NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY -UNDERSTANDINGS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210004-6
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• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
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1963 Approved For ReW41612139M6V1/91: CIMIKKEINBISBMSET2M60100210004-6 15935
thinleencouraged or led the Soviets to
sign this treaty. We have already dis-
cussed many of the other reasons. All
of the witnesses but one appearing be-
fore the committee believe the United
States 'now has superiority in nuclear
- weapons, and that the risks implicit in
the treat S7 are outweighed by the ad-
vantages. Dr. Teller would not agree
with that testimony; but Dr. Teller is
Dr, Teller. His testimony is there for
the Senator to see. But all the other
witnesses, of equal reputation and capac-
ity, testified directly to the contrary.
The committee was assured that the
executive branch intends to maintain
Oiir superiority by intensive underground
testing programs; by maintaining the
vitality of our weapons laboratories; by
remaining in a high state of readiness
to test in the atmosphere in the event'
of violations; and by improving the vari-
ous systems by which the United States
can detect and identify the nuclear ac-
tivities of other powers.
The President's letter, which the Sena-
tor from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSENI read to-
day, reaffirms, at least from the highest
authority, the statements made before
the committee.
A great deal has been said with re-
gard to the moratorium on testing. It
is well to remember the record on this
point, because it has been someWhat mis-
understood.
In March 1958, the Soviet 'Union an-
nounced a moratorium on nuclear test-
ing, pfovided the 'Western. Powers did not
test.
In August of 1958, foreseeing the end
of our own test series, President Eisen-
hower announced our willingness to sus-
pend tests for 1 year.
These were unilateral statements.
They were not treaties. They were not
formal agreements. One side made a
statement. President Eisenhower an-
nounced our willingness to suspend tests
for 1 year, beginning on October 31, if
the Soviets agreed to do likewise. We
conducted tests through the end of Oc-
tober. The Soviets tested on November
1 and 2, and then stopped. That was all
they tested. President Eisenhower said
those tests freed us from our pledge, but
that we would continue the suspension
"for the time being."
? In 1959, the Soviet Goverriiiient said
again it would not test unless the West-
ern Powers did so first.
In December 1959, President Eisen-
hower said the 'United States considered
itself "free to resume nuclear weapons
testing," subject to advance notification
of such intention.
France, which is a Western power, be-
gan testing in 1960. She had not been
under any commitment. There were
staternents by our Government, our
President; but France had not made any
such agreement, so she considered her-
self free.
The Soviet Government declared that
the continuance of tests by Prance might
dorilPti :the Soviet Union to resume tests.
ere :were' further tests by FrariEe
before the Soviet Union began testing
again on September 1, 1961.
. ? .
This js quite different from n a formal
treaty not to test. These were exchanges
of intentions.
Thus, no formal agreement existed. It
was merely a de facto suspension, which
was broken by the Soviet Union, after
long preparations. However, the United
States had not stopped working on nu-
clear weapons. There was testimony
that our laboratories were maintained in
a high state of efficiency. The staffs of
the laboratories were increased during
this period. We obviously must have
been making some preparations for re-
sumption of tests underground, because
it was only 2 weeks after the Russians
started testing and broke the moratori-
um that we conducted our first test.
It is too bad that the Russians broke
the moratorium, as they did, but it was
somewhat different from a violation of a
treaty.
Mr. HARTKE. Another allegation is
that this treaty is the first step in inter-
national control by the United Nations.
Does the chairman of the committee
agree?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I certainly do not.
We all look forward to a lessening of the
arms race and to diminishing arma-
ments. We use the phrases of "disarm-
ament" and "complete disarmament"
loosely. I do not think the committee
foresees any such development. Cer-
tainly I do not.
So far as United Nations control is
concerned, the treaty does not in any
way relate to control by the United
Nations.
There is nothing in the treaty or any-
thing associated with it, in my view, that
could justify any such statements. It
is in no way a disarmament treaty. To-
day there was a discussion of President
Eisenhower's suggestions and under-
standing. It is in no way a disarma-
ment treaty, and it does not in any way
inhibit the use of armaments in anyway.
It is difficult to answer the question
other than to say it is absolutely irrele-
vant to the treaty.
Mr. HARTKE. Finally, some people
fear that if the treaty were ratified, we
would not be able to use nuclear weap-
ons in case of war?either in our own
defense or in defense of the nations we
are committed to defend. I would be in-
terested in the comments of the chair-
man of the committee on this question.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I?refer the Sena-
tor to pages 5 and 6 of the committee
report. I do not believe I should take
the time of the Senator or of the Senate
to read it all. A nuclear explosion or
ny other explosion in the event of hos-
tilities is not affected by the treaty.
President Kennedy, in his letter, made
this very Clear.
The important testimony on this ques-
tion, given by the-Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, among others,
was that the treaty would not affect the
use of weapons in wartime. It is only a
lest ban. It is not a ban-the-bomb
treaty. In the Case of hostilities, either
directly affecting us or one of our allies,
we feel it is in our interest to defend,
there is no inhibition upon the use of
weapons.
In fortifying that statement, the Sen-
ator will see on page 5 of committee
report, a statement by the Russian Gov-
ernment in response to a somewhat sim-
ilar criticism by the Chinese. I shall
read only the last part of it:
Second, the treaty also does not prohibit
the Soviet Union, if need be, from holding
underground nuclear tests, from increasing
the stockpiles of its nuclear arms, and even
from using these weapons against the im-
perialist aggressors if they unleash a war in
a fit of insanity.
In other words, aside from what our
people who negotiated the treaty have
told us, and the President's interpreta-
tion, the Russian Government itself has
said the treaty does not inhibit them
from using the weapons in case of war
started by the so-called imperialist ag-
gressors.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I have
just posed a series of questions to the
distinguished chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee--questions which
have been posed to me by the people
who have sent me to the Senate. The
chairman has replied with forthright-
ness, with great sincerity and clarity.
We have, moreover, the assurances of
the President of the United States on
matters of serious concern and reserva-
tions of many of us. Chiefly these con-
cerns are whether or not secret or hid-
den concessions have been made to the
Soviet Union; whether or not we shall
lay so much reliance upon the words of
the document that we ignore the possib-
ility that the treaty may be broken. The
President has assured us that no addi-
tional concessions or agreements have
been made or implied. He has further
assured us that we will continue tests
that are legal under the treaty; namely,
those underground?and that we shall
continue in readiness to resume tests in
the air and the sea so that, if the treaty
should be broken, we shall not endanger
our security.
Mr. President, I believe this treaty
serves a purpose. It is a hopeful sign?
a slim crack of sunshine in the cloudy
skies of world tension and cold war. But
we also feel that it is to our advantage
and the advantage of mankind.
I view the treaty as a way to cease the
pollution of the air, our food and our
drink from the poisons of radioaCtive
elements. I believe that the cessession
of tests may save infants from death and
crippling. Thus, if it is kept for just
a day or a week or a month, it will have
served a useful purpose.
We must look at the test from this
angle. Potentially, it can be a device
that may lead to additional concrete
benefits for all mankind. Perhaps
through this instrument the highest
goals and ambitions of all of us for per-
manent peace on earth may be attained.
The treaty itself does not guarantee
this. It does not even give us the hope
for this lofty ambition.
The treaty will not end the arms race.
It may?I repeat?may lead to some
Moves to limit the arms race. And this,
in turn, may help to thaw the cold war
or lead to peaceful ends.
But this, too, is more than we can ex-
pect. We can just hope.
But while we hope, We must view with
realishi. The past performance of our
adversaries in the cold war is such that
they have broken treaties virtually as
fast as they have made them. We must,
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then, expect this treaty to be broken even
though we have hopes that it will be kept
and that it will lead to further gains for
all of mankind in this eternal quest for
peace.
The world is watching. Every mother
In our land and throughout the world
who has concern for the health of her
babies and their babies looks to us in the
Senate to help insure that they will not
be killed or maimed by the poisons of
radioactivity. But just as surely, death
is preferable to capitulation to slavery.
But we hold in our hands the vote that
can give mankind new hope.
The treaty will not end war or cold war
or an arms race. It may not even long
end the threat of the poisoning from
radioactivity.
Should Russia break this agreement as
she has others, the force of world opinion
will be mighty. It will come crashing on
the heads of the Russians.
But this is not enough. We shall re-
main ready to resume our tests for we are
determined to maintain the security of
this Nation and of the free world?for-
ever.
Let Russia take warning here and now.
Behind a breaking of this treaty she will
find a strong iron fist of the strongest
Nation in the world, the mightiest nu-
clear power?these United States.
The world wants this treaty because it
It in the world's best interests. Should
Russia break its solem word again, the
world will react.
And the instrument of this reaction
will be our own country.
Firm in this knowledge and warm in
the comfort of my own convictions that
the world deserves hope, I shall support
this treaty.
I thank the distinguished Senator from
Arkansas for yielding to me at this time.
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY?
UNDERSTANDINGS
Mr. DODD submitted understandings
Intended to be proposed by him to the
resolution of ratification of the treaty
banning nuclear weapon tests in the at-
mosphere, in outer space, and under-
water, which were ordered to lie on the
table and to be printed.
own, RIGHTS
As in legislative session,
1VIr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to include in. the
RECORD at this point as a part of my re-
marks an article from Newsweek, issue
of September 16, 1963, written by Walter
Lippmann, on "The Negroes' Griev-
ances," and also today's editorial in the
New York Times on desegregation of Ala-
bama's Public schools. The crying need
for a standard of law and fidelity to it
remains a constant reminder that the
price of a slow, pace on civil rights legis-
lation in the Congress is to add measur-
ably to the jeopardy to public order and
tranquillity in the meantime.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows;
[From Newsweek magazine, Sept. 16,1963]
THE NEGROES' GRIEVANCES
(By Walter Lipmann)
Since the afternoon of the march in Wash-
ington, the first question ha everyone's mind
has been whether the demonstration?so big,
so disciplined and so moving?would make
any difference in Congress. A cool answer
would have to begin, I think, by noting that
it will be easier for Congreas to promote free-
dom than to provide jobs. .
To many of the marchers it is, I realize, a
dusty answer to say that their economic
grievances are not primarily or peculiarly
due to racial discrimination. Admittedly, in
the hiring and, firing of labor, the chances of
the Negroes are poorer than of the whites.
Nevertheless, there can be no solution of the
Negro labor problem even if hiring and firing
could he equalized. For We have a chronic
lack of demand for about Sy, percent of the
people wanting jobs. With jobs scarce, the
problem cannot be solved by establishing
quotas for Negroes at the expense of the
whites. All that could do would be to em-
bitter race relations.
A real solution can be had only in an up-
surge of the American economy which will
increase the demand for labor, white and
black, by some 2 to 3 million jobs. This
will take care of almost all but the unem-
ployable, for whom special treatment, such
as retraining, will be needed.
The economic grievances of the Negroes
cannot be redressed on a racial basis. They
are an inseparable part of the national prob-
lem of how to stimulate the American econ-
omy?how to provide that much higher
standard of life which is Within the capacity
of our technology, our resources, our capital
reservea, and our labor force. Here there is
no near prospect of a big advance. In the
Congress the conservative coalition opposes
the measures which in the experience of the
more advanced countries of the world are
conducive to rapid and :3i/stained economic
growth To this opposing coalition a pre-
ponderant mass of the voters are giving at
least tacit assent?some because they agree
With the conservative coalition and some be-
cause they do not understand the alterna-
tives.
HEARTS AND MINDS
Where the most can be done most quickly
is in the civil rights measures directed at
the disfranchisement of Negroes, their segre-
gation in public education, and discrimina-
tion against them in public accommodations.
It is quite true that laws passed by Congress
cannot change the hearts and minds of whites
or blacks, and that the problems of the two
races living in the same coununity will not
soon disappear. But it is false to argue that
D
????'"ir**- nothing can be done becaulle everything can-
not be done. It will do a4great deal if the
denial of civil rights is outlawed emphati-
cally with the stamp of the authority of the
Nation.
The quickest practical results are likely
to come from that section Of the civil rights
bill which would outlaw racial discrimina-
tion in public accommodations. For this
kind of discrimination is a public humilia-
tion based solely on color. It is a public dec-
laration that the descendants of the slaves
are not full American citizens. The victims
of this discrimination are for the most part
the very Negroes who are the natural leaders
of ,the Negro people. They are the ones who
can afford to travel, and it Is they who have
begun to be part of the American public
way of life. They suffer acutely from the
stigma put upon them when they want a
room in a motel or a sandwich at a lunch
counter or a glass of water. This stigma
Injects poison continuously into the rela-
tions of whites and blacks. ,
DESPOTIC THEORY
Of all the grievances, this one is the most
blatant. It is also the most easily redressed.
It is said, however, by Senator GOLDWATER,
for example, that to make it unlawful, for
the owner of a lunch counter to discriminate
is to deprive him of his right of private prop-
erty. This is a conception of private prop-
erty which Blackstone described as the "sole
and despotic dominion * * * over the exter-
nal things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the
universe."
No civilized society has long tolerated the
despotic theory of private property. This
conception of property is alien to the central
truths of Christendom, which have always
held that property is not absolute but is a
system of rights and duties that are deter-
mined by society. A man's property, says
Blackstone, "consists in the free use, enjoy-
ment and disposal of all his acquisitions,
Without any control or diminution, save only
by the laws of the land."
Private property is, in fact, the creation
of the laws of the land?the laws of owner-
ship, sale, and inheritance, the zoning laws,
the sanitary laws, the laws of eminent do-
main. It is a primitive, naive, and false
view of private property to urge that it is
not subject to the laws which express the
national purpose and the national con-
science?among which have been for a hun-
dred years the abolition of slavery and the
admission of the Negroes to the rights of
American citizenship.
[From the New York (N.Y.) Times,
Sept. 11, 1963]
WALLACE'S DEFEAT IN "VICTORY"
Governor Wallace finally achieved what
he had been seeking for a week--Federal in-
tervention. President Kennedy, after exer-
cising monumental forebearance in the hope
that the clear will of Alabama's own citizens
would make their Governor cease his reckless
defiance of law, had no choice but to use his
powers to enforce Federal court orders for
school integration in Birmingham, Mobile,
and, Tuskegee.
Governor Wallace thus has his "victory."
But at what a price. By his actions, his vain
posturings, his cries that he was standing
up for the people of Alabama against a
dictatorial Federal Government, by his mo-
bilizing of State troopers to spurn court
orders and chase Federal marshals off the
capitol grounds in Montgomery, he has
undermined respect for lawful process and
stirred up a devil's brew of racial hatred
that can erupt any minute into further vio-
lence, perhaps more bombings, more riots.
The unruly students at Birmingham who
yelled "Nigger, go home" at fellow students
had been given an example in folly by their
Governor. The racial activists who
attempted to break police' lines and paraded
in horn-blowing motorcades through Bir-
mingham streets could point to that same
example.
Had Governor Wallace accepted the in-
evitable last week?as the officials and the
school board of Birmingham, Mobile, Tuske-
gee, and Huntsville had done?it is probable
that there would have been no trouble at
all. Certainly none with which the police
forces of those cities could not have coped.
Huntsville supports that conclusion. So do
all the other southern areas where public
school integration proceeded quietly last
week.
By his conduct Governor Wallace has de-
graded himself, his State and its people.
And in some measure all of us. He has won
a "victory," but the price of victory, as he
must have known it would be, is eventual
total defeat. Not only for Governor Wal-
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ments to which it has been a party. A
list of 27 of those agreements appears on
page 967 of the printed hearings of the
committee.
In that connection I also draw the
Senator's attention to pages 132 to 135
of the hearings. At that point he will
find a list of agreements, some of which
are treaties and some not so formal,
which the Russians have violated. That
material was inserted in the record dur-
ing the hearings.
With respect to these documents I
should like to make the following com-
ment: While some of the agreements
listed an page 967 are of real substance
and importance, a number of them are
more or less minor in nature. So one
must discriminate to some extent in
judging the nature of those agreements.
Further, with regard to this list of
broken agreements, the Senator will
note the significance of the fact that
since Stalin's death in 1953 there have
been relatively few breaches of agree-
ments. The most important one, from
our point of view, relates to the Berlin
wall and access to Berlin.
To illustrate how nebulous and in-
consequential some of these agreements
are, though cited as being significant
treaty violations, two of the last four are
agreements that the 'U.S.S.R. had with
Yugoslavia with regard to credits and
grants. It would be somewhat similar
to our agreements in connection with
foreign aid. We always consider such
agreements rather tentative in nature.
We decide that we will do so much for
a certain country, usually with recipro-
cal obligations. Two of those cases are
ones in which the U.S.S.R. withdrew or,
rather, postponed for 5 years a grant to
Yugoslavia of $285 million. That was a
bilateral agreement. I do not believe it
was in the nature of a treaty or a solemn
undertaking. It was an agreement be-
tween those two countries. I only men-
tion that point so that we do not swallow
the declaration that 50 out of 52 agree-
ments have been broken, but we should
consider the nature of the agreement.
Insofar as concerns solemn treaty un-
dertakings of a dignity and a substan-
tive importance comparable to the one
now before the Senate, outside the Berlin
problem and since the death of Stalin,
the number of treaties violated has been
relatively few. Many more of equal dig-
nity have been adhered to without viola-
tion. For example, I cite the Antarctic
Treaty and the Austrian Treaty. So far
as I know, no violation of these treaties
has taken place.
These things are not quite as black
and white as they appear.
Further with regard to the present
treaty, the very least one can say with
regard to what distinguishes the treaties
that have been observed from those vio-
lated?which applies in all cases, I
think?in that the treaties that have
been observed are those which were in
the interest of the S9viet Union. It was
for that reason that the committee was
concerned in its hearings, and set forth
In its report the considerations which, it
appears, have led the Soviet Union to
enter into this agreement. Insofar as
those considerations can be relied on to
be continuing factors in Soviet policy,
they provide some guarantee against fu-
ture violations of this treaty.
First, it is apparent that the 1961-62
tests have led Soviet scientists to believe
that in many critical areas of nuclear
weaponry they have achieved a rough
technical parity with the United States.
Of course, it is speculative as to how
they feel, but it is very probable that
they feel a certain assurance as to their
capacity, which from their point of view
is their deterrent.
Second, the Cuban missile crisis is
likely to remain in the minds of the
present Soviet leadership as a sobering
glimpse at the implications of nuclear
war.
That point was developed at consider-
able length, and I believe quite per-
suasively, by the Secretary of State in
his testimony at the hearing.
Third, is the Sino-Soviet schism. The
depth of that schism as it is progressive-
ly revealed, indicates, I believe, the ex-
tent of the commitment which the Rus-
sians have been willing to make for the
sake of agreement in this case. It seems
hardly likely that such consequences as
the Soviet Union has already incurred
from the mere signing of this document
would be incurred for the sake of a docu-
ment which they do not intend to abide
by.
An example of that break was set forth
in this morning's newspaper. The bit-
terness of the exchange between the two
countries indicates that there has been a
great change in that relationship, and it
also has had a sobering effect upon the
Russians.
Fourth, the possibility of diverting re-
sources away from nuclear weapons de-
velopment and into the consumer goods
area in which they are solely needed has
probably motivated the Soviet leaders.
Once the diversion is made it seems pos-
sible that this will have a cumulative
effect in creating a Soviet Union with
interests in other areas than weaponry.
For several years we have heard about
the difficulties of Russia in respect to
agriculture. It is quite reasonable to
believe that these difficulties may have
contributed to the Soviets desire to de-
celerate the rate in the field of nuclear
weapons in order to enable them to de-
vote more of their resources to things
such as agriculture and the production
of other consumer goods.
Finally, there is the interest which the
Soviet Union must share with this coun-
try in preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. This interest can only
increase with time.
All these things are questions which
the committee believes?and I believe?
the treaty effects in a way which is in
the self-interest of the Soivets. We rely
upon such self-interest for the observ-
ance by the Soviets of the treaty. It is
in their interest. It seems to me that it
is quite possible that great countries,
with the kind of power that we both
possess, could have a common interest in
certain fields. These fields may be dif-
ferent. We do not have the same in-
centives, for example, insofar as con-
sumer goods are concerned, although I
think we have a great need in the field
15933
of education, urban renewal, and other
things to divert some of the exorbitant
cost of armaments to meeting those
needs. They are not the same interests
as those of the Russians, but they are in
that general area.
Insofar as these considerations lead the
Soviet Union to enter upon the treaty,
they will to a greater or lesser extent, I
believe, bind them to the treaty in the
future.
In addition to self-interest, some gen-
eral statements can be made as to the
likelihood of Soviet treaty violation on
the basis of an analysis of the treaties
adhered to and violated in that Govern-
ment in the past.
For one thing, the greater the num-
ber of parties adhering to the treaty, the
greater seems the assurance that the So-
viet Union will not blatantly abrogate
the understanding reached. To date
In excess of 80 parties have adhered to
the treaty.
While it would not be prudent to pre-
dict any change of Soviet policy in this
regard based on the personalities of the
Soviet leadership, it is noteworthy that
recent treaty violations have sought the
color of legal justification in place of the
cynical statements of Marxist dogma
which accompanied the about-faces of
the Stalin period. Perhaps the need for
legal arguments to support their position
will eventually lead the Soviets to con-
form their conduct to international law.
However, the most persuasive argu-
ment for not permitting past violations
to dictate our present relations with the
Soviet Union on this matter is that a
violation in this case will not pass un-
noticed or put the United States at a
disadvantage. The treaty is self-policing.
The United States can safely rely on its
own ability to detect Soviet violations
and to maintain a military and scien-
tific posture that will assure that no
gains will accrue to the Soviet Union
from violation of the treaty.
That latter statement is based to a
considerable degree upon testimony
taken in executive session, which is avail-
able to the Senator if he wishes to look
at it, with regard to our country's capac-
ity for detection.
Mr. HARTKE. I think I shall do that.
I should do it, in all sincerity, for the
benefit of my own constituency and for
my own satisfaction.
Secondly, many have alleged that the
treaty is advantageous only to Russia.
The Senator has indicated that there
were certain benefits from the treaty to
Russia; otherwise, the Russians would
not have signed it. It has been said that
the Russian goal is to dominate the
world, and that the Russians would not
agree to a pact which would not aid them
in obtaining this objective. I am sure
my constituents would be interested in
the chairman's view of this question.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If that statement
has any validity, it could be said about
any agreement. To put it another way,
no agreement could ever be signed, be-
cause obviously the parties who signed
it each believe, at the least, that it is to
their advantage.
We think the treaty is to our advan-
tage, also. In this particular case, the
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limited test ban treaty is an American
proposal, going back to 1959, as has al-
ready been stated, and as the Senator
knows.
Its purpose is to decelerate the arms
race which, if allowed to proceed un-
checked and unlimited, would represent
a hazard for both the United -States and
for the Soviet Union. So this hazard
faces both of us equally.
I have already given certain reasons
why we believe the Soviets can be relied
upon to some extent?perhaps to a great
extent?to abide by the treaty, because it
is in their self-interest. It is also in our
self-interest. I think our interests are
mutual in many respects with regard to
this particular treaty. Many of the rea-
sons why the Soviets will abide by the
treaty, which I have mentioned, are also
applicable to and relevant to this ques-
tion. It is in their interest. It is also
in our interest.
I emphssive that this is an American
proposal by the previous administration,
supported by this administration.
It is inconceivable to me that both
administrations, together with the vast
majority of the present military leaders
of this country and a clear majority of
the scientific brains not only of the
present administration but also of the
past one, could all be mistaken in their
assessment as to where the advantage
lies.
Mr. HARTKE. Many people also be-
lieve that the Russians will test secretly.
We have heard this in the debate re-
peatedly on the Senate floor. Many
people believe that, because there will
be no on-site inspections, we shall be
unable to detect such tests.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The on-site in-
spections, as the Senator knows, which
occupied so much of the discussions in
Geneva, related to underground testing,
which is not to be covered by this treaty.
In the atmosphere, in outer space and
under water, it is the belief of our best
experts?the ones to whom I have al-
ready referred?that our capacity for de-
tection is adequate. Not only was this
the testimony in executive session, but it
was also stated in open session, without
going into details.
The director of the CIA; the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; Dr. Brown, the chief
scientific adviser; and the Secretary of
Defense all stated in general terms that
they believe our detection capacity is
adequate to detect any significant viola-
tions of this treaty in the environments
covered by it.
I think everyone would recognize that
there could be tests small enough in size
that they might go undetected, but they
would be quite small and would not be
significant with regard to the balance
of power between the countries.
Mr. HARTKE. It is also said that
even if the Russians do not test in their
own country there is nothing to prevent
them from providing a nonsignatory na-
tion, such a,-Red China, with nuclear
weapons which would then be tested un-
der Russian supervision.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That would be a
clear violation of the treaty. If it were
done, the treaty would be abrogated and
would end. The language of the treaty
prohibits such acts.
The signatories undertake to dis-
courage or to prevent testing by other
nations, by allies or by any other nations.
That would be a clear violation of the
treaty. Our experts have no doubt that
we would know that they were doing it,
and therefore it would amount to an
abrogation of the treaty. We could of
course withdraw from the treaty. Sec-
tion 4 has a very lenient withdrawal
clause..
(At this point Mr: CLARK took the
chair as Presiding Officer.)
Mr. HARTKE. Another often-
repeated objection is that entering into
a test ban agreement now would prevent
the United States from conducting the
atmospheric tests necessary to develop
very large yield weapons as a counter to
the Soviet superweapons, which are now
supposedly 100 times More powerful than
the U.S. Polaris and Minuteman missiles,
on which our future defense depends.
It has also been contended that it would
freeze our development of an antimis-
sile defense system; and that, therefore,
we must continue testing to maintain
and to, increase our nuclear deterrent
power, for if we do not test we shall lose.
This is also apparently the view which
has been expressed on the floor of the
Senate by the Preparedness Subcom-
mittee.
I wonder if the chairman of the com-
mittee would care to comment upon this
point.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There was testi-
mony to that effect, but the great weight
of the testimony was 'contrary to that
view. I should say that the testimony
Indicated the premises of the question
are false.
The committee was Informed by ex-
pert witnesses that the United States,
without further testing, could develop a
50- to 60-megaton Weapon for B-52
delivery. But these same witnesses as-
signed very little importance to such a
weapon.. For example, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Taylor,
replying to a question on this point,
said:
I attach very little inaportance to this,
frankly, Senator. The whole very high yield
weapons field Is one which has very little,
If any, military significance.
I interpolate that as long ago as 1954
this question was discuSsed by the lead-
ing military and civilian experts, and
they decided against the development of
high-yield weapons. The concept of a
50- or 60-megaton weapon, as opposed
to a 5- or 10-megaton weapon, rather
loses its meaning, because the 5- or 10-i
megaton weapon suitably deployed is so
powerful as to be capable of destroying
any city in the world. That is why the
experts did not feel there was any point
in going into the extremely high-yield
weapons.
General Taylor's comment was sup-
ported by the combined statement of
the Joint Chiefs. As the Secretary of
Defense and these other witnesses point-
ed out, the United States could have
developed such weapons but has concen-
trated instead on the more useful, flexi-
ble, and deliverable low and intainedi.-
ate-yield weapons.
With regard to ABM development,
the committee took exhaustive testi-
mony, some of which is quoted on pages
12-15 of the report, on this question.
The burden of expert opinion is that
development of an ABM system suffi-
ciently effective to justify deployment
would be exceedingly difficult, if only
because offensive capability in the nu-
clear field is likely to remain far a.head
of defensive capability.
Dr. York, one of the leading scientists
in the past administration, who headed
the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at
Livermore, Calif., said:
The race between offense arid defense is
a race between a tortoise and a hare and if
only the hare does not go to sleep, the tor-
toise has no chalice.
To interpret that, he was saying that
the offense can always be kept ahead of
the antiballistic missile, or defense, if we
are at all alert. Of course we must be
alert, whether there is a treaty or not.
But whether development of an effec-
tive ABM system is a feasible prospect
or not will not depend on testing its
warhead, according to Secretary Mc-
Namara, the Joints Chiefs of 'Staff, Dr.
Brown, and most of the other expert
witnesses.
As the Committee report observed:
The United States has a number of nuclear
warheads of suitable design and performance
for antiballistic missile systems under de-
velopment. Still others of larger yield can
be developed underground. However, the
development of a high performance ABM
tern Is is a composite of staggering technical
problems, largely unrelated to the warhead?
a relatively simple and manageable part of
the whole system.
Secretary McNamara said:
An ABM system consists of several types
of radars, the interceptor missile and the,
very complex computing equipment at a
ground station to control the radars and to
direct the interceptor missile. The various
radars serve to detect incoming objects in
nearby space, to track the incoming war-
head, and to track and control the inter-
ceptor missile, which is targeted on the
incoming warhead by the computing equip-
meat.
That testimony demonstrates that. the
real problem, the difficult problem, in the
ABM system is not the warheads?we
have many?but the system that directs
and computes, which the treaty does not
affect. We can pursue the experimental
projects in this field and in experiment-
ing and developing computers and all
that goes with them, without the inhi-
bitions of the treaty.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, we all
know that the Soviets broke the 1958
moratorium and in so doing gained su-
periority over us in nuclear weaponry.
If they should break this treaty, it would
take us several months to resume test-
ing, and therefore they would gain an
additional advantage.
What has the chairman of the com-
mittee to say in reply to that question?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is true that the
Russians obviously learned a great deal
from those tests. I have already said
that this is one of the considerations we
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ance policy to the Soviets. The poten-
tial for further relative gains in nuclear
technology which flow from the surprise
abrogation potential, when considered
together with the military disadvantages
and risks to the United States which
stein from the freezing of technology in
certain vital areas, characterizes this
treaty for the United States, from the
military standpoint, as a matter of
"heads, they win, and tails, we lose."
At this point, Mr. President, I am re-
minded of a quotation from a recon-
struction of what Patrick Henry prob-
ably said at one point in his famous
"Liberty or Death" speech on March 20,
1775. The quotation is as follows:
The question before the House is one of
_ awful moment to this country. For my own
part, I consider it as nothing less than a
question of freedom or slavery; and in pro-
portion to the ?magnitude of the subject
ought to be the freedom of the debate. It is
only in this way that we can hope to arrive
at truth and fulfill the great responsibility
which we hold to God and our country.
Should I keep back my opinions at such a
time, through fear of giving offense, I
should consider myself as guilty of treason
toward my country, and of an act of dis-
loyalty toward the majesty of Heaven, which
I revere above all earthly kings.
Mr. President, conceivably it could be
true under some circumstances, as stated
by the Foreign Relations Committee in
its report, that excessive reliance on mili-
tary considerations could undermine the
national security. I am not so per-
suaded, however, particularly in this
instance.
The military disadvantages and mili-
tary risks, as they are so labeled in the
context of this debate, are not disad-
vantages and risks just to our military
forces, nor should they be so confined.
What are referred to as military disad-
vantages and risks, are, in fact, disad-
vantages and risks to the continuation of
the one proven method which we have
found to prevent nuclear war. They are
jeopardies of serious and formidable im-
port to our ability to save the lives of a
large percentage of the American public
and possibly a sizable portion of the
world's population. In the alternative,
they are jeopardies of serious and for-
midable import to our ability to protect
the continued liberty of all Americans
from Communist domination.
There are no more serious risks than
these.
What are the alternative paths to pre-
vention of nuclear war?
Are the alternative ways to prevent
nuclear war proven or speculative?
We are told that the principal thrust
of this treaty is "political," and that the
"political considerations" outweigh the
military disadvantages.
The military disadvantages and risks,
which are actually risks to our deterrent
of nuclear war or slavery, are finite.
They are specific and quantitative.
They can be numbered and weighed.
They are real, practical, and, when un-
derstood, awesome.
The "POIitleal- "Considerations which
have been mentioned, have been, at most,
vague generalizations, such as references
to "peace" and "relaxed tensions."
There is no specificity to the so-called
taeritrin which testing had been pro-
hibited by the treaty.
For one thing; the Soviets would con-
trol, the tuning and could, therefore, set
precise target dates for their series of
tests. Such target dates are as impor-
tant to -preparations for testing as a
Countdown is to a missile launching.
The United States, being unaware, as it
*Mild, of the time when the abrogation
would occur, could not maintain specific
target dates repeatedly without seriously
degrading both the morale of the per-
sonnel involved arid the state of pre-
paredness of the United States to test.
On March 2, 1962, approximately 6
months after the Soviets overtly abro-
? gated the test moratorium, and in a
period when the United States was still
attempting to make its testing mean-
ingful, President Kennedy, fresh in the
knowledge and experience of the lack
Of preparedness in which this country
found itself after the Soviets started
testing, stated:
But in actual practice, particularly in a
society of free choice, we cannot keep top-
flight scientists concentrating on the prepa-
ration of an experiment which may or may
not take place on an uncertain date in the
future. Nor can large technical laboratories
be kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting
for some other nation to break an agree-
ment. This is not merely difficult or in-
corivenient--we have explored this alterna-
tive thoroughly, and found it impossible of
execution.
Perhaps the President's recollection of
the difficulties we experienced have be-
come dim with- the passage of time. I
believe the President's assessment on
March 2, 1962, was correct. I agreed
with his assessment then, and I still
agree with that assessment.
If, as the Foreign Relations Commit-
.tee concludes, the Soviet scientists are
confident that In many critical areas of
nuclear weaporiry they have achieved a
*rough technical' parity with the United
States, that achievement is a direct re-
sult of the premeditated, deceitful, and
sudden overt abrogation by the Soviets
of the test moratorium in September
1961. If the Soviets achieved a rough
technical parity by such a devious means
the first time they tried, there is every
reason to believe that they will attempt
the same thing again. ? And there is no
?
reason not to believe that if they
achieved parity' the first time, they Qould
achieve a clear superiority in technology
the next go-ardund.
? Thus, if the Soviets have riot already
achieved sufficient technological advan-
tage with which to overpower the U.S.
strategic forces as a result of their 1961
and 1962 series of tests, or if subsequent
determinations by Soviet scientists re-
veal to them that they have achieved
less than the necessary technological
advancement t6 make the risk of nuclear
blackmail or nuclear war aceeptable,
they can alwaYs-, -under this treaty, re-
peat the surprise abrogation technique
arid place their bets on another cycle of
weaponryz '
posgibilities of alibther surprise
abriigatiOn-bit?the Soviets is distinctly
ctimtlative to the military disadvantages
to the 'United States inherent in the
treaty. It is in the nature of n insuf-
,
political considerations. At best, the
political considerations which we have
heard fail to provide any credible means
for replacing our finite deterrence as a
means to prevent nuclear war.
It is my sincere hope that the propo-
nents of ratification can, in the course
of the debate, define and explain the
political considerations and aspects of
this treaty, and precisely how these polit-
ical aspects will prevent nuclear war
in the absence of an overwhelming su-
periority of strategic power in the United
States.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. THURMOND. I yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator
is near the conclusion of his remarks.
In my judgment, he has presented us
with an absolutely masterful analysis of
this problem. It is my judgment that
the Senator from South Carolina is 100
percent correct in his position.
- On the day I attended the meeting of
the Committee on Foreign Relations
when the treaty was ordered reported,
I did not know how I would vote. But
the military aspects of the treaty were
not adequately explored, in my judgment,
by the Committee on Foreign Relations.
If I had to be the Senate's lawyer, and
advise and consent to the ratification of
the treaty, I would never have voted to
report it without having called before the
committee Dr. Teller, one of the ablest
scientists in the world, to tell the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations in secret ses-
sion what he wanted to say. Of course,
that information was made available to
the Senator from South Carolina and
his committee, because they undertook to
explore these matters.
The Senator well knows that the two
great military advisers who have the
responsibility to defend this country and
to fight and die for the country at the
drop of a hat did not increase their pro-
spects for promotion when they went
before the Senator's committee and gave
their honest judgment about the treaty.
It is my belief that if the decision had
not already been made, and if one had
asked General LeMay what he thought
about the treaty, and had let him study it
and reach 'his conclusion prior to the
time the President, as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces, had signed it,
General LeMay would have said, "Do not
take this action."
I remember when the Humphrey Dis-
armament Subcommittee was in full op-
eration, I was a member of that sub-
committee. President Eisenhower was
in the White House. Members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff came to us, one by
one, and each one said "Before you start
to disarm this country, you had better let
us arm it. We are not well enough
armed as things now stand."
That condition has been corrected to
some extent. Today the Nation is much
stronger than it was at that time. But
as the Senator from South Carolina has
so well pointed, out, the weapons of the
future are being constantly developed,
and our only security lies in being pre-
eminently the strongest?in being first
with the best.
I might cite a statement by a man who
was once described by General Lee as
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very complicated serieS of tests, We
cannot make such tests underground.
The area in winch the Russians are
ahead is the area in which they should
not remain ahead. Etnt under this
treaty, in that one area--now one of
Soviet superiority?they will remain
ahead, for under the treaty we will bind
our hands to so great an extent that we
shall find it impossible to catch up in
that field.
In the area where we are ahead--in
the use of the smaller Warheads, we?
and the Soviets?can acqpire much valu-
able information by testing underground.
In addition, as the Senator well knows,
our Nation would not give its word to
abide by a treaty of this kind if it did
not expect to keep it. Even if we tried
to cheat, as an open nation we would
soon be caught. A police state, such as
the Soviet Union, would have a better
chance of getting away with cheating.
However, the Russians do not need
to cheat, for they can use China for their
cheating. They can explode weapons
over the high seas, and then can blame
Albania, Yugoslavia, EaSt Germany, or
some other country, or can just say that
they do not know how it happened, and
that they have no idea how those explo-
sions in the South Pacific occurred. So
it is very easy for them, to be success-
ful in their attempts to lie to us and
cheat and defraud us. There are a mul-
titude of ways in which they can get
ahead of us in the development of nu-
clear weapons?and a multitude of ways
in which this treaty wOuld prevent us
from developing the weapons we need in
order to defend ourselves against attack.
Finally we come to the question, are
we willing to trust the Murdering Com-
munists? The answer is "No." We
must never trust them.
For 20 years, or perhaps a little longer,
our defense policy has been based on the
theory that the way to achieve peace is
through preparedness; and before the
world we have offered , to share our
atomic secrets, provided there would be,
fool-proof inspection, so as to be sure we
would not be victimized.
After pursuing that pnlicy and seek-
ing that objective?which is disarma-
ment, with foolproof inSpections?now
we are asked to approve a treaty which
to a certain degree does amount to dis-
armament; but insofar as it amounts
to disarmament, it woul4 be unilateral
disarmament, without the benefit of in-
spection.
Let me say to the Senator from South
Carolina that if this is to be the first
step, I shall hate to see the next one, be-
cause by steps of this type we would
render our Nation incapable of relying
upon its defenses.
So long as we remain strong, I believe
we shall remain free?but only so long
as we have sufficient strength to conduct
a successful defense. That is what the
very able Senator from south Carolina
has well pointed out. I agree with him.
Certainly he has rendered a great service
in bringing to us the benefit of his wide
experience. I sincerely hope that all
Senators will read carefully every word
of his most valuable speech.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able
being the greatest cavalry officer, to his
knowledge, at the time?old Nathan Bed-
ford Forrest. General Lee had never met
him, but he felt that General Forrest was
perhaps the greatest cavalry officer on
either side. He was famous for his sim-
ple principle of Warfare which, if either
side had adopted it, might have caused
the war to proceed differently. General
Forrest used to say, "GeCthere fustest
with the mostest"?meaning men.
Today, the idea is to get there first with
the latest developments in weapons; with
something superior to what the other
country has.
Hundreds of millions of people live
under the Communist yoke. They can
be twisted by a single command. So we
must have the best weapons.
The Senator from South Carolina; the
distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr.
RUSSELL], chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services, who has been a member
of that committee for more than 20 years,
and is one of the ablest students in the
entire world in this field; and men who
have the responsibility of defending the
country, and who spend most of their
time thinking about this subject, have
concluded that this treaty could cause us
to be placed in a position where we could
no longer defend ourselves adequately.
For this reason, it seems to me it is our
duty to vote to reject the treaty.
I realize that it would be highly em-
barraseing to the President of the United
States in his position of leadership in the
world if the treaty were to be rejected. I
realize that it would embarrass the Presi-
dent domestically if the treaty were to
be rejected. When I voted for the es-
tablishment of the Agency for Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament, I stated that I
was not voting to disarm the United
States; and that everything that Agency
did would have to be approved by the
Senate.
So I cannot in good conscience vote to
ratify the treaty merely because the
reputation of the President is at stake or
the President's prestige is at stake, for
I have told the people of my State that
I will not vote to disarm my country
unilaterally.
I am not going to vote for ap-
proval of a treaty which might
prejudice the security of this Nation.
I believe the Senator from South
Carolina has spelled out a case that can-
not be answered. I have carefully read
the statements of the very able and patri-
otic Secretary of Defense; and his state-
ment simply does not meet these argu-
ments. He says, basically, that we are
very strong. Everyone agrees that we
are. But then he proceeds to say that
this treaty will tend to perpetuate our
advantage. The Senator from South
Carolina knows that statement is just
eyewash; it is ridiculous. In the area in
which the Russians are ahead, we will
not?under the treaty?make tests. In
the area in which the Russians are ahead
with their very large bombs, we have not
exploded a missile of more than 15 mega-
tons. The Russians have exploded 57-
megaton missiles?three times as large
as ours. They have all the information
they need in order to explode that large
a missile. They have the benefit of a
11
Senator from Louisiana for his kill re-
marks; and I wish to commend him for
his fine comprehension of this problem.
He has asked very penetrating questions.
I hope all Senators will read them, and
thus will benefit from them.
Again I congratulate the distinguished
Senator from Louisiana for the great
service he has rendered.
Mr. President, hypotheses and abstract
theories do not prevent wars. If these
are What we propose to substitute for a
proven deterrent to nuclear war, only
heaven can save us. In that case, we
can only hope that, in this instance, God
will help those who refuse to help them-
selves.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
understand that the Senator from In-
diana [Mr. HARMS] wishes to ask a few
questions.
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SimesoN in the chair). The Senator
from Indiana.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
have the floor. I thought the Senator
from Indiana wished to ask some ques-
tions.
Mr. HARTKE. I do. Will the Sena-
tor from Arkansas yield for that pur-
pose?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. HARTKE. I am sure Senators
have received from their constituents
large numbers of letters on the test ban
treaty. Since the treaty was initialed
on Tuesday afternoon, I have received
from the citizens of Indiana approxi-
mately 4,500 expressions of opinion.
These expressions run about 2 to 1 in
favor of ratification. In the letters from
those of my constituents who oppose
ratification, several specific objections
are repeated over and over. I have pre-
pared a list of the most frequently men-
tioned objections. I believe it would be
interesting and profitable if the disting-
uished chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, who has heard and
considered all the pros and the cons at
great length, would agree to provide some
answers to those objections, even though
probably in one form or another he has
heretofore expressed his opinion upon
them.
The most frequent objection men-
tioned is that there is no assurance that
the Russians will respect the treaty, since
they have already broken 50 out of the
52 treaties with the West. I wonder' if
the Senator from Arkansas would com-
ment upon that objection. '
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I shall be very
glad to. I say to the Senator from In-
diana that it is clear that the Soviet
Union in its short history has violated
a large number of international treaties,
Including such important political agree-
ments as the nonaggression pacts with
Lithuania, entered into September 28,
1926, Latvia., February 5, 1932, and
Estonia, May 4, 1932, the arrangements
for access to Berlin, and the Potsdam
Declaration relating to the establish-
ment of a central German Government.
However, it should also be noted that
the Soviet Union has to all appearances
satisfactorily observed a significant num-
ber of multilateral and bilateral agree-
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Atomic Energy Commission for a num- Has the Senator the least doubt that not be careful about steps in that direc-
ber of years. if the Soviets made a similar break-
through they would develop it? Would
they not test the weapon to make sure
it worked? The simplest way to do so
would be to take it to China where, even
if we detected the explosion, they could
say, "That is terrible. Those Chinese
Communists are awful. We deplore this.
We are very sorry about it. We have
sent them a note protesting it."
For lack of proof, this Nation's hands
would be tied.
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is ab-
solutely correct. Admiral Strauss was a
distinguished naval officer during World
War II. Later _he served as chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission in a
highly competent manner. He has
rendered this country great service. He
is a true patriot and a great American.
His testimony should carry great weight
with the Senate of the United States.
I am very glad the Senator from Lou-
isiana called attention to the excerpt
from his statement. I have a copy of
his complete statement in my office. I
was very much impressed by it.
If we have any new inventions or
weapons that might involve or require
testing in the atmosphere, we would be
Prohibited, under the treaty, from testing
In the atmosphere, and we would never
know for certain whether or not they
would be successful until they were tested
in the environment in which they would
have to be used. The Senator is abso-
lutely correct on that point.
If the Russians developed a new weap-
on?which they undoubtedly will?from
the recent tests, the Senator can rest
assured they would abrogate the treaty
and test, or test it clandestinely. Their
word is nothing. Their goal is domina-
tion of the world. They would not live
by the treaty. Or they could go next
door to China and the test could be con-
ducted on the Chinese side.
So, from any angle we may approach
this issue, from any viewpoint we may
look at it, all the advantages in this
treaty are on the side of the Russians,
and against our best interests. The
United States is an honorable nation.
It will observe its word and will keep a
treaty or contract. The Communists
will not. The Communist leaders can-
not be trusted, and we must not rely
upon them.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, it has been said that this treaty is
but a small step, the inference being that
there will be additional steps.
Mr. THURMOND. That is what I
believe the. President of the United
States said, and it gives me great Con-
cern. This first step is far too much,
and I fear that if It is ratified, the fol-
lowing steps would be similar.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If a Senator
is firmly convinced that the treaty would
prevent us from developing weapons we
need for our defense, that it would per-
mit our adversary to remain ahead in
areas? where it- is ahead, that it would
permit it to catch up in the areas where
we are ahead, and that the treaty would
be used by our adversary to obtain at
least a year's leadtime, in one respect or
another, I ask the Senator if we should
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is cor-
feet,
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. It seems to
me that Admiral Strauss' testimony is
worthy of being considered by the Sen-
ate. He Stated: -
A radical new weapon discovery or a
breakthrough in countermeasure systems,
suddenly tested and found workable, could
put the possessor nation in command of
world events.
We ourselves were twice in that position,
first with our invention of the fission bomb
and later of the fusion bomb.
Mr. THURMOND. The atom bomb
and the hydrogen bomb.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Yes.
I Continue to read his testimony:
Of course, we never considered making
such use of our advantage, but what if in
the future the situation is reversed, as well
it may be?
Suppose it were the other way around?
Snppose the Communists had the ad-
vantage, instead of us?
Mr. THURIVIOND. We are dealing
with an enemy Whose goal is the domina-
tion of the world. There can be no ques-
tion that the Communists would use the
breakthrough for conquest, either by
bIaekinail or sneak attack.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am read-
ing the testimony given by a man who
had the responsibility to think about the
problem for a number of years. I read
further:
For instance, irhas been said that the
Soviets might elect cheating with a single
test which might even escape detection; that
we could surely detect a series of tests but
that one test by itself alone would be of
little significance. This unfortunately will
not stand up in the light of history.
We cannot forget, we should not forget,
that only one single test proved the atomic
bomb, and one test proved the principle of
the H-bomb. If such radical invention is
made on our side of the Iron Curtain, one
that is provable only by testing it above
ground, the treaty will firmly bind our hands.
Thus paralyzed, we can only file the idea
away in a safe and pray fervently that the
game invention will not occur to scientists
on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Un-
fortunately, there is a well-recognized and
frequentfy experienced phenomenon known
as simultaneous invention. It may operate
against us.
If the discovery?the breakthrough?is
made on the other side of the Iron Curtain,
is there anything upon which to base an esti-
mate of the situation? Would the Soviets,
in,that circumstance, or other circumstances
favorable to them, clandestinely breach the
treaty?
The Senator knows as well as I that if
the Soviets should come forth with a
fantastic _neW weapon they would de-
velop it. If there were some break-
through?certainly we would make some,
and so would they?if we should make
the breakthrough which would provide,
as an example, a fantastically successful
4efense,,we would be barred from
testing it. We would not know whether
It would work or not. We would not
know how to overcome the many imper-
fections which might be involved, or any
problems which might, develop in con-
nection with it.
No. 143
tion.
Much as we would like to have some
way of living with the Russians, I ask
the Senator if this fact does not remain:
Our Nation will continue to be imperiled
so long as the Communist doctrine of
advocating complete domination of the
world is the theory and the political mo-
tivation of great powers like the Soviet
Union and Communist China.
Mr. THURMOND. I thoroughly agree
with the Senator. If Russia asserts that
it is signing the treaty now to work for
peace, let her first show her good faith.
Let her withdraw her technicians and
troops from Cuba. Let her stop the war
in Laos and Vietnam. Let her tear down
the Berlin wall. Let her release from
behind the Iron Curtain, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Latvia, and
the other nations that are now subju-
gated behind the Iron Curtain. Let the
Soviets show some deeds of good faith.
The Senator and I, and every other
right thinking person in America, want
to live in peace. The Senator from
Louisiana, who has fought in a war and
knows the horrors of war, does not want
another war. Others who have fought
in wars abhor war. But the treaty is not
calculated to bring peace. In my judg-
ment, it is calculated to bring us war,
or subjugation.
Therefore, I think it is clearly not in
our best interests to ratify the treaty.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. When the
President made his statement about
Cuba, which amounted to a virtual ulti-
matum with regard to missiles there, the
Senator from Louisiana predicted, with
complete confidence, that there would be
no war between the United States and
the Soviet Union, at least not at that
time, because the Senator from Loui-
siana was convinced that thig country
was so very strong, and so well abreast of
developments in weapons, that the dam-
age which would be inflicted would be
completely unacceptable to the Soviet
Union, and that she would not accept
the damage which would be visited on
her in the event of war.
So long as we are dealing with the kind
of people that control the Soviet Union
and Communist China, the only real
safety will lie in our ability to defend
ourselves and in the preeminence and
superiority of our modern weapons.
The sooner we recognize that there
can be no safety or security in a treaty,
and that we must rely on our ability
to fight and defend ourselves, the better
off we shall be. As Patrick Henry said
in his memorable speech, "Gentlemen
shout for peace, but there is no peace."
A cold war is in progress, and it will con-
tinue for a long time. We may as well
recognize the fact that the only way we
can defend ourselves is to have the most
preeminent weapons possible. We hope
we shall not have to use them. The only
way to be sure of that is to have the best
weapons.
I agree with the Senator from South
Carolina. The treaty means that now or
at any time in the future this Nation
would be second best in its ability to de-
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fend itself, and would greatly increase
the prospect of warfare.
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from
Louisiana is correct. In my judgment,
the only thing that has kept the Com-
munists from attacking us, and the rea-
son for our not having been attacked, is
our vastly superior striking poWer. The
only language the Communists know is
power. Because of the great nuclear
Power that we have, and which the Com-
munists fear, we have been able to
avoid war. We have been strong.
We are a peace-loving Nation. Unlike
the Communists, we do not commit ag-
gressions. We have no worldwide goals
or aspirations involving aggression.
They are grasping and working day and
night to dominate the world. We must
remain stronger than the Communists.
We cannot do so if we tie our hands be-
hind our backs by such means as this
treaty. The treaty would prevent us
from gaining the knowledge we need in
the higher yield weapon field, or
weapons effects and in the development
and employment of an antiballistic mis-
sile weapons system, it would prevent us
from testing our weapons systems and
warheads to make sure they are work-
able. Either one of those fields could
prove to be the very thing that would
save this country from destruction.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. THURMOND. I yield.
Mr. SIMPSON. I call the Senator's
attention to the statement of the Presi-
dent in his letter to the distinguished
leaders of the two parties in the Senate.
He said this in paragraph 5 of the letter:
While the abnormal and dangerous pres-
ence of Soviet military personnel in the
neighboring island of Cuba is not a matter
which can be dealt with through the instru-
mentality of this treaty, I am able to assure
the Senate that if that unhappy island
should be used either directly or indirectly
to circumvent or nullify this treaty, the
United States will take all necessary action
in response.
In the light of conditions in Cuba and
the apparent lack of action on the part
of the administration, does the Senator
from South Carolina believe any cre-
dence should be accorded this particular
paragraph in the President's letter?
Mr. THURMOND. I cannot see that
it should. We were told we were to have
on-site inspection in Cuba so that we
could say definitely that the missiles and
weapons had been removed. That has
not occurred.
Mr. SIMPSON. Nor do we know
whether or not the Russian military per-
sonnel have been removed.
Mr. THURMOND. They are still
there, and the technicians are still there
in great numbers. How long will we al-
low them to remain there, 90 miles from
our shore? We want to see some deeds
of good faith before we enter into a con-
tract that affects our security so vitally.
Mr. SIMPSON. Will the Senator yield
for one further inquiry?
Mr. THURMOND. I yield.
Mr. SIMPSON. I attended many of
the hearings, both in the Senator's com-
mittee and as an observer at the other
committee hearings. I gathered the im-
press,.on from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and Dr. Teller and others that they were
agreed that the Soviet Union would not
keep the treaty, and that the probability
at this time, was that the Russians were
ahead of us in the antiballistic missile
field. Did the Senator from South Caro-
lina gain the same impression?
Mr. THURMOND. The testimony of
the military experts and of the scientists
was to the effect that it Is general knowl-
edge that the Communists will not keep
a treaty any longer than it is to their ad-
vantage to do so. That was generally
acknowledged, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff so stated, that the Communists are
ahead of us in the antiballistic missile
field.
Another potential danger from clan=
destine testing flows from the possibility
that the Soviets will conduct underwater
tests in inland lakes in the Soviet Union.
If such tests were of very low yield, they
would fall below the threshold of U.S.
detection and identification capabilities.
Even if such nuclear explosions under-
water were of sufficient yield to be detect-
able, the signals received would be seis-
mic, and indistinguishable from signals
which would be received from under-
ground tests, which are legal under the
provisions of the treaty. There are, of
course, no on-site inspections provided
for in the treaty, so that verification is
out of the question.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. THURMOND. I yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I believe
both the proponents and the opponents
of the treaty can agree that the Commu-
nists will lie whenever it suits their pur-
pose to do so. We are discussing a
treaty which states that we will not test
in the sea. Russia is not the only Com-
munist power. China is a Communist
power. Albania is a Communist power.
Yugoslavia is a CoMmunist power.
Rumania and Hungary and East Ger-
many are Communist poWers. We do not
even recognize East Germany. Suppose
the Communists wish to find out what
the effect of an atomic explosion would
be on one of our Polaris submarines.
They could go out and make that test in
a submarine in the South Pacific some-
where. They could do that and lie, "We
did not explode that." How are we going
to prove who did explode it?
Suppose there is an explosion some-
where in the South Pacific or somewhere
near the South Pole, and suppose they
say, "We know nothing whatever about
it."
Suppose we say, "Who was the awful
fellow who did it?" Supposing Albania
says, "We did it," just to play the game
with the Communists. They can say,
"We did not sign the treaty. We did
it."
Suppose Red China lies and says, "We
did it.'"
It is standard Communist procedure to
lie to us when it hurts us and helps them.
Red China could say, "We did it." How
are we going to say that a Russian sub-
marine did it? We would be bound by
the treaty. One government would say,
"We do not know anything about it."
Another would say, "We did it." How
would we know who did it, unless we were
told in advance? No one believes that
they would tell us in advance about an
explosion some 500 miles south of Tas-
mania. They could do that. How would.
we know who caused the explosion?
Mr. THURMOND. The Communists
are known to be guilty of deceit and de-
ception. They will do what the dis-
tinguished Senator from Louisiana said
they might do. They would riot hesitate
to do so if they felt it was to their ad-
vantage to do it. The Chinese Reds
might make the underwater tests, as-
sisted by Soviet technicians.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If we did
something like that, a member of the
crew would come back and tell about it,
and there would be an investigation.
Some people probably would want to im-
peach the President for breaking the
solemn obligation of the country under
the treaty. The Communists are not
bound by any such considerations. It
is a part of their doctrine and idealism
to act the way they have been acting
right along. That is what they believe
in. For the life of me I cannot under-
stand how anyone could prove that the
explosion was not set off by the Com-
munist Chinese, or perhaps even by Ho
Chi Minh of North Vietnam. How could
we prove who was responsible? All we
would know would be that there was a
big blast.
Mr. THURMOND. Much could be
learned about weapons effects from
underwater detonations. Among other
things, the vulnerabilities of submarines
and estimates of the radius of kill of nu-
clear devices exploded underwater for
antisubmarine warfare purposes could be
ascertained.
Currently, our detection capabilities
are largely degraded in the distances of
outer space. Should our capabilities be
improved to the extent which the prob-
able state of the art would now permit,
there would probably be little likelihood
that the Soviets would attempt to clan-
destinely test for weapons effects in
space. Weapons effects tests require
considerable instrumentation and prep-
aration, and therefore, would be sub-
ject to detection from normal intelli-
gence, as well as technical detection
devices. Proof tests of warheads and
total systems, however, require less prep-
aration and considerably less instru-
mentation, and the possibility of in-
frequent, but highly significant, clan-
destine proof tests by the Soviet Union
constitutes a distinct risk. The risk,
again in this case, is decidedly cumula-
tive; for it could serve to confirm a
weapons design which was based on
technology derived from the Soviets 1961
and 1962 series of tests.
Of even more serious import than that
flowing from the risk of successful So-
viet clandestine tests is the potential for
a sudden and surprise abrogation of the
treaty by the Soviet Union in the form
of a comprehensive series of tests.
Despite the promised safeguards, and
even under circumstances where the
promised safeguards of readiness to test
are carried out vigorously by the execu-
tive branch, a surprise abrogation by the
Soviets would still catch the United
States unprepared to test meaningfully
and comprehensively in the environ-
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early th World War II our naval forces
were using torpedoes that would not ex-
plode? They had been tested under
simulated conditions, for prior to the
war, "economize" was the order of the
day, and our naval chiefs were unwilling
to use torpedoes in actual deepwater
tests against shins. So the tests were
made under simulated conditions. They
were made with deepwater torpedoes.
We had not then developed shallow-
water torpedoes. It was believed that
when the torpedo pasSed beneath a ship,
the magnetic field of the ship would ex-
plode the torpedo.
When tested under simulated condi-
tions, the torpedoes worked perfectly;
but under actual war conditions they
went about 10 feet deeper than planned,
with the result that they did not pick up
sufficient magnetic impulse to make them'
explode; and nothing happened.
Some people thought our submarine
commanders perhaps lacked the courage
to move close enough to the ships to be
sure the torpedoes would hit them.
Others thought the sailors were drinking
the alcohol in the gyroscopic mechanism
of the torpedoes, and thus causing them
to malfunction. Then it was found that
the firing pins of the torpedoes were too
brittle, and were not sufficiently viable
to withstand the shock of a direct hit.
So our torpedoes would not explode.
One commander reported that it was
WaSte of time and money to send a
submarine 8,500 miles, only to find that
the torpedoes were no good. It was clear
that actual use under war conditions was
required.
The Japanese, who did not have that
problem, sank practically all our Pacific
Fleet. Their torpedoes were designed to
work in shallow water. And the British
had developed a good one, which they
' used to excellent effect when they raided
the Italian naval base at Taranto.
Developing a &intact torpedo is a sim-
ple problem. I believe I could build one
Myself, by reason of knowing a little
about fulminate of mercury and TNT.
But that problem would be simple, com-
pared to the intricacies involved develop-
ing a missile that would be accurate
enough to shoot down 100, 200, 500, or
1,000 other missiles. However, to fail in
that task would 'be to mortgage our fu-
ture survival, because the scientists have
proved that these things can be done.
Someone will develop a successful mis-
sile defense. I hope and pray that this
Nation, rather than the Soviet Union,
develops it first.
Dut I say to the Senator from South
Carolina that in my judgment?and I
believe it is also the judgment of the
Senate Preparedness Subcommittee?we
shall never have a successful missile de-
fense so long as we abide by the terms
of the treaty.
Mr. THTJRMOND. The Senator from
Louisiana is correct. He was a distin-
guished naval officer in World War II,
and he-Sai'very7interestingly related the
experience with our torpedoes. I believe
his illustration is apropds. We must test
this weapon in the environment in which
it will actually be used, in order definitely
to determine whether it will be success-
ful.
I feel that our stockpile Of warheads
should also be tested, for it is quite pos-
sible that duds are among them.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the
Senator from South Carolina yield?
Mr. THURMOND. I am glad to yield
to the distinguished Senator from the
Cowboy State.
Mr. SIMPSON. Is not that the
gist of the testimony of Dr. Teller?
Mr. THURMOND. Dr. Teller's testi-
mony was to that effect, as was the testi-
mony of other scientists and military
experts.
Mr. SIMPSON. I compliment the able
Senator from South Carolina for his
magnificent exposition. Because of his
great ability and his long military expe-
rience, he should be carefully listened to
by the people of America, I believe his-
tory will record that he is entirely cor-
rect.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Sen-
ator from Wyoming for his kind remarks.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I believe I have referred to a cer-
tain amount of information which has
not otherwise been available to us. Does
the Senator share the opinion of General
Twining and Admiral Radford?both of
whom at one time were Chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff?that we would not
be able to develop an atomic missile de-
fense without testing?
Mr. THURMOND. I am not sure that
they expressed an opinion on that par-
ticular point, but General Twining testi-
fied in secret session and gave us ex-
tremely valuable information that was
most helpful. Almost any person pres-
ent would have been convinced by his
statement that the treaty would not be
in our best interests.
Incidentally, as I stated earlier, Gen-
eral Twining has been with a group
known as the Twining Committee, which
is carrying on research and work for the
Air Force, as I understand. He is prob-
ably in as favorable a position as anyone
to know what the situation is and wheth-
er or not the treaty would be helpful to
us. Some may say that these former
chairmen or chiefs are now out and are
not familiar with the latest information,
but this is not necessarily the case.
General Twining has been briefed re-
cently on intelligence. He is informed
of what is going on. That is one reason
he could not testify in open session and
give all the information that he pos-
sessed.
Admiral Radford made a very strong
statement, which is in the record of the
hearings before the Committee on For-
eign Relations, and which, although
brief, is against the treaty on the ground
that it Would not be in our best national
interest. Admiral Burke, a former Chief
of Naval Operations, shares that opinion.
Mr. President, the sum and substance
of the matter is that there has been no
race. The reasons for the 'U.S. failure
to test more aggressively are difficult to
pinpoint, but were political, psycholog-
ical, and technical in nature. Not the
least of the reasons why the U.S. test
programs lagged was the state of unpre-
paredness to test which resulted from
the moratorium. Some of the first tests
which the United States conducted after
15927
the Soviets openly breached the mora-
torium were of little or no value, for they
were hastily and ill prepared. This, too,
contributed to the relative gains in nu-
clear technology which the Soviets
achieved in the past 2 years.
In those areas of testing where the
United States has concentrated, the
United States still holds a probable lead
in technology, despite our lack of ag-
gressiveness in testing. This is the case
in the low megatonnage weapons design
technology, where we are still ahead.
There is every reason to believe that if
the United States tested seriously, after
planning and scheduling carefully, with-
out an off-again, on-again approach that
has so often characterized the U.S. ap-
proach to testing, we could maintain an
overwhelming superiority. Our scien-
tists are more imaginative and capable,
our laboratories are more efficient, and
our military planners more sound in
judgment of weapons requirements than
those of the Soviets. Our capabilities are
superior to those of the Soviets, not in-
ferior. But superior capabilities cannot
avail the United States of superior stra-
tegic power, and thereby an assured de-
terrent to nuclear war, unless there is a
will and policy for these capabilities to be
realized to the maximum. Had we tested
to the extent of our capabilities since
September 1961, the superiority of tech-
nology held by the United States on that
date would not have diminished or dis-
appeared, but would have increased de-
spite the comprehensive Soviet series of
tests.
The requirements for testing which are
listed in the report of the Preparedness
Subcommittee are not substantially dif-
ferent in nature than they were in Sep-
tember 1961. Had these requirements
been met by serious and diligent U.S.
testing in the period since that date, the
United States would probably now have
a commanding lead in nuclear technol-
ogy; and a treaty, such as the one now
before the Senate, which tends to freeze
certain levels of technology, could have
assisted in protecting this commanding
lead in nuclear technology. As it is, we
are in the position of considering a treaty
which may at best tend to freeze a rough
technological parity overall and freezes a
technological inferiority of the United
States in certain crucial areas.
In reaching their conclusion that the
"Soviet scientists presumably are con-
fident that in many critical areas of nu-
clear weaponry they have achieved a
rough technical parity with the United
States," the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee was attempting to assess the probable
motives of the Soviet Union in now ac-
cepting what heretofore it has consist-
ently rejected. While attempts to as-
sess the motives of the Soviet Union are
necessarily conjectural and highly specu-
lative, as pointed out by the Foreign
Relations Committee, none of the prob-
abilities of Soviet motivations should be
excluded from consideration.
The Foreign Relations Committee has
omitted from, consideration in its re-
port one quite possible, and I am con-
vinced, probable, motive of the Soviets
in suddenly signing this treaty. Admit-
tedly, this probable motive is of a mill-
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Member 11
tary nature, which may account for the
lack of consideration accorded it in the
Foreign Relations Committee report.
It Is possible, even probable, that the
Soviet scientists have concluded, as a
result of the series of tests conducted by
the Soviets in 1961 and 1962, that they
have achieved a technological break-
thrqiigh in discovering vulnerabilities in
the U.S. strategic nuclear force and in
learning enough about multimegaton
weapon design to exploit those vulner-
abilities. The vulnerability which they
may have concluded that they have dis-
covered may pertain solely to some fea-
ture of our missiles in silos, or in the cir-
cuitry which controls the launching or
guidance of the missile. Such vulnera-
bility could be in the warheads. There
Is such a large area of lack of knowl-
edge in the United States, and the So-
viet tests were suffiidently comprehensive,
that the vulnerability could lie in any one
of a number of areas. It could be in our
missile control circuits, or in our warn-
ing system. The means to exploit such
a vulnerability could lie in the very size
of the blast or in the shock effects of their
monster bomb, for which they have the
technology to produce delivery vehicles,
if they do not now have the vehicles
themselves. The means of exploiting
the vulnerability could well lie-in the
exotic effects produced by the 100-mega-
ton bomb.
If the Soviets have achieved a tech-
nological breakthrough by which they
could produce weapons to neutralize or
destroy our land-based missile force, they
would, of course, still have to deal with
the Polaris system. This is where even
a less than perfect ABM system could
contribute substantially to downgrading
the credibility of the U.S. second strike
force. One of the principal problems in
ABM development is providing a capa-
bility of dealing with saturation attacks.
A relatively unsophisticated ABM system
can be very effective against single mis-
siles fired at single targets. The P_olaris
system does not fire salvos. There can
be no simultaneous saturation attack on
a large number of targets by a Polaris
system. Even if the Polaris carried up
'to five warheads on each missilean ABM
system of limited capability could pro-
vide a substantial and highly effective
defense. If Soviet detection and coun-
terfire capabilities have also been ssub-
stantially improved, they might be per-
suaded that the Polaris submarine could
be knocked out before many of its mis-
siles were launched. We do not have
much knowledge on the radius of kill of a
multimegaton weapon when employed
against a submarine.
If, indeed, the Soviets achieved such
knowledge from their 1961 and 1962
series of tests, they would still have a
problem, of course. There is always a
chance, in the absence of a test ban
treaty, that the United States would test
and discover knowledge which could be
used to remove vulnerabilities in our sys-
tems and design new counterweapons.
'The relative Soviet productive capacity
Is so poor, that even if the United States
obtained the pertinent and needed in-
formation 2 years after the Soviets?say
in 1965?there would be a distinct possi-
bility that the United States, through its
superior production, could correct the
vulnerabilities in its weapons systems
and deploy new weapons systems before
the Soviets could complete their produc-
tion arid deployment.
If, indeed, these were the circum-
stances in which the Soviets found
themselves following their evaluation of
their series of tests, what would be a
more logical solution than to seek a
treaty banning testing, and thereby
freezing the level of knowledge in those
critical areas where the Soviets judged
themselves to have a distinct advantage,
while leaving themselves free to test in
that area of testing where they still felt
they could make gains on the United
States? Such circumstances are quite
possible, and not in the least inconsist-
ent with the knowledge which we now
possess. Indeed, the facts to support
such a theory of motivation are much
more cogent and persuasive than is the
basis for any of the possible Motivations
discussed by the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee in its report.
This theory of motivation may well
not be accurate, but that only puts it at
the top of the category of the possible
motivations suggested by the Foreign
Relations Committee. .
There is one vital difference, however.
If the motivation which I have sug-
gested proves to be the correct one--and
I am convinced that it is--ratification of
this treaty will leave the United States
With alternatives only of submitting to
nuclear blackmail, nuclear war, or sur-
render; for, we will have no credible de-
terrent to nuclear war when the Soviets
have managed to translate their nuclear
knowledge into nuclear weapons, a
period which could take from 3 to 5 years
or possibly a little longer.
Thus, even in the absence of the con-
sideration of the questions of the pos-
sibilities of clandestine testing by the
Soviet Union or a second surprise abro-
gation of the treaty with a new series of
tests by the Soviet Union, the military
risks inherent in this treaty are formi-
dable?even fearsome. The crux of the
military disadvantages is the fact that,
unlike the conditions that existed in
early 1961, we no longer have a clear
superiority in nuclear technology, and in
many areas of weapons design and effect
all the evidence supports a conclusion
that the Soviets now enjoy a superiority
in nuclear technology.
The test ban treaty tends strongly to
freeze the Soviet advantages in nuclear
technology. Such a freeze could be used
to compensate for their relatively slow
productive capacity, so ,that they could,
in time., confront us with deployed wea-
pons systems which could, at least in
their own judgment, give the Soviets
a clear superiority in ,strategic power,
especially if this power is used to carry
out a first strike against us.
At the very least, it gives the Soviets
time to convert their knowledge into
weaponry, so that they end up with a
qualitative and quantitative parity of
strategic weapons with the United States.
Again, in view of the differing strategies,
this would give them the advantage
which might well be the basis for a de-
cision to carry out a first strike restating
in nuclear war.
Under existing circumstances, even
if the treaty is observed by the Soviets
according to the letter of the treaty, the
military effect is to diminish, if not en-
tirely negate, the possibility that the
United Ctates can continue to maintain
the overwhelming strategic nuclear
power which will deter and prevent a
nuclear war as it has in the past.
As serious as these military aspects
of the treaty are for the United States,
there are other factors which add to
the number and magnitude of the risks.
These factors are the possibilities of
undetected or unidentified clandestine
tests by the Soviet Union, and of another
surprise abrogation of the test ban by
the Soviet Union.
Our existing capabilities to detect and
identify nuclear explosions in the at-
mosphere, underwater and in space are
the best now existing in the world.
These capabilit:es are not the best the
state of the art in this country will per-
mit. However, if the treaty is ratified,
substantial improvement would be very
costly and unavoidable.
There are many uncertainties about
our detection and identification capa-
bilities. There are obviously thresholds
below which the capabilities are de-
graded seriously, and in some cases, dis-
appear. Future developments by the
Soviet Union could quite conceivably de-
grade substantially our existing detec-
tion and identification capabilities.
These uncertainties exist, in varying de-
grees and under differing circumstances,
in all environments covered by the test
ban treaty.
The potential dangers of clandestine
testing by the Soviet Union in the three
environments covered by the test ban
treaty do not rank among the major
military disadvantages to the United
States resulting from the treaty, nor
even as one of the major risks should
the treaty be ratified. There are, how-
ever, certain elements of risk flowing
from the possibility of clandestine test-
ing which should be noted even though
they pose minimum hazards and dangers
to the United States in and of them--
selves, since these elements of risk are
in some respects cumulative to the mili-
tary disadvantages above noted.
First, there is little probability that
relatively low-yield, low-altitude, or sur-
face nuclear detonations in the Soviet
Union would and could be both detected
and identified under all circumstances by
the United States. Although there are
different opinions in scientific testimony
as to the degree to which isolated tests
of this type could influence the strategic
balance of power, there is no question,
that such additions to Soviet technology
derived from such tests would be ctunu-
lative in areas of technology where the
Soviets now either have, or possibly have,
a lead; thereby increasing the military
disadvantages of this treaty.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I should like to ask the Senator
if he is 'familiar with the statement by
Adm. Lewis Strauss? I believe Admiral
Strauss served as Chairman of the
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Car .rdissiles off, or whether our guidance
systems and control systems would be
destroyed, or whether the exotic effects
of the nuclear explosion would play such
a part that we could not direct our mis-
siles to the target, or whether they could
even take off from the ground. There
was serious concern about these things,
and it is necessary for us to obtain
further information on whether our
systems would be able to penetrate.,
? the enemy's antimissile defense; and
whether our antimissile defense system,
Which we ought to be developing, and
which I hope Someday we will be de-
ploying would be able to withstand the
? enormotts missiles that would be fired
at us, as well as the effects of our own
defensive missiles, The only way that
can be determined is through actual tests
in the environment in which these weap-
ons are actually to operate, in order to
? determine the exact results.
Mr. TALMADGE. From What the
Senator has Said, the testimony of the
scientists displayed a fear of the un-
known?that we did not know what the
reaction would be, while at the same
? time the Soviets probably know, through
their tests, what the reaction would be.
. Mr. THURMOND. The Senator has
expressed that point correctly, except
that we do have some knowledge on the
matter, which provides a very real basis
for the concern, although that knowledge
is limited. The evidence indicates the
Soviets know more, though probably not
everything.
Mr. TALMADGE. I thank the able
? Senator very much for permitting me to
ask these questions of him. He is deliv-
ering a very able speech. I wish I could
stay for the remainder of it, but t must
keep an appointment. I assure the Sen-
ator that I will read it with great benefit
In the Rump tomorrow.
Mr. THUR1VIOND. I thank the able
Senator for his kind remarks.
Since the United States does not know
the results of the Soviet experience in
tenting multimegaton weapons, we are
not capable of evaluating the military
- effectiveness of such inultimegaton
weapons.
We are -further handicapped by the
fact that we have not subjected most of
our, major missile weapons systems to
operational proof tests. Only the Po-
laris system has been subjected to a full-
scale systems test. Atlas, Minuteman,
and Titan have had no such tests. At
? this point, we must estimate, without full
knowledge, the reliability of these weap-
ons systems, even in the absence of en-
env attack. This makes it even more
? difficult, if not wholly speculative, to esti-
mate the reliability of such weapons sys-
tems in the nuclear environment of at-
tack.
Even more important, in assessing our
deterrent capability, we cannot with any
degree of confidence know what the ag-
viets belfeve tie ?rreli ability of our weap-
ons Systems to be, since we do not have
their weapons effects knowledge upon
which they base tpeir judgment.
?A particularly, vital area of technol-
ogy is the antiballistic Missile field.
Despite the generalized statements of
conClUsiOnS 14' some witnesses, which
have had the tendency to confuse the
relative levels of technology in this field,
a specific analysis of the tests them-
selves is the best indicator of the facts.
The Preparedness Subcommittee thor-
oughly examined the details of all the
tests relating to this subject. While the
specifics of information on both our tests
and those of the Soviets are classified,
the subcommittee summarized the situa-
tion as follows:
In the field of weapons effects experiments
related to the design and development of an
effective antiballistic missile (ABM) system
the evidence, although less conclusive, in-
dicates that the Soviet Union in 1961 and
1962 conducted a series of complex high-
altitude operations which, if properly in-
strumented, could have provided substantial
and important data on various types of
radar blackout and nuclear effects., These
Soviet experiments were clearly dictated by
an ABM development program.
The United States has conducted no ex-
periments comparable in complexity to
those Soviet operations and a disturbing
number of the U.S. high-altitude-effects
experiments which were conducted were
compromised either by considerations un-
related to the technical ahjectives of the
test program, by inadequate or faulty in-
strumentation, or by operational inadequa-
cies.
? Only the limitations of security clas-
sification prevent the presentation of
more specific proof of the obvious Soviet
lead in technology in the ABM field.
? As is shown by the chart of U.S. test
requirements on page 6 of the Prepared-
ness Subcommittee's report, those areas
in which we have the most vital deficien-
cies of knowledge are the precise areas
Where we cannot acquire significant ad-
vances with underground tests.
There is an additional disturbing fea-
ture which must be taken into consid-
eration in any comparison of United
States and Soviet nuclear testing expe-
rience. A large number of the U.S. tests
have been devoted to the purpose of de-
veloping capabilities for detecting, iden-
tifying and analyzing nuclear tests and
other nuclear detonations carried out by
other nations. This was a very essen-
tial program, and has given us a more
realistic estimate of our own detection
capabilities, although here, as in other
areas, large uncertainties still exist.
Apparently the Soviets have devoted few
of their tests to such purposes. Any
comparison of numbers of tests designed
to evaluate the relative levels of tech-
nology for weapons design and weapons
effects in the United States and the So-
viet Union must be qualified by the dis-
parity of numbers of tests for,the pur-
pose of developing and improving de-
tection techniques.
Equally important to a realistic ap-
praisal of comparative tests is the fact
that the Soviets, who do, not adhere to a
Second-strike Policy, can concentrate
their tests on a mare narrow spectriini
of interests than can the United States,
Because of our second-strike policy, a
Substantial number of our tests must he
devoted to ascertaining the capability of
our (,)wn weapons systems to survive a
nuclear attack. The ,Soviets, who do not
plan to await an attack .before jauneh-
ing their nuclearjorges, do not need to
test so extensively on the ability of their
own systems to withstand nuclear at-
.
15925
tacks. Their technology can concen-
trate on the vulnerabilities of U.S. sys-
tems and the means to exploit those
Vulnerahilities.
On the basis. of comprehensive study
and comparisons of Soviet and United
States nuclear technology, the Prepared-
ness Subcommittee found the military
disadvantages to the United States to be
as follows:
1. The United. States probably will be un-
able to duplicate Soviet achievements in
very high yield weapon technology.
2. The United States will be unable to
acquire necessary data on the effects of very
high yield atmospheric explosions.
3. The United States will be unable to
acquire data on high altitude nuclear weap-
ons effects.
4. The United_States will be unable to de-
termine with confidence the performance
and reliability of any ABM system developed
without benefit of atmospheric operational
system tests.
5. The United States will be unable to
verify the ability of its hardened under-
ground second-strike missile systems to sur-
vive close-in, high-yield nuclear explosions.
6. The United States will be unable to
verify the ability of its missile reentry bodies
under defensive nuclear attack to survive
and penetrate to the target without the
opportunity to test nose cone and warhead
designs in a nuclear environment under
dynamic reentry conditions.
7. The treaty will provide the Soviet Union
an opportunity to equal U.S. accomplish-
ments in submegaton weapon technology.
? As is obvious, most of these disadvan-
tages result from the absence of a capa-
bility by the United States under the
treaty to acquire knowledge of weapons
design and weapons effects in areas in
which there is at least a probability that
the Soviets have more knowledge than
do we.
In addition?and this is the eighth
disadvantage in the report?the treaty
would diminish our capability to learn
of Soviet advancements in technology.
With testing limited to underground, we
would be denied the knowledge we can
gain from analysis of radioactive debris
from Soviet tests. With the passage of
time, our knowledge, or basis for esti-
mates of the state of the art of nuclear
weaponry in the Soviet Union, will be
materially degraded.
The military aspects of the treaty can
be placed in perspective only if trans-
lated into the effects on our capability
to maintain the overwhelming superior-
ity of strategic power essential to an
effective deterrent of nuclear war in the
years to come.
We know that the Soviets now have a
clear superiority in the technology of
multimegaton weapons design, and
under this treaty the United States
could not surpass or even duplicate that
knowledge, In the absence of such
knowledge, we cannot realistically eval-
uate the military value of such multi-
megaton weapons.
We know that the Soviets have per-
formed tests, which, if properly instru-
mented, have given them a lead in high-
yield weapons effects technology. This
knowledge, if now possessed by the So-
viets, cannot be acquired by the United
States under the terms of the test ban
treaty. We cannot, therefore, realis-
,tically assess the vulnerabilities of our
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,tember 11
own weapons systems to the high-yield
blast, shock, communications blackout,
and exotic radiation and electromagnetic
phenomena. The Soviets, from the tests
they have already conducted, could
know both the vulnerabilities of our
weapons systems and their own Capabil-
ities with multimegaton weapons to ex-
ploit those vulnerabilities. Since it is the
potential enemy's estimate of the sur-
vivability of our second-strike force
after their attack which determines the
effectiveness of our deterrent force, the
importance of our lack of knowledge of
what the Soviets know assumes critical
proportions.
The importance of the relative levels of
technology in the ABM field derives from
the fact that deployment of an effective
ABM system could seriously degrade, if
not nullify, the deterrent capability of a
nuclear force composed of ballistic mis-
siles. An ABM system which falls short
of perfection can nevertheless seriously
degrade the credibility of a missile force
deterrent, especially when combined with
an offensive force designed to exploit
vulnerabilities of a second-strike force
with a first attack.
In summary, the facts developed by
the Preparedness Subcommittee over a
period of 5 months of investigations and
hearings, which included a detailed
study of tests by both sides, show a bleak,
dismal and doubt-pervaded prospect, if
this treaty is ratified, for the U.S.
capability to maintain the overwhelm-
ing strategic power essential to deter
nuclear war.
Intimations have been heard, and
some of them not very subtly put, that
the conclusions of the Preparedness Sub-
committee are overly pessimistic. Surely
no one can charge, however, that the
report of the Preparedness Subcommit-
tee is more pessimistic than the report
of the Foreign Relations Committee is
optimistic. Indeed, the Foreign Relations
Committee report has one characteristic
In common with U.S. intelligence esti-
mates of the situation in Cuba prior to
October, 1962. They both adopted the
most optimistic conclusion from the
standpoint of the United States that the
facts, or any presentation of the facts,
would possibly support.
However, even accepting the conclu-
sions of the report of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee as correct, for the sake
of argument, the prospects for maintain-
ing an effective deterrent if this treaty
Is ratified are most discouraging.
The report of the Foreign Relations
Committee, in discussing the probable
motivations of the Soviets, states:
Soviet scientists presumably are confident
that in many critical areas of nuclear
weaponry they have achieved a rough tech-
nical parity with the United States.
If Soviet scientists are confident that
the Soviets have achieved a rough tech-
nical parity with the United States in
many critical areas of nuclear weaponry,
as the Foreign Relations Committee says,
the days of continued credibility of the
11.9. deterrent force are numbered, and
the one thing that has prevented nu-
clear war for so many years is doomed.
Regardless of how wrong the Soviet sci-
entists may be in their Judgment?and
we do not know the technological infor-
mation on which they base their judg-
ment--our nuclear force will no longer
constitute a deterrent, if, they do not be-
lieve in its superiority. ,Their plans are
based on a first-strike strategy, and
under conditions of parity from other
standpoints, this gives them a very dis-
tinct edge. 'There is srll consolation
that the Soviet scientis may be over-
confident, and that the optimistic con-
clusions of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee as to the relative levels of tech-
nology may be correct, thus making it
possible for us to retaliate effectively
after a Soviet nuclear attack. We might
even bring more destruction on the
enemy than was visited Upon us, but we
would have failed in ?lir primary pur-
pose in creating and Maintaining our
strategic forces?to prevent a nuclear
war through deterrence.:
Quite obviously, the Foreign Relations
Committee report refers to the judgment
of Soviet scientists that a parity exists
in nuclear weapons technology, rather
than a nuclear weapons parity, although
the report does not specifically so 'state.
There is little doubt that the United
States today has a clear superiority in
strategic nuclear forces-,that is, in qual-
ity and quantity of weapons in place.
There is small comfort in this distinc-
tion, however, for, as Dr. Edward Teller
so accurately and succinctly stated:
A disparity of knowledge today is a dis-
parity of power tomorrow.
When the serious military disadvan-
tages to the United States as ,a result of
this treaty are pointed Oat, there is often
a response made that only one side of
the picture is being considered. This
argument maintains that if both sides
continue testing, nuclear parity will
surely result. Another version of the
same rationale is that further testing by
the United States may stimulate testing
by others who will thereby overtake U.S.
technology. This arguMent is based on
the false premise that there has been an
all-out arms race in miclear testing by
the United States and the Soviets.
Unquestionably, in the 1961 and 1962
series of tests, the Soviets tested at a rate
which was probably near the maximum
of their capability. It takes two to make
a race, however. The United States, un-
fortunately, was not even running. In
the period since the test moratorium was
overtly broken by the Soviets in Septem-
ber 1961, the Soviets have conducted
approximltely three times the number
of tests that the United States has con-
ducted, and this includes, of course. Only
the Soviet tests of which we have knowl-
edge. Again, even this disparity Must be
expanded in view of the fact that some
ofethe U.S. tests were for the purpose of
Improving detection techniques, that
others were related to the peaceful uses
of nuclear detonations, and the fact that
the first-strike strategy of the U.S.S.R.
permits the Soviets to Concentrate more
or weapons design and effects?the most
pertinent technology to strategic power.
In terms of average yield, the Soviet tests
of 1961 and 1962 were a high multiple of
the average yield of U.S. tests.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator from South Caro-
lina yield?
Mr. THURMOND. I am glad to yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the able
Senator from South Carolina agree that
we shall never be able to develop a de-
pendable atomic missile defense without
testing in the atmosphere?
Mr. THURMOND. That is my opin-
ion. During their recent tests, the Rus-
sians made tests in the atmosphere that
showed that they were testing for the
development of an antimissile system;
and it is -blear that they have gained
knowledge which they can use now in
manufacturing weapons to perfect a
more advanced ABM system. Unless we
test in the atmosphere, we shall not be
able to determine what will actually oc-
cur when such a weapon is used in the
environment in which it is designed to
be used.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Has the Sen-
ator from South Carolina heard the ar-
guments to the effect that we can develop
a practical, workable missile defense
without ever testing it under actual trial
conditions?
Mr. THURMOND. Yes. Today, we
have an antimissile program. We have
not produced or deployed it, but we have
an antimissile designed that has in tests
knocked down 8 out of 12 shots, as I have
already stated. However, it would be im-
possible to perfect this system and de-
velop it to a point where we would feel
we could rely upon it, because testing
underground will not be the same as test-
ing in the environment in which it will
actually have to operate. No one can
tell what results will be forthcoming
when tests are actually made in the at-
mosphere.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator
from South Carolina knows, of course,
that at present we have no dependable
answer to the problem of destroying a
missile which is accompanied by a num-
ber of decoys. In other words, the Rus-
sians may have, or get, large missiles
with multiple warheads and multiple de-
coys. If one is fired at us, it can be ex-
pected to explode, while on its way, and
to separate into 25 or 30 components?
perhaps 25 dummies and 5 actual bomhs.
Mr., THURMOND. That is correct.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. We have no
present answer to that problem. We also
know that if we try to shoot them down
with an atomic missile, there will be a
communications blackout--for which we
have no answer at present. The black-
out caused by the first explosion would
make it impossible to see the following
missile.
Some contend that perhaps we can
"design around" this problem. As I
understand, the idea is to have at other
places a number of radar systems which
perhaps could spot the missiles. But in
that event, if war broke out between the
U.S.S.R. and the United States, we would
be confronted with probably hundreds
of missiles fired simultaneously; and
therefore it might not be possible to
"design around" that problem.
In addition, is the Senator from South
Carolina familiar with the fact that
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Mr, LONG of Louisiana. The wit-
nesses testified before us about the re-
spects in which they believe we are ahead
Of the Soviets. I ask the Senator, how
could they know Such things? Has the
Sena* au reason to believe that our
people know what the Russians know
about atomic weapons? Would it seem
more likely that the Russians have a way
of keeping those thing S secret?
Mr. THIIRMOND. The testimony
given before the Preparedness Subcom-
mittee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
are on the other side of this question,
with respect to various points is very
clear that in certain fields the Commu-
nists are ahead. When one looks at those
points, relating to where they are ahead,
It is frightening. Our information of
Soviet technology is limited, but through
analysis of radioactive debris from Soviet
tests, we have some information.
I suggest, if the Senator has time, that
he read the testimony given by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on that point. The staff
has it available. It has been summa-
rized. I believe that seven or eight dif-
ferent points are covered. It is well
worthwhile reading.
Today in my speech / shall bring out
as well as I can, without violating the
rule against divulging classified material,
what is involved. A little later I shall
come to the disadVantages of the treaty.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Has the Sen-
ator explored in his mind the possibility
that if the Soviets wished to do more
testing it could be done on Chinese ter-
? ritory? So long as we were not able
to prove that the Russians were doing it,
so long as we merely suspected and were
unable to prove it, we would be bound
by the treaty to continue to refrain
from testing.
IVir. THURMOND. The Senator has
brought out a key point. That is a ques-
tion which I propounded to some of the
military and scientific witnesses who
testified before the Preparedness Sub-
committee. I asked, "What would keep
the Russians from shifting their equip-
ment and scientists just over the Chinese
line, thousands of miles away from
where we can reach, so that we would
never know whether the testing was
done in China Or in Russia?"
That is exactly what they could do.
The evidence which was brought out in
the inVeitigation showed that it could
be the case.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Would it
not be eaSier to arrange to do the test-
ing on Chinese territory? than to go to
the expense, small though it might be,
of providing an adequate underground
tunnel to conduct explosions?
Mr. THURMON'b. That could be done
. by the Russians. With the instruments
which we have today we might be able
? to pick up those tests: but we would not
be able to tell whether they were con-
ducted in Chinese or Russian territory- if
they were conducted near the line. It
Would be impossible to tell that. The
Russians could gp near to the line and
carry out a series of tests, and then the
Russians_could & deny that they had any-
thing 'do with them, and it would be
difficult to tell on which side of the line
the tests were being conducted. If the
Chinese were conducting the tests, that
still would not be a violation of the
treaty, technically speaking, yet it would
be an effort inspired by, prescribed by,
supervised by, and under the leadership
of the Russians.
We could not even be sure who was
testing if we determined the detonation
was of an advanced device.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. From the
Communist point of view, would that not
be a fine, patriotic thing for them to do,
for the benefit of their nation?
Mr. THURMOND. There is no doubt
about it. They would not hesitate to do
that, if they thought it to their ad-
vantage.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does not the
Communist doctrine teach that it is the
duty of Communists to do that sort of
thing?
Mr. THURMOND. Absolutely. That
brings up the next question, about the
rift. It has been claimed that there is
a rift between Russia and Red China.
I asked the members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, "If there were a showdown to-
day with Russia, on whose side would
China be'?" They answered, "On the
side of Russia," in their opinion.
I asked, "If there were a showdown
today with China, on whose side would
Russia be?" and they answered, in their
opinion, "On the side of China."
If the showdown is coming between
our Nation and Russia or between our
Nation and China, and if those nations
will be, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff think
they will be, standing together, what dif-
ference does it make if there is any
rift?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not also
correct that all those people really argue
about is, "Which is the better way to
destroy the United States?"
Mr. THURMOND. That is the whole
question. The Senator has put his
finger on the point. They ask only,
"Which is the best way to destroy the
United States?"
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. From the
Russian point of view, it is by entering
into this treaty. They think this is the
best way to conquer the world.
Mr. THURMOND. Russia appears to
feel that is the best way to proceed.
Russia feels that it should proceed
gradually to take over the world by sub-
version, deceit, and deception; by get-
ting us into traps and placing us in such
a position that we will either be destroyed
or have to surrender.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Meanwhile,
they obtain every military advantage
they can. If the result of this treaty
should be to retard us from developing
modern weapons of the future, while
'the Communists rushed pell-mell ahead,
using the information that they may
now have, would that not be advancing
the doctrine for which Russia is con-
tending, namely, that this is the better
way to subjugate the Western nations?
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am grateful
to the Senator for permitting me to tres-
pass upon his time. I have been very
much troubled about this treaty, and I
believe the majority of the members of
the Preparedness Subcommittee, of
which the Senator is one, have rendered
a great service to this country in point-
ing out in the report how the treaty
would prejudice our defense. I congrat-
ulate the Senator for the speech he is
making.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the dis-
tinguished and able Senator for the ques-
tions propounded. They have been in-
formation-seeking questions. They have
brought out information that I hope Will
be of value to the American people.
On the Preparedness Subcommittee,
headed by the distinguished Senator
from Mississippi, all members but one
agreed to the report. The ranking Re-
publican member, the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], did not
agree. One member, the distinguished
Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON]
had additional views, however. The
others were all in accord on the report,
and even the Senator from Missouri [Mr.
SYMINGTON] went along with the report
with the addition of individual views.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If a Senator
concludes, as I do, that this treaty would
prejudice the defense of the United
States, and that it would result in this
Nation being second best as compared
with the Soviet Union in weapons of the
future, would it not be his duty, as well
as the duty of the rest of us, no matter
how much the political repercussions
might affect this Nation, to vote to con-
tinue to develop the most modern weap-
ons, and to reject the treaty, if we con-
cluded that the treaty would adversely
affect our defenses?
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is
correct. Furthermore, in my judgment,
the only thing that has prevented the
Russians from Wing nuclear weapons in
their aggressions and their efforts to take
over this country is our tremendously
superior nuclear striking power. It has
been the deterrent that has hindered and
kept the Russians from starting a nu-
clear war. Now, since the Russians have
gained this vast knowledge from recent
tests, and their advantages will be frozen
if the treaty is ratified, we are going
to be greatly handicapped, because the
Russians have scientific knowledge about
high-yield weapons, weapon effects, and
antiballistic missiles, which are vital to
us and our future, that we do not have;
and the only way we can obtain it is to
test in the atmosphere.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I thank the
Senator very much. I shall listen with
interest to the remainder of his speech.
I regret to say that few Senators are
present to hear the speech this after-
noon. What the Senator from South
Carolina is presenting should be heard
and studied by every Member of the Sen-
ate before he votes on the treaty.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Sen-
ator for his kind remarks.
Obviously, therefore, we cannot credit
ourselves with strategic superiority suf-
ficient for a credible deterrent force if
we merely possess a numerical advantage
in weapons of roughly equivalent quality
to those of a potential aggressor. Our
announced second strike strategy?or our
public renunciation of a first strike?
places a burden upon us to maintain an
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overwhelming superiority in quality and
quantity of strategic weapons. It is a
heavy burden from many standpoints,
and puts us at a distinct disadvantage.
In the past, and even now, we have man-
aged to carry that burden, and since it
has effectively prevented a nuclear war,
it has been worth the extra effort re-
quired.
In assessing our ability to deter a
would-be aggressor in the future, we
must, therefore, examine the relative
levels of technology today, and the pros-
pect for relative technological progress
in the near future, always keeping in
mind that our self-imposed second strike
strategy requires far more than a numer-
ical and qualitative parity to maintain
a credible and effective deterrent.
With these two factors in mind, it
should be clear that our current supe-
riority in nuclear weaponry, standing
alone, or even combined with our capa-
bility to produce greater quantities of
today's weapons in the future, offers lit-
tle comfort that we can maintain an
effective deterrent force in the future.
As impressive as is our weapons array
at the moment, it is sobering to recall
that we have not begun production of a
strategic weapons system of later vintage
than 1957. To be sure, existing weapons
systems are constantly being improved,
but the absence of any new strategic
weapons system for more than 6 years
Is an invitation to obsolescence.
The most pertinent Issue on the ques-
tion of our capability to maintain a suf-
ficient strategic nuclear force to insure
that we can deter a nuclear war in future
years is the relative levels of nuclear
technology in the United States and in
the Soviet Union at present. Since the
three environmental test ban will inhibit
the development of technology in certain
areas, if observed, the existing level of
technology when this treaty would go
into effect is particularly pertinent in
those areas.
The Preparedness Subcommittee has
studied for months the relative balance
of nuclear technology between the United
States and the Soviet Union. The inves-
tigation included the compilation and
comparison in detail of each and every
nuclear test conducted by the United
States and the knowledge gained there-
from, together with the best information
available in this country on each of the
Soviet tests on which we have informa-
tion.
The conclusions drawn from this com-
parison, to the extent permitted by secu-
rity considerations, are presented in the
report of the Preparedness Subcommit-
tee. Admittedly, estimates of the Soviet
achievements are conservative, and are
by no means based on the sound rule
of military intelligence that the most
pessimistic judgment as to a potential
enemy's capabilities should be drawn.
In general, the comparative rates of
testing by the United States and by the
Soviet Union in the past 2 years is sig-
nificant. In 1958, when the test mora-
torium began, the United States held a
clear superiority over the Soviet Union
in the yield-to-weight ratio over the en-
tire range of deliverable weights for
weapons. One-fifth of the U.S. tests had
been in yield ranges above 10 megatons,
and the Soviets had conducted no tests
above 10 megatons.
During 1961 and 1962, the Soviet
Union conducted more than twice the
number of tests of yields above 10 mega-
tons that the United States has ever con-
ducted, and more than four times the
number of tests the 'United States con-
ducted in the same yield range in the
same period. The Soviet Union has
demonstrated in these tests capabilities
for .a clearly superior performance to the
United States above about 15-megaton
yield. The last U.S. experience in this
yield range was in 1954 almost a decade
ago. Our uncertainty about the design
of such Soviet weapans is most dis-
turbing.
In the multimegaton yield ranges, it is
quite obvious that the Soviets now hold a
clear superiority in technology.
In the yield ranges below a few mega-
tons, available evidence indicates that
the United States continues to hold a
lead in weapons design and performance.
This is the precise area in which the
United States has concentrated. Even
this lead is not positive enough to be too
reassuring, however. Prior to the mora-
torium, the United States had conducted
more than twice as many tests in this
yield range as had been detected in the
Soviet Union. The ntimber of tests in
this yield range that we know the So-
viets conducted in 1962 and 1963 indi-
cates clearly that the Soviets are intent
on challenging the U.S. position in this
range, and this is an area in which con-
tinued testing underground, permitted by
the treaty, can contribute to further ad-
vancements of technology.
In the lower yield ranges, we know far
less of the Soviets' testing experience, for
our detection, identification, and ana-
lytical capabilities are degraded at the
lower end of the yield range spectrum.
The Atomic Energy Commission indi-
cated that available evidence would not
permit a comprehensiVe comparison of
U.S. and U.S.S.R. capabilities in this
yield range, and recommended that a de-
velopment capability for the U.S.S.R.
comparable to that of the United States
be assumed.
Under present circumstances, the ac-
quisition of knowledge concerning weap-
ons effects is as crucial, if not more so,
than knowledge of weapons design. In
answer to questions, , General? LeMay
stated that knowledge of weapons effects
was clearly more crucial at this juncture.
Unfortunately, this is one area in which
the Soviets almost assuredly hold a lead.
Judging from the knowledge which we
have of Soviet multiniegaton weapons
tests, we must assume that the Soviet
Union amassed a significant and valuable
body of data on high yield blast, shock,
communications blackout, and the ex-
otic effects of radiation and electromag-
netic phenomena which are not now
available to the United States, and
which we cannot acquire with under-
ground testing.
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. THURMOND. I am glad to yield
to the distinguished Senator from
Georgia.
Mr. TALMADGE. In 1962, the-Soviet
Union made tests of an extremely large
type of weapon, as I recall, of perhaps
50 or 60 megatons. Is that correct?
Mr. THURMOND. Yes.
Mr. TALMADGE. Have we any in-
formation as to what effect such tests
would have on systems that might be
used for our own missiles fired from sub-
marines or land bases?
Mr. THURMOND. The evidence be-
fore the Preparedness Subcommittee in-
dicated that it could be very serious., In
other words, the blast, shock, column-
nications blackout, and the exotic effects
of radiation and electromagnetic phe-
nomena must all be taken into consider-
ation. It is felt that the high-yield tests
have been very beneficial to the Corn-
munists, in that they now know how to
go about constructing the weapons they
need, which could turn the tide in the
cold war.
Mr. TALMADGE. I take it that we
have made tests with some of our own.
weapons in the 10- and :15-megaton
range.
Mr. 'THURMOND. That is correct.
They are much smaller than those of the
Communists. We have not tested above
15 megatons since 1954, and the state
of the art has advanced significantly
since then.
Mr. TALMADGE. When those weap-
ons are fired, are our firing systems still
operating accurately?
Mr. THURMOND. We still have far
less weapons effects knowledge than we
need. I do not wish to go into classified
information, but we are very much con-
cerned about the high-yield weapons,
which the Communists are now able to
produce with the knowledge they have
gained. In my judgment this is one of
the reasons for their wanting the test
treaty, to get a breathing spell so that
they can manufacture these weapons
based on the knowledge which they have
gained from their tests. Their produc -
tion capabilities are poor. They will then
be able to say to us, "Either surrender,
or be destroyed."
Mr. TALMADGE. Is it the able Sen-
ator's view, then, that if they were to
hurl bombs of great magnitude at us,
say, in the 50-, 60-, and even 100-mega-
ton range, the effects of the explosion
might be felt by our firing mechanisms
and therefore we would be unable to re-
taliate? Is that the thrust of the Sen-
ator's argument?
Mr. THURMOND. That is a distinct
possibility, but our knowledge is Brri-
ited. That is the opinion of some of the
scientists and military experts. Further-
more, the Senator has put his finger on
a key point, because we would not be able
to hold tests to determine what the exact
results would be.
Mr. TALMADGE. Was that fear sup-
ported by the majority of the scientists
and the military, or by a minority of the
scientists and the military?
Mr. THURMOND. / do not recall ex-
actly about the number who testified,
but they were all concerned about the
effects of the firing of the high-yield
missiles which could be dropped on us,
and the effect it could have on the ques-
tion of whether we would be able to get
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us?without war, if they can; but with
war, if they must.
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from
Louisiana is absolutely correct. When
Lenin took over Russia in 1917, he said
the aim of the oviets was to dig the
graves of all other governments, and to
be the heirs and successors to all the
other governments in the world. The
present Communist leaders have not de-
parted from that philosophy. That was
Stalin's goal; and that is Khrushchev's
goal. That is the goal of all Commu-
nists. They have not abandoned that
goal. Even since this treaty has been
signed, the Communists have said this
treaty is in their interest. They have
tried to assure the people of Yugoslavia
that this treaty is is in the interests of
the Communist world. They have tried
to assure, the Red Chinese that this
treaty is in the interests of communism
and for the benefit of the Communist
world, and that it will hasten what the
Communists call the final stage of the
revolution.
Anyone who studies and reads enough
to understand communism knows that
the only time when the 'Communists will
enter into an agreement with another
country is when they feel it will be to
their advantage to do so. They will not
hesitate to enter into a treaty, because,
as Stalin said, they believe treaties are
like pie crusts and are m^de to be
broken. They will not hesitate to break
them when it is in their interest, They
Will observe them only when it is to their
benefit to do so,
In 1958, they observed the moratorium
only until they had made the necessary
preparations for resumption of testing.
So, after extensive preparations, in Sep-
tember 1961, they avertly broke the
moratorium and resumed testing. As a
result, they have pined great knowledge
which we do not hate. But we must
have it if we are to be able to manufac-
ture the weapons necessary to deter war.
Because they have gained significant
knowledge, they are willing to sign this
treaty, so as to give them a breathing
spell in which they can now manufac-
ture their weapons in accordance with
that knowledge. We should have that
knowledge, too; but we can' gain it only
by testing in the atmosphere and in
space.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I do not wish to point the finger of
scorn at any of the fine men who serve
in our Military Establishment. But is
It not true that the military men who
have testified in favor of this treaty serve
under the President, are part 61 the
executive branch, and are expected to
support the major policy decisions of the
administration?
Is It not also true that it is expected
when the President appoints the Joint
Chiefs or others who hold high, policy-
Making positions, he is entitled to insist
that when final decisions on important
policy matters are made, they support
the President's position?
- Mr. THUR1VIOND. Of course. An
able former member of the joint Chiefs
of Staff told me that those in that po-
sition feel they should support the Presi-
No. 143-8
dent's decisions if they possibly can, be-
cause he is their Commander in Chief
and is the President. So they, believe
that they Should either support his de-
cisions or should state outright to the
President that they cannot do so?so
that if he then wishes to relieve them
from their duties, he can then proceed
to do so.
But, as military men, they have been
trained to take orders; and in this case
they were told to consider the political
implications, as well as the military im-
plications. I understand they were
further told that in considering the po-
litical implications, they should consider
the information furnished _them by the
State Department, and should also con-'
aider that that information was correct.
If that is true?and that information
came to me?then they had to weigh the
politioal considerations along with the
military considerations. But, of course,
they are military men, not political men.
general LeMay gave us a clue when he
said that if this treaty were today in its
proposal stage, he would not recommend
that it be signed.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. As a practi-
cal matter, is it not more or less tradi-
tional that if one who holds the position
of Chief of Staff of one of the armed
services feels that he must oppose the
President, the Commander in Chief,
and if he believes he should advise Mem-
bers of Congress to vote against the
recommendations of the Commander in
Chief, he should then tender his
resignation?
Mr. THTJRMOND. I believe the Sena-
tor is probably correct. It is quite inter-
esting to note that when General
Twining?a former chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, but not now di-
rectly "under the gun"?after recently
studying this question for the Air Force,
testified before us in secret session, the
effect of his testimony was that this
treaty is not in the best interests of our
national security.
Adm. Arleigh Burke, who is a former
Chief of Naval Operations and a former
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
made a similar statement to the effect
that it would be a great mistake to ratify
the treaty.
Admiral Radford filed a statement be-
fore the Committee on Foreign Relations.
He is a former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. He is not now under the
gun directly. ,He made a strong state-
ment against the treaty which every
Senator should read.
In addition, other generals who are
still in service, but Who are not members
of the Joint Chiefs and not in top posi-
tions, came in and testified. I admire
them greatly for their courage in doing
so. I wonder if their testimony will affect
them in the positions to which they have
been assigned. I hope it will not.-It is
also worthy of
no -Chat the Air orce
Association today issued a statement
against the treaty.
? I do not believe any objective person
who heard the statement Of General
Power would be inclined to favor
ratifi-
cation of the treaty. General Power has
1591
charge of our delivery systems to send
the missiles or the bombers to drop the
bombs in case we get into a war. He is
the man who, if he received orders from
the President to drop nuclear weapons,
would press the button which would
command the planes or missiles to go.
General Power must know every detail
and implication relating to the military
and pertaining tp nuclear warfare and
nuclear development, He is an expert on
the subject. He is also chairman of the
group that targets all of our strategic
weapons.
General Schriever, who has charge of
our testing, development, and missile
program, is also an expert.
Both those men feel that the treaty
would not be in the best interest of our
national security. They do not take into
consideration any of the so-called politi-
cal factors. They look at the question
from the standpoint of the security of
the United States.
I should like to hear those who main-
tain that we must consider the problem
primarily from a political angle say to
what political angle they refer. What is
the politics involved which is worrying
them? What is the political angle? I
should like to hear any Senator who
thinks there is an overriding political
consideration tell the Senate and the
people of our country what political as-
pect overrides the military disadvantages
and risks. I ask that question in the face
of testimony of military men who are not
now under the gun, and who are free and
able to say that to ratify the treaty
would not be in the best interest of our
national security, and who point out that
we are risking the only deterrent that
has to date prevented a nuclear war?
our strategic nuclear force.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I was not in a position to hear all
of the witnesses who testified before the
Foreign Relations Committee. However,
I did have the opportunity to read most
of the statements and also to hear the
testimony of Dr. Teller, who in my
opinion gave us some very enlightening
information in this field.
It seemed to the Senator from Louisi-
ana that we should keep two things in
mind: First, what effect will the treaty
have upon the defense of the United
States? Will it affect us adversely or
will it affect us favorably?
Second, what effect will it have upon
our international relations? In my
mind, there is no doubt that, all things
being equal, it would be desirable to have
some sort of test ban treaty with all the
nations of the world. But, on the other
hand, if by doing so we would greatly
imperil the future defenses of the United
States, we should ratify no such treaty
as the one before the Senate.
Dr. Teller pointed out various ways in
which the treaty could prejudice the de-
velopment of the new weapons needed
to defend our country. So far as the
Senator, from Louisiana is concerned,
that testimony was not successfully re-
futed. Dr. Teller further said that there
is additionEil infOrmaticin diafi he could
give us to Shaw Us" wily the treaty would
prejudice the United States, and why it'
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would prejudice us even worse than was
indicated in his public statement. The
Senator might be interested to know that
our committee thought so little of the
man who was correct about the hydrogen
bomb, and without whom we probably
would not have been preeminent in that
field, that we did not even call him back
to tell us in full session the classified and
secret information which he communi-
cated to the Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee, of which the Senator
from South Carolina is a member.
Some Senators wished to wait at least
until the Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee had made its report.
Those are men who should be experts
In that field. Senators have been talk-
ing about the foreign aid bill, and how
much money we might give to some back-
ward countries. The Senator is a mem-
ber of the Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee, which is discussing the
development of new weapons, how much
they will cost, how long it will take to
acquire them, and so forth. So some
members of the committee thought we
should wait until the Preparedness In-
vestigating Subcommittee, which had
heard a considerable amount of expert
testimony from the defense point of view
which we had not heard in the Commit-
tee on FOreign Relations, reported.
As the Senator knows, we did not have
the benefit of that information. On the
morning we voted, the junior Senator
from Louisiana placed a telephone call
to the chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services. The chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services, the Sen-
ator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] is a
man whom I greatly admire and one
whom I once supported for the nomina-
tion of President of the United States.
I voted for the Senator from South Caro-
lina for President.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Sen-
ator very much.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Both Sena-
tors serve on the Committee on Armed
Services. The junior Senator from
Louisiana placed a call to a man who
perhaps for 20 years has been a member
of the Committee on Armed Services.
He has been chairman for a long period
of time. He is a man whom President
Truman once said was probably the best
qualified Democrat to be President, and
a man Who probably would have been
President except for the fact that he was
a Southerner. The Senator from Louisi-
ana desired to know what the Senator
from Georgia [Mr. Russlax] thought
about the question after that able states-
man had had an opportunity to receive
information that the Senator from
Louisiana did not possess.
I regret to say that the Committee on
Foreign Relations did not see fit to wait
until those who are experts in the field
of atomic power and who would be our
best experts in the field of preparedness,
could give their advice.
It seems to me that we are rushing
things very gravely and dangerously,
when we proceed to rush ahead and try
to ratify a treaty of the sort proposed
without having carefully considered the
best advice that we can get, which would
indicate that the treaty would prejudice
the defense of the United States.
I say to the Senator, that I shall vote
against, the treaty. Perhaps I shall have
more to say on the question later in the
debate. I shall vote against the treaty
because' as a former member of the
Committee on Armed Services and as a
member of the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, I am fully convinced that the
treaty would be a very good deal for the
Soviet Union and wotild very seriously
prejudice the future defense of our
country.
I know that some people are concerned
about the fallout problem. The best ex-
perts on that subject nave told me that
we should not let that question control
our thinking in this field, and that it is
a minor problem comPared to the other
major, weighty problems, such as the
ability of our Nation to defend itself
from destruction by enemy nations. ?
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator has
spoken of the problem of radiation fall-
out. Dr. Foster, who has charge of one
of our nuclear laboratories, testified that
a man living in the mountains of Colo-
rado would get more additional radiation
from living in that area due to the height
than he would get from fallout resulting
from nuclear testing.
Also the Senator might be interested
In knowing that a recent book has been
written by Earl Voss, entitled "Nuclear
Ambush: Test Ban Trap," which is con-
curred in by scientists and experts. This
book brought out the fact that a man
wearing a wrist watch with a luminous
dial will receive 10 tines more radia-
tion than he would redeive from fallout
from testing. A man 'living in a brick
home would get 20 times more radiation
than he would get from the fallout test-
ing.
Much of what we hear about fallout
is bugaboo. It simplY does not exist.
Dr. Seaborg, upon being questioned by
the chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services, the Senator from
Georgia [Mr. Russmi], brought out
very clearly the fact that the amount of
radiation now is not dangerous. There
is no danger.
Of course, if there should be a nuclear
exchange, and if fallOut should result
from it, the radiation which would occur
would be dangerous, and lethal.
Certain people would like to stop test-
ing to reduce the dangers of radioactive
fallout. The point is that it is not neces-
sary to stop testing, because we can now
test with clean weapons and devices.
The manner in which we test is such that
we can test without the dangers of fall-
out. We have been doing it. The scien-
tists say we can continue to do it.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. As I under-
stand the situation,af)11 of the testing
which has been done y all the powers
on earth which have atomic weapons is
estimated to have increased radioactiv-
ity in the atmosphere by about 10 per-
cent. That increase in radioactivity
will gradually dissipate itself. It will
gradually decay, in some 70 years from
now or perhaps a longer period of time.
Eventually it will decal. and dissipate it-
self from the atmosphere, and will make
11
no difference. But the radioactivity in
total has been increased by about 10
percent.
The sister of the junior Senator from
Louisiana moved from Baton Rouge, La.,,
to Boulder, Colo. When she did so,
though she did not know it?she liked
the atmosphere there and the family
thought it would be goad for their
health?she subjected herself to 70 per-
cent more radioactivity, because the
atmosphere in Boulder is less dense than
that in Baton Rouge.
The family thought it would improve
health. Probably it did. The more arid
atmosphere probably improved her
health to a greater extent than the detri-
ment caused by an increase in radio-
activity.
If a person were born and reared in
the state of Kerala in India, because of
various mineral deposits, that person
would be subjected to an increase oi'
radioactivity of 1,000 percent, compared
to the radioactivity in Washington, D.O.
Nobody in Kerala ever knew there was a
problem. Nobody there knows it now,.
How could those people have survived?
If they were subjected to an increase of
a thousandfold above what we are now
talking about; that is, the amount of
radioactivity which would result from
the explosion of these bombs in tests?
The practical approach is that such
a contention should not control our
thinking. I regret to say that most pea-
plc who believe we ought to ratify the
treaty are inclined to so believe for that
reason. Sometimes I have a feeling that
that might have been the reason why the
Russians exploded a 57-megaton bomb,
to try to terrify the world into agreeing
to a treaty like this.
Mr. THURMOND. That could have
been the reason, or at least, one of the
reasons. I agree with the Senator that
radiation from fallout is a big "bugaboo"
which is being played up today, with
some people saying that is one of the
reasons why we should ratify the treaty.
In my judgment that contention has no
merit; just as other reasons given for
wanting to ratify the treaty are without
merit.
I think this country will take a dan-
gerous step if the treaty is ratified.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, when one reads the testimony by
the Secretary of Defense?upon which
the administration relies for its case?
one finds that his argument breaks down
to this: That the United States is ex-
tremely strong, that we presently are
ahead of the Soviet Union in a number
of respects, and that this treaty would
tend to maintain the advantage we pos-
sess.
I should like to ask the Senator if we
are ahead of the Soviets with regard to
the big bombs.
Mr. THURMOND. We are not ahead
of the Soviets with regard to the high..
yieldweapons. The Soviets have a lead.
It is assumed that we are ahead of the
Soviets with respect to the low-yield
weapons. At a later point in my speech
today I shall cover that point in greater
detail.
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1596
ballistic missile_ .system, the onlY Nibs
definitely to determine if such a system
would be successful and would really
produce, results and operate, is to test
It in the environment in which it would
have to operate. That would be the
,
atmosphere.
Mr, .14,0NO of, Louisiana: One simple
problem that is easy enough for a per-
son to appreciate is this: If we are to de-
velop a reliable defense against enemy
missiles, not merely a defense that could
shoot down the first?missile, I would pre-
sUMe that ,we already have the capability
to develop suchlt, defense?but the ability
to continue Shooting down the 2d, 3d,
4th, 5th, 6th, or even the 100th missile
fired at us, aimed at the same point, we
must develop an ability to locate and
tracic such enemy missiles headed for
our country, even though the atmosphere
would be disturbed by the exploding mis-
siles we are sending out, arid recognize
the possibility that even enemy missiles
may be exploding out in the atmosphere
and creating what is known as a radar
blackout.
At present, we do not know how to
Solve that problem. It has been sug-
gested that we "design around it." I
aSSULMe that means we would hope, if the
radar were blacked out at New York, that
we might be able to pick up enemy mis-
siles 'bY radar at Philadelphia, for ex-
ample. But if one is trying to defend
against a barage of 300 or 400 enemy
missiles fired against us simultaneously?
perhaps a thousand fired simultaneous-
ly?with more coming, we must be able
to continue to track with all the radar
equipment and continue to shoot mis-
siles down, even though some of our de-
fenses will' be destroyed simultaneously
with the defending of them. There is no
way in which that kind of defense can
be developed without atmospheric test-
ing.
Mr. THURMOND. T'fie Senator is
eminently correct. It would be impos-
? sible to develop a type of antiballistic
missile systein upon which this country
? could place complete reliance until such
a system had been tested in the atmos-
phere, which is the environment in which
the system would have to operate if an
exchange should take place.
'VII*, LONG of Louisiana. Is the Sena-
tor aware of the fact that some of those
who advocate the treaty undertake to say
that it cannot be done; that no one will
ever be able to develop a successful mis-
sile defense? Where would this coun-
try be now if we had taken the attitude
30 years ago, or even 20 year ago, that it
? could not be done? Where would we be
If we had taken the attitude that the
atom could not be cracked; that the
atom was something that could not be
' harnessed? Where would we be if we
had taken the attitude that a proximity
fuse could not be developed? Where
would we be if we had taken the attitude
that the airplane could not be developed,
andtHat menlvould never be able to fly?
Where world we be if we had taken tbe
attitude that space could not be con-
quered? We would be far behind our
potential adversaries. They would be in
a position to hand us an ultimatum to
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which NVe would either have to surrender,
or else be destroyed.
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from
Louisiana is correct.
I recall that one of the scientists?I
believe it was Dr. Teller?testified that
several year's ago he was doubtful about
this system; but he is now convinced that
It can be successful.
Consider what the Russians have done.
This information is now public. When
I spoke on this subject before, much of
the information was disclosed in secret
session. But it has now been made pub-
lic and has appeared in the newspapers.
I do not think there is any question now
that the Russians have developed a sys-
tem which our intelligence says will
knock down medium-range missiles,
those calculated to go to 1,200 miles, and
intermediate-range missiles, those cal-
culated to go to 2,500 miles, and, under
certain favorable conditions, intercon-
tinental ballistic misgiles.
Immeasurable progress has been made.
I was talking with one of our military
men a few days ago about the Nike-Zeus,
which is our best antiballistic missile
development to date. He says that 8
shots out of 12 have been successfully
made. This shows that the system can
be and is being developed. We know
the Russians have made great progress
in that field. Not only have they de-
veloped a system, but they have deployed
a system function around a certain city
in Russia.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Let us as-
sume for a moment that the Russians
already have the information they need
In order to develop a successful missile
defense. Is it not correct to assume that
they have been ahead of us in missile
development all the time; and if they
have succeeded in developing what they
need for a successful missile defense, and
we by this treaty make it impossible for
our Nation to develop a successful mis-
sile defense, will we not, by ratifying and
confirming the treaty, have placed our
Nation in a position in which it could be
destroyed?
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from
Louisiana is a man of vision on that
point. He certainly sees the !acts as
they exist. The Communists have made
great advances in this field. Some of
their tests were obviously dictated by
antiballistic missile requirements, as the
Preparedness Subcommittee points out in
its report.
? From September 1961, in 1962, and
this year, they have been conducting ex-
tensive high-yield-weapons tests. They
have obtained vast amounts of knowl-
edge and information which we do not
possess. In order to gain such knowl-
edge, we would have to make tests in the
atmosphere; but this treaty would not
permit us to make tests in the atmos-
phere. Therefore, if this treaty is
ratified, the gains the Communists have
made in recent years in connection with
the development of an antiballistic mis-
sile system and the development of high-
yield weapons will be beyOnd our reach.
The gains they have made in the recent
tests will thus be frozen, and we shall
never be able to obtain- the knowledge
that we need.
? 14r. -I..:sbNG of Louisiana. Mr. iTesi-
dent, will the Senator from South
Carolina yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER, (Mr. Mc-
INTYRE in the chair). Does the Senator
from South Carolina yield to the Senator
from Louisiana?
Mr. THURMOND. I yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Sena-
tor from South Carolina also aware of
the fact that no one has ever been able
to rely on the Soviets to keep their word?
I know he realizes that the only time
when the Soviets have kept a treaty or
an agreement was when it served their
Immediate interest to do so.
Mr. THURMOND. Yes. The able
Senator from Louisiana is certainly
familiar with the record of the Commu-
nists in connection with keeping treaties
and keeping their word. I believe the
Defense Department issued a pamphlet
last November on broken treaties; it can
be obtained from the Department. In
one column, the treaties are listed; in
the next, is a statement of how each
treaty was broken and when it was
broken.
The Senate Subcommittee on Internal
Security has compiled a report on Com-
munist treaties; and I understand that
the subcommittee has recently released
a supplement to that report. It shows
clearly that the Communists cannot be
relied upon to keep their word. They
will not keep their word. Their goal is
world enslavement and domination.
They are driving toward it every day.
To them, truth is anything that pro-
motes communism; and they feel they
are warranted in saying anything and
doing anything to accomplish that goal.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Sena-
tor from South Carolina familiar with
the fact that the Communists teach that
anything that will promote the spread
of communism is justified?
Mr. THURMOND. Yes.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. From the
point of view of a Communist, if he tells
the truth of if he fails to cheat or fails
to. victimize us, to his own advantage,
then he has committed an unpardon-
able and treasonable act. Does not the
Senator know that if a Communist is
asked how far a certain paved road con-
tinues, we can be sure that whatever he
tells us will be wrong. If the road hap-
pens to be 50 miles in length, he will say
it is 5 miles in length or 1 mile in
length. One can be sure that whatever a
Communist tells us will be wrong. The
?reason for that is that he is unwilling to
tell us the truth, and he realizes that if
he does reply at all, we may find the
truth. From the Communist point of
view, it is much better that we be mis-
informed, rather than that we be
ignorant.
When we are dealing with the Com-
munists, we must realize that they are
seeking to subjugate our country. They
want to take charge; they want to make
us bend to their will; and they want to
find a way to victimize us. That is their
entire purpose. That is why they are
willing to sign an agreement of this sort.
I should like to ask the Senator from
South Carolina whether he agrees that
their dedicated purpose is to destroy
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may te, in no way ia35 from the fact
that the treaty which the Senate is now
considering is, in and of itself, impor-
tant--even vital; for this treaty bears
significantly on the fundamental issues
of liberty or subjugation, peace or war.
The report of the Cenate Foreign Re-
lations Committee which recommends
that the Senate ratify this treaty, while
recognizing that the treaty does have
military implications, minimizes the mil-
itary aspects and states that the main
thrust of the treaty is political. In view
of the report's warning to the Senate
that excessive reliance on military con-
siderations could undermine national
security, it is particularly interesting to
note that the majority of the space in
the report is devoted to explaining away
the military implications of the treaty.
In its discussion of the military aspects
of the treaty, the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee report quite accurately points
out in some detail that the United States
now has a clear and overwhelming su-
periority in strategic nuclear power.
Drawing from the specifics of our arsenal
which Secretary McNamara made pub-
lic for the first time during his testimony,
the report cites the strength of the Stra-
tegic Air Command at more than 500
SAC bombers on quick alert, and more
than 500 missiles?Atlas, Titan, Minute-
man, and Polaris?new in the UB. fprce.
Even without accepting these rather
loosely rounded off numbers as precisely
accurate, no one can seriously doubt the
present clear superiority of the U.S.
strategic nuclear power. As has been
the case since World War II, the
United States still has strategic power
that can and does, as it has in the past,
effectively deter any would-be aggressor.
It is precisely this significant imbal-
ance of strategic power that has pre-
vented the occurrence of a nuclear war
for almost two decades. Our policy of
deterrence, based on an overwhelming
superiority of nuclear power, has proved
to be an effective preventative of nuclear
war. Gen. Thomas Power, commander
of the Strategic Air Command, put the
matter most succinctly in his testimony
before the Senate Preparedness Subcom-
mittee. He stated:
I am seriously concerned about losing our
military superiority, because I think that
this superiority has resulted in a peaceful
world as far as nuclear war is concerned, and
I can't think of anything more important
than to keep the world safe from a nuclear
war.
I think if we get into one, there will be no
winners, only losers, and I think mankind
will have reached its highest plateau of
stupidity if it tries to reach its aims and goals
or settle its differences with nuclear weapons.
However, I think that our formula to
prevent this has been a successful one to
date, and it is a real simple formula. We
have had overwhelming military superiority
to the point where it is ridiculous for Mr.
Klarushchev to even seriously contemplate
attacking this country. Now I maintain
that it is possible to hold this type of lead,
tind that is what I recommend.
Ad stated by General Power, that great
SAC commander, we have found by ex-
perience that a policy of deterrence can
and does prevent nuclear war. There
are two essential ingredients of a suc-
cessful policy of deterrence. The first
is the actual strategic superiority, which
in this day and age, means nuclear su-
periority. Second, a patential aggres-
sor must be convinced that we have such-
overwhelming superiority that it would
be utterly foolish to seriously contem-
plate an attack and that such power
would be unleashed if attacked.
The very fact that there has been no
nuclear war is convincing evidence that
we have had, and still have, overwhelm-
ing nuclear superiority,, and that the
Soviets are convinced that we have that
superiority. No further ,back than last
fall, when Shrushchev made his bold
gamble in Cuba, it was pur overwhelm-
ing strategic nuclear poWer, and Ithru-
-shchev's knowledge of t1at superiority,
that prevented a nuclear war.
It is not enough to say that we now
have a clear nuclear superiority in
weaponry, however. If onr policy of de-
terrence of nuclear war is to continue,
and we intend to prevent a nuclear war
in the :future as we havet,in the past, we
must either continue to maintain an
overwhelming superiorit7, or turn to
some untried and untested formula for
preventing nuclear war. This requires
a closer look at our strategic force
structure.
In assessing either the, present or the
future balance of strategic military
power, a most distorted picture will re-
sult from any oversimplified comparison
of weapon for weapon, or weapon for
target, on a simple numerical basis. A
realistic view till result only if the com-
parison includes a qualitative analysis
of the weapons, together with an analy-
sis of the strategies which control the
use and employment of stich weapons.
Today, for the first time in many years,
the United States does not have a
manned bomber aircraft in production.
Our weapons production Is concentrated
on ballistic missiles. Whatever the
merits of the differing opinions as to the
advisability of putting almost sole re-
liance on missiles, the dramatic shift in
emphasis from manned aircraft to mis-
siles demonstrates the fat that military
superiority depends on the quality of
weapons more than it depends on num-
bers. It is the qualitative factor of
weaponry that accounts for obsoles-
cence. For example, right now we are
in the process of dismantling the Texas
towers, which comprised a part of the
obsolete-before-deployed 'SAGE system,
the' aborted brainchild Of Dr. Jerome
Wiesner. No matter how much of the
Sage system we still haye deployed, it
is immaterial; for its existence makes
no difference to the balance of strategic
military power. No munerical increase
can substitute for qualitative improve-
ment. There is nothing you need so
much of as something which is not very
good.
It is the qualitative factor that makes
it impossible to judge tomorrow's or next
year's balance of ,power by the number
of weapons we have depToyed today, or
by the number of today's weapons we
will be able to produce tomorrow. To-
day's weapons will be obsolete tomorrow,
and the number we have Or can produce
will be increasingly irrelevant with the
passage of time. If, therefore, we want
a realistic idea of the probable balance
of strategic power in the future, we must
consider primarily the question, What
are the relative levels of weapons tech-
nology today? More than any other fac-
tor, it is the level of technology today
that will determine the balance of stra-
tegic power in the future.
The second fallacy of numerical com-
parisons of weapons, and weapons
against potential targets, is most appar-
ent in the arguments of those who dwell
on what they mistakenly call the over-
kill capability of the United States.
Those who expound the theory of over-
kill seem to believe that only one weapon
Per target is needed, and that the num-
ber of weapons which exceeds the num-
bers of potential targets is surplus to
needs, or overkill.
The fallacy of such reasoning is the
omission from consideration of the reali-
ties of the strategy which determines the
use or possible use of the weapons.
By this time, it surely should be clear
that the United States is committed to
a second strike nuclear force. Our stra-
tegic weapons are to be used only after
we are attacked. This means that we
must rely for deterrence, not on the total
number of weapons in our arsenal, but
only on those weapons which would re-
main operative after an all-out nuclear
attack against the United States. Since
we do adhere strictly to a second strike
strategy, we must rely, in fact on the
number of our weapons which a poten-
tial aggressor believes would survive the
most destructive nuclear barrage he
could launch. In making an assessment
of this deterrent force, a potential ag-
gressor will, of course, take into account
the quality and reliability of our weapons
system.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator from South Caro-
lina yield?
Mr. THURMOND. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Louisiana.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Sen-
ator a member of the Preparedness In-
vestigating Subcommittee?
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from
South Carolina is a member of the Pre-
paredness Investigating Subcommittee.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Then the
Senator is familiar with the report of
the Preparedness Investigating Subcom-
mittee, which states that in eight major
ways the treaty would prejudice the de-
fense of the United States.
Mr. THURMOND. That is correct. I
discuss those ways later in my speech,
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Those eight
ways are set forth on pages 7 and 8 of
the interim report of that subcommittee.
Mr. 'THURMOND. The Senator is
correct.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the
Senator agree that in some ways the
treaty could adversely affect the United
States to the extent that we would prob-
ably never be able to develop a reliable
defense against enemy missiles so long
as we abided by the provisions of the
treaty?
Mr. THURMOND. I certainly do, and
this feeling is shared by the military
men and the scientists, who, I feel, are
best equipped to make an appraisal of
that subject. In developing an anti-
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Mr. DIRKS Mr. President I
? ,
be-
eam very curious about that word when
I saw it. I have read General Eisen-
hower's letter several times, So I took
it on myself to make indirect, inquiries
and get the stoiy in such fashion that
I could disclose it. He was not interested
in reservations Co the treaty; he was in-
terested in an assurance that our nu-
clear arsenal would be available for our
security. and the security of our allies;
and that is =ode abundantly clear in
one .paragraph ? the President's letter.
In addition, there is an addendum note
in the committee report that has a bear-
trig on that point. It is generally recog-
nized that slipA weapons would be so
used. _
Mr, FULBRIG-HT. Is it the Senator's
view, thatthat entirely satisfies the view
of Oeneral Eisenhower as to what should
be the reservakien?
Mr. paucsErt. Exactly.
Mr, FOLBRIQIIT. I think that has
been made clear.
Oeneral, Power: was mentioned. Gen-
eral Power is (Me_ of nine who have what
are called field commands in, various
parts of the world. He felt he could not
approve,the treaty. General Gerhart re-
fused to give an opinion because, he said,
he was not sufficiently informed, and it
? was beyond his competence. General
? Power is the only one who actually took
a pOs. ition in opposition to the treaty.
? I was present When that matter was
discussekwith the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
That inforrnatiOn came through the
Joint chiefs not by direct communica-
tion with ine. general Gerhart did riot
Wish to take a position. General Pow-
er was` the only one who took a position
against the treaty.
? countiro General Eisenhower with the
other aetive Members of the military
forces, including:the Secretary of De-
fense, there arc 14 prominent, leading
Men' in this field in favor a the treaty,
? against 2 who have taken the other
position.' That is a prety good average_
in COnnection with any controversial
4, subject of this kind.
? OnePer clUeltion which the Sen-
ator mentioned ?telated to the possibil-
ity of change in Russia. The Senator al-
luded to _a ?so-called alert No. 5, is-
sued some time ago by the military. I
do not. question the fact. However, in
the Violations cited?and this inforina-
ton begins at page 132 of the record of
the hearings?it will be noted that there
has been some change in the tempo
of repudiation of agreements since the
decease d Mr. Stalin in 1953. The rec-
ord of hearing shows that since 1953
there Were tour instances of YU/lotions
of agreements, two of them, being with
Yugoslavia coneerning loans, not unlike
What' I notice we are contemplating do-
ing, in view of certain difficulties, in the
case of _Pakistan. It has been noted in
the press ,that we are contemplating a
- change in our decision with regard to an
airport.
In the case of two of these violations,
a,in &wary, 1956 and one in August
50, thez_relOtec_i_to matters in Which
We P.a,Ye pq gr IntereSt. The Only
One really seriously, affecting is is that
relating to the Berlin wall, in which' we
have a great interest. We have no in-
terest in the other two, and I do not
knffw that they were quite in the spirit
Of violation of treaties as we think of
this treaty. They related to two loan
agreements with Yugoslavia.
4 do not say that this treaty Is based
on trust; I think it is more applicable
to individual action and interest of the
nations involved.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I mentioned that to
establish the thesis that we are not un-
mindful of what has happened.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am bringing this
point up only to show that nations do
change. Merely because there have
been violations does not mean that the
Soviets will violate this treaty. As the
Senator properly stated, I think they
will avoid doing it, because it is in their
interest to abide by the treaty, or it is
lot in their interest at all.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
am very proud that we have in this coun-
try a fully operative two-party system.
I again congratulate the distinguished
minority leader, the leader of the Re-
publicans in this body, for the position
he has taken, not in behalf of party,
but in behalf of the Nation, which in-
cludes both parties. He has done so
without imputing to any Senator any
base or ulterior motive if he happens to
want to vote against the treaty, or wants
to offer understandings or reservations,
because he realizes, first of all, that, so
far as each individual Member of this
body is concerned, the time is fast ap-
proaching when we, as elected officials,
In line with our constitutional obliga-
tions, must decide, each in his own mind,
what he thinks is best for his country.
I am glad the distinguished minority
leader brought out the plank in the Re-
publican platform of 1960, on the par-
ticular subject of atomic testing, which
was a stronger plank than the one con-
tained in the Democratic platform of
that year.
Like the distinguished minority lead-
er, I question the motives of no Member
of this body. I only hope that, in our
collective wisdom, in the long run, we
will be enabled to show that what we
have done will be in the best interests
of our country and the course which
another elected official, the President of
the United States, sought to follow in
carrying out his duty.
Of course, there are diverse views in
this body. I Am glad there are. If every
Senator were in favor of a treaty of this
magnitude, I would then be truly wor-
ried.
There are doubts on the part of Sena-
tors who are in favor of the treaty, as
well as those who are opposed to it. I
am not surprised that there are fears
and anxieties, because these are good in
the consideration of a treaty of this kind.
I would hope also, as the distinguished
minority leader has brought out, that we
would not brush off what happened at
Nagasaki and Hiroshima. I hope the fig-
ures will be repeated time and time and
time again-66,000 killed, 69,000 injured,
62,000 buildings destroyed, in Hiroshima.
And what caused that destruction? One
bomb, allegedly equivalent to 15,000 to
20,000 tons of TNT. Now we are talking
about bombs of the equivalent of .100
million tons of TNT in one 100-megaton
bomb.
I hope we will consider all the factors
inherent in a study of this treaty, not
only genetic and physical, not only mili-
tary, not only political, but the combina-
tion of all these and any others which
may be worth consideration.
I point out once more, because there
seems to be a question in the minds of
some people in this country that some
sort of pressure was used to get the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to come along, that the
record will show that the distinguished
Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL],
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, asked each member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff if any pressure was ex-
erted, and the answer was, unequivocal-
ly, "No."
Of course, they said that, in their opin-
ion, a combination of factors determined
their judgment. But when they were
asked the direct question if they fa-
vored the ratification of the treaty?and
it is in the record of the hearings, a copy
of which is on every Senator's desk?the
answer was yes, provided the safeguards
which they advocated were contained
herein and which, to the best of my
knowledge, no Senator disagrees with.
We have been given assurance by the
President of the United States, and that
assurance has once again been brought
to the attention of the Senate because
of the initiative of the distinguished
minority leader, who, in my opinion, has
once again performed a real public serv-
ice, for which I hope he gets the credit
he deserves and not the condemnation
which sometimes comes his way. I
salute a great American.
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, this
has been one of the finest hours in the
history of the Senate. We listened, to
a great American today. We listened to
a leader of one of the great political
parties, who discharged his responsibil-
ity of leadership. He brought to the
Senate a message from the President of
the United States, which answered some
of the questions lurking in the minds of
certain Members of the Senate.
Beyond all that, based upon a unique
lifetime of experience and devotion to
his country, in uniform and in Congress,
EVERETT D/RKSEN made all of us proud
of the lucidity of his assertion, and an
eloquence that is unmatched in the Sen-
ate. With it all he added overwhelm-
ingly to the reasons why this country
needs to be united and why, as I see the
light, his advice and recommendation
should be followed.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the
President of the United States has char-
acterized the three environmental test
ban treaty as a first step, and if he says
it is a first step, I, for one, am quite will-
ing to take his word for it; for the Pres-
ident is the one who controls the negotia-
tion of agreements with foreign nations,
and he is in a position to know, from dis-
cussions which have taken place, what
are the terms to which other powers will
agree, or are likely to agree.
The fact that this treaty is a first step,
and the contemplation?fond or fore-
boding?of what the succeeding steps
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Mr. DIRKSEN. Anywhere that ten-
sions exist. May it never be said of us
that we are the ones to excite and peddle
tensions all over the world.
Mr. CURTIS. That is correct. Ten-
sions are a weapon of the Soviet Union.
The tensions will go on in this country
and in that country, with one act of
subversion after another. Whether or
not we should end testing in the atmos-
phere should be decided on the merits
of the question, rather than a possibilitl,
that it will end the tensions of the cold
war.
Mr. DIRKSEN. After 400 abortive
sessions at Geneva, at long last when
there is an opportunity for an expres-
sion and a demonstration of a little faith,
I do not wish to be found wanting in
that faith, in the hope that good fruit
may come of it.
Mr. CURTIS. I am aware of the dif-
ference between the position of the Sen-
ator from Illinois, who has faith in this
regard, and the position of the Senator
from Minnesota [Mr. Hum mazy] , who
said that the treaty was not based on
trust.
I shall hurry on. The Senator has
been most generous in yielding time.
The Senator from Illinois mentioned
that we would have a posture of readiness
to test. May I ask the distinguished
Senator whether that was President Ei-
senhower's position during the morato-
rium?
Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes; I rather think
so.
Mr. CURTIS. Very well. Was it pos-
sible to carry it out?
Mr. DIRKSEN. It is possible to carry
It out.
Mr. CURTIS. Was it? Not, "is it"?
, Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes; it is.
Mr. CURTIS. My question relates to
what happened in the past. Was it pos-
sible, and did the United States carry
out successfully a readiness to test?
Mr. DIRKSEN. The Senator from
Nebraska is a member of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy. The Senator
has the seat I formerly held. I would
rather ask some Senator who serves on
that committee, who is familiar with
what the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy was doing at that time, because
that would be a source of information.
Mr. CURTIS. I believe it is true that
Johnston Island was permitted to go
down. I believe it is true that tests were
hurried. I do not care to go into any
classified information as to how effec-
tive the tests were, but they were hurried,
and, in a measure, very disappointing.
Mr. DIRKSEN. That is no reason
why they had to be hurried, if the Con-
gress and the President cooperate, if the
request comes from the Atomic Energy
Commission for equipment, for labora-
tory requirertients, for personnel and for
funds, and there is evidenced not only a
desire but also a determination to move
ahead and to maintain an immediate
readiness posture, there is not the slight-
est reason why it cannot be done.
Mr. CURTIS. Other than that it was
tried once and did not Work.
Mr. DIRKSEN. That does not prove
It cannot be done.
Mr. 'FULBRIGHT. I. President, will
the Senator yield for a comment?
Mr. CURTIS. I haVe almost an-
eluded..
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish to comment
on that point. We did test underground
2 weeks after the tine the Russians
broke the moratorium, and for about 6
months in the atmosphere.
Mr. CURTIS. Those are the tests to
which I referred, which were not very
effective.
The Senator from Elinois spoke at
length about Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Such occurrences tear the hearts of
everyone; but does it follow that someone
whose position with respect to the treaty
might differ from that of the Senator
from Illinois would wish for a recur-
rence of those things?
Mr. DIRKSEN. Let me ask the Sen-
ator from Nebraska a question. Under
the circumstances, with bigger and more
destructive weapons being built all the
time, with armament burdens upon
every country in the world, unless we
take a step in the whole domain of faith,
what will be left except gloom and de-
featism against the day when some care-
less person will pull the trigger?
Mr. CURTIS. I would rather have
gloom than to slumber,
Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not hear the
Senator's word. The Senator would
rather have gloom than what?
Mr. CURTIS. Slumber, as a national
posture.
Mr. DIRKSEN. The Senator says
"slumber"?
Mr. CURTIS. Yes.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Is there any reason
why we should be complacent or in-
cautious?
Mr. CURTIS. I do not know.
Mr. DIRKSEN. There is nothing in
the treaty to that effect.
Mr. CURTIS. I know; but the Joint
Chiefs of Stiff have Warned against it.
Certainly there was a sound reason for
their warning.
Mr. DIRKSEN. When I heard them
at the committee meetings, they sup-
ported the treaty. They gave some at-
tention to various things which I have
recited, which were summarized in the
record, but they supported the treaty.
Mr. CURTIS. General Power did
not.
Mr. DIRKSEN. But he is not a mem-
ber of the Joint Chief* of Staff.
Mr. CURTIS. No; but I read his
testimony before the deletions were
made. It is rather revealing.
Is there anything in the treaty which
would outlaw?or give any assurance
against?an atomic attack on any city
in the world?
Mr. DIRKSEN. No, And no one said
there was. The President made that as
clear as crystal.
Mr. CURTIS. I could not understand
the reason for the description of the at-
tack on those two Japanese cities unless
the Senator was offering something
which would stop similar occurrences.
Mr. DIRKSEN. It is necessary to ad-
vance to that kind of, goal a little at a
tune. There was no , misrepresentation
When it was said that this treaty is a
first step.
15C117
Mn CURTIS. No one has said what
step it is. The Chinese proverb, "The
journey of a thousand miles begins with
one step," is true, but I am concerned
- about the direction in which the journey
will proceed.
Mr. DIRKSEN. When we stop testing
underwater, in the atmosphere, and in
all the environments except under-
ground, it seems to me that is a long step.
The Republicans appreciated that fact in
1960, because that is precisely the way we
set it out in our own party platform.
when we went to the voters for their suf-
frage.
Mr. CURTIS. I remind the Senator
that since then the Soviets have tested.
Many well-qualified people believe that
they have acquired information which is
very valuable, which we do not have; and
that although they refused to agree at
one time there is a likelihood that they
will wish to agree now because there is
some advantage in it, secret or otherwise.
We do not have the same set of facts
before us. It is not a question of keeping
faith with the treaty since there was a
certain ratio of power and knowledge
which existed then which does not exist
now.
Mr. DIRKSEN. The best comment I
could make is that a very distinguished
former President of the United States
and General of the Armies, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, keeps abreast of develop-
ments and has not fractured his rela-
tionships with his former military asso-
ciates. He has a very active mind. He
expressed some concern on one point?
which I think the President's letter cures,
but he does support the treaty.. One
would believe that he is conversant, with
the advances made in that field by the
Soviet Union; and the question of
whether we are maintaining a superior
strength.
Mr. CURTIS. The Senator has been
more than generous. I did not intend
to consume this much time. I merely
wished to inquire into certain of the
Senator's intentions in reference to the
position he intended to portray to the
country through the speech.
Mr. DIRKSEN. It has a large admix-
ture of faith, and I hope it will always
be there.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. DIRKSEN. I would rather yield
the floor. I promised my distinguished
friend from South Carolina [Mr.
THURMOND] that I would not occupy the
floor for more than 45 minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This will take only
a few minutes.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield to the Senator.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I congratu-
late the Senator. He has made a mag-
nificent speech. I do not think he talked
at length on any aspect of his speech.
It was all very concise.
There was one aspect that the minor-
ity leader mentioned that I thought he
had not developed fully. He said he
would come back to it. It was General
Eisenhower's letter, in which he used the
word "reservation." I wonder if the
minority leader will go further into that
point. I thought he said he intended to
refer to it later.
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'45 minutes with the President and ex-
pressed our concern. We made certain
suggestions to him. In response, on
September 10, he sent this letter, which
reached me by hand last night at half-
pt 6: LetTaE wmrE ov
readittothenSensEate:
`Trailtingion, D.C., September 10, 1963.
Hon, MIKE MANSFIELD,
Hon, Eva6,orT MatINLEY DIRKSEN,
U.S. SCD,Ste,
Washinfton,
braa. ,?SszrATort _ MAwsrixx,n AND bzuAroll
Dmitsrisr: I am deeply appreciative of ?the.
suggestion which you made to me On Mon-
day morning that it would be helpful to
have A further elarifying statement about
the policy of this administration toward cer-
tain aspects of our nuclear weapons defenses,
under the proposed test ban treaty now be-
fbre, the Senate. share your view that it is.
desirable to dispel any fears or cencernA'in
the minds of Senators or of the people of our
country on these Matters. And while I be-
lieve that fully adequate statements have
been made on thepe matters before the vari-
ous comMittees of the Senate by the Secre-
tary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Director, of Central Intelligence, the Chair-
man of :the Aternie Energy Commission, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless I aril
happy to accept your judgment that it would
be helpful if / restated what hie- already
been said so that there may be no misappre-
hension.
In confidence that the Congress will share
and support the policies of the administra-
tion in this field, I am happY to give these
unqualified and unequivocal assurances- the Members Memhers of the Senate, to the entire
Congress; and to the country:
I. Underground` nuclear testing, which is
permitted under the treaty, will be vigor-
ously and diligently carried forward, and the
equipment, facilities, personnel, and funds
necessary for that purpose will be provided.
As tne, Senate knows, such testing is now
going on. While we must all hope that at
some future time a more comprehensive
treaty may become possible by chanesin the
policies of other nations', until that time our
underground testing program will continue.
.
2. The "United States will Maintain a pos-
ture of readineas to resume testing in the
environments prohibited by the present
treaty, and it will take all the necessary steps
to safeguard our national security in the
event tha,t there should be an abrogation or
violatian, of. any treaty provision. In par-
ticular, the -United States retains the right
? .
to resume atmospheric testing forthwith?
That Was a point I made with the
President,. I said, "It has got to be
made"; and he put it in his letter?
if the Soviet Union should conduct tests in
violation of the treaty.
3. Qur facilitiee for the detection of pos-
sible, violations of this treaty will be ex-
panded and Improved as required to increase
our riasuranee against clandestine violation
by others.
- r hqpq partiaular attention will be
given to this_paragraph:
?
,
4. In response to the suggestion made by
? President Eisenhower to the Foreign Rela-
tions Committeemn. August 23, 1963, and in
con.forsnity with .the opinion of the legal
adv,reer ,?fthe Department of State, set forty
iii.the report of the Corrunitiee on 'Foreign
Relations,I am glad to einphaiize again that
the treaty lb no way limits the authority
of the Commander in Chief .to use nuclear
weapons:for the defense of the United States
and fts.,aliles,_if a,situation should develop
requirinz such a grave decision. Any. deei-
Sloii 11N such weapons would be made
by the 'United States in accordance with its
constitutional processes and would in no way
be affected by the terms of the nuclear test
ban treaty.
5. While the abnormal and dangerous
presence of Soviet military personnel in the
neighboring island of Cuba is not a matter
which can be dealt with through the instru-
mentality of this treaty, ram able to assure
the Senate that if that -unhappy island
"should be used either directly or indirectly
to circumvent or nullify this treaty, the
United States will take all necessary action
in response.
. ,
6. The treaty in no way changes the status
of the authorities in East Germany. As the
Secretary of State has made clear, "We do
not recognize, and we do not intend to rec-
ognize, the Soviet occupation zone of East
Germany as a state or as an entity possessing
national sovereignty, or to recognize the
local authorities as a government. Those
authorities cannot alter these facts by the
act of subscribing to the test ban treaty."
7. This Government will maintain strong
weapons laboratories in a vigorous program
of weapons development, in order to ensure
that the United States will continue to have
in the future a strength fully adequate for
an effective national defense. In particular,
ae the Secretary of Defense has made clear,
we will maintain strategic forces fully en-
suring that this Nation will continue to be in
a position to destroy any aggressor, even
after absorbing a first strike by a surprise
attack.
B. The United States will diligently pursue
its programs for the further development of
nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by
underground tests within the terms of the
treaty, and as and when such developments
make possible constructive uses of atmos-
pheric nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-
poses, the United States will seek interna-
tional agreement under the treaty to permit
such explosions.
I trust that these assurances may be help-
ful in dispelling any concern or misgivings
which ,any Member of the Senate or any citi-
zen may have as to Ou-r determination to
maintain the interests and security of the,
United States. It is not only safe but nec-
essary, in- the interest of this country and
the interest of mankind, that this treaty
should now be apProved, and the hope for
peace which it offers firmly sutained, by the
Senate of 'the United States. -
Once more, let me express my appreciation
to you both for your visit and for your sug-
gestions.
Sincerely,
JOHN ItENNEDY.
?
Mr. President late the other night I
went back to refresh Myself on a little
history. One of the classic reports made
in our generation was the one made by
John Hershey, to the New Yorker, on
what happened at Hiroshima. It makes
one think. It came as an account from
a Japanese preacher who long ago was
educated at Emory University, in At-
lanta, Ga. He did his undergraduate
work there and developed great fluency
in English. He was one of the principal
witnesses wilen JOhn, Hershey went to
Hiroshima to write that almost death-
less account.
The B-29's had bombed nearly every
Japanese town except Kyoto and Hir-
oshima. The Japanese called the B-29
"Mr. B," out of ,respect for the might
and the power of that great wartime
bomber.
As he relates the story, it was 8:15 in
the morning of a bright, sunny day. The
weather was a little humid and warm.
At 8:15, things hagpened. Out of the
20th Air Wing, Col. Paul W. Tib-
betts, Jr., flying that B-29, and with
two escort observation planes, flew over
the center of Hiroshima, a town of
probably 375,000 persons. Then, for the
first time, the whole bosom of God's
earth was ruptured by a manmade
contrivance that we call a nuclear
weapon.
Oh, the tragedy. Oh, the dismay. Oh,
the blood. Oh, the anguish. When the
statisticians came to put the cold fig-
ures on paper, they were as follows: As
a result of 1 bomb-66,000 ki1l-1;
69,000 injured; 62,000 structures de-
stroyed. That was the result of that
one bomb, made by man in the hope of
stopping that war. Little did he realize
what this thermonuclear weapon would
do, and the anguish that would be
brought into the hearts of men, women,
and children. At Hiroshima it caused
a mass incineration such as never be-
fore had been witnessed in the history
of the whole wide world. The result was
almost too catastrophic to contemplate.
In the accelerated march of history,
how quickly we forget. But there is
the account, for all to read; and it all
happened at 8:15, on a bright and shin-
ing morning, when God's day began, and
when, I suppose, hundreds of thousands
of people were thinking that, despite the
war, they had been privileged to live
another day.
Mr. President, that happened 18
years ago last month. Since then, what
have we done? What steps have we
taken? How far have we moved?
The President calls this treaty a first
step. What sort of steps have we taken,
except steps to make the bombs that fell
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki look like
veritable toys when compared to the
heavy-duty, heavy-yield weapons of to-
days?
I want to take a first step, Mr. Presi-
dent. I am not a young man; I am al-
most as old as the oldest Member of the
Senate, certainly am older than a great
many Senators. One of my age thinks
about his destiny a little. I should not
like to have written on my tombstone,
"He knew what happened at Hiroshima,
but he did not take a first step."
God willing, Mr. President, and in the
frame of my own party's platform and
with the knowledge that the Soviet Union
has violated treaties, there must still be
enough faith, and enough confidence to
make us willing to take a first step in
this field.
If it fails, we will still be here. We
have not forfeited caution. We have
forfeited nothing. The President has
given us assurances in regard to what
is proposed to be done in underground
testing in these and other environments
and in regard to developing all the equip-
ment necessary in order to maintain our
strength against any aggressor on the
face of the earth.
Mr, President, I believe it is just as
well to conclude this slightly rambling
discourse by reverting to the Chinese
proverb. "The longest journey begins
with a single step."
This is a first, single step. It is for
destiny to write the answer. It is for
hi.story to render judgment. But with
?
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15916 oepternber
consummate faith and some determina-
tion, this may be the step that can spell
a grander destiny for our country and
for the world.
If there be risks, Mr. President, I am
willing to assume them for my country.
So I support the treaty; and I will vote
for approval of the treaty with no re-
servations whatsoever.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, let
me congratulate the Senator from Illi-
nois on his magnificent speech.
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Illinois yield?
Mr. DIRKSEN. I am glad to yield.
Mr. CURTIS. I thank the distin-
guished Senator. I trust that he will be
willing to answer a few questions.
Mr. President, I love and admire the
distinguished Senator from Illinois. He
is most persuasive. He is patriotic. He
is fair in the conduct of his office as a
Senator. I listened intently as the Sen-
ator from Illinois recited the testimony
he had heard, the documents that he had
read, and the interviews that he had had.
Does the Senator intend to imply that
it would not be possible for another
Senator to attend the same meetings,
hear the same testimony, read the same
documents, possess an equal sincerity of
purpose, and yet arrive at a different
conclusion from that reached by the
Senator from Illinois? ?
Mr. DIRKSEN. Absolutely. That is
what makes the world the great world
that it is. We can listen to testimony,
come to different conclusions about it,
and do so honestly and sincerely. I
would not for a moment reflect upon the
integrity, the honor, the honesty, the
sincerity, or the conviction of any other
Member of this body.
Mr. CURTIS. The distinguished Sen-
ator is so charming and so pershasive?
Mr. DIRKSEN. Should I disclaim
that?
Mr. CURTIS. The Senator is dan-
gerous. He can lead us astray.
Mr. DIRKSEN. would not do so
wittingly or knowingly.
Mr. CURTIS. I know that. The Sen-
ator spoke at length about fears that
have been expressed in various places.
Then he told of this great effort?and
it was a great effort?to allay those fears.
Is it the opinion of the Senator from
Illinois that those fears came from the
unlearned people of the country or those
who did not honestly desire the right
answer in the cause of peace?
Mr. DIRKSEN. I can answer only
with respect to my own misgivings.
Those arose in such large measure from
the fact that I was not fully informed
as to what our readiness posture
was, how diligently and vigorously we
were going to pursue it, to make sure
that at no time and under no eventual-
ity would our country be other than
strong and equal to any aggressive effort
that could be made against us.
Mr. CURTIS. Perhaps I have not
made my question clear. The Senator
talked at length about the fears that
exist. Then he spoke of his diligent ef-
forts to allay those fears. My question
is as follows: Do those fears exist only
arnong people whose intentions toward
our country and toward a peaceful world
are not good and people who do- not
know?
Mr. DIRKSEN., Certainly not. I rec-
ognize them as honest Views springing
from the consciences of 'people.
Mr. CURTIS. That leads me to my
next question, which is this: I listened
intently as the Senator told of his great
efforts to allay those fears. It seems
to me that we would have been helped
greatly if, rather than allaying the fears,
the possible Justification for the fears
might have been ascertained. Is that
not the responsibility of, the Senate?
Mr. DIRKSEN. That is a highly com-
plicated field.
Mr. CURTIS. Is that not our respon-
sibility?
Mr. DIRKSEN. I was thinking of
those who testified. In all kindliness,
I refer to them as the ' second echelon
in Government. But f like to hear from
the President and the Commander in
Chief who is at the top and who in that
capacity can push the bUtton, move for-
ward, sideways, or pull back. That is
the reason for the letter. The reason
was to make sure that, as we move for-
ward, we shall be ready at all times for
any eventuality that might arise under
the treaty.
Mr. 1CURTIS. I shall state the point a
bit crudely. If someone Should fear that
his house was afire, would it be better to
alio:3r such fear, or to ascertain whether
the house was afire?
Mr. DIRKSEN. One ascertains
whether the house is afire. That is a
physical thing that is easily ascertained.
Mr. CURTIS. I understand. The dis-
tinguished Senator spoke at length of
the treaty violations of the Soviet Union,
which seem to be nondebatable. Do I
correctly understand the Senator to ex-
press an opinion that the Soviet Union
has changed in that regard?
Mr. DIRKSEN. Perhaps so. There is
a risk. We must take a chance.
Mr. CURTIS. Does the Senator be-
lieve that the Soviet NIS changed in re-
gard to adherence to treaties?
Mr. DIRKSEN. When the Soviet
Union became flexible enough to be will-
ing to entertain the negotiation of a
treaty. I would earnestly hope that there
had been some change in its attitude.
On that basis, I believe that while there
is risk, it is a risk that we can accept
with safety.
Mr. CURTIS. The Senator from
Minnesota stated on television that the
treaty was not based upon trust, but on
hope. Do I correctly understand the
Senator to say that he hopes the Soviet
Union has changed, or: that he believes
that it has?
Mr. 1DIRKSEN. Who does not have
hope? Does not the Senator from Ne-
braska?
Mr. CURTIS. I do not believe they
have.
Mr. I)IRKSEN. I did not say that. I
asked if the Senator from Nebraska did
not hope.
Mr. CURTIS. I hope the Soviet Union
has changed. I do not believe it has.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Hope springs eternal.
As the great salesman, Paul, said long
ago, "Faith, hope, and charity"?those
are the great virtues.
11
What would mankind be like without
hope? What can we say to this genera-
tion that has been so steeped in cold war
for more than 18 years if we say there
is no hope, and no chance?
Mr. CURTIS. The distinguished Sen-
ator is generous and kind. He has led
me to my next question.
Mr. DIRKSEN, Good.
Mr. CURTIS. The Senator spoke at
length about the horrors of the cold war
and how it has affected our people and
the youth of our country. The effect
is brought about by the actions of the
Soviet Union moving forward in Cuba
and many other places in the Western
Hemisphere. It may be affected by our
own defense program. The existence or
nonexistence of nuclear testing will prob-
ably have no effect on the advances made
by the Soviet Union in taking over ter-
ritory and millions of people.
The Senator has read a letter from
the President stating that our testing.
will continue, and that we shall be pre-
pared. Now the Senator has aroused in
our lsearts a desire to end the cold war.
Is it the intention of the Senator to
present any evidence that the treaty
would end the cold war?
Mr. DIRKSEN. I have no evidence
that it would end any kind of war. Did
not the President make manifest in the
statement that accompanied the treaty
that there is no assurance that even
nuclear war, let alone cold war, will end?
We hope for those desirable goals. That
is the best we can do.
Mr. CURTIS. Why not hope that it
will cure cancer or do some other very
noble things? A message goes out to the
Nation telling us of the horrors of the
cold war. I want to know whether we
are presented with a treaty that will end
the cold war.
Mr. DIRKSEN. First, let us not let
the analogy of cancer get too far away.
Cancer is something over which human
volition has no control. But where hu-
man decisions are involved, they con-
cern operations of the mind. That is
what we are dealing with when we talk
about inhibitions on testing in the at-
mosphere and under the water. So there
is not the slightest analogy between the
two.
Mr. CURTIS. All right. We will
erase that analogy. But is it the inten-
tion of the Senator from Illinois to sug-
gest to the country that the treaty is a
treaty to end the cold war?
Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not say,that.
Mr. CURTIS. I did not say that the
Senator made that statement. I asked
if it was his intention to give that im-
.
pression.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I only hope that, first,
tensions will subside and, second, that
perhaps we will say, as Solomon said to
the Lord, "Give therefore Thy servant
an understanding heart."
It may be that if we ease the tension
little by little a better understanding will
develop. If that understanding should
conic, we would have a good predicate
on which to fashion the second, third,
and fourth steps.
Mr. CURTIS. Where will we ease
tension? In this country or in the So-
viet Union?
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15914 Approved ForRekgetilegagARCINA14/8COMR9D? AWiii' Ertl 00210004-6 September 11
-At long last I had two more discussions That is what my party said to the were falling during the late war, a pliant-
with the distinguished majority leader. country, as we rallied behind Richard nent member of the House of Commons
I said, "MIKE,, there is only one place Nixon. Out of 69 million votes we came said, "If it keeps up, it will break the
where this question can be discussed at within 113,0-00 of victory. Oh, yes, we nervous system of our people."
the top echelon, and that is with the have a Party in this country. I do not Some think this is all remote. But it
Commander in Chief, the President of subscribe lightly to party platforms. I is not remote. There is an impingement
the United States." I said, "I have read have served on the platform committee of all these_ pressures, all these consid-
the capitulation of Dr. Seaborg in the of my party when such solemn words erations, that are a part of the cold war.
hearings. I thought it was excellent. were indited. They become lures to get Yet a whole generation has grown up
But suppose the President had Other the people into one's corner, There is under them. How many more genera-
ideas. I heard the Joint Chiefs of Staff something grave and solemn about it. I tions will grow up before we receive an
when they expressed the hope that this accepted the platform plank in that answer to the question? That is a con-
would be done or that would be done spirit. We said: cern of mine; it must be a concern of
or the other would be done." We advocate an early agreement by all every other Member of this body.
I went to the upper office. It is rather nations to forgo nuclear tests in the atmos- There has been some sentiment about
difficult to get into that office,? Some- phere. the heavy-yield, high-megaton weapons
times I think it is easier to get a charge That is what we seek in the treaty as distinguished from those that we
accOUnt at Tiffany's than to get into thetoda have; and one could detect a certain
upper office, where the Joint Committee y.
Second, 89 nations are now signa- defeatism. I am not an expert in the
on Atorinc Energy meets. There I saw tories td the treaty. Think of the prop- field. I have never served an the Com-
John 1VIcCone, who served as chairman aganda weapon that we would give Nikita mittee on Armed Services, which has the
of the Joint Committee on Atomic En- Khrushchev if we failed to stand up and benefit of such information. I readily
ergy under Eisenhower, and who now ratify the treaty. He could go into all sit at the feet of those who are members
serves as Director of Intelligence. the areas of the world and say to their of the committee, when I seek advice,
I listened keenly. He had certain rec- leaders, "Did I not tell you for many information, and instruction. But I re-
ommendations, as the distinguished years that they are imperialists, capital- member that in the war in which I was
chairman of the Joint Committee, the ists, and warmongers? Here is the proof, a soldier on the Western Front, our
Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PAS- They refused to subscribe to a cessation strength was on paper, but our cause was
TORE], so well knows. of testing of the hideous weapons that good, and we prevailed.
I followed through on this matter be- can snuff out so much life." I remember when I helped to vote this
cause of the fear that continued to beset That would be a consideration in itself country into World War II. Our air
i
Me. for supporting the treaty. Our arsenal power was on paper. We made close
Then I had another meeting with the of weapons is available. I shall touch on distinctions between weapons that were
-distinguished majority leader. I said, that later. It will be remembered that in being and those that were being
"Mut.% I think you ought to contact the on the 23d of August former President planned. So much was not in being.
President." The letter which I shall Eisenhower sent a letter to the distin- But our cause was good and we tri-
read a little later is not the result of the guished chairman of the Foreign Rela- umphed. Let it never be said that the
President calling me. It is the result of tions Committee. I have read it several Senator from Illinois has any spark of
the work of the majority leader and the times. He used the word "reservation." defeatism in his soul, no matter what
Minority leader, who expres-sed a corn- It bothered me. I decided to pursue it. the equation is as between weapon
mon fear, and who felt that they ought to I did so. Through one of his assistants strengths, because I am pretty sure that
talk with the Commander in Chief, be- I contacted him at Gettysburg. Was it our thermonuclear strength, coupled
cause if there were to be assurances, they an inadvertent use of the word, which is with our cause, will abide and prevail, as
ought to come from the highest and most a word of art in this business, or did he it has and as it must.
authoritative source, the President of the really mean it? Did he know what a One other thing the President said:
United States. , reservation really meant? It was not the Do not expect too much of this treaty.
That was :the foundation and -back- significant thing in the mind of Presi- I thought it sounded biased in the mes-
ground. dent Eisenhower. What he wanted to sage, which contains 10 specifics. But
I should like to recite a few of the con- be sure of was that there would be an the treaty will not necessarily stop war.
siderationS Which move me to support ironclad assurance that our nuclear ar- We hope it will. We hope it is in the di-
the treaty, not the least of which, of senal would be available for ourselves rection of peace. What else can we do
course, is the party position. I am a lit- and for our allies if the need ever arose. except hope? But is there assurance?
tie old fashioned. I was here when Wen- I will deal with that point at a little None. There are many things that the
dell Winkle appeared before a Senate greater length in connection with the treaty will not do, and it is necessary to
committee, and when Tom Connally President's letter. go back to what the President said in
asked him a rather sharp question, Wen- Suppose there is deviation. Suppose his message.
dell Willkie said, "Oh, that is only cam- there is abrogation. Will we be ready, Abraham Lincoln had a rule, and I
paign oratory." I was here as a public and would we move into it? That was think it was a great rule. I jotted it
servant at that time. It is no campaign another point on which I wanted some down, so that I would have it correct.
oratory in my book, when one's party assurances. This is what he said:
goes to the country and asks the country The President in his message to the The true rule in determining to embrace
to give to it the direction of the affairs of Senate said it was a first step. So it is. or reject anything is not whether it have
the country. That is either a covenant The Chinese?and perhaps it conies from evil than of good. There are few things
any evil in it but whether it have more of
or it is not. If it is a covenant, it is Confucius himself?have a saying: "The wholly evil or-wholly good. Almost every-
?Made to be kept.
. longest journey begins with the first thing especially of Government policy is an
This was my party's platform in 1960: step.? A step must be made somehow, inseparable compound of the two so that
We are similarly ready to negotiate and because a whole generation of Americans our best judgment of the preponderance be-
? to institute realistic methods and safeguards has grown up in the atmosphere and in- tween them is continuously demanded.
for disarmament, and for the suspension of tensity of the cold war. That is the case in this instance. I
nuclear tests. We advocate an early agree-
ment--
The bombs fell in August :' 945. Sup- have not heard anyone deny that there
pose a youngster was 12 years old. Add are risks in the treaty. But, as Lincoln
Listen to that? 18 to that. That is 30 years. Consider said, every policy is a compound of risk
We advocate an early agreement by all na- the generation that has not known any- and nonrisk, of good and evil. Which is
tions to forgo nuclear tests in the atmos- thing except the cold war, the preponderant quality? That is why
phere, and the suspension of other tests as
_ . _ We are devoting hundreds of millions our judgment is demanded. So I must
, verincatioX1 teehaques permit. We support of dollars to studies of mental retarda- rationalize the problem in 'that fashion
? the .Presiqent in ariy decision he may make
to reevaluate the question of resumption of tion and mental health. Does anyone and on that basis predicate judgment.
underground nuclear explosions testing, if mean to tell me that those pressures do With those concerns in my mind, and
the Geneva Conference fails to produce a not have an effect upon a nation? When with those concerns in the mind of our
satisfactory agreement. T was in Britain, and the V-1's and V-2's distinguished majority leader, we spent
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There was a nonaggression pact with
Turkey in 1925, and ultimately a tre-
mendous effort to secure rights from
Turkey on the Black Sea Straits.
There was a treaty with Afghanistan
in 1926. We have recently been host to
the Afghan royal King. Yet the Soviets
made Afghanistan cede a piece of terri-
tory. 4
I have a special interest in Lithuania,
because there are literally thousands or
Baltic people?Lithuanians, Estonians,
and Latvians?in Chicago. A treaty with
Lithuania not only was made but also
was extended, yet it did not prevent the
Soviet Union from annexing Lithuania.
So I have gone through the whole
lesson book to get that side of the story.
I went further than that. I referred to
the records of 1933, when, during the
administration of Franklin Roosevelt,
the Soviet Union was recognized, on the
16th of November, 1933.
It intrigues me some to read Maxim
Litvinov's letter. He was the Soviet
Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The let-
ter was written in Washington. It was
written to Franklin Roosevelt.
In the first paragraph he said:
It will be the fixed policy.of the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics-
1. To respect scrupulously the Indisputa-
ble right of the United States to order its
own life within its own jurisdiction in its
own way and to refrain from interfering in
any manner in the internal affairs of the
United States, its territories or poseessions.
Paragraph 2 is worthy of recording,
because at times we forget these things.
In paragraph 2 Mr. Litvinov wrote:
To refrain, and to restrain all persons in
Government service and all organizations of
the Government or under its direct or indi-
rect control, including the organizations in
receipt of any financial assistance from it,
from any act overt or covert liable in any
way whatsoever to injure the tranquillity,
prosperity, order, or security of the whole or
any part of the United States, its territories
or possessions, and in particular, from any
act tending to incite or encourage armed
Intervention, or any agitation or propaganda
having as an aim, the violation of the terri-
torial integrity of the United States, its ter-
ritories or possessions, or the bringing about
by force of a change in the political or social
ceder of the whole or any part of the *United
States, its territories or possession.
These assurances go on and on. They
were the foundation for the recognition
of the Soviet Union by the United States
in the first administration of Franklin
Roosevelt, in November 1933.
I want those people who send me all
this documentation and literature to
know that sources of information are
available. I want them to know that I
have been rather diligent in carrying out
the pledge I made to them.
Second, I was curious about the sud-
den change on the part of the Soviet
Union. When Mr. Dean was still our
representative to Geneva?and then
there had been 400 sessions?I was still
a member of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy.
The day Mr. Dean left for Geneva, I
said, "Mr. Dean, come back with some-
thing worth while and I will support it.
Come back with something else and I
No. 143-7
will fight, and I will resist as best I can."
So I served notice at that time.
Who would not be curibus about the
sudden change of heart/ Is it China
and the re-ported difficulties with the So-
viet Union that have had some impact
on Mr. Khrushchev? I do not know.
But while I am about it, I want to give
my own opinion of what I expect is a
part of the Chinese situation. In 1953
China took a census. Probably a mis-
take was made. It took a little while to
obtain corrected figures, and when that
was done it announced to the world that
the population of Red China was 583
million and that it was growing at a rate
of 15 million or more each year. At that
rate, China today has 730 million people.
In 15 years she will have 1, billion people.
Those 1 billion people will have to be fad.
A great many headaches, difficulties,
and responsibilities have arisen, and will
arise.
When I was in Burma, I visited about
10 miles down the Irrawaddy River and
I was shown a great storage of rice. I
was told that the rice wasjull of weevils.
Then I was told that We sold 250 000
tons of Louisiana rice to J,apan, and al at
It was their market. That is a surplus
rice bowl. I flew over Thailand. I
know the rice bowl in that area. I
know the Laottan rice bowl. I remem-
ber being in that area when the French
were fighting at Dien Bien Phu.
That is a large area; and the popula-
tion of 1 billion must be fed. There is
the pressure. Perhaps Mr. Khrushchev
knows cif that pressure. It may well be.
Difficulties have been referred to with
respect to these countries. There may
be somthing real about It. It may be
what was written on the,parchments of
history long ago when it was said, "It
shall come to pass that when man is
hungry he shall feed himself, and when
he does he shall curse his king and his
God."
There is nothing worse than a popula-
tion pressure. What is to be done about
it? Many countries have been through
great hunger, and they have been im-
pelled by a force that drove people not
only to desperation, but to action.
That, of course, is a diversion; but I
want people to know that I have tried to
take a hard look. I have tried to fortify
myself. I believe I have been diligent.
The chairman of the FOreign Relations
Committee can well say that I was pres-
ent to listen to the testimony. The dis-
tinguished Senator from; Mississippi can
say that I was present to listen to Dr.
Teller. In addition, Dr: Teller came to
my office for a long visit. I sat with the
Atomic Energy Commission under Di-
rector McCone. I have, proceeded with
diligence. I say that in modesty.
I have tried to explore everything in-
volved. I wanted to get the whole story.
I make that statement as I try to ex-
plain the question of treaty violations,
evidences of lack of faith on the part
of the Soviet Union, and the testimony
of our leaders, like Secretary Rusk, Sec-
retary McNamara, Di. Teller, John
McCone, and the Joint -Chiefs of Staff.
There is no Question about the anxiety
and concern on one side, and the coun-
sel and advice stressed by those to whom
we have committed the security and de-
fense of our country.
Where do we turn in our difficulty if it
Is not to General Wheeler? Where do we
turn to if it is not to Admiral McDonald?
Where do we turn to if not to General
Shoup, of the Marine Corps? Where do
we turn to if not to the Chief of Staff of
the Navy? They have been educated in
our own schools, supported at public ex-
pense. We not only expect them to be-
come competent in their field, but we
also expect fidelity to duty, and we get it.
They are ranged on one side, and history
Is ranged on the other. What choice does
one take in the case of the treaty under
those circumstances?
I detected one thing in every commit-
tee hearing I attended. I have detected
it in much of the material that has come
to my desk. I detected it in the letter
that is attached to the 10,000 signatures
that lie at the desk in my Capitol office.
It was an overlay of concern, of anxiety,
and of fear. It could be detected in the
questions which arose, namely Where
are we vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?
Where are we in respect to heavy yield
weapons? Where are we in respect to
light yield weapons? What is the
strategy? What is the pattern? What is
the formula? Hav,:. we a readiness pos-
ture? Are we prepared to resume testing
if necessary? What shall we do in the
event of abrogation? What shall we do
if there is evidence of deviation from the
treaty?
All these questions arise in anxious
minds arid hearts. One cannot hear such
questions without having some sense of
apprehension and concern, himself.
What do we do about it?
I began to toy with the idea of a con-
current resolution expressing the sense
of the Senate and the House. I con-
ferred with the Parliamentarian. It had
no place here, but it had only one pur-
pose. It was to allay the sense of anxiety
and fear I had detected on every ground.
I went to my friend the distinguished
majority leader, and discussed the ques-
tion with him. After thinking about it
some more, I thought this was not the
approach. Someone said, "Why did you
include the House of Representatives?"
After all, we must ascertain whether to
implement the tisaty or whether to im-
plement a program. That was set out
in the concurrent resolution. I drafted
the resolution. I had it perfected, I
thought. But I did not submit it. Then
subsequently I went to the majority
leader again. I said, "Mike, there is
fear in the country. Why do people call
at all hours of the' night?"
One of the roughest scoldings I ever
received was at 2 o'clock in the morning
from a constituent of the distinguished
Senator from Florida. I could not get
him off the telephone. He said, "Don't
you hang up on me. I am a taxpayer,
and I am going to tell you off.'"
The number of telephone calls was le-
gion. They came at the most awkward
hours. I tried to accept all of them.
Some of the callers would not wait, and
it was a little difficult.
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versity. T'hese articles stated that about for 'victory and escape will then be seized As chairman of the Committee on For-
3,000 children, mostly in the intermoun-
tain West, had received excessive doses
of radiation from the tests conducted
at the southern Nevada test site. The
Committee estimated that 10 to 12 cases
of thyroid cancer would result as a con-
sequent of this exposure. The article in
the Washington Post stated that:
The committee Said its analysis of the
? data shows that past tests exposed a number
of local populationsin Utah, Nevada, Idaho,
and probably other communities as far away
as Troy, N.Y., to fallout so intense as to rep-
- resent a medically unacceptable hazard to
children who may drink fresh locally pro-
duced milk.
Continued unrestricted testing by Rus-
sia and the United States, joined in time
by other nations, will increasingly poison
the air all of us must breathe. Even
then, as the President has observed:
, .
The number of children and grandchildren
with cancer In their bones, with leukemia in
their blood, or with poison in their lungs
might seem statistically small to some, in
comparison with natural health hazards.
But this is not a natural health hazard, and
it is not a statistical- issue.
Nor does this affect the nuclear powers'
alone. These tests befoul the air of, all men
and all nations, the committed and the un-
? committed alike, without their knowledge
? and without their consent. That is why the
continuation of atmospheric testing causes
so many countries to regard all nuclear
powers as equally evil; and we can hope that
its prevention will enable those countries
to see the world more clearly, while enabling
all the world to breathe more easily.
'
These are some of the reasons, then,
? that give ,us plausible grounds for hope
that thie treaty will be kept by the Soviet
Union, as well as by the United States.
Our hopes must be tempered with the
caution of past experience in dealing
with the Kremlin, and we must reznain
prepared to resume our own testing, if
ever the Russians default. In the mean-
time, the treaty itself will not change
. Communist ambitions, or eliminate the
possibility of nuclear war; it will not, in
itself, reduce our need for arms or allies,
or progranis of assistance to others. But
it is an important first step toward a
more rational relationship between the
Soviet Union ancl the Western World.
Given the pressures of a deepening split
between oscow and Peking, this treaty
could open the way to other settlements
with Rues* of far-reaching significance.
To these ,possibilities we must remain
alert and prudently responsive.
For nothing is more urgent than for
the two nuclear giants to find a way out
of their atomic dilemma. Today we con-
front one another like two oldtime West-
ern gunmen standing face to face, pistols
drawn, aimed and Cocked, near the center
of a log, lying across a yawning chasm.
Neither can fire hie pistol, because of the
? certainty that the other, even with a
dying reflex, will also squeeze off a fatal
shot. Neither can. advance upon the
other, because of the danger that a point
? will coiilk)yhen h, adversary, from fear
or uncettainty, may tighten his pressure
, upon the hair trigger of doom for both.
Each is_ afraid to lower his weapon, or
even to allow it to waver, because each
expects that a momentary opportunity
by the other.
Meanwhile, both protagonists grow
tired. The hot sun beats down, and
sweat forms around the tensely squint-
ing eyes. Each wonders when?not if,
but when?the other, fearing that he
may be the first to weaken, will decide
to take the deceptively smaller risk of
getting off the first shot. Each feels
that he must inch closer to his adversary,
SO it will be certain that the reflex shot,
too, cannot miss.
Each knows in his heart that-the situ-
ation cannot continue indefinitely, but
must be resolved, in some way, before
nightfall.
Is there not a likeness between this
situation and our own dreadful dilemma
with respect to the Russians? Now, with
this test ban treaty, it is as if both par-
ties had agreed that, on signal, each
would take one step backward. Each
can afford to do this. If he takes the
step, and his opponent does likewise,
there will be time to consider what the
next step might be. Trust is not, in-
volved, only a true instinct for self-
preservation. -
Mr. President, it has been said that this
treaty is a symptom of a "no win" policy.
I say there can be no winners?not the
Russians, not the Americans, not West-
ern civilization itself?unless the atom is
tamed. So let us begin here and now.
We are a hundred men and women,
clothed at this moment with a fateful
responsibility. Let it not be said that
it was the U.S. Senate, heir and custo-
dian of the longest tradition of freedom
in the history of man, which lacked the
courage to take the first step back from
the commitment to violence which offers
only the specter of eventual extermina-
tion for our people, our country, and all
we cherish.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Idaho yield?
? Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield
to the Senator from Utah.
Mr. MOSS. Today Senators have
heard one of the most persuasive and
penetrating speeches on the proposed
nuclear test ban treaty which will be
heard in the Senate as this important
subject is discussed. The senior Senator
from Idaho, with his usual penetrating
attention to detail, his broad background
of knowledge of this subject, and his
eloquence in expressing himself, has
given the Senate an outline, a prospectus,
or a viewpoint that I personally deeply
appreciate. I call on Senators to read
carefully in the printed RECORD what has
been said today. I thank the Senator
from Idaho for affording me the oppor-
tunity to hear a good part of what he
said today.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator
from Utah.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator
from Idaho yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. s I, too, wish to say
that. the Senator from Idaho has made
a valuable contribution to the discus-
sion of the treaty. The Senator was
most attentive in the hearings and fol-
lowed them diligently. He is as well
qualified to discuss the merits of the
treaty as any Other 1VIember of this body.
eign Relations, I appreciate his taking
the pains to present his excellent speech,
which was so well organized and pre-
sented to the Senate.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Idaho yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield to the Senator
from Tennessee.
Mr. GORE. I congratulate the dis-
tinguished senior Senator from Idaho
upon an able address. It is a cogent
analysis of the issue before the Senate.
But I wish also to recall, as the REC-
ORD will disclose, that the senior Senator
from Idaho, speaking in 1959 as the
junior Senator from Idaho, made an-
other eloquent speech on the floor of the
Senate. Standing at his own desk in the
rear of the Chamber, he urged just such
a treaty as is now before the Senate. So
I congratulate the Senator for his pre-
science and vision, as well as upon the
delivery of an able speech.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator
from Tennessee. At that time I drew
much inspiration from the thinking of
the Senator from Tennessee, who was
one of the first to suggest that the United
States might suspend further atmos-
pheric testing unilaterally and chal-
lenge Russia to do likewise. This was
most significant in contributing toward
the position taken by the Government of
the United States and the Government
of the United Kingdom in the negotia-
tions which led to the offering to the
Russian Government of a treaty limited
to the atmospheric areas.
Mr. GORE. I appreciate the generous
references made by the Senator. If I re-
call correctly, I suggested that the United
States take this step unilaterally, if nec-
essary, but in the hope that it would be
an invitation to the Soviet Union to join
in the concert.
Mr. CHURCH. That is exactly so. I
know the Senator from Tennessee shares
with me the feeling of accomplishment
that finally a treaty such as this has
come before the Senate for ratification.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Idaho yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield to the distin-
guished majority leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
join with other Senators in expressing
thanks to the distinguished senior Sen-
ator from Idaho for the speech he has
just delivered. For a long time the Sen-
ator from Idaho has been a student of
the subjects he has discussed today.
His contribution to the debate will be
most enlightening, and will result in a
better understanding of the difficult
problems which confront all Senators in
the consideration of a treaty of such
importance as this.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I yield
the floor.
Mr. DIRKSEN obtained the floor.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Illinois yield without
losing the floor, so that I may suggest
the absence of a quorum?
Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield for that pur-
pose.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OteriCER. The
clerk will call the roll. k
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The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I ob-
ject.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
INOUYE in the chair). Objection is
heard; and the clerk will continue the
call of the roll.
The legislative clerk resumed and con-
cluded the call of the roll; and the fol-
lowing Senators answered to their
names:
[No. 158 Ex.]
Hartke Mundt
Hayden Muskie
Hickenlooper Nelson
Hill N.uberger
Holland
Hruska
Humphrey
Inouye
Jackson
Aiken
Bartlett
Bayh
Beall
Bennett
Bible
Boggs
Burdick
Byrd, Va.
Byrd, W. Va.
Cannon
Carlson
, Church
r Clark
Cooper
Cotton
Curtis
Dirksen
Dodd
Dominick
Douglas
Eastland
Edmondson
Ellender
Ervin
Fong
Fulbright
Gore
Hart
Pell
Prouty
Proxmire
Randolph
Johnston Riticoff
JOrdan, N.C. Robertson
Jordan, Idaho Russell
Keating Simpson
Kennedy SrnaLhers
Kuchel Smith
Lausche Sparkman
Long, Mo.
Long, La.
Magnuson
Mansfield
McClellan
McGovern
McIntyie
McNamara
Metcalf
Miller
Morse
Morten
Moss
Stennis
Symington
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
aA3ts
Williams, N.J.
Williams, Del.
Yarborough
Young, N. Dak.
Young, Ohio
Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that
the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. AN-
DERSON), the Senator from Maryland
[Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from Alas-
ka [Mr. GRUENING], the Senator from
Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator
from Wyoming [Mr. MeGEE], and the
Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRON-
Ey] are absent on official business.
I further announce that the Senator
from California [Mr. ENGLE] is neces-
sarily absent.
Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the
Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLorrl and
the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON]
are absent on official business to attend
a meeting of the Interparliamentary
Union.
The Senator from New Jersey [Mr.
CAW, the Senator from Arizona [Mr.
GOLDWATER] , the Senator from New York
[Mr. Jsvirs ] , the Senator from New Mex-
ico [Mr. MECHEM], the Senator from
Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], and
the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Scor] are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OleteiCER. A quo-
rum is present. The Senator from Il-
linois [Mr. DIRKSEN] has the floor.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I envy
Senators who have time to commit words
to paper and to present a formal speech
to the Senate. I make that statement
in all modesty. First, I wish I had the
talent for it; second, I wish I had time
for it, because it makes an infinitely
better RECORD. But, because of the pres-
sures of a variety of work, I discover that
I must be content with something of a
synopsis that I had to dictate between
telephone calls yesterday, and which
Senators will find on their desks. So
I apologize for the meager material that
I have presented to Senators in a formal
fashion.
As Senators know, I do not read a
manuscript very well; and I believe it is
incumbent an me to Search my heart
and my mind and to talk topically as
well as I can on the subject at hand.
At the outset, let me say that I shall
support the treaty. It is no easy vote.
In my office are probably 40,000 letters,
and on my Capitol desk are petitions
containing 10,000 names in opposition to
the treaty. But I mist equate those
against the whole number of electors in
my State. Moreover, I have admonished
them over and over again that, regard-
less of the entreaties and presentations
that have been made to me, I feel that
I must follow a type of formula laid down
by Edmund Burke, the great parliamen-
tarian and Prime Minister of Britain,
when he said it was his business to con-
sult with his people, but it would be a
betrayal of his conscience and a disserv-
ice to them if he failed to exercise his
Independent judgment,
So today my statement that I shall
support the treaty is an exercise of my
independent judgment based upon what
I think is best for my country.
I have been drenched by all the cor-
respondence and material that have
come to my desk. I have gone over 100
pounds of pamphlets, brochures, letters,
and all types of printed material that
had a bearing upon the issue that is
before the Senate.
I doubt whether at any other time?
except three?in nearly 30 years of ex-
perience in the House end in the Senate,
I have been so beset with the views and
expressions of people _everYwhere.
I believe the first occasion was in 1940.
If I am in error by a year, I shall have
to ask my distinguished friend the Sen-
ator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]
whether that was the Year of the "cash
and carry" neutrality debate. I think it
was. I remember the ;intensity of feel-
ing which existed everywhere in the
country and how emotionally and pas-
sionately people conineitted their feel-
ings to paper. That as one occasion.
The second occasion' was the dismissal
of Douglas MacArthur That happened
In the Truman administration. The
commentators and others had managed
to excite the country. At that time I
received about 200,000 ietters.
The third time was when I was a mem-
ber of the Committee on Government
Operations of the Senate, the committee
of which the late Senator McCarthy was
the chairman. Thatl committee con-
ducted the trial. I Was a member of
the committee. On that occasion, the
country was excited. 'Senators will re-
member that it was late at night when
the Senate voted on the question. As
the proceeding had been under the klieg
lights and television cameras for 7 weeks,
obviously it evoked Er, tremendous interest
everywhere in the land. I believe there
are still thousands of letters which I re-
ceived, which have notheen opened. My
office staff indicated that more than
250,000 letters were reeeived.
Senators can conceive what it is to
have someone "smite yOu hip and thigh,"
in an angry mood, and say, "I demand
a personal answer."
I do not know how one could answer
people personally under those circum-
stances without resorting to the robot
machines and other devices which are
designed to diminish the workload upon
the shoulders of Senators.
So I find, under all circumstances, that
this is one of such occasions. On the
other occasions?one under Frankin
Roosevelt, one under Truman, and one
under Eisenhower?we managed to sur-
vive, and we went our own way.
I believe perhaps Shakespeare was es-
sentially correct when he said, in "Ham-
let":
There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will.
He might well have used the word
"destiny." This could be, conceivably,
a time of destiny for the country and
for the world. Who am I to judge?
Time and history will have to render that
judgment.
But this is an important matter that
engrosses our attention. I pray that I
may be on the right side. I accept this
assignment, and I accept the responsi-
bility for my vote with a sense of grav-
ity and concern.
Before the treaty was initialed, I was
privileged to see a thermofax copy. I
examined it as best I could. I rendered
some offhand opinions at the time, some
of which did not stand up. I saw them
recited in an editorial the other day.
One must expect that sort of thing in
public life. But I do not let it bother
me.
I said to my people, I said to the coun-
try publicly, and I said in the press gal-
lery that I would take a hard look at
the treaty. I said I would be diligent in
examining its every implication, and
that there would be only one standard by
which to come to a vote, and that would
be: What is best for the present and for
the future of the United States of Amer-
ica, which has been so good to me as a
citizen?
In pursuance of the assurance that
would take a hard look, I wanted to look
at both sides, and I did look at both sides.
I was concerned about a treaty with
the Soviet Union. Who would not be?
I am no novice at the business of ex-
amining into the Soviet history and its
record with respect to treaties. As a
member of the Internal Security Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary I have had abundant op-
portanity to look. I referred even to
the old Army.data known as "Alert No. 5:
Soviet Treaty Violations."
I examined the violation of an under-
standing with the Georgian Republic,
now absorbed into the Soviet Union, as
early as 1920.
I examined into the trade agreement
with Britain, when there was assurance
against propaganda. It was violated,
and the trade agreement with Britain
fell.
In 1922 there was a treaty of assurance
and friendship with the country of
Czechoslovakia, yet later it was violated,
and Czechoslovakia was forced to cede
territory to the Soviet Union.
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culminated in a daring thrust by Khru-
shchev to install missile bases in Cuba,
at our very doorstep. In this reckless
gambit, Khrushchev in effect was ask-
ing: "If her vital interests are challenged,
Is the United States really willing to risk
all in a nuclear war?" President Ken-
nedy's response, doming swift and sure,
gave Khrushchev his answer. The world
watched breathlessly as Kennedy ordered
the Navy to turn back Russian ships on
the high seas, even as he laid down his
ultimatum that the Cuban bases must
be dismantled and the Russian missiles
Withdrawn. Khrushchev had his answer,
and he backed away under circumstances
Which surely inflicted the most serious
reversal on the Communist cause since
the end of the second war.
I suppose Khrushchev's question had
to be asked?and answered?somewhere,
sometime' if a turning point in the nu-
clear arms face Vas ever to be reached.
The Russians had to know whether, in
a showdown situation, we actually stood
ready to suffer a full-scale nuclear ex-
change?whether, - in effect, we would
sooner choose to be dead than Red. Had
Kennedy allowed the Russian mis-
sile bases to remain in Cuba, then
Khrushchev would have known that he
could win his points, one by one, through
the threat of nuclear war?that he could
bluff his way to world dominion. Under
such circumstances, the Russian nu-
clear arsenal would have had utility,
after all, in advancing the objectives of
Soviet foreign policy. The Russians
would doubtlessly have then intensified
the nuclear arms race, and we would
have no test banlreaty before us today.
Bo the tense and terrifying days of
last October may well be recorded by his-
torians of the future as a time of destiny
for the whole human race, when the for-
titude of an American President won for
us another chance to harness the nu-
clear monster, or, as Kennedy himself
has put it, to stuff the genie back in the
bottle, while there is still time.
Those days of danger last October are
like yesterday to me. I remember talk-
ing with the Secretary of State in the
midst a the crisis. For days and nights
he had not left his? office, except to con-
fer with the President. The awful strain
of having set the United States on colli-
sion course with the Soviet Union was
written in his face, and I thought of how
lonely the President must be.
The agony dwelt also in the Kremlin.
Those of us who serve on the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee have learned
something of Khrushchev's ordeal dur-
ing those tense hours, when the knot of
war had to be untied even as events
tightened it around both countries. The
feat was accomplished in the 11th hour
by men whose involvement will chasten
them all their lives through.
Bo the stage was set for the President
to renew the American effort to temper
the nuclear arms race by another at-
tempt to reach an agreement on a nu-
clear test ban. In June of this year, be-
fore leaving on his triumphal trip to
Europe, Kennedy judged the time to be
ripe for another overture to the Soviet
Union. At American University, in a
remarkable speech that I regard as the
highwater mark of his first term in of-
fice, the President addressed himself to
the conscience and good sense . of the
American people, with these memorable
words:
I have, therefore, chosen this time and
this place to discuss a topic on which ig-
norance too often abounds and the truth is
too rarely perceived?yet it is the most im-
portant topic on earth: world peace.
I speak of peace because of the new face
of war. Total war makes no sense in an age
when great powers can maintain large and
relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and
refuse to surrender without resort to those
forces. It makes no sense in an age when a
single nuclear weapon contains almost 10
times the explosive force delivered by all
of the allied air forces in the Second World
War. It makes no sense in an age when the
deadly poisons produced by a nuclear ex-
change would be carried by the wind and
water and soil and seed to the far corners
of the globe and to generations yet unborn.
Today the expenditure of billions of dol-
lars every year on weapons acquired for the
purpose of making sure we never need to
use them is essential to keeping the peace.
But surely the acquisition of such idle stock-
piles?which can only destroy and never
create?is not the only, much less the most
efficient, means of assuring peace.
I speak of peace, therefore, as the neces-
sary rational end of rational men. I rea-
lize that the pursuit of peace is not as
dramatic as the pursuit of war?and fre-
quently the words of the pursuer fall on
deaf ears. But we have no more urgent
task.
Some say that it is useless to speak of
world peace or world law or world disarma-
ment?and that it will be useless until the
leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more
enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I
believe we can help them do it. But I also
believe that we must reexamine our own
attitude?as individuals and as a nation?
for our attitude is as essential as theirs.
And every graduate of this school, every
thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and
wishes to bring peace, should begin by look-
ing inward?by examining his own attitude
toward the possibilities of peace, toward the
Soviet Union, toward the course of the cold
war and toward freedom and peace here at
home.
With a candor as refreshing as it is
uncommon to men in high station, the
President went on to say:
No government or social system is so evil
that its people must be considered as lacking
in virtue. As Americans, we find commu-
nism profoundly repugnant as a negation of
personal freedom and dignity. But we can
still hail the Russian people for their many
achievements?in science and space, in eco-
nomic and industrial growth, in culture and
in acts of courage.
Among the many traits the peoples of our
two countries have in common, none is
stronger than our mutual abhorrence of
war. Almost unique, among the major world
powers, we have never been at war with each
other. And no nation in the history of battle
ever suffered more than the Soviet Union
suffered in the course of the Second World
War. At least 20 million lost their lives.
Countless millions of homes and farms were
burned or sacked. A third of the nation's
territory, including nearly two-thirds of its
industrial base, was turned into a waste-
land?a loss equivalent to the devastation of
this country east of Chicago.
Today, should total war ever break out
again?no matter how?our two countries
would become the primary targets. It is an
ironical but- accurate fact that the two
strongest powers are the two in the most
danger of devastation. All we have built, all
15909
- -
we have worked for, would be destroyed in
the first 24 hours. And even in the cold
war, which brings burdens and dangers to
so many countries, including this Nation's
closest allies?our two countries bear the
heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting
massive sums of many to weapons that could
be better devoted to combating ignorance,
poverty, and disease. We are both caught up
in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which
suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on
the other, and new weapons beget counter-
weapons.
In short, both the United States and its
allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies,
have a mutually deep interest in a just
and genuine peace and in halting the arms
race. Agreements to this end are in the
interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours?
and even the most hostile nations can be
relied upon to accept and keep those treaty
obligations, and only those treaty obliga-
tions, which are in their own interest.
So, let us not be blind to our differences?
but let us also direct attention to our com-
mon interests and to the means by which
those differences can be resolved. And if
we cannot end now our differences, at least
we can help make the world safe for diversity.
For, in the final analysis, our most basic
common link is that we all inhabit this
planet. We all breathe the same air. We all
cherish our children's future. And we are
all mortal.
Then the President focused upon the
one place where a beginning might be
made. Said he:
The one major area of these negotiations
where the end is in sight?yet where a fresh
start is badly needed?is in a treaty to out-
law nuclear tests. The conclusion of such
a treaty?so near and yet so far?would check
the spiraling arms race in one of its most
dangerous areas. It would place the nu-
clear powers in a position to deal more ef-
fectively with one of the greatest hazards
which man faces in 1963, the further spread
of nuclear arms. It would increase our se-
Curity?it would decrease the prospects of
war. Surely this goal is sufficiently import-
ant to require our steady pursuit, yielding
neither to the temptation to give up the'
whole effort nor the temptation to give up
our insistence on vital and responsible safe-
guards.
In this great ?address at American
University, the President correctly as-
sessed the changing temper of the Krem-
lin strategists in the aftermath of their
Cuban misadventure. His renewed in-
vitation to Khrushchev to rethink things
through was superbly timed. Logic is
the same, whether pursued in English or
Russian, and our refusal to yield to the
Red missile threat in Cuba led to one in-
escapable conclusion: The issues between
the United States and the Soviet Union
could not be settled by nuclear intimida-
tion.
Once this conclusion is reached, it be-
comes possible for both sides to consider
ways for tempering the precarious risks
inherent in what has been aptly de-
scribed as the nuclear "balance of ter-
ror." A partial test ban treaty was a
reachable first step in easing tensions
and slowing down the feverish arms
race. Once again, Kennedy offered it;
this time, Khrushchev accepted it.
So we have before us a treaty which
was negotiated?once the time was
ripe?with extraordinary ease and speed.
1% has been examined with the utmost
care by the members of the Senate For-
eign Relations, Armed Forces, and 4tomic
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allies in certain crucial respects._ Since
we are required to spend twice as much
proportionately on military defense than
our NATO partners in Western Europe,
or Japan, our peacetime steel, shipbuild-
ing, and machine tool industries are be-
coming increasingly obsolescent, in com-
parison with theirs, a factor which weak-
ens our competitive position in the world
market. More pertinent still, while 65
percent of our research and development
funds go into weapons systems, only 15
percent of the research mark or yen in
countries like Germany and Japan need
be devoted to military purposes.
The staggering expense of the imre-
strieted-nuclear arms race has forced us
to give insufficient attention to the se-
vere problems which are building up here
at home?the problems of diminished in-
dustrial competitiveness, of automation,
of education, of air and water pollution,
of pockets of chronic unemployment, of
mass transit, of urban renewal?all, of
which demand major new steps for solu-
tion.
And the same problem plagues the So-
viet Union. Khrushchev has been unable
to hide the increasing demand of the
Russian people for a better life. I have
seen enough of Russia with my own eyes
to understand the popular appeal for a
larger diversion of the nation's resources
to consumer goods, food, clothing, and
adequate housing. Their demands are
far from met, and cannot be, unless the
nuclear arms race can be slowed down,
and resources diverted from the sword
to the plow.
Finally, the United States and the So-
viet Union, despite their profound differ-
ences, share one further inducement for
keeping this treaty. They have a com-
mon need for ending the physical and
psychological consequences of continued
nuclear fallout. Internationally, this
fallout has proved prejudicial to both
countries. Other nations, with much
justification, angrily demand: "By what
right do you slowly poison the air we all
must breathe?" Internally, the physical
dangers of fallout are most severe in the
United States and the Soviet Union
themselves.
Senator BARTLETT of Alaska has called
our attention several times to the high
radiation levels in the areas inhabited
by Eskimos in his State. Swedish scien-
tists have also noted high radiation
levels in the Arctic areas of Scandinavia;
one would suppose that Soviet scientists
are similarly concerned about their own
Arctic regions.
But it is not only in the Arctic areas
that high radiation levels are injurious
to life. On June 7 of this year, the Fed-
eration of American Scientists issued a
press release stating that:
The release of large amounts of radio-
active debris comparable to that resulting
from the 1262 U.S.S.R.-u.s. test series must
be regarded as producing a definite increase
in Cancer mortality among children born
within 1 to 2 years following that test series.
Articles in the Washington Post and
New York Times of August 22 called at-
tention to the findings of the St. Louis
Committee on Nuclear Information
headed .by Dr. Eric Reiss, associate pro-
fessor of Medicine at Washington ljni-
?
Energy Committees. We have heard ext.
Pert testimony ranging from the techni-
cal military consequences of the treaty to
its broadest implications in world poli-
tics and long-range cold war strategy.
When all of the testimony is taken into
account, the overwhelmingly consensus
has supported the treaty. Our leading
statesmen, the Chiefs of Staff of our
Armed Forces, the directors of our intel-
ligences and atomic energy programs, the
great majority of our nuclear scientists,
endorsed the treaty. It was the prepon-
derant judgment of the expert w:tnesses
called from many different fields of
study, scientific, military, and political,
that the risks to which we will be ex-
posed without such a treaty far exceed
the risks we assume with it. The case
was strongly made that the best in-
terests of the United States would be
served by our ratification of this treaty
without reservation.
There was, of course, testimony against
the treaty, and there will be votes
against it in the Senate. Not one among
us lacks suspicion of the Russian Gov-
ernment, and it comes easily to reason
that, since we and they are opposites,
no adjustments between us are possible,
that whatever is good for thein must be
bad for us.
If this is true, then cohabitation of
this plant must ultimately give way to co-
annihilation, tensions will grow ever
greater as the spiraling earns race
heightens the common danger, and there
will be no escape from a fiery oblivion.
Yet is not this treaty itself a rebuttal
to so dismal an outlook? Both sides
have signed it, because each side has
separately concluded that it serves its
own interests to do so.
Decidedly, this does not mean that
we believe we can now trust the Rus-
sians. No element of trust is involved in
this treaty. It is limited to testing in
those environments where we ourselves
can detect any significant violations,
without having to depend on any sort of
Cornmunist disclosure.
It has been said that we can expect
the Russians to keep this treaty only so
long as they find it in their interest to do
so. I agree. And I would add that is
all the longer we intend to keep it.
As the distinguished chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee has sug-
gested the typical course of a, sovereign
nation, throughout the whole path of dip-
lontatic history, is to keep a treaty only
so long as it remains in its national in-
terest to do so.
Both sides have carefully included an
escape clause for this very purpose,
drawn as broad as language can make it.
Article IV reads, in part:
Each party shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the treaty if it decides that eXtraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this
treaty, have jeopardized the supreme inter-
ests of ta country.
But there are good reasons to suppose
that both the Soviet Union- and the
United States may well find it in their
Mutual interest to keep this treaty. The
two nuclear giants bear the weight of
certain common problems which, this
treaty should serve to lighten.
First, the two nuclear giants have
most at stake in avoiding a nuclear war.
The United States and Russia would be
the principal targets of a nuclear ex-
change. Each has trained its missiles
upon the launching sites, the cities, the
industries of the other. The conse-
quences we Americans,would suffer were
succinctly summarized by Mr. Sanford
Gottlieb, who testifie& that our "home-
land population and way of life would
be pulverized, and the survivors would
have the unenviable jeb of trying to re-
fashion civilization out, of the radioactive
rubble. Freedom would not walk among
the survivors." Khrushchev, on his part,
has commented that the survivors would
envy the dead. It is little solace, either
for the Russians or for,us, that Mao Tse-
tung has already sewed that nuclear
war today would be a Armageddon for
the West, making the world safe for the
Chinese. The treaty does not end the
nuclear competition between us and the
Soviet Union, but, as Walter Lippmann
has observed, "limiting the experiments
will remove the hysteria, the violence,
and the poison from, the competitive
search for absolute supremacy," arid thus
should contribute toward the avoidance
of a nuclear war.
Second, it is the two nuclear giants,
as matters now stand, which have the
most to lose by the spread of nuclear
weapons technology te other countries.
Each new nation added to the ranks of
the nuclear powers holds up another
match to the fuse of nuclear disaster for
all. And if nuclear arsenals spread to
nations with unstablel governments, or
come into the possession of regimes af-
flicted with a "rule or ruin" philosophy,
then the risks to which we are now ex-
posed would quickly MUltiply beyond cal-
culation. This treaty alone will not pre-
vent, but it will retard, the further pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons.
Third, the treaty, by imposing limita-
tions on future tests, will slow down the
development of ever more costly and
complicated nuclear weapon systems?on
both sides. huge nuclear arms budgets
have imposed a disproportionate burden
upon the United States and Russia, as
compared with our respective allies. It
is now costing us, in this country, more
than $50 billion a year to maintain our
Armed Forces, which is over half our to-
tal Federal budget. The cost has in-
creased fivefold in the last 15 years.
Testimony was given that it is likely to
double again by 1970, if present trends
continue. The Soviet Union, drawing
upon lesser wealth, spends an even high-
er percentage of her national income for
arms.
While the United States and Rus-
sia have been thus increasing their mil-
itary budgets, their non-nuclear allies
have been able to devote a bigger part
of their wealth toward improving their
economies. Within the Soviet bloc,
countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and even Rumania, boast higher living
standards and more consumer .goods
than Russia, a fact which has embar-
rassed Khrushchev during his recent
visits. As for the United States, we still
maintain the highest lilting standards in
the world, but our country is beginning
to fall behind some ai our lion-nuclear
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We a* not the only victims. The both roads. I feel that to forsake either
Soviets have a special fondness for non-
aggression pacts; they have gone- into
these treaties in a big way?with Poland,
Finland, Rumania,, the Baltic States,
among others?and have violated nearly
every one of them.
. Mr. President, the goal of civilized peo-
ple is peace. What is the best way to
Maintain peace?
The nuclear test ban treaty, submitted
by the President to the Senate, is be-
lieved by many conscientious people to be
in the interest of peace.
The treaty we are asked to ratify is,
believe, in the interest of every American
If it does not endanger our people's safety
or security.
Notwithstanding our justifiable dis-
trust of the Soviets and our awareness of
the limitations of the treaty, we are
mindful of the grave danger of nuclear
war and the advantage of keeping open
any channel, however remote, for the
avoidance of nuclear worldwide destruc-
tion.
I wish to insert another point right
here.
One of the reasons most commonly of-
fered for a nuclear test ban has to do
with the danger of fallout contamina-
tion. Most of my mail favoring the test
ban treaty has referred to fallout from
atmospheric testing.
I regret to say I have not heard or read
any conclusive testimony on this point.
Regardless of how the vote on ratifica-
tion goes, I think the responsible othcials
of the executive branch of the Govern-
ment owe the public a frank and ade-
quate answer on this point.
Either there is real danger from fall-
out incidental to atmospheric testing or
there is not, and this point should be
settled.
It is the positiOn of many of our of-
ficials?and sincerely believed by a great
majority of our citizens?that this treaty
represents the first step made in 18-years
toward permanent peace.
On the other hand, I am mindful of
the fact that the Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee has filed a report
stating that the treaty will adversely af-
fect the future quality of the Nation's
arms and that if will result in serious
Military disadvantages.
Some witnesses questioned the safe-
guards to protect the national security
of the United States.
On this point. I joined with colleagues
on the Armed Services Committee in of-
fering a resolution requesting that the
administration furnish full information.
The administration furnished the desired
? information. It gives us assurance that
we can Make the progress necessary to
protect and maintain our deterrent with-
- in the limitations of the treaty. We are
assured that the development of our
? arsenal Will continue unhampered.
Incidentally, if we should fail to rat-
ity, it would possibly shake the confi-
dence of the 88 other nations who have
signed, of,
in our steadfastness of
purpose -ah'd Our devotion to peace.
There are two possible roads to peace.
One is the_ proved road of strength and
Vigilance. The other is the unProved
road of negotiation. We must travel
path would be to court war and invite
destruction.
Let us place our trust in the path of
strength- and our hope in the path of
negotiation.
Mr. President, after careful considera-
tion I have come to the conclusion that
the treaty does not sacrifice anything
vital to our security and does offer some
hope. Therefore, I will vote for ratifica-
tion?even though it must be with more
hdpe than trust.
Mr. CHURCH obtained the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield, with the understand-
ing that he will not lose his right to the
floor?
Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to
the majority leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum, for the
Purpose of submitting a request to the
Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, yes-
terday the leadership, in conformity with
the rules of the Senate, endeavored to
move to the next step in the considera-
tion of the resolution of ratification.
This is the normal procedure. However,
at the request of the distinguished Sen-
ator from Georgia Mr. Russm.l, who
expressed no opposition whatever to the
procedure which the leadership was at-
tempting to follow, we agreed with him
to put it over until today.
Under the rules of the Senate the pro-
cedural situation is- such that reserva-
tions, interpretations, and understand-
ings with respect to the treaty are not
in order at this stage of the proceed-
ings. At this time only actual amend-
ments to the language of the treaty it-
self may be offered: In the past, the
traditional method by which the Senate
expressed its reservation to, or its un-
derstanding of, the meaning of the treaty
was by adding such reservation or un-
derstanding to the resolution of ratifica-
tion. This is the Proper procedure arid
the one which the leadership understands
Is intended to be followed now. -1 there-
fore now ask unanimous consent that
the treaty be considered as having passed
through the seiTeral parliamentary stages
up to and including the 'Presentation of
the resolution of ratification. The grant-
ing of this request, if it is granted, will
not deny any Senator the right to speak
on any part of the treaty, the treaty as
a whole, or for that matter on any other
subject. The only effect procedurally
will be to foreclose the offering of
amendments and to allow the offering of
proposed reservations and understand-
ings.
The PRESIDING OloviCER. Is there
objection?
Mr. TI-117RNIOND. Reserving the right
to object, amendments may be offered. I
would not wish that the Senate be bound
by such an agreement. Therefore, I
object.
Mr. MANS.FIELD. I say to the Sena-
tor from South Carolina that this is an
action which can be taken at any time.
I would hope that the Senator, in his
understanding of the situation, would
understand also the position in which
the leadership finds itself. We are not
trying to rush the treaty to completion.
We are making it as easy as possible for
every Senator to make his views known,
either for or against the proposed treaty.
It is the usual procedure which we are
requesting at this time, and only the
usual procedure. It will not preclude the
offering of reservations or understand-
ings by any Senator who wishes to do so.
To the best of the knowledge of the lead-
ership?the combined leadership?no
amendments are at the desk, nor has the
leadership been informed of any amend-
ments to be considered. The Senate can-
not consider reservations or understand-
ings until this step has been taken.
Mr. THUFtMOND. I reassert my de-
sire to cooperate with the leadership in
every way I can. This is an important
subject. I see no need to foreclose the
question of amendments, if it is decided
that amendments should be offered. I
shall have to insist on my objection.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
from South Carolina himself have any
amendments he wishes to offer? The
reason I ask is that we know of no
amendments.
Mr. THURMOND. I do not care to
give a final answer to that question at
this time.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Sena-
tor from Idaho for yielding.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, a treaty
In which all signatories have agreed to
refrain from nuclear testing in the air,
underwater, and in outer space, has
finally come before us for ratification.
It is here because the Governments of
the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union have at last rec-
ognized that it may be better to try to
halt the nuclear arms race than to try
to win it.
For years we have known in our bones
that there was no way to win this race.
The longer it has gone on, the closer
both sides have come to nuclear parity.
As our respective atomic stockpiles have
grown more immense, the more certain
it has become that it will be suicidal to
use them. The combined American and
Russian nuclear arsenals are now es-
timated to contain an explosive power of
some 60 billion tons of TNT?enough to
put a 20-ton bomb at the head of every
human being on earth.
Small wonder that the President has
said:
Today, every inhabitant of this planet
must contemplate the day when this planet
may no longer be habitable. Every man,
woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword
of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of
threads, capable of being cut at any moment
by accident or miscalculation or by mad-
ness. The weapons of war must be abolished
before they abolish us.
Men no longer debate whether armaments
are a symptom or a cause of tension. The
mere existence of modern weapons-10 mil-
lion times more powerful than anything the
?
.4
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15908 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE September ii
world has every seen, and only Minutes away
from any target on earth?is a source of hor-
ror, and discord, and distrust. Men no
longer maintain that disarmament must
await the settlement of all disputes?for dis-
armament must be a part of any final settle-
ment. And men may no longer pretend that
the quest for clisaxmament is a sign of weak-
ness?for in a spiralling arms race, a na-
tion's security may well be shrinking even
As its arms increase.
We know this treaty is only the first
step on the long, uncertain journey to-
ward arms control. Many steps must
follow if we are ever to grape our way
out from under the somber shadow of the
mushroom cloud. But the treaty repre-
sents our first chance to embark upon
the journey since the burst of that fate-
ful fireball above Hiroshima 18 years ago.
It may be a small step, and it comes
very late, but it proffers some hope of
being the commencement of that long
pilgrimage to avert what the President
has aptly described as "the world's slide
toward final annihilation."
As the first nation to have developed
the atomic bomb, we have always felt
a special responsibility for the control
of such weapons. Less than a year after
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United
States offered its original plan for the
internationalization of atomic energy.
Bernard Baruch, as spokesman for Presi-
dent Truman, appeared before the
*United Nations in support of the Amer-
ican proposal, saying:
We are here to make a choice between the
quick and the dead. That is our business.
Behind the black portent of the new atomic
age lies a hope which, seized upon with
faith, can work our salvation. If we fail,
then we have damned every man to be the
slave of fear. Let us not deceive ourselves.
We must elect world peace or world destruc-
tion..
Tragically, our proposal was rejected
by a suspicious Stalin who believed, with
his generals, that Russia could never be
secure without first securing the bomb.
Thus began the nuclear arms race.
Never has a competition occurred more
frightening or more futile. Never have
the energies of two great nations been
so largely absorbed in so frantic a pur-
suit of the Devil's arts.
At first, we followed the grim statis-
tics of the race with horrified fascina-
tion. Warheads were soon perfected
that were 10 to 20 times as powerful as
the bomb which inflicted 140,000 casu-
alties on Hiroshima. But this was only
the beginning. As fusion followed fission,
hydrogen weapons were added to the
American and Russian arsenals which
were hundreds?even thousands?of
times more powerful still. To our dis-
belief, we learned there were no upper
limits to the size of the explosions that
could be contrived.
New words were needed to measure the
forces being released in the testing?
kilotons, megatons, the very terms be-
gan to turn sour on our tongues. And as
the years passed, as the costs mounted
ever higher, as our weapons systems be-
came ever more sophisticated, as our
missilemen went underwater and under-
ground, it became .increasingly evident
that national defense, in the sense of
shielding our homeland and our way of
life, had gone the way of the Musket and
the powderhorn. The term itself has
nearly disappeared from the lexicon of
contemporary military useage. Against
nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles, we have no defense. Instead,
we maintain an enormous deterrent
Which alone may surVive a full-scale nu-
clear attack upon us.' Its purpose is not
to defend, but to avenge. The frenzied
doomed from trio
search for national $ curity through nu-
clear armament has ailed.
Indeed, it was fo
outset. Instinctively, we have known
this from the time We first detonated
c,,
the hydrogen weapo that sank an is-
,
land in the Pacific. those days it was
Senator Brien McM hon, of Connecti-
cut, the chairman o the Joint Atomic
Energy Committee, Who was impelled to
introduce a resolutical concerning "the
overriding problem o; our time?how to
stop the armaments 'race and establish
a just peace." In sponsoring this resolu-
tion, McMahon was joined by several
men who are still Members of the Sen-
ate--Senator FULBRIENT, of Arkansas;
Senator SPARKMAN, Of Alabama; Sena-
tor MAGNUSON, of Washington; Senator
MORSE, of Oregon; and Senator, then
Representative, JacrrioN, of Washington.
The stirring summation of one of Mc-
Manon's addresses should suffice to show
the depth of his concern, even then, that
the world must find 1, way to deal with
the split atom before! the atom split the
world. He said:
Mr. President, the cock is ticking, tick-
ing, and with each swing of the pendulum
the time to save civilization grows shorter.
When shall we get about this business? Now,
or when Russia and theATnited States glower
at one another from atop competing stacks
of hydrogen bombs. enators, destiny will
not grant us the gift of indifference. If we
do not act, the atom will.
If we do not act, we May be profaned for-
ever by the inheritors pf a ravished planet.
We will be reviled, not ;as fools?even a fool
can sense the massive ,danger. We will be
reviled as cowards?and rightly, for only a
coward can flee the awesome facts which
command us to act with fortitude.
But the United States and the Soviet
Union were too caught up in the momen-
tum of their grisly competition to heed
Meldahon's warnings With little inter-
ruption, the clock ha S continued to tick
away for the 13 years that followed until
we found ourselves?true to his predic-
tion--glowering at one another from atop
our respective hydrogen stockpiles, in the
course of the two terrible showdowns of
1962--one over Berlin and the other over
Cuba.
An implacable fate has not granted us
the gift of indifference. What American
parent in the dark hours of the Berlin
confrontation or the Cuban missile crisis
failed to look at his children and shudder
at the thought of the catastrophic con-
.-sequences of nuclear ,war? As we were
forced to peer over the brink of the abyss
where is a sane and honest man who
would deny that we were not "the slaves
of fear?" And who, among us would
contend that the Rustions felt no panic?
However, wrongminded we believe them
to be, the Russians are human, too.
How close are we today to the end of
the rope? No one can say for sure. If
other showdowns lie ahead, we must face
them bravely, and pray that nuclear
holocaust is averted. But sure It is that
We cannot slide down the rope indef-
initely. Somewhere it has a frazzled end
which will drop us into a witch are of
incredible destruction. This treaty is
one pull back on the rope, the first pull
of a long climb which could lead to a
safer and saner world.
From Truman forward, our Presidents
have sensed the futility of continued,
unrestricted testing, and our need to
somehow temper and then to harness the
nuclear arms race itself. Less than 3
months after President Eisenhower took
office in 1953, he renewed the American
offer for international control of atomic
energy to promote its use for peaceful
purposes only and to insure the prohibi-
tion of atomic weapons. In 1958, Ei-
senhower ordered a cessation of this
country's nuclear testing, and his ad-
ministration, in cooperation with the
British Government, commenced nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union in an
attempt to reach agreement on a com-
prehensive test ban, applicable to all
environments, including underground
testing.
Perhaps the effort was premature;
perhaps the objective sought was too
ambitious for the times. The inclusion
of underground testing greatly compli-
cated the problem of working out an
adequate system of inspection and con-
trol. We contended, rightly I think,
that seismographs alone could not al-
ways distinguish between certain kinds
of underground nuclear explosions and
earthquakes, and that onsite inspections
of suspicious events would therefore be
required, if covert violations of the pro-
posed treaty were to be safeguarded
against. The Russians contended that
a static control system would suffice, and
that our motive in demanding roving in-
spections was actually a guise to permit
hostile reconnaissance and espionage
within the Soviet Union. .On this issue,
the negotiations dragged on inconclu-
sively for many months.
Thinking it impossible, at that time,
to obtain Russian consent to onsite in-
spections, which were in my view in-
dispensable to any workable compre-
hensive treaty, I myself proposed on the
floor of the Senate, in April of 1959, that
the United States seek a limited test
ban agreement to stop further nuclear
testing in theatmosphere.
Later that year, President Eisenhower
and Prime Minister Macmillan joined in
offering Khrushchev a limited ban on
atmospheric tests up to an altitude of 59
kilometers. In 1961, President Kennedy,
again with Macmillan, proposed a ban
on atmospheric tests. Both of these pro-
posals were rejected by the Soviet Gov-
ernment as insufficient.
All of us know the sorry story of how
the stalemated negotiations for a com-
prehensive nuclear test ban treaty ended
in dismal failure; we recall how the So-
viet Union, after quiet preparations, sud-
denly resumed testing on a most exten-
sive scale, forcing the United States to
do likewise. We remember, too, how the
testing was accompanied by a new round
of bellicose speechmaking in the Soviet
Union, coupled with a hardening of Rus-
sian attitudes on every cold war front.
And we shall never forget how the era
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whims and prejudices of uninformed public
opinion on such matters as foreign aid.
Senator PULBR/GHT did not spell out what
he had in _mind in recommending enhance-
ment of Presidential authority in foreign af-
fairs but certainly one of the steps required
would be modification of the constitutional
requirement of a two-thirds approving vote
by the Senate for ratification of a treaty with
other powers.
"The prospect is a disagreeable and perhapd
a dangerous one, but the alternative is im-
mobility and paralysis of national policy
in a revolutionary world, which can only
lead to consequences immeasurably more
disagreeable and dangerous," he said.
Senator Fotaroonr confined his reform pro-
posals to the field' of foreign policy. Being
an influential committee chairman and being
? possessed of am le seniority, he found no
reason to be crit 1 of congressional han-
dling of homefront ? oblems.
"In domestic matte it seems to me, the
Congress is as well qua ed to shape policy
as the Executive, and. in me respects more
so because of the freedom f at least some
Members from the particul electoral pres-
sures that operate on the Pres ent," he said.
On this point Senator Fur Ions came
Into direct disagreement with a .ther con-
gressional participant in that s . .osium?
Senator JOSEPH S. CLARK, Democrat Penn-
sylvania.
Senator 01,,ARK, a former mayor of ila-
clelphia, pointed an accusing finger at n-
greas, the State legislatures and city counc s
as "the greatest menace to the successf
operation Of the democratic process."
Be painted a dismal picture of what goes
on in the Nation's Legislative Chambers.
There, he said, is "where the vested interest
lobbies run riot, where conflict of interest
rides unchecked, where demagoguery knows
few bounds, where poltical lag keeps needed
? action a generation behind the times, where
ignorance is often at a premium and wis-
dom at a discount, where the evil influence
of arrogant and corrupt political machines
Ignores most successfully the public inter-
..est, where the lust for patronage and favors
for the faithful do the greatest damage to the
public interest."
Those are, strong words and they did not
endear Senator , CLARK to his colleagues in
Congress. Nor did the reforms he urged to
correct the legislative evils he sees. These
are:
Strengthening the executive at the expense
Of the legislative branch. Specifically he
-? proposed 4-year terms for Members of bot
the House 'cod Senate so that they all wo
be electefit In preadential campaign y rs
and thin committed to the national at-
form.
Amendment of the Constitution allow
the President to make Executive ?point-
Inents without Senate confirmat doing
away with "the need to satisfY egislative
parochialism."
Election of congressional co ittee chair-
man by secret ballot rather th by seniority.
Outlawing of delaying tac cs such as the
filibuster and the bottling p of proposed
legislation in committee. e would require
that all bills sent to the C ? itol by the White
House be brought to a v te on their merits
regardless of cornmittei action.
- ?
Fair reapportionment of congressional and
State legislative districts in all States.
Stronger laws gOvtrning campaign con-
tributions, including tax inducements to
small contributors.
Anotber?entry in the national debate over
What's wrqng in Washington came from the
political scientist and author, Jame S Mac-
Gregor Burns, in his recent book, "The
Deadlock of Democracy?Four-Party Politics
In America."
He finds both Democrats and Republicans
guilty of misrepresenting themselves.
No. 145-----6
it is Professor Burns' contention that ao--
tually there are two Republican and two
Democratic Parties. Each, he says, confuses
and deceives the public by maintaining sepa-
rate presidential and congressional wings
which stand apart like separate sovereign
powers.
At each national convention in recent
years, he points out, the GOP has nominated
a political moderate who ran on a platform
with broad appeal to moderates and inde-
pendents as well as conservatives.
Once those presidential elections are over,
he writes, control of Republican policy has
tended to shift back to the standpat, con-
servative leadership of the party's conserva-
tive wing, currently personified by such
men as House Minority Leader CHARLES A.
HALLECK, Senate Minority Leader EVERETT
M. DIRKSEN, and Senator BARRY M. GOLD-
WATER.
It is much the same on the Democratic
side, his argument goes. The convention
nominates a John F. Kennedy, an Adlai E
Stevenson or a Harry S. Truman to run o
a national liberal platform of glow
promises.
Then, when the tumult of the ca sign
dies down, the congressional wing the
party resumes its old stand on t right
under the brass-knuckle leadershi of such
Democratic moguls as Virgini Senator
HARRY F. BYRD and Representa e HOWARD
W. SMITH, boss of the House es Commit-
tee.
Professor Burns lays the lame for drift
and delay in present-da Government to
what he calls the four-i rty system "that
ompels government by ? nsensus and coali-
on rather than a t -party system that
a ?ws the winning p y to govern and the
los s to oppose."
Be would do aw with the congressional
wings ? f the two ? arties by absorbing them
into th natio parties, largely through
most of e c gressional reforms proposed
by Senato C ARK.
He nomi tea for oblivion the seniority
system in ress, minority devices such as
the Rul ittee veto, the filibuster,
malapp ? ionme and one-party districts.
One f the mos enetrating of the recent
disc ions of Gov nment reform and of
the clining prestig f Congress came from
a eshman Member ? the House, Repre-
tative ROBERT TAFT, in an address at
e American Bar Associa on convention in
icago this month.
Mr. TAFT told his fellow la ers that Con-
gress is the weak link in the F eral Govern-
ment and that it must be revita ed if there
is to be a halt to the mounting sumption
of power by the executive an judicial
branches at the expense of the Is slative
branch and of State and local govern ents.
Unlike his late father, Mr. TAFT loo for
no resurgence of States rights. He de ed
the Federal system as "a governmental
ganization which permits continued exis
ence of lesser subdivisions for limited pur-
poses" and said recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have made argument over States rights
more and more academic.
Some of the reform suggestions Mr. TAFT
threw out at the bar convention were famil-
iar. Others are new and bold.
For instance, he proposed a voluntary re-
drawing of State boundaries to relate them
to the "economic and practical realities and
necessities" of modern industrial civiliza-
tion.
This revision of State lines is particularly
desirable for coping with the increasing
complexities and contradictions involved-in
large multi-State metropolitan areas, he
said.
Among the other reforms suggested by
Mr. TAFT were:
Elimination of the electoral college system
to head off a possible fiasco in a presidential
election.
,
Solving the legislative reapportionment
problem by taking it out of the hands Cif
the courts and enacting a constitutional
amendment defining clearly the require-
ments for guaranteeing the principle of
representative government. -
Changir g the pr cess of amending the
Constitution by pr ? iding for ratification by
a two-thirds vote the people of two-thirds
of the States as eli as by a two-thirds vote
of bath Houses f Congress. This limitation
of the power the State legislatures would
offer "more Minty" to the process, he said.
Action b State and local governments to
eliminate uplication of governmental units
and to liminate the "balkanization" of
metrop 'tan areas by county and State lines.
A ift in the Federal tax base to give
the ates and local government more reve-
nu to deal with health, education, welfare,
a other such programs.
Turning to the question of the House, Mr.
AFT traced most of its ineptitude to the
wide dispersion of leadership on both the
majority and minority sides and took his
stand with those who favor trimming the
powers of the Rules Committee.
"Because of the power of the Rules Com-
mittee, along with the seniority feature in
connection with committees, the selection of
committee chairman and the right of com-
mittee chairmen to schedule or refuse to
schedule legislation for hearing, the centers
of power within the parties in Congress are
multiple, with no one being in a position
to direct even the procedural aspects of the
legislative body," he said. Mr. Tarr sug-
gested the undoing of the 1960 reform which
stripped the Speaker of the House?then Jo-
seph G. (Uncle Joe) Cannon?of many of
his arbitrary powers.
He said that reform was made at a time
when the legislative dominated the execu-
tive branch and that now with the executive
firmly in the saddle and Congress the under-
dog, the time has come to build up the power
of the speaker and centralize the sources of
procedural power within the two parties.
Discussions about the shortcomings of the
Federal Government usually wind up with
the finger of accusation pointed at Congress.
On the 535 Members of the House and
Senate falls the responsibility of overseeing
the vast Federal establishment of nearly 2.5
million employees and 2,300 executive depart-
ments, agencies, offices, and bureaus.
They are called upon to review and author-
ize Federal spending at a rate approaching
8100 billion a year and to pass upon the pro-
grams submitted by the White House.
In trying to cope with this formidable
burden of work, the legislative branch is em-
ploying substantially the same loose organi-
zation and the same ivy-covered ground rules
it developed by stops and starts between 1789
and the outbreak of World War I.
Taking their cue from the authors of the
Constitution, successive generations of con-
gressional leaders have erected their own
elaborate system of checks and balances
which enables the minority to frustrate the
ajority and clog the legislative machinery.
ttempts to grease the wheels of Congress
ha been frequent in the past. The last
serio s effort came in the Reorganization Act
of 19 passed after the legislators were
warned y a blue-ribbon committee of the
America Political Science Association that
it "must dernize its machinery and meth-
ods to fit ?dein conditions if it is to keep
the pace wit. a greatly enlarged and active
executive br h."
The 1946 act, however, failed to produce
any lasting cha es beyond a boost in con-
gressional salaries It did reduce the num-
ber of standing c mittees from 81 to 34,
but that cut eventu ly was nullified by the
creation of equally 1 e numbers of stand-
ing subcommittees.
Now, 17 years later, owing public dis-
taste for "do-nothing" co greases is applying
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dff
pressure for a new st:,b at rewrj.ting some
cirthe archaic rules of procedure,
Proposals to name a joint House-Senate re-
form study group to draw up reorganization
recommendations are now resting in com-
mittee in both houses, backed by bipartisan
groups of liberals.
The towering logjam of au:finished busi-
ness, mounting since early January, prob-
ably will prohibit action on any reform
committee resolution this year, but the
handwriting is on the wall and it will come
eventually.
Disclosures of unethical conduct by Con-
gressmen, including nepotism, padded pay-
rolls, junketing, conflicts of interest, to say
nothing of the extravagance displayed in the
building of the stately new House Office
Building, have aroused the ire of at least
some of the Nation's voters.
It is likely that there will be a reform group
named next year but the results are uncer-
tain. The only thing sure about a reorgan-
ization program is that it is likely to in-
clude a congressional pay increase.
In the past, senior Members have been
able to consistently beat down efforts to make
the House Rules Committee a con,duit rather
than a blockade against pending legislation;
and set a time limit on debate in the Senate;
to delegate authority for disposing of some
of the trivia that now takes up valuable time,
or to write a new code of ethics fOr Congress-
men.
Reform is overdue. Reform is inevitable.
But before it can come, it appears that
there will have to be a landslide election to
give one or the other of the two parties
enough new members and the overwhelming
majority needed to rout the entrenched sen-
ior members and ram through a meaning-
ful reform program.
[From the Toledo (Ohio) Blade, Aug. 25,
1963]
CALL To REFORM
The crisis in government described on this
page is neither unprecedented or revolu-
tionary. The history of government can be
recorded as one crisis after anether, each
defined in its own debate and possessed of
its own timeliness.
Usually these crises?the run-of-the-mill
type, so to speak?center upon specific issues
or proposals: a tariff policy, a tax bill, a
treaty. What sets today's debate apart is
that it probes to the vitals of the govern-
mental system itself, the process by which
other crises are resolved.
Even this aspect of the crisis discussed here
Is not unprecedented. But its crucial nature
Is the more emphasized by the fact that
similar crises-in-depth have occurred previ-
ously only when the Nation's very existence
was at stake, when the alternatives were to
change or to die. Thus the Founding Fathers
threw out the Articles of Confederation in
1787 to convert 13 rival entities into a viable
sovereignty, and the Civil War was fought to
free the national impulse to expand from the
restraining bonds of provincialism.
The urgency of the current crisis is fur-
ther highlighted by the fact that those who
recognize and define it are not all detached
bystanders. With the exception of Professor
Burns, each of the men whose views are out-
lined here is involved in the governmental
process. Together, they represent a broad
range of geographic, economic, social, and
political interests.
It is significant that none of these men
belong to the school of skeptics which sees
the crisis as heralding the collapse of Ameri-
can democracy. All are confident that the
United States can continue to build on its
present constitutional foundation. That
they find some of the superstructure in dire
need of renovation actually testifies to their
faith. Just as the superstructure they con-
demn was originally erected to replace an
earlier outworn one, so rthey want now to
remodel the procedures and powers of gov-
ernment to give new vitality to the old
framework.
The crisis, then, is one pf dynamic politics.
This can be seen in the fact that so much of
today's controversy is sparked by decisions
of the Supreme Court. As Justice Harlan
told the American Bar Association this
month, it is a "serious mischief" to con-
clude that "all deflcier4ies in our societ
which have failed of onrrection by other
means should find a cure in the courts."
But resort to the courts is inevitable when
normal political method
iz become so fossil-
ed that they deny the negro the opportu-
nity to obtain his rights or deprive millions
t
of ciaizens of fair repr sentation in their
State and National legis atures.
The 1963 crisis in American Government
marks another turning point in our develop-
ment. History teaches lis that there is no
cause for despair. But it also teaches us
that it could be disastrous to ignore the
summons to reform.
TRII3UTE TO SENATOR PEARSON
FOR HIS SPEECH ON CUBA
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last
week I was privileged tto hear a part of
the fine speech on Cuba delivered by the
distinguished junior Senator from Kan-
sas [Mr. PEARSON]. Unfortunately, I
was called from the Chamber before I
could snake any comment on his speech.
So I take this opportunity to compliment
?and commend him for the forward-look-
ing ideas he expressed in the speech he
delivered on that occasion.
I am impressed by 'the fact that he
has considered the possibilities as to
what might be done in the future when
Cuba, once again is free He also empha-
sized the part the Organization of Amer-
ican States should take in planning for
this possibility, which without question
will become a fact. Re then enumerated
five essential elements; of a free society
which should be consid,ered by this inter-
American organization,
In his conclusion, he outlined three
reasons why we should now prepare for
the rehabilitation of Cuba; and he went
Into some detail in explaining them.
Toward the end of this speech he made
this pertinent commen$:
Mr. President, I have tried to see beyond
the curve of the horizon, to the day when
Cuba once again will be free.
I wish to take this oCcasion to compli-
ment, the distinguished junior Senator
from Kansas for making a distinct con-
tribution to our understanding of' the
Cuban problem, and also for attempt-
ing?as he stated so succinctly?to see
beyond the curve of the horizon, into the
future, and to make plans accordingly.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohit. Mr. President,
will the distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana yield briefly to me, to enable me to
comment on that subject?
Mr. MANS1-01ELD. I am glad to yield.
Mr. YOUNG of OhiO. Mr. President,
It was my privilege a14o to be seated in
this Chamber throughout the great
speech the Senator from Kansas [Mr.
PEARSON] made last week.
I desire to pay my respect to the jun-
ior Senator from Kansas. Indeed, I feel
that by his speech, he Made a great con-
tribution, and he deserves the congratu-
11
lations of all Senators for the leader-
ship he has demonstrated so soon after
becoming a Member of the Senate.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Has morning bush-
ness been concluded?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business is closed.
.12.1111Pmem..
THE NUCLEAR; TEST BAN TREATY
The Senate, as in Committee of the
Whole; resumed the consideration of
Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.) , the
treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in
the atmosphere, in outer space, and un-
derwater.
Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, after
weeks of studying the issue of the nuclear
test ban treaty, as a member of the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee?having
listened to testimony before our com-
mittee and having read the lengthy argu-
ments on both sides?I have come to the
conclusion that it is in the best interest
of the American people to ratify the
treaty.
In doing so, I am laboring under no
illusions about the character of the chief
cosigner, the Soviets, or about the limi-
tations of the treaty. It is a matter of
balancing the risks.
I favor our making every possible effort
to achieve agreements on nuclear test-
ing?and on disarmament and peace?
with the Soviets so long as these agree-
ments incorporate adequate safeguards.
We in the Senate will ratify the flu..
cleartest ban treaty without any illu-
sions as to its limitations. We know full
well that the leopard has not changed
his spots.
Even during the final negotiations at
Moscow, Khrushchev joined in a public
declaration calling for the "liberation of
South Korea" from the U.S. "imperial-
ists." No doubt, the Soviets still intend
to "bury" us.
As President Kennedy said in his ad-
dress to the Nation on July 26:
Nations cannot afford in these matters to
rely simply on the good faith of their ad-
versaries.
We are not deceiving ourselves about
our adversary. Neither are we deceiving
ourselves about this treaty. It is not the
millennium, as the President said.
And, as he said further, it does not
"mean an end to the threat of nuclear
war. It will not reduce nuclear stock-
piles; it will not halt the production of
nuclear weapons; it Will not resolve all
conflicts, or cause the Communists to
forgo their ambitions."
Let me say, further, that I firmly be-
lieve that the Soviets will not hesitate to
break this treaty when it serves their pur-
pose to do so. We are fully aware of Rus-
sia's record of broken agreements.
I have been furnished with some in-
teresting statistics on our past negotia-
tions with the Soviets. I have no reason
to doubt these figures. During the last
25 years, the United States has had 3,400
meetings with the Soviets?including
Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, Panmunjom,
and Geneva. The negotiators spoke 106
million words-100 volumes. All this
talk led to 52 major agreements, and the.
Soviets have broken 50 of them.
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : 01A-RDP65B00383R000100210004-6