The total labor force in Communist China grew from some 274
million persons in 1953 to about 316 million persons in 1962. Civilian
employment increased from an estimated 271 million persons to about
313 million persons.
More than 85 percent of the civilian force was employed in agri-
culture. Nonagricultural employment at the end of 1962 is estimated
to have been roughly 4 million persons higher than at the end of 1953.
This does not, however, reflect the significant changes which oc-
curred in nonagricultural employment under the Communists. Prior
to 1957 the creation of new job opportunities in the nonagricultural
sectors of the economy lagged behind the growth of the population.
In 1958, the "leap forward" brought an enormous expansion in non-
agricultural employment. The figure went up by more than 15 mil-
lion persons during a single year, bringing the total to 55 million.
In the ensuing economic debacle, nonagricultural employment declined
by 1962 to roughly 43 million persons.
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EMPLOYMENT OF MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL =N
CmNA (ESTIMATED FOR 1957)
COMMUNIST
Managerial personnel:
In state organs and their subdivisions-----------------------
1,600,000
In the Communist, non-Communist political parties, trade unions,
women's and youth organizations_________________________
1, 200, 000
In economic enterprises-----------------------------------
3,500,000
In education and health-----------------------------------
750,000
Subtotal-----------------------------------------------
7,050,000
Professional personnel,
Engineers----------------------------------------------
50,000
Technicians----------------------------- ---------------
450,000
Agro-technicians------------------------------------------
80,000
Teachers at all levels______________________________________
1,900,000
Doctors, interns, nurses (excluding midwives and practitioners
of Chinese medicine)------------------------------------
340, 000
Cultural and artistic personnel_____________________________
125, 000
Journalists and lawyers---------- ------------------------
30, 000
Veterinarians (trained in modern medicine)------------------
10, 000
Meteorologists-------------------------------------------
15,000
Scientists and researchers__________________________________
15, 000
Subtotal-----------------------------------------------
3,015,000
Total ------------------------------------------------
10,065,000
Although Communist China, has an abundant supply of unskilled
labor, it has always been faced with very serious shortages of technical
and skilled labor, shortages that were partially eased by Soviet tech-
nicians until they were abruptly withdrawn in nud-1900. The
Chinese Communists have attempted to expand the number and
quality of technicians and skilled workers at all levels. The increase
in the number of trained people and the accumulation of on-the-job
experience during the past decade alleviated some, but certainly not
all, of these shortages.
The educational system
Great stress has been laid on various types of education by the Chi-
neso Communists. Schools were built in all parts of the country.
Large educational complexes made up of a.. number of technical col-
legges were established. Such universities as 'Peiping, 'rsinghua and
Chiaotung, well-known before the Communist takeover, were ex-
panded. In the leap forward period of 1958-1960 the number of
institutions for which college status was claimed rose so sharply that
educational standards suffered badly. The term "college" was bastard-
ized to the point where several years later it remains difficult to estab-
lish how many institutions of higher learning are operating in China.
Institutions maintaining standards in any way comparable to higher
educational levels elsewhere may not be much above the figure of 236
existing at the beginning of the leap forward.
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Included were the following types:
Comprehensive---------------------------------------------------- 17
Polytechnical----------------------------------------------------- 10
Specialized:
Engineering--------------------------------------------------- 40
Agriculture and forestry---------------------------------------- 31
Medical (public health) ---------------------------------------- 37
Economics- - - - b
Law and politics---------------------------------------------- 8
Language----------------------------------------------------- 8
Fine arts----------------------------------------------------- 17
Physical education--------------------------------------------- 6
57
Teachers----------------------------------------------------
Others (field not known) -------------------------------------3
Total------------------------------------------------------ 236
Total enrollment in institutions of higher education rose from
155,000 in 1947-1948 to around 900,000 in 1960-1961. Enrollment
fell thereafter and by the fall of 1962 probably was less than 800,000.
There are four general types of universities and colleges operating
in China-comprehensive, polytechnical, specialized technical, and
teachers colleges. Comprehensive universities in China are compar-
able to a faculty of arts and sciences at an American university.
They train scientists and college teachers in basic disciplines such as
physics, astronomy, biology, the humanities, etc. Peiping, Futan,
and Nankai Universities fall into this category. Polytechnical uni-
versities are made up of several departments, the number of fields
covered varying in different schools. Basic engineering principles
are emphasized. Examples are Tsinghua, Chiaotung, and Harbin
Industrial Universities. The specialized colleges train personnel for
specific assignments in the iron and steel or the aeronautical industry,
in surveying, in trade and finance, etc. The teachers colleges are
intended primarily to provide teachers for middle schools. Teachers
for higher educational institutions are trained by the universities and
colleges themselves.
The number of graduates from these institutions from 1949 through
1962 is estimated to be 950,000 distributed as follows:
Engineering-----------------------------------------------------------
290
000
Science
i
,
56
000
Agr
culture -------------------------- -------------------
,
70,000
Medicine and public hoalth---------------------------------------
95
000
Teacherher training ------------------------
,
276
000
Others ----------
,
163:000
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A high quality education was received by a small proportion of these
graduates. Most did not obtain an education equivalent to that
conunonly received from accredited colleges in the United States. A
shortage of competent teachers was the major limitation. Also con-
tributing was the regime's idea that students should participate in
labor and receive a liberal amount of political education. In addition,
almost all were allowed to graduate irrespective of academic achieve-
ment, many after only two or three years of course work.
The choice of quantity over quality was consciously made. It was
probably useful in serving China's short-term needs. Narrow training
in specialized fields did turn out graduates fit to meet immediate needs
in industrial, mining, construction, and other activities. The par-
ticular specialties of these narrowly trained men were not, however,
always responsive to the demands of (lie moment.
An attempt to meet the need for higher quality in education, recog-
nized as necessary for the long pull, was maclc in the better universities
and polytechnical institutes. Curricula, length of courses, and avail-
ability of competent professors sugest that some graduates of these
schools were relatively well trained. Even in these schools there was
some sacrifice of quality. Most students were required to take part
in physical work and time-consuming political indoctrination meetings.
Teachers were overloaded. Effectiveness of the better professors was
further reduced by burdensome responsibilities for planning and organ-
izing, turning their talents to practical problems in industry and other
activities, parrying disruptive directions of party authorities, and
trying to carry out their work in a general atmosphere of frantic
urgency to meet ill-defined and changing goals.
Graduate work
Chinese universities have failed to produce (lie needed numbers of
qualified people prepared to go forward into graduate work. The
Academy of Sciences in 1955 and 1956 tried to recruit candidates for
a four-year program of graduate training. The selection was to have
commenced in August 1955 but only 65 qualified students had been
selected by March 1956. In the fall of 1956 the academy found only
268 out of 1,470 applicants qualified for its program. Part of the
problem was that many universities were retaining students for their
own graduate programs started at about the same time. The situa-
tion was so bad that in 1958 the academy set up its own University of
Science and Technology to prepare students for later work at the
graduate level.
The graduate programs that got under way six years ago have not
flourished. Apparently no new graduate students were taken into the
program after 1956 until the fall of 1962 when the academy enrolled
213 and the universities about 1,600. None was reported to have
completed his work until the fall of 1.962, six years after the program
started. The academy reported in February 1963 that 99 had com-
pleted their work and that over 400 were in training. Current. graduate
enrollment in the universities may be in the order of 2,000. The num-
ber is not adequate for China's needs.
Limitations on enrollments in the graduate program appear to rest
in largo part on the shortage of scholars capable of and available for
service as tutors. In 1956 only some 200 persons in the academy
were named tutors; only about 130 were named in the universities.
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Use of Soviet schools
Education of Chinese students in Soviet bloc countries has con-
tributed to the supply of new scientific and technical personnel in
China. Chinese have been trained both in Soviet universities and
colleges and in research institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences
and other academies. Practically all. Chinese students sent to the
Soviet Union after 1956 were graduate students. Previously large
numbers of undergraduates had been sent with numbers reaching
nearly 2,000 per year in 1955 and 1956. After 1960 few new students
of any level were sent, but a majority of those already enrolled con-
tinued their studies. The total number sent in all years is about
7,500 of which about 2,500 were probably graduate students. About
1,100 have completed work for the Soviet kandidat degree. Less
than 1,000, probably considerably less, are currently in training at
advanced levels in the Soviet Union.
Chinese students in the Soviet Union pursued their studies in many
fields of basic and applied science and engineering, judging by the
titles of dissertations they have published in Soviet journals. Em-
phasis was clearly on bread-and-butter subjects applicable to China's
immediate needs. Subjects supporting agriculture and public health
were the most numerous. Other fields were water conservancy,
transportation, electric power, mineral exploitation, chemical and
metallurgical industries, and machine building processes. The dis-
sertations revealed no effort to concentrate on complex new technology
associated with such fields as nuclear power, computers, modern
aircraft, or missiles.
Chinese have taken part, however, in the activities at the Joint
Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna, outside Moscow. This
institution trains personnel from all Soviet bloc countries in nuclear
physics, but not in nuclear weapons technology. The work at Dubna
is apparently not in the nature of formal study leading to dissertation
and degree.
Chinese students returning from graduate study in the Soviet
Union probably make up a large majority of the better trained now
researchers in China. Although reasonably well trained in a formal
sense, they are inexperienced. The best probably are assigned to
research institutes of the Academy of Sciences and other academies
or to the universities.
Scientific manpower
The leaders of Communist China appreciate the importance of the
contribution made by science and technology to national strength.
They want effectively planned and directed research in well-equipped
and staffed laboratories. Chinese capabilities in this direction have
been greatly strengthened over the past decade. Progress, however,
has been less than might have been expected from their resources
and furious activity. Several factors helped stunt the full flowering
of Chinese science.
First of all, many well-trained scientists in China were educated in
the western non-Communist world. The regime regards their political
reliability as doubtful. The leaders cannot risk placing such men in
policymaking roles. They are even hesitant about placing such men
in positions of lower level authority without the constant and over-
riding presence of a politically proven party stalwart.
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Secondly, the Chinese Communists' passion for quick success led
them to use special methods which frequently were not as productive
as more traditional means. Research work projects were started,
then stopped, under misconceived plans. Availafle research tech-
nicians were misused. Large numbers of poorly trained researchers
were thrown into projects as though quantity would substitute for
quality. The initiatives of experienced researchers were frustrated
all too often by party cadres attempting to manage researchers as
though they were machines with on-and-off buttons.
Thirdly, planning for the training of technical personnel has failed
in many cases to balance supply and need. The attempt to fix the
numbers needed in a narrow technical specialty three to five years
ahead has seemed beyond Chinese capabilities. By he time students
complete their three- to five-year programs of higher education, needs
in many cases have changed. For example, t??e ragime trained so
many Russian interpreters and translators that tlicy were in excess
lo before relations with the Soviets began to cool.
The major staffing problem in China's scientific organizations is
of course, to find enough competent scientists and teachers. At the
present time, they have in general a few qualified men backed by a
large body of poorly trained and inexperienced personnel. They lack
the large group of medium quality, ex erienced researchers of the
kind. that make up the main body of the scientific community in a
technologically advanced society.
China has a few well-trained and competent scientists in nearly
every area, of technology. Therefore, useful progress can be made in
almost any scientific or engineering project of sufficiently high priority.
However, there are not enough first-rate people around to make
progress in more than a limited number of advance] projects at any
one time. The rate of progress on a priority project can be stepped
up only by a process of bleeding other projects.
The training of scientists and technologists appears lately to have
been put on a more promising track, but the principal resource for
advancement, the well-trained and experienced tutor, remains in short
supply. There is no crash program that can solve the problem.
The dissemination of news and opinion in Communist China is
managed virtually in its entirety. The voice of dissent is infrequently
raised. The leaders in Peiping see their problem in this area largely
one of mobilizing the party, the government and the population behind
their programs. Principal communications media arc used almost
exclusively to instruct and goad.
The party rank and file and the people are told only what the
leaders feel is necessary for the purpose of carrying out instructions.
Rarely does a hint creep out of policy disagreements within the
privileged circle. The party does not regard the spread of dissenting
views expressed within this circle as at all helpf-il, and they are
rigorously suppressed.
Classified channels
The principal means used by the leaders to propagate the party line
are classified communications, the open press and radio, and study
meetings. Classified publications and documents flow out of the
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party center by secure telecommunications, by post, and by hand or
word of mouth. Leading party figures travel a good deal bringing
the latest word from Peiping. Lesser leaders from the outlying areas
are brought to Peiping for the same purpose.
The Chinese Communists are intensely suspicious and their security
practices are stringent. In fact, they incline to overload the system
and hold tightly a range of information openly available in other
countries.
Many party and government organs produce restricted publications.
These go to a selected clientele, usually officials who have reached a
designated level of responsibility or who occupy posts affected by a
new turn in the line. The contents are used by such officials as a
guide to their day-to-day activities and as background for lectures
to subordinates. One such publication is Reference News, a daily
bulletin which does little more than rehash foreign news dispatches.
The fact that such a publication is distributed only to officials whose
duties are judged to require it testifies to the Chinese Communists'
security mania. Open technical publications from abroad are han-
dled in a similar fashion.
The party press
Despite this preoccupation with security, a reliable key to Peiping
thinking can be found in the pages of party publications like People's
Daily and Red Flag. They are carefully studied, for a reader is aware
that be may be called upon for a personal elucidation of passages at
the next meeting of his study group. The Chinese party press, with
its captive audience, is surely among the dullest reading matter
offered on a daily basis anywhere in the world.
Articles in the top Peiping publications regarded as especially
important get broad and timely dissemination. They are broadcast
to both domestic and foreign listeners. Materials so handled are
speeches by important regime figures, communiques from Central
Committee sessions, vital editorials and a host of lesser items. This
material frequently appears verbatim in papers outside the capital
the same or the following day. Collections of pertinent articles on a
common theme are sometimes gathered into a pamphlet and distrib-
uted at home and wherever possible abroad.
Meetings
The meeting is a third channel which supplements and fills out the
other two. Meetings and conferences seem to be a necessary part of
life in all societies, but in few places do they absorb so much of the
person's time and energies as in Communist China. The Chinese
Communists have raised the meeting almost to a governing technique.
From national conferences held in Peiping with great magnificence to
the neighborhood study meeting in a humble dwelling down the block
group discussions are a prominent feature of the Chinese intellectual
landscape.
Meetings can be strictly party affairs, or they can involve a mix of
party and non-party types in which the party element is always
dominant. The objective is to communicate decisions reached by
constituted authority, to explain these decisions, to persuade those in
attendance as to the wisdom of the course chosen and to point out to
them their part in carrying out the decision.
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Even plenary sessions of the party's Central Committee can be
viewed in this light. They rovide the opportunity for an airing of
policy lines which have beenhaniuiered out in earlier, more restricted
sessions. Regional and local party conferences follow to "pass along
the spirit" of the. Central Committee's deliberations.
The same is true of sessions of the National People's Congress,
Lite, China People's Political Consultative Conferen- e, and the, Supreme
State, Conference. Led by top party men, they are essentially mcet.-
ings of citizens, whose counsel may at times be genuinel valued but
who are normally brought together to Bear party leaders expound
party policy. An effort is made at such meetings to try and impart to
the non-party delegates a sense of participation in the process of ruling
China.
There are also specialized conferences like it statistical work con-
ference, or a conference on political work in [lie armed forces. These
bring together a group of important- officials inycolvcd in a common
undertaking. Some may precede a party decisio-i on a given subject
and may thus represent an opportunity for the exT=resign of individual
opinion. But most publicized meetings are convened for the leader-
ship to display its interest in a given topic and expose its views thereon.
Some conferences are used, at least partially, as incentives. For
example, the. party sponsors periodic conferences of labor heroes, acti-
vists and other "advtine&d elements." individuals are brought to
Peiping at public expense. Sonic are accorded the- Honor of meeting
key to such as conference doubtless confers Tse-tung status locally on
the recipient.
Bye far the most prevalent meetings are the regular sessions of one's
local study group. Stimulated and directed by party cadres, these
small groups of 10- 30 persons meet regularly throu~liout China.
The leaders plainly attach much importance to there since they are
willing to accept the significant losses in productive time which they
entail. These meetings may take up no more than a few hours a
week or they may occupy half a day or more every day over an ex-
tended period.
Attendance at time meetings, like ninny other activities in Communist
China, is ostensibly- voluntary. Social and other pressures are,
however, exerted against absenteeism. Anyone so bold as to cut the
meetings Could expect visits from local party cadres, friends and
colleagues which would be continued until he relented. In the view
of one ex-resident of the mainland, attendance is "like going to
church in an orphanage."
The topics of these meetings are usually current affairs as seen
through the eyes of the party lenders. The Sino Soviet dispute and
Khruslichev's ninny shortcomings were popular subjects during 1962.
The lender, normally a party member, opens a meeting by outlining
[lie party's thought on the selected topic. Everyone joins in the
subsequent discussion. Failure to speak out is regarded as suspicious.
Persistent refusal to play- the game would probably result in it request
for a written explanation. This paper would then form the subject
matter of a subsequent meeting. Members of the group would
subject the explanation to a searching critique for completeness and
sincerity, both highly valued in a self-criticism of this sort.
Meetings are sometimes used to persuade an individual or a group
of individuals to accept son--e new task. At the height of the down-
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to-the-farm movement in 1959-1962, meetings to persuade those
earmarked for movement were common. Not many city dwellers
were anxious to go out and live and work with the peasants, but there
were few recorded instances of refusal after a few persuasion sessions.
The earnestness of the group's persuaders was doubtless stimulated
by a realization that a lack of all-out effort on their part would only
single them as likely candidates for the next batch.
The Chinese Communists have no fixed way of dealing with
offenders. One method is to expose an individual to public humilia-
tion and ridicule at a "struggle" meeting. Struggle meetings were
more common during the land reform movement in the early 1950's
than they are now. They are still used, however, to deal with persons
charged, for example, with counter-revolutionary activities. The
meetings are not meant to be public trials. Individuals brought
before them have already been judged guilty. The objective is to
provide a salutory example for the people.
Such a meeting might be opened by a recitation by the presiding
cadre of the political crimes committed, the heresies written, spoken Or'
thought. Comments are invited from the audience, an invitation
scarcely to be ignored since silence contains the suggestion of similar
infection. The meeting may accept a sniveling confession from the
person being "struggled" with or move directly to sentencing, usually
either execution on the spot or an open-ended sentence at labor
reform. Those who have attended become active agents of regime
retribution.
Just how effective are these various methods of spreading the word?
The system appears to operate very well when it comes to disseminat-
ing regime policy downward. It is in fact one of the most effective
things the Chinese Communists do. The system operates less well
in other directions. It has been used too frequently by the leadership
to smell out real or potential dissent. As a result it has become a
sluggish instrumentality for conveying suggestions to the leaders or
for informing them of real conditions in the country.
This difficulty in upward communications bothers the leaders at
the party center. They have launched periodic campaigns to stimu-
late discussion and even criticism, and to insist on veracity in reports
made to them. They are doubtless sincere, but such efforts encounter
formidable obstacles. For one thing an individual can never be quite
sure where the boundaries of permissible debate are at a given time.
The boundaries shift, and what seems permissible today may turn out
to be the rankest sort of deviation tomorrow. Chinese have before
them the lesson of the aftermath of the liberalization effort of early
1957 when the party promised free debate--to "let one hundred
flowers bloom, let all schools of thought contend." Many of the
flowers turned into poisonous weeds in a short period of time, and a
number of careers were blighted. Recollection of this makes for
caution in accepting present party encouragement to speak out.
Nevertheless, genuine intellectual debate does take place. In
1962, for example, economic publications printed articles which
advanced suggestions on how resources could be used more effectively.
Others discussed in fairly frank terms the problems of economic
management in a socialist state. One even offered the argument
that profits had a role to play in a socialist economy. The airing
of such ideas was clearly not an. attempt by the leaders, who would
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probably regard the last argument as perilously close tc heresy, to
propagate a now party line. It seems rather to have been part, of an
attempt to extend somewhat the boundaries of permissible intellectual
VII. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SYSTEM
The guiding principles of Chinese Communist personnel manage-
ment were formulated in the less complicated world of the Chinese
revolution and do not appear to have been markedly chRRnged since.
They include: 1) the absolute supremacy of the party, 2) a highly
centralized management technique, and 3) a remarkable continuity
and unity of purpose at the top echelons. They have produced a
disciplined and dedicated elite, but at some cost in fle:dbility and
individual initiative.
Mao Tse-tung and his closest associates are strong personalities,
the result of rigorous Chinese Communist selection processes. The
leading group has displayed high organizational and administrative
capabilities. It has been able to move with dispatch on some issues
confronting China. Its approach to others has been halting. It
moved very quickly to exploit to Chinese advantage Soviet discom-
fiture as n result of the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962. Communes
were set up almost overnight in 1958, but the three-year retreat from
these ill-conceived units has, on the other hand, been slow Ind ainful.
Party personnel processes have brought to the second level of
authority devoted, loyal men who share the aims and convictions of
the top leaders and speak the same language. They are men who
have had many years of administrative experience, men who have
proven themselves to be tough and ruthless. Only true believers get
this far in the system. As a group they are more likely to be versed
in Mar.sm Ikninism and the teaching of Mao than in a technical
specialty.
Many middle and lower level officials appear able, bur, there does
seem to be a shortage of good administrators and managers. These
lesser officials opperate in a system which constantly peeaehcs dis-
cipline. Naturally, many fail to develop an aptitude for vigorous,
independent action. They became adept buck-passers, bureaucrats
who check too many things with Peiping. This further overloads the
top command in which key figures already hold several concurrent
jabs. These officials can givo'less than full time and energy to any
one of their posts. These men, whether in high party position or low,
are in a sense the end product of Chinese Communist political indoc-
trination. This striking program has to a great extent created and
maintained a unity of approach unthinkable in a democratic state.
No real apposition is countenanced and no alternative courses are
offered. There is relatively little wheel-spinning over -objective or
method.
The framework for recruitment, transfer and promotion focuses
a great deal of power and responsibility in a few hands. The domi-
nant leaders identify national security priorities and commit talent
to favored programs in complete freedom. People selected for jobs
have no real individual safeguards such as exist in the U.S. or Western
nations. Most Chinese accept this sort of treatment', go where
they are told to go by the authorities and do what the-,,, are told to
do. There is no outside competition for talent. Recr.utment and
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assignment of personnel present no problems; undesirable turnover
is rare.
The system permits the authorities to channel the country's best
talent, insofar as it is available, into key areas of national policy.
Great efforts are made to stimulate work in approved scientific,
technological and economic fields, especially those related to the mar-
tial arts. This work is supported and directed by the party.
However, the system does try, all too frequently, to force round
pegs into square holes. The overall record of the assigning authori-
ties might be termed fair to good.
Persons who have visited Communist China testify that the average
Chinese Communist functionary is a hard worker. This is partly the
result of the existing personnel system. Competition is fierce, and
the individual must make his way within the mold in which the system
has cast him. There is no opportunity to shift jobs, or even to resign.
Advancement depends entirely upon pleasing the authorities above.
The asceticism preached by the party helps produce individuals willing
to devote themselves fully to their work. The sense of dedication
today may not be what it was in the earlier years, but enough remains
so that it is a significant strength of the Chinese Communist system.
Material incentives are present and important in keeping the
Chinese functionary bent to his task. His perquisites are small, but
valued amidst the general poverty of China. These functionaries also
work under the stimulus of a system of retribution which operates on
abstract and shifting principles.
Overstaffing is a problem in today's China. Swollen staffs can be
attributed in part to the Chinese Communist practice of giving on-the-
job training to people who will be moved to staff other offices or fac-
tories when they are finished. A lack of mechanical aids means that
many office and factory tasks, done elsewhere by machine, are done
by hand in China. But the most telling reason is simply China's
tremendous population.
Skilled manpower in China is strictly limited, yet the present leaders
fail to make full use of what they have. They seem quite willing to
fritter away some of the talent they do have.
Students who have been educated abroad are regarded, almost
without exception, with suspicion when they return to China. They
are viewed as having been infected by foreign ideas. It is up to them
to prove otherwise, and over the long haul. Many returned students,
even those afire with the desire to help build up a new China, find it
hard to break through this shell of suspicion. They find that the
party will not make full use of their hard-won skills.
The leaders in fact find it hard to rely fully on technically trained
people, no matter where their education was won. There are in China
competent scientists and economists who could contribute more than
they do to the development of plans and practices. These people
are, under the operation of the present personnel system, rigidly
excluded from policymaking roles. The dominant figures-dogmatic,
poorly educated and distrustful men-prefer to rely for advice on
long-term associates who share the leaders' background, prejudices
and shortcomings.
Talent is also wasted in the party's obsessive drive for political
conformity. Countless man-hours are devoted to political indoctrina-
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t-ion and lost to production or the search for technical knew-liow. The
authorities are willing to pay the price.
The personnel situation in Communist China today is in some ways
like that in the Soviet Union during Stalin's dying days. The top
strata, overu-orked, old and tired, forms an impenetrable roadblock
for those below. The bureaucracy is stagnating. Advar cement, even
of able and trusted people, is generally slow and ondcrous. Party
seniority and personal relationships are still major factors in selection
for responsible positions. What remains to be seen is whether the
departure of the present leaders will rejuvenate the system.
d
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