STATEMENT OF BUSHROD HOWARD, JR., ADVISER TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF YEMEN, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE SENATE, ON JUNE 21, 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280083-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: June 21, 1963
• Content Type: STATEMENT

ranent ai t~ Kih~clam a# the Yuen.
~TI~1fiEMENT C3F ~U3HR4D HC3WA.RI3~ R., AY3VISER
..,.~ ..
.Tt?,~H~ ~vE~NMENT 41~' n M~NGD4M OF R
q~~~~~ ~~~~~~1 `~!_.Ili, _"+ .Y~rn.. ~~~uis
-In I?acsmber, Nasser tad abant 1Z
,
open Egyptian ag~resscan and it:tsrvention, despite th+t`aleas short i'orimd
_ . ..
control of more than one third. of the country b1- the Lo7ts-liet Gt3wtt-tttsnt~ despite
the unwillingness of the population in the area controlled h?Y tlt+s
for the Rebels the United States on December I'~1th rac~o~a~issd;'iheJAst~s1 ss`ir~
and helped them. otRaitt ~''emen`s IA13 seat.
V.9. APFROVES AGGRE33I4N
This is a mast dangerous precedent.
ported a doctrine against which we haws fought since the end of World mar II:
A revolution immediately followed by the iAtsrvention aFf a foreign army to
maintain the Re~ela in power. .While the formees g.oYerrufnsnt is still,ss~istins
effectively and maintains control to a Ysry ru~tstaatia2 area of the ~ount~, the
Rebels are recognized on the grounds that the other government is reactionary
and it is progressive.
The recognition of the Sallal regime by the United Statss has not barn es-
plained. It was said that Nasser had agreed to withdraw his troops from the
Yemen, then estimated at 1 2,000, it- retarn fc~r raco=aitian o~ his puppet regime.
But by mid-February. Nasser had 30,000 troops in the Ysntien. Ia that
month he was able to mount a successful attack on the al-Jauf plain between
Sanwa and Sa'ada. As a result he was able to''oceupy" the Eastern I)sssrt.
iiUNKER-BUNGHE MISSIONS
Cln March 1, 1'463, the time vat the $uac2u Visit ~ Yem~ea+
1~iastsr an?
nouneed that the war was over and rssi~tanca had collapiisd. ~tan'bassador
Elaworth Bunker's mission was considered by the Stag Departmsmt to ~ a fa,ca-
saving way for Grown Prince Faisal to "disengage" himself frvrn a last catwsss^
All other observers felt that withdrawal of the Egyptisarr would lead th+t'
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immediate collapse of the Reber. In fact bY' March:ll. the Loyalists erere
already countarattatking in the al-Jauf .plain. $ythe ~isst week.ot April, they
had reestablished ?ontact with Southern franc. By Msy 2lT. +-~1 the al-J'au~ plain
had been recaptured and Loyalist forces hsd reached the Sata''a-~tod~~da rva~t?
Reports bath from the Yemen and from American"reporter indicate that
the Royalists have made very substantial ~itary progress air-ce the- middle e!
March and there is no question that thsy can witx as ~-cac~ asi ~~F~~yptians witb-
draw,
Egyptian rtrategy is plain: terror hq~rrnbing. Last week iA addition to
napalm bombs, high explosive and strafi~. Isere are two reported raids. with
the use of poison gas,, Thir has been the pattern.. of the $~gtisn, a~gressioa,
when defeated on the ground, they have sssorted to increased air
.~
THE AGREEMENT' OF APRIL $. 1963 .
Un April 8, 1963, the represent:tivss of the UAR and sff Saudi Arabia
signed an agreement to cease their intervention is the XerneA.c~.iv~il was"F~ to
accept the supervision of this disersgagemsnx ~' tie tT~ited !'~pation~, , The, UAR
agreed to stop all fighting within the Yemen and to withdraw #~ts troops and
planes. Saudi Arabia agreed to stop supplyixs~ ors and baser to the Loyalists
and to establish z 12- I /2 kilornetar demilitarized cone on either side of the
Saudi Arabian-Yemen border. ,_ _..
Saudi Arabia immediately put its .side of the llgreert~ent into fosse. Nasser
not only stalled, giving the excuse that the tTN observers were not in place, but
publicly repudiated the Agreement in a speech at Cairo... Qn Ma-y 22, bye pro-
. ,
claimed to his Arrny,
"You were the vanguard of thrtse forces ,~n the- ~attlefieki.
and you have tinally returned with a tr'ictary. T (Lgypt-
ian troops) are ors the Yemxeni l,~attlefieltl t tk~ ':~'~?
_.-
They will be there until it becQrn.a! certai - rvitbosrt any
deception or doubt -that the ssactitrn that tes the ~fetnem
revolution is forced through defeat to conta that b~atred
in its own heart."
A few days later Nasssr's Gemeral co~rsanding #ha g"'ax~a ~?-more
sgecific. He stated that the L~yptiad ai'~y'''~r~ ~e fsr-r' fiw y~drg~~ this
.?.
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ruse necessary to defeat the Royalists.
On Sunday Sane 2, 143, Thomas ~..Hamiltoa, the head of the 1"!i`.Y. Tia~nss
UN bureau, wrote a"'New Test fQr U. N. ~"` which states the casd admirably:
"... Tht General Assembly has beensa preoccupied...
that the most important international .issue hoar Gc-a- .
fronting the organization, the United Arab Rapublic~?
intervention in the civil was in_the Ysman. hss s~rsct~l
_ ._
little attention.
"The immediate question is wisether -sad bow sin =
Seczetary U Thant wilt go ahead with his plan to seed
200 observers to Yemen. They wrould have the drat
purpose of checking up an Saudi ~Arabia'? psomi,as tar.
step supplying military equipmeat to the farces o!' the
lnaan sad to verify Fresfdeat ~ea>~n~al Abtkal Nasssr's
compliance with his promise to withdraw the Z8,+0?~f3
traaps he sent to Yemen tar suppc-rt" the republican se-
gime .
"...In the circumstances, it is remarkable 'that rseither
the United Nations nor the United- States ?has issued a
Single word of c.ritieism of the United Arab Republic's
violation of the Charter provisions ruling out the rtes arf
farce.
"The danger of a Middle Eastern war will remain un-
less Colonel Nasser decides to suspend his aggressive
designs regarding both the Yemen and Saudi Arabia...
Actually the question whether the United Nations observ-
ers are sent to the Yemen is net of great impartsnce as
far as the immediate issue is concerned.
"As in the case of the United Natiaas Middle East farce.
which was stationed in Egypt is 1956 after the Sues crisis.
the observers would merely caastitute the outward and
visible signs of acease-and-desist agreement. 'T'heir
presence would save face for Nasser, a the event that
he decides to stay his hand. But the withdrawal spree-
meat could be carried through without them."
Shockingly, the lower policy level of the 9tat? ~?epartarterat hive actively
and consciously sabotaged the UN Agreement. They have stated that it -would
be "unrealistic" to expect Nasser to withdraw his troops from the Yemen uaail
he eras sure that 5allal could survire unaided.
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These statements have canstaatly 6eea made since the April A~rteaa~tnt
~. _ ,
by officials in the I?eparimant of Mate. 3'bis is kao~, tc- Na~~~r~ i ~!,
the rassan that he feeis that he can dei'y and deny his sq~reemeat to rr#t>tdsaw.
He beliaVes that 1`~C?THING that he does -will stop the United Mates frvrn.eoa,-
tinuing to support him financially and politically. .
The pattern of caastantly tryia~ tv outbid the Soviet XTafaa fa the caat~sst
- ,. _ ~ ,.
for Nasser"s ,goodwill has been too well a~etablirhed !os mere a~anomitiaas ;v-b-
Iicly expressed lead privately denied to haw aty et[ect.
The only wsy that Nasser can be fvres+d to abide blr his Araeaseai
_, ~ . ,
withdraw from the Yemen fs tv put is a self eafvs~cie~ ~aactfva shvuid ha s
abide by his word.
I therefore rscorriirterd thit ire 1~`a?i~ii Assi~rtance Act bd
adding the following paragraph to Sectiesa 1~~~;
""(g) No assistance shall be provided to the ~faitasd Arab
ltapublfc under this Act, os vender the A~rieriltural
I?avelopmeat and Assistaac? Act cd l4',datr, as artrended,
after Qctober 1, l9d3. Mess ~th+t Fsesideat efetfr- -~_
minas that tixe United Arab Republic :has complied with
t:he Agreement entered into by the Vaned Arab Repub-
lic, Saudi Arabia and the Secretary general of the r
TJnited Nations oa April ~, 1963."
Thi a would s ee m a mild and rear enable provision. ~ Ness er has cv
ILLEGIB
ted a clear act of aggression. He ha? premised twice to withdraw his traps
from Yemen. He has now stated that he has av intention of abiding by his .
Latest agreement. It is surely not contrary to good sense aid Eavd_pvlity ~Eor
the Langres: to decLre that Nasser shall haw av turther. Am+srican aid to
finance a war that he has premised to ?tap and that we belfew to be wranj asyd
dangerous. ~~
,--~
CC~P3SEC2UEI~CE:S OF THREAT TtJ CUT AII3 TC) I+tAS~3ER
m
Nasser now obtains all the awns and military expert: he itese~s Pram tie
Soviet Union. If American aid is withdsawa, Vassar !a*il,l tuna to ss~d hseoitis#r
totally dependent an the Soviet VAioa is the thesis of the Departaa~act of ~.
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This is not a threat. Even assuming Nasser could obtain aid from the
;, . v
Soviet Union to replace our aid, this would d~ratroy his appeal~to utaos r~la~ .
... .. ~. rte.,. ti, .
Naser's present strength is his apparent ability tc- obtain sad troaa~ both the
V.S. and then USSR regardless of his irresponsible smd aggrtasiw behsviar.
Minorities throughout the Middle East ? 1~Curds, Shia Muslims and t:6sis-
tians - tear a Nasser state. They are well aware t~f the trratnzent 4f tfte
...< __.~
atiinorities in Egypt. Small businessmen and eatreprenetera sr~ squalor a,frsid
of Nasser's socialism. All believe that there is ao hope of resisting Nasser
if he continuer to obtain the support of the United State unless they obtain tl-s
support of the Soviet Union.
Today, in Iraq, for the first time, there is s sn~I ehgac+t of a ~Lnasisa
breakthrough. fihe Kurds are #iciag~s ~=aa~ncid~c ~asnpa.ign ~T ~e prts+ent
Government. The Shia Muslims w~-o are the e~rit~r fn ffiouthera Iraq;~saad
in Buaghdad are resentful of the discrimiastion blr both, tbs l+ias~trrist? sad the
Baathists who ^tand for a unitary Sunni Arab State.. $oth the Kurds and the
Shins are well penetrated by the Gosxirnursi,sts. ~t is a matter c-f timee whey the
military power of the Kurds amill be aglied to the po'~tic~ g~owet~ of the Shia
to bring about a Russian oriented rerolutfom.
THE YEMEYV, THE U3 AND THE UN
Throughout the Middle East, and in et~s.ny other parts of tb~s wand. the
tJJN sponsored disengagement of the Yenaen is being watched. The United
States Government has intervened b^i- pressure ot: ~Sstq+!!i Arabia, $ritain d
Jordan; by the Bunker Mission; and, bir er~couragiug the UN to ttndertaks the
sesponsibility.
ILLEGI
Should the UN fail to make Nasser withdraw according to his gledg+r, it
will be as great a blow as the betrayal of Ethiopia by the League of Nations.
Yet, today any regorter will tell .you ? (1) the .State Department are
convinced that Nasser will not withdraw until, lie i? atersr that Sa11a# can.. sur-
wive, and (2.) Sallal cannot survive if Nasser withdraws.
The amendment that I suggest would in Secretary T?nlles' phrase make
the UN agreement ?elf~enfvrcing.
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~~~
To betray the Yemen by permitting Nasser to ~`launt the agreement to
withdraw will be to serve notice that the United Nations is not a, peace disking
force but a cloak for cynical appeswsement.. ILLS IB
The Administration is making a dangerous and stickle
maintain that they have a moderating intluhnce an Nasser due to A~ricau
economic aid. (They refuse to use this moderating influence, on the ground
that to use it would be to lose it, but that is another question. ~
Yet it is clear that there is a pre~ent and re*$ da4nger t'ltat Nasa+tr ~rf11
take over Saudi Arabiawith its X500 rnillioa a year _~il rsvaattrs. il~'hen-that
occurs, Nasser will no longer need American econc~ra~ic aid. .`'I'h# ta,t~d ~d?
erasing inziuence w+itt aisappear unused..
To base American policy on the continued ex~steec~s +~f the Areseut ~or-
ernrnent of Saudi Arabia is far rrlora irrrsaponstbts aed daraus than ~a
m~~ ~ , ~