APPRAISAL OF CUBAN AND SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250076-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 76
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250076-3
TOP SECRET
APPRAISAL OF CUBAN AND SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN CUBA
INTRODUCTION
Since the missile/bomber crisis of October 1962 and the subsequent
withdrawal of Soviet strategic weapons and associated personnel, the
military posture in Cuba remains essentially a significantly improved
Cuban military establishment backed by Soviet air and ground units,
highlighted by air and coast defense systems, particularly an integrated
island-wide air defense network of high-performance aircraft and
surface -to -air-missiles.
estimate of Soviet`troop strength in Cuba remains essentially unchanged.
been diminished since the withdrawal of the strategic weapons, and our
been estimated to be in four highly mobile armored groupings at these
camps, well equipped with modern, sophisticated weapons, and about 5, 000
involved in the 24-site SA-2 missile system. The remainder are manning
the other Soviet-controlled installations and equipment or are attached to
Cuban ground, air, and naval units as advisors and instructors. There are
also military personnel from other Bloc countries, principally Czecho-
slovakians, probably totalling not more than a few hundred. Based on all
available evidence, we believe basic Soviet capabilities in Cuba have not
military replacements. Evidence presently on hand thus still does not permit
a firm conclusion as to the actual numbers of Soviet military personnel
that remain. In view of the foregoing and coupled with the fact that no
basic changes have been observed in the Soviet military establishments in
Cuba, we have not yet revised the estimate of Soviet military strength as
being in the magnitude of 17, 500.
We have no indications that Soviet personnel and equipment are being
withdrawn from the four Soviet military camps at Holguin, Remedios,
Artemisia, and Santiago de las Vegas. About 5, 000 Soviet troops have
SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN CUBA.
Since 13 February, substantial numbers of passengers have departed
Cuba en route to the USSR. Reliable reports indicate that probably a
total of about 3, 000 have been withdrawn,, the great majority appearing
to be military. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that some of the
many Soviet ships that have arrived in Cuba since 13 February have carried
The precise Soviet intentions for their continued military presence
in Cuba are not definable at this time, particularly since the scope and
EXCLUT)3~aD FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADI DOD DIR 5200.10
Capy
of
"
of "' copse
each
.,
-
Opp v~~~F? Rel
a 2004/03/15_.: CIA-RDP65B
DOES NOT APPLY
JCS and DIA review(s), completed.
 Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250076-3
TOP SECRET
phasing of the projected Soviet troop withdrawal are not yet clear. How-
ever, Moscow apparently hopes to maintain a sizable military presence
in Cuba for some time. The Soviets probably calculate that such a mili-
tary presence serves as a politico-psychological deterrent to a possible
US/OAS intervention in force. They also probably value possessing a
means to apply pressure and assert influence on Cuban policy in any
critical stage of disagreement with Moscow. They probably estimate that
the Soviet troops in Cuba could play a key role in the maintenance of a
Communist regime. The Soviets also probably assess that a prolonged
military presence in Cuba will establish a precedent in the Western
Hemisphere.
Retention of sophisticated weapons systems under Soviet control - -
such as the MIG-21 aircraft, SA-Z's, coastal defense cruise missiles,
and the KOMAR guided-missile boats - - may eventually raise irksome
questions of Cuban sovereignty and some Cuban resentment of the Soviet
role in Cuba. Castro, on occasion, has already indicated his opposition
to the Soviet failure to challenge continued US overflights. The presence
of Soviet combat groupings may also strain Soviet-Cuban relations because
of their ability to intervene in Cuban affairs.
Castro's internal security apparatus is in itself highly effective and,
to date, has proved quite capable of suppressing the sporadic anti-
government actions attempted thus far in Cuba.
CUBAN MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES
The numerical. strength of the Cuban ground forces is about 175, 000 - -
approximately 75, 00.0 in the standing army and 100, 000 in the ready
reserve. In addition, there are some 100, 000 home-guard militiamen
of insignificant combat'capability but useful as a police reserve. The
standing ground forces have substantially completed basic unit and com-
bined arms training at battalion combat team level.
abilities of the standing army and ready reserve have been
ca
Th
p
e
enhanced by new equipment brought in during 1962 and by further training
b
an
and experience, including mobilization during the crisis. The Cu
ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and
to repel small-scale attacks from abroad. Their ability to defend against
-a large-scale US military invasion would be limited' by their lack of train-
In such a
ision level
di
h
.
v
e
ing and experience and joint operations on t
Approved For RRele7e 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R0001002 -
 Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250076-3
TOP SECRET
contingency, they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense
or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the
Cuban military establishment would be able or likely to carry out prolonged
operations of this type.
The most significant change in the Cuban military situation since
July 1962, other than the introduction and removal of Soviet strategic
weapons, is the improvement in air defense capabilities resulting from
the presence of the Soviet-manned radar and communications networks,
SA-2 missile sites, and 42 MIG-21 fighters. The strong Soviet air defense
presence - - supplemented by the Cuban-manned jet fighter force composed
of about 65 MIG-15/17/19's and a considerable quantity of Cuban anti-
aircraft artillery - - now gives Cuba an integrated air defense system.
Although Cubans may be trained eventually to operate the more advanced
Soviet air defense equipment, there are now some indications that such
training is presently taking place. However, for some time Soviet manning
will be required for effective use of the equipment.
Considerable improvement has occurred within the past year in
Castro's capabilities to combat guerrilla elements within his own country.
Castro now has a "vertical envelopment" capability involving the use of
land-based helicopters and paratroopers, thus severely restricting the
ability of anti-Castro guerrilla elements to carry out sustained operations
in significant strength. Furthermore, MIG fighter aircraft provide an
island-wide capability for applying air attacks against guerrilla actions.
Cuban capabilities for military operations overseas remain severely
limited by the lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans probably
could only undertake an overseas operation in limited strength of some-
what less than a battalion. However, for political as well as military
reasons, the Castro regime is most unlikely, under present circumstances,
to undertake military operations of this nature.
POSSIBLE MILITARY THREATS FROM CUBA
Military actions against the United States from Cuba are considered
highly unlikely because of the risk involved in provoking a retaliatory
response from the United States. The principal conventional military
actions which can be envisioned are possibly air raids on Southern Florida
by single or several MIG's or B-26's, or hit-and-run demolition sabotage
carried out by squad-sized groups using motor torpedo boats or the KOMAR
guided-missile boats.
-3
Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250076-3
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250076-3
TOP SECRET
Because Castro has demonstrated a fanatic's zeal and volatile temper-
ament, we cannot totally discount the possibility that, should he deem
it necessary to sustain his cause or his position, he might attempt
aggressive actions against US shipping, the Guantanamo Naval Base, or
possibly even the southeastern portion of the United States.
An added threat to US security could be posed by the possibility of
Soviet use of Cuban ports for logistic support of their submarines. Although
we cannot predict Soviet intentions, we have no evidence that the Soviets
are establishing a submarine base in Cuba, and every report concerning
this contingency is pursued thoroughly.
Based on the conclusion that, with the 1962 withdrawal of missiles
and bombers, no such systems are presently in Cuba, we do not believe
a nuclear threat from Cuba currently exists. Although the Cubans almost
certainly use some caves for storage of supplies, ammunition and equip-
ment, intensive intelligence collection and analysis has failed to provide
any evidence to substantiate numerous and persistent rumors and reports
that ballistic missiles are hidden in caves and secret installations in Cuba.
Furthermore, comprehensive evaluation of all available information has
produced no evidence of the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Storage
facilities at the missile sites were either never completed or have been
abandoned. In addition, there is also no evidence of the elaborate secur-
ity precautions which the Soviets customarily take with respect to such
weapons.
In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which
Castro would openly intervene in the Western Hemisphere with substantial
forces in the face of prompt and vigorous US and probable OAS counter-
action. Castro probably prefers to continue his extensive propaganda
campaign and to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to insur-
gency in other Latin American countries, with particular emphasis on
guerrilla training and ideological indoctrination of revolutionary leaders
invited to Cuba and sent back to lead anti-government activities in their
homelands.
In conclusion, while current Soviet/Cuban military capabilities do
not constitute a direct threat to the United States, continued, Soviet mili-
tary support and presence will progressively strengthen Communist Cuba
as an. active, relatively secure base for subversion and as a potential
military operational base.
Approved For Release 2004/03/15: CIA-RDP65B00383R0001002''ET
 Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250076-3
TOP SECRET
US DEPLOYMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE CUBAN/SOVIET THREAT
As has been previously discussed, the continued presence of Soviet
military units in Cuba do not, per se, pose an immediate threat to the
United States, nor will their departure at some future date have any sig-
nificant impact on our deployments to provide for the security of the
Southeastern United States. What is of significance is the continued
presence of Soviet troops in this hemisphere and of weapons systems that
could conceivably be employed in a hit-and-run attack against the United
States, our aircraft or our shipping. The recent "shrimp boat" incident
lends credence to such a potential. On balance, however, it is difficult
Cuban contingencies is appropriate, regardless of whether Soviet units
and
strengthened. Two Hawk battalions, one Nike battalion, an increase
numbers of fighter aircraft have been deployed to Southern Florida to
cope with such an eventuality. However, the bulk of US forces deployed
during the October crisis have returned to their normal stations. Our
continuing analysis reveals that present arrangement of forces planned for
to envision circumstances in which either the Castro regime or the Soviet
authorities would find such a course of action to their advantage. Never-
theless, the defenses of Southeastern United States have been significantly
d
remain or depart Cuba.
Approved For Release 2004/03/15 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250076-3
TOP SECRET