INTERIM REPORT ON MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

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kept resources of nature be if the people are
not in a, position to enjoy them firsthand?
Li the early days of our Nation, he com-
ments, men had to be more rugged physi-
cally. Today we have machines to do our
work- and to carry us around, so we have
- greater need for outdoor exercise.
And as,he speaks he looks up wistfully from
the chair in which he is seated in his
spacious Washington, D.C., office and fixes his
gaze on the large colored pictures on his
wall showing the rugged Tetons of Wyoming
and Rainbow 'Bridge in Utah. Obviously, he
would feel more at home climbing the-moun-
tainous heights or tramping the trails in the
open. His lean, muscular build shows that
he is advocating that which he knows best.
True fitness results from a balanced ap-
proach, according to the Secretary, having to
do with the body, 'the mind, and the soul.
Also there is a' negative aspect about it?the
leaving behind of those things which are
harmful or destruchve in order to gain the
better ?venial positive purposes in life. "We
are much better oft with clean habits," he
observes., And his serious concern for the
welfare of youth shows up clearly as he goes
on, "If young people start off right, they
will have every chance of living a long and
happy life."
The importance of personal living habits
and right mental attitudes, with spiritual
undergirding, comes out again as Secretary
of the Interior Udall concludes, "The future
greatness of our country rests ultimately on
what kind of individuals we are and whether
each person achieves his own standard of
excellence."
Indeed,' if the Secretary's ideals are fully
developed, his "monuments" will be not only
in the form of new national parks, preserved
wilderness areas, and conserved natural re-
sources, but also in the better health of our
citizenry, the balanced growth of our young
people, and a greater strength of our' Nation
as a whole.
- ,
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION REC-
ORDS CONCERNING GOV. GEORGE'
C. WALLACE OF ALABAMA
Mr. MORSE, Mr. President, in the
Washington Post of yesterday, Septem-
ber 8, and the Washington Star of yes-
terday, September 8, appeared two edi-
torials critical of the senior Senator
from Oregon because he disclosed that
the Governor of Alabama receives dis-
ability allowance for a service-connected
psychoneurosis, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the two editorials be printed at
'this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the edi-
torials were ordered to be printed in the
Ricosa, as follows:
[Prom the-Wa'shington (p.c.) Post,
, Sept. 8, 1983]
? TUE GovEalloa's DISABILITY
CrOv,Peorge C. Wallace of Alabama should
not be reproached or censured for a psycho-
neurotic, disability incurred in the military.
service of ids country. It is unfortunate
that his Medical record has been made a
part of the political controversy in which
the Governor has been involved. The files
of the Veterans' Admipistration are not
closed to Congress and probably should not
be,qofe.94., 4gainst legitimate congressional
or public inquiry essential to protect the
Government against fraud and irregularity.
But it is regrettable that Senator MORSE felt
odMpelled to use for a political purpose a
medical history that private doctor-patient
ethics would keep confidential. fi is one
thing to pe angry at Governor Wallace for
What?sur,ely is a misguided policy. It is
80810thing L,else to reproach him for an in-
capacitating disability incurred In line of
duty.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
Sept. 8, 1983]
Ovx. Limns
By any standard; the exchange of insults
between Senator MORSE and Alabama's Gov-
ernor Wallace has been an unedifying spec-
tacle. And it goes from bad to worse.
We hold no brief for Governor Wallace.
His erratic behavior in trying to force the
closing of certain schools in his State is as
reprehensible as it is senseless. Even so there
are areas in which a man is not legitimately
subject to attack.
One of these has to do with war-incurred
disabilities. Senator MORSE, asserting that
the Governor had questioned his mental
competence, returned the compliment by
-citing "official records" to show that Mr.
Wallace has been "granted service-connected
disability for psychoneurosis, for which an
evaluation of 10 percent was assigned." This
condition apparently resulted from flying
combat bomber missions in World War U.
Mr. Wallace was honorably discharged from
the service and was awarded the Air Medal.
Senator MORSE mentioned the Veterans'
Administration, although he did not disclose
the source of his information pertaining to
the Wallace medical record. A VA spokes-
man said officials there were "puzzled" since
Senator MORSE had neither requested nor re-
ceived their records. The spokesman added
that a Member of Congress Is one of the few
persons entitled by law to receive such in-
formation, but that it is given with the un-
derstanding that it is "confidential."
Whatever the fact as to this, a man's rec-
ord showing a service-connected disability
ought to be off limits for all participants in
any name-calling contest.
Mr. MORSE. For the benefit of the
editors of the Washington Post and the
Washington Star, may I refresh their
recollections in ,regard to what their
public duty is as journalists. When men
are elected to high public office, their
qualifications to hold their office becomes
a subject which the public has a right to
know about. The Senator from Oregon
received most of his information about
the Governor of Alabama from Alabama.
There is no question about the accu-
racy of the statement made in the REC-
ORD by the Senator from Oregon in re-
spect to the fact that the Governor of
Alabama receives disability payments for
a psychoneurotic condition. I think it is
rather pertinent to have the public know
when any public official is holding pub-
lic office and is not mentally sound or
has a past record of mental unsound-
ness?in this ease ,psychoneurosis. It is
regrettable that the Governor suffered
that malady. The senior Senator from
Oregon paid him high tribute for 'a bril-
liant and dedicated:tar record. But the
fact is that the Governor liecariie sick.
The fact is that he is drawing pay for a
psychoneurosis condition suffered during
the war. Many of the people of Alabama
are disturbed about the behavior of their
Governor. I was supplied with some of
the information I used from Alabama.
In my judgment the Governor's psycho-
neurotic history should be pill:ilia-knowl-
edge for the public to determine to what
extent that condition apparently brings
forth some of the Governor's conduct,
such as the position he is taking in Ala-
bama this sad day.
I wish to say to the editors of the
Washington post and- the Washington
Star that whenever a public official; in
the opinion of the senior Senator from
Oregon, is disqualified in any way to hold
a public trust, the senior Senator from
Oregon, as long as he sits in this body,
intends to make that information known
to the public. In my judgment, that
happens to be the duty, that I owe my
oath of office. It is a sad thing, but I
cannot escape the conclusion that a good
deal of the bigotry, racism and intoler-
ance displayed by the Governor of Ala-
bama probably was caused by the fact
that he does have a record of suffering
from a psychoneurosis.
Further may I say to the editors of the
Washington Post and the Washington
Star once a person is placed in a posi-
tion of public trust he is not entitled to
the protect'on of secrecy in respect to
his qualifications to hold such a position
of public trust. Any mental unsoundness
involves a matter so vital to the welfare
of the public that the public should not
be kept in the dark about it as the edi-
tors of the Washington Post and Wash-
ington Star apparently seem to believe.
The fact that a public official is a vet-
eran gives him no more right to be pro-
tected from public knowledge of his Um-
itations than anyone else..
Once a person enters the fish bowl of '
public service he is not entitled to nor
has any right to expect that any of
his defects or limitations which bear
upon his ability to serve the public should
be concealed from the public. The edi-
tors of the Washington Post and the
Washington Star have permitted their
prejudices to cause them to draw the
distinction between the rights of privi-
lege of a private citizen not holding a
public trust and the rights of public
officials.
INTERIM REPORT ON MILITARY
IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED
LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommit-
tee, of which I am chairman, has today
filed with the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices an interim report on the military
implications of the proposed limited test
ban treaty. The report is also being re-
leased to the press and the public.
The report is the product of an ex-
tensive and exhaustive inquiry by the
subcommittee into the military and tech-
nical aspects of the various nuclear test
ban proposals. During the inquiry,
which commenced last September, testi-
mony was received from 24 witnesses.
Among them were many of the most in-
formed and knowledgeable persons in the
Nation in this field. A broad range of
testimony was received from both sci-
entific and military experts and from
both proponents and opponents of the
treaty.
The overall purpose of the inquiry was
to develop as fully and factually as?pos-
sible the available military and techni-
cal information bearing on the subject
matter to insure that the Senate would
have available to it essentially the same
body of military and-technical evidence
as is available to the executive branch
in its formulation of nuclear test ban
policies. After the negotiation of the
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,eptern,be; 9
SFNATE
Moscow treaty the subcommittee focused
its attention on the potential impact of
that treaty upon the future of our Mili-
tary Establishment and strategic forces.
The interim report is directed specifi-
cally to the partial test ban agreement
and the military advantages and disad-
vantages which flow or might flow from
it. Political considerations and matters
of foreign and international affairs, as
such, are not within the scope of the
report.
The report discusses, within the limits
of security classification, the military,
technical, and security problems which
are associated with the treaty banning
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer
space, and underwater.
The report is signed by all members
of thebcommittee xbt tne enarof
from 1essachus9tts LMr. SALTONSTALL1.
The Senators so signing the report are
myself, as chairman, and the Senator
from Missouri [Mr. SymINGT014], the
Senator from Washington [Mr. JACK-
soli]. the Senator from South Carolina
[Mr. Tunersome], the Senator from
Maine [Mrs. Seam], and the Senator
from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER]. The
Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Mr:
Tnt?Ismatt wngitecimo to sink the re-
Port, ed a dissenting view. Additional
views were flied by the Senator from
Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON]. These are
included with the report.
From the testimony which the sub-
committee heard it was abundantly clear
that the ratification of the treaty would
result in some military and technical
disadvantages and risks for this Nation.
Indeed there was little controversy on
this point. There was, however, consid-
erable divergence of opinion among the
witnesses as to the extent and effect of
the risks and disadvantages and as to
whether they are acceptable on balance.
Some of the witnesses viewed the risks
and disadvantages as being of a miner
nature and as being fully acceptable from
the standpoint of our Nation's security.
Others assessed them as being of serious
and major proportions.
Among the military disadvantages as-
Sociated with the treaty discussed in the
report are the following:
First. The United States probably will
be unable to duplicate Soviet ,achieve-
ments in very high yield weapon tech-
nology.
Second. The United States will be un-
able to acquire necessary data on the ef-
fects of very high yield atmospheric ex-
plosions.
Third. The United States will be un-
able to acquire data on high altitude
weapons effects.
Fourth. The United States will be un-
able to determine with sonfldence the
performance and reliability of any ABM
system developed without benefit of at-
mospheric operational system tests.
Fifth. The United States will be unable
to verify the ability of its hardened sec-
ond-strike missile systems to survive
close-in high-yield nuclear explosions.
Sixth. The United States will be un-
able to verify the ability of its missile re-
entry bodies under defensive nuclear at-
tack to survive and to penetrate to the
target without the opportunity to test
nose cone and warhead designs in a nu-
clear environment under dynamic re-
entry conditions.
Seventh. The treaty will provide the
Soviet Union with an opportunity to
equal U.S. accomplishments in submeg-
aton weapon technology.
Eighth. The treaty will deny to the
United States a valuable source of in-
formation on Soviet nuclear weapons
capabilities.
There were, of course, counterargu-
ments. It was contended for example,
that the Soviets would be equally in-
hibited. It was accurately asserted that
progress could be made in some im-
portant areas without the benefit of at-
mospheric testing and Mat the test ban
would not prevent qualitative improve-
ments being made in our Weapon systems
either as a result of underground testing
or by virtue of nonnuclear technology.
In addition, the testimony was unani-
mous that, except in the field of high
yield weapons, the United States today
holds a clear and commanding lead in
nuclear weapons and weapon systems.
This superiority is said to result from a
larger and more diversified stockpile of
nuclear weapons, by more numerous,
varied and sophisticated delivery sys-
tems, and by a greater capacity to pro-
duce nuclear materials, weapons, and
delivery systems. It was strongly urged
by some witnesses that the treaty would
nd to stabilize this superiority.
As against this, howeyer, we learned
from the evidence that the Soviets have
overtaken and surpassed us in the de-
sign of very high yield nuclear weap-
ons; that they may possess knowledge of
weapons effects and antiballistic missile
programs superior to ours; ang that
under the terms of Me treaty it is
entirely possible that they will achieve
Parity with us in low yield weapon tech-
nology. Thus the effect of the treaty
is to legalize testing in the area where
we deem the Soviets to be inferior?that,
is low yield weapons?and deny to us
the benefits of desirable testing in the
higher yield areas where the Soviets are
or may be superior.
After carefully weighing all of the
evidence, the majority of the subcom-
mittee has concluded that the proposed
treaty will affect acivereely the future
quality of this Nation's ems, and that it
will result in serious, and perhaps for-
midable, military and technical disad-
vantages. Any military and technical
advantages which we Will derive from
the treaty do not, in the judgment of
the majority, counterbalance or out-
weigh the military and technical dis-
advantages. It appears that the Soviets
will not be inhibited to Me same extent
in those areas of nuclear weaponry
where we now deem them to be inferior.
Admittedly, however, other factors,
which are not within the scope of the
subcommittee report, are pertinent to a
final judgment on the treaty. Among
these are matters relating to interna-
tional affairs, foreign policy, and our
relations with other countries. As the
report states, When these are taken into
consideration, each individual must
reach his own judgment on the basis
of personal philosophy, Past experience,
current knowledge, and the relative
weight which he assigns to the various
factors involved.
Another matter discussed in the re-
port are the "safeguards" upon which
the Joint Chiefs of Staff conditioned
their approval of the treaty, and which
are designed to reduce to a minimum
the adverse effect of the treaty upon our
weapon programs. The subcommittee
considers it to be vital that, if the treaty
Is ratified, these safeguards be imple-
mented to the maximum extent. We
have already asked for and received cer-
tain assurances from the administration
with respect to these safeguards but have
not received the detailed information
which we feel should be furnished. If
the treaty is ratified it is the intent of
the subcommittee to monitor the imple-
mentation of the safeguards on a regular
basis.
However, as is said in the report, even
the most thorough implementation of
the safeguards will not reduce the mili-
tary and technical disadvantages of the
treaty. No safeguard can provide the
benefits of testing where testing is pro-
hibited and none can assure that this
Nation will acquire the highest quality
weapon systems of which it is capable
when the means for achieving that ob-
jective are denied.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I would
like to read' a few passages from the
subcommittee report. They are:
In considering the impact and effect of
the proposed test ban it is important to re-
member that for nearly two deeades this
Nation has been confronted by an. adversary
who has openly and repeatedly claimed that
his dominant goal is to destroy the nations
of the non-Communist world. Only because
we have maintained clear military superi-
ority and the ability to inflict unacceptable
damage upon him has the would-be aggressor
been deterred. The basis of our deterrence
is military superiority which, in turn, is
based on our nuclear weapon programs and
nuclear retaliatory forces.
It is vital to our survival that no step
be taken which in any manner would im-
pair the integrity and credibility of our de-
terrence or degrade the ability of our military
forces to protect our security if we should
be challenged militarily by a hostile nuclear
power.
Mr. President, I appreciate the indul-
gence of the Senate. After presentation
of the report of the Committee on For-
eign Relations, the members of the sub-
committee of which T am chairman will 1
from time to time have further remarks it
to make.
THE RAMPART CANYON DAM ON
THE YUKON
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last
Saturday some 90 Alaska citizens, mostly
from Anchorage and Fairbanks?the
State's two largest cities?but with rep-
resentation from other parts of our far-
flung 49th State, assembled at Mount Mc-
Kinley National Park to discuss ways
and means of speeding the development
of the State's virtually undeveloped hy-
droelectric resources through the river-
basin development of the mighty Yukon
at the Rampart Canyon damsite, This
site lies about 100 miles northwest of
Fairbanks in almost the geographical
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? st 15 6
beat way Out Would be to settle the issue
once and for all, even- though some loss of
territory WOUld be inirolved. The decision
of tI3,e U.S. 'Government- as announced on
July 18\was thus a diPlomatic or practical,
and not*. a legal disposition of the problem.
The prea t position of the Department of
State is as .11ows:
-""The 'On d States has a proud record of
poinplying W ? its international obligations
land faithfully ecuting treaties to which it
Ilea a reed 'y * Our disagreement with
, the Chanrilzal aw d, even though based on
valid arguments h d in good faith, seems
inconsistent, after had agreed in a treaty
? to accept the result hout appeal' with our
historical position and ?oals as a nation."
'There 'wOuld be 'sped advantages in our
relations witli/Vie-xicoi
" ,"A Boni Ce Of irritation w ich has troubled
United States-Mexican rela one for almost
100 years would' be rernoved;
?-"Arbitration would be restor as a means
of, peaceful' settlement of disp s between
the t7nited States and Mexico;
? "rile, Ohanaizal as an einotiona issue in
"which diatortS What otherw might
be a faiOrable vie* of the United tates,
WoUld be reindYed.' Settlement would am-
Mate Use of Ohainizal as the bas for
propagatini the view, -even through the e u-
eition sySteni, that the United States d
not live ? tiY its tre-aty commitments; an
- "The "Oonim- iinlits-and other enemies of
the Vnited.Srafes"iniclexieo WOuld be denied
One
of the-prOpagalida weapons they are using
to injure United States-Mexican relations.
-"The `settlement , should also have signift-
eant a,clyantages for El Paso:
"An international dispute which has seri-
Ouely imPeded the natural direction of
growth of El Paso would be removed and har-
? nionious relations between the sister cities
Of, ,E1 PaSO and Ciudad Juarez would be
strengthened;
-
"The deVeloRment of El Paso, especially
traffic ciraulation and the provision of public
utilitiee, Would be Materially improved with
the incorporation into El Paso of the upper
haf of gordova, Island;
"The ,41.nuid On the title to the lands in
tle OhaMizA'traet remaining in the United
States, *111613. has Plagued property Owners
for s,':Wae10"0-pars, **Mad be removed;
revelule base in El Paso would be
considerably enfianFed because a blighted
area in 'El Paso would be improved and con-
t government; ribute its fair share to the cost of municipal
, ? ? ? ?
? 'Settlement of the dispute will at last per-
mit won't-1On of the international flood con-
trol meaSuieS eeheritial for the proper pro-
? tectiOnOk El -Paso;
"The' international 'bridges at El Paso &Mid
.be replaced with' structures in harmony with
the needs of the-over 600,000 people who live
in the ElP*i-Cindad Juarez area; and
O "The, ,reestablishinent of the Rio Grande
as the boundary *Mild facilitate border con-
trol,, health control, and other inspection
. 1:(iectsures,- as well as beautify the riverfront
on both Sides of the river." 10,'
, /TX:WISP/ie. OF sErrimssErrr
The Settlement on which the two Gov n-
O inents agreed has a double purpose: end
the dispute with Mexico and to es ish a
-fixed riYel-b-oundary between El o and
Ciudad "J'ilarez: " The negotiate of the
- agreement have also had in the pro-
,
tection of existing property in rests in the
46 a"-reSult, the settleme t calls for the
uggriOnVrexT8-6; and th exchange be-
tweeMegfeicafict-the Uni d States, of sev-
eralafferent 13'aieels of lalld inside and just
Outsidetlie'dhaiiiiiia. Specifically, the agree-
mentlnapOraterthe following provisions:
,
10' DePartmen of State, "The Chamizal Set-
tlement?" July 1963, 5-16.
1. The -United Stales will transfer to Mex-
ico a net amount of 437 acres of territory now
under American jurisdiction, approximately
the area that the Arbitration Commission
awarded in 1911. Of this amount marked
for Mexico, 366 acres will come from the
disputed Chamizal zone and 71 acres from
U.S. territory east of Cordova Island.
2. Cordova Island will be divided equally
between the United States and Mexico. Each
nation will have 193 acres. This transfer of
territory to the United States is to equalize
the transfer to Mexico of land necessary to
establish the river as the boundary.
3. The Rio Grande will be relocated, be-
ginning at a point marked "A" on the map
Included in this study. The new channel
will be concrete lined, and will make pos-
sible an improvement of properties on both
sides.
4. Both Governments will acquire title to
all the land and improvements in the areas
assigned to them, "free of any limitation on
ownershp or encumbrance' of any kind in-
cluding private titles." No paAnents will be
made, as between the Governments, for the
lands transferred.
6. The United States will receive compen-
sation for the 382 structures in the Chamizal
zone and to the east of Cordova Island that
will be transferred to Mexico. However, pay-
ment will be made by a Mexican bank (Banco
Nacional Hipotecario Urbano y de Obras
Publicas) and not by the Mexican Govern-
ent. The value of the improvements pass-
g to Mexico has been set at $4,675,000.
. The two Governments will share equally
th cost of relocating and constructing th
ne river channel, as well as the cost f
buil ? g the new bridges. Each ?overrun t,
howev , will assume the expenses that 11
arise o its side of the river in the cou e of
making ese improvements.
7. After ?oth Governments have a roved
the conven ion and passed the le slation
necessary to plement the agree ent, the
Government the United States 1 acquire
by purchase or? ondemnation t properties
to be transferre to Mexico. is process
will take place wi in a perio of time upon
which the two ?undary ommissioners
agree.
8. When all acquisi ons nd arrangements
have been completed, e U.S. Boundary
Commissioner will ce ? fy to this effect.
Both Commissioners I then proceed to
demarcate the new b nd . The record of
their action will b ubmltd to both Gov-
ernments for thei pproval.
9. The Intern ional Boundry Commis-
sion will be "c a ged with the r ocation, im-
provement, d maintenance Ok the river
channel, as ell as the construct n of the
new bridg .
10. Th nationality of present o former
residen in the areas to be transfe d will
not b affected, nor will the jurisdic n of
the overnments over legal proceedin or
ov the laws applicable to acts or conchsct
1 e areas before the exchange, be altere
To clarify for the reader the transfers
exchanges involved in the settlement, th
map on pages 26 and 27 has been divided into \,?
three sections. Section 1 includes all of the
Chamizal lying south of the line of 1852. Of
this area, 366 acres are to be cut to Mexico.
About 1,750 persons live in the part to be
transferred, most in the narrow western
region. The land in this section assigned
to Mexico contains about 233 single dwell-
ings, many of them owner-occupied. Sev-
eral factories and business establishments
are in the zone and will be affected by the
transfer. It is through this section that the
streets of El Paso lead to the international
bridges over the Rio Grande and directly into
the center of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. Almost
1" Department of State, press release: July
18, 1963.
110
all of the people "in' the area are American
citizens of Mexican descent. Because the
tract is disputed territory, clear titles have
not always been given to the landholders.
Section 2,' which is to b transferred to
the United States, consists entirely of un-
developed land. Accordin to plans, about
50 acres will be used to various Federal
installations, and, depen ing on the action
of Congress, the remain er may be given to
the city of El Paso for a ecreational area and
for other purposes re ating to the general
welfare, or sold for p ivate enterprises.
In section 3, whic will go to Mexico, there
are about 248 dw lings. The population
is about 1,775, ? new elementary school
is in this area, d most homes are more
modern and of reater value than those in
section 1.
Of the ent e acreage to be transferred
to Mexico, re than half consists of agri-
cultural lan and, stockyards. All the area
marked for the United States is in section
2 and all is ow undeveloped.
LIESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED
The s ttlement involves various legal and
politics questions, some of which have not
yet ben resolved. For example, the U.S.
Gove nment does not admit, nor can it ad-
mit that the Chamizal is Mexican territory
in eeping with the arbitration award of
1 1. Legally, the United States must insist
its ownership of the entire tract, for
therwise it could never acquire title to the
properties involved in the settlement, espe-
cially through condemnation proceedings.
Again, since all American titles to land and
buildings will become void as soon as they
are transferred to Mexico, it is necessary for
the United States to own them up to the
moment of transfer. Leading court decisions
hold that when two states or nations agree
on a boundary, even though it be a compro-
mise line, the conclusive presumption is that
such line has always been the true boundary.
The courts have accordingly ruled that titles
held under grants from one country to land
placed by a compromise in another country
are entirely void.in? For these reasons, all
Property claims and all details involved in
moving the river channel must be completed
before the title to any tract is transferred
to Mexico.
In its present form, the agreement between
the Governments of the United States and
Mexico is a memorandum based on diplo-
matic discussions and an exchange of notes.
It. is technically a modus vivendi that must
be converted into a convention or treaty
before the two Governments may formally
approve it. But since the memorandum
contains the essential details of the agree-
ment, there is no reason to anticipate diffi-
culty in negotiating the necessary
convention.
The next step will require action by the
legislative branches of both governments
to confirm the convention and pass the
measures necessary to put it into effect.
First, the Senates of the two nations must ap-
prove the convention, then their Congresses
must enact the proper enabling legislation
and appropriate the funds necessary to carry
ut the terms of the convention.
The outlook in Mexico is favorable, since
th majority of leaders in the country ap-
pe to regard the settlement as a diplomatic
vict. y. Aecording to the Mexican Consti-
tutio treaties are confirmed by a simple
majori of the Senate.11a Because of the
special osition of leadership the President
occupies n the Mexican political system,
he should ? aye no trouble under normal con-
111 Henders v. Poindexters Lessee, 12
Wheaton 530; e is Croix v. Chamberlain,
12 Wheaton 599,
110-onatitution Mexico, 1917, art. 76,
par. I.
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cONGRESSIONAL RECORQ-- SENATE September 9
ditions in securing this me4ority.1" Al-
though the Constitution et Meekica proscribees
certain types of treaties, boundary settle-
ments are not specifically forbidden. Article
27,, however, declares that nuim national do-
n:lain is inalienable and imprescriptible."
Yet this restriction has not beeu applied in.
respect to rectifications along the boundary
and settlement of water right_s . The con-
vention of February 10, 1933, for the rectifi-
cation of the Rio Grande inethe Valley of
Juarez-El Paso, and the treaty of February 3,
1944, respecting the distribution of waters
between Mexico and the United States, both
of which Mexico has faithfully carried out,
are precedents for the action cif the Mexican
President in the present case.?5 As head of
the Partido Revolucionario Inatituelenal
(PRI), which controls both benches of the
Congress, President Lopez Mateos :should
have no problem in securing, such legisla-
tive measures as may be necessary to carry
out Mexico's part .of the agreement, unless
there is some unusual and unexpected
development
THE PROSPECT Iaj WASHiNGTON
The outcome in Washingtonjs lees certain.
Whet action the Senate and Congress will
take is anyone's guess at this moment. The
proposed disposition of national territory?
or tarrit.Pry that many persons in the United
States consider to be national?could arouse
deep feelings of opposition in Washington
and throughout the country. The two U.S.
Senators from Texas are sharply divided.
Reflex W. YARBOROUGH, Democrat, approves
the agreement in full and has pledged his
support in its behalf. As a former resident
of El Paso, Senator YARBOROugIA sees many
benefits that the agreement will bestow on
this border area. On the other hand, the
Republican Senator from Texas, JOHN
TOWER, strongly objectseal
The position of Senator TOWER is inter-
esting and important. He says that his op-
position to the settlement is based primar-
ily on the belief that a State pf the Union
must not be "dismembered" without its con-
sent. He therefore insists that the people
of Texas, acting through the legislature,
must approve the settlement before he votes
in favor of Wig Of course, the Senator is
entirely within his rights in defining the con-
ditions under which he will vote pro or con;
' legally, however, there is a question as to
whether the people or the government of
Texas has any control over the ultimate deci-
sion. When Texas was voted in the Union on
March 1, 1845, the Congress at Washington
agreed to annexation on this condition: "said
State to be formed subject to the adjustment
by this Federal Government of all questions
of boundary that may arise with other gov-
ernments."11? In a recent opinion, the At-
torney General of Texas has concluded that
the approval of the people of Texas is not
I" William L. Tucker, "The Mexican Gov-
eminent Today" (Minneapolis, 1957), chs. 4
and 7.
114 Constitution of Mexico, 1917, art. 15.
116 Rodolfo Cruz Miramoiates, "Derecho In-
ternational Fluvial" (Mexico, DF.. 1950,
passttn. Also see his discussion in "Lectures
Juriclicas" (Universidad de Chihuahua, Es-
cuela de Derecho, 1962), No. 10, 75 ff.
Robert E. Scott, "Mexican Government
in Transition" (Urbana, 1959), ceas. 6, 7, and
8.
114 Paso Herald-Post, July 18, 1963; the
El Paso Times, July 17, 1983. Senator
GRUENING, of Alaska, praises the Kennedy
settlemeht, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 109,
No. 110, July 22, 1963, 12375-12378.
I" The Dallas Morning News and the El
Paso Times, July 19, 1963.
Joint resolution, Mar. 1, 1845, 5 Stat-
utes, 797.
necessary to legalize, the transfer of the
Charnizal territory to ,Mexico.120
Once the Senate of the United States has
confirmed the convention, if it decides to do
so by the necessary two-thirds vote, both
Houses of Congress melst pass legislation ap-
propriating the funds necessary to buy the
acreage that will go to Mexico and to effect
the changes and improvements on the Amer-
icon side of the river.At this moment when
other aspects of President Kennedy's gr legis-
lativet
program are in doubt; it is not possible
to make safe predic one.= The outcome
respecting the Chant al agreement would
seem to depend in part on the right timing
in submitting the tissue to Congress for
aceion.
In the event that opoeition arises in the
Senate and the two-thirds vote required to
confirm the convention does not materialize,
does that kill the Chatnizal agreement? Not
necessarily. Another approach is still avail-
able, although the treaty route appears to
be better in the present case. The agree-
ment; may beapproved by means ,of a joint
resolution passed by a simple Majority in
both Houses of Congress. This method has
been used on various occasions when action
on treaties has been 'blocked by a Senate
minority?for example; in the annexation of
Texas in 1845 and Hawaii in 1895. The so-
called Green-Sayre *mulct, according to
which a subcommittee of the Senate's Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations acts closely
with the executive department in working
out the details of a fofeign-policy project to
be adopted by a joint fesolution, may afford
an effective method 4 overcoming obstrue-
tioniem.122 It must be borne in mind, how-
ever, that in keeping With article VC, para-
graph 2 of the Constitution, a joint resolu-
tion, as a "law," must "be made in pursu-
ance' of the Constitution, and it would be
subject to stricter limitations than a treaty
made "under the authority of the United
States." Given this important constitu-
tional distinction between laws and treaties,
method remains as a possibility if the con-
vention would be a safer procedure to use
in transferring to a foreign country territory
under the jurisdiction of a State in the
Union.lea Even so, the joint-resolution
method remains as a efossibility if the con-
vention encounters streng minority opposi-
tion in the Senate.
THE TASTE, AHEAD
,
After the hurdles in Washington and
Meeico City have been overcome, much work
lies ahead in El Paso. The Federal Govern-
ment must buy or legally condemn all the
properties in the area destined for Mexico,
plus land on the north side of the river, esti-
mated at 58 acres, needed for the right-of-
way of the channel.
The channel of the river must be moved
and rebuilt. Plans should be drawn up to
develop, utilize, and serVe the territory along
the north bank of the river, and these plans
must be put into effect The issue concern-
ing a suitable highway along the north bank
of the river must be disposed ofe24 Some
3,725 persons must be moved out of the area
affected and provided with housing, schools,
le, The El Paso Times, July 17, 1963. The
Atto:rney General has refused to file suit to
test the validity of the Oharnizal agreenient.
See El Paso Herald-Post, July 31, 1963. A
suit is pending respecting the constitution-
ality of the transfer of territory from Texas.
See the El Paso Times, Aug. 6, 1963.
525 See U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 5,
1963, 44; the El Paso Times, Aug. 6, 1963.
'22 Elmer Plischke, "Cenduct of American
Diplomacy" (Princeton, 1961), 400-403.
14' C. Herman Pritchett, "The American
Constitution" (New York, 1959), 333-3313.
1st The El Paso Times, tluly 24, 1963.
i
and other facilities elsewhere in El Paso. It
is estimated that the cost to the Federal
Government could finally amount to between
$30 and $50 million. The city of El Paso
and El Paso County must assume addi-
tional costs and responsibilities. At best,
between 3 and 5 years may be required to
complete the project in its various phases.125
Measured in any terms, the Chamizal set-
tlement is a major undertaking, and it is
of special significance to the inhabitants of
the El Paso-Juarez area. From the local
point of view, regardless of other considera-
tions, the settlemennt offers an opportunity,
long overdue, to eliminate a kind of "no
man's land," much of it vacant and unim-
proved or occupied by substandard houses.
The settlement opens the way for a bene-
ficial program of rebuilding, unique because
of its international aspects. It matches on
the American side of the river the ambitious
undertaking of Mexico in its Programa Na-
cional Fronterizo that is rapidly changing
the few of Ciudad Juarez and other Mexican
cities along the border. The social and eco-
nomic interdependence of El Paso and Juarez
has been firmly established during the many
interesting years of their history as twin
cities facing each other across the low banks
of the Rio Grande. If finally put into effect
the accord that Presidents Kennedy and
Lopez Mateos have reached should materially
advance the well-being of both communities
at the Pass of the North, reducing the physi-
cal barriers between them and stimulating
the development of mutual interests, both
economic and cultural.
..11001111
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, today
marks the beginning of formal debate in
the Senate over ratification of the limited
test ban treaty by the terms of which
further nuclear tests in the atmosphere,
underwater, and in outer space are to be
prohibited for such time as the treaty
shall remain in force.
We have already experienced in this
Chamber a great deal of comment con-
cerning this proposed treaty most of
which, I daresay, stressed the advantages
to be gained through its ratification with
very few remarks devoted to a consider-
ation of the risks involved and the con-
sequent disadvantages which might ac-
crue to the United States. Certainly,
these, too, must be harshly examined and
evaluated in order to deternaine whether
all these purported advantages do in-
deed, far outweigh the cumulative risks.
Without presuming to suggest or de-
fine the parameters within which the de-
bate should be confined, I will, neverthe-
less pose certain questions which I feel
must be satisfactorily resolved during the
course of debate on this treaty. Other-
wise, I shall personally feel that I pos-
sess insufficient information upon which
to exercise an informed judgment when
vote is taken.
I am not unmindful of the fact that
one of the parties to this agreement is
the same country which, in recent years,
among other things, ruthlessly repressed
the Hungarian uprising; erected a
shameful wall of tyranny around Ber-
lin; surreptitiously deployed ballistic
missiles in Cuba and, after months of
stealthy preparations, shattered a mora-
torium on nuclear testing which had
"5 El Paso Herald-Poet, July 18, 1963.
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19 6'3 CONGRESSIONAL:-
been in effect for 34 months. It has also
seen flf, To abrogate virtually , all the
agreements and treaties it has ever en-
tered into with other nations whenever
It served its purpose to do so.
My questions, however, do not concern
the good faith or trustworthiness of the
Nation with which we are here dealing
as the questionable reliability of the
leaders of the Soviet Union in abiding
by the letter and spirit of their obliga-
tions is already a disgraceful matter of
common knowledge and public record.
I would point out, however, that *in
? August of lait year at Geneva, a pro-
? posal by the United States, which was
very similar to the treaty now Tinder
debate, met with adamant intransigence
on the part of the Soviet Union and I
consider it more than mere passing?
strange that suddenly the Soviet Union
found this limited agreement to be so
vital to her national interests that it was
negotiated, initialed, and signed with
remarkable expeatency and haste. The
poor draftsmanship of its provisions, and
the utter lack of definition of its terms
not only reflects this haste but defeats
its very purpose through the varied in-
terpretations to which it is subject.
The 1961-62 series of nuclear tests
conducted by the Soviet Union were mas-
? sive, sophisticated, and impressive.
Ours, on the other hand, were too hastily
contrived to give us all the data which
we Might otherwise have acquired had
there been time for more orderly prep-
aration. With this knowledge of rela-
tive testing in mind, I would then ask:
First. Has the Soviet Union, through
Its most recent atmospheric test series,
now achieved a nuclear advantage over
the United States of a military or sci-
entific significance?
? Second. Are we reaSonably confident
and secure in the knowledge that our
ballistic missile retaliatory second strike
force will survive and operate in a nu-
clear environment?
Third. In seeking to slow down the
arms race as a purported advantage of
this treaty, will we adopt nuclear parity
as the basis for deterring thermonuclear
war rather than nuclear superiority?
? Fourth, Will the treaty, as claimed,
prevent the proliferation of nuclear
Weapons when France and Red China
refused to be bound and when under-
ground testing is sanctioned for all na-
tions whether they sign or not?
Fifth: How is one to define or inter-
Pret that which shall constitute an un-
derground test within the meaning of
article I, section 1, subsection (a) of the
treaty?
Sixth. Do we possess the capability to
detect all nuclear detonations occurring
In the three environments prohibited by
the treaty?
Eleventh. Can any significant advances
in nuclear technology be achieved by
clandestine testing in those three en-
ironwents at yields which may possibly
below our ability to detect?
Vigil& Will we be able to differen-
tiate between a Shallow underground ex-
plosion and an atmospheric burat deton-
ated close to the surface of the earth?
No. 141-5
Ninth. Can we, in fact, maintain an
adequate readiness to test in those pro-
hibited environments in the event the
treaty should suddenly be abrogated?
Tenth. Will our 'scientific laboratories
and the interest of our scientists de-
teriorate under a treaty which permits
only underground testing?
Eleventh. Will we be restrained from
ever determining feasibility, developing
and deploying any defense whatever
against ballistic missile attack?
Twelfth. Will this treaty permit the
Soviet Union to achieve equality in the
low yield tactical weapons where it is
generally acknowledged that we have an
advantage and yet, preclude us from
ever achieving equality in the high yield
weapon where the Soviet Union is un-
questionably superior.
Thirteenth. To what extent can we
satisfy, through underground testing, the
military and scientific requirements
which were to have been investigated
by atmospheric tests planned for next
year?
Fourteenth. What is the human toler-
ance for radioactivity and what is the
truth about the danger of atmospheric
contamination, even at previous rates of
testing, in causing genetic damage and
lukemia to the living and yet unborn?
Fifteenth. What will be the effect of
ratification upon our Plowshare pro-
gram?a project designed to deepen
harbors, dig tunnels and canals, or other-
wise cause beneficial changes to the to-
pography through controlled and con-
tained nuclear explosions?
Sixteenth. Will the participation of
East Germany in this treaty constitute
even so much as a tacit, implied, or sug-
gestive recognition of that Communist
regime as a sovereign national entity?
These, Mr. President, are the questions
which, in my opinion, must be resolved
in the course of this debate and I look
forward with keen interest to their even-
tual resolution. Without satisfactory
answers to them, it will be virtually im-
possible for any of us to measure and
evaluate the gains versus the risks of
entering into this limited test ban treaty.
I am also aware of the consequences
which might flow from a failure to ratify
this treaty. Some Members of this
Chamber who had earlier expressed
guarded reservations about it have al-
ready been labeled as "atom mongers"
by the Russian-controlled press. Simi-
larly, our national image in the world
as a country desirous of peace with jus-
tice would undoubtedly be attacked and
villified by such propaganda were we to
fail to ratify.
However, I shall continue to reserve
judgment on this issue until such time
as the evidence convinces me that the
paramount issue of our national safety
and security will not be put in jeopardy
by ratification of this treaty.
BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY OF PRES-
IDENT DAVID 0. McKAY
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I wish to
Call the attention of my colleagues to a
milestone in the life of the man who is
15657
the first citizen of Utah and one of the
most distinguished citizens of the Nation.
Yesterday was the 90th birthday of
David 0. McKay, president of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
commonly known as the Mormon
Church.
This brief tribute will be but a trickle
in the flood of greetings and felicitations
which are flowing to President McKay,
for he has received expressions of love,
devotion, and admiration from almost
every region of the earth.
President McKay has been president
of the Mormon Church since 1951. For
16 years before that he carried the heavy
responsibility of counselor to preceding
presidents. The church is guided by
three leaders?a president and two coun-
selors?so for some 28 years President
McKay has served in the presidency.
The growth of the church has been
phenomenal under his leadership.
Nearly one-third of the world's 1,800,000
Latter-day Saints have been baptized
since 1951. The number of stakes?a
stake is a geographical unit in the
church roughly equivalent to a diocese?
has risen from 180 to 350, and the annual
number of converts from 17,000 to more
than 100,000 last year.
In addition to the large Mormon popu-
lation in Utah, there are very sizable
numbers in other States, principally
Idaho, Arizona, California, Nevada,
Wyoming, Washington, and Oregon.
But it is not of the church, it is of the
man himself, that I wish today to direct
my remarks.
David 0. McKay stands out as a spir-
itual, community, and educational
leader of the West and of the United
States.
Last December, in Salt Lake City,
nearly 500 business and civic leaders,
whose religious affiliations include Juda-
ism and a dozen Christian denomina-
tions, gathered at a testimonial banquet
in his honor.
Joseph Rosenblatt, a Jew and presi-
dent of one of Utah's largest industrial
corporations, voiced the feeling of all
when he asked at this dinner:
Does anyone know of any man who has
lived with greater faith or purpose, and
obedience to the exhortation of the Prophet
Micah "to do justly, to love mercy, to walk
humbly with God"?
David 0. McKay was born in Hunts-
ville, a small farming community near
Ogden, Utah, September 8, 1873. He still
maintans a farm in Huntsville, where he
raises horses and often spends weekends.
After being graduated from the Uni-
versity of Utah in 1897, he plunged at
once into the life of educational and re-
ligious activity which almost exclusively
has consumed all of the energies of a
long and active life.
In 1901 he married Emma Rae Riggs,
who has been, and is today, his constant
companion and aid. In addition to the
arduous work of the church, they have
reared a large family, whose filial devo-
tion is one of their greatest blessings.
In 1902 he became principal of Weber
College, in Ogden. That same year he
was made a member of the General
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15658 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE September
Board of the Latter-day Zaints Sunday
schools. He held numerous positions
In that organization, culminating in his
appointment as general superintendent,
which he, held for many years?until
1934.
And his service has included the presi-
dency of the European missions of the
church and commissioner of the church
board of education.
At the comparatively early age of 32
he became one of the 12 apostles of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints.
As apostle, counselor, and president,
he has carried a heavy load of responsi-
bility in business and community affairs.
He has served on numerous corporation
boards of directors. He has served on
the governing boards of three Utah uni-
versities?the University of Utah at Salt
Lake City, and Utah State University at
Logan?both of which are State-sup-
ported institutions?and the Brigham
Young University at Provo, which is the
Latter-day Saints Church university.
One measure of the tremendously in-
creasing administrative responsibilities
which President McKay has had to carry
as head of the, church is in the figures I
have quoted on the organization's
growth.
Other measures of that responsibility
are the tremendous growth of our Na-
tion and the dynamic changes which
have rushed headlong through the years
he has spent on earth.
When David 0. McKay was born, Ulys-
ses S. Grant occupied the White House.
The Pony Express had ceased operations
only 14 years before. Only 4 years be-
fore, the golden spike which linked our
Atlantic and Pacific coasts by rail had
been driven at Promontory Summit, not
far from his birthplace at Huntsville.
President McKay was born before Utah
was admitted to the Union, before the
Spanish-American War, before the Boer
War, before the organization of the Ford
.Motor Co.
His life spans the development of avia-
tion from the epic effort of the Wright
Brothers to the 1400-mile-an-hour
flights of the X-15. It spans an immense
sweep of scientific achievement from the
discovery of radium to the explosion of
the, hydrogen bomb.
He was a young man before the in-
vention of the motion picture machine
or the radio receiver. He was 47 before
American women were given the right to
vote.
In 1870, 86,000 persons were counted
in Utah; the census of 1960 counted
890,000; and today there are 1 million.
The city of Ogden has grown during
that period from 3,127 to 70,100. And
the Salt Lake Valley which has become
the center of the church, now holds
some 400,000 people.
And the Mormon people, who took 40
years to build the Salt Lake Temple
with granite hauled from the canyons
by oxcart, now dedicate a new chapel
every week. For the organization which
President McKay heads is engaged in a
vast building program of temples, stake
houses, and educational and office struc-
tures, in Utah, throughout the United
States, and in many foreign lands.
With all of these adMinistrative bur-
dens, President McKay has remained a
great teacher. Thortful personal
preparation has gone to every one of
the thousands of sermons and addresses
which he has delivered. And he is a
truly eloquent speaker, Blessed with a
strong, resonant voice, he presents his
points with an excellence of phrasing
that makes his public utterances as
pleasant to the ear as they are nourish-
ing to the spirit and instructive to the
mind.
William Shakespeare wrote that these
are the things that should accompany
old age: "honor, love, obedience, troops
of friends." And these David 0.,McKay
enjoys in overflowing abundance.
He exemplifies a firm faith in the fun-
damental doctrines of his church.
And he is a thorough citizen of the
1960's. In July he visited with Astro-
naut White, discussing enthusiastically
space technology and thresholds of ex-
ploration. Until a scant few years ago,
he drove his own automobile on the nu-
merous visits he pays to units of the
church organization ia the States sur-
rounding Utah. He is a confirmed jet
air traveler. Last year, he visited
church groups in Scotland. And he has
just returned from a flying trip to Wales,
where he presented an organ to the
Mormon Church membership for their
chapel in the community of Merthyr
Tydfil, where David 0. McKay's mother
was born.
Today, one of his 'proudest accom-
plishments is the genuine affection that
now exists between the Mormons and
so many people of other religions. This
was not always so. The Mormons were
driven to exile beyond the borders of the
United States in 1847. But today, in
large part due to David 0. McKay and
his life, with its devotion to principle, to
faith, and to true fellowship, there ex-
ists not only tolerance, but concord and
genuine respect for the Mormon- people
and their prophet president, David 0.
McKay.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I wish
to join in the very fine tribute that has
been paid to David Q. McKay by the
junior Senator from Utah. I have had
the pleasure of visiting with this man. I
can say in all candor that I have never
met nor conversed with a more remark-
able man. His service over the years
demonstrates that he 4 one of the great,
good men of the world.
On the occasion of his 90th anniver-
sary, I feel certain the people of Idaho
join with the people of Utah in extend-
ing their heartfelt felicitations to David
0. McKay.
Mr. MOSS. I thank the senior Sen-
ator from Idaho. I am sure people
everywhere feel this way about this great
man, particularly the people of Idaho,
who know him so well.
ROCHESTER'S LABOR NEWS URGES
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF
TEST BAN AGREEMENT AND
STRONG CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLA-
TION
Mr. }MATING. Mr. President, among
the responsible voices raised in favor of
9
the limited nuclear test ban treaty and
pending civil rights legislation have been
those representing the American labor
movement. As is so often the case when
progressive, forward-looking measures
are at stake, our unions have been in the
forefront of the effort to secure congres-
sional approval of these two vital items.
An interesting and forceful editorial in
the Labor News of Rochester, N.Y., points
up the close connection between these
two matters. In order that more Mem-
bers of Congress may have an oppor-
tunity to benefit from this excellent ed-
itorial and as an effort to increase sup-
port for the test ban agreement and
meaningful civil rights legislation, I ask
unanimous consent to have it printed at
this point in the RECORD.
There Wing no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RzeoRe,
as follows:
THE CONNECTION
In two separate actions, the Rochester
APL--CIO Council this week took steps plac-
ing it in the mainstream of world events;
events which are going to change the Natiou
we live in, and the world in which we live,
and of which our Nation is a part.
In one, the labor council is asking Con-
gress to include equal employment oppor-
tunity guarantees in the nature of a Pair
Employment Practice (PEP) amendment to
President Kennedy's omnibus civil rights
bill?a bill threatened with death by fill-
buster and threatened with death by even
fairminded Senators because it may lose
them future votes from segregationists.
In the other, the APL?CIO Council here
is asking our own State's two Senators to
help the Senate ratify, and quickly, the
nuclear bomb test ban treaty signed in Mos-
cow 2 weeks ago, and thus put our Nation
on record as supporting a retreat, even this
small one, away from global insanity and.
global holocaust?because without such a
treaty, the nations with bombs will be inak-
ing bigger bombs, and the nations yet with-
out bombs will be getting them; more trig-
gers to pull, and more itchy fingers on the
triggers.
At first glance, there seems to be no con-
nection between these two actions. Both
timely, both commendable, but what's the
connection?
This. Simply and finally this. Unless,
this Nation of ours can emerge from under
the darkness of racial discrimination against
people with dark skins, and emerge com-
pletely, this Nation will no longer be in any
position to teach freedom and democracy
to a world which is two-thirds dark skinned
Unless our civil rights struggle is ended,
and ended once and for all in victory for
human rights, and human dignity, and
quickly, the black, brown, yellow, and other
off-white peoples of the earth will turn
away from us in loathing and distrust, and
our efforts to teach them freedom and de-
mocracy will be like whistling in the dark, in-
side a hollow tube bent back against our
own ears, and for no other ears.
Unless we, here, today, in this Nation can
lead the free world and make it believe itn us
and what we preach, and make it want to
join us in the struggle for human freedom
and dignity everywhere in this small sphere
constantly growing smaller, no amount of
bombs will in the end help us, because
bombs are much worse teachers than words,
and words are not as good as actions.
No test ban treaty will in the end help us
if we are alone in the world, and we will be
alone in the world some day soon if the
headlines showing Birmingham and Oxford
and Jackson (and lately Brooklyn, and
Philadelphia, and Detroit, and maybe
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1566
-111111,.i4I4ti'VC OfftCel" Of the Ccklorad,o'rarm milk market is sufficient unto itself and cord- WISCONSIN DAIRIES COOPERATIVES,
. ,331444 la gta,f6-g; ' ' - - pletely independent of all similar markets is Union Center, Wis., August 30, 1963.
.vv,, 9,,,pr., xei,), much oppose, S. 1915, whichopposed 6,- die pr6i. ? unrealistic and unsound. There is a great Hon. GORDON ALLOTT,
Mir.e, irY 'bill
deal of overlapping of market supply and Senate Office Building,
- ctoc to'ciiirie lip--
sales areas and intermarket movement of Washington, D.C.
TuW0..y. VVe hope, too, you will vote against milk. DEAR SENATOR ALLOTT: It has been brought
thalWeCarthy amendment S. 1961. Either m""''
of these bills is worse than no legislationt If a class I base plan were incorporated ? that the Proxmire class I
don't know ow much' you hafe to do
Into a Federal order, adjacent markets with
I h '
to w k?p people up such as those who con-
orders likely would be forced to adopt similar
'
?
tilivallf, ant tO give away all the money in plans in self-defense. The end result could
the U.S, ea,surY. - . be a single, nationwide Federal milk order.
? 3. This plan could lead to severe restrie-
Also, m letter I received from Otie tions on entry of new producers and some-
, .
M. need, eX cutive director of the Na-
kind of trade barrier to keep out milk from
tonal Cream 'es Association he stated
other areas. We believe in reasonable corn-
petition in all areas of our economy, and in
their position o this bill in these words: the right of new producers?particularly
..
It is... our cons red opinion that S. 1915 young people?to have an opportunity to en-
? will not achieve its vowed purpose. We be- gage in dairy farming if they so desire.
neve this ie a bad
feated. -
.I have ev,en reCei
from milk- produCers i
which the. senator who
bill comes, voicing their
- this bill,
The 'American Farm Bur
' tion not only believes tha
will not solve the Problem but w
ill, and should be de- _ 4. At first, many farmers might cut t
milk production because they would re
e lowest class price for all milk del
d correspondence
In excess of their individual allo
the State from
ntroduced this ai (quotas).ednc If thefarm price for fluid
n
unchanged, the average
opposition to gross Income op when
milk production. His "fixed" c
U redera- duction would continue wheth
s. 1915 produced excess milk. This
decline in his net income, r
aggra-
sure for higher class I price
vat e sItuatIOn, , duce consumption inten
maintain that ft s the present m ket- from "new" or "Outsid
Ing contro s that have been the real ul- widen the spread betwee
prit in creating the present surpluses. manufacturing uses.
It wmAlcl seem, Mr. President, that th 5. The Secretary of
only result that is certain to be achieved termine whether?a
by this legislation is that the cost of ons?allocations w
?cations were ne
milk to the consUmer will be increased. lat corporation f
That is hardly asound basis upon which vent.-'.e large co
in
d' t'
a
to enact legislation. terms
The letters of the Wisconsin Dairies ments,
Cooperative aria the American Farm family ow
Bureau P,ederation which I averred to tions were
earlier me many more excellent Points ditions, curr
concerning this bill, and for the benefit frozen. The a
of other Senators I ask unanimous con- further if fine or
sent that these letters be included in the negotiable bases an
'
, .,, REcoxn at. this point, plan witA nontransfe
capita
us w
d-
ye
red
ons
as re-
armer's
cut his
of pro-
or not he
uld cause a
lting in pres-
that would re-
fy competition
producers, and
rices for fluid and
riculture would de-
under what concli-
ld be transferable. If
tiable, this could stimu-
ing because of the ad-
orations would have in
available for new invest-
rking to the detriment of
d-operated farms. If alloca-
transferable under any eon-
farming operations would be
uation would deteriorate
market had a plan with
a nearby market had a
ble bases.
failed?as appears
Would mount for
la?undesirable
6. If,,,the allocation .1)
There being nO Objection, the letters highly' probable--pressur
were ordered to be printed in the REC- nati wide production con
OR9, as follows: ? tho gh those would be.
AMEEICAN FARM HITREAIT FEDERATION, We believe the present dair
August 30 ,1963. been aggravated by proposals
(...i9noc?
aa ALL9TT,
compulsory or so-called voluntary
B
oblem has
institute
ta pro-
many
ion
on,
U.S. ,9enate, ? *grams. These proposals have cause
*
Washington, D.C. dairymen to maintain or expand prod
' ?
Dzaa Swayoa A,L_LOTT: You very shortlf for base-building purposes.
Our dairy farmers expect their net incom
? will have before you for Senate consideration to increase and price-support purchases to
8. 1915, dealing with major changes in the
Federal milk marketing order iirogram. rt Is decrease provided:
I Talk about the possibility of dairy quota
OUr Undelitanding_that amendments will be '
programs is terminated.
? offered on the floor_ to sidd to thisbillfirovi- 2. There is no increase in support levels.
slow for Making compensatory (Brannan
3. Total consumption continues to increase
type) payments to dairymen, on a -nation- in line with the upward trend that has pre-
wide basis, both within and outside-inazket-
a- , vaned since the end of World War II.
Ing order areas. - S. .9.,.. Since the level of dairy price support Was
.. Va.= T3-Ureaq vigorously oppotes S 1 .." lowered to '75 percent of the parity equivalent
. We also are oppose to any arnenilnients that on April 1, 1962, substantial improvement in
would add to S:1615 jarOvisions- for compen- the national supply-demand situation has
satory payments.- There are InanY- reasons resulted. During the current marketing year
? for our opposition,' the most important of dairy production is down from a year earlier:
which are:-
, ??a , - - and CCC purchases under the dairy price-
1. We beljeve that Congress should move support program of butter, cheese, and non-
toward the private, competitive enterprise jo dry milk are all substantially down from
? itarketing.,system in agricultural production the same period a year ago.
? and marketing, 'and away from unnecessary' We, therefore, strongly urge you -to vote
? governmental regulation. This proposal against S. 1915 and amendments to add to
Nould, r9sli,,It. In, tvisil milk producers being it compensatory payments on a nationwide
- diregtiy regulated under' Federal milk orders would be far
for tiplt. time, -They would be subjeet to
_,_ es , ,,oits . . have to
better fat.OUr. dairy farmers, consumers, and
basis. 11.4....neW dairy legislation
?hn
ena _ _or WOLF' and would nave to tupayers than passage of these proposals.
sucla?,records as the Secretary may
. Sincerely yours,
? CHARLS B.
, Unplieci assumption that each fluid
,
81,1?-OMAN,
to my attenti
base bill (S. 15) will be considered in the
Senate Sep her 3 or 4.
Althou purported to be desirable from
the sta point of the fluid milk interests
opera g under Federal marketing orders, .
it ac ? ally is not in the long-term best in-
ter of the dairy industry as a whole; nor
t consuming public. This conclusion
ems from the following facts:
1. The new subparagraph (H) of the bill
says "Notwithstanding any other provision
of this section,". This essentially means "in
spite of" or "an obstacle to the-implementa-
tion of paragraph 8c(5) (A) through (0),
(H) will overrule in determining how the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1937, as
amended, will be administered and legally
interpreted.
2. In effect (A) through (G) would be
notieffectiVe whenever a conflict arose in
interpretation or administration of subpara-
graph (H). This means that 8c (5) (G)
which provides: "No marketing agreement
or order applicable to milk, and its products
in any marketing area shall prohibit or in
any manner limit, in the case of the prod-
ucts of milk, the marketing in that area of
any milk or product thereof in any Produc-
tion area of the United States" will no
longer limit the Secretary's powers to pre-
vent him from establishing "trade barriers."
(See pp. 16-21 of the Supreme Court decision
Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., et
al., Petitioners v. United States et al. dated
June 1, 1962). The above section and the
subsequent interpretation thereof was
largely the basis for eliminating the down
allocation and compensatory payment pro-
visions which were interpreted as restric-
tions to the free flow of milk and milk prod-
ucts.
3. Therefore bill S. 1915 would legalize re-
strictions via the class I base plan.
4. Such restriction to the movement of
milk would have the following results:
(a) Would prevent the free flow of milk
between production and consumption areas.
It would prevent producers located in the
various regions of the United States from
competing for higher priced fluid markets on
a free and equitable basis.
(b) It would allow class I prices to rise
to exorbitant levels in high cost of produc-
tion areas at the expense of consumers in
these areas. In no case should the class I
rice in Federal orders differ more than the
c. t of transporting milk from alternative
sou es.
(c) t would provide a legal basis for al-
lowing ? equitable treatment of producers
under a deral order system which is na-
tional in s e.
(d) It wo insulate fluid producers lo-
cated in high t of production areas from
the competition more efficient areas of
production. In s t it would legalize an
economic trade bar of the most flagrant
type.
Fifth. Furthemore in sikte of all the wrong
it could do, the bill would he relatively in-
effective in accomplishing its primary ob-
jective, namely that of cutting milk produc-
tion in Federal order markets. There are no
areas where the variable costs of producing
milk are higher than the lowest class price.
To put it another way: producers will not
cut back production unless the marginal
costs of production exceeds the lowest class
price. In either of the above cases the
producer would continue to produce milk as
long as 'the price was a-Wilde/WY-
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oeptember
high to help pay for his fixed cost, of produc-
tion such as machinery, equipment, build-
ings, interest on investment, etc. Any such
bill, to out production in Federal order mar-
kets, would have to incorporate an. excess
price, for below the level of price of the low-
est class use.
Sixth. Page 2, lines 6 and 7, includes Within
the base "reserves of milk as may 'be found
essential thereto." Many markets are on a
3- or 4-day bottling schedule. This Means
that as the bottling week shortens the neces-
sary reserves in the market coulkbe inter-
preted to mean as high as 50 percent above
fluid milk requirements. With the tech-
nological advancements in transportatiou
the interpretation of necessary reserves
should include supplies available from al-
ternative sources. The, bill as written would
not only protect the producers within each
Federal order from outside competition, but
would allow for protected increa.seis in pro-
duction far above the level of production
presently in most orders.
Seventh. Page 3, line 11, states that bases
are transferable. This particular provision
Would result in values being attached to
bases with their subsequent sale to the high-
est bidders, or producers under orders Which
can do the best job of gaging the highest
class I prices from their consumers.
In summary the bill entitled "S. 1916"
would reverse the Supreme Court decision,
disadvantage the consumer and in the long
run the dairy producers 'including those pro-
ducers the bill was designed to help.
Your thoughtful consideration and oppo-
sition to this bill would be greatly appre-
ciated.
Very sincerely yours,
WrscoNsm DAMEES COOPERATIVA,
ROBERT J. WILLIAMS,
Public Relations and Procurement
Director.
P.S.--This letter is in behalf of Wisconsin
Dairies 'Cooperative which is the sedond larg-
est in Wisconsin and Dairy Maid Products,
Eau Claire, which is a federation of coopera-
tives with a total farmer membership of
21,000.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there further morning busi-
ness? If not, morning business is closed.
ITHE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
The Senate, as in Committee of the
Whole; restunect the conaideratiOn of Ex-
ecutive /4 (88th Cong., 1st seas.), the
treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in
the atmosphere, outer space, and under-
water,
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The Senate is in executive session.
The treaty is in the Committee of the
Whole and is opekto Amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGIIT. Mr. President?
The ACTING PRESIDEN'r_nro tern-
, pore. The Chair recognizes the Senator
from Arkansas.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Arkansas yield, with-
Out loSing his right to the floor? _
Mr. raLBRIGHT. I
Mr.- MANSFIELD. Air. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
.
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll. -
Mr.. MANSkoma,D, Mr. President, I
, ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
?Mr. FULBRIGH'r. Mr. President, I
consider it a high honor to have the
privilege of presenting te the Senate, on
behalf of the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, the Nuclear Te$ Ban Treaty.
? This treaty, if it receives the approval
of this body, may well prove to be a
turning point in history of incalculable
significance to the hurnan race?and
especially to all Americans, who, because
of our strength, bear a eCial responsi-
bility for the prevention of a nuclear
war.
In a few words, this treaty makes
sense under the conditions confronting
the world today.
I shall try to develop,: in my remarks,
the reasons why it makes sense: but I
urge Senators to give serious considera-
tion to all aspects of this treaty and to
develop, as fully as possible, every facet
of the questions involved.
This treaty, I am confident, will stand
mi under the closest sorutiny. It was
because of my conviction about the
merits of the agreement, that I invited
the members of the Armed Services
Committee and the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy to sit With the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations during the tak-
ing of testimony and ;to have a full
opportunity to examine, each and every
witness on the same terms as those
available to the members of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations.
I was pleased by the cooperation of
the members of the committees. Their
questions did much to develop many of
the more esoteric and difficult aspects
of the scientific and technical problems
Involved. ?
In short, I believe an exhaustive and
complete examination ,of all relevant
questions is contained in the 1,000 pages
of public testimony, together with the
many hundreds of pages of executive
hearings.
In deciding whether to render its ad-
vice and consent to the nuclear test ban
treaty, .Mr. President, the Senate must
consider two basic questions: first, is
the treaty compatible with the military
security of the United States? Second.
does it advance the broad purposes of
American. foreign policy? On the basis
of extensive committee hearings, I be-
lieve the answers to both of these ques-
tions are affirmative, and that the treaty
is indeed both safe and wise.
In my remarks I should like to com-
ment briefly on the military and techni-
cal factors in the treaty, and then to
discuss some of its broad political impli-
cations. Military and technical consid-
erations were examined in detail in the
combined meetings of the Committees
on Foreign Relations, .Armed Services,
and Atomic Energy, and are further
elaborated in the report of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations. These factors
have to do with the safety and prudence
of our adherence to the treaty. Less at-
tention has been given to the reason and
purpose of the treaty, Which have to do
with its long-term implications for in-
ternational relations. ,
9
At the outset, I should like to com-
mend my colleagues on the three com-
mittees which heard testimony on the
treaty for the responsible and bipartisan
spirit of the proceedings. The hearings
before the three committees and the
subsequent deliberations of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations were char-
acterized throughout by an awareness
that this treaty, which in its broad out-
lines and intent were conceived by a
Republican administration, and is now
being implemented by a Democratic ad-
ministration, is a matter of the national
interest, transcending all considerations
of personal and partisan advantage. It
Is particularly noteworthy and com-
mendable that in the Foreign Relations
Committee the motion to report the
treaty favorably and without reservation
was offered by the senior Republican in
the Senate, the Senator from Vermont
CD.fr. AIKEN3, and received the unani-
mous support of the Republican members
of the committee.
Before examining the wisdom of our
adherence to this treaty and the ways in
which It can be expected to advance our
overall national interests, we must as-
sure ourselves that the proposed com-
mitment is a safe one, one which will not
derogate from the military superiority
and strategic advantages which the
United States now possesses.
It is the strongly held conviction of
the officials who have the main respon-
sibility for our national defense, both
civilian and military, that the American
nuclear force Is, and under the treaty
will remain, manifestly superior to that
of any other nation. As the Secretary
of Defense pointed out in his statement
in support of the treaty, the U.S. nu-
clear force now contains, in addition to
tactical, airborne, and other nuclear
weapons, more than 500 missiles?Atlas,
Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris?and it is
planned to increase this number to over
1,700 by 1966. In addition, the United
States has nuclear armed SAC bombers
on air alert and over 500 SAC bombers
on quick-reaction alert. By 'contrast,
Secretary McNamara pointed out, the
consensus is that the Soviets could place
less than half as many bombers over
North America on a first strike. It is
estimated that the Soviets have only a
fraction of the number of ICBM missiles
that we have and that their submarine-
launched ballistic missiles are short-
range, require launching from the sur-
face, and are generally not comparable
with our own Polaris force. According to
the best available estimates, our numeri-
cal superiority in ballistic missiles will
increase both absolutely and relatively
between now and 1966. In short, our
nuclear superiority is both great and
growing.
As to the effects of the treaty on this
favorable military balance, the key fact
Is that whatever opportunities for prog-
ress in nuclear technology are opened
or closed to the United States, the same
opportunities will be opened or closed
to the Soviet Union. In the judgment
of the Secretary of Defense and most of
his military and scientific advisers, the
most probable ultimate result of unre-
stricted nuclear testing would be tech-
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Waal parity between the United States
arid the Soviet ?Union. By limiting the
Soidets to underground testing, which
is more difficult And More expensive than
? -atinOspheric testing and where the
United states has substantially more ex-
perience... we can retard Boviet_progress
and prolong the duration of our tech-
? nological superiority. In the words of
Secretary McNamara:
? - This prolongation of our teclanological
Superiority will be a principal direct mili-
tary effect of the treaty on the future
Militar,, y balance.
,..
? Among the military-technological
,
?
questions considered in the hearings on
the treaty, three particular problems
Were the ft:nu& of special concern and
scrutiny: the problems of the antiballis-
tic missile, the high yield nuclear bomb,
and the _ability to resume atmospheric
testing quickly in the event of Soviet
violation or withdrawal from the treaty.
Should the Russians develop and de-
ploy, an antiballistic missile system, the
preservation of Qur deterrent power and
the mairitenanCepf the balance of power
Wand require us either to Perfect an
antiballistiC /WW1? system of our own
or to develop means of penetrating the
Soviet antimissile system. In the judg-
ment Of leading nuclear weapons scien-
tists, the development of a highly effec-
tive antiraissile system would be exceed-
ingly difficult and perhaps impossible,
while the development of an, effective
penetration capability is entirely feasible
and, in fact, relatively easy.
At that point I should like particularly
to invite the attention of Senators to'
the testiniony of Dr. York and Dr. Kis-
tiakowsky on the question of the anti-
ballistic missile. _
To continue progress in both an anti-
missile system and in penetration capa-
bility depends baldly at all on the test-
ing of nuclear warheads but almost en-
tirely on the improvement of delivery
sYstems and of techniques of detection,
Identification, discrimination, and inter-
ception. Such information As to ?effects
as May be required can be largely ob-
tained through extrapolations based on
?* previous testing experience and, as Sec-
Mary McNamara put It, "through de-
-signing around pur uncertainties,"
This is the judgment of such eminent
- .
nuclear w_eapops_scientists, among oth-
ers, as I have mentioned, Dr. Herbert A.
.Nork, Director of_Defen,se Research and
'Engineering in the Eisenhower admin-
.- istration and former direptor, of the Law-
rence Ilacjiatiort ,,Laboratory in Liver-
more; Dr. Peorge B. Kistialtowsky, Spe-
cial assistant for...science and technol-
Ogy to President,Eisenhower and now
Profess0 of physical Chenlistry at Har-
vard University?I stress the fact that
,those scientists, were with? the previous
? administration Merely because it has
been intimated by some that they believe
toMe of the, witnesses Might have been
iniluenc by pressure from the present
,it ,t_inlinis Ion; but the gentlemen_whom
- 1 ant nm,lpg wol-ild not under AnY cir-
cUmstanceS have_ been susceptible to
? preSstire, and they are quite independent
of anzinfinenCe 91 that kind?Dr. Stan-
islaw M, clam, resident adviser at the
Atomic Energy Commission's Los AlamOS
Scientific Laboratory since 1943; Dr.
Harold Brown, currently Director of De-
fense Research and Engineering in the
Department of Defense; Dr. N. E. Brad-
bury, Director of the Los Alamos Scien-
tific Laboratory; and Dr. Freeman J.
Dyson, former chairman of the Federa-
tion of American Scientists and cur-
rently professor of theoretical physics at
the Institute for Advance Study in
Princeton.
The consensus of expert opinion on the
antiballistic missile problem is that it is
highly unlikely that the Soviet Union
will have the capacity in the foreseeable
future to develop an antimissile system
that we could not saturate; that even if
they had the money and ability to de-
velop such a system, we would be able
to detect it early enough to take neces-
sary countermeasures; and, most im-
portant of all, that the treaty will im-
pose no significant obstacles to the de-
velopment of our own antimissile and
penetration capabilities, while such lim-
ited obstacles as it does impose will apply
as much to the Soviet Union as to the
United States.
The problem of the antiballistic mis-
sile, and indeed of the overall relation-
ship between nuclear warheads and
delivery systems, was admirably sum-
marized by Dr. Bradbury, who said in his
statement to the committee:
We tend to ignore the enormous role of
the system in nuclear warfare and to con-
centrate on the more dramatic character of
the nuclear warhead. The best nuclear war-
head is no good in a crashing airplane, an
intercontinental missile falling into the sea,
or in a ballistic missile defense system which
does not detect the target, discriminate
among decoys, determine a trajectory, fire
another missale, guide it to an intersection
with the incoming one, and are its warhead.
In that sequence, the technical elegance of
the warhead is almost the smallest problem.
Or said another way, if a good and practical
antiballistic Missile system can be devised
and built, it will have a warhead. This one
can guarantee.
As to the problem of high-yield nu-
clear weapons, the big bombs of 50 to
100 megatons which of course could not
be tested under the treaty, the judg-
ment of our foremost nuclear scientists,
including those whom I have mentioned,
is virtually unanimous that such weap-
ons are neither necessary nor even desir-
able for our nuclear deterrent force, and
that in any case we can construct such
bombs whenever we' wish without atmos-
pheric testing. On the basis of expert
scientific advice, both the Eisenhower
and Kennedy administrations have con-
cluded that both for our attack capabil-
ity and for the survival capability of our
forces in the event of attack, large num-
bers of smaller missiles are much more
desirable than smaller numbers of larger
missiles. The Soviets are ahead of us,
it is conceded, in the yield-to-weight
ratios of very large weapons, but there is
no question of our ability to design such
bombs and the improvement of the accu-
racy and reliability of our present mis-
siles is a much more effective approach
than increasing their yield.
As Dr. Ulam wrote recently:
When it comes to the question of very
large bombs of 60 or more megatons, which
the Russians have tested, it is quite clear,
100210002:8
15663
and therefore Is no secret, that we could
construct such bombs any time we want. As
has been stated in the press, this country
has tested bombs with yields of more than
10 megatons. When one considers the fact
that such a bomb, if properly delivered,
would ruin any city in the world, and if one
remembers that two bombs of 10 megatons
each have a much greater area of destruction
than one 20-megaton bomb, it seems quite
obvious that our arsenal contains large
enough weapons. (Letter to the Washington
Post, Aug. 16, 1963.)
Parenthetically, it seems to me that
we have become so bemused in our pub-
lic discussions with megatons and multi-
megatons that we have come to think of
these weapons yields as rather neutral
scientific phenomena, forgetting that we
are talking about instruments of almost
unimaginable destructiveness capable of
killing tens of millions of people with a
single explosion.
From my own experience in the hear-
ing, listening to the distinguished scien-
tists calmly describe such horrors objec-
tively and dispassionately, all the
testimony leaves me with the feeling
that we surely are afflicted with what one
might call "megaton madness," when
we talk of even bigger bombs. Perhaps
we would do well, in forming our scien-
tific judgments of these weapons, to look
again at the pictures of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, which were devastated by
weapons of only 15 or 20 kilotons. Per-
haps we would do well, when we speak
of "small" bombs of 5 or 10 megatons,
to remind ourselves that we are talking
about weapons which, if used in warfare,
would bring upon mankind a visitation
of horror beyond anything ever ap-
proached or even conceived in all of the
wars of human history.
To talk of winning such a conflict?
Said Dr. Kistiakowski?
is to misuse the language; only a pyrrhic
victory could be achieved in a nuclear war.
The third major technical problem of
special concern during the hearings on
the treaty was that of our capacity for
prompt resumption of atmospheric test-
ing in the event of Soviet violation or
withdrawal from the treaty. Both Dr.
Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory, and Dr. York, for-
mer Director of the Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory in Livermore, told the com-
mittees that while it will not be feasible
to keep the laboratories ready for an
instantaneous resumption of atmos-
pheric testing, it will be possible to keep
the laboratories in first-class operating
order, to resume testing within a period
involving no unacceptable risks, and to
maintain a vigorous and productive
group of scientists engaged in weapons
development.
In his statement before the commit-
tees, Secretary of Defense McNamara
said:
We have the determination to retain a
readiness to test in every relevant environ-
ment. This is a firm national policy. Its
existence will not only render the risk of
abrogation minimal, but will constitute a
strong deterrent to abrogation.
There are, of course, other military-
technological questions on which the
three committees asked for and received
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15664 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEeP
N E k5-ember 9
detailed testimony. We were assured by
administration witnesses that the Gov-
ernment intends to maintain a vigorous
and effective program of underground
testing and a continuing program of im-
proving our ability to detect and identify
clandestine tests. With regard to the
feasibility of these and other safeguards,
Dr. Kistiakowski stated that 'all of
these things are completely feasible both
from a purely technical point of view
and from the point of view of tire man-
agement of the U.S. scientific effort."
Citing the successful maintenance of
weapons research and development dur-
ing the 1958 moratorium on testing, Dr.
Kistiakowsky said:
There is no reason why this performance
should not be repeated in the predent con-
text which Is less restraining becauise of the
continuing of underground testing.
Senators will remember during that
moratorium there was no testing at all.
In addition to these technological
questions, there arose during the hear-
ings and the subsequent deliberations of
the Committee on Foreign Relations a
question as to whether the language of
article I of the treaty prohibiting any
nuclear test explosion, "or any other
nuclear explosion," might have the effect
of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons
in time of war.
The President, the Secretary of State,
and the Secretary of Defense have all
stated that the treaty will in no way
restrict the use of nuclear weapons in
time of war. A written opinion of the
Legal Adviser to the Department of
State, dated August 14, 1963, endorses
this view in detail, explaining that the
treaty has no relevance to a state of war
and that the language in queStion was
inserted solely to close a loophole
through which nuclear explosions for
military purposes might have been con-
ducted under the pretense of being for
peaceful purposes and not "nuclear weap-
on test explosions." The Soviet Gov-
ernment, in its reply of Auguit 20 to a
Chinese Communist note of August 15,
made it quite clear that it regards the
treaty as in no way curtailing the right
to use nuclear weapons in time of war.
There is in addition the generally ac-
cepted rule of international law with
regard to the validity of treaties in time
of war: That provisions cbinpatible
with a state of hostilities, Unless ex-
pressly terminated, will be enforced, and
those incompatible rejected."?Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Techt against
Hughes, U.S. Court of Appeals of New
York, 1920. It is a tragic -certainty
that in a third world war the nonuse
of nuclear weapons would be regarded
as incompatible with the state Of hostili-
ties.
There is no question whatever on that
subject, as to the understandrng of the
Parties to this agreement. -
Lest there be any remaining doubt as
to the right of- the President to use nu-
clear weapons in time of war, the report
of the Committee ori Foreign:Relations
includes the following Ianguag,ka of inter-
pretation of the treaty:
The Senate should be assurea that the
committee, in recomniending apifoval of this
treaty, is entirely satisfied tha -the treaty
In no way impairs the authority and dis-
cretion of the Commander lii Chief in time
of crisis to employ whatever weapons he
Judges the situation may require, in accord-
ance with our constitutional processes. ,
The treaty as it stands is a sound
and constructive document. The at-
tachment of any reservation, whether on
matters covered by the treaty text itself
or on any of a number of extraneous
issues of the cold war, would be unwise
and irresponsible. It would necessitate
a renegotiation of the treaty not only
with the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union, but also with the .scores of other
nations which have already acceded to
the treaty. Such a renegotiation would
take place in an atmosphere of doubt
and m:istrust as to American motives.
The treaty as it stands centains reason-
able and adequate safeguards for the
vital interests of the United States. An
attempt by reservations to reconfirm
safeguards that are already provided for,
or- to introduce issues unrelated to the
test ban itself, would probably result in
the loss of the treaty, in a general
worsening of the cold 'war, and in a
breakdown of confidence in the United
States that would make it exceedingly
difficult to negotiate future agreements.
These I believe, are the major reasons
why it is safe and prudent for the Senate
to render its advice and consent to this
treaty without reservations. The mili-
tary, technological, and legal considera-
tions which I have discussed have to do
mainly with safeguards in the event that
the treaty is violated or otherwise breaks
down. In the remainder of my remarks,
I should like to suggeSt some positive
reasons for our adherence to this treaty
and to set forth some of the possibilities
for advancing the aims of American
policy and improving the world environ-
ment in the event that the treaty is re-
spected by the signatories.
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield, or does he prefer to
conclude his statement?
Mr. F'T.1LBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. TALMADGE. Speaking of some
of the problems about Soviet Union
treaties, I think the American people
wonder, in view of the past record of the
Soviet Union of having violated some
50 out of 52 treaties that have been con-
cluded, what assurances or guarantees
we have of detection of clandestine viola-
tions by the Soviet Union.
Mr, FULBRIGHT. We have very
great safeguards with respect to detec-
tion. Unfortunately, this is an area in
which the testimony of those in charge
of this program was taken in executive
session; but that testimony is available
to Members of the Senate. I recommend
first that the Senator _look into that
testimony. I must generalize as to the
development of the methods of detection
with regard to violations.
? A major effort in that direction has
been underway for a number of years.
Several new and promising methods have
been put into effect. Methods of detec-
tion of nuclear weapon explosions have
been developed, particularly with respect
to explosions in the atmosphere, but also
With respect to subterranean and under-
water explosions, and finally with respect
to those carried out beyond the at-
mosphere, in outer space, by means of
the newly developed satellites, some of
which are already in operation.
I think it only wise to say in public
that I was amazed, and I believe all the
members of the committee who heard
the testimony were amazed and quite
satisfied with the progress that has been
made in the field of detection.
Mr. TALMADGE. Will the Senator
yield further at that point?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly.
Mr. TALMADGE. Is it the Senator's
conclusion, then, in response to my ques-
tion, based on the evidence of our scien-
tists who testified in secret session, and
the evidence of our military authorities
who testified in secret session, that if the
Soviet Union clandestinely violates this
treaty, we shall have that information
almost immediately?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is a
correct way to summarize the situation.
It is possible that very small explo-
sions?Senators have heard of the ques-
tion of thresholds that was discussed in
previous discussions of proposals for lim-
itation of tests?could go undetected, but
they would be so small that they would
be of relatively slight significance.
Mr. TALMADGE. I thank the Sena-
tor for clearing up that point. I think
that is one of the problems that must
perplex a great many people in America,
and perhaps other countries. In the
past, 'treaties that have been made by
the Soviet Union have been violated
whenever the Soviet Union thought it
was in its own national interest. I be-
lieve the American people are assured
that we, as we should, will carry out any
treaty we make, and they therefore have
some apprehension that this may be a
one-sided treaty for the benefit of the
Soviet Union and to the disadvantage of
our country.
Mr. FITI.J3RIGHT. On that point
should like to make a comment or two.
It is true that in a relatively short
period?a rather turbulent period--the
Soviet Union has violated a number of
international treaties, including such im-
portant political agreements as the non-
aggression pacts with Lithuania, entered
Into September 28, 1926, Latvia, on Feb-
ruary 5, 1932, and Estonia, on May 4,
1932, the arrangements for access to
Berlin, and the Potsdam Declaration re-
lating to the establishment of a Central
German Government.
However, to obtain a proper perspec-
tive, it should be noted that, to all ap-
pearances, the Soviet Union has satis-
factorily observed a significant number
of multilateral and bilateral agreements
to which it has been a party. A list of
27 of these other agreements appears
on page 967 of the printed hear ings?
which are on the desks of Senators.
I think one might say that what dis-
tinguishes those observed treaties from
those which have been violated is the
interest of the Soviet Union, as the Sen-
ator from Georgia has stated.. It is for
this reason that the committee was con-
cerned in its hearings and has set forth
in its report the considerations which,
it appears, have led the Soviet Union to
enter into this agreement. Insofar as
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1963 CONbRESSIONAL R
those,? considerations can be relied on to Would be not only to our advaritage, but
13e. rontInuing factors influencing Soviet
policy, they prOVide some .gtial'antee
against future violations of the treaty.
First, it. is apparent that the 1961-62
festh haVe led the Soviet scientists to
believe that in Many critical areas of
nuclear WeapOrirf they have achieved a
rongh technical parity with the United
States. That is det out in our commit-
tee repdit, and it' is quite clear in some
of the testimony.
Some of the witnesses made the
point?Which I think is a good one?
that the Cuban missile crisis is likely to
remain In the minds Of the Soviet lead-
erd for, dome tithe. That was quite a
shock. The statement Of the Seeretary
of State in the hearings is highly impor-
tant on-that
The third factor is the Well-known
difficulties the Soviets are -having today
with the Chinese. I was interested in
noting within the past few days that the
Chinese- are accing the Soviet Union,
through having signed this -treaty, with
recoplizing Chiang Kai-shek's govern-
ment on Taiwan: It is almost an exact
duplicate &f the pointthat has been
made that we may recognize East Ger-
many by Our adhesion to the treaty.
In considering the question of Russian
violation of treatied, it will be noticed
that she `has lived up to a nprnber of
them.
I do not think we can be so self-right-
eoUS as to say this FOuntry has never vio-
lated alreatY.
diamot follow it too closely, but I
believe the" Seneca Indiana have been
saying thafthis Government violated its
treaty with the Seneca Indians in New
York. '
We have been a very fortunate country
in many respects. We have been free to
a greater degree than most countries?
certainly more than the European coun-
tries?of attacks on our borders. So I
do not think we ought to be too self-
righteous on the question. I admif that
the Russian record is not very good, par-
ticularly in an earlier period, not too
many years 6,go, when the head of the
Goverrunent was not Mr. Khrushchev.
We made "a treaty with Russia about 2
year ago ielating to Antactica. At that
time people said that we could not trust
the Russians.' I do not recall anyone
talking ,about the slightest violations by
Russia of that treaty. I do not think
there is Much incentive to violate it.
I think theSaine situation appliedhere.
In other Words, there is a mutual inter-
est. I am not saying that this treaty is
exclusively in otir interest. I do not be-
lieve the Russians would have signed it if
they had not thought they had a corn-
rrion_inferest in the treaty.
A further protection, I remind the sen-
ator, is the' withdrawal clause. The
withdrawal clause is so lenient that I do
riCt think it would be necessary to abro-
gate the treaty illegally, when the with-
drawal Can be done legally very easily.
. Th, roVision is lenient. 'It was put
inlike.Waty.at the insistance of the mil-
itary. But recOgnizing that entering
Into thid ffe-itY There is a common inter-
est in abiding by the treaty, therefore it
No. 141-6
to their advantage as well.
Mr. TALMADGE. As I understand,
the withdrawal clause provides for 90
days' notice.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.
Mr. TALMADGE. But in the event of
Soviet Union testing in violation of the
treaty, it would require no notice on our
part for us to begin tests.
Mr. FULBRIG,HT. That is my opin-
ion. If they violate the treaty, all bets
are off, so to speak.
Mr. TALMADGE. It would be void at
that moment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. It would no
longer be in effect. We should be sure,
however, that they had violated it. We
should not act on a trivial basis or in a
capricious manner. We ought to be sure
that there has been a clear violation. I
am sure the Senator would be satisfied if
he read the record of the best authority
in this field, the man who is in charge of
the subject, with respect to our great
development in the field of detection.
I believe it to be beneficial to both sides
that there has been this development,
and that the idea of secrecy is less im-
portant now.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MORSE. I am glad the Senator
from Georgia,has raised the last point
with respect to abrogation. We are
dealing with an important principle of
international law. If there is a violation
of the treaty by party A, party A abro-
gates the treaty, and thereby relieves
party B of any responsibility under the
treaty. The abrogation by party A is the
same as though a match had been put to
the treaty and burned it up, to use a fig-
ure of speech. I am glad the Senator
from Georgia raised that point. I have
read some comments which indicated
that the editors who made the comments
were not aware of the doctrine of abroga-
tion. When there is abrogation, nothing
is left.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. One other treaty
that the Russians made recently was the
treaty over Austria, which had been pre-
ceded by a long period of negotiations.
However, at last the treaty was signed.
So far as I know, that treaty has not been
violated. No advantage has been taken
under that treaty by the Russians.
Perhaps it is not very popular to say
it, but if my memory serves me correctly,
when we found it necessary to build the
Panama Canal, we found ways of abro-
gating, indirectly perhaps, a treaty which
we had made in 1848 guaranteeing the
sovereignty of Colombia. We thought
it necessary to do that.
Therefore, none of us is absolutely
without fault. When I refer to "us," I
mean any nation. None of us is without
fault with regard to international agree-
ments. I agree that the record of our
country is far better than that of Russia,
particularly in recent years. Perhaps we
have not been quite so sorely tempted,
however.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
R000100210002-8
TE 15665
r1V1 EIV. Mr. President; h'ist
should like to ask the Senator whether
the Soviet 'Union has ratified the treaty.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. They have signed
it. I do not know that they have rati-
fied it as such. Of course they do not
have the same procedures that we have.
I do not know -of any other country that
has the procedures that we have.
Whether or not the Supreme Soviet has
actually acted, I-do not know. I am not
an authority on the constiutional
processes of Russia. She is committed
to the treaty.
Mr. MILLER. I am reading from the
British Year Book of International Law,
1958, published by the Oxford Press, ed-
ited by Prof. C. H. M. Waldock, as fol-
lows:
Soviet documents of ratification, according
to the Soviet view "reflect the general style
of Soviet diplomacy" and consequently are
characterized by their "brevity, clarity, sim-
plicity, and exactness of formulation." They
are issued by the ratifying constitutional
organ, namely, the presidium of the Supreme
Soviet. Without them, there is no ratifica-
tion; Soviet practice and theory have never
accepted either oral ratification or ratifica-
tion through fulfillment.
It goes on to explain a few more items.
The point I wish to make is that I have
seen nothing reported to the effect that
the presidium of the Supreme Soviet has
ratified the treaty. That being the case,
I am wondering whether we know the
treaty will be ratified by the Russians.
If we do not know whether the treaty
will be ratified, or hope that it will be
ratified by them, the question is, When
will they do so?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is quite a
difference in the relationship of the
executive in the Soviet Union with the
presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and
what the situation is in their country.
They have the party system, which de-
termines the action to be taken. There
is certainty of its ratification by the
presidium of the Supreme Soviet. That
is not always true under our system.
I do not believe that the fact that the
Russians have not taken formal action
is a valid reason for us to defer action on
the treaty.
I think of the somewhat similar sit-
uation in Great Britain. I do not wish
to go into a dissertation on the British
Parliamentary system, with which I am
a little more familiar than I am with
the Russian system, but when the execu-
tive in Great Britan signs a treaty, un-
less a question is raised in Parliament,
and there is a vote of no confidence, the
treaty is considered to have been ratified.
The British do not have the formal pro-
cedure that we have in this country. It
is not possible under the British system
for a Prime Minister to be Prime Min-
ister unless he has control of the ma-
jority in Parliament. Once he loses it,
he goes out of office. That is why our
ratification is of special significance.
As the Senator knows, the Supreme So-
viet is not quite the kind of legislative
body that the Senate is or that Parlia-
ment is.
Mr. MILLER. I quite realize that it
is not democratic organization. How-
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15666 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September
ever, I invite the Senator's attention to
another statement in the book, at page
328, where it is stated:
Soviet theory does not view an interni-
tional treaty which is subject to ratification
as having any legal force until (a) the rati-
fication process has been completed, or (b)
completion of the exchange or deposit of the
documents of ratiflcat'on depending upon
the stipulation concerning ratification in the
treaty text.
I have already quoted from 'the book
regarding the ratification process, which
indicates that the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet will have to ratify the
treaty before the Soviet Union will con-
sider that it has been ratified.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Since the Senator
raised the question, my assistant, who
keeps up with these matters, has handed
me a note saying that the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet has approved the
treaty, but it has not yet been deposited.
Mr. MILLER. Does the Senator know
when the Supreme Soviet ratified the
treaty?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Approved it.
The Senator from Alabama tells me it
was within the past few days. I believe
it is of no particular significance or im-
portance. I believe that when they
signed it, that was it. There is no doubt
whatever as to what the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet does in a matter of
this kind. That is not always the situa-
tion when a treaty comes before this
body. I call to mind John Hays' famous
remark about the fate of a treaty in this
country.
Mr. MILLER. If I did not think it
was an important question, I would not
have asked it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not mean the
way the Senator puts it. I do not mean
that it is not important that the treaty
be ratified by the Russians. I mean
there is no doubt that it will ratified.
There is not the slightest question that
the treaty executed by the existing Gov-
ernment in Russia will be approved by
the Supreme Soviet. I did not mean
that it was not important that it be
ratified. There is not the slightest doubt
that it will be.
Mr. MILLER. On that point, I recog-
nize that we might expect it to ratify
the treaty; but I think it would be help-
ful, at least to some of us, if the Senator
from Arkansas would provide for the
RECORD the exact date on which the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet ratified the
treaty.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I shall do so.
Mr. MILLER. Also, since I believe
the treaty is barren on this point, I
should like to ask whether the ratifica-
tion process is intended to be consum-
mated by an exchange or a deposit of the
documents. As I understand, one of the
two procedures is necessary for the
treaty finally to become effective, so far
as the Soviet Union is concerned.
About 10 days or 2 weeks ago, I read
a report in the newspapers that the pro-
posed treaty had been referred to a com-
mittee of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet, I have not seen anything re-
ported subsequent to that. I hope we
might have such information.
As I understand, until the treaty has
been consummated by a deposit or an
exchange of the docuMents, it would be
possible for the Soviets merely to with-
hold the filing of the documents. We do
not know what the Soviets would do.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. What harm does
the Senator think would come to us if
the Soviets should withhold such filing?
Mr. MILLER. I assume the effect
would be to leave us up in the air. It is
similar to the practice fh the real estate
business. If one wishes to sell his house
and offers it at a certain price, he ordi-
narily places a time limit within which a
prospective purchaser must accept the
offer.
We know we do not trust the Soviets.
The treaty is not based on any trust or
confidence in the Soviets. It would be
entirely possible for the Soviet Union to
sit on the treaty for 6 months or a year
or 5 years.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator
mean that under those circumstances
the United States would be inhibited
from testing or doing as we pleased? -
Mr. MILTFR. We Would be so far as
the other signatories of the treaty are
concerned.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh, no; not at all.
Unless all three of the original signa-
tories signed and depOsited the treaty,
It would not become effective. If the
treaty were not signed and deposited in
a reasonable period, it would fail; just
as if the United States failed to ratify it
within a reasonable tinie?a specific date
was not set, because we could not com-
ply with such a practiee under our con-
stitutional system?if We dallied around
and waited until next spring, I think the
Soviets might say, "Forget about it. Let
us not have anything More to do with it."
Mr, MILLER. And the United States
could be of the same mind?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Most certainly.
The treaty cannot become effective un-
less all three of the original parties ap-
prove it.
Mr. MILLER. Would it be the Sen-
ator's position that if the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet did not ratify, or
If it did ratify and the documents were
not deposited?which is necessary to
consummation
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The treaty would
be "off."
Mr. MILLER. The United States
could say that all bets were off?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Soviets did
not ratify it sooner, ,than that?I used
next spring as a way of putting it?I
do not think we would Wait around un-
til next spring.
I shall obtain for the Senator the exact
status of the treaty in the Soviet Union.
I did not notice the report In the news-
paper or anticipate such a question, but
I am told that the treaty has already
been approved by the Supreme Soviet,
but has not been deposited.
The Senator from Alabama says that
Is what he read. I missed it. I did
not anticipate a question on this sub-
ject.
Mr. MIT r ;FIR. I certainly did not wish
to ask a question that the Senator could
not answer. I know the Senator will ob-
tain the information.
9
Mr. FULBRIGHT. We will obtain the
Information. But I am sure that neither
the Senator from Iowa nor any other
Senator believes, after all that has hap-
pened, including the ceremonies last
month, that there is even a remote
chance that the treaty is in doubt, so far
as the Soviet Union is concerned--pro-
vided the United States ratifies it?and I
do not believe there is any question about
the British believing it to be in doubt.
Mr. MILLER. Will the Senator also
provide information regarding the next
step? Assuming that the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet has ratified the
treaty, will the next process be the de-
positing of the document? if so, where
and when will the exchange of docu-
ments take place? If the Senator could
obtain that information, it would be ap-
preciated.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is my under-
standing that the United States will de-
posit the document with the two other
principal signatories. In other words, we
will deposit the document in London and
Moscow; and each of those countries
will deposit with the other two princi-
pal signatories. But I shall submit an
official statement for the RECORD.
Mr. MILLER. That is what some of
us would like to have done.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is my under--
standing of the way in which the for-
malities are to be carried out.
Mr. MILLER. I would appreciate hay-
ing the Senator clear up something else
that has puzzled me; that is, the dif-
ference betwen amendments, reserve-
tions, and understandings. It had been
my understanding that an amendment to
the treaty could be adopted by the Sen-
ate and that that would require a re-
negotiation of the treaty. Is my under-
standing correct?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
quite correct.
Mr. MILLER. It was also my under-
standing that a reservation to the treaty
would not require a renegotiation. Yet
I believe statements have been made by
the chairman of the Committee on For-
eign Relations and others to the effect
that reservations would require renego-
tiation. I would appreciate having the
Senator clear up this point, because I re-
call the Connally reservation, which, to
my knowledge, did not require a renego-
tion of the treaty involving the World
Court. Since the Senator from Arkan-
sas has had vast experience in this field,
I would appreciate having him enlighten
us on the subject.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Connally res-
ervation merely nullified the action for-
merly taken, because it reserved to the
United States the unilateral, exclusive
decision as to whether a subject came
within the jurisdiction of the court.
For all practical purposes, that was the
end of any useful participation by the
United States in the World Court. As
the Senator from Iowa knows, the World
Court has never functioned. That is a
good example of how a reservation can '
completely destroy a treaty. The Con-
nally reservation destroyed the action
that was taken by the United States in
joining the World Court.
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CU.N liRESSIC./N AL itt,t,U ?
1Mr, .MILLER,... I was not raising the
question as to whether the Connally
reservation was a _good one or a bad one.
Although the World Court has had very
little business to transact, it has not
been entirely _without activity.
- The point I sought to make was that
the mere fact tilat the U.S. Senate
adopted what is known as the Connally
reservation did not necessitate the re-
negotiation of the treaty with respect to
the World Court. I am wohdering
whether there is any difference between
that reservation and a reservation that
Might be propoSed to the nuclear-test
ban treaty.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The best author-
ity I have available, which was prepared
in anticipation of such a question on
this precise point, and one of the prin-
cipal authorities in the field, is Charles
Cheney Hyde's book, International Law:
A reservation to'a treaty n a formal state-
ment Made by a prospective party for the
purpose Of creating a different relationship
between that party and the other parties or
prospectiie parties than would result should
the reserving state accept the arrangement
Without having made' such a statement. A
mere interpretative declaration made by a
prospective p"art f without- such a design,
and with a view merely to accentuate a cora-
' mon understanding, is not regarded as a
reservation, unless another party or prospec-
tive party deems it to be ?productive of a
different relationship between the state is-
suing the declara,ton and the other parties
or prospective parties than would result
were the. declaration not made. In a word,
? whether an intetpretative statement is to
be regarded as a reservation and dealt with
as such depericts in pranks upon the place
which the states to which it is addressed are
disposed to assign to it.
Of course, the Senate may include in
Its resolution language expressing its
underStanding or interpretation. So
long as this language does not substan-
tively affect the terms- of international
obligation of the treaty or. relates solely
to domestic matters, there would be no
legal effect on the treaty. tinder exist-
ing practice, however, the Executive
'would communicate such Understand-
ings or interpretations to the other
parties.
The difficulty, here would be whether
. ..,, the other -Parties would accept Our inter-
pretation of this question as being pre-
cisely a domestic matter. If there were
? any difference Of view between the Gov-
ernment of the Soviet Union and the
? Governthent of GreatBritairi as to the
nature of the hriderstandinCrenegotia-
ton might well be required. other
words, the other parties "would have to
Wept our interpretation that the res-
ervation did not affect the subStance of
the treaty.
The Senate may also include in its
resolution language expressing its reser:*
vation. Normal reservation language
? would involve some change in the Inter-
national obligations of the treaty and
might affect its terms in such it- signifi-
cant manner as" to rectiiire the Executive
- to con ith1? the terms of the re-ser-
.(ratien fo the other parties to the treaty,
thus enabling 'them to take such action
as they felt appropriate, inclilding reser-
-vations Of their own, or even a refusal to
proceed with the treaty.
15667
Finally, the Senate may. question the should be adOpted. Perhaps the Sen-
terms of the treaty Itself. In this in-
stance, there is no question that the
treaty would need to be renegotiated.
The chief reason why I strongly rec-
ommended, in my previous remarks,
against reservation, or even an under-
standing, unless it was so clearly a do-
mestic matter that it could not conceiv-
ably lead the other parties to disavow
the treaty, is that it would, at the very
least cause great concern and confusion
about our intentions. I would dislike to
see that done. It is dangerous to put
such things in the resolution of ratifica-
tion. It was for that reason that the
committee went to great length to in-
clude in its statement and committee
report, which is quite distinct from the
resolution 9f approval, what its under-
standing of the treaty is.
For example, as for the point about
the use of nuclear weapons in time of
war, we had not the slightest doubt about
that, nor do we believe the Russians
have. But we included it in the report.
Mr. MILLER. Is it the position of
the Senator from Arkansas that a reser-
vation of that sort would require renego-
tiation, and that it would be in the same
status as an amendment?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It would not be in
the same status as an amendment. I
think it would be unfortunate to include
any provision which is well understood
and could well lead to misunderstand-
ings, not only on the part of the Russians,
but also on the part of many of the
Other signatories. I do not know what
the understanding is to which the Sen-
ator refers; there are a great many of
them. But I believe its inclusion would
'be a subject for disoussion, and result in
possible confusion and misunderstand-
ing. That would be most unfortunate;
and I do not believe its inclusion would
add a thing to the treaty, because I think
its treatment of the subject is quite clear,
and we made it as clear as words can
make it in the report. During this debate
I am sure members of the committee
will say, "That is what we believed, or
else we would not have approved the
treaty."
Mr. MILLER. But the Senator from
Arkansas is not suggesting, is he, that
after the treaty has been negotiated, a
reservation would be improper, so far as
the Senate is concerned?that the mere
negotiation of the treaty means the Sen-
-ate would not be acting properly if it
saw fit to adopt a reservation?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly not. The
Senate has a perfect right to adopt res-
ervations. I only say it would be very
unwise for the Senate to do so. There
would be nothing improper about it, but
it would be very unwise. The procedure
for the adoption of reservations is clearly
-laid out, but I think the adoption of
reservations in this case would be very
unwise, just as I think the Connally reso-
lution?which I voted against?was very
unwise. ?
-Mr. MILLER. Does the Senator sug-
gest that it would be unwise for the
Senate ever to adopt reservations to a
treaty?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No, I did not say
that. But I know of none that I believe
ator from Iowa has in mind one that
we have not thought of which may be
both proper and wise. But certainly the
treaty has been very carefully consid-
ered, as have also all the suggested pos-
sible reservations which have beep
brought to our attention.
As I earlier stated, the committee in
response to a motion of the Senator from
Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] voted in favor of
having the committee report the treaty
without reservation. We believe it is a
very simple treaty, relatively speaking,
and that there is no need for any reser-
vation. That is all I am saying.
Mr. MILLER. I wish to make sure
that I understand correctly the Senator's
position. I understand that he is not
saying it would be unwise to adopt any
reservation whatever to the treaty, but
that he is merely saying that those ad-
vanced thus far are, in his opinion, un-
wise. Do I correctly understand his
statement?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Those I have
heard of, or which have been suggested,
seem to me to be either irrelevant or ex-
traneous. Certainly we should not in-
clude a reservation which would go be-
yond the concept of a test ban treaty.
I believe such a reservation would be in-
terpreted as an effort to kill the treaty;
and it would jeopardize, I believe, final
acceptance of a treaty, not only by the
three original signatories, but also by
the approximately 80 other countries
that have acceded to the treaty to date.
If some unforeseen danger?one not
yet developed during the very extensive
hearings?were to be disclosed, that
might be a different case. I suppose it
is conceivable that there could be situa-
tions in which it would be wise to adopt
a reservation. But I was trying to make
the point that it would be unwise for us
to attach to the treaty any of the reser-
vations that, to my knowledge, have been
suggested thus far.
Mr. MILLER. I see.
Does the Senator from Arkansas know
whether the Soviets have yet made any
reservations to the treaty?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is my under-
standing that they have not. I under-
stand that they approve of this treaty.
Of course, they do not follow the same
procedures that we do. I do not think
they have adopted any reservations.
Let me ask the Senator from Alabama,
who read the account of their approval,
whether they adopted any reservations
to his knowledge.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, if
the Senator from Arkansas will yield to
me, let me say I heard over the radio,
and I was also told by someone who read
it in a newspaper, that the ratification
by the Presidium was without any res-
ervations whatsoever.
Mr. President, while I am on my feet,
I wish to suggest that there be printed
at this point in the RECORD the memo?
-
randum relating to reservations, for I
believe it will be helpful to many
Senators.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that would
be a good idea. I did not read it all, and
I believe it would be very informative.
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15668 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have the memorandum printed
at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the memo-
randum was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
RESERVATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS, AND
INTERPRETATIONS
A vote for a reservation to this treaty
would be tantamount to a vote against the
treaty. That should be clearly understood
by each Member of this body and by every
citizen. The highest officials of this Gov-
ernment believe that a reservation would
kill the treaty. First, a reservation would
require the approval of all 85 of the coun-
tries that to date have adhered to the treaty.
This would also apply to any interpretation
or understanding added to the resolution of
ratification.
A reservation would also require renegoti-
ation of the treaty. A Department of State
memorandum on the question submitted last
year to the United Nations contained this
comment:
"It is understood by the U.S. Government
that the term 'reservation' means, according
to general international usage, a formal
declaration by a state, when signing, ratify-
ing, or adhering to a treaty, which modifies
or limits the substantive effect of one or more
of the treaty provisions as between the re-
serving state and each of the other states
parties to the treaty."
Thus, a reservation would alter the con-
tractural relationship defined by the provi-
sions of the treaty and set the stage for a
new rcemd of negotiations with all that this
would limply.
It is possible that an "understanding" or
"interpretation" embodies, like a reservation,
in the resolution of ratification would be
similarly destructive. A committee staff
memorandum on this question says: "Irre-
spective of what term is used to describe a
condition imposed on a treaty ? ? the
view of the U.S. Government when it serves
as a depositary is that the content or effect
of the statement is of prime importance. If,
despite the designation, the executive branch
believes that the condition has the actual
character and effect of a reservation, it would
be so treated and thus would open the treaty
to further negotiation."
Thus, a reservation would in all probability
kill the treaty, while an understanding or
interpretation could kill it. It must be re-
membered, first, that any one of the three
would require the approval of all the other
signatories; second, that none of the three is
necessary; third, that any one of the three
could encourage reservations and under-
standings from the other countries. The
questions that have been raised which bear
on the provisions of the treaty and their im-
plications have been thoroughly explored by
members of three Senate committees in an
exhaustive series of hearings, and the bi-
partisan interpretation of these matters has
in each case been clearly spelled out in the
committee report.
As for reservations and understandings
that do not relate to the substance of this
treaty, they are in ray view not only irrele-
vant but mischievous and, as such, deserve
to be rejected overwhelmingly not only by
those, like myself, who unreservedly favor
the treaty, but those of my colleagues who
have expressed opposition and raisgivings
about it. This treaty will not end the cold
war or turn swords into plowshares, and it
, should not be evaluated in these terms. It is
a step in the direction of sanity and away
from the hazard of nuclear wax.
If the Senate calls this treaty into question
with a reservation or other qualification, it
will invite the scorn of the civilized world;
it will open the floodgates of Communist
propaganda and give communism, a move-
ment that has been largely emptied of its in-
ternational force and appeal in recent years,
renewed vigor. More important, by injecting
a new issue, the treaty would almost cer-
tainly be lost, the cold war made more in-
tense, the confidence of the world in Ameri-
can reliability diminished, and the effort of
several years to discourage the chance of
nuclear war by reducing tensions, braking the
arms race and inhibiting the proliferation
of nuclear weapons rendered futile.
Mr. MILLER. I, tot, believe it will
be helpful. I also belieVe we should have
In the RECORD some statement in with
regard to the alleged rlailication by the
Soviets.
Mr? PULBRIGHT. Let me say that as
a result of this exchange, the chief of the
staff has telephoned the Department., and
his been informed that the following is
the correct statement:
The treaty has been unanimously en-
dorsed by the Joint Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of
the Union, and the Council of Nationalities.
It is now before the Presidium of the Su-
preme Soviet, which has the power to ratify.
It has not yet been acted upon. The
confusion has resulted from the unani-
mous endorsement by the Joint Foreign
Affairs Committee and the other two
bodies--which is equivalent, I suppose, or
somewhat similar to a report by the Sen-
ate Foreign Relatlonsl Committee re-
Porting to the Senate. The information
that the Presidium itself had acted was
not correct.
I repeat that in all honesty I do not
believe there is the slightest doubt but
that they will approve it, because I do
not believe that much dissent among the
Presidium is to be expected or would be
tolerated.
Mr. MILLER. I share with the dis-
tinguished Senator from Arkansas his
understanding of hoW they operate.
Nevertheless, I am not Very trusting, and
I believe it would be well for us to under-
stand,, before the Senate votes on the
treaty, that it has not 'et been ratified
by the Soviet Union, and we do not know
whether or when it will be. We may
expect that it will be; Nit it has not hap-
pened yet.
I believe all of us would feel more
comfortable about the treaty if we
learned that the Presidium had ratified
It, and that the doctunent was on its
way here for deposit.
I wishto ask a further question about
understandings: Can the Senator en-
lighten us about the status of an under-
standing, as compared,1 let us say, to a
reservation? I ask this question because
I understand that the distinguished
Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dom]
will propose that the Senate adopt some
understandings.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. We are having
some difficulty with the semantics in-
volved. I consider that our statements
In the report constitute the understand-
ing of the committee, and that if they
are endorsed by the Senate, they will
state the Senate's understanding of what
the treaty means. That is quite differ-
ent from being made a part of the reso-
lution of ratification. We get into a
very difficult gray area here; the ques-
tion turns on the nature of the under-
standing. For example, the statement
I read, which is from the best historical
9
authority on this matter, concludes that
where the understanding relates to a
purely domestic matter which has no
relationship to the substance of the
treaty, it could very well be that such
an understanding would not involve the
slightest danger of invalidating the
treaty or causing its rejection. In this
area it is almost impossible to draw a
sharp line, and to say that an under-
standing of one kind would invalidate
or lead to the rejection of the treaty or
require renegotiation, while an under-
standing of another kind would not have
any of those results. I believe we would
have to have the substance of the pro-
posal before us and would have to study
It, before we could make any kind of
reasonable judgment as to what effect
the proposal would have on the treaty. I
consider out statement in the report to
be a statement of our understanding of
what the treaty does not do.
I would call it an understanding but
one not requiring the action of other par-
ties to the treaty. It would not be a
part of the resolution; yet it would be a
part of the treaty's history. It would
be a part of what we intended the treaty
to mean. An understanding which was
not put in the resolution but would actu-
ally change the substance of the treaty--
whether called an understanding or
not--could, if the substantive, effect of
the treaty would be changed, lead to re-
jection of the treaty by the other parties
to the treaty.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. ELLENDER. In that case would
there be a difference between an. under-
standing and a reservation?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. When a reserva-
tion or an understanding is included in
a resolution of approval, there might be
difficulty as to the words used and as to
what effect those words would have.
That is what I am trying to prevent.
Unless there is something very seriously
wrong with the treaty, new language
ought not to be inserted. What the
Senator from Louisiana says, when /
say, and what every other Senator says
about the meaning of the treaty has sig-
nificance in determining the way in
which the treaty is interpreted.
What the Senator has said about the
passage of proposed legislation is true,
but a treaty is a little more delicate sub-
ject than a bill relating to domestic ques-
tions, because we are dealing with for-
eign countries, many of which do not
understand our system very well. They
might misinterpret our statements as
an effort to reject the treaty.
Mr. ELLENDER. Is it not a fact that
there would be serious objection to a
reservation imposing a condition that
might not be acceptable?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That would clear-
ly be so.
Mr. TIJENDER. I understand that
the distinguished Senator from Arizona
[Mr. GOLDWATER] desires to include in
the treaty a reservation that the treaty
shall not become effective unless and
until the Russians withdraw their mis-
siles and troops from Cuba. A reserva-
tion of that kind would nullify the treaty,
in my judgment.
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Mr. FULERIGIrr. I agree with the
? - 3
SenatOr: 3, L
s Mr. MIThER, -VII% President, Will the
? Senator yield further?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. -
Mr. wattErt. Would it be the posi-
tion of the-Senator from Arkansas that
let us say for the sake of terminology,
an underseanding;If made a part of the
resolution of ratfleation, would -amount
to a reservation whereas if it Were
Merely an understanding as a- 'matter
of, let us say, legislative history- entered
In the record but not made a part of
the resolution of ratification, it would
not be o tf 'he same stature? -
Mr. FIMBRrGIfT. Again the distinc-
tion as to what it th called is not the im-
portant po nt. The question is what the
treaty, in substance, provides. Irrespec-
tive of the term used, it depends on what
the depositary includes with respect to
the effept of the understanding upon the
contents of the treaty itself.
If language indicating an understand-
ing is proposed and inserted in the reso-
_ lution Of ratification and it would tend
to vary from the understanding or the
interpretation of the original parties, it
would be the same as a reservation. I
do not think we can judge the question
In the abstract.
For the information of the Senator,
I should like to quote from a memo-
randum which T had printed in the
RECORD'
It is possible that an "understanding" or
"interpretation" embodied, like a reservation,
In the resolution of ratification would be
similarly destructive. A committee staff
memorandum on this question says: "Irre-
spectiVe of what term is used to describe a
condition, Unposed on a treaty ? ? * the vieiv
of the U,S, Governinent when it (serves as
a depositary is that the content or effect of
the statement ii of prime importance. If,
despite the designation, the executive branch
believes that the condition has the actual
character and effect of a reservation, it would
be so treated and thus would open the treaty
to further negotiation."
We come back to the questionnI what,
In fact, we are, proposing to do rather
than What an action might be called.
Mr. MILLER. In other words, it is
the contentand not the label which is
- ?
important.
Mr. -PULBRIGIIT. The Senator is
Correct.
Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator.
Mr. LLENDER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield'?
Mr. PULBRIGHT. I yield.
mr Ft,T ENDER I should like to ask
a question. Suppose Russia were to
? ratify the treaty and the Senate should
insert a reservation such as the one I
described in relation to Cuba. Would
It not be possible for the Russians to
come baCk and say, "We will agree with
that provision in regard to Cuba if you
withdraw, your troops from Europe."
Mr. trABRIGHT. Surely.
ELLENPER. The Russians
might telrus, `'?You -withdraw yOul troops
? from north Africa, Taiwan, and all over
the world, or we will not accept the
reSerVa-tiOn.-
N'VL.1313,I0HT. The Senator is
correCt, think it is utterly unrealistic.
it wonlcii)e much better to vote against
the treaty than to apprO-ach it-in that
-manner by bringing in extraneous and
irrelevant matters.
Mr. ELLENDER. I agree with the
Senator.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It would be much
more frank and honest to say, "I vote
against the treaty."
The essential purpose of the nuclear
test ban treaty is to bring an element of
sanity and restraint into the relations of
great nations which know, but do not al-
ways seem to feel and believe and act as
though they know, that a decision made
in anger or fear, or a simple mistake,
could result in the grisly incineration of
millions of good people who are helpless
against nuclear bombs and the complete
destruction of human society.
National security does not and cannot
depend on military power alone. Since
the end of World War II American mili-
tary power has been vastly increased by
the development of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles. At the same time, as
Dr. Herbert York pointed out in his
statement in support of the treaty, our
national security has been rapidly and
inexorably diminishing. In the early
1950's the Soviet Union, had it been will-
ing to pay the price of retaliation, could
have inflicted some millions of casualties
on the United States by an attack with
bombers carrying atomic bombs. By the
late 1950's the Soviets, at heavy retalia-
tory cost, could have attacked us with
more and better bombers, inflicting some
tens of millions of casualties. By the
mid-1960's the Russians will be able to
_launch an attack on the United- States
using intercontinental missiles and
bombers that would cause perhaps a
hundred million casualties. The United
States, of course, will be able to inflict at
least equal, and probably much greater,
losses in a retaliatory blow against the
Soviet Union. As Dr. Herbert York said:
. ?
This steady decrease in national security
was not the result of any inaction on our
part but simply the result of the syfitematic
exploitation of the products of modern sci-
ence and technology by the Soviet Union.
There is no technical solution to the
paradox of growing military -power and
decreasing national security. A nation's
seCurity is a function of its overall posi-
tion in the world?its political and eco-
? nomic strength as well as its military
power, its diplomacy and foreign trade,
its alliances and associations. Security
In addition depends upon the general
state of international relations, upon
whether or not a nation has powerful
enemies and upon the character and
policies of its enemies. Security, in
short, is not merely a military and tech-
nological commodity, but a combination
of many elements, all of which must be
taken into account in the shaping of na-
tional policy. Only if we regard national
security as simply a matter of armaments
and nothing more is it possible to credit
the view of a noted witness that this
? treaty is "not directed against the arms
race," but "against knowledge." The
treaty before us represents a modest but
realistic effort to increase our security by
political means?by retarding the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons and by
diminishing, however slightly, the ten-
sions and animosities of international re-
lations.
It is a dangerous oversimplification to
regard national security solely in terms
of weapons systems and military tech-
nology. The uncritical acceptance of a
simple equation between security and
armaments can only lead us into an ac-
celerating arms race, mounting interna-
tional tensions, and diminishing security.
It can lead us to give undue weight to
the political views of highly specialized
scientists, such as Dr. Teller, whose ex-
perience and knowledge have only very
limited relevance to the complexities of
international relations. War, said
Clemenceau, in his famous maxim, is
too serious a business to be left to the
generals. Some of our most thoughtful
scientists, such as Dr. York, believe that
It is also too serious a business to be left
to the nuclear physicists. _ There is an
alarming similarity, as Walter Millis and
James Real point out in a recently pub-
lished book, "between the credence given
to a modern physicist pontificating on
strategy or politics and that accorded an
Aztec priest predicting tribal disasters,"
"The Abolition of War," 1963, pages ix-
x.
It is essential that we bear in mind,
In our deliberations on this treaty and
In all of our major policy decisions, that
security has many dimensions besides
military power. As Prof. Marshall Shul-
man pointed out in his statement in sup-
port of this treaty, it is quite possible for
us to possess overwhelming military su-
periority and still be confronted with the
erosion of our power and influence in the
world if our alliance system is allowed to
weaken, if confidence in our resolution
is called into question, if our political and
economic policies are ineffective, or if by
ill-considered unilateral measures we
provoke our adversaries into hostile
countermeasures.
None of this is intended to suggest that
a high level of military power is anything
less than essential as a deterrent to Com-
munist aggression. "But it is intended
to suggest," in Professor Shulman's
words, "that there may be a point be-
yond sufficiency at which purely mili-
tary preoccupation may diminish rather
than increase our security in the full
sense of the word."
Armaments are a cause as well as a
result of world tensions. This maxim,
so frequently stated and so rarely acted
upon, is at the heart of the nuclear test
ban treaty. Its meaning was set forth
in simple but eloquent language in Pope
John's great encyclical, Pacem in Terris.
The nuclear arms race, Pope John ex-
plained, is justified as essential for the
maintenance of peace through a balance
of armaments, but "one must- bear in
mind that, even though the monstrous
power of modern weapons acts as a de-
terrent, it is to be feared that the mere
continuance of nuclear tests, undertaken
with war in mind, will have fatal con-
sequences for life on earth."
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. HOLLAND. Does the Senator un-
derstand that the late Pope, by that
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statement, indicated he was thhelting In
terms of fallout or radiation?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe so. It was
one of the things he had in Mind, cer-
tainly.
Mr. HOLLAND. I have read rather
carefully the report made by the com-
mittee which the distinguished Senator
from Arkansas heads, and likewise the
report made by the subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services headed by
the distinguished Senator from Missis-
sippi [Mr. &mons].
I find almost no reference?certainly
very small reference?to the question of
danger to people in our time and in times
to come from radiation or fallout, and
the hazardous effects to be avoided by
cutting down the degree of saturation in
the atmosphere.
I wonder if it is not true that this is
one area as to which the Soviets are as
sure to have a desire to reduce or elimi-
nate that danger as we have, or any-
body else who has children, or grand-
children, or the hope for generations to
follow, has? I wonder if enough atten-
tion has been given to that danger and to
the chances of ameliorating it through
the adoption of the nuclear test ban
treaty?
Noting the comment made by the late
Pope, I wonder if, after all, that is not
one of the major considerations in this
whole matter. Would the Senator care
to comment?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it Is a
major consideration. On page 21 of the
report we made reference to this ques-
tion. There was some testimony about
It in the hearings.
The testimony was, speaking very gen-
erally, mostly on other things. Consider-
ing the limited testing which has been
going on, there has not been, worldwide,
at least, a very dangerous buildup of
fallout or radiation. On the other hand,
,if we continue to test and if there is ex-
tensive testing, we do not know hove dan-
gerous this could be.
I agree with the Senator. I do not
think this was stressed as much as it de-
serves to be stressed, particularly be-
cause the principal attack upon the
treaty arose from the military angle.
The response in the committee and of
the witnesses is very often determined
by the criticism. This related a great
deal to the military situation.
That is one reason why so much at-
tention has been given to this problem
by the people of my State. I have given
It more than I normally would, because
of the danger, in my view, to the treaty
which arises from the military. The
military men are the principal critics of
the treaty.
I think .it is quite natural that mili-
tary people, or those in any other pro-
fession, be very sensitive with respect to
any inhibition upon the practice of their
profession. I do not cast any reflections
upon their patriotism, honesty, or any-
thing else by that statement. I think it
Is a common factor.
Reduction of radioactive fallout is an
affirmative consideration in favor of the
treaty; and there was not much said
about it, unfortunately. The Senator
knows that witness after witness ap-
peered-erne...11Y of equal stature, in my
view, with Mr. Teller?but most of the
news was devoted to M. Teller, because
be was attacking the treaty. Very little
Was said about Dr. York or Dr. Itistia-
kowsky. What they said was not news,
because they were for the treaty.
Reduction of radioactive fallout is an
Item to be considered In favor of the
treaty. -Unfortunately, perhaps, the
committee did not go into it sufficiently.
Certainly it Was not treated as an item
of great importance, as it should have
been.
I think the Senator is correct in his
observation. ,
Mr. HOLLAND. It seems to me that
it is an important part 'ref the entire ap-
proach to the treaty, and one of the most
important ceojectives to be attained.
Also, to follow up a point made by the
distinguished Senator from Arkansas a
short while ago in his eolIoquy with the
distinguished Senator from Georgia, this
Is a field in which there must be mu-
tuality.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. t agree with the
Senator.
Mr. HOLLAND. I 'cannot conceive
that any human being would not be con-
cerned with the dire results of fallout
or radiation on children, which I under-
stand are much More seyere with respect
to children than to adults.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. HOLLAND And with respect to
children of unborn generations to come.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
correct.
Mr. HOLLAND Since we are trying
to develop points as to which there are
mutual reasons for arguing for the adop-
tion of the treaty by the three principal
signatories, it occurred to me that this
was a point which should be emphasized.
-Mr. FULBRIGHT. t am glad the
Senator has given emphasis to it on this
occasion. I think the Senator is abso-
lutely correct.
Sonic people say, "We' wonder why the
Soviets are willing to sign the treaty.
It must be only to their advantage.'"
This is a good example of why it is
mutually advantageous, rather than to
the advantage of only one side.
Mr. HOLLAND. Does the Senator not
think that the signing by more than 80
non-nuclear powers, wno have no ad-
vantage to gain from this except greater
security in life, evidences tremendous
interest and a worldwide concern on
the subject, which is something to be
considered as the treaty is being debated?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
absolutely correct That goes a long
way to explaining the .very rapid ac-
ceptance by more than BQ nations of the
treaty. The Senator is ;quite correct.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to mee
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MANSioiELD. I commend the
destinguished Senator from Florida for
raising the questions of radioactive fall-
out about which So little has been said,
though it is pregnant with meaning, as
the Senator pointed out, not so much
far this generation, but for the genera-
tion growing up and generations yet to
come.
9
I hope that when any Member of this
body considers the treaty he will con-
Bider it not from a political viewpoint
only and not from a military viewpoint
only, but in the overall picture, taking
Into consideration much of the potential
thinking which was in the minds of peo-
ple but not mentioned or raised to any
great extent during the course of the
hearings before the committee.
I ani impressed that, in addition to,
the very fine speech which the dis-
tinguished chairman of the Foreign.
Relations Committee is giving, the dis-
tinguished senior Senator from Florida
has seen fit to raise this most important,
question, and also to cite the fact that,
aa of this moment, 89 nations have rati-
fied this treaty and have indicated their
willingness to go along with it. I think
the Senate owes the Senator a vote of
thanks for raising the question.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. HOLLAND. First, I want to
thank the majority leader as well as to
assure him that my own understanding
of this problem is far from complete,
but, as I have understood it through the
years, there Is no question at all over the
fact that children with small thyroid
glands are much more likely to be visited
with disaster in that area of their body,
which may lead to cancer of the thyroid,
by reason of the pollution of the atmos-
phere by large quantities of radiation.
I am sure the distinguished Senator
from Arkansas has gone into it more
fully than I have. Am I correct in that
statement?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That Is my
understanding. We had testimony that,
I think, related to iodine 103. There are
a few elements that seem to collect by
and through milk, which affects par-
ticularly children, because they are the
greatest consumers, relatively speaking,
of milk.
It will be recalled that a few weeks ago
there was a very strong protest made
from the health authorities in Utah, be-
cause of the rather close proximity there
to the place of tests, and the contamina-
tion had concentrated there. There has
been a greater concentration in the
Northern Hemisphere as compared to the
Southern Hemisphere.
It has been called to my attention that,
at page 862 of the hearings, it will be
seen that Dr. Rietiakowsky said:
The Soviets might embark upon develop-
ment not of hundred, but thousand-megaton
weapons. There are conceivable things. I
am quite sure of that, and obviously other
nations will also move into the nuclear arms
race, and since for an inexperienced country
It is so much easier to make tests above
ground than underground, certainly the situ-
ation of wide-open testing will assist them
in that desire, in fulfillment of that desAre.
So, I would say the amount of radio se-
tive fallout will keep increasing. It is now
still a comparatively small fraction of the
total radiation which we are exposed to and
thus one could make the argument that the
occasional malformed babies, occasional cases
of leukemia, and so on are numerically than
significant compared with normal occur-
rences, but, of course, that does not help the
people who have that misfortune.
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s?allputd.well, obviously' these Ire-
quP CiPil Of mishaps and 'tragedies will In-
:i ,
TV;ulow what the encl. of It. is sir.
"We had other testimony. One, a biol-
ogist from Harvard, was quite positive_
on this point.
Mr. gota;ANI,),, If the ,$enatsir will
allow me to interject one more thought,
as a Mernber of the Senate-legislatiVe
Committee on Agriculture and Fares*,
We
have alreadY received complaints
from various sources, particularly from
the good women of the country and
-women's organizations, with reference to
this same subject, and particularly with
reference to theSontamination of chil-
dren through milk, by reason ofthe fact
that producing cows may be subjected to -
=due radiation from eating forage af-
fected by fallout from atmospheric
tests.
X know that here is a:question which
has distUrbed ;now, many of okir people:
There cannot be any doubt Of ft; because
We have had numerous complaints, and
we have investigated them in a small
way.
In concluding the point, I hope those
who have come closer to grips with this
Whole problem, or series of problems, will
not fail to give is all facts that can be
produced for the RECORD with reference
to this hazard to mankind that comes
from undue saturation of the atmos-
phere with radioactive materials. It
seems to me that this must be of Con-
cern to Ap people, whether We want to
call it politics, whether We want to call
It security, whether we want to call it
mere humanitarianism, whether we want
to call it aelf-interW, because almost all
of us have children and hopes of grand-
children and other? to come 4104g, so it
becomes a very selfish problem for all of _
us. If the treaty?tends reduce that
con,cern, I think that is a maximum ob-
jective hi connection with the whole
treaty.
Mr, FULBRIGHT. I appreciate what
the Senator has said. I agree with him
coMpletely.
Mr. CARLSON. my. P;esident will
_
the Senator yield?
Mr. FOIBIZIGHT. I yield. -
Mr. CARL,8014. On ,the -qUestion
which has been discussed, I agree with
the distinguished Senator from Florida
and with, the distinguished chairman Of
the committee that there was consider,-
able testiinony. There are maw pages
In the hearings and in the index with
regard to fallout. In order to have the
RECORD Complete, though, I think I_
should read from page 214 of the hear-
ings, in which Dr. Seaborg, in response
to a question by the Senator from Geor-
gia [Mr. RussELL1, made the following
respontei: '
Senator RussELx,. Dr. Seaborg, / read in the
paper, I believe the day before yesterday, that
there is tw,ice as muph radiation in milk to-
day as there was 3 years ago.
Is that approximately right? .
SEABoae. The:,t -would depend on the
SeCtion?-,KtDe ,,,coujitry that was being re-
ferreci tc 1,,wpurs1 like to say that there
are probably sections of the country where
there is twice as Inlich strontium 90 in milk
now as there was 8 years ago; yes, sir, Sen-
ator.
94
15-671
Senator RUSSELL. Has that yo reaChed a a_spiring to develop their own nuclear
point where it is sufficTent to endanger the
capacity.
htlraan faintly?
Dr. SEABORG. NO, Eli. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator RussaL. Ts It "a Tong WayirOrn if? Senator yield for a brief question?
. Dr. SEABORG. It is a considerable distance Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me first read a
from it; yes, sir. short quotation. Then I shall yield. I
The Senator from Georgia made ark-
read from page 949 of the hearings.
other short statement on the same sub- This is Dr. Meselson, of Harvard Uni-
t versity, testifying:
I thought those quotations should be Bearing this in mind, a reasonable estimate
a part of the-ItEeoRii at thig time, be.:- for the number of children with gross mental
cause I believe we all have ahigh regard owroiraybs ieecaalusbecause
defectsof tkewho e bnetic e ff ebcotrsnoifnf thel-
for the distinguished scientist, Dr, Sea:: out from tests ,conducted to date_ is about
borg. 50,000. These defects include 'such things as
Musauiar dystrophy, blindness, dwarfism,
Mr. PPAP.KU..4/C. Mr,yrssiderit, will
the Senator yield in that connection? and other major deformities.
Mr. FLTLBRIGHT. I yield. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
- Mr. SPARKMAN. The question of
Senator yield?
fallout radioactivity was of great interest Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
to all members of the committee, because
we realized its importance on genera-
tions yet unborn. However, there is
something that ought to be kept in mind.
It was brought out by my question to
Dr. Seaborg and other witnesses who tes-
tified. There is not a great deal of fall-
out when only one nation is testing in
the atmosphere or anywhere else, but
with a combination of such nations?two
at the present time, and perhaps in the
next few years as many as five, and there
is a possibility of expansion even beyond
that number in years to come?a great
mass of debris would be thrown out.
Furthermore, the debris does not
merely float around where it is thrown
out, and is not scattered uniformly about
the earth, but it has a tendency to gather
in pockets. There may not be enough in
the atmosphere, if divided by the num-
ber of people in the world, to hurt an
individual; but it is not found in that
way. Instead, there are pockets of con-
tamination in the Midwest, when there
have been times, as the Senator from
Florida has said, when the grass became
so contaminated that it was assumed to
be somewhat hazardous to be used for
milk production.
There have been similar reports of con-
tamination from Nevada. In Utah, only
in recent weeks, pockets have been no-
ticed there in which the contamination
could easily, and perhaps rather quickly,
reach a hazardous stage, if several dif-
ferent nations were testing and throwing
out such debris all the time. I think we
ought to keep in mind that such con-
tamination is not of uniform distribu-
tion, but is subject to being thrown out
Into pockets.
' Mr: FULBRIGHT. I appreciate, the
Senator's recalling that testimony.
The testimony of a biologist on the
subject of health hazards of radiation
from nuclear testing appears at page 949
of the hearings. I will not take the
trouble to read it. I call attention to it
for the benefit of Senators who may wish
to look into this question.
-
The Senator from Alabama has
summed up the situation. There has not
been a great deal of testing. There was
a short moratorium, and a short burst of
great activity, following which there has
Mr. MILLER. I am just as concerned
as anyone else about the potential fall-
out effects, not only on our present gen-
eration but on future generations also.
However, I am amazed at the diverse
testimony which has been given in this
situation. The Senator from Arkansas
has read a statement from a professor
at Harvard University, indicating that
there will be 50,000 genetic defects on the
basis of the tests which have already
taken place. Yet I believe this, too,
should be made a part of the RECORD.
On March 2, 1962, the President of the
United States announced the resumption
of nuclear testing. He said:
It has been estimated, in fact, that the
exposure due to radioactivity from these tests
will be less than one-fiftieth of the difference
which can be experienced, due to variations
In natural radioactivity, simply by living in
different locations in this country. This will
obviously be well within the guides for gen-
eral population health and safety, as set by
the Federal Radiation Council. _
There seems to be quite a split in opin-
ion between the President of the United
States on the one hand and the state-
ment quoted by the Senator from Arkan-
sas, made by a professor at Harvard
University. I hope that during the
course of the debate we might get at a
common understanding on this subject,
because I believe there are extreme view-
points and divergent opinions very far
apart on both sides.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not see any
testimony to the effect that fallout was
a good thing. I am sure the Senator
does not mean to say that. He does not
believe it is a good thing, does he?
Mr. MILLER. I do not; but when the
President says the results of the tests he
was directing to be resumed in 1962 will
not show more than one-fiftieth of the
amount of the variation between one
part of the country and another, it is
quite a statement and ought to be put
in the RECORD, so that it may be taken
into consideration in the light of what
Professor Meselson has said.
Mr: FULBRIGHT. If something is
not done about the continued accelera-
tion of the tests, not only by the United
States and the Soviet Union, but also
others?and France is now making plans
been very little testing. So there has to conduct tests in the Pacific?the sit-
nobeen con muous, widespread' testmg uation e -serious. In that con-
as that which could result from nations nectpn France hasalready aroused New
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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65600383R000100210002-8
15672 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE September
Zealand, Australia, and Peru. Of course,
they have protested.
There are others also. I believe there
are eight countries which, It is believed,
at some time or other will have the ca-
pacity for conducting such tests. If this
continues, it is agreed that at some point
It will become dangerous.
I do not believe that any of these peo-
ple say that what has already happened
has resulted in a disastrous situation,
but they would like to stop it.
Professor Meselson estimates that 50,-
000 have been affected by what has al-
ready been done. In a world of 3 billion
or so, I suppose some people might think
that that is not very important, espe-
cially to those who are not affected. As
the Senator from Florida has pointed
out, it is important 'to those who are .
affected, particularly those living near
, test areas; and those people have pro-
,
, tested.
Mr. MILLER. I believe that 50,000
? genetic defects would be tragic. I find
it inconceivable that such a great differ-
ence should exist between what, the pro-
fessor at Harvard has said and what the.
President said in his statement ordg a
little more than a year ago. I believe
the President's statement ought to be in
the RECORD.
I also invite attention to page 224 of
the hearing. I should like to quote from
that page, as follows:
Senator IlmicENLOOPER. I Want to ask you
this, Doctor. Has science been able to pin-
point even one case where fallout can be
scientifically attributed to radiatiou--that is,
Where one case of leukemia or bone cancer
or things of that kind or mutation that can
be scientifically attributed to fallout?
Dr. SEADORG. Prom worldwide fallout, that
Is?
Senator lircxErmoorza. Yes, sir.
Dr. SEABORG. Excepting these one or two
freak cases of local fallout. I think that the
answer would be no. I know of no case,
where a particular case could be attributed
to fallout.
hind that to be quite a statement to
put in juxtaposition with the statement
about the 50,000 defects that professor
Meselson has presented before the com-
mittee., I do not know whom to believe
at this point.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Dr. Seaborg
speaks about worldwide fallout What
does the Senator believe the doctor
meant by that? He is excluding any of
the cases in which there is clearly and
demonstratively a connection, between
fallout and deformity. There were the
cases in Japan, the cases of the fisher-
men in the Pacific, and so on.
It is like arguing that no one has yet
proved, that smoking cigarettes causes
lung cancer. However, there Etre a great
many doctors who think so. I cannot
say that I know positively of a case that
has been caused directly by smoking. I
am inclined to think that it does have a
bad effect, although I ana a mild smoker.
What the Senator has quoted should
be taken in connection with br. Sea-
borg's testimony at page 219, where Dr.
Seaborg referred to the fact that "stron-
tium 00 comes down from tUe upper
atmosphere, the stratosphere, and so
forth, at a rate faster than ccnesnonds
to its half-life, that is, through rains
and so forth. Then it, comes doyen to
earth, of course, which is a worse _place
for it to be than up in the stratosphere."
I believe that the oV,erall conclusion
to be drawn from Dr. ,Seaborg's testi-
mony is that fallout is not a good thing,
that it is not a good thing to put more
strontium 90 into the atmosphere. What
they are saying is that they Cannot
identify or trace a calpal connection.
If we should reach some unknown
threshold, I suppose, it could become
dangerous. I suspect it ie very much like
the argument that cigarette smoking
causes cancer. I do net know how to
resolve this kind of prohlem. I do not
believe the Senator thinks that there is
no health hazard involVed.
Mr. MILLER. I wonder if it would be
fair to state that up ,until now the
amount of fallout from testing has been
such as not to cause , any particular
alarm so far as genetic effects and other
effects are concerned. At least, we have
no scientific testimony On this point.
Mr. :FULBRIGHT. Excluding the local
areas, close to the testing area. Dr. Sea-
borg spoke about worldwide effects. The
people in Utah did not, like it. I have
had no particular protest made to me by
People in Arkansas, altheugh as of a cer-
tain date we know that, strontium 90 is
higher in the Ozarks than in other areas.
Mr. MILLER. Perhaps it would be
a fair statement to ay. that Possible
disasters or bad fallout effects are as
much of a danger and would cause as
much concern on the part of the people
of the Soviet Union, as on the part of
the people of the United States.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree.
Mr. MILLER. As the Senator from
Florida has pointed net, there is a
nuituality; and if we are poncerned about
fallout, we need to be net one iota more
concerned than the people of the Soviet
Union. There is a quid pro quo. It is
sometimes made to appear as though the
United States were theot
ly country that
needed to worry about allout. I think
itavell to point ont that e people of the
Soviet Union need to w rry about it as
much as we do. It is no more an argu-
ment for us than it is fpr them.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
going pretty far. He is saying that if the
Russians do not mind dying from this
disease, why should we bother about it?
Mr. MILLER. It i4 not quite so
simple.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Soviets had
a different attitude toward life than we
do, there might be soine difference in
our views; but I do not think there is a
differenre in attitude. / do not believe
it is a good argument te say that if the
Russians do not mins' dying from
dwarfism or leukemia, we should not.
Mr. MILLER. That le not the argu-
ment. ,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. p sounded as
though it were. ,
Mr. MILLER. If the Senator has
doubts on that point, let me make it clear
that the people of the Soviet Union are
probably advised by their specialists?
and they are as much aware of this
danger point as We arer-that it is dan-
gerous to resume testing when the nu-
clear fallout reaches thp danger point.
9
The Senator from Florida has stated
that there is a mutuality, but we should
emphasize that this argument holds true
for the Soviets as well as for us. It ought
to be made clear that when the United
States resumed testing in 1962, the Presi-
dent gave the direction to do that and
delivered a magnificent address to the
American people disclosing his reasons':
for doing so. I am confident he would
not have asked for the testing to be re-
sumed if, based upon all the scientific
advice that was available to him, he
thought the testing would cause an un-
due amount of pollution of the air due
to nuclear fallout from the testing.
We ought to keep that in mind, so that
we will not overemphasize the fact that
the nuclear fallout is of prime consider-
ation, although the Senator from Florida
has made a good point that it is a matter
of mutuality, and we do not find many
areas of mutuality at this time.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Arkansas yield?
Mr. relLBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator
from Iowa for his comment. He has re-
ferred to one of the points I was trying
to bring out; that is, that this is an area
in. which there should be a mutuality of
approach. The Soviets are just as hu-
man as we are.
Second, perhaps they are a little more
concerned just now about this point
than we. This is conjecture, but we
know they have conducted a number of
atmospheric tests with so-called dirty
bombs that were not so far from concen-
trations of their people as was our last
group of atmospheric tests conducted in
the remote recesses of the Pacific.
While / have no information on the
subject, it seems to me that we at least
have the assurance that here is an area
of mutual concern to them and to us.
We might even feel that the Soviets have
a little more cause for concern right now
than we do because of the 71 atmospheric
tests conducted by them, in 1961-62, some
of them having a high degree of concen-
tration in the exploding of nuclear weap-
ons and nuclear bombs vastly greater in
power than any we have exploded.
So my point is borne out?I thank the
distinguished Senator from Iowa for
bringing it out?that here is an area of
Mutuality which would rarely occur
In an international 'issue between the So-
viet Union and the United States. I do
not want the U.S. Senate to lose sight
of that fact.
I thank the Senator from Arkansas
for yielding, and the Senator from Iowa
for raising the question.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Sena-
tor from Florida.
I, too, commend him for making this
point; it is an important one. .
History may teach us little about the
present arms race, which, because it
involves nuclear weapons, has possibili-
ties for catastrophe unparalleled in the
past. But one lesson is clear. A con-
tinuing arms race, accompanied by
mounting fears and tensions, has almost
inevitably in the past led to war.
There is perhaps some instruction for
us in the experience of Europe before
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Approved For Re
e.,otthe great powers of that
lY Planned a major war, but
the Iwo major groupings, the
Pow erA and the Entente Powers,
eget by fears of attack by the other.
Fear grew into Conviction as the two
40dtliancel continued to arm against
eaC er &Vain and desperate quest
for secnritY. ,41-itualrfear, generated the
arn1?.. raee, wniCh in turn generated
greater I car Until almost by accident Eu-
rope waa Plunged into general war.
lime emerged broken and deva-
Stated from the war of 1914 and from
the ,peeorid World, War which was
spaWhe4 by the consequences of the First
But 410,11409M _Survived. The simple,
MI:Welling fact of our OW11 time is that
the world's great nations, and ir any of its
arlialler Ones, almost certainly could not
Survive as Organized societies a third
World. War fought with nuclear weapons.
It is this prospect, so obvious and yet so
Incfc4pretkemilae, that makes it essen-
tial for is to break, out of the fatal cycle
of fear and armaments and greater fear
fald jlnatlY War.
44e,?rillelear test ban treaty will not
brea% the, cycle. It is far too modest an
elfort to have More than a marginal ef-
fect, on the conflict between .the Com-
p= _n1S1 a,nd, the free world. But if it is
althr411,7 obaerVed, this treatY can in
some 414ffil1 IneaSUre Mitigate the fears
and AuSpicions of the cold war and per-
haps In One. lead to further measures
Of, limited accommodation. It is not
likely it is indeed all but inconceiv-
able=that the cOnflict between commu-
manl andthe Tree world can be resolved
44.1140.1me. Sat the final resolution
of the cgnilict, however vigorously we
nv,y desire and pursue it, is not an urgent
Matter, The World has always been be-
set by conflicts-religious and dynastic,
hational, and ideological?and few have
beey resolved by means other than the
VO ution of history.
..-What IS Urgent for both the Commu-
niStS KA the free world is the preven-
tion ef nUclear war. This single objec-
tive, the slirvival of the civilized societies
Of the earth, is the one elemental inter-
eat which, all naLions_have in common,
and Ilene Mere anthan the United States
and the,,Apylet Union, which, being the
InlnelPal,no&sessOrs Of nuclear weapons,
wokt he their principal targets.
Withont way minimizing the
Seriousness Of Our, conflict with the So-
ilet..,Uplun, we can and must recognize
that this conflict is neither total nor
absolute.? There are areas of mutual in-
terest between Us, among which the pre-
vention of nuclear war is preeminent.
One of Own. we have just discussed; an-
other is the prevention of nuclear war,
which / helieve is the preeminent one,
because it would involve a far greater
poisoning Of the atmosphere. The nu-
clear _test _boa treaty is rooted in this
singe enininnil interest. It is a tenta-
tive anci_eautious_ agreement aimed at
attaining a meastire Of stability and mod-
eration in the military confrontation be-
tween the two great powers.
' Mr. COOPER,. Mr. President, will the
8etqrz Arkkri sas Yield?
I yield?
-RDP65B00383ROOG100210002-8
CORP. ?5.4N-sag
Mr. COOPER. I must say at the out-
set that I intend to vote for the treaty.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I never doubted
that the Senator from Kentucky would
do so.
Mr. COOPER. It was my desire to
vote for it, but I wanted to be satisfied
about .its effect on our security. I at-
tended the hearings and heard most of
the testimony given in public and exec-
utive sessions before I firmly made up
my mind to vote for the treaty.
I have been listening with interest to
the Senator's excellent statement, but I
would like for him to clarify a part of
his remarks.
We all agree that there are risks in the
treaty which cannot be wholly resolved.
I believe the Senator would agree with
my statement. Further the risks have
been known since negotiations looking
toward a treaty ban on nuclear weapons
began under the administration of Pres-
ident Eisenhower.
We have always recognized the pos-
sibility of clandestine testing by the
Soviet Union. It is also possible that
the Soviet 'Union may be ahead in some
forms of scientific development, as they
are in high yield nuclear devices. But
the preponderance of testimony, includ-
ing that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is
that we will be able to maintain our
overall superiority.
But against these risks?risks which
we must accept if we ratify the treaty?
we must balance another risk?the risk
that the proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons?the unabated nuclear arms race?
may lead inexorably to a nuclear war
which would leave no victor.
But I have just noted that the Senator
has stated that there is little in the
treaty which gives hope of breaking out
of the cycle of the arms race. This
seems to contradict what I believe is a
chief argument against which to balance
the risks we must accept if we ratify the
treaty.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Against the arms
race? I was referring to a modest con-
tribution to the resolution of the cold
war, which is quite a different matter.
Mr. COOPER. The Senator said:
It is this prospect, so obvious and yet so
Incomprehensible, that makes It essential
for us to break out of the fatal cycle of fear
and armaments and greater fear and finally
war. The nuclear test ban treaty will not
break the cycle.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of the conflict?
I believe the conflict between ourselves
and the Russians, particularly the
ideological conflict, will continue.
I believe this treaty is a very modest
step. What is really significant is, not
the length of the step, but the direction
in which it is taken. The treaty consti-
tutes a change from a .continued, ever-
increasing buildup of nuclear weapons;
and this point is very significant.
There is a difficulty in connection with
the treaty, in that it is a very moderate
Inhibition upon the freedom of action of
both sides. However, the really signifi-
cant point, in my opinion, is that we
have arrived at any agreement at all.
QC,Orlak?I ?ague.
15673
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Because we have
been trying for a long time to arrive at
an agreement. As the Senator from
Kentucky knows, the previous adminis-
tration made many such efforts, but they
were always fruitless, and never resulted
in an agreement on anything. Mean-
time our budget for these weapons grows
larger and larger and I assume Russia's
does, too.
The question may be asked: What does
this treaty do? The testimony was that
in the foreseeable future we must take
other safeguards until other develop-
ments occur. Tests underground are
much more expensive than tests in the
atmosphere. I did not mean to leave the
impression that the treaty is insignifi-
cant. It is only insignificant in the sense
of procedures to resolve our basic dif-
ferences. They must come through
means other than military means.
Mr. COOPER. I understand, for I
have read the advance copy of the sen-
ator's speech. I agree with what he says,
and also with the emphasis which must
be given, in connection with the arms
race, and our security.
I have listened to a great deal of the
testimony, and I have read the great
part of it. There does seem to be a kind
of contradiction, for the Senator from
Arkansas has said this ban will help in-
hibit the proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons and will have an effect upon the nu-
clear arms race itself. But the admin-
istration asserts, and the scientists and
the military assert that we will make re-
doubled efforts in the field of under-
ground nuclear tests.
I believe this underground testing is
necessary to assure our security, but it
does raise the question whether this
treaty will inhibit the nuclear arms
race?at least between the United States
and the Soviet Union.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. But my point is
that even with the same effort, under-
ground tests will cost more.
Mr. COOPER. That is correct.
Nevertheless, everyone agrees that un-
derground testing must go forward. But
You have correctly stated that the treaty
is a step which may lead to other agree-
ments.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. COOPER. President Kennedy has
said that the treaty would open the way
to further agreements, and former Presi-
dent Eisenhower said, in his letter to the
committee, that the greatest advantage
he saw from the treaty was that it
might lead to enforceable agreements
between the United States and the So-
viets and to a reduction in the arms race.
Does not the Senator think, then, if
this treaty is only the first step, that the
real test of the treaty may be found in
he attitude of the Soviet Union during
the year or two which follow its ratifica-
tion? And may not this period tell us
whether the Soviet Union will be willing
to make any just settlement of the issues
that create the danger of war?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, indeed. And
that is very important.
Mr. COOPER. Whether the Soviets
show any inclination to take further
steps, such as an enforceable argeement
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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 ? CIA-RDP65B00I83R000100210002-8
15674 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATK eptembd 9
on underground tests or an agreement in
regard to Berlin, or one in regard to
Cuba, will test the attitudes of the So-
viets and show whether they intend to
take the further steps toward the settle-
ment of the issues they have created.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree. But we
have to give them that opportunity, by
our ratification of the treaty. If it is
not ratified, we shall never know that,
Mr. COOPER. I believe that as we
take this first step, with its known risks,
the real test of Soviet intentions lies
ahead.
Mr. FLILBRIGHT. I appreciate the
Senator's comments, and I am very
pleased with his attitude--although, as
I said at the beginning, I had no doubt
that he would take this attitude, for
he has had enough experience in this
field to know its importance.
Mr. COOPER. I wish to ask a ques-
tion about reservations and understand-
ings. Is it not true that during the
negotiations with the Soviet Union re-
specting the ban on nuclear testing, be-
ginning under the administration of
President Eisenhower, and continued
under the administration of President
Kennedy, the negotiations related al-
most solely to the subject of agreement
upon nuclear weapons?
Mr. FULBRIGITI'. That is correct.
Mr. COOPER. Is it not also true that
when Premier Khrushchev suggested in
a speech?whether he suggested it in
negotiations, I have no way of knowing?
that the treaty might be followed by a
nonaggression pact, it was the position
of Members of Congress, that we should
not consider such an agreement at all,
but that our efforts should be directed
solely- toward a test ban agreement?
Mr. PULERIGHT. Yes, that was the
position of our Government
Mr. COOPER. It was our position,
too, was it not?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
- Mr. COOPER. I believe the Senator
will agree that to attempt now to attach
to this treaty a reservation regarding
other issues?those about which we feel
very strongly and correctly, probably
would mean?and I believe it actually
would mean?the failure of the limited
, step embraced Within this treaty.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the
Senator from Kentucky. He is abso-
lutely correct. In my opinion, that
would be a great mistake, and it would
be very unwise to attempt it. Further-
' more:--,I do not believe it would succeed.
It would be a roundabout way of voting
against the treaty or trying to destroy
the treaty, in my opinion. That would
be the intended result.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will
the senator from Arkansas 3eld?
The PRE81DING OFFICER. (Mr.
WALTERS in the chair). Does the Sena-
tor from Arkansas yield to the Senator
from:Florida?
Mr. PTj'LBIIGH'T' I ani glad to
yield.
Mr. HOLLAND. I note on pages 658
and 659 of the printed hearings of the
comitittee so ably headed by-the distin-
guished Senator, a report" froin the New
Yort Times of August 21, covering the
subject which' the senator from Arkan-
sas, the Senator from IaWa, other Sena-
tors, and I have been discussing?namely
the question of danger to people from
radioactive fallout.
wonder if the Senator,will permit me
at this time to ask unanimous consent
that the news item published in the -New
York Times to which I referred be
printed in the Remo at this point.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not at all. I shall
be glad to have the item in the RECORD.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I
make that request.
There being_ no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
NEVADA FALLOUT, FOUND A HAZARD?CHILDREN
POSSIIU,Y HARMED, CONGREEIS PANEL IS TOLD
(By John W. Finney)
WASHINGTON, August 21.--Several thou-
sand children in Nevada and Utah have prob-
ably received hazardous doses of fallout radi-
ation from nuclear testing in Nevada over
the last 12 years, according to a report today
to the congressional Joint Atomic Energy
Subcommittee.
The report was presented in behalf of the
St. Louis Citizens Committee for Nuclear
Information by Dr. Eric Reiss, associate pro-
fessor of medicine at the Washington uni-
versity School of Medicine.
The committee, composed chiefly of scien-
tists, analyzed the fallout from about one-
third of the 99 tests conducted at Nevada
since 1351. It concluded that on several oc-
casions tale amount of radioactive iodine fall-
ing out in the region arnund the test site
far exceeded the permissible radiation levels
established by the Government.
As a result, according to the study, chil-
dren drinking milk containinated with the
radioactive iodine probably received grossly
excessive doses to their thyroid glands.
One reason for the high exposures is that
the children were drinking milk from cows
that foraged in highly contaminated pas-
tures. There was no dilution of the iodine
content, as normally occurs when the milk
is drawn from a large milkshed.
In an interview, Dr. Reps estimated that
3,000 children, mostly in 'Utah and Nevada,
had received excessive cfoses of radiation.
Be predicted that this wduld result in 10 to
12 cases of thyroid cancer in the exposed
children.
The report was highly critical of the
Atomic Energy Commission's procedures for
monitoring the health haZard posed by fall-
out from the Nevada tests,
It charged past and repeated Commission
assertions that the hazard had been confined
to the Nevada test site and that the Nevada
tests sad been carried out without any dis-
cernible threat to the safety of local popu-
lations.
An analysis of available evidence shows,
the report said, that children in the States
bordering the Nevada test site have probably
been exposed to medically significant radia-
tion.
The report criticized the Commission for
Its inadequate monitoring procedures, which
failed to look for the amount of radioactive
materials, particularly radioiodine, entering
the food supply. With: proper monitoring
procedures, the report Suggested, it would
have been possible to take simple preventive
measures, such as removal of local, contami-
nated milk supplies, that would have re-
duced the radiation expozure to children.
_
The Commission declined to comment on
the report until its offinials had an oppor-
tunity to read it.
By its timing and conclusions, the report
is certain to enlarge the neva fallout contro-
versy developing over the health hazards
'posed by past tests in Nevada to children in
Approved For Release 2004/03/11:
Nevada and Utah. Somewhat similar CCM-
clusions?that some of the tests resulted in
unexpectedly high fallout of radioiodine near
the test site?have been reached by a 'Uni-
versity of Utah group and by Dr. Harold A.
Knapp, a former fallout expert with the AEC.
The controversy has already reached the
presidential level. At his news conference
yesterday President Kennedy promised a fur-
ther study of the reports but he said that as
of now he did not believe that the health of
the children had been adversely affected.
The President cited the reports as furtber
justifiCation for the nuclear treaty barring
atmospheric explosions. The St. Louis com-
mittee, however, said that the hazardous
fallout had also come from underground
testing. It noted that venting?in which the
explosion breaks through the surface?had
been reported for at least seven underground
tests in Nevada.
The St. Louis committee report is the first
to assert that radiation exposures have
reached levels at which there is general medi-
cal agreement that physical damage would
result.
DOSAGES ARE ESTIMATED
In the past, the argument has raged over
the effects of radiation exposures measured
in fractions of a roentgen--levels so low that
it is difficult to establish that they have a
harmful effect. However, the St. Louis study
finds that in some cases Utah and Nevada
children have received radiation exposures
to their thyroid glands measured in 100 rads
or more?levels in the range considered can-
cer producing by the Federal Radiation
Council. (A rad is a unit measuring the bio-
logical effect of radiation.)
For example, the report said, on at least
seven occasions since 1952 children in Wash-
ington County, Utah-160 miles east of the
test site?have received thyroid doses rang-
ing from 5 to 100 rads or higher. From ex-
plosions in 1953, it estimated, children in
St. George and Hurricane?two towns in the
county?received doses to their thyroids
ranging from 100 to 700 rads.
For normal peacetime operations, the Fed-
eral Radiation Council has proposed an av-
erage exposure of 0.5 rad to the thyroid for
the general population, with a maximum of
1.6 rad for any one individual. A radiation
protection guide of 30 rads is proposed for
atomic workers.
In sufficiently large doses, radioiodine can
cause thyroid cancer. There is still consid-
erable uncertainty over how large a dose is
needed, but in a recent report the Federal
Radiation Council pointed out that cancer of
the thyroid had been observed in children
after exposures as low as 150 rem. (A rem is
the dosage of ionizing radiation that will
cause the same amount of biological injury
to human tissue as 1 roentgen of X-ray
dosage.)
Radioiodine is a particular threat to chil-
dren because their thyroid gland is smaller
and more sensitive to radiation. Fallout
iodine 131 enters the food chain by falling
on grass. It is consumed by cows and passed
on into the milk. It then tends to concen-
trate in the thyroid,
CONTROVERSY OUTLINED
As the President noted at his news con-.
ference, there is some scientific controversy
over the validity of the recent reports about
iodine fallout from the Nevada testa. The
argument is largely over the methods of
extrapolation used to reach the conclusions.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I in-
vite the attention of the Senator from
Iowa [Mr. MILLER] and other Senators
who are in the Chamber to several parts
of that article:
First, as was correctly stated by the
Senator from Iowa, there is no complete
unanimity between the scientists on this
IA-RDF'65600383R000100210002-8
Approved Fo
L.t, 4
t
ET IN rt-rE Ffrrs NEW Ihuu;paragra,ph o he news STRONTium
?i-t- the Bettom of page 659, notes No PERIL SEEN
that, act:" ? - ---' - ' The Nation's milk supply during June con-
c,-na,- the II-64s article e-chie-fi . the ? tamed a record high national daily level of
PlredDiAti0/1 of a?repOri- to' 'the" jant 32 picocuries of radioactive strontium 90 per
Mn*" Ener Suboommitte of the liter, the Public Health Service reported
ogy d
Congress,hy:Dr. ric Reiss, assliciae pro- This was newly double the national level
. '.I.1860r, : -9,,t :_xnedIcifi6" at tlie?,W:__ ii:s.??M.,?ligto/i, of 17 picocuries recorded in June 1962, the
university Scheer Of Medicine, on -behalf highest for any month last year. A spokes-
of the St. Louis citizens Committee for man for the . Service pointed out that the
. , Nilelek,1711/91711404. The article states '' figures bore out estimates made earlier this
that or :norrirriftTee is eenio&-ea -ehieny- year by the Federal Radiation Cduncil.
Of ISCtentrits,' and gives the difiC which A picocuri, newly adopted term replacing
micromicrocurie, is one-millionth of a curie.
they rePolt which I shall not n i
'quote
. _ . ? A curie is the equivalent of the radioactivity
' (18411A_S: the article will. appear In the produced by one gram of radium. A liter
''. REC,ORP,,.. , is slightly more than a quart.
17rowever, / invite the attention of Sen- '
y DUE TO TESTING
..
ators. tq the next to the last paragraph Th
..? - . , . e Council said last May that the fallout
, ,,. ,
on page s59, which I believe bears out levels this year would probably be substan-
- the ttatethet.:thatl made. t? the senator tially increased over those in 190 but would
frOMAgic,ansas,- It reads as follows: "stilt be, in relative terms, far short of figures
HadlOrealne is 'a.articu ar eat to chil- which would cause concern or justify
dren bece,USts their, thyroid glincili smaller countermeasures." Excessive amounts of
and more sensitive to radiation. Fallout strontium 90 in food could cause bone can-
iodine 101 entersthe food chain by falling cer in humans who consume it.
:01It:grallS+.. It is coniiiiiierby cows and passed The report said the increase would result
,on'' into tlx milk. :It then tends to concen- largely from nuclear weapons testing in 1981
trate in tn? tnyrari. and 1962, most of It by Russia.
f
T. highest average daily level ever re-
Earlier in tile Olin-1
e article IS an ate corded at an individual sampling station was
by Dr. n,eisS as 'to the ' ntirriber. a' 6 - at Mi
15ftel&ON8RW-attaiN5EKAR___ ATIP0160216002-8
Minot, N. Da.k., during June, at 62 pico-
dren n QVA, 6, and Utah who he curies per liter of milk. The June 1962,
thought could expect d contract y average there was 30, so there was
e to slightly more than a doubling.
,thyroid cancer because of the exposure The May level was 50. For the year ended
to r?Ito date. I would not want with, June, the total was 10,962 making
It to appear that either I or the doctOr Mina third high among the 62 sampling sta-
- , , _
making the report are presenting that tions on a 12-month i begs.
AS a anausive finding, but that is his- The second highest level for an individual
prediction hi the rei,ert. r-thiaik the -station during June was 59 at Rapid City,
Senator .for allowing me to have the ar- s. flak., more than double the 27 recorded
there in May. The 12-month total was 7,672.
tide. printed e ECORD.
Mr, Perr.MRICIVIT. I think' that is
very worthwhile,'
Mr. MILLER. ,Mr. President,-will the
Senator yield se that I may ask to have
printed in the Ricein anotheCiefOrtl
ri7L1ARIPST: f Yield.
Mr, On page 24 of the
Washington Sunday Star appears an
Item entitled -atrontium 90 Liyel in
Milk WU gevi High; No Peril Seen," in
?which it is pointed out that the Nation's _
' milk supPly during June of this year
contained A record high natiOnaI daiTY
level of 32 picocuries of radioactive stron-
tium 96 per liter,a,ccording to 'the Pub;
lic Ilealth Service.
At thesktine time, the 'article wisely
points out, the Federal itadiaticiii
h levels
? HIGHEST AVERAGES
However, Little Rock, Ark., and New Or-
leans, La., continued to rank No. 1 and No. 2
in the Nation in total picocuries from 1
liter Of milk daily for the 12 months ended
with June.
Little Rock had a a-ally average for 'June
of 62 and 12=nionfh total of 12;055. New
Orleans had a daily level of 42 and 94 year's
of 12,418. The May daily average was 51
at Little Rock and 40 at New Orleans.
In general, average daily levels went up
during June in the Atlantic seaboard States
from North Carolina northward to Canada.
Charleston, S.C., reported an average daily
level of 28 during both May and June, and
there were decrees. -.time- in Georgia,
Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi.
,
WATCH FOR DECREASES
The levels inCreased in June from most
sampling stations in the Central, Midwest-
this yekprobably would be subkintially - ern, and Rocky Mountain States.
increaa0, over these or ius,:c.? but' wouia ' But the Pacific coast States of California,
x .,.,,,,, ?.
. still be, fn relative jethis, far --ajoit Of? Oregon, and Washington and Alaska had
, the, ag,u0s, ,iiihich would -11-6-14-6-auied - decreases during June. Honolulu, the sam-
pling station In Hawaii, reported a level of
cencern Or 'justify counter meaSUres. - "' ? io during both months.
The Public Health Service spokesman A Health Service spokesman said the Serv-
pointed out that the Public 'Health Serv- ng with great interest to see
I I - watching with interest tos ice-41,wa4ch-i
see whetherthere will b national lowering
,
whether- there will be a. decline in the ' of the 'stiOnliooT:9:0:'?Efinl-In -Siliavisqii6fiT
reriote, ribted,dauurieenger6thareenrry arundeerw.oesf tthhee . p ...., ., ,. _.._ , ,_.
, . Mr. tli,nix,IaHT. One of the great
mcifithe, since 'lune was the pe-a-k i962-mcifith.
high point of 1962. - difficulties of devising and agreeing on
Mr: ? r7113n/61-.11'.. I think it would rational measures to prevent nuclear war
he fine tC" lieve'ttet in the Feen4 is what Raymond Aron has called atom-
'Irma:isle/A,: I ask jg ..inc,rgaillitY, the fact that the cense-
OQ4141' to love aririted _af: quences of such a war are almost beyond
this Ixli h' the 14e6R.R., ?:1"?-tx'''..1...741P.T.1-....0..._111.1,113an ,,,eomprehension. This atomic
which I ti)..etrrecc , ingedulity" ?is apparent in, our diplo-
' the' article 'inacY and strategic `thought, in our polif-
'II We
There eiLng objection,
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD icardisciissioria- and our da lire,
15675
a traffic fatality Or a mine disaster or of
the risks faced by an astronaut circling
the earth, but we speak almost dispas-
sionately of megaton weapons, of big
bombs and small bombs, and of show-
ing the Russians that we are not afraid
of war, as if these were rather ordinary
subjects of discussion without any rela-
tionship to the destruction of our civili-
zation and the death of hundreds of mil-
lions of people.
There is a kind of madness in the dia-
log of the nuclear age, an incredulous
response to terrors beyond our experi-
ence and imagination. There are few
examples in history of nations acting
rationallY to prevent evils which they
can foresee -but have not actually experi-
enced. Somehow, we must find a way,
and encourage our adversaries to find a
way, of bringing reason and conviction
into our efforts to prevent nuclear war.
Experience in this case is clearly not the
best teacher, because few would survive
to profit from the lesson.
The United States and Russia, with
their vast territory and resources, do not
need nuclear weapons to be the foremost
nations of the world. Indeed, without
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles,
Russia and the United States would be
not only the strongest and richest na-
tions of the world, as they are, but also
the most secure and invulnerable to
atOtIkCOurse, I mean if no country had
them. I do not mean if they alone had
them.
By their acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons, the two great powers have destroyed
the traditional advantages which wealth
and size had placed at their disposaL
Their security now is a tenuous thing,
depending solely on their power to deter
attack and, ultimately, on sheer faith
that each will respond with reason and
restraint to the deterrent power of the
other.
There is in addition the prospect of
proliferation. At some point in the fu-
ture, Communist China and then many
smaller Nations are likely to acquire nu-
clear weapons and the means of deliver-
ing them. The acquisition of nuclear
weapons by small nations will act as a
great equalizer, giving them power out of
ail proportion to their size and resources
and further undermining the advantages
of size and wealth enjoyed by great na-
tions like the United States and the So-
viet Union. The short-range effect of
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
the two great powers was to increase
their military stature. The probable
long-range effect will be that the great
powers having undermined the tradi-
Ilonal soUrces _of power in which their
advantage was overwhelming, will have
tosompete on terms approaching equal-
ity with nations that could never before
have challenged them.
The significance of these considera-
tions is summarized by Edmund Stillman
and William Pfaff in their admirable
book, "The New Politics." "America
and Russia," they write, "would have
dominated the world et the war's end,
atomic weapons or no. lied they -been
wise, they would have come to agree-
,
as follows; - speak with grave concern anfr feeling of ment early to avoid the spread of these
,
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15676 Approved FeesethettaRsiven. gilmon3R00010021000k8PteMbtr 9
weapons; but they did not. Their pen-
alty is to see the beginning of a time in
which the very category of great power
is negated by events," Edmund Stillman
and William Pfaff, "The New tolftics"
1961, Page 138.
For these reasons, the *United States
and the Soviet Union share an overrid-
ing common interest in the imposition,
however belated, of some limitations and
safeguards on nuclear weapons. Looked
at in this way, the test ban treaty, by de-
celerating the arms race and reducing
the pace of proliferation, will help the
two great powers to recover some of the
traditional advantages of great Size and
wealth. These advantages, so recklessly
and unknowingly cast away by the scien-
tific genius of the great power's them-
selves, can never be fully recovered. But
it is clearly in our interests to attempt to
mitigate the trend toward nuclear pro-
liferation--a trend which, if realized,
will place vast powers of destruction in
the hands of small as well as great na-
tions, of those who-are reckless as well
as those who are responsible, of those
who have little to lose as well as those
who have everything to lose.
There is no longer any validity in the
Clausewitz doctrine of war as "a carry-
ing out of policy with other means."
Nuclear weapons have rendered it totally
obsolete because the instrument of policy
is now totally disproportionate to the end
in view. Nuclear weapons have deprived
farce of its utility as an instrument of
national policy, leaving the nuclear
powers with vastly greater but far less
useful power than they had before.
So long as there is reason?not virtue,
but simply reason?in the foreign policy
of the great nations, nuclear weapons
are not so much an instrument ? an in-
hibition of policy.
By all available evidence, the Russians
are no less aware of this than we. The
memory of their 20 million dead in World
War II is still fresh in the minde of most
Russians. In a speech on July 10, Khru-
shchev castigated the Chinese Commu-
nists as "those who want to start a war
against everybody." "Do these men
know," he asked, "that if all the, nuclear
warheads were touched off, the world
would be in such a state that the sur-
vivors would envy the dead?"
It is the vulnerability of the Soviet
Union to nuclear war, clearly under-
stood by the Soviet leaders, that has led
them to proclaim the doctrine a "peace-
ful coexistence." Inhibited by the
threat of nuclear annihilation, they seek
to realize their ambitions by more tradi-
tional methods of diplomacy.
Now?
In the phrase of Stillman and Pfaff?
it is war that they seek to wage by politics?
Mr. CHURCH, Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to yield.
Mr. CHURCH. I have listened with
great interest to the excellent address by
the distinguished chairman of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations this after-
Stillman and Pfaff, "The New Tolitics,"
p. 142.
noon. I am particularly interested in
what he has just said, because it seems
to me that this treaty my well indicate
G
that both the overnme t of the United
States and the. Government of the
Soviet Union have at last realized it may
4
be better to try to halt the nuclear arms
race than to try to win it.
As the Senator has well: observed, there
is no way to win?not or the United
States, not for the Russians, and not for
Western civilization. Something must
be done to harness the nuclear monster
we have loosed upon the world, or the
armaments race will ultiMately end in a
fiery oblivion for all of u,&,
It seems to me?and I ask the Senator
if he agrees?that the tfeaty, far from
being of limited, minima importance, as
has often been suggested' in recent days,
may in fact be of great symbolic impor-
tance, as representing; the turning
point?when the two nuclear giants be-
gan to grope their way hack toward a
more rational relationship with one an-
other. Only in this direction is there
any hope for us, or for the Russians, or
for the Western World. i
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has
put it very well. There As a sort of in-
herent contradiction, if X may use that
term. In and of itself, the treaty would
not actually do much, but the significant
fact is that an agreement is reached at
all. The substantive provisions would
not really inhibit either of the powers
very much, because, as the testimony
shows, underground testing can proceed,
and there can be development of the
system.
What the Senator says is extremely
important. I think this is by far the
most important document since those
relating to the United Nations after
World War II and relating to NATO, be-
cause it symbolizes a change in direction.
We do not know what may happen. No
one can. foretell. We may later wish to
withdraw. Who knows what may occur?
We have that right, under the treaty.
It may not develop in that manner.
On the other hand, it is an important
treaty because it demonstrates the fact
that these two great powers -have found
enough common interest in the matter to
reach an agreement. That is quite sig-
nificant. ,
Mr. CHURCH. Does the Senator also
agree that perhaps this realization on
both sides could not have occurred if
there had not been a nuclear showdown
between the two nations?
Mr. EU LBRIGHT. The Senator refers
to Cuba?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes. " I often think
that had it not been forhe Cuban crisis
this treaty would not be efore us today,
because the resolve of t. e President of
the United States, at that time, to risk
nuclear war to uphold our vital interests
must have made it apparent, as Khru-
shchev himself conceded in his exchanges
with the Chinese Commtmists, that the
American "paper tiger' had nuclear
teeth. .
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the
Senator. As the Senator knows, the
Secretary of State agrees with him. He
is quite correct. Cuba was an important
and significant contribution to the cir-
cumstances which led to the agreement.
Mr. CHURCH. Oftentimes in the
course of the hearings, as the chairman
knows, questions were raised which
seemed to indicate suspicion or lack of
understanding as to why Mr. Khru-
shchev, having twice rejected a some-
what similar treaty, finally accepted this
one.
Does not the chairman feel that the
Cuban crisis, which brought both coun-
tries to the brink of the abyss, must
have chastened those men who tried to
untie the knot of war even as it tightened
around both sides? Does not the Sena-
tor feel that those tense terrible days
made it somewhat logical to expect,
afterwards, that the time was ripe for a
treaty?that Khrushchev himself had
been forced to reconsider his situation;
and the President anticipated as much
in the remarkable address he made at
American University, in which he again
invited the Soviet Union to make a start
toward harnessing the unrestricted arms
race through a partial test ban treaty of
the kind before us?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
correct, in my view. I appreciate very
much his emphasizing this point. I have
no doubt in my own mind that this con-
tributed greatly to the reconsideration
by the Russians of their decision regard-
ing the test ban treaty. I am delighted
that this has resulted. It was a danger-
ous period. If things had continued the
way they were going there would have
been great danger.
Mr. CHURCH. I agree wholeheart-
edly. I commend the chairman of the
committee for the fine address he is
making to the Senate.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Sena-
tor from Idaho.
In the pursuit of its ambitions, whether
by militant or peaceful means, the Soviet
Union, like any other nation, is subject
to the unending pressures for change im-
posed by time and circumstance.
Man--
It has been said?
the supreme pragmatist, is a revisionist by
nature (Eric Hansen, "Revisionism: Genesis
and Prognosis," unpublished paper.)
Those who attribute to the Soviet
leaders a permanent and unalterable de-
termination to destroy the free societies
of the West are crediting the Soviet
Union with an unshakeable constancy
of will that, so far as I know, no nation
has ever before achieved.
The attribution of an unalterable will
and constancy to Soviet policy has been
a serious handicap to our own policy. It
has restricted our ability to gain insights
into the realities of Soviet society and
Soviet foreign policy. It has denied us
valuable opportunities to take advantage
of ,hanging conditions in the Commu-
nist world and to encourage changes
which would reduce the Communist
threat to the free world. We have
greatly overestimated the ability of the
Soviets to pursue malevolent aims with-
out regard to time or circumstance and,
in so doing, we have underestimated
our own ability to influence Soviet
behavior.
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A., ma of heresy has been attached
to Atiggestions, by American policy-
MakerS SlAt S.Pviet policy can? change
or that it is Sometimes altered in re-
sponse to our own. But it is a fact that
? In tl?e Wale of the failure of the aggres-
sive policies of the Stalin period, the
Soviet leaders have gradually shifted to
a policy of peaceful, or competitive, co-
? existenCe with the West. This policy of
"war, 4Y Means of politics" confronts us
with certain subtle dangers but also with
certain opportunities if we are wise
enough to take advantage of them.
The abrupt change in the Soviet posi-
tion Whioh made possible the signing of
the nuclear test ban treaty appears to
have been Motivated by the general
failure of competitive coexistence as
practiced in the past few years and by a
ntunber pf specific problems, both for-
eign and goinestic. The most conspicu-
ous of thede is the public eruption of the
dispute with Communist China. In ad-
dition, the Soviet leaders have been
troubled by economic difficulties at home,
particularly in agriculture, by the in-
creasingly insistent demands of the
Russian people for more and better food,
clothing, and housing, and by difficulties
between the regime and Soviet intellect-
uals and axtists; by increasing centrifu-
gal tendencies ha Eastern Europe, ag-
gravated by the dismaying contrast with
an inereasingly prosperous and powerful
Western Europe; and by the negligible
rewards of Soviet diplomacy and eco-
nomic aid in Asia and Africa.
The most crucial failure of Soviet pol-
icy has been in its dealings with the
West, Contrary to Soviet expectations
Of a few years ago, it has proven impos-
sible to ,extract concessions from the
West on Berlin and Central Europe by
nuclear diplomacy. Thwarted in Europe,
Ehrushchev embarked last year on the
extremely dangerous adventure of plac-
ing missiles in Cuba, hoping to force a
solution in Berlin and an unfreezing of
Central Europe. The debacle in Cuba
led the Soviet leaders to a major re-
appraisal of their policies.
That reappraisal has apparently re-
sulted in a decision to seek a relaxation
of tensions with the West. The nuclear
test ban treaty is clearly calculated to
serve that purpose. From the Soviet
point of view, a limited detente with the
West at this time appears to offer certain
clear advantages, of which three seem of
Major importance. First and foremost
Is the genuine fear of nuclear war which
the Soviets share with the West, all the
More since the united States demon-
strated Al the Cuban crisis that it was
prepared tp use nuclear weapons to de-
fend Its vital interests. Secondly, in
the mounting conflict with the Chinese,
the Soviet Union could claim a success
for its, policies arid, more important,
could. We _the Worldwide popularity of
the teet han to strengthen its position
bpth in the Conplunist bloc and in the
non-Coinnkunist underdeveloped coun-
tries, thereby further isolating the
Chinese. Thirdly, Khrushchev appears
to be interested iii measures which will
PerMit al,eyelling off, and perhaps a re-
duction, of weapons expenditures so as
to be able to divert scarce resources for
meeting some of the demands of the
Russian people for a better life.
In a recent article Prof. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Director of Columbia Uni-
versity's Research Institute on Commu-
nist Affairs, interpreted the Soviet adher-
ence to the test ban treaty as follows:
Krusohchev's acceptance of an "atmos-
phere-only" test ban strongly suggests a ma-
jor Soviet reassessment of the world
situation and an implicit acknowledgment
that Soviet policies of the last few years have
failed. The Soviet leaders have evidently
concluded that the general world situation
is again in a "quiescent" stage. Instead of
dissipating Soviet resources in useless revo-
lutionary efforts, or missile adventures of the
Cuban variety, they will probably concen-
trate on consolidating their present posi-
tion.2
If the test ban is conceived by the So-
viets as an interlude in which to consoli-
date their position, strengthen their
power base, and then renew their ag-
gressive policies against the West, is it
wise for us to grant them this interlude?
It is indeed wise, for two main reasons:
first, because it will provide the West
with an identical opportunity to
strengthen the power base of the free
world, and secondly, because it will gen-
erate conditions in which the Soviet and
Communist bloc peoples will be embold-
ened to step up their demands for peace
and a better life, conditions which the
Soviet leadership will find it exceedingly
difficult to alter.
From the point of view of the West, an
interlude of relaxed world tensions will
provide a splendid opportunity to
strengthen the free world?if only we
will use it. There has been a great deal
of discussion of the military safeguards
which must accompany this treaty.
Equally important are the nonmilitary
safeguards which we must take to
strengthen ourselves in a period of re-
laxed tensions. First of all, we must use
the opportunity to bring greater unity
and prosperity to the Atlantic communi-
ty?by seeking means of resolving our
differences over the control of nuclear
weapons and by negotiating extensive
tariff reductions under the terms of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Secondly,
we must reinvigorate our efforts to
strengthpn the free nations of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America by providing
a more discriminating and intelligent
program of economic assistance and by
encouraging cooperative free world aid
programs through such agencies as the
International Development Association.
Finally, we can use a period of relaxed
tensions to focus energy and resources on
our long-neglected needs here at home?
on the expansion and improvement of
our public education, on generating
greater economic growth and full em-
ployment, on the conservation of our
resources and the renewal of our cities.
If we adopt these "nonmilitary safe-
guards" with vigor and determination, I
think it can be confidently predicted that
the free world will be the major benefici-
ary of a period of relaxed world tension,
with a power base so strengthened that
the margin of free world superiority
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "After the Test
Ban," New Republic, Aug. 31, 1963, p. 18.
0 0100210002-8
It 15677
over the Communist bloc will be sub-
stantially widened.
The second great advantage to the
West of a period of relaxed tensions is
that it will release long-suppressed pres-
sures for peace and the satisfaction of
civilian needs within the Soviet bloc.
Public opinion, even in a dictatorship
like the Soviet Union, is an enormously
powerful force, which no government
can safely defy for too long or in too
many ways.- Russian public opinion is
overwhelmingly opposed to war and
overwhelmingly in favor of higher wages,
better food and clothing and housing,
and all the good things of life in a mod-
ern industrial society. The Russian peo-
ple may well turn out to be a powerful
ally of the free nations, who also want
peace and prosperity. It is entirely pos-
sible that a thaw in Soviet-American
relations, even though conceived by the
Soviet leadership as a temporary pause,
could lead gradually to an entirely new
relationship. Pressed by the demands
of an increasingly assertive public
opinion, the Soviet leaders may find new
reasons to continue a policy of peace and
accommodation with the West. Step by
step their revolutionary zeal may dimin-
ish, as they find that a peaceful and afflu-
ent national existence is not really so
tragic a fate as they had imagined.
No one knows for certain whether So-
viet society will actually evolve along
these lines, but the trend of Soviet his-
tory suggests that it is by no means
Impossible.
Indeed, the most striking characteristic of
recent Soviet foreign policy?
Said ProfessOr Shulman in his state-
ment on the treaty,
has been the way in which policies under-
taken for short-term, expediential purposes
have tended to elongate in time, and become
embedded in doctrine and politiCal strategy.
It is possible, I believe, for the West
to encourage a hopeful direction in So-
viet policy. We can seek to strengthen
Russian public opinion as a brake
against dangerous policies by conveying
accurate information about Western life
and Western aims and about the heavy
price that both sides are paying for the
cold war. We can make it clear to the
Russians that they have nothing to fear
from the West, that so long as they re-
spect the rights and independence of
other nations, they themselves can have
a secure and untroubled national exist-
ence under institutions of their own
choice, which, though repugnant to the
West, will never of themselves be the
occasion or cause of conflict.
The purpose of the nuclear test ban
treaty is not to end the cold war but to
modify it, not to resolve the conflict be-
tween communism and freedom?a goal
which is almost certainly beyond the
reach of the present generation?but only
to remove some of the terror and passion
from it. The treaty is only a modest first
step in that direction. It is not the
length of the step but its direction which
Is important. If the treaty works as we
hope it will, we must in the years to come
seek ways of modifying the nationalist
and ideological passions that fill men's
minds with _too inuch zeal and blind
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15678 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 7.)eptembe;, 9
them to the simple human preference
for life and peace.
It is an open question whether we will
be able to civilize national and ideologi-
cal animosities as we have civilized per-
sonal rivalries and political, religious,
and economic differences within our own
society. As Aldous Huxley has written:
There may be arguments about the best
way of raising wheat in a cold climate or of
reafforesting a denuded mountain. But
such arguments never lead to organized
slaughter. Organized slaughter is the result
of arguments about such questions as the
following: Which is the best nation? The
hest religion? The best political theory?
The best form of government? Why are oth-
er people so stupid and wicked? Why can't
they see how good and intelligent we are?
Why do they resist our beneficent efforts to
bring them under our control and make
them like ourselves? 8
Men will undoubtedly continue to con-
test these questions for centuries to
come. The major question of our time?
and it is a question that is implicit in
this test ban treaty?is whether we can
find some way to conduct these national
contests without resorting to weapons
that will resolve them once and for all
by wiping out the contestants. A gen-
eration ago we were speaking of "mak-
ing the world safe for democraey." Hav-
ing failed of this in two world wars, we
must now seek ways of making the world
reasonably safe for the continuing con-
test between those who favor democracy
and those who oppose it. It is a modest
aspiration, but it is a sane and realistic
one for a generation which, having failed
of grander things, must now look to its
own survival.
Extreme nationalism and dogmatic
ideology are luxuries that the human
race can no longer afford. It must turn
Its energies now to the politics of sur-
vival. If we do so, we may find in time
that we can do better than just to sur-
vive. We may find that the simple
human preference for life and peace has
an inspirational force of its own, less in-
toxicating perhaps that the sacred ab-
stractions of nation and ideology, but
far more relevant to the requirements
of human happiness and fulfillment.
There are, to be sure, risks in such an
approach. There is an element of trust
in it, and we can be betrayed. But
human life is fraught with risks and the
behavior of the sane manns not ;the
avoidance of all possible danger, but the
weighing of greater against lesser risks
and of risks against opportunities.
There are risks in this nuclear test
ban treaty, but they are lesser rather
than greater risks and the political op-
portunities outweigh the military risks.
As George Itennan has written:
Whoever is not prepared to make sacrifices
and to accept risks in the military field
should not lay claim to any serious desire
to see world problems settled by any means
short Of war.4
hope the Senate will consent to the
ratification of this treaty. Ti it does so,
it will be taking a risk, but it will also
saldous Huxley, "The Polities of Ecology"
(1963), p. 6.
George F. Kerman, "Disengagement Re-
visited," Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1959, p. 199.
be creating an opportunity. And if the
treaty is faithfully executed and con-
tributes in some small measure to the
letisening of the danger of war, it will
open the way to new risks and still
greater opportunities. I believe that
these too should be pursued, with reason
and restraint, with due regard for the
pitfalls involved, but With no less re-
gard for the promise of a safer and more
civilized world. In the course of this
pursuit, both we and our adversaries may
find it possible one day to break through
the barriers of nationalism and ideology
and to approach each Other in something
of the spirit of Pope John's words to
Khrushchev's son-in-law:
They tell me you are an atheist. But you
will not refuse an old man's blessing for your
children,
- I ask unanimous consent to insert in
the RECORD at this point, following my
remarks, a letter which I received from
Mr. Lewis W. Douglas, former Ambassa-
dor to Great Britain, arid former Direc-
tor of the Budget, in which he supports
the treaty.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
NEW Yogic, N.Y.,
September 6, 1963.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with
the suggestion that I communicate to you
my views about the limited nuclear test ban
treaty which has been negotiated by the ex-
ecutive branch of our Government, and which
has been submitted to the Senate of the
United States for its adrice and consent, I
am writing you this brief letter.
The testimony contained in the hearings
before your committee has been carefully re-
viewed. Especial attentien has been given to
the expressions of doubt made by witnesses
regarding the provisions'of the treaty which
has been under consideiatiori by your com-
mittee and Which has been reported by your
committee to the Senate.
According to the testimony of the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, their com-
petent advisers, and ottter competent wit-
nesses, the risks that _ ay be implicit in
ratification of the limited test ban treaty can
be substantially reduced to a minimal level.
Accordingly, the positive aspects of ratifica-
tion of the treaty are extremely significant
and important to the security and future of
our own country, to the security and future
of the signatory powers; and to the security
and future of those whc) accede tc, its provi-
sions. Among other things, it tends marked-
ly to limit?if not completely to eradicate?
the spread of the development of nuclear
lethal weapons to many nations that do not,
at the moment, possess them. This is a sub-
stantial and notable restraint on the nuclear
armament race and in itself is of inestimable
benefit to Our national, interests and to our
future. Moreover, the :limited nuclear test
ban treaty is the first titne in a very substan-
tial period that the national interests of both
the Soviet on the one hand- and the United
States on the other have been sufficiently
identical to result in an agreement covering
a matter of great impOrtance to the signa-
tories and to the entire population of the
world.
That an accornmodarion in this particular
and important respedt has been reached
among two of the most important Western
Powers and the Soviet suggests that step by
step and seriatim, one by one, some of the
other important issues on which, so far, no
agreement has been reached, with the pas-
sage of time and the exercise of patience
combined with eternal vigilance, can be duly
resolved to the satisfaction of our national
interest and to the benefit of the civilized
world.
It cannot be asserted positively that these
advantages over the span of years will, in
fact, accrue to us. Nor can it be asserted
positively that they will not over a span
of years be fully or partially achieved. Only
the future can draw aside the veil of ob-
scurity in this regard.
There is, quite obviously, the risk that
the Soviet may not observe faithfully the
provisions of the treaty and may secretively,
if this be remotely possible, resume testing
In the prohibited environments. There is
the hazard, also, that developments beyond
the orbit of the Soviet's influence may force
either the Soviet on its part, or our own
country for our part to give notice of in-
tended abrogation of the provisions of the
treaty. Accordingly, however, great may be
the prospective advantages to cur country
that are implicit in ratification of the terms
of the treaty, no one can say that there do
not remain risks implicit in a formal acces-
sion to and affirmation of its provisions,
The testimony of the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense and their corn-
petent advisers justifies, however, the confi-
dence that this particular risk, among others,
can he reduced to a minimum point, by con-
tinued testing underground, by the main-
tenance of laboratories at a high state of
scientific competence and efficiency, and by
the preparation of procedures that can be
immediately employed for a resumption of
tests in outer space, in the atmosphere, and,
underwater?should this eventuality, unhap-
pily, become necessary.
But these risks implicit in ratification
should be weighed against the risks that
almost inevitably result from failure to
ratify, or from the attachment of reserva-
tions which nullify the terms of the treaty.
Failure to ratify the treaty or nullification
of its provisions could be construed, and
doubtless would be construed, by other na-
tions as an affirmation by the 'United States
of the position which is being so vigorously
advanced by Peiping. This view, in effect,
is that war is inevitable between the Com-
munist world and our own world, and that
coexistence?no matter under what terms it
may be defined?is impossible of achieve-
ment.
This inference, which would naturally be
drawn from any failure on our part to ratify
the limited nuclear test ban treaty, would
provide the Soviet with no alternative course
except that of embracing implicitly or other-
wise the views which are so vehemently
argued by the authorities in Peiping. The
full consequences of driving the Soviet into
this intransigent and fateful position by
failure to ratify the treaty need no elabora-
tion by thoughtful men. It is almost im-
possible to calculate what might be the final
consequences of such an irresponsible act for
our country, for the part of the world with
which we are reasonably compatible, and
Indeed, possibly for all mankind.
Among other things, one of the conse-
quences might well be the extinguishment of
the last ray of light that might otherwise
illuminate the future of a large part of the
human race, for it might lead the human
race closer to disaster, whether as a result
of a more intense nuclear arms race and fall-
out, whether by taking us further down the
road toward nuclear war?or by both.
No matter what one may calculate to be
the motives of the Soviet, the prospects for
humanity implicit in a more rigorous nuclear
arms race, should the treaty be rejected by
the Senate, are so grim as to make the risks
of ratification fall into their proper prospec-
tive and assume comparatively minuscule
proportions of magnitude.
Those in positions of final accountability
who would reject the provisions of this treaty
should weigh carefully the responsibility
which they must accept of visiting upon us
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1963 CONORESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
and Mankind the possiblo.--if not probable?
direful_cesonsequences that are implicit in fail-
ure 'to ratify the treaty now under con-
sideration.
Accordingly, I am confident the hope of
thoughtful and expectant people throughout
the world and of those experienced in the
field of iiiternational affairs, including deal-
ings with the Soviet, is that the Senate with-
out reservation or qualification will promptly
and overwhelmingly place its stamp of ap-
proval qn the limited nuclear test ban treaty
which is presently before it for its advice
and cement. ,
Very truly yours,
L. W. Doucias.
- .Mr._.$4,1:4-TONSTALL. Mr. President,
first I commend the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, the dis-
? tinguished Senator from Arkansas, on
the very full and complete argument he
has made in behalf of consenting to the
treaty. s
Mr. FI.13.4BRIGHT. I thank the Sena-
ter for his kind remarks.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I approach the
subject f,rom a slightly different point
of view, that of the military.
As a memher of the Preparedness Sub-
committee, I listened to much closed-
door testimony on the nuclear test ban
treaty. As a member of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee I was also invited to sit
with the Foreign Relations Committee
and the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy at their hearings, most of which
were public.
Atter careful consideration of all the
testimony to which I listened, I have
reached the conclusion that I will vote
to consent to the nuclear test ban treaty.
There is always a risk in any action and
the question before the Senate is to
determine which is the lesser risk?to
Consent to the treaty, or to refuse that
consent, We must bear in mind also the
fact that more than 80 nations of the
world have already agreed to participate
In the treaty as it is is written. If the
United States fails to ratify this treaty?
a proposal which, in substance this
country itself offered in 1959 and again
111 1962?when ca,n_we expect or hope to
ge another agreement from the Soviets?
The ratification of this treaty does not
- mean that we can trust the Soviets any
more than we could before. The ratifi-
cation does not mean that preparations
for our own security can be lessened to
any degree. But, if we fail to ratify this
treaty now it will be a blow to the many
nations in the world who are looking to
us for leadership 'and who are looking
to us to do our part to get a greater op-
portunity for peace in the world.
The signing of this treaty by the three
foremost nuclear powers at Moscow on
August 5th of this year evoked a bar-
rage of COnament--some of which was
optimistic, and some which loudly con-
demned it as a Communist trap by which
we in the United States if we became a
party to this treaty would jeopardize our
? national securtiy. Probably the truth is
somewhere between these two extremes.
Certainly neither the President of the
United States nor the Senate of the
United States will consent to any inter-
? natiOnal pact which is inimical to our
national security. Nor, as the President
stated so fully, can we harbor thoughts
that the benefits from this treaty will be
great. Certainly members of the admin-
istration and every Senator have tried to
make a thorough, searching and pene-
trating examination of each specific
provision and the overall consequences
of the treaty if it is ratified.
Any examination must start with the
premise that we cannot rely on the
Soviets to keep their obligations beyond
those which are for their own good and
benefit. So we must be prepared to go
forward with all of our national security
programs. Every one of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and military leaders who testi-
fied before both committees emphasized
this, as did the civilian witnesses.
No one in the free world can positively
know the reason why the Soviets have
suddenly decided to sign such a test ban
treaty when they had previously twice
rejected it. This is a question that I
have been asked time and time again
and my answer is that we do not know.
It may be their differences with China,
or it may be because they want to get
ahead more with their economic devel-
opment. And it may be that their pres-
ent willingness to sign is because through
their recent series of atmospheric tests
they have gained valuable information
on the effects of weapons that they have
or can have, and that therefore the nu-
clear power balance is more in their fa-
vor. Whatever made them decide to sign
does not matter if we view the treaty
solely in the terms of our own national
self-interest, as we must. Therefore, I
think we must view this problem not
only in the terms of our willingness to
accept and assume certain calculated,
inherent risks, but also in our determi-
nation to minimize such of these risks
as we can by taking those actions which
we may lawfully take and still abide by
the treaty in letter and in spirit.
The desirability of this treaty, speak-
ing solely from a military point of view,
must be weighed against the need of the
United States to conduct, first, further
atmosphere tests in order to resolve un-
certainties in that vulnerability of our
hardened missile launch sites and control
centers, second, the ability of our war-
heads to penetrate an enemy defense
and, third, our ability to develop and de-
ploy a reasonably effective anti-ballistic
missile defense system of our own.
The best available assessment of the
relative positions of the United States
and the Sdviets in the field of military
nuclear technology indicates to us that
the Soviets possess an advantage over us
in the very high yield weapon, in the in-
formation concerning its explosive ef-
fects, and, conceivably they have some
advantage in the anti-ballistic missile
defensive system. In my opinion, how-
ever, neither the Soviets nor ourselves
have now or can develop in the near fu-
ture an anti-ballistic missile defensive
system that is effective.
We feel reasonably certain that super
bombs?of 60 to 100 megatons?cannot
be delivered over intercontinental dis-
tances by ballistic missile at the present
time but only by strategic bombers.
This calculation of course may have to
be altered in the years to come. How-
ever, we want to remember that we do
not possess, very high yield weapons be-
15679
cause it is the considered judgment of
this administration and of the previous
administration that we do not want them
and do not need them to have an effec-
tive nuclear arsenal. However, testi-
mony was presented to us that we can,
through, underground testing, develop
weapons yielding 50 to 60 megatons for
aircraft delivery and a 35-megaton war-
head for ballistic missile delivery.
Therefore, this treaty will not preclude
us from closing, to a degree at least, the
Soviet advantage in the high yield
weapon. It will impede us, but not pre-
clude. us.
The second military consideration?
missile launch site vulnerability?con-
cerns nuclear weapons effects. Our chief
military leaders have all testified that
they have a high degree of confidence
that our ballistic missiles systems will
survive in a nuclear environment. Large
yield atmospheric tests would undoubt-
edly give us greater confidence or make
clear areas where some further harden-
ing of our missile sites should be under-
taken. However, we want to remember
that some of these uncertainties can be
eliminated by a better worked-out design,
more dispersal and larger quantities of
deployed missiles so that even under the
most pessimistic, circumstances a sub-
stantial nuclear force will survive for a
devastating second strike.
Third, the testimony showed us that
the warhead for an antiballistic missile
can be readily developed through under-
ground testing, but the problems of de-
fense against oncoming warheads are
most critical in the Missile system itself.
The critical antimissile problems are re-
action time, performance of the missile
and the ability of the radars to discrimi-
nate between the warhead and decoys
and to resist the blackout effects from
radiation emitted by a nuclear explosion.
The treaty, we are told, would only hin-
der the investigation into the resistance
of the radars to the effects of blackout,
something which our scientists hope and
believe they can eventually design
around. We cannot, of course, really
know the effctiveness of an ABM system.
in the absence of proof tests in the at-
mosphere to stimulate operational con-
ditions. However, the same restrictions
and limitations apply equally to any sig-
natory to the treaty, and I repeat, the
testimony of our scientists was unani-
mous to the effect that the development
of an effective ABM system is still a long
way off.
Fourths the ability of our warheads
to penetrate a nuclear defense is directly
concerned with the effects of blast and
radiation created by an antiballistic mis-
sile explosion over the target. The radi-
ation effects cannot be fully tested un-
derground. But, as testified, like all
offensive action, the key lies in saturat-
ing the defenses, and that we believe we
are able and will be able to do in the
years ahead. The Secretary of Defense
testified that peneration aids, warhead
hardening, and quantities of missiles,
several of which are directed at the same
target, will assure penetration and ulti-
mate devastation of the target areas.
From a military standpoint then, the
Variety of pur nuclear retaliatory or
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CONGRESSIONAL
second-strike forces?Atlas, Titan, Min-
uteman, and Polaris missiles, land and
carrier based, strategic and tactical
bombers?provides us with an over-
whelming nuclear superiority which will
continue to constitute an adequate de-
terrent to thermonuclear war? with or
without this treaty. Therefore its ratifi-
cation is a lesser risk than a stimulated
RIMS race.
On the question of possible cheating,
we cannot delude ourselves into believing
that we can detect every single test the
Soviets might conduct. There can cer-
tainly be a legitimate concern - over
clandestine cheating, but there is a ques-
tion of whether it would add much in
view of the fact that underground test-
ing is permitted. Any cheating through
atmospheric tests would have to be with
very small yields, and tests of high yields
in outer space would be far more expen-
sive than the results would seem to war-
rant. Responsible officials testified that
clandestine testing in their opinion can-
not upset the power relationship,
I Was most impressed by the joint
statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
which was presented before both com-
mittees by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the
chairman. He emphasized, as did each
of the Chiefs of Staff in their individual
testimonies, that there were certainly
some military disadvantages, but that in
their opinion, these disadvantages can be
minimized, and in some cases eliminated,
by adopting the four safeguards which
the Joint Chiefs so strenuously recom-
mend to us in emphasizing their unani-
mous support of the treaty.
These four safeguards are:
First, we must aggressively conduct
underground testing to the full extent
of the capabilities of our laboratories and
scientists to benefit from them. We
must not let this program lag through
lack of money or lack of execution on a
stop and start, off again, on again basis.
Second, we must maintain our nuclear
laboratories at their optimum capabil-
ities so that the impetus of the work of
those laboratories will continue to hold
the interest, energies, and imagination of
our nuclear scientists.
Third, we must be ready to test in the
atmosphere on the shortest possible no-
tice to guard against a sudden breach of
the treaty and open resumption of test-
ing by another signatory.
Fourth, we must take whatever steps
we can to improve our detection System
so that we will haveconvincing evidence
whether or not the treaty is being vio-
lated. This is mighty important in
helping us to decide whether we should
exercise our own right to withdraw from
the treaty if our supreme interest?as
stated in the words of the treaty?is be-
ing jeopardized.
There is no question that we could do
More in the military application of our
nuclear technology without a treaty, but
that does not say that the signing of the
treaty is incompatible with our national
security.
We also want to remeniber that many
of-the advantages that have stimulated
emotional feeling in favor of this treaty
are not at all that they seem. The mes-
sage of the President of the United States
RECORD ? SENATE September 9
on August 8 made this clear. We believe
the treaty will inhibit and impede the
nuclear arms race, but it will not prohibit
it. The threat of a nuclear war remains
to plague us?as it has Once the brains
and energies of our scientists unleashed
the destructive force of the split and the
fused atom. Our stockpile of nuclear
weapons we know is not affected, nor is
the production of more bombs and war-
heads prohibited. This treaty will not
prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons to other countries which do not
now possess them, but it gives us confi-
dence that this proliferation will not be
widespread because of the promise of
some 80 nations to abide by it.
In any event the treaty will stop the
pollution of the air we breathe and the
food we eat from radioactive fallout.
While the degree of genetic damage and
the danger of cancer resulting from
doses of radioactivity have never been
definitely established, Medical opinion is
unanimous in the belief that any amount
Is harmful. This was brought out in the
Questions asked by and the answers given
to the chairman of the committee. This
is another worthwhile humanitarian
benefit to be derived ,from this treaty.
While the treaty does not accomplish all
that many of our citizens emotionally
hope it may accomplish, it is a step, a
small step to be sure, for mankind
throughout the world to somehow work
its way out of the problems created by
nuclear weapons.
Scientists testifying before us raised
several questions on the wording- of the
treaty which must be clarified by defini-
tion. What, for instance, constitutes an
underground nuclear explosion within
the meaning of article I, section 1(b) ?
As one who listened to the testimony, I
suggest that it shall be defined as one
which occurs below the surface of the
earth at such a depth as may be neces-
sary to contain conipletely the fireball
associated with such an explosion.
Second, the phrase "or any other
nuclear explosion" in article I, section 2
shall be construed as not to prohibit the
use of nuclear weapons by the United
States whenever we deem such use to be
necessary for our own national security
or when we believe it is necessary to ful-
fill our commitmente to any of our allies
in the event of an armed aggression.
Furthermore, the kovision of article IV
requiring 3 months advance notice of in-
tention to withdraw as a party to the
treaty does not apply in any case of an
armed aggression.
Third, questions ? were raised at the
hearings as to whether nuclear explo-
sives could be used for peaceful pur-
poses?in our terminology, Plowshare.
I came away from the hearings with the
feeling that the Plowshare program was
important not only to us but to the eco-
n.oinic improvement of the world and,
therefore, certainly when we consent to
this treaty, we should make it clear to
the executive department of our Gov-
ernment that this, must be worked out.
We were assured by responsible witnesses
that it could be and would be done.
There is no provision in this treaty
which will require officials of the ad-
ministration to implement the four safe-
guards recommended by the Joint Chiefs
of. Staff. But I am confident that any
administration will do so and keep Con-
gress informed, because hs the final
analysis Congress is responsible for the
authorization and appropriation of the
funds needed to maintain our security
and the needs of our military establish--
ments at all times.
We recognize, of course, that other
countries have not signed the treaty and
have stated that they will not do so,
principally France and Communist
China. We further realize that the
possibility of nuclear devastation is not
now and never will be eliminated by the
treaty. We are also fully cognizant that
the Soviets will only live up to its terms
when it is to their advantage to do so.
However we know that we will live up to
it, and as the leader of the free nations
our influence in living up to it will, have
a tremendous effect upon other coun-
tries that may want to breach it.
We know that this will not lessen the
efforts of the Soviets to establish com-
munistic governments In other countries
of the world, nor will it solve any other
problems that we have now or may have
in the future with Cuba. But ,we cEo
know that the ratification of this treaty
my three of the most powerful nations
in the world is a step forward toward
greater understanding of a more peaceful
world, and thus a step forward toward
our own security. With a constantly
watchful administration and with a Con-
gress that is sensitive to its responsibili-
ties for our security, I hope that the
ratification of this treaty will be a sub-
stantially lesser risk and that we may
go forward with it. I shall, therefore,
as one U.S. Senator, vote to consent to it.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Massachusetts yield?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. The Senator has
made a forceful statement. Coming
from the ranking Republican member
of the Committee on Armed Services, it
should set at rest any of the doubts that
have been voiced in one circle or an-
other as to the significance of the treaty.
It is a great service to make ,such a
helpful speech to this body.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I thank the
Senator from Arkansas. Like him, I
hope the Senate will consent to the
treaty.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Massachusetts yield?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield to the
Senator from New York.
Mr. 'KEATING. I join with the dis-
tinguished chairman of the committee
in commending the distinguished Sena-
tor from Massachusetts for his thought-
ful and careful analysis of the problem
before the Senate and the forceful pres-
entation of his viewpoint in favor of our
granting consent to the treaty.
I was interested particularly in that
part of the Senator's address in which
he referred to what was understood by
the committee. As I view it, we shall be
faced with both reservations and under-
standings. A reservation, as I under-
stand the term, if adopted would require
a renegotiation of the treaty. An under-
standing would not. However, even an
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?nding_nlight have an adverse
? e11"ek. %Lan OPPosite effect from What was
intendeck. In other words an under-
? standIng might have the effect a creat-
ing doubt about the plain wording of the
treaty and thp remoning of the com-
?ijaittee_Olat C.94)51clered the treaty,
which we ri,Qt at all wish to create.
do not know precisely what will be
Offered; but, as I view the Senator's ap-
pl'oach to the problem, we would gain
nothing. 'Icothing would be gained, from
any point of view, by adopting as formal
understandings points which have al-
ready been made ,.clear in the committee
?hearings, and which are containedin the
repOrt f the committee. Am I, COrrect?
? Mr,. ALTONSTaL. I believe the
Senator frOrn New, york is correct- Cer-
? taM definitions must be worked out with-
in the administration; but I do not be-
lieve there need be any formal interpre-
tation ,o?r TeServation. I believe the con-
? Stant attentien congress gives to this
- problern_and to working it out with the
administration will answer any doubt
that may arise.
? I believe the rdest important point I
have, ,heard disen4Sed is the Meaning of
tne Word "underground." The Senator
from New :5TOXX., he,,s in mind the defini-
tion of the, word "underground" and the
extent to ,which the treaty would permit
Us to continueV1eBOWshareprogram, if
? fox eXaMple, we wanted tol2Uild another
Panama _Canal,, and problems of that
eharaCter,. All ft...se are administrative
problems tsz Which Congress is very sensi-
tive, because it must appropriate the
matey; and 'the ,administration must
work with Congress. So I do not believe
there is any need for a formal reserva
. .
tion or .inter retation
Mr. ItEATING. ,As I understand, the
.exeOntive branch laaS? furnished to the
conimittee certain communications to in-
dicate what its understanding is. Am I
correct? "
Mr, SA.LIONSTALL. I have listened
to definitions given in testimony before
the Preparedness Investigating Subcom-
mittee of the term "underground explo-
sion." I have heard Secretary of State
Rusk and seKeral others define It; but
so far as I know, there is no formal, writ-
ten decla0:in its meaning.
Mr. Pw,,pRiatirr, Mr. President, will
the Senat5freni lidassachUSettcyleld?
-?The rait SIDINQ OFFICER (Mr.
INOUYE in the 04410 Does the Senator
from IVIassachusetts yield to the Senator
from Arkansas?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I am glad to
yield.
Mr. YUILIFIRIGHT. We do have some
expressions from the State Department,
particularly from tile Secretary of State
and others there, in regard to the ques-
tion the Senator has raised, Lan1..very
glad he hap, raised it, because a discus-
sion a these problems helps us to arrive
1Pin i trOublesorne in the case
of vening,. the ,slete,rmination_of_the
anon illaderground explosion to
be allowell. tt? he-vented ?above the groimd
? an aroxPad i4toc_AuDther country. so
long as it does not go into another Coalin-
g
-
try, we can use the "Plowshare." The
limitation is whether the vents into the
air are sufficient to affect anything out-
side our own jurisdiction.
I believe this debate is helpful to our
reaching an understanding of the mean-
ing of the treaty.
Mr. KEATING. I have read in the
press?which is the extent of my knowl-
edge of this matter?that some under-
standings may be offered?that is, offered
formally, for adoption or rejection. I
was trying to get to the bottom of what
might be involved there.
In his statement, I believe former
? President Eisenhower raised the point
that in the event of attack or aggression
against our country or an ally of ours,
nothing should interfere with our being
able to take proper steps to defend our-
selves. As I understand, he has made
clear that he did not intend that to be
stated in the form of a formal reserva-
tion, which would require renegotiation
of the treaty with some 89 nations; he
intended it more in the nature of a basic
understanding.
Since I believe all?including the So-
viets?are agreed on this point, offhand I
see no necessity for the adoption of this
statement as a formal understanding.
On the other hand, it seems to me that
it would be rather unfortunate if such
an understanding were proposed, and
then were rejected. That might be con-
strued as a rejection of such an under-
standing. I wonder what the Senator
from Massachusetts, and the distin-
guished chairman of the committee, and
other members of the committee feel
should be done if we are confronted with
such a situation.
- My offhand reaction is that there is
no necessity to encumber the treaty with
language of that kind, for if such a pro-
posal were made and then were voted
down, the question is whether that would
be regarded as an indication that we are
not in agreement.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is my under-
standing?and I should be glad to get
confirmation of this from the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee?
that all the responsible witnesses, both
the military and the civilian, testified
that if our national security were to be
threatened in any way by an aggressive
attack, we could retaliate immediately.
Mr. KEATING. That is also my
understanding.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
quite correct. In preparing the com-
mittee report, we had this point in mind,
and expressiy Covered it. This is set
forth in the official report of the com-
mittee, which is to be construed part of
the history of this treaty; and I believe
it would be.
I agree with the Senator from New
York that it would be unfortunate to
attach formally to the resolution of rati-
.fication either an understanding or any
other provision unless it were really vital
in connection with the discovery of some
point we have not thus far discovered.
I cannot'speak for President Eisenhower;
but from what I have read in the past
and from what the Seator from .new
York and other Senators have said. I am
quite sure it has been correctly stated
that he did not intend it as a reserva-
tion. That is why we treat it with such
care in the committee report. We hoped
to satisfy everyone on this point. It is
the universal understanding. The
Russian Communists have made the
same point in response to a Chinese
assertion regarding this matter.
We in the United States might under-
stand the meaning of such a reservation;
but, even so, some of the 80 other coun-
tries might regard it as an attempt by
us to renege or to qualify our endorse-
ment of our participation. I think it
would be very difficult to find a reserva-
tion which would be acceptable.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Furthermore I
believe it important to bear in mind the
fact that any administration which im-
plements the treaty will always be sub-
ject to questioning by Congress. It
seems to me any problem that may arise
will be solved better by a sensitive Con-
gress rather than by a formal reserva-
tion.
Mr. AIKEN. However, I note that all
of this debate has not brought out the
real danger of a reservation or a state-
ment of understanding. Let me state
the real danger. Let us use, as an exam-
ple, the assertion that the United States
should reserve the right to use nuclear
weapons in the event of war. Very well;
suppose we adopted a reservation to the
United States of the right to use nuclear
weapons in the event of war. Then we
would be admitting that the treaty did
not permit the use of nuclear weapons
in the event of war. That would be an
outright admission, whereas such a
statement of understanding would only
cast doubt upon the right of the United
States to use nuclear weapons in the
event of war.
But it is understood by all the parties
concerned, and it is also international
law, that any country has a right to use
any weapons it has in the event of war.
Furthermore, I cannot conceive that any
President who might be in office at the
time would be so depraved as to refuse
to use any weapons under his command
in the event of attack.
But the danger of a reservation?
which is slightly less than the danger
Inherent in a statement of understand-
ing?is that by adopting it, we admit
that the treaty does not do what we
know it is intended to do.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator is
very helpful.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.
Mr. KEATING. I, too, think that the
statements were very helpful. My un-
derstanding is that a reservation is of
greater importance than a statement of
understanding.
Mr. AIKEN. In the present case it
would be an admission that the treaty
would not permit the use of nuclear
weapons in the event of war. I. am
speaking of that particular reservation.
Mr. KEATING. Yes. It seems to me
that the same might be true of other
SWAM:4s ,..of_undustanding. I am
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speaking without knowing specifically
what reservation or understanding may
be before the Senate, but I apprehend
that the Senate will be faced with the
problem at some time during the debate..
There will probably be statements of
understanding offered with respect to
which, on their merits, there might be
unanimous accord. Senators will be
faced with the problem of deciding what
to do in relation to such statements of
understanding. Again, speaking gener-
ally, it seems to tae that the Senator from
Vermont has correctly set forth that it
would be unfortunate for Senators who
are in favor of the treaty to support
statements of understanding on issues
which are now perfectly clear from the
committee report.
I ask the chairman of the committee
whether he, as an expert on international
law, believes a Statement of understand-
ing really would add anything to the
committee report itself. I assume that
the statements in the committee report
are statements of understanding and the
basis upon which the committee recom-
mended to the Senate that consent be
given.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is my under-
standing. Shortly before the Senator
- came to the Chamber there was an ex-
change in relation to that question.
Whether a statement is called an under-
standing or a reservation does not en-
tirely determine its character. It is
what one actually intends to do. If the
statement changes any substantive pro-
vision of the treaty, even though it might
be called an understanding, it would still
be of such a nature as to require renego-
tiation, and perhaps it Would jeopardize
the treaty.
I agree with what I believe the Senator
is saying. Whatever we May say about
the treaty, either in the report or as a
part of the legislative history, it would
be extremely risky to put it in the resolu-
tion of ratification of the treaty. I have
not heard any statement that I would
agree to as being necessary, proper, or
wise to have inserted in the resolution of
ratification. What the Senator from
New York thinks it means: what the Sen-
ator from Massachusetts thinks it means,
and Interpretations received in the dis-
cussion for the purpose of forming a
basis Upon which to accept the treaty,
are Matters that are not only proper but
desirable. Bull think there is a great
difference. I read some exeerpts from
one of the great authorities on inter-
national law, Mr. "Chaves. He finally
came down to the distinction. An
amendment would clearly require re-
negotiation. He pointed out the distinc-
tion between understandings, interpre-
tations, and reservations. Those terms
will not control. It is What we actually
attempt to do that is meaningful.
Mr. ICEATING. Who wiluld make
that decision?
I. FULBRIGHT. Eventually each
nation will decide for itielf. IS we insert
in the treaty some ProvisiOn that we
think is innocuouS, other nations Might
tlo likewise. It would open lathe treaty,
Our Government Would-Corarhunicate the
reservation to the other original signa-
tories, and if they should say, "We do
not understand the treaty in that way;
that is not what we agreed to," that
would be the end of the treaty.
Unless we think a reservation would
be really vital to our segurity, I believe
it would be a great mistake to put in un-
derstandings, as I believe we have been
using the term, although they should be
developed in the debate.
Mr. KEATING. In general, I certain-
ly share that view. Unless something
develops?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Like the Senator
from New York, I do notknow what may
develop. But those that I have read
about do not seem to me to be of a na-
ture to be attached to the treaty.
Mr. KEATING. What I am about to
say is said with the utmost respect for
the sincerity of Senators who are in fa-
vor of the treaty as it is, those who are
opposed, and those on both sides who
seek to attach understanding or reserva-
tions. Obviously one method of blocking
the treaty would be to attach some con-
dition, understanding, or whatever it
may be called, which, in an ordinary leg-
islative situation, we Would call a crip-
pling amendment. Stich action could
kill the treaty, as it has killed lesser
bills.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
correct.
Mr, KEATING. While that may not
be the motive of Senators who seek to
add reservations, I think we must be on
guard. If we desire to take this rather
modest step forward, we must be on
guard against that type action as well as
on guard when the vote comes On. the
treaty itself.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I could not agree
with the Senator more. He is absolutely
? correct.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. / do not have the
floor, The Senator from Massachusetts
has the floor.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator
from Michigan wishes to ask me a ques-
tion; and, frankly, I must catch an air-
plane. Will the Senator kindly defer his
statement?
Mr. COOPER. I aria glad to do so.
SALTONSTALL. I yield to the
Senator from Michigan.
Mr. HART. I thank the Senator from
Massachusetts for hie kindness. I may
be introducing something that is irrele-
vant to the question of the Senator from
New York and otherS. But as we ap-
proach the close of the first full day's
discussion of the treaty, I should like to
ask the Senator frorit Massachusetts a
question which bears on the theme which
runt; repeatedly throtigh the mail I am
receiving, and, I suggest, the mail that
a good many of our colleagues are re-
ceiving. We receive the impression that
the treaty is good if itis bad for the other
fellow; it is a bad treaty if it is good
for the other fellow: It is the notion
that two parties to *le contract before
- the Senate cannot be subjected to the
same test that we as lawyers apply to
determine whether a contract relating to
civil relations is good:
Has not the rule always been that a
contract is a good contract when the
interests of both parties are served and
when their interest supports the hon-
oring of the contract? Would it not be
a stupid nation that would insist that
all treaties to which it would become a
party must be those which would always
weigh only in its favor? Is that not a
fallacy? The flood of mail Would argue
to us that if there is anything good for
the other party to the treaty, namely,
the Soviet Union, we should vote against
it because it follows that it would be bad
for us.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I believe the
Senator from Michigan has the same
view as I entertain. We must look at
the proposal from the point of view of
what is best for us, and assume that the
Soviets would not have signed the treaty
unless they believed it was besi; for them.
So long as it helps our security, so long
as it makes one little step toward greater
opportunity for peace in the world, we
must accept it with our eyes open to the
possibility that the Soviets or any other
nation may disregard it at any time if
they think it is to their advantage to do
so. But so long as the Soviet Union will
stay with it, and we know that we want
to stay .with it, it is one little step for-
ward to a more peaceful world. That is
my attitude toward the treaty.
Mr. HART. That has been my atti-
tude throughout. I thought it would be
well on this very first day to nail down
perhaps an oversimplified response to the
repeated suggestion I have mentioned,
and to suggest that there is relevancy in
the example of the contract between two
citizens.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator is
correct.
Mr. HART. A contract makes sense
when it serves the advantage of both
parties to the contract. It is a good con-
tract. I think sometimes treaties have
a contractual nature and are subject to
many of the tests that apply to civil
contracts.
LMMr. SALTONSTALL. I agree with the
Senator.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
FOR THE DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR
AND HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE 150 JOBS AT $30,000
As in legislative session,
Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr.
President, on August 7 the Senate passed
H.R. 5888 making appropriations for the
Departments of Labor, and Health, Eda-
cation, and Welfare, and related agen-
cies for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1964.
On -page 25 of that bill the Senate
adopted an amendment, which is num-
bered 25.
Since the passage of the bill I have
discovered?and I have checked this with
the Department and have found my un-
derstanding to be correct?that the
amendment, as it would be interpreted,
would give the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare the authority to ap-
point 150 employees at $30,000 per year.
That certainly was not my intention
when the Senate approved this amend-
ment, nor was it my understanding. I
have checked with several other Mem-
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1963
L
feelings of dread, hatred, and despair in the
hearts of hundreds of millions of people.
These are not the emotions on which to build
a stable peace.
Some of the arguments put ? forward for
the treaty are speculative at best. We are
highly skeptical of the line that the treaty
marks the advent of a new era in interna-
tional relations, in which the United States
and the Soviet Union will get along famously.
All the evidence indicates that it will be
decades and generations before we will be
able to regard the Soviet Union as a reason-
ably trustworthy nation.
But a test ban would have one positive
result that has been strangely ignored dur-
ing most of the current debate. It would
end radioactive fallout throughout the world.
That is, it would stop the addition of any
more fallout to that which is still coming
down from the tests in previous years.
Perhaps the fallout question has been by-
passed because of fundamental ignorance
about it. Even the scientists disagree as to
how much genetic damage will be done to
coming generations by strontium 90 and
carbon 14 filtering down from the big mush-
room clouds.
? But one thing which cannot be denied is
the rapid increase of strontium 90 in milk
and in the bones of children. And no sci-
entists anywhere say that this is a good
thing. They all say it is bad. How bad it is,
no one knows.
? Some experts say that more than a million
children will eventually be born deformed
or defective because of the radioactive fall-
out that has been released to date. The es-
timate could be wildly wrong. Let us hope
so. But when dealing with unknown haz-
ards, it is always wise to assume the worst.
In balance, the risks in not signing the
treaty outweigh the risks in signing it.
[From the Boston Globe, Aug. 7,19631
IF THEY FAIL To RATIFY . .?
? (By Laurence Barrett)
WA8HINGTON.---S0 far, the argument over
the limited nuclear test ban treaty has
skirted perhaps the most important issue:
What the consequences would be if the Sen-
ate fails to ratify.
President Kennedy says this would be a
"great mistake." Mr. Harriman says it would
cost this country its position of world lead-
ership. These are understatements. It is
not too much to predict that rejection of
this treaty will sentence the world to con-
tinued imprisonment in the dungeon that is
the arms race for a long, long time.
Both in the administration and in Con-
gress there is considerable optimism that the
necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate will
be achieved. Yet there is an undercurrent
of opposition, rather muted for the moment,
and lacking in focus. If a rallying point
emerges, the treaty could be in trouble. Re-
jection is not the only avenue of defeat. An
attempt could be made to append "reserva-
tions" or even formal amendments. These
could have the same effect as a negative vote.
One wonders whether those who for vari-
ous motives are searching so hard for minute
flaws in the treaty have honestly considered
the larger question of what failure to ratify
would mean.
If the United States is unwilling to take
this very little step toward arms control,
then its stated position since the end of
World War II in favor of controlling the atom
is a fraud. And the more recent American
posture in favor of arms reduction and ulti-
mate disarmament is doubly fraudulent.
It must be remembered that the treaty
under consideration is essentially an Ameri-
can treaty, which both the Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations put forward for
the world to see and desire. Were we seek-
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Ing to deceive the world? Were we safe in
the knowledge that the Russians would spurn
any agreement, merely teasing humanity?
The treaty to ban tests in the atmosphere,
outer space, and underwater is the most
modest advance possible that can still pro-
vide meaningful progress. If we fear this,
then longer strides toward peace will fright-
en us senseless.
Would the Russians negotiate with us seri-
ously again on anything else? It is difficult
to see why they should. They could simply
bask in their greatest propaganda victory of
the cold war.
The arguments against the treaty vary
from sober considerations of the military and
technical iniplications to hysterical screams
about what monsters the Russians are. The
Senate must think about the former and try
to be immune from the latter.
The Republican congressional leadership
now gropes for some rational basis on which
to question the treaty. It posed this choice
last week: "Which will do most to preserve
peace in the world, ratification of a limited
treaty placing selective restraints on the de-
velopment of nuclear weapons or a maximum
up-to-the-minute defense capability so de-
structive as to prohibit attack? (This is the
same Republican leadership that thinks the
defense budget could be cut easily by a few
billions.)
Actually, this seemingly logical question
contains holes. The treaty doe& not prevent,
or even seriously inhibit, continued weapons
development. But there is a bigger hole.
The question implies that an absolute de-
terrent exists, or is readily obtainable. This
is a delusion. There exists only the means
for mutual destruction.
No new weapon is immune to a still newer
defense. No defense remains impermeable
for long. The choice really is between an
ever-quickening contest for more devastating
weapons and a glimmer of hope that the race
may slow to a more rational pace.
[From the Christian Science Monitor,
Aug. 29, 19631
EISENHOWER AND THE TEST BAN
The Eisenhower proposal that the Senate
write a reservation into the test-ban treaty
before signing it is a useful cautionary signal.
The suggested provision would protect the
United States position on the use of nuclear
weapons to repel aggression. While the
treaty does not concern what weapons would
be used by either side in the event of war,
there are good reasons for keeping the record
of negotiations very clear.
General Eisenhower is specially aware of
this. In 1959 he participated with Premier
Khrushchev in talks aimed at lessening ten-
sions. Later Moscow referred time and again
to these as creating a "spirit of Camp David,"
which the Soviets accused the United States
of violating in subsequent moves for its own
security. It would do the cause of world
peace no service to have such a performance
repeated.
But a writing of real reservations into the
treaty could open up a Pandora's box of de-
bate not only between Moscow and Wash-
ington but even within the Senate. It would
open the United States up to suspicions
among some signatories to the pact that
the Americans were trying to sabotage it.
The pact is not so ironclad a document as to
merit renegotiation simply to make plain the
United States interpretation of its effect on
inherent right of self-defense.
As Chairman FULBRIGHT of the Senate's
Foreign Relations Committee pointed out,
this right is already recognized in the United
Nations Charter. The Senator said he did
not believe that Mr. Eisenhower's doubts
require a basic change in the document
15689
waiting to be signed and should not techni-
cally be described as a reservation.
It would seem therefore that the Senate
could reasonably accompany ratification
with a declaration to cover the sense of the
Eisenhower signal. The more important
aspect of the Eisenhower statement is after
all that a leading figure of the Republican
Party is giving the pact his support, though
necessarily qualified,
[From the Haverhill Gazette, Aug. 1, 063]
NUCLEAR TEST TREATY
Reports from Washington indicate that
more and more Senators are going to base
their final decisions on a nuclear test ban
treaty on the feelings of the residents of their
home States.
If that is the case, we hope neither Mas-
sachusetts Senator will have any doubt about
the feelings of the residents of this State.
The Senators should be made aware that Bay
Staters are in favor of the test ban treaty.
We can expect, of course, that Senator
EDWARD M. KENNEDY will vote in favor of the
treaty so strongly recommended by his
brother, the President. We have seen noth-
ing to indicate Senator LEVERETT SALTONSTALL
will oppose the treaty, even though some of
his Republican colleagues are beginning to
put forth reasons for possible votes against
the treaty.
Nevertheless, both Senators should know
that there is strong support in this State for
the treaty and for the hopes for peace that
were voiced by the President when the agree-
ment was announced.
Ratification of the treaty by the Senate is
essential to a continuation of the trend to-
ward reason shown by the heads of the Amer-
ican, British, and Russian Governments in
their handling of nuclear armaments.
Granted, we cannot trust the Communists
and we must remain constantly vigilant in
spite of any treaties and agreements that are
signed. It is still logical, however, that we
can never emerge from the shadow of nu-
clear holocaust unless a start is made on
eventual abolition of these terrible weapons.
And where else can we start?
Granted, too, that France and Red China
scorn the agreement and have announced
they will have no part of it. The fact re-
mains both countries have far to go in their
development of nuclear weapons?France
has exploded a few and Red China has not
yet exploded any?and the officials of those
lands have not experienced the awesome
power of true super weapons in the modern
sense.
We must support an agreement which
could be the start of a reasonable approach
to international relationships. Treaties
have been broken throughout history and
will continue to be broken, but the time
must come when men either learn to live
together or bring about complete destruc-
tion.
[From the Haverhill Gazette, Aug. 9, 1963]
DECADE OF HYDROGEN BOMB RIVALRY COULD
END WITH BAN RATIFICATION
(By Richard Spong)
The agreement to ban atomic tests, if
ratified, will mark the end of a decade
of hydrogen bomb rivalry. Having de-
stroyed the atomic monopoly of the United
States in September 1949; the Soviet Union
announced to a dubious world on August
8, 1953, that it had achieved the hydrogen
bomb.
The word came at the end of a long speech
by Georgi M. Melenkov, then Soviet Pre-
mier, to the Supreme Soviet, Russia's Parlia-
ment. He spoke of the solace the United
States?the trans-Atlantic enemies of
peace?had enjoyed in a monopoly of a still
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zeptemoer 9
more powerful weapon than the atom bomb,
the hydrogen bomb. This was no longer
true, he Went on: "The Government deems
it necessary to report to the Supreme Soviet
that the United States has no monopoly in
the production of the hydrogen bomb either.
Convincing facts are shattering the wagging
of tongues about the weakness of the So-
viet Union."
American and British scientists were
skeptical. It was pointed out that evidence
of a Russian H-bomb explosion would in-
evitably be carried through the atmosphere
to the U.S. detection devices that had re-
corded three Russian atomic blasts between
1949 and 1951.
The doubt was short-lived. The Soviet
Government on August 20 announced that
it had tested a hydrogen bomb within the
past few days. The announcement was con-
firmed by the T.J.S. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. The AEC said that on August 12 it
had detected an explosion in the Soviet
Union that involved both fission (uranium-
plutonium) and thermonuclear (hydrogen)
reactions similar to those in U.S. tests of
H-bombs. The AEC announcement, inci-
dentally, disclosed for the first time an
American hydrogen-bomb test as early as
1951.
Great Britain, as the result of a certain
amount of backing and filling, did not ex-
plode its first hydrogen bomb until May
15, 1957. France is reported to be at least
3 years away from completing work on an
H-bomb, but President Kennedy obviously
meant France on July 26 when he spoke
of the "four current nuclear powers." Sev-
eral other nations are believed nearly cap-
able of setting off an atomic explosion, but
they would still be several years away from
a hydrogen bomb.
Senator HUBERT H. FIUMPHREY, Democrat,
of Minnesota, chairman of a Senate Disarma-
ment Subcommittee, said early in 1962 that
Communist China might explode an atomic
device "anytime within this year." Under
Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman
brought back from Moscow a more opti-
mistic view. On July 29 he told reporters
that Soviet Premier Khrushchev was not
overly concerned about Red China's nuclear
capabilities in the foreseeable future. Har-
riman added that since 1960 the Soviet
Union had discontinued all technical as-
sistance to the Chinese nuclear development
program.
[From the Daily Evening Item, Lynn, Mass.,
Aug. 16, 19631 ,
RUSK ALLAYS PEAR OF TREATY TRICKERY
In the light of public discussion of the
nuclear test ban treaty, one fact stands out.
Many Americans now believe there is no
longer a basis for abnormal fear that the
Russians may have tricked our negotiators
into signing something that contains a hid-
den time bomb.
Analysis of his testimony before the U.S.
Senate committees shows that Secretary of
State Dean Rusk has given unqualified as-
surance that the test ban treaty contains no
"side arrangements, understandings or con-
ditions of any kind."
Rusk also has declared without reservation
that if the United States does detect infrac-
tions of the treaty by the Russians, this
country has the capability?and the intent?
to quickly resume bomb tests.
These statements by a man of Rusk's
ability, experience, and Integrity should go
a long way toward calming any jitters the
public may have had.
Everyone knows it's hard to do business
with someone you can't trust. But all signs
indicate that our representatives have been
on constant guard against any _fast shuffle
during the treaty negotiations.
Why should anyone have been so suspicious
of a hidden gimmick in the treaty?
For one reason, because of the "managed"
news in the recent Cnban affair. Many
Americans have felt they not only were kept
uninformed in that case, but were actually
misled as to the facts.
They have been wondering if they might
not run into More of the same treatment in
the test ban treaty. SecMtary Rusk's frank-
ness has dispelled that staspicion.
So now we can concenrate on keeping up
our guard and watching like a hawk to make
sure the Russians keep their word, as given
in the treaty.
Our guess is the Senate and the country
will decide the risk is worth taking when you
consider the alternative.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I have
also received communieations from lead-
ing scientists and physicians in the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, all of whom
underscore the urgency of this test ban
from the scientific and medical view-
point. I ask unanimous consent that
these letters appear at this point in my
remarks.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY,
LABORATORY FOR NUCLEAR SCIENCE,
Cambridge, Mass., June 28, 1963.
Hon. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: I respectfully
urge you to use your influence in support
of the administration's efforts to reach an
early agreement with the U.S.S.R. on a per-
manent cessation of atomic testing.
In my opinion mankind as a whole has
never faced a problem of such urgency and
overwhelming importance as the problem of
insuring that nuclear power will not be used
for its destruction. I am convinced that
a test ban treaty is the first necessary step
.toward the solution of this problem. I am
also convinced that the risks to our national
security of a continued 'arms race far out-
weigh whatever risks may be present in a
test ban agreement, even though such an
agreement may not provide absolute insur-
ance against the possibility that a few small
underground explosions remain undetected.
Moreover, whatever small chances of viola-
tion may now exist, they will further de-
crease as the detection techniques continue
to improve. Thus, one should hope that the
technical problems of control no longer con-
stitute a roadblock to the negotiations of a
test ban treaty.
Sincerely yours,
nauxo Rossr,
Professor of Physics.
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECkNOLOGY,
LABORATORY FOR NUdLEAR SCIENCE,
Cambridge, Mase., August 9, 1963.
110/1. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY ThEtkk you
very much for your kinol reply to my letter
concerning the negotiations for a test ban
treaty.
I am sure you were as gratified as .1 was
by the successful concluaion of these nego-
tiations. The agreement signed in Moscow,
although limited in scope, represents a step
of great importance becanse it will stop fur-
ther radioactive contamination of the atmos-
phere, it will help check the spread of atomic
armanaents to other natidns and it will create
a more favorable climate for possible further
negotiations. Since theSe benefits are as
vital to the Russians as they are to us, I am
confident that the u.s.s,n. has entered into
this agreement with the serious desire to see
it fulfilled.
I earnestly hope that the U.S. Senate will
ratify the agreement promptly and with con-
siderably afore than the required two-thirds
majority of votes. Such an action is un-
doubtedly in the best interest of our country
and I am sure that it will be enthusiastically
approved by the vast majority of our fellow
citizens.
Sincerely yours,
BRUNO Rossi.
, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
DEPARTMENT' OF MEDICINE,
Boston, Mass., July 8, 1963.
The Honorable EDWARD E. KENNEDY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: I am enclosing a
copy of a letter I have sent today to the
President. I earnestly hope that President
Kennedy will have your enthusiastic support
in what seems to me to be the most pressing
issue before us at the present time.
Very truly yours,
HOWARD H, HIATT, M.D.
JULY 8, 1963.
THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MIL PRESIDENT: I cannot adequately
express my. exhilaration at the news of re-
cent days that a test ban may really be in
sight. Your willingness to educate and lead
our people in an area where education and
leadership are sorely needed is gratifying
indeed. It does appear as though the Soviet
Union may be receptive at this time, and I
should like to express my gratitude at your
willingness to take the initiative. We can
only hope that the efforts of our negotiators
in Moscow will be characterized by flexibility
on our part as well as that of the Soviet
Union, and that this may be the beginning
of a meaningful program of disarmament.
Respectfully yours,
HOWARD H. HIATT, M.D.
Turfs UNIVERSITY,
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,
Boston, Mass., July 3, 1963,
The Honorable EDWARD KENNEDY,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: In view or the
coming negotiations for a possible nuclear
test ban treaty, I should like to voice my
opinion that such a treaty would be of ut-
most importance to us in that it would stop
future fallout, the hazards of which, both
biological and genetic, I am fully aware as a
physiologist. Further, it would tend to
lessen the pressures of a spiraling arms race,
reduce the spread of nuclear weapons to other
nations and be the basis for possible future
negotiations toward disarmament. I do not
believe that a test ban agreement would in
any way endanger American security,. On
the contrary I feel that continued testing
would, by increasing the accumulation of
nuclear weapons and by the entrance of other
nations into the nuclear arms race, tremen-
dously increase the chances of a nuclear
holocaust.
Again, I should like to urge that all efforts
be made toward a test ban agreement.
Sincerely,
ATTILIO CANZANELLI, M.D.,
Professor of Physiology.
PHYSICS RESEARCH DIVISION,
GEOPHYSICS CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
Bedford, Mass., August 5, 1963.
The Honorable THEODORE KENNEDY,
The U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: I am very pleased
that at last we have been able to negotiate a
test ban agreement in some form. I believe
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Jr,6?very helpful to our political image
if the Senate can ratify this agreement by
- the la?rgest possible majority.
Ap professional physicist working pri-
marily in defense problems for over 20 years,
,beheve that the abandonment , of testing
can avoid pollution of the atmosphere, with-
out necessarily harming our defense effort in
any was. This requires of course that re-
search and development in all of these mat-
ters continue without testing, and that the
morale, be not permitted to deteriorate. In
short, X have faith in the capacity of the De-
tense and State Departments to outmaneuver
the Russians even though the rules of- the
game may be moving toward peace.
Yours very truly,
RoSBRT 013. CARPEW4a,
Manager, Optical Physics Department.
P.5.?Of course I speak only as an indi-
vidual.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
?10.1ncn-TE, DErAarivismr QF PHAR-
MACOI,ODY AND EXPERIMENTAL
? THERAPEUTICS,
Boston, Mass., August 1, 1963.
The Honorable EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
The t. 1 Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: I am most
pleased by the chain of events that have re-
cently lead up to the test ban treaty; how-
evr, I am a little disturbed that there is a
possibility that the Senate will not ratify
this treaty.
I hope that you will support with en-
thusiasm ratih:catinn of this treaty.
Sincerely yours,
? CpisiAx KoungTsn.y? Ph. D.
Reqearch, Professor of Pharmacology
and Psychiatry,
?
PETER -BRIVT in ,pRiGnA
Bos on, Mass., July 26, 1963.
lion. EDwAnw 14,ICPTNEDY,
004f4tO,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR 1C,P,TNEDY : I arn writing to
express my enthusiastic support of the pre-
liminary test ban negotiations and my hope
? that it will he ratkiled in the semte. This
seems the first original and imaginative step
in foreign policy that this administration
has taken.
Sincerely,
8AwroRD QIFFOJID, M.D.
THE WoncEsrsit iovzmArrow role
.
XatilarmENTAL Rior,,ocv,
Shrewsbury, Mass., August 8, 1963.
? Hon, EliwARD M. KENNEDY,
U.S. Senate,
? Washgton, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: On June 27 you
- kindly replied to a letter from me in, regard
to the hope that nuclear test ban negotia-
tions could be continued, I am sure you
plan to ratify the action that was taken
by the President, but I am writing again In
the hope that you will be able to use as much
- influence as you can to see that the bill
receives the necessary two-thirds vote.
You needn't bother to acknowledge this
letter.
Sincerely yours,
BRUCE PRAWFORD,
Business Manager
-
Mr, KENNEDY, Mr. President, in
summary, the Senate must decide
whether it is wise, to continue to pile up
weapons and couqterweapons, each more
powerful than the,jast in a cycle of tech-
nology which has no end. Ten years ago
We wektold that the ICBM was the ulti-
mate weapon. Now we hear about the
antiballistic MiSsile. Modern technology
being What it is, there is no ultimate
- ' -
weapon, and each advance increases both
the risk of war and its destruction.
Should we not instead choose the other
course?starting now to strive, cautiously
and patiently, to come to agreement by
which nuclear arms can be controlled.
We have a chance now to take the first
step that we have been hoping for for 6
years. A limited test ban is better than
an all-out arms race, and the time to
make the choice is now.
Mr. President, 85 nations have signed
this agreement to date,_ Once before in
our history an international agreement
was made, designed to preserve the peace.
Nation after nation ?joined In, but the
United States, whose President had la-
bored so hard to create the agreement,
stayed aloof, by action of the Senate.
Had the United States joined the League
of Nations 44 years ago, a war which took
60 million lives might have been avoided.
Let history be our teacher and the
cherishment of the people our guide, and
I am sure this small but historic treaty
will receive the endorsement it deserves
from the Senate.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
wish to take the time, on the first day
of debate on the test ban treaty, to com-
mend the distinguished chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Sena-
tor from Arkansas [Mr. FoLscrorrl, the
distinguished senior Senator from Mas-
sachusetts [Mr. SALTolverALLJ, the dis-
tinguished junior Senator from Massa-
chusetts [Mr. ,KENNEDY], and the Sena-
tor from Maine [Mrs. Swim] for the
speeches they have made today. They
have all made a distinct contribution to
a better understanding of tiliS most
im-
portant treaty, about which there is wide
disagreement, and about which much
more will be said in the days ahead.
I believe also that the questions raised
on the floor by the distinguished senior
Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], the
distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr.
TALATAD00, the able Senator from Loui-
siana [Mr. ELLgrmsa), the able Senator
from Michigan [Mr. HART], the able
Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING],
the distinguished Senator from Kansas
[Mr. CARLSON], the able Senator from
Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the distinguished
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER],
the able Senator from Iowa [Mr. MIL-
LER], the able Senator from Idaho [Mr.
Cimacix], and other Senators, have all
helped to bring about some clearing of
the skies, so to speak, some breakthrough
on the moot points with respect to the
treaty now before us.
While I am disappointed that there
will be amendments, understandings,
and reservations offered to the treaty,
nevertheless I respect the right of any
Senator to offer such motions. I think
they are a sign of deep concern. They
should be heard and considered most
seriously by the Senate. I look upon
Senators who offer these particular mo-
tions as men of responsibility, who are
deeply troubled by the problems which
confront them in their consideration of
the treaty, just as those of us are who
favor the treaty. By that I mean, of
course, that in this day and age nothing
is certain, everything changes, and the
m0100210002-8
problems and complexities of the world
which confront us today create situa-
tions which our minds find hard to grasp
and our intellects not sufficiently strong
enough to grapple with them.
I am delighted with the progress of
the debate today. I hope we shall be
able to continue on a similar or even
stronger level in the days ahead. As
stated previously, there will be no at-
tempt to rush the debate; but I would
hope that any Senator who wishes to
speak on this most vital subject will not
take that statement as a means by which
to dilly and dally and let things slide,
but will make his speech as soon as pos-
sible, so that the treaty can be cleared
as thoroughly as possible.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
NOON TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that when the
business for today has been completed,
the Senate adjourn until 12 o'clock noon
tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
NEEDED: A "DO SOMETHING"
CONGRESS
As in legislative session,
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the New
York Times magazine in yesterday's edi-
tion contains a most interesting article
entitled "To Make It a `Do Something'
Congress." The byline reads:
As operated now, Congress blocks more
laws than it passes and trivia rather than
substance dominates debate, says an observer,
who offers some suggestions for improvement.
The observer is Sam Zagoria, assistant
to Senator CLIFFORD CASE, of New Jersey.
As we all know, the distinguished senior
Senator from New Jersey has been most
active in the area of congressional re-
form. He and I have cosponsored reso-
lutions which we have separately intro-
duced. My resolution is intended to
create a joint congressional committee
to investigate and report to the Senate
and House of Representatives ways and
means of rendering Congress a more ef-
fective legislative body.
Senator CASE proposes in his resolu-
tion a joint commission which would
have certain outside members.
I am happy to say that the Subcom-
mittee on Standing Rules of the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration
has reported favorably to the full com-
mittee my proposal for a joint commit-
tee. Unfortunately, however, the sub-
committee has excluded from the cover-
age of the proposed joint committee a
consideration of the rules of either the
House or the Senate, and this exclusion
would seem practically to tear the heart
out of the validity of the proposal. How-
ever, I have not abandoned hope that
perhaps in the full committee, or even
on the floor of the Senate, the integrity
of the original resolution may be re-
stored.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed at this point in the
RECORD the aticle written by, Mr. Za-
?
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15692 Approved FettfittliklassWginttredliMPWATI3R00010021000 Zap t
goria. I commend it to all Senators as
an able, carefully reasoned argument
in support of that congressional reform
which I believe to be essential to the
proper functioning of Congress in the
years.
' There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times Magazine, Sept.
8, 1963]
TO MAKE /T A DO-SOMETHING Cowen-sm.?As
OPERATED Now, CONGRESS BLOCKS MORE
LAWS THAN IT PASSES AND TRIVIA RATHER
THAN SUBSTANCE DOMINATES IMEATE, SAES
AN OBSERVER, WHO OFFERS SOME SUGGES-
TIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
(By Sam Zagoria)
(Sam Zagoria, a former Washington re-
porter and Nieman Fellow, is now adminis-
trative assistant to Senator Clarroan CASE,
Republican, of New Jersey.)
WASHINGTON.?AS the 88th Congress toiled
past Labor Day, go-home day of other years,
Capitol Hill observers wondered why Con-
gress is convening longer and accomplishing
less. Press comments on its performance
were filled with such phrases as "legislative
meandering," "massive logjam Of legisla-
tion," "greatest do-nothing Congress in a
generation."
Technically, the 88th was supposed to
close shop and head homeward on July 31?
the adjournment date set by the Congres-
sional Reorganization Act of 1946--but by
that date only three major bills had been
enacted into law, a record more appropriate
for the Washington Senators baseball team.
In fact, in the boxscore of the Congressional
Quarterly, an independent, experienced ap-
praiser, at the end Of the 88th's first '7
months, more than a third--38 percent?of
the President's legislative proposals had re-
ceived no action at all in either the House
or the Senate.
But while leaders of the 88th banter
cheerily on the likelihood of a Thanksgiving
or Christmas adjournment, none feels the
need to explain the delay in getting down to
business or why so little businesb has been
actually transacted. True, Congress is now
occupied with the test ban treaty and civil
rights, but behind them is a backlog of long-
waiting legislation.
Why has this Congress accomplished so
little? Let us join some of the millions of
tourists from the 50 States and many foreign
nations who each year ascend majestic Capi-
tol Hilt to watch Congress conduct the legis-
lative business of the Nation. 'Most visi-
tors, particularly those from abroad, ap-
proach a session of Congreas, acclaimed one
of the greatest legislative bodies in the his-
tory of the world, with awe and respect.
And what do they see?
If they came this summer there was a
good chance that they would see chambers
of empty of all save fellow tourists. The
House and the Senate were frequently out of
session. This lackadaisical pace was hard
to understand when, according to its own
timetable, Congress should have been near-
ing a climax.
But, assuming our tourists are lucky and
Congress is in session, then what do our
guests see?
On the floor of the Senate is a handful of
Senators and aids. A brief discussion of the
bill at hand is interrupted by discourses on
subjects about as close to each other as the
North and South Poles. A discussion of civil
rights disorders, the threat of a nationwide
strike or the nuclear test ban treaty can be
put on the shelf while a discuasion of the
future of the boiled peanut ensues. "Do the
Senate rules permit such illogical conduct?"
an astonished observer wondera. The an
-
saver is an Unconditional Yes
On the floor of the Hottise there may be
discussion of prospects for tactical on a tax
cut or tax reform bill or bath. "But if this
is brought to the floor under a closed rule,
no amendments will be possible," points
out ene legislator. The obeerver in the gal-
lery is puzzled. A closed !rule means that
the House Rules Committee has ordered that
no changes can be made in the bill on the
floor; only a vote on the entire measure is
possible. But if each Congresman has equal
power in the House and the duty to perfect -
and improve legislation, how can he do his
job properly under a closed rule? That is
a question which the Rule Committee has
been successfully sidestepping since before
Most of us gave up playing hide-and-seek (a
game incidentally not unknown to the chair-
man of this committee When distasteful
legislation comes Up).
But we have been talking only about dis-
cussion of important legialation?action is
another subject altogether. Congressional
sessions in recent years have shown some
similarity to a Greek tragedy. First comes
the triumphal heroic call to arms In the
President's state of the Union message. We
must, we can, we will, he trumpets to the
Nation The chorus is lifted?there wilt be
help for education, a cure for unemployment,
a remedy for rights denied; peace, prosperity,
and purpose. The backup messages and
draft bills flow in mighty rhetoric from the
lansite House up Pennsylvania Avenue to
the lofty Capitol. Once there, the message
is conscientiously published in the anesthe--
tizing type of the CONGRESSIONAL REconn.
Read in this document: hardly anything
seems urgent or exciting, but the public still
thinks progress is being made.
Then the curtain falls?ea silence as com-
plete as if the messa'ges had been sent to
Siberia instead. Committees meet or do
not meet; they take up legislation or do not
take up legislation?all ais the chairman de-
cides. They convene heartngs whose subject,
length, and even witnessw are decided on
largely as the chairman or ains. The urgent
matters that the President of the United
States, elected by voters of the whole Nation,
cited tor action are not assured of even a
hearing much less a vote. Instead Congress
- rattles on, debating boiled peanuts, kite
flying in Washington, and a potpourri of
minor bills while the fires of civil rights
burn on, the hunger for higher education
gnaws, and time intensi es other needs.
The Greek chorus rxourns, amending
"Never on Sunday" to i lude most of the
week.
The
heart of the problem is the rules and
procedures of Congress,, many unchanged
since the formation of Ciangress.
As ?the rules stand, they set up no pro-
cedure for the scheduling of legislation or
for assuring a President Of consideration for
his legislative proposals. Nor has the con-
gressional leadership drawn up a timetable
Of its own, partly because committee chair-
men are unwilling to hale a time limit put
on their efforts. Without committee action,
the leadership has nothing to put before the
full House or Senate.
There is not even a flrin requirement that
the committees meet at an. They decide for
themselves whether to n*et at stated inter-
vals or at the call of the chairman; but even
a regularly scheduled /sleeting can be put
over by the chairman. Some committees,
such as Senate Judiciary, have on occasion
not held meetings for months?as when Sen-
ator EASTLAND, the chairman, saw a civil
rights bill in the offing.
When a measure finally gets out of com-
mittee and onto the floor, there is still
no guarantee of quick action. The full
House and Senate meet at the discretion of
the leadership. They have to meet at least
every 3 days, but this clan be a formality.
Members of both Chambers are supposed to
be available for all sessions except when they
have been granted a leave of absence, but this
Is not enforced. As a practical matter, the
House rarely schedules a controversial or
important measure on days other than Tues-
day through Thursday; otherwise there
might not be enough Members on hand for
the leaders to raise a quorum or mobilize
votes for a party's position.
There are yet other ways by which legis-
lation is delay or diluted. The Senate's rule
of unlimited debate makes possible the fili-
buster to talk a bill to death; while the
House has a rule of germaneness, requiring
that talk be to the point of the .pending
matter, the Senate does not. A tabling
motion?to put an amendment or a bill
aside--can, in effect, kill a measure without
Its substance ever coming to a vote. An un-
related "rider"?an amendment having noth-
ing to do with a bill's main purpose?can be
used to weaken or bury it.
Partly because of these rules and proce-
dures, the role of Congress in the Federal
Government has been slowly changing. Our
forefather's conception of a system of active
government braked by a structure of checks
and balances has been eroding into an un-
balanced arrangement where the executive
and judicial branches are the activists and
the legislative branch only slows action.
- This is not to argue that a President's leg-
islative program?any President's--should be
enacted from apple subsidies to zeppelin con-
struction; but it is to say that the present
method of helter-skelter legislating, with no
rhyme nor rationale to the scheduling other
than the whim of committee chairmen, is
not an effective way to carry out the Nation's
business.
What can be done about this'? Congress
could authorize a commission to study its
rules and procedures and make recommenda-
tions for improvement. This is how we were
able to achieve limited, but significant,
progress on modernization and streamlining
almost two decades ago. Legislation has,
been introduced by Senator CLIFFORD P. CASE,
Republican, of New Jersey, and several col-
leagues for appointment of a commission,
consisting of Members of Congress and out-
side experts, to make such a study. His view
is that the workings of Congress should not
be considered the exclusive preserve oil its
present Members, and that the public at
large has a substantial stake and much ob-
jectivity in appraising the rules.
A similar bill, but one limiting the com-
mission to Members of Congres:s, has been
introduced by Democratic Senator JOSEPH
CLARK, of Pennsylvania, and several HOUSD
and Senate colleagues. His view is that
Members of Congress are more likely to ap-
prove a commission limited to c:olleagues in
the manner of the 1946 reform. CASE and
CLARK have each sponsored the other's bill,
recognizing that they will be lucky to
achieve either this year.
A Senate Rules Subcommittee has now
merged the two bills into one providing for
a joint commission consisting of 6 Mem-
bers of the Senate and 6 from the House
to study 10 problem areas and additional
topics aimed at improving the organization
and operation of Congress. The next step is
for the full Senate Rules Committee to take
up this and three related resolutions.
One item high on the list of the Case-Clark
proposals is a review of congressional sched-
uling. Perhaps -there should be a leadership
timetable for committee hearings and floor
action requiring that some major problems
be taken up , before the summer wanes,
Other ideas are for committees to meet on
certain days of the week and the full House
and Senate on other specified days; this
would break the pattern of Tuesday-to-
Thursday weeks and foil those Members who
put outside activities', such as law practice,
ahead of legislative duties. A program fol.-
lowed in some State legislatures for 2-year
sessions, with the first year devoted to ap-
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TO:
Mr. Elder 1611-'
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
Attached are three excerpts
the Congressional Record of
from
Monday,
first
the
9.September, containing the
, day's debate in the Senate of
nuclear test ban treaty.
?
Assistant Legislative Counsel
FROM:
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GPO: -0-439445
FORM NO
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REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.