INVESTIGATION OF THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100250046-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: August 9, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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88th Congress
1st Session
INVESTIGATION OF
THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM
INTERIM REPORT BY
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED ' STATES SENATE
UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF
S. Res. 75
(88th Cong., 1st Sess.)
ON
THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
98018 WASHINGTON : 1988
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RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachusetts
HARRY FLOOD BYRD, Virginia MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri J. GLENN BEALL, Maryland
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina CLIFFORD P. CASE, Now Jersey
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
CLAIR ENGLE, California
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
STEPHEN M. YOUNG, Ohio
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
HARRY L. WINGATE, Jr., Chief Clerk
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi, Chairman
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachusetts
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
JAMES T. KENDALL, Chief Counsel
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
U.S. SENATE,
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
May 9, 1963.
Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There is transmitted herewith an interim
report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed
under Senate Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban
military buildup.
In its inquiry to this time the subcommittee has received testimony
in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report
transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military
developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection
with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have been
developed and are now known to the subcommittee.
The subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry into the
Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more subsequent
reports on this subject will be issued in the future.
It was necessary that this interim report to the full Committee on
Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the subcommittee
submitted the report for review for security purposes, in order that it
could be printed and released to the public. It has been so reviewed
and the necessary security matters have been deleted.
Respectfully,
JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.
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CONTENTS
I. Introductory statement________________________________________ 1
IL Summary of major findings____________________________________
III. Situation prior to mid-July 1962________________________________
Cuban forces -----------------------------------------
(B) Intelligence activities and operations____________________
IV. Situation from mid-July to October 22, 1962_____________________
(A) Buildup in Soviet forces and equipment_________________
(B) Identification of specific weapons and equipment---------
(1) SA-2 sites------------------------------------
(2) Cruise missiles________________________________
3) Mig-21 fighters-------------------------------
(4) IL-28 (Beagle) bombers----------------- -----
(5) Medium range and intermediate range missiles____
(C) Failure to identify Soviet organized combat units -_____-__
(D) Alleged photographic gap______________________________
(E) Transfer of U-2 flights from CIA to SAC________________
(F) Intelligence activities and operations generally-----------
to time of removal of IL-28 bomb-
1962
tober 22
O
f
i
,
,
c
rom
on
V. Situat
--- - ------- - ---- --------------- 11
ers------------------------------------------
------------
A) Intelligence activities and operations generally ----------- 11
B) Identification of organized Soviet combat units ----------- 11
C) Removal of missiles and IL-28 bombers ----__-___ 12
VI. Current military situation in Cuba------------------------------ 12
(A) Intelligence activities and operations generally ----------- 12
(B) Nature and capabilities of forces and equipment now in 13
Cuba----------------------------------------------
(1) Types and numbers of weapons----------------- 13
(2) Strength and capabilities of forces --------------- 14
3) Reports of concealed strategic weapons in Cuba___ 15
(4) Withdrawal of Soviet personnel-----------------
(C) Summary of threat arising from Soviet presence in Cuba_ - 16
(D) Prospect of internal revolt or invasion------------------- 17
VII. Concluding statement----------------------------------------- 17
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INTERIM REPORT. ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The dramatic events which occurred -last October with respect to
Cuba are now history. Following photographic confirmation of the
fact that strategic and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced
into Cuba and President Kennedy's confrontation with Premier
Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive weapons were ostensibly
withdrawn.
However, the public concern .and debate about the Cuban situation
has not subsided. There have been and are insistent reports that the
Soviets still maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed
in caves .and other underground facilities and that Soviet troops are
based in the island in numbers far in excess of those accepted by our
intelligence community. Reports also abound with respect to the
use of Cuba as a base for subversive, agitational, and revolutionary
activities directed at other Latin American countries.
The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation
into the entire subject matter in an effort to determine the facts.
Although the investigation still continues, the subcommittee deems
it appropriate to issue an interim report at this time. This report
will be limited to a review of military developments and intelligence
activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962
to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A
discussion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be
included in a subsequent report.
Broadly speaking, the term "intelligence community" includes the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the in-
telligence sections of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Department of State,. the National Security Agency, the
Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more limited
sense. Whore the term appears in this report it primarily refers to
and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force. Other agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of
the term to the extent that they participated in or contributed to any
of the activities or operations discussed.
Up to this time, the subcommittee has received testimony in execu-
tive hearings from Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelli-
gence; Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence
Agency; Maj. Gen. Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli-
gence, U.S. Army;. Rear Adm. Vernon L. Lowrance, Director of
Naval Intelligence; and Maj. Gen. Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Air Force.
The subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of
written reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department
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of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. We have also considered reports issued by the Special
Consultative Committee on Security of the Council of the Organiza-
tion of American States and the Cuban Revolutionary Council.
In addition, the subcommittee staff has made an extensive investiga-
tion and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not
hold official positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles.
Staff investigators spent approximately 45 man-days in the Miami
area alone.
Information has also been received from individual Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives.
This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received
from the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the subcommittee.
It does, however, include some information from other sources.
Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain
any overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations.
Major findings, based on the testimony and evidence thus far received,
relative to intelligence activities during the military buildup have
been incorporated. Our general recommendation at this time is that
an alert vigilance be maintained over all activities taking place in
Cuba.
IT. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be
criticized in some areas, in other areas they performed creditably.
Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational
and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a
limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost com-
pletely closed society.
2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was
this capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of
the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba.
Credit is due to those involved in this mission.
3. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and
collecting intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears
that several substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies
in the evaluation of the information and data which was accumulated.
4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence
community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompati-
ble with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba resulted
in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be
erroneous. Among these were:
(a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained
on October 25, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence
community that organized Soviet ground combat units were
present in Cuba. The importance of this should be obvious.
(b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially
underestimated throughout the crisis. On October 22, our intel-
ligence people estimated that there were 8,000 to 10,000 Soviets
in Cuba. They now say that, at the height of the buildup, there
were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on the island.
(c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained
on October 14 that the intelligence community concluded that
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INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITART BUILDUP 3
strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching
their pre-October 14 negative judgment the intelligence analysts
were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy
and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were
not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A con-
tributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intel-
ligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban
refugees and exiles.
5. The subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate
charges and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed
from September 5 to October 14. The evidence before the subcom-
mittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded.
6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central
Intelligence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the
operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October
14 were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit.
No evidence was presented to support the charge that the operation
of the U-2 flights were transferred from the Central Intelligence
Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock or friction
between the agencies.
7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion
that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba.
However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite
possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in
caves or otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on
this question can come only from penetrating and continuing on-site
inspection by reliable observers and that, based on skepticism, if
nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about the matter.
8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns
in the island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage
and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons.
Refugee and exile reports continue to insist that they are being so
utilized. Military-connected activities have been noted with reference
to a number of them but it is the view of the intelligence analysts
that the military usage of the caves is for the storage of those weapons
which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage of offensive
weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a sub-
stantlal degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard
evidence confirming the presence ofdstrategic missiles in Cuba at
this time.
9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have
been withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether
or not strategic missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality
of this is illustrated by the fact that, assuming maximum readiness
at preselected sites, with all equipment prelocated, the Soviet mobile
medium range (1,100 miles) missiles could be made operational in a
matter of hours.
10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately
5,000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the
October confrontation, leaving according to intelligence sources,
about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of 4,000 to 5,000 additional
have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people
say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as "tech-
nical reasons," the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is
9so1s-63--2
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4 INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates
to the subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the
original estimate. There is also some doubt in our minds as to the
adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly ar-
riving. All of the intelligence people agree that there is no evidence
that any of the combat ground troops associated with the four mobile
armored groups have been withdrawn.
11. Some other sources-primarily refugee and exile groups---esti-
mate that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in
mind the lack of hard evidence on the question and the substantial
underestimation of last fall, we conclude that no one in official United
States circles can tell, with any real degree of confidence, how many
Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the opinion that the official
17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.
12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and
Cuban forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and
could offer severe opposition to any attack. They are admittedly
capable of surpressing any internal rebellion or revolt mounted without
external support, and it is clear that an invasion from without, to
have a fair chance of success, would require large forces, extensive
seaborne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.
13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offen-
sive weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not
believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct
aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America.
Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach
no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive evidence.
14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting,
spurring, aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and sub-
versive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere and that
such activities present a grave and ominous threat to the peace and
security of the Americas.
III. SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962
It was estimated by intelligence sources that at the beginning of
1962, the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000,
a ready reserve of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although
the ground combat capability of the Cuban forces had increased
since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it was thought that, although
the Cuban forces were of varying states of training, they had the
capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat
team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations
with units larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that
they were maintained primarily for the purpose of internal security
operations and to repel any attempted invasion. The intelligence
community thought that approximately 500 Soviet-bloc advisory
personnel were then in Cuba.
By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefited by
the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people
trained in bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG 15's, 17's and 19's
as well as about 40 propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport,
and utility types.
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INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN M A
The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially coastal patrol
type. Several of these craft in the subchaser and motor torpedo
boat types had been received from the Soviets. The crews on a
number of these craft were mixed Cuban and Soviet, indicating that
the Cubans were still under training.
It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to
July 1962 vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been
introduced into Cuba for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result,
it was believed that even then the Cuban Army was one of the best
equipped in all Latin America. The arms and equipment furnished
the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World War II
equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to
whether the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons intro
duced into Cuba at this time was not more than ample to supply
the needs of the Cuban forces as then constituted.
B. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS
The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July 1962
consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral
reconnaissance flights over international waters and the collection
of reports from refugees, exiles, and other human sources.
For some time prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central
Intelligence Agency had been flying at high altitudes over the island
of Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early
1962, the frequency of the flights was increased.
Also, even before 1962, regular reconnaissance and photographic
flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international
waters but not over the island of Cuba.itself.
In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source
reports were collected and assessed. Included in these reports were
many which contained..., allegations of missile-related activities and of
the presence of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba. However,
although the reports were checked to the greatest extent possible, the
intelligence community obtained no confirmation of such activities.
In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem,
the intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence
activities and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements
with respect to Cuba. The flights over Cuba were increased. The
intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communi-
zation of Cuba. However, on the basis of the information collected
and the assessment of this information, the intelligence conclusion at
this time was that the activities were primarily defensively oriented.
No Soviet combat units or strategic weapons were discovered.
The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities
in Cuba were then primarily directed toward defense, did conclude in
early 1962 that it might probably be expected that the IL-28 (Beagle)
light bomber would be supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.
IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962
A. BUILDUP IN SOVIET FORCES AND EQUIPMENT
In late July and early August, our intelligence noted a significant
change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from
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the Soviet Union became clearly evident. Ship arrivals, both dry
cargo and passenger, increased drastically. For example, for the
first half of 1962, an average of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month
arrived in Cuba. The number jumped to 37 in August. Only one
Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during the first 5 months
of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.
While our intelligence people were aware from this and other infor-
mation that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was underway, its exact
nature and impact was not clear to the intelligence community.
During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile
activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked
out as scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them in-
cluded consistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile
activity, there was no confirmation of them.
At the same time, there were human source reports that some of
the ships were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-
Soviet personnel being excluded from the dock areas. The practice
of unloading at night in small easily guarded ports, remote from large
population centers, was known to the intelligence community, although
the alleged security conditions ashore could not be confirmed.
Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of
the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was
reported that some of the arriving personnel during this period were
primarily young, trim, physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and
that they formed in ranks of fours on the docks and moved out in
truck convoys. Refugee, exile and other human source reports sug-
gested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals, the new arrivals were
Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence community adhered
to the view that they were military instructors, advisers, and trainers,
plus a number of civilian technicians and advisers associated with
improving the Cuban econom . The view was that they did not
include significant numbers of y Soviet military personnel and that
they were not organized into combat units. As late as October 29,
in an unclassified information brochure published by the Defense
Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet "personnel" in the island
were estimated at 5,000.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
1. SA-2 sites.-About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated
by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special
attention on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by
the "next" high altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight,
flown on August 29, established positive identification of SA-2
surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at two of the suspect locations
and at six others in western Cuba. Flights from August 29 through
October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system can
engage targets at altitudes up to 80,000 feet and has a slant range of
about 25 miles.
2. Cruise missiles.-A coastal defonse cruise missile installation
was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional
cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-
shipping missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40
miles. On August 29 KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile
launchers each were identified in Cuba.
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S. MIG-2i fighters.-Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban
Air Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the spring of
1962, the presence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first
confirmed by a picture obtained on September 5, 1962.
4. IL-28, (Beagle) bombers.-As early as the spring of 1962, the
intelligence community was of the view that the Soviets might
send the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension
was confirmed by a picture taken on September 28 which was later
evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's aboard a Cuba-bound
ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was dissem-
inated to the intelligence community on October 10.
5. Medium range and intermediate range missiles.-As has already
been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of
unconfirmed reports and rumors from human sources about strategic
missile-related activity in Cuba. None of these reports were con-
firmed prior to October 14, 1962. It is evident that many of these
reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missiles, which, although nowhere
near the size of the strategic missiles later identified, still appears large
to the untrained observer.
However, after mid-September some reports of missiles' being in-
troduced into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive
weapons to arouse the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This re-
resulted in the conclusion-apparently reached near the end of Sep-
tember 1962-that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic missile
(MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a result, photographic
coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October 14 a Strate-
gic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflow the area and
emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal
medium-range ballistic missile complex.
Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how
many ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the
Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photo-
graphs had revealed a lesser number. It could not be established,
therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into
Cuba or specifically how many the Soviets planned to introduce.
Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-
range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude
reconnaissance missions flown after October 14. Six MRBM sites
were located, all of which had achieved a full operational capacity on
October 28 when the dismantling of the sites commenced. Three
IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated that a fourth would
be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational before
being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become
operational by December 15.
The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about
1,100 miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range
of 2,200 miles.
C. FAILURE TO IDENTIFY SOVIET ORGANIZED GROUND COMBAT UNITS
As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that
many of the soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military
units, and notwithstanding the evidence of a drastically increased
buildup in modern and sophisticated ground weapons, the intelligence
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community did not identify the presence of Russian organized ground
combat forces in Cuba until October 25 when new pictures obtained
by low-level photography, coupled with a reanalysis of previous
photography, led to the conclusion that there were, in fact, four
organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba. The
aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence
people to be about 5,000 men.
In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in
Cuba was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For
example, on October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed
the Nation, the intelligence community estimated the Soviet personnel
in Cuba to be 8,000 to 10,000. The current intelligence evaluation
is that at the height of the Soviet buildup, there were in Cuba an
aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This is, of course, a
retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate. One factor in the
underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in October
was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally
loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded
and that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving
passenger ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is believed
that the additional Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships.
There is some reason to doubt that even the 22,000 figure would
account fully for all of the great quantities of weapons and equipment
introduced into Cuba since June 1962.
Equally important, since on October 22 the President did not know
of the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in
heavily armed organized ground combat units, he could not include
this factor in his actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at, that
time their withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere along with the
strategic missiles.
There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap
in our photographic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from
September 5 to October 14. We have examined this question as
thoroughly as possible and have found the allegations with respect to
it to be unfounded. The record of the flights which were scheduled
between August 29 and October 14 should be sufficient to clear up
the situation and these will be summarized here.
The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted
in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.
On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and
eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the
central portion but weather conditions prevented any photographic
returns with reference to the eastern end of the island.
A flight was planned for September 10 but this was not flown.
On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather con-
ditions, it was not wholly successful.
Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26.
Flights were flown on September 26, September 29, October 5, and
October 7. These flights completed the coverage o$ those areas of
Cuba which had been spotlighted as requiring early attention.
Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14. On
October 12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for
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operating the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba,
and on October 14, it flow the flight which gave the first hard evidence
of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba.
E. TRANSFER OF U-2 FLIGHTS FROM CIA TO SAC
There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a
conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Strategic Air Command (SAC) with reference to the operation of the
U-2 high altitude flights. These reports have contained allegations
that a deadlock existed between CIA and SAC and that this was
resolved at the policy level by transferring the function of flying the
U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that this
is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.
These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been
found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to
suggest that any conflict between CIA and. SAC existed or that there
was any delay in photographic coverage of the island because of the
fact that the U-2 program was being operated by CIA prior to October
14.
Likewise, there.is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between
the two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the ques-
tion of by whom the flights should be flown.
The subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the trans-
fer of the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered
that the SA-2 sites in the San Cristobal area had been located on
August 29. The U-2 flight which was flown on October 14 was
programed to overfly this area. In view of the possibility that the
flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's it was con-
cluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be
conducted by the military rather than by civilians. This decision
was entirely reasonable and proper.
It is a fact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the
one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site.
This, without explanation, originally gave the subcommittee some
concern. However, after inquiring closely into the situation we are
convinced that there is no significance to it and that it was just a
matter of timing and coincidence.
F. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS GENERALLY
As has been indicated, the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights
over Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting,
until September. The stepped-up schedule for September and early
October has already been outlined. All. of the U-2 flights prior to
October 14 were flown by the CIA.
After the mission which verified the existence of MRBM's in
Cuba, there was a concentrated effort to determine the precise nature
of the missile buildup and the exact location, number, configuration
and state of readiness of the missile systems. Between October 14
and October 22, the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 17 high
altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiated until
October 23, the day following the President's message.
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During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over
international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts
using refugees, exiles, and other human sources.
In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the
subcommittee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other
areas, however, our intelligence did quite well. The MRBM's were
discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The
IRBM sites were discovered in a very early stage of construction. The
IL-28 bombers were discovered while they were still in their crates.
The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had been removed from
the shipping container. All these weapon systems were identified,
and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before
they became operational in a very compressed and limited period of
time despite adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were
penetrating an almost completely closed society.
The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29, and were
credited by the intelligence community with becoming operational on
a site-by-site basis commencing in mid-September. It is certain that
these air defense missiles had attained an operational capability by
October 27. On that date a U-2 plane piloted by Maj. Rudolph
Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and Major Anderson was
killed.
CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed
photographic capability, were able to give a unique performance in
intelligence operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the
President, his advisers and U.S. diplomatic representatives incon-
trovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in
direct contravention of Soviet government assurances. This visual
proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the
Organization of American States and world acceptance of the correct-
ness of our position.
Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It
is only a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most
important one. It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in
Cuba during the period of at least a month between their introduction
into the Island and their deployment on sites. The absence of photo-
graphic confirmation of human source and other reports, therefore,
does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other sources.
The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to
have done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of
data and information. The deficiency in the performance of the
intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and
assessment of the accumulated data. Moreover there seems to have
been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to
accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had
been gathered.
In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted
the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information
available. This is in sharp contrast to the customary military
practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established
by the accumulation of evidence.
There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence
people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports. This
was based on the general lack of experience and training of the refugees
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and exiles as military observers, their frequent inclusion of items not
reasonably credible among those things which were within their power
of observation as to time, place and comprehension, and on the
consideration of the obvious self-interest of the Cuban sources.
Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the
Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they
believed that such a development would be incompatible with Soviet
policy as interpreted by them. The error inherent in this estimate
was clearly demonstrated by subsequent events. The danger that
such preconceptions will control the weighing of the facts as events
unfold is evident.
The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelli-
gence judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be
erroneous. A few of these will be mentioned.
The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact
that organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into
Cuba until photographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on
October 25, and the related fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba
was substantially underestimated throughout the entire crisis have
already been discussed.
. It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not
estimate that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until
photographic confirmation was obtained on October 14. It appears
that, on this point, the analysts were strongly influenced by their
philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet.policy to
introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that
the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight. Among
other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile complex in the
San CristoIal area on August 29 could logically have led to the assump-
tion that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile
installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not bein em-
placed for the purpose of protecting any existing or known military
installation.
V. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, To TIME OF REMOVAL OF
IIr-28 BOMBERS
A. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS GENERALLY
On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October
23, 1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there
was a concerted effort to obtain detailed information both about the
entire island and selected targets.
During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air
Command flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23
through November 15, when the low level flights over the island were
discontinued, the Air Force and Navy flew. a total of 162 low altitude
sorties.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF ORGANIZED SOVIET GROUND COMBAT UNITS
As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25
provided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet'highly mobile
armored task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result
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was first distributed to the operational military commands on October
30. Up to that time, it was thought that the Soviet ground equipment
arriving in Cuba was to be utilized by the Cuban forces.
C. REMOVAL OF MISSILES AND IL--28 BOMBERS
To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October
crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium
range ballistic missiles and related equipment, intermediate range
ballistic missile equipment, and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.
A comprehensive and concentrated aerial reconnaissance and fleet
observation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus
of this equipment. This program involved high and low altitude
flights over Cuba, accompanied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance
of the departing ships over Cuba and Caribbean waters and continued
surveillance across the Atlantic.
The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandon-
ment of the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading
from the sites to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe
the material as it arrived, was assembled on the docks, and loaded
aboard ships.
As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic
missiles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine
were removed by the U.S.S.R. However, they acknowledge the
existence of continuing reports to the contrary and freely concede
that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible that despite our surveillance
program, we were misled and deceived.
VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA
A. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS GENERALLY
Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers
the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to sur-
veillance of the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic
flights continue on a regular basis. Since the U-?2 was shot down on
October 27 there has been no further attempt to interfere with our
aerial reconnaissance. The resaon for this one incident amidst a
pattern of acquiescence in the overflights remains a matter for specu-
lation.
The collection efforts using the techincal and the various human
sources available, such as refugees, exiles, and others is a continuing
process. The close surveillance of merchant shipping arriving and
departing Cuba, by naval air and surface ships continues, as does the
peripheral surveillance by reconnaissance and photographic aircraft.
A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba
might become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have
been repeated rumors and speculations that such is already the case.
Much of this is related to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving
and expanding certain commercial fishing facilities. The intelligence
community, however, does not believe that in fact Cuba is now, or has
been, a base for Soviet submarines.
Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to
provide temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient
to greatly extend their time on station away from bloc nation ports,
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and to facilitate their operations generally. Reasonably sheltered
anchorages or ports with sufficient depth, ready supplies of diesel
fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxation facilities ashore for
the crews greatly extend the time away from home for any submarine.
The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of the high
usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods
considerably. The use of shore-based long range communication
systems and information from surface and shore-based radio and
radar nets would greatly facilitate Soviet submarine operations in
the Caribbean as well as assist in attempts to evade detection.
B. NATURE AND CAPABILITIES OF FORCES AND EQUIPMENT NOW IN
CUBA
1. Types and Numbers of Weapons.-As previously mentioned, it
was testified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at rein-
forced battalion level with the effective modern weapons for such
units, including rifles, machineguns, light and heavy mortars and
considerable field artillery. For an organization of that type they
have a rather large amount of mechanized equipment, tanks, self-
propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers. They also have
available a considerable amount of antitank guns and light antiair-
craft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much
of the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the
types mentioned above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not
known or estimated.
The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons
in plentiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each,
in a tight knit perimeter air defense of the entire island of Cuba.
These weapons are similar to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very
good indeed. Their fire control system is also estimated as of a
high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a large amount
of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite
complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of
intensive training, including quite technical schooling, for the native
Cuban troops to replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably
associated with the SA-2 sites for low level air defense, as well as in
local defense of other important sites, are some of the large additional
numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in by the Soviet Expe-
ditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are manned
by Soviets is apparently not known.
There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about
30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed
as part of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal
Soviet employment of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet
naval crews. As an added feature of these missiles, there are at
least 150 of them in Cuba, far more than could be logically associated
with the known missile launching sites. It may be speculated that
the launchers for these missiles may have been in some of the bloc
shipping turned back by the October quarantine and thus failed to
reach Cuba.
The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type
high-speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These
boats are each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The
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missiles are estimated to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats
are under Soviet control, but Cubans are believed to have been
observed aboard them. The KOMAR's are apparently the only
Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expedition.
The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed
with almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations.
Many of these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of
mechanized and motorized divisions reinforced by artillery and other
units, are known to be in surprisingly large numbers. As mentioned
before, the amounts, if any, handed to the Cubans from the many
hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships of the Soviet
expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include very large
and substantial numbers of heavy tanks and medium tanks; self-
propelled assault guns; 57-mm. antitank guns; light, medium, and
heavy mortars; field artillery pieces; antiaircraft guns, both 30-mm.
and 57-mm.; armored personnel carriers; a number of the truck-
mounted multiple launchers for the 130-mm. rocket; and quantities of
various types of motor vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equip-
ment. We feel that the official estimates of the number of Soviet
troops are questionably low when related to the large numbers of
the weapons listed above.
To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Army tactical
missiles. The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided antitank missile
similar to our SS--10 and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket
with a range of about 25 miles, which can be equipped with a nuclear
warhead. It is similar to our HONEST JOHN.
According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has
approximately. 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high perform-
ance supersonic jet fighters. They are probably equipped with air-
to-air missiles. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios
necessary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense
system, SA-2 and fighter.
2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces.-It was testified that the
strength of the Cuban Army apparently remains at the same level as
before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular army, 100,000 in the
militia, and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.
At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence
of the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still,
the official estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported
withdrawal of some 4,000 to 5,000 since the first of the year, the level
of confidence in its accuracy varies even within the intelligence com-
munity. Other sources present considerably higher estimates---some
ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in mind the substantial
underestimation of last October, we can only conclude that no one-
outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles-knows how many Russian
troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum
figure.
In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined
with the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive
sense. The air defense system is believed to be of a high order of
effectiveness. The coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight
perimeter defense of the Cuban shoreline, evidently because the
quarantine turned back the necessary launchers to complete an inter-
locking net similar to the SA-2 system. This gap in the island defense
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INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP 15
may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft. The Soviet
Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well
coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces,
could offer severe opposition to any attack. This opposition would be
sufficient to make it necessary to mount a large seaborne landing
effort along with any. desired airborne effort in order to be sure of
success.
Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive
weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does
not believe that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat
to the United States or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive
sense. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can
reach no conclusion on this because of lack of conclusive evidence.
It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of
provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct
and present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores
on the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively
difficult to engage in the smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns,
and heavy truck-towed' artillery. Light mortars, machineguns,
rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons, grenades, explosives,
radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter. Gunrun-
ning is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced
and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba,
as a centrally located base for such Communist operations, a present
and grave menace to the peace and security of the Western Hemi-
sphere. The use of Cuba as a base for subversion will be discussed
in more detail in a later report.
S. Reports of concealed strategic weapons in Cuba.-Reports from
refugees, exile and other human sources insist that the strategic
missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed
in caves and otherwise.. The intelligence community, although
aware of these reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere
to the position that all strategic weapons are withdrawn.
It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to
the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else,
there is grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-
clad assurance of the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles
in Cuba can come only as a result of thorough, penetrating on-site
inspection by reliable observers. The current intelligence estimate
that they are not present is based largely on the negative evidence
that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This, of course,
was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14.
There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and
caverns in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the
storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive
weapons. It is also true that military activity has been observed in
connection with these caves. Our intelligence people are of the
opinion that some of the caves are in fact utilized for the storage of
military items and equipment other than strategic missiles, such as
ammunition, explosives, etc.
The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with
respect to this matter cannot be overemphasized. The criticality of
it can best be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established
that, upon the assumption that all missiles and associated equipment
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16 INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
and the necessary personnel were readily available near preselected
sites in a state of complete readiness, mobile medium-range missiles
could be made operational in a matter of hours. Thus, if these
missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba, the danger is
clear and obvious.
The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has
already been discussed.
If. Withdrawal of Soviet personnel.-Even though the intelligence
community believes that a net 4,000 to 5,000 Soviet military personnel
have been withdrawn from Cuba since the first of the year, because
of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons" the previous
intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba remains
unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the subcommittee that
there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is
also some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information
as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could
have been undetected arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known
that cargo ships have repeated their prior practice of unloading at
night under conditions of strict Soviet-imposed security. In any
event, as the matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelli-
gence community does not believe it et has sufficient concrete evidence
to estimate any reduction in overall Soviet military capability on the
island. There is no evidence that any of the combat troops associated
with the four armored groups have been withdrawn.
C. SUMMARY OF THREAT ARISING FROM SOVIET PRESENCE IN CUBA
Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet
presence in Cuba presents to the Americas is as follows:
1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary
and agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the
opportunity to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition, and propa-
ganda throughout Latin America.
2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been
withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-
introduction of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using
the Soviet forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the
activity.
3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the U.S.S.R.
4. The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities
based on Cuba.
5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids
originating from Cuba.
6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict
our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and
electronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast
United States and the Caribbean.
7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes
launched against the United States from the Soviet Union.
8. Advanced Soviet submarine bases could be established in Cuban
ports with very little effort.
9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a
further reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.
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10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other
Latin American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational,
and sabotage techniques.
11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our
Nation's image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably
doubt our ability to meet and defeat the forces of communism thou-
sands of miles across the ocean if we prove unable to cope with the
Communist threat at our very doorstep.
A consideration of all these matters serves to emphasize the gravity
of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.
D. PROSPECT OF INTERNAL REVOLT OR INVASION
The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now
be seen to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by
native insurgents, or invasion by external forces from any source.
The ringing of the island by the Soviet air defense and missile system,
and the islandwide evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian
troop units, all apparently immune from attack, has been and will be
an increasing psychological damper to the fires of revolt. We can
only expect, under present circumstances, that whatever capacity
and will to resist communism may exist among the people in Cuba,
will wither and shrink. The communization of the younger element
creates simultaneously an increasingly militant Communist nation.
The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a
primary psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently
being used as a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive
the fires of freedom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of
Castro's native Cuban forces standing alone, to withstand any insur-
rection, depends upon the support the Cuban people give to the
insurgents, and the effective outside help given to insurgent forces.
VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT
Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the
public debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other
strategic weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of
Soviet troops being maintained there. These things are certainly of
undeniable importance. The matter of basic and fundamental im-
portance, however, and the source of the real threat, is that interna-
tional communism now has a firm foothold in this hemisphere and
that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.
The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and
spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and
we can be sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest
extent possible. The paramount danger at this time is that the na-
tions of this hemisphere may be subverted one by one and be ex-
ploited, in turn, for subversive and revolutionary activities. By this
process of erosion our neighbors to the south may fall nation by nation
until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist goal of isolating
the United States has been attained.
Communism, of course, operates on a worldwide scale and its meth-
ods and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it
operates. With this in mind, the value to the U.S.S.R. of the occupa-
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Lion of Cuba is apparent. The techniques of Communist subversion
may vary from simple infiltration to violent intervention. Whatever
its form, however, in Cuba as elsewhere it is conceived, developed, and
perfected by the leaders of world communism for the purpose of fur-
thering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is to
destroy existing political, economic, and social orders and to replace
them with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete
physical and moral control of subjugated peoples.
This aim and goal has already been achieved in Cuba. It will be
achieved elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to
prevent it. We must be prepared to take appropriate and positive
action in our own national self-interest and in the interest of the collec-
tive security of the Western Hemisphere.
The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the result-
ing menace to our security, requires and demands that the United
States be ever alert and vigilant to all of its sinister implications. We
must exercise the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and
use all available resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true
military situation in that unhappy :island and to insure that we will
not again be deceived and surprised. The entire Cuban problem, both
military and political, should be accorded the highest possible priority
by our governmental officials to the end that the evil threat which the
Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be eliminated at an early
date.
0
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