DEAR SENATOR STENNIS:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250108-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 108
• Content Type: LETTER

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DRAFT
The Honorable John Stennis
? United States Senate
confirming latter from Mr. Kendall of the lame dab, I am forwardias
In response to your telephone request on.Match tub and the
Dear Senator $ismds:
the appended report on Cuba.
This appraisal. approves by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. sapplempats
the detailed information provided to the Preparedness Subcommittee by
the Director. IAA, and the Chiefs of Army, Navy. and Air Torce
Intelligence. The evaluations and estimates of this Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the current military situation in Cuba ha. e , "rect relation-
ship to existing US military contingency plans. Accordingly,. I am sure
.you will appreciate that the content of the report is highly sensitive
., information. .
I trust the appended re r is respepsive to the needs of the
Preparedness?;Subco?mitt~e.
Sincerely,
JCS and DIA'rev'iew(s) completed".
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
.runs
Joint Chiefs of Staff
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military aosture. inCuba remains essentially a sisaitisantly improved
Cuban Military establisher nt backed by?evist sir" Mall gr'O ts,
highlighted by air and coast defense systems. particular _aX-intsgritsd
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island-wide air defense network of high-performance aircraft sad
surface -to-air-missiles.
that some 2, $00 have been withdrawn. Our.pbotographic surw*llance has
Since mid-February, substantial numbers of passengers We
departed Cuba an route to the USSR. Fairly reliable reports indicate
.permitted as to make a head count of about 2,100. However, it has not
been deter-mined how many of the outgoing Soviet passengers are civilian
or military. In addition, some of the outgoing passengers may have
r
ably offsetting In part these withdrawal' several hundred now Soviet
arrivals in Cuba have been reported. Zvidence presently on hand thus
does not permit a firm conclusion as to the actual aimabsri of Soviet
been Cubans on the way to the USSR for training. Moreover, also poss-
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and coupled with the fact that no basic changes have been
Soviet military establishments in Cuba, we have not yep revised thh
of Soviet military strength as big i the magotts 017.000,
We have no indications that Soviet personnel and equipment are be
withdrawn from the four Soviet military camps at Holguin, Remedios.
Artemisia, and Santiago de lam Vegas. About 5, 000 Soviet troops have
been estimated to be in four highly mobile armored groupings at these
camps, well equipped with modern, sophisticated weapons, and about 5-,600
involved in the 24-site SA-2 missile system. The remainder are manning
the other Soviet-controlled installations and equipment or are attached
to Cuban ground, air, and naval units as advisors anddnstructors. There
are also military personnel from other Bloc countries, principally
Czechoslovakians, probably totalling not more than a few hundred. Based
on all available evidence, we believe basic Soviet capabilities in Cuba have
not been, diminished since the withdrawal of the strategic weapons, and
our estimate of Soviet troop strength in Cuba remains ease
The precise Soviet intentions for their continued military presence
in Cuba are not definable at.thia time, particularly since the scope and
phasing of the projected ,Soviet troop withdrawal are not yet clear. How-
ever. Moscow apparently hopes to maintain a sizable military presence
in Cuba? The Soviets probably calculate that such a military presence
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serves as a politico-psychological deterrent to a possible US/GAS inter-
vention in for. "they also pro"
pressure and assert influence on Cuban policy in may aritics% hags
rscowe ThASoviat troops is Cos t eoald PUT
role in the maintenance of a Communist regime. The Soviets also pro
bably assess that a prolonged military presence in Cuba will establish a
precedent in the Western Hemisphere.
Retention of sophisticated weapons systems uncter Soviet control - -
such as the MIG-21 aircraft, SA-Z's, coastal defense cruise missiles,
and the KIOMAR guided-missile boats - - may eventually raise irksome
questions of Cuban sovereignty and some Cuban resentment of the Soviet
role in Cuba. Castro, on occasion, has already indicated his opposition
to the Soviet failure to challenge continued US overflights. The presence
of Soviet combat groupings may also strain Soviet-Cuban relations because
of their ability to intervene in Cuban affairs. ? .
hhe-Eioviet"n tt1is
Ho?wsvar,Castro's internal security apparatus is in itself highly effective
and, to date, has proved quite capable of suppressing the sporadic anti-
government actions attempted thus far in Cuba. Castro's present ability
to control the Cuban population would not be greatly degraded.by the
removal of all Soviet troops.
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CUBAN MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES
The numerical strength of the Cuban ground forces is about 175. 000
approximately 75, 000 in the standing army and 100.000 in the ready
reserve. In addition, there are some 100.000 home-guard militiamen
of insignificant combat capability u eful ai a police reserve. The
standing ground forces have,cornpleted ba is unit and combined arms train.-
ing at battalion combat team level.
The capabilities of the standing army and ready reserve have been
enhanced by new equipment brought in during 962 and by further training
and experience, including mobilization during the crisis. The Cuban
ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and
to repel small-scale attacks from abroad. Their ability to defend against
a large-scale US military invasion would be limited by their lack of
training and experience and joint operations on the division level. In such
a contingency, they would have to revert fairly. quickly to static defense
or guerrilla operations, ,but only a relatively small proportion of the-C~
military establishment would be able or likely to carry out prolonged
operations of this type.
The most significant change in the Cuban military situation since
July 1962, other than the introduction and removal of Soviet strategic
weapons, is the improvement in air defense capabilities resulting from
4 -
the presence of the Soviettranned radar and communications hetworks,
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SA-Z missile sites, and MIG-21 fighters. The strong Soviet air defense
presence - - supplemented ley the Cuban-manned jet fighter force composed
of 67 MIG-l5/17/19's"and a considerable quantity of Cubsrn anti.
aircraft
artillery now gives Cuba an integrated air defense system. Although
Cubans may be trained eventually operate'the more,advance'd Soviet r~p air defense equipment, there arefc:~'-Iy $-- 4wsa indications that such train-
ing is presently taking place; and for some time Soviet manning will be
Castro's capabilities to combat guerrilla elements within his own country.
Castro now has a "vertical envelopment" capability involving the use of
land-based helicopters and paratroopers, thus severely restricting the
Considerable improvement has occurred within the past year in
required for effective use of the equipment.
reasons, the Castro regime is most unlikely, under present circumstawps,
what less than a battalion. However, for political as well as military,
ability of anti-Castro guerrilla elements to carry out sustained operations
insignificant strength.
Cuban capabilities for military operations overseas remain severely
limited by the lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans' probably
could only undertake an overseas opera tioa in limited strength of some-
POSSIBLE MILITARY THREATS FROM CUBA
Florida by single or several MIG's or B-26'i, or hIjyaod-run demolition/
from Cuba which can be envisioned are possible air raids an Southern
The principal ?mventional military actions agait the United States
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sabotage carried out by squa4sised grohps using motor torpedo boats or
the KOMAR guided-missile. boats. Although such possibilities are
recognised, these actions are considered highly unlikely because of the
risk involved in provoking a retaliatory response from the United States.
However, Castro has demonstrated a fanatic's seal and unpredict-
able temperament. We cannot totally discount the possibility that, should
he deem it necessary to sustain his cause or his position, he might
attempt aggressive actions against US shipping, the Guantanamo Naval
Base, or possibly even the Southeastern portion of the United States.
An added threat to US security could be posed by the possibility of
use of Cuban ports for logistic support o
ubmarines. However,
we have no firm evidence of Soviet intentions to establish a submarine
base in Cuba, and every report concerning this contingency is pursued
thoroughly.
Based on the conclusion that, with the 196Z withdrawal of missiles
and bombers, no such systems are presently in Cuba, we do not believe
a nuclear threat from Cuba currently exists. Although the Cubans almost
certainly use some caves for storage of supplies, ammunition and equip-
ment, intensive intelligence collection and analysis has failed to provide
that ballistic missiles are hidden in caves and secret installations in Cubao
any evidence to substantiate numerous and persistent rumors and reports .
Furthermore, comprehensive evaluation of all available information has
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United States. nor will their departure at some futuri date have any Big-
nificant Impact on our deployments to provide for the-security of the
Southeastern United States. What' is of significance is e continued
presence of'Soviet troops in this hemisphere and of weapons systems that
could conceivably be employed in a hit-and-run attack against the United
States, our aircraft or our shipping. The recent "shrimp boat" incident
lends credence to such a potential. On balance, however, it is difficult
to envision circumstances in which either the Castro regime or the Soviet
authorities would find such a course of action to their advantage. Never-
theless, the defenses of Southeastern United States have been significantly
strengthened. Two Hawk battalions, one Nike battalion, and increased
numbers of fighter aircraft have been deployed to 'Southern Florida to
cope with such an eventuality. However, the bulk of US forces deployed
during the October crisis have returned to their normal stations. Our
continuing analysis reveals that present arrangement of forces planned for
Cuban contingencies is appropriate, regardless of whether Soviet units
remain or depart Cuba. .
US FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR POSSIBLE INVASION OF CUBA
In the event the invasion of Cuba becomes necessary, it is contemplated
that moat of all of the strategic reserve forces in CONUS, ,*eluding Army,
Navy, A it and Marine forces, will be employed if and as V
oire$
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produced no evidence of the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Storage
.. abandoned. In addition. there is also no evidence of the elaborate secur-
facilities at the missile sites were either never complet4 or havq been
ity precautions which the Soviets customarily take with respect to such
weapons.
In- general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which-
Castro would openly intervene in the Western Hemisphere with substantial
forces in the face of prompt and vigorous US and probable OAS counter.
action. Castro probably prefers to continue his extensive propaganda
campaign and to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to insure
gency in other Latin American countries, with particular emphasis on
guerrilla training and ideological indoctrination of revolutionary leaders
invited to Cuba and sent back to lead anti-government activities in their
Inc onclusion, while current Soviet/Cuban military capabilities do
not constitute a direct.threat to the United States, continued Soviet
ba as
an active, relatively secure base for subversion and as a potential mili-
tary operational base.
US DEPLOYMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE CUBAN/SOVIET THREAT
'As has been previously discussed, the continued presence of Soviet
milit?ry units in Cuba do not, per se, pose an imu ediate treat to the
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The time required to overthrow the Castro government cannot be
estimated prior to the commencement of hostilities. The initial assault
may cause the collapse of organised Cuban resistance. However, plans
are based on the worst possible outcome of the initial opirstioas; namely.
Cuban reaction is such that the initial US assault forces must await
reinforcement before proceeding with assikned tasks. Based on estimated
Cuban capabilities, it is possible that major combat operations might
terminate in a matter of days. However, the duration of possible subsea
quent operations to eliminate pockets of resistance, overcome guerrilla
forms, and to establish full control of the island could last for a much
longer period. The exact length of this period cannot be accurately fore-
seen.
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