FRENCH MILITARY POLICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100230014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 14, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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G 0 V 9 t M E N T U S E O N L Y
14 May 1963
FRENCH MILITARY POLICY
by Pierre Messmer, Minister of Defense
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES
JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
Building T-30
Ohio Dr. and Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington 25, D. C.
G O V E R N M E N T U S E O N L Y
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GOVEANNIVENT USE ONLY
G0'OS 069
?NCR MILITARY PO
[Following is the translation of an e,rticle by Pierre
Messmer,, Minister of D efense, in the French-language
zdgazine 11" do e: e e Utiorrai4, (~4 tiozas1 Defense
Review),, a,r ~~ ,,ems' 3, e j
Military policy consists in Piefi. tngw or i,zi , e . ppin , W- A
tra,inni g our armed forces for battle; it is an , ?rportant saelp is time
of wax, an essential ooa ponent of defex se .polloy and it can under-
. o r by those who are. fs .i ..iar with the often stated principles
of that policy
As part of topic here today, I will describe first of all the
forces or, more e of 'ical y, the weapons systems which we b we. or which
we want to have,, as well as the or ni2:ation of their comA 4 setup;,
these cc ,sie rations I will then derive the requirements accruing
aeries as part of o` program; i , ccnclueior, I will, ?+i case . the
of our Military policy on the country., in t. of y ce "
Very soon, 7W nee wi. have three weapons systems, The first
wespone system. the strategic nuclear force (often celled striking force); it is the mission of this force to act as deterrent and, .if
this deterrent function should rail.,, to .t esi. ted enemy targets
with the. most powerful nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. The two
basic technical co +onaaxata of this force are the b b or t e n z le ,^ r
the `mean of delivery (bombers or roc te); i a: dition' o
se we have launch pads, c .autoati.ons facilities, and m
equipment.
a first generation of our strategic nuclear fore
of Mira :IV h i' rs with &. speed of A', to Tech 2 and wtt
ion r e of 20j00 1m wit ,out r s~ uclin and 4,U00 i with in .fLi h
refuel ng by C-135 tar rs..Bach aircraft will sari o e t;'/ Pe , . bomb
-,- that is to say, a fission" bomb -- with a power equivale t to 50 or
60 i of TNT (three tires the power of the Mrosh~za hhomb); the '
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prototyDen of this bomb 1 ,As ' been tested successfully On 1 Me?y ` 62 in
the Sahara.. The first .irt:r t equipped with the f ,rsst bombs will be
operatic.: .: before the end of 1961; the 50th aircraft grill he & i,vc,: ere
at the erd of 1966.
yy~ This :Virs^t J genejrWrtion Ti~ll bey can a emtyi" Lily4 ehweocter?ye.~+:,erde jam, y;ads.. t~:c
i..i
bombs ag i.,r~"raw (hoth of which ca~5,~4 be fu Whs?4 prrxre.*d so 1:04}S:'t the $4
useful erp? oyy e ut car. be prolonged), it will be follo, ed, etarti in
. ~~ by a, . sedonc. generation which will consist of thereto-nuclear
weapons and. } ockets. If we warm to moke thermos-nuclear we?ap s. we
will have to have urartium highly enriched with isotope 235,* but this
will' not be possibly vyatil after the isotope sepera:: ism ,pl a i..t, ow
tinder construction at ? ierr.?e atte, has been co splete ., which should hap-
pen exourcl the. begii niri of '1967-
The rocket ploy ed for this mhermo?nuclaa.r w ,:rhea d f%z now in
the resew. ch st≥ it will be a ballistic rocket aemoer
nations. As a far France is ~ as Franc':.~ ' is concerned these one . ;~.'`' wciizlt. + ;i''r 'ee-? stationed
in Germany and co stitut:! ng the First Army-, es v'ell as 'r.p a .'_r i.njts of
the l:st Tactical Air Corps, which ydisc ,seed:!. earlier. i?.s entire force
ich we shell c`on`tinue to mod~.o'w4rize M1a:.at which w o not intend to
augment - is for from negligible; it puts Trance in W if place, ?3'f"Ge
the United. states i d CTe ni , ny t and oefor'e '' re g. Britain.
The French land and air i 'e'ven ioC. forces do not nei.oi to
these two major units (First Army and lst, Tactical Air Corps) end con-
stitute a WOW reserve which, in tine of .peace and in We of war,
is under French, +: remand, For instance, t0- i n i,ts s x t i,,.oned in 'patropo-
r ??,W7+"'.
... tan. France a n d I n North Africa, in time of ., rv t', l he under the
Commander in Chin , Met I opol :i.ta -MediterXi r r- . ut'i 3 t ti o 1e'd
in overseas zones 1.,, 2, and 4 would, be unOr be F:C:7"r^1t r .. in 'ti ] 4
Central An ,.tco omits stationed in overseas zone a and in Djibouti would
In Ocean; r C," under the nthe .: C?""i.` ~],Ca (?k Chief, ay ;~ irly 1 .,tl~l..,,~t,~.the .. ~'... in, the
South tf z..
Pacific ? f.] .1.,6,+.i. Yir.~1r` _ the CoEM'inend.cii in Chief, ~efa~ i..cif'ie.
i". t1' ilt.''tht;
},., The k'S..,a,~rh-'seas Or and naval forces, when at sea, would. be un`de_.
the authority c-f the Chief of Navel Opera t7 VI3s, except for those wh._e.:z
the , er21;ment puts at the disposr.%...i.. o a theatre a'o snder.
TV third system of forces, the ter: itoriai operational defenac
forces, are e assigned g; mission C 1' d i ?Ln N out enemy .' .i, t. i-, ,t..7 3U-. ..ht is-.t.C -
t., the in landing' which r n r ~~~rl French ren~ soil or which might 07, ~i:,ny in any
form whatever, to penetrate French foil.
51ese farces consist of units of the ;wTG T and he air force (plus
some elements of the navy) which exist in time of Kan. an & w lids. would,
be heavily' reinforced by wartime mocilization.
For Us iie rr i t on at 2 ryopere Iona, ..,,.r ~; f_?.1 .t:. forces a e army
l 4 L ,. l~~ 1., 4T/
furnish ..iu't s Wen iien r`eiy;ionu.l brigades (basically, one oe .~ .. `wi.le for ~c
.+Ya 'ia'i~)ln. i1
military } re ion) ~frath a strength s of 5,000 ,0r.t men, . w to .Li"L'Rt'Pian e:rs
Or by the ccronnder of the territorial A r defense forced In case of
conflict, the territorial operational defense force will be tenter the
we must e a = . is that the territorial oper?at.3 onal defense for-,
css are not territorial regiments charged, as in 1914-1918, with r r-
t?I,Ln c e: mu:unica;tions lines or with minor static missions determined by
;evil authorities; these will be combat units capable of attackix ;
beastly-armed enemy i `ts which may have landed on Tench soil; the
w.t;t i s. E of the territorial operational defense forc Mp wh,.gin necessary, must
be able to operate as Maquis in order to eo ` tntxee a war if the first bait..,
t,l s e bowl d l:..as`a:ve tanned out for us. his means that they will have
to have good cadres, goad troops, r rrd. eed weapons; of coureee., we are
not pleDnirg to ee,,.. ip them with atomic weapons but we are going to eive
"her the hand of weapons amt communications er. tzipment which will enable
therm to fight a conventional k ,r or a c rx war do or guerilla war; this
means they are also goin to have antitank weapons and weapons hss~-,inst
'Ur ht armored vehicles, such as light scout cars, for example. As for
:i,o,i:stics, they will live off the land and Say will have to be capa-
ble of rapidly adapting themselves to >wxerilla co editions.,
Well tr ,wed, well equipped* the units of the territor ;i.
operational defense force VIA have an operational mission. In case
of wax or in, case of war sca e, their military commanders would of
have to shoulder the entire responsibility for domestic defense, police.
unctions,, transportation, food sr~pply, and so on. it is of course
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ON
poea' b '! t t e; 'ttr'' 1 s PIt mko it
all. a
of theme e i ilit .ee an the er ?
for . to 'tA row, vh:,ah t3
o1 i only 'fir t ex, *e, t w >a .
t'ki# ;poi t, our o"o :a . ;re -la e in ltdo .(
I On
*ad
ver b,,.-art ; er e o ; Aoli .y ee ,b i :zae? it t ma r S it
fered `. on a as regmaAs tv o re13 ie , t1m, ti .x=, -6: r o
they were Often aGeeZ.l `. con t" t .L of o
f
hey we a i . e At j outeiie t e= .t ~ the
base o r deter '2 i y. the e e y oaa ott h
rr aeaxy tor t military r er to t*lm . over sr o ~
place of t 4 oiiril i stratioae i i elt r bad c:o .ljie i or whA, b,
bal aia ci,, F - r a e o e r t' a tit 6tion w o i a , d. of c t - l e T v*-atly
ri rea t h ver"I d no-it York for tab Invader* auM the 4 From
.: iota t tor. 13 so co l lay and so r tie .cz to the level
ties a ar ti ;t t ,t. it wo 1 " J:r2 sib e y x the
winder to tAke, its lz . 'bare.
boc*ause good d.caestio eferseo by i.FTl t to the bttlcfba:A .
I d stio e: .a e, the c e- ,t :on? e. ; e
on Is P. t in amee of a i t; it 1rry o ~ Pesos
of be lie i "r ,a e , Asia &M ,c`! `"r ' ?a
p .R`'?' . tMG L etVi . ;35t 4n O .tr Word,.s
gi iaa of the tWrlsing, It wrLe th reVc, :t.`"r`ml
vYLio \k!'~atllaM '~5~ AYi to resist the ne?, ~k'4'ty '.A.:~ m 1&/~i bciwt~e
x le to ,j Chem" e at s cceee, d, ti &"ewe xast
ing hio along with &U of Western Mma pj ,
will. aitte to omit. Ieelf to a long .r
lead to tex ri ai, i io tir o
Good te:
of dv tenae .
'0o uencee of our
j-l so ooseq nes
ma elv'e Celt o
N, leer weocna wie brought a mvo1u
t .otiue (oo ee ?spa tiy',, there have also been c L&
w U ae in persome! t d unit trya.i. )I
ovoliiti W i l l } M o r e f rz t M M " lfkcste:
w,s ,s for e: o e iT4, our ' ro wt: o, AM9
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the 14th century.
ought abo ;t by the use of power o the 'battle!
r der not to make this article too Ion, 3:
those consequences of our ailitery policy vhztob concern per
materiel in our armed forces,
er? be measured ozslry by the r b r of d1k isio s on ski
but above all by the : ' :. of r a bo s which they as=
against enemy targets
For the f
bers of men a. not a. pr;
as we., as the duration
for discussion, though most
l
for military policy PuzVoSeSIT,
ser ice are sti : subjects
toy reasons, rather ? an
Our lone-range plan cells for lese than 6 006 ' ren in peace
no not includi g da orle, for the tree services; AN , ! fi. ulrk'c
AM is smaller tKa the figure specified in our on i; .
not too high for a. country w iob soon Will "have 50 Mi11,ion i..1,
but it is still too high if we are not capable of e uippi:
with modern arms and : ateri ., a to ,c ling he how to use this equip-
ment.
o si l ation will of course continue to be necessary for ter-
de sc'! but it is only a supporting ?,` ctor AM is of i
the Intervention forces but which is: . i ihle as far to
farces are concerned, This is why o :w'
W"
1939 ,
biU ion .of 1 million men, in case . of wart
their quality. To e,
cnaltsss t :'s, d, trfM n"
one f
r oa t
our M.
de
CA
esstu y
flit r'y history of France, mere r a
er of teen
al ity, we must 0
M o cares a. troops can. for example,
1 se .ection, ste adar'.s which wo.ay? eliminate
guxxaon d before they ever joined up (as again
years); we could also in rova recruitment " y raising
is for: z e es e i;e'rz .! i.li.t ?ry ? o s
be developed and br oar
training on all levels of
base our training effort, we will hay,
d more money on it the training of a oo lssi.oned
the rber in each age o t o y,
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jet pilot cot G 440,M) .T rsnas, tb !. d ". ;f a cl,=As'sior,ie iti
fi=ner :tor the M' gun costs b5,i Fraxioa., !,xid t.o of a to d,r:Y -
v-er wets 35,0,0 F:'nncsr Becz:uge of the, f ~1,r tioa oofjt of
tI."Li :w"i ,
the van t ma,, mi...ty of c res a nd speet.ali.sts w1i'11. h vv to be career
't .ie: s; this 1S whys d..eopits t'he reduction In tha v .`. ' :)f n'n~
we do not plaza to ~, a decrease in the %as. ber of E ft`it~er we
are going to try to rec- ,44t more o .co izatonec o " leer . Ct r
tk"L'iinind pi ogr will therefore h i to strengthen fcr al a, se ipl1ne
which is a.lw , 's nea ssaxy, am well as irtelleti tt l dis_-I. line Which
1.51 now required in the cc i M of modern exmiee, of fast rya.:. pt ater i.al
but 1"'re"? ile Units ,-- fra'aile 'k r c c uE they axe &,Lw :4. f xx:p erg.. t cz s inang
s ,t ?err ,
These co iumders and thes4 11nits must : ecei.ve the 6_-st arms,
Fach year~;,., a. ms anti eqp z . tent' prryducti om beami,;a4. more 1if y w'li ;, mare tlif'
ficWLt, and, more expensive. In the 25 year frc is'j to 1963 the per-
ton price, expressed in constant Franc fi,4g" r'? e , ha !ti doubled for olk
tripled for &hipa, and c titint led for alrci.,af't. .4r- article in F'e; ar*Wuar
1962 (Rev,,at d,e. De Too ides ('i m Worl d evie,) ,1 F erb: r ry 1>962,) 111 Stec
the ar/ L? N 1 /yt~yr~ep e y aeeep~e,tYO:~~fq ipmen?tyyitems; [ gyIy-v;yaldry lies to addq hh at
9, tan of 's,2b yAdr.4rt,2 .. a o,Osts 50-100 4 Lres less in S hf& f0 m of tAll &tc+. le
r;Or tS'tKI. thi t'' e fora of conventional e :csi,v*a in bow zersa charged
with tolite$ for ex ple sine the thamoiua,14-a.r bomb 're: ton, of e; 1o-.
siv s, is muc'. less cpansi-ve than the atomic bamb.
Controary to widespread. t pinion, r e eerch e a . p `.t't ct,ion of wrea-
pons destined for the t :tegic rraclear' force (A-bo .;o PierrelattC l? n"b"
alra;xkaft, rockets, and so on) represent less that 13'j of the. military
budget and will not c awount to 25%% of that budget t til to . fl-,,e. e
%> ?
of this decade , By tray ojf comparison Great Britain puts on1`U 10% of
its military expenditures -,. which are otherwise greater then 0= 45 into nuclear armaments.
But a al , e. ts,, even the so-cal .ed aom?entloml arms,. a t keep
up with tee l. olo ical progr sa end must be apted. to the .. vale
ell tixties. our =its wild. need tactie,,il mobility withoua which ,;
camiot esce,i a destruction; this is why ;,at- nvc Li aroec-couaxt tru ,
tracked vehicles, combat helicopters e:nci., for t a~? elr ffe?^ VOL, &ir
craft. The command must have a flexible and fact :'xzfon'ceti a~ system
such as ra ser", supersonic reeonx aIsr a c e a1 cr t't,, droxer; r' ~.i
remote-coratrol.led aircraft t whicb are erauipped With cameras : xt which
are sent ,.a r? esaaso~s missions t'.rx
e latest Ytodele of these
drones provide for aerial observation of tet in v a, telev'ision), and
even satoll.-': tes; they need reliable coma n.ica:tions net corks which
must bt, wide spread. e-nd have, a: .; message tra sr.,-ission a&pa4,..1ty.
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;dower, c la tty
ela weapond eqUIPM
o
To pro%wre
:, we I l Wave
u ps ~ 0,194
2 l:
O e ;# , *t,, 'GM 4111.1 ,
co s e it the reduction i numbers
a and more of? pin, for
. d Imes . t, toao 161,4 of theae
. ;lu t
a ums far sqpV*i*tIrAg
our pie ,.
I 'k 2 a a, w will 5 to as . .h, as
it L of course 1o is 1 to 9 h
i. .130 t i.x;
o` er to WPM-
duotioal in an `Y l be el jo: t y `b :1. t
.bf some of t, t rvt:h r. As , matter of tact, the AtImatic
Alliance has re, e#. great e p t tion , In this field . In prmioted
some ,,a roe e t gusts an 9 :k .o io of the ? iairc 0, ,sa y the
Bluk;j
But this oa r :
th&g W1
to rho
to the o v :=e, s terx
he more mod. o i
to be between the eiv `i..
and to o r a a plamtq but-.
eM a e d c ie' ar',, of our coo%m-
' lorwe will t- as., bmIa
o rt : .
entitle ea d
0 ths same we will :feel
e fec of military policy
nation TA. anwe strongly, even in peace o
WOMId have to
1. our e}M.
Moment a Various other ense expenditures which would
ttAmt up to 2O 5 W lion or theTeabomts); bo
to rc tht , suei about WS; W we might
oil o alitary espendituras out f' entire over'
h; e been 00x decreasing for ever, ?e x ;
I not only to our :aI
he w it era out of tie gross atlonal pro 4 tt is o :],y
. the construction of f Atlantic a t l b :i v
;:o of ou .r o t like to keep e : phaei ir.
rapid growth of Fret& military eNpendlturva.
?, Hecate i :?? was involved.
I because patio a
Wain an above l because any-
Wded from thin.
tomic weapons; hI o z t t
and, lo r thle re a, oh, we "C t t
(or p ?noeee
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Thus we that these criti+ ism$ are it reality d#,x.ect d
a,ga.i. t the vc I principle behind our fete se effort- those people
t.rho yeaterda.y complain fit about they long d sttan of ;,r~iwl i s..r :'rvic
ar! the sew, people who today ,yy that our arm* experradithr ,; are too
In France., as in other countries in Western 'Tur, se, pt ;b
opinion still jurl ?n these expendit;vtres accc rdi. ^.g to the sta l .a of
the lit e . or Mciot econoin1r-ts of the 19th centwLryf c>,a t'I e be
.s
of vario w Opposing theories, these ecor ti.3Sts a ed on on point..
they all sa,ld that r ilit ry ear l.tures had no eeonoxjrtc utility
all. Nov, these doctrlnea no ,lonCr r e 1 in our pressnt.dayr reeaii.ty
A ca ret l ate, objective- analysis shore tla .t,, in a
the eW.rv U re for the odes xi z* t iort of an ::riy to a
wing de M-= ,, are more in the mature of i vestments that
Cally a socially profitable and'that aiao he relit th.r,
t SIl'.iE4d gro-4
mnmd-
1 rSe portion Of our mflitart e:xpex l1t' a s : r e4 ? it ? tiyg
4 a.
billion In 1. ' 10.2 billion in 2.( ,')63) in the Prox of oontrots
and orders p; n:4ed with a, t3 trdduetri s, a::Lror t
shipyards, elrvtricai. er electronics plants, etc. ."kea.
is )lve a lazge portion of o eery odext industries ate,, vi ' in
them involve ' the most ivanced techniques available. In 19621 t e
mi..Li.tta r budget, allocated 1. billion Fr ass to research of all kinds,
fran basic rent arch all the t xy to prototy -s for the pat 5 Year ,
in all .evelop#,.d. countries,, tecbnologic:al pro , ezs has ho l d. the
i ua ria]. civilizations a ke great at;ri s and hay been opu'rt d on
by military needs. In `'mace, the, , ton-ie finer C t reissiorn ;ears 6,
'
P-f .ite fun& f
r the military biigetIt our civ: ian a ,a `X` ,,wq
the French prng.un and the European pro : in which we an,,
pa-ti ) vou16. be impossible it they were not s` pparted by
pra gr i i irs xir the construction of xock.et< w ed as a9. a rr "ci. i ,b
rt is art illusion to believe that it ro ;~c..d e a
wi 1t ,:ray' e ,f : *xad:it Lxs over to civilia~.?~ sc fatii c or
i t4a ~,. ?f
r earc,b; e x p e r i e n c e a shows th :t the savings r sle in mi..litaa r j fa ,i-
tur f FB mORt aawayf he1r fin+9ttce cons wer E? ~'r ~ "rC t' ores
Le very frequently overlook t o fact that, out of mi.j terry
xpe itureks which are not directly . elecc2 back into th z j,tio .l
Oconortr in other vo 8.3 billion in 396-3 (18.5 minus 10.2 equals
.3) A'~+~ pr s,: at in ~Mi ~ydeyyincipa x . y vas a &, d allovance eva pe /.d..4!L.'re sa km: a -
pat oe fot :rth is used for the ' ral and to ll i
x it ie 1 train Tq of ape
eao ael, or the T stem e Department and prov; des for F r w the nginee ?s
a 1 tech aieiaz we need; this effort involves the polytechnic
~~ Ak~o~ d, count ,
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whe'l
1 School
oI " a
civil onginpers 3
the ."ter ` , e 'e ;
its,, in the gi a l or tteo nic aboo;1s i t
of oo , r e tbe .i:It ooh e - , for idabarrcef
aMM ('Llm t of tbeg, military b"Orkgot is event on them*
n o ean datNy Vt.t the . i o n b i t at1, fraot Vito
as doea for inat c the ,i y- ad ce1 c p vhicb
,.o Francs per year and s o c r of. c iv i
vices.
die- i corps schools,, the
of .; an of tbAgG < c oo .
a thaz Military ones
4 he; a caa a.. e
ode m)thi3 '. of oi`dau; #dli cua.,,
y~~y~~qq v
ation of our a- need f
d:i, varec, " h.o 1
Dry":,
up-,ion toe at;
till o+o:.i.to tbe
-~ .S Ydm 5 Y 19 -'V- o
O a
o., . of France,, will pre)-tit c this nev
do .. s
vrM In our
r`.ard
~ '10
11-t io , 0 1n l , ,ll of them
t it drmmlsopmertt e i oec the rA-U se
J. inl."arve..
eniegror.
>h m
on projtiet Pad, vi
be, the lane
t e vi
5: :uu &MA 43
,l o. ghm, at
be efit 3 noat o
the war,,, ttt
of a; l IM sroee e o
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a ffset :o
a is z ,'JA z1.1itar tit to a thst s a.
po iti o o rn e
.-'o a. .beat a s it tt a *tee tbo~
o p t w id Inthe rldj it 1 th.+ o of the esnez ,ia1 uie:zcta
ry not u r 1o,rei policy. .il + &s se Lion i4 nW ivr, but it is particularly
true toez-y.
u Jeaax
Ix, 1949 a aie :ieim w-s made. to hn.ve ~ + e Je;? n ,Lts
neighbors and the United S ts.?.=ea in the Ati .ui e . ,li re axis 'Led to
the ci**vtix of NATO as It ra led to lead to thy: 1-'urorear
Cw ; :.i.ty. a ianoe h&s euebl.ed 'tops-, t aks to ; a ics ..pr
tacti.on, to :a: aI t Soviet pr,ssu a M. to. rt-oa"r ~teri ly
as 1^. very & the pa~~oi ~? p ob1 of .th Ati,ixeti..e
Al i:a ee has been the we of aato>nic yea o b a e k cam" ter 19 -5 e , for
a3, e.,o ". is tim al=e th Vii, r ttos he as b trn Ll? aei: `ieei Into two ~:~k e or ta~a.`
those that hell u? lea weapons and thcaae th-at .1,d wt,, Only the for
axe enable of defendI=r their freed a i their the others
are co to ser7itse o^~ aaate lite atat s.
O'Ar nuclear ve onaa. ctiU not exaab1e as to n; ote
the giants of the world; but ? They t U t ,ble ` ee to aea.-~e "being
1.4
Approved For ReleasetZMWUW:1-O5B00383R000100230014-3
 Approved For Release 2004/018/25 : CIA=RDP65B00383R000100230014-3
QV.-'na r 1,
?trest are. at
the Americans aM the e e e L P. : the
pv,rata.: bit Olti. of b gerOr and eei, k , ,ze their
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Wh the nuclear ' cent or nnx?anoe 'a
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