QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE TEST BAN TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200005-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 24, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

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Record
PROCEEDINGS 'AND DEBATES OF THE 881h CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER'243''1 963
Senate
The Senate met in executive session at
10 o'clock am., and was called to order
by the Vice President.
The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown
Harris, D.D., offered the following
prayer:
Father of all, whose righteous laws
condemn and will at last break whatso-
ever bars, Thy children from abundant
life: In these days freighted with destiny,
for whose decisions the future will judge
us, by Thine enabling might may Thy
servants here in the ministry of public
affairs maintain, their integrity unsullied
by personal animosities, prejudices, or
selfish ambitions.
And now,as;there looms the hour when
for men and nations comes the moment
to decide, to whatever decision come
those who here speak for this free land,
this, day in a choice between frowning
risks on either side, may those who give
their consent and those who withhold it
alike be sustained by the supreme satis-
faction that, In a grave crisis, they have
done their full duty, and that in the
face of trembling and fearful humanity
their vote represents their patriotic judg-
ment deserving well of the Republic.
We ask it in the Redeemer's name.
Amen.
TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE
LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that, as in legis-
lative session, there be a morning hour
for 5 minutes, at the end of which time
I shouldlike to suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
THE JOURNAL
On the request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and
by unanimous consent, the reading of
the Journal of the proceedings of Fri-
day,, September 20, 1963, and Monday,
September 23, 1963, was dispensed with.
DIEATU' OF -TILLMAN B. HUSKEY,
CHI CABINETMAKER IN THE
SENATE
Mr. DIRKSEI', Mr. President,, on Au-
gust, 24, just?1 day before his ,birthday,
Tillman B. I#usTeey, Sr., who was the
chief cabinetmaker on the Senate side,
passed away.
Mr. Huskey served this body for nearly
30 years. I wish to take note of his pass-
ing, because he was among those whom
the public never er sees, but who-so faith-
fully serve th Tate.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE
TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. SYMINGTON.. Mr. President,
factual data in the Preparedness Subcom-
mittee's report is accurate. Is that correct?
? Answer. As I stated in my additional views
that are included in the Preparedness Inves-
tigating Subcommittee report, "To the best
of my knowledge the factual data contained
the Sub r in the report of the Preparedness I
lieve
ink Subcommittee cois is c correct.
are I believe
e overly pes-
simistic as to the effect of the treaty on our
national security."
2. Question. Does the Senator subscribe
to the opinion of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, stated in its report, that, and I quote :
last week, after the .completion of my tary considerations could undermine na-
remarks on .the test ban treaty, the dis- tional security" by' encouraging comparable
tinguished Senator from South Carolina
Jr. ZVITnuerviQ-Np]?placed in, the RECORD
36 questions he would have asked pie
with respect to this treaty if he had been
on the floor when I concluded.
Inasmuch as it was necessary for me
to leave, to go back to Missouri for the
remainder of the week, irl order to fulfill
several longstanding engagements, I
was not in a position to answer. .
Upon my return to town yesterday,
however, I worked on answers to these
questions; and I ask unanimous consent
that they be printed, together' with the
questions, at this, point in the RECORD.
I take this opportunity to commend
the Senator from South Carolina for the
many long hours he has spent in study-
ing this matter. We agree on many
points; .on others, we do not. I wish we
could agree on all, especially inasmuch as
I know of the complete sincerity of his
position.
Mr. President, the-distinguished Sena-
tor from South Carolina also put in the
RECORD the transcript of a television pro-
gram of April 28 in which I participated.
That program was conducted at a time
when the Preparedness Subcommittee
was giving consideration to the-so-called
comprehensive treaty-one far differ-
ent from the treaty that is under con-
sideration today, in that it involved an
onsite inspection agreement to super-
vise underground testing.
There being no objection, the questions
and the answers.-were__axdere.d to_ be
printed in the RECORD, as follows:
1. Question. The Senator is In. a unique
position, since he is a member, of both the
Foreign Relations Committee and the Pre-
-paredness Subcommittee, and signed the re-
ports of both committees. I believe the
world, possibly creating new ones."
Answer. Everyone agrees that military con-
..siderations are very important. However, no
olio _belieyes that.rnilltary factors are the
sgle, considerations. For example, I_ have
expressed concern , particularly because of
the "likely pioliferatlon of nuclear weapons
capabilities in the world. While I do not be-
lieve that this treaty by itself will stop such
proliferation, - I do believe that the treaty
could be a small step in that direction.
3. Question. I notice that the Senator
states that "unless there can be some under-
standing among the growing number of na-
tions that will have the weapon, a nuclear
holocaust is only "a question of time." Does
the Senator mean to imply that armaments,
rather than human weaknesses, cause wars?
Answer. Both armaments and human weak-
ness are required for war. It is unfortunately
true also that armaments and human
strength are both required to maintain a
just peace. It is the kind and proliferation
of armaments, not the existence of arma-
ments, that are now in issue.
4. Question. The United States has main-
tained a level of armaments over recent years
unequaled in all history. Would the Sena-
tor not agree that these armaments have
been the very factor that has prevented
nuclear war?
Answer. They have been a mighty im-
portant factor. I believe that these arma-
ments have been important in causing the
Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba and
in preventing many other Communist ad-
ventures, especially in Europe and perhaps
the Far East. The existence of U.S. military
power, known to the Soviets, has in my opin-
ion prevented Soviet conduct which might
well have led to war.
6. Question. Would the Senator not agree
that the only way in which one can be sure
of preventing nuclear war, so long as the
Communists maintain their goal of world
domination, is to keep an overwhelming su-
periority in strategic military, power?
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Answer. It is vital that the United States
maintain its capability to destroy the So-
viet Union if a retaliator$ strike is required.
6. Question, The Senator from Missouri
has correctly pointed out that the military
disadvantages of the treaty to the Soviet
Union must also be considered, along with
the military disadvantages to the United
States. Would not the Senator from Mis-
souri agree that in assessing the relative
military disadvantages of the treaty, that
the starting point, in terms of technology,
of both the United States and the Soviet
Union, is largely determinative of the de-
gree of disadvantage from prohibition of
testing in a particular environment?
Answer. As I understand the question, I
agree that the degree of disadvantage im-
posed on a nation by the treaty Is deter-
mined, to some extent, by where that na-
tion is now as compared with the other in
terms of nuclear technology. There is a
tendency for progress 'to come harder to the
nation ahead-breaking new ground. For
example, advancements in yield-to-weight
ratios become more difficult as one ap-
proaches the theoretical limits. Thus the
Soviets-behind in medium- and low-yield
weapons-could, If unlinfited testing were
allowed, be expected to make relatively rapid
progress in those areas. Under the treaty,
however, Soviet progress in these areas can
be expected to be slower.
7. Question. The Senator has pointed out
that the Soviets will be unable to test for
blackout phenomena after the treaty goes
into effect, just as will the United States.
Isn't it a fact, however, that the Soviets
specifically tested for blackout phenomena,
and particularly as it applies to ABM sys-
tems, in the 1961-62 series, but that the
United States has made no comparable test?
Answer. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said that
the Soviets may possess some information
not available to the United States. Dr,
Brown, in his testimony added: "Yes, and we
have some data that they may not have."
Dr. Brown has stated that our tests were
comparable to theirs-particularly in that
they provided a much broader range of data
from which extrapolation can be made with
more confidence; that each side has had
about the same number of tests, over yield
ranges and altitude ranges which are com-
parable though not identical; that enough
has been learned in the United States to
verify the existence, nature, and rough de-
pendence of blackout characteristics on yield
and altitude, although important details still
have not been explored; that the same is
probably true in the Soviet Union; that
enough is now known in the United States
to determine for example how blackout en-
ters, with other factors in the anti-ICBM
problem, in determining the optimum radar
frequency; and that both sides have done
several tests with very extensive instrumen-
tation. Both Dr. Brown and-Dr.Bradbury
testified that blackout tests were conducted
by the United States in 1958 and 1962 and
that we have learned enough about the
problem to be able to take measures to de-
sign around It. Senator SPARKMAN On Sep-
tember 16 dealt with the matter. He re-
ferred also to the testimony in executive
hearings of Mr. John McCone. I refer the
Senate to the same source.
8. Question. Another factor which bears
heavily on the relative military disadvan-
tages of the treaty, as I am sure the Senator
will agree, is the different strategies of the
United States and the Soviets. Since the
United States must rely on second strike
capabilities, it must test to determine every
possible vulnerability in its weapons systems,
for to leave one that is unknown could spell
disaster In the event of any enemy first
strike. Since the Soviets rely on the strategy
of a first, or preemptive strike, they do not
have to test for the purpose of insuring the
invulnerability of their own weapons sys-
tems, but can concentrate on ferreting out
one or two vulnerabilities of our weapons
systems and the proper weapons design to
exploit our weapons systeths vulnerabilities
that they have found. Does this factor not
require, in effect, far more comprehensive nu-
clear testing for weapons effects and proof
tests by the United State6to maintain its
second strike force than is-necessary for the
Soviets to advance their first strike force?
Answer. Without regard to what the So-
viet strategy actually is, prudence requires
the United States to maintain strategic forces
capable of surviving any Soviet surprise at-
tack and delivering a devastating counter-
blow. In this connection, It is important to
understand, with as little uncertainty as
possible, the phenomena which may bear on
the survivability of our systems. As I said
on September 17, "While I regret * * * that
the United States did not, before now, find
the answer to more of the gnawing vulner-
ability questions, I am convinced that the
Soviets, limited as they are by the terms of
this treaty, will not be able to change the
elemental facts of the strategic nuclear power
balance." Our systems are many in number
and involve great redundancy in command
and control. This being the case, it is most
unlikely that any one or two vulnerabilities
will be critical. And, it should be noted
that, hampered by the test ban, the Soviets
will have difficulty estimating the nature of
any weaknesses in U.S. systems which may
exist.
9. Question. The Senator states that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have seen no need for a
100-megaton bomb. Is the Senator not
aware .that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have, In
fact, recommended that we go ahead with
the development of the big bomb?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, in his
testimony before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, assured :that "the United
States, without any future testing, can de-
velop it warhead with a yield of 50 to 60
megatons for B-52 delivery." This size and
type weapon, I understand, falls within the
range of interest expressed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in the recommendation re-
ferred to. The Joint Chiefs of Staff In their
statement of position on, the limited test
ban treaty said that "The Joint Chiefs of
Staff have not regarded as'Important the at-
tainment of weapons in, the 100-megaton
range from which the United States will be
debarred by the treaty. They feel that the
types and numbers of megaton yield weapons
available to us now or ins the future could
give us an adequate capability in the high-
yield weapon range." As the report of the
Foreign Relations Committee points out:
"Even Dr. Edward Teller, a critic of the
treaty, recently commented: 'It is not clear
to me that these very big yields will result
in a substantial advantage for the Rus-
sians. * * * In evaluating the consequences
of the test ban, I do not place very great Im-
portance on the lead which the Russians en-
joy in this particular field."' He has also
agreed that we do not need atmospheric test-
ing in order to construct larger bombs.
10. Question. Isn't it also a fact that Gen-
eral LeMay recommended, the development
of a big bomb as early as, 1954, but that he
was refused?
Answer. General LeMay testified: "I asked
for, the Air Force asked for, a big yield bomb
as early as 1954." Testimony also brought
out this was a bomb of over 50 megatons.
11. Question. Isn't it a' fact that one of
the reasons that the recommendation of the
military for development of a big bomb has
never been approved lies in the fact that the
defense policy of the Nation is based on a
shift in reliance from manned aircraft, which
could deliver a very high yield weapon, to
ballistic missiles, in which we do not now
have a capability of delivering the necessary
weight to achieve the very high yield?
Answer. I am told that the reasons for no
decision to develop a very big bomb are
September 24
many. The principal one is the absence of a
military role in which such a weapon was
superior to smaller weapons. It- must be
borne in mind that, as weapons to use against
military targets in. a retaliation role, larger
numbers of smaller weapons are to be pre-
ferred on a cost-effectiveness basis, and also
because the smaller delivery systems are
easier to harden or make mobile. With re-
spect to the shift in emphasis to missile de-
livery, it should be remembered both that
manned aircraft will have an important role
in the foreseeable future and that, without
atmospheric testing, larger warheads could
be developed and stockpiled for our bombers
as well as our future missile systems.
12. Question. The Preparedness Subcom-
mittee report, in which the Senator from
Missouri attests as to the accuracy of the
facts reports as a fact that, and I quote:
"The United States will be unable to acquire
necessary data on the effects of very high
yield atmospheric explosions. Without such
knowledge it Is unlikely that a realistic as-
sessment can be made of the military value
of such weapons." Would the Senator not
agree that the Soviets have a distinct lead
over the United States in this area, and
that we do not now have the necessary in-
formation from which to assess the military
potential of the 100-megaton bomb when
used against us.
Answer. This part of the subcommittee
report was a conclusion, and by the testi-
mony a disputed fact. Dr. Harold Brown,
Director of Defense Research and Engineer-
Ing, stated that "although they have done
more high yield tests, those were not effects
tests. Their geography, and the associated
activity does not indicate to me that they
are effects tests." Here again, I refer the
Senate to the testimony in executive hear-
ings by Mr. John McCone, Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. With respect
to the adequacy of information at our dis-
posal, I repeat my regrets, stated to the Sen-
ate on September 17, that we did not, before
now, 'take more steps to reduce our uncer-
tainties relating to the survivability of our
missile force. But I am advised that we
do have a great deal of information from
which to assess the military potential of a
100-megaton bomb used against us; and that
the Soviets know no more than we do about
any vulnerabilities that may exist.
13. Question. Would the Senator not
agree, that regardless of whether the United
States would decide, after acquisition of suf-
ficient Information on which to make a real-
istic evaluation, to build a 100-megaton
bomb for its own arsenal or not, that it is a
major disadvantage for the enemy to have
a major weapon of which he knows the mili-
tary potential, and for the United States to
know existence of the weapon, but to be
precluded from ascertaining with some de-
gree of certainty its military potential?"
Answer. There is no reason. to believe that
the Soviets know more than we do about the
military potential of a 1.00-megaton bomb.
Neither side has tested one. The 60-mega-
ton test by the Soviets was a weapons, not
effects, test. As for the implication of a
Soviet technological lead in the very high
yield range, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
testified that technological superiority is
only one aspect of the net security which
must take into account the number of weap-
ons, variety of delivery systems and the
magnitude of nuclear plant and stockpile:
"As to net superiority in ability to inflict
damage on the enemy, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider that the United States at pres-
ent is clearly ahead of the U.S.S.R. in the
ability to wage strategic nuclear war." We
have data from which we can estimate the
effects of very large weapons.
14. Question. The Senator is quite pessi-
mistic about the ability of either the United
States or the Soviet Union to develop an
effective ABM system. According to the in-
formation we now have, the Soviets have
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Answer. As was predicted, high-yield, high-
altitude Soviet explosions did affect some
communications circuits for a limited period
of time.
23. Question. Is it not true that although
the time of explosion of the nuclear warhead
substantially affects the level of electromag-
netic phenomena, even in the same medium
where the warhead is detonated, that we
have attempted to test the effects of this
phenomenon only underground, not even in
the medium where the weapon would pre-
sumably be detonated, with a very small
yield explosion and attempted to extrapolate
the results?
Answer. Our experiments directed at black-
out and electromagnetic pulse have been
conducted in the atmosphere. Certain yield
and altitude extrapolations have been re-
quired-as would be the case for the Soviets
as well.
24. Question. Would the Senator not agree
that the Soviets have demonstrated a capa-
bility for producing the maximum level and
residuality of exotic radiation effects with
a very high yield warhead, and that, if their
tests were properly instrumented, they had
the opportunity to learn much about the
effects of these phenomena?
Answer. There Is no Indication that the
very high yield Soviet warhead was exploded
at an altitude which would optimize exotic
radiation effects. Furthermore, Dr. Brown
testified that the test was not instrumented
for effects purposes.
25. Question. Would the Senator not agree
that in these exotic radiation effects of nu-
clear explosions could possibly and even
.probably lie vulnerabilities to our missile
sites and the communications and control
circuits, as well to our early warning sys-
tems? -
Answer. It is possible but not probable
that radiation effects could render any given
missile site, communication and-control cir-
cuit, or some portion of our early warning
system vulnerable in some unassessed way.
Secretary McNamara addressed this problem
at length in his statement before the Foreign
Relations Committee as follows:
"Our missile force is deployed so as to
assure that under any conceivable Soviet first
strike, a substantial portion of it would re-
main in firing condition. Most of the land-
based portion of the force has been hardened,
as well as dispersed. In addition, we have
duplicative facilities which will in the future
include the capability of launching each in-
dividual Minuteman by a signal' from air-
borne control posts. The United States now
has a substantial amount of information in
this area of hardened missile-site vulnerabil-
ity. Our knowledge of the Soviet testing
program leads us to believe that their un-
certainties are at least as great as ours.
Uncertainties of this kind, and others-into
which we must count uncertainties of the
accuracy of Soviet missiles-will continue to
be compensated for by conservative designs,
wide dispersal and large quantities of mis-
siles.
"Furthermore, the most pessimistic view
of these uncertainties suggests a vulnerabil-
ity ratio for our hardened, dispersed Minute-
man sites or less than two sites killed on the
average by a single very large-yield Soviet
missile. It is clear that the Soviets do not
have anything like the number of missiles
necessary to knock out our Minutemen force,
nor do they appear to have any present plans
to acquire such a capacity."
I understand also that, with respect to our
early warning system, blackout from a very
high yield nuclear explosion would itself be
a form of warning.
26. Question. Would not the Senator agree,
as is stated in the Preparedness Subcom-
range effectiveness of some electromagnetic nlittee's report that the Soviets now enjoy a
phenomena against communications cif- lead in knowledge of high yield weapons ef-
cuits? fects?
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
deployed an ABM 'system in one location to either, and I conclude from that that neither
which we attribute significant effectiveness we nor they feel that is the most vital part
in defending against IRBM's, including the of an antimissile development."
Polaris, which incidentally are not missiles 17. Question. Is it not true that the high-
which can be salvoed, but we attribute very ly complex ABM tests performed by the So-
little effectiveness to this system against viets could have, and probably did provide
ICBM's. In view of the fact that it is pos- valuable information on the ability of an
sible that the vulnerabilities of our missiles ABM system to operate in a nuclear environ-
in silos could possibly be exploited by some ment, including radar and communications
weapons effects of which we are not now blackout, and that we do not know the pre-
fully knowledgeable, to say the least, would cise results, or the thrust of the knowledge
the Senator not agree that under some cir- that the Soviets gained thereby?
cumstances the present Soviet technological Answer. The Soviets obviously obtained
capabilities in the ABM field are of large important blackout information from their
significance? tests, as did we from ours. We do not know
Answer. The problems which face us, and the precise results of their tests, nor do they
presumably the Soviets, in any attempt to know the precise results of ours. It is likely
develop an ABM system are concentrated, that both sides understand the thrust of
primarily, in nonnuclear areas-in areas un- the knowledge gained by the other. In this
affected by the treaty (reaction speed, missile connection, see my answers to questions 7
performance, traffic handling capacity, and and 14.
capacity for decoy discrimination). So the 18. Question. Will the Senator from Mis-
question asked is one largely unrelated to sours tell us whether the Joint Chiefs of
the test ban. Nevertheless, with respect to Staff, when they made their assessment of
the Soviet ABM position, the Preparedness the treaty, had all of the details of the Soviet
Investigating Subcommittee's report did not ABM tests in their possession, or whether
find that the Soviets have deployed an ABM certain significant facts about the tests had
system which has significant effectiveness never been disclosed to them?
in defending against IRBM's. Dr. Brown Answer.: After reading this question, I
stated that he does not believe that the So- checked with the Department of Defense,
viets have deployed any installation as good and am advised by the Department of De-
as, certainly not better than, Nike-Zeus. fense that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had full
Moreover, with respect to the Polaris mis- access to all the information available on
sile, it would be mistaken to conclude from Soviet testing.
the fact that a missile is not salvoed that 19. Question. In discussing the question
it has no penetration capability against an of vulnerabilities of our missile sites, the
ABM system. As the Foreign Relations Com- Senator points out that the Soviets will not
mittee report points out, penetration capa- be able to make- tests to determine vulner-
bility includes such techniques as multiple abillties any more than will the United States
Warheads, varied trajectories, the use of under the treaty. Once again, we must go
heavy and light decoys, and so forth. With back and examine the point from which each
respect to relative positions in ABM tech- side starts if we are to reach an objective
nology, the testimony of Dr. Seaborg, Dr. evaluation. The U.S. reliance on a second
Brown, and Dr. York is that the relative strike strategy, together with the Soviet re-
strength of the United States and the liance on a first strike strategy, makes it
U.S.S.R. in the ABM field is comparable and incumbent on the United States to have a
that the United States may be ahead. Fur- broader spectrum of knowledge on the vul-
ther, it must be remembered that even the nerabilities of missile sites than the Soviets.
most ardent ABM supporters did not testify Is it not a fact that the Soviets have demon-
that an ABM system could be counted on to strated in their tests that they know more
save a nation from lethal harm, about exotic radiation effects than does the
15. Question, As the Senator correctly United States?
stated, the Soviets could not, if they abide Answer. See my answer
i,4 and 12.
i
b
th
#
i
n any more
y
e
raty, o a
nformation 20. Question. Is it not true that the mag-
from ADM testing than could the United
States while the treaty was in effect. Is it nitude and residuality of some electromag-
not true, however, that the Soviets have al- netic phenomena varies substantially accord-
ready performed tests dictated by ABM con- ing to the time when the nuclear explosion
sideratlons specifically on the blackout prob- takes place?
lem, to which the United States had made Answer. If the phenomena referred to is
nothing comparable? blackout, I am advised that It probably does
vary substantially according to the time of
Answer, See my. answer to question 7. day and magnetic latitude.
16. Question. The Senator stated that 21. Question. Is it not true that the United
"specifically, apprehensions in the ABM field States has generally tested for weapons of
were not, borne opt, at least to me, in the fects in the atmosphere only at periods when
'highly classified intelligence briefings we such effects were at a minimum, while the
received," Is it not true that the briefings Soviets have tested for the maximum of such
to which the, Senator refers included a spe- effects?
cific description of Soviet ABM tests, to Answer. I am advised that most weapons
which we have performed nothing compara- effects are not sensitive to the time when
able? the explosion takes place. With respect to
Answer,, Dr. Brown compared the United blackout, it is true that TY.S. tests have been
States alld U.S.S,R., ABM tests as follows: conducted at a time of day when the effect
"The Soviets have said that they have inter- would probably be lesser and that the Soviet
cepted a missile with a missile. We have in- tests have been conducted at that time of
tercepted a missile with a missile on numer- day when the effect would probably be great-
ous occasions. The Soviets have not said- or. I am also advised, however, because of
and on my examination of all the available the physical manifestations of blackout and
evidence I believe that they have not inter- the methods used to record those n anifes-
cepted a missile -with a "missile at ICBM tations-that is, the instrumentation of the
ranges, that is at ranges of many thousands, tests-the information gained from a test
several thousand miles, 4,000 or more. It is is likely to be greater if the tests are per-
not a frm concl.,sion but It 15 what I be- formed as the United' States has scheduled
lieve. We have in ,ercepted a missile at ICBM them,
ranges,' at our test site at Kwajalein. See- 22. Question. Is It not also true that the
ond, the Soviets have not said that they have Soviet tests of very high yield weapons over
intercepted a m sslle with an interceptor the Soviet Urlon demonstrated a very Ion;-
,
carrying an exploading nuclear warhead.
Again, on invesigationof the relevant facts,
I conclude, that they have not. We have not,
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16902 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 24
Answer. On this point, the report of the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
used the words "probably" and "prudent to
assume." With respect to the merits of the
point, see my answers to questions 8 and 12.
27. Question. Would not the- Senator
agree that the knowledge of weapons ef-
fects, particularly the exotic radiation effects,
and knowledge of the vulnerabilities of our
missile silos and communications and con-
trol circuits are so closely related that they
are for all practical purposes inseparable?
Answer. Yes; and all of these areas are
related inseparably to factors such as num-
bers, diversity, accuracies, and yields of
weapons, redundancy of command and con-
trol, national strategies, and so on.
28. Question. The Senator from Missouri
has quoted the concluding paragraph of the
presentation of Gen. Maxwell Taylor for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff which states: "It is
the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that, if adequate safeguards are established,
the risks inherent in this treaty can be ac-
cepted in order to seek the important gains
which may be achieved through a stabiliza-
tion in international relations and a move
toward a peaceful environment in which to
seek resolution of our differences." Does
the Senator believe, as is implied by the
statement he quoted, that the treaty will
lead to a stabilization of international
relations?
Answer. I believe that the treaty could
be a step toward, rather than away from,
a more stable order in international affairs
and a more peaceful environment. No one
has suggested that the treaty by itself will
lead inevitably toward firm, peaceful in-
ternational relations. See also my answer
to question 33.
29. Question. Does the Senator believe, as
this same quotation implies, that the treaty
is a move toward a peaceful environment?
Answer. See my answer to question 28.
30. Question. Does the Senator believe
that this treaty will cause the Berlin wall to
be torn down, so that this unstabilizing fac-
tor on,international relations will disappear?
Answer. No.
31. Question. Does the Senator believe
that this treaty will improve the situation
in Vietnam caused by Communist aggres-
sion?
Answer. No, at least not in the short term.
32. Question. Does the Senator believe
that this treaty will eliminate the Commu-
nist regime in Cuba, or reduce the all-out
efforts of the Communists to subvert Latin
America?
Answer. The treaty will not solve the
problem of the Communist attempt to pene-
trate Latin America.
33. Question. In what way, if any, will this
treaty lead to the stabilization of interna-
tional relations and a peaceful environment?
Answer. In my statement to the Senate on
September 17, I said that, after advising and
consenting to the treaty, the Senate, "to-
gether with the other arms of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, should gird for the contest in the
new situation. We must do our part, not
only to ensure that the four safeguards listed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are effectively
implemented, but also to maintain the vigi-
lance and strength of the Nation while the
small first step which this treaty represents
finds its way into the complex of conditions
from which the future will be made." I con-
cluded: "With our eyes open, therefore, let
us give weight to the fact that this treaty
might point the way toward bringing nuclear
weapons under some form of satisfactory
control; and thereby furnish hope that a
just and lasting peace will move out of the
shadows into more of the light."
34. Question. Would not the Senator agree
that the principal power from whose ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons the greatest
danger of nuclear war arises is Communist
China?
Answer. Proliferation of a nuclear weap-
ons capability to Communist China will be
very unfortunate and tiapgerous, as would
proliferation to certain other nations. China,
I would think, would be the most danger-
ous.
35. Question. This treaty will not prevent
the development of nuclear weapons by Red
China, will it?
Answer. This treaty alone cannot prevent
Red China from developing nuclear weapons.
However, in two respects, it may retard that
development. By its provisions the treaty
prevents the signatories from assisting any
nation in carrying on nuclear testing in the
prohibited environments. Furthermore, as
I see it, no country which is fighting for lead-
ership in the Communist and uncommitted
world can be totally oblivious to the senti-
ments of the over 100 signatories who have
already signed this treaty.
36. Question. Is it the 'understanding of
the Senator from Missouri from the testi-
mony of official witnesses that the -United
States will withdraw from the treaty if Red
China tests nuclear weapons in one of the
three environments in Which testing is
banned by the treaty, although Red China
will not be a party to the treaty?
Answer. I understood witnesses to say that
whether the United States will withdraw from
the treaty if and when Peed. China tests a
nuclear device in the prohibited environ-
ments will depend upon a -number of factors
that cannot be determined at the present
time. To me the important point would seem,
to be the fact that we haveretained the right
to withdraw, in this or any other case, if
we think withdrawal advisable in our own
national interests.
THE LATE CARL A. HATCH, OF
NEW MEXICO
Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, for-
mer U S. Senator Carl A. Hatch, of New-
Mexico, who passed away last week, was
born in Kansas, and was one of the
Senate's truly great statesmen.
I think it appropriate' to mention the
fact that he was the author of the Hatch
Act, which Congress firs passed in 1939,
and a year later enlarged in scope. This
legislation was timely, in that the Fed-
eral employees had been pressured to
make contributions to political organiza-
tions. The situation became so bad that
there was a general uprising against it.
The late Senator Hatch 'wrote the legis-
lation known as the Hatch Act, which
was to prevent these abuses.
As we now approach another political
campaign, there are rumors that 'the
Federal employees may again be pres-
sured to participate in raising funds for
COPE, the political arm of the AFL-CIO.
I hope this is' only a rumor, for I think
it would be most unfortunate if the Fed-
eral workers were again subjected to the
pressures of political groups and orga-
nizations.
In the Wednesday, September 18, issue
of the Topeka Daily Capital there was
published an editorial entitled "Father
of Hatch Act." I ask unanimous consent
that it be printed in the RECORD, as a
part of these remarks.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FATHER OF HATCH ACT
The death of former U.3. Senator Carl A.
Hatch, of New Mexico, recalls his vigorous
efforts to bring about political reforms
through the Hatch Act wh#ch Congress first
approved in 1939 and, a year later, enlarged
the scope of the act.
Senator Hatch sought to restrict and con-
trol the political activities of members of
the Federal civil service and at the same
time protect them from intimidation or coer-
cion in voting at elections.
The first Hatch legislation was designed
primarily to prevent abuses such as had been
reported by the Sheppard. Senate committee
in connection with the congressional cam-
paign of 1938, when great numbers of people
were on relief rolls.
Besides forbidding intimidation or coer-
cion of Federal employees during election
campaigns, the act prohibited solicitation or
receipt of political contributions from relief
workers or persons receiving Federal relief.
Nor could relief funds be used to coerce
voters, and it became unlawful for any per-
son to promise any employment or other
benefit as a reward for political activity.
The second Hatch Act, approved in 1940,
extended the ban on partisan coercion, cam-
paign assessments, and political activity to
cover employees of State and local govern-
ments if engaged in full-time activities
financed wholly or in part by Federal funds.
This affected large blocs of highway depart-
ment employees, for example, in the various
States.
Drastic changes were also made in regu-
lations governing campaign funds. Any
political committee operating in more than
one State was required to limit its expendi-
tures to $3 million in any calendar year. At
the same time individual. contributions for
use in campaigns to nominate and elect Fed-
eral officers were restricted to $5,000 each in
any calendar year.
The first test of the law in, the 1940 elec-
tions showed the law relating to contribu-
tions and expenditures to be full of loop-
holes, arising from. vague phraseology which
made it difficult to enforce. Committees act-
ing independently of regular national com-
mittees collected and spent sums far in excess
of the maximum allowed by the Hatch law.
The 1944 presidential campaign provided ad-
ditional evidence, historians note, of the
ineffectiveness of the Hatch Act.
Perhaps the Hatch Act could be included
in the same category or could be classed as
an another noble experiment in Government
but it did give some of the politicians pause
and made them more circumspect in their
operations.
If the Hatch Act has not been as effective
as Senator Hatch hoped it would be, it in no
wise dims the Senator's efforts to curb cor-
ruption and establish politics on a higher
plane.
Aside from a notable career in the U.S.
Senate, Senator Hatch was learned in the law
and eventually became a Federal district
judge in New Mexico. One of his colleagues
on the Federal bench has described him as a
"sound, upright man-constructive in every
way."
He was also a kindly man, possessed of
great good humor even after his eyesight
began to fail and he retired from the Federal
judiciary. Probably it was not well known
in Kansas that the Senator from New Mexico,
who fathered the Hatch Act, was a native
Kansan, born at Kirwin in 1889. His career
was a creditable one and he served the public
well.
CIVIL RIGHTS IN ALAEAMA
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, an edi-
torial, entitled "They That Take the
Sword," which was published this morn-
ing in the Washington Post, is a timely
warning to the Negro leaders of America
that in their legitimate fight for their
constitutional rights, there is no place for
violence or, as is pointed out in the edi-
torial, for taking up the sword. The Post
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1963 CGNG1LtSSIONAL 1ECO1 D =SENATE 16907
nternationaltelecommunication conven- Protocol to the international convention (declaration o coUnited Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.,
and regulations, signed at At- for the regulation ation in war and peace,
? guotion of g of December 2, United ed States/ United
lantic City radio October 2, 1947. (Superseded.) 1946, done at Washington November 19, 1956. with declaration regarding Iran. (Depart-
(TIAS 1901.) (TIAS 4228.) ment of State Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1943, pp.
Convention bf the World Meteorological Protocol amending the international sugar 409-410.) (Comment: It is considered that
Organization, signed at Washington October agreement of 1953, done at London Decem- the Soviet Union has violated understand-
11, 1947. (TIAS 2052.) ber 1, 1956. (Expired December 31, 1958.) ings set forth in this declaration.)
Convention on the Intergovernmental (TIAS 3937.) Protocol on the zones of occupation in
Maritime .Consultative Organization, signed Interim convention on conservation of Germany and the administration of Greater
at Geneva March 6, 1948. (TIAS 4044.) North Pacific fur seals, signed at Washington Berlin, signed at London September 12, 1944,
Convention on safety of life at sea, signed February 9, 1957. (TIAS 3948.) United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and
at London June 10, 1948. (TIAS 2495.) Modifications of the first paragraph of France. (Also amendments signed Nov.
Protocol prolonging the international sugar Annex II of the international load line con- 14, 1944 and July 26, 1945.) (TIAS 3071.)
agreement of May i;. 1937, signed at London vention of July 5, 1930, communicated on (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet
August 31, 1948. (Expired together with the October 27, 1947 (entered into force for Union has violated understandings set forth
1937 agreement.) 11 (TIAS 1997.) United States July 13, 1957). (TIAS 4266.) in this protocol.)
Protocol bringing under international con- Convention on' the high seas, done at Armistice agreement with Rumania, signed
-trol drugs outside the scope of the conven- Geneva April 29, 1958. (TIAS 5200.) at Moscow September 12, 1944. (EAS 490.)
tion of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manu- Telegraph Regulations (Geneva Revision (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet
facture and regulating the distribution of 1958), signed at Geneva November 29, 1958. Union has violated this agreement.)
narcotic drugs, as afnended by the protocol (TIAS 4390.) Armistice agreement with Bulgaria, signed
signed on December 11, 1946, done at Paris International sugar agreement of 1958, at Moscow October 28, 1944. (EAS 437.)
November-19,1948. (TIAS 2308.) done at London December 1, 1958. (TIAS (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet
International Convention for the North- 4389.) Union has violated this agreement.)
west Atlantic Fisheries, dated at Washington Modifications of the fifth paragraph of an- Agreement on control machinery in Ger-
February 8, 1949. (TIAS 2089.) nex II of the International Loadline Conven- many, signed at London November 14, 1944,
Protocol amending the agreement for the tion of July 5, 1930, communicated on Sep- United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and
suppression of the circulation of obscene tember 19, 1949 (entered into force for United France. (Also amendment signed May 1,
publications of May 4, 1910, with annex, States, Aug. 7, 1959). (TIAS 4550.) 1945.) (TIAS 3070.) (Comment: It is con-
signed at Lake Success, N.Y., May 4, 1949. The Antarctic treaty, signed at Washing- sidered that the Soviet Union has violated
(TIAS 2164.) - ton December 1, 1959. (TIAS 4780). this agreement.)
Telegraph Regulations (Paris revision international Telecommunication Conven- Armistice agreement with Hungary, signed
1949), signed at Paris August 5, 1949. tion, signed at Geneva, December 21, 1959. at Moscow January 20, 1945. (EAS 456.)
4892.) (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet
(Superseded.) lat 2 (TIAS
Convention relative to o the treatment of international wheat agreement, 1062, Union has violated this agreement.)
prisoners of war, dated at Geneva August 12, opened for signature at Washington, April Yalta agreements (protocol of the proceed-
1949. (TIAS 3364.) (Comment: It is con- 19-May 15, 1962. (TIAS 5115.) ings of the Crimea Conference), signed at
sidered that the Soviet Union has violated 2. International Agreements Other Than Yalta February 11, 1945. (Department of
this convention.) Treaties State press release 239, March 24, 1947; "For-
Convention relative to the protection of Universal Postal Union Convention, signed eign Relations," the Conference at Malta and
civilian , persons in time of war, "dated at at Stockholm, August 28, 1924. (Super- Yalta, 1945, p. 975 ff.) (Comment: It is
Geneva August 12, 1949. (TIAS 3365.) ceded.) (TS 708-A; 49 Statutes at Large considered that the Soviet Union has violated
Convention for the amelioration of the 2741) understandings set forth in the Yalta pro-
condition of the wounded and sick in armed Universal Postal Union Convention, signed tocol.)
forces in the field, dated at Geneva August at London, June 18, 1929. (Superseded.) Act of military surrender (terms between
12, 1949. (TIAS 3362.) Statutes at Large 2523.) the United States and other Allied Powers
Convention for the amelioration of the (46 Universal Postal Union Convention, signed and Germany), signed at Rheims May 7,
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship- at Cairo, March 20, 1934. (Superseded.) (49 1945, and at Berlin May 8, 1945. (EAS 502.)
wrecked members of Armed Forces at sea, Statutes at Large 2741.) Declaration regarding the defeat of Ger-
dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. (TIAS Universal Postal Union Convention, signed many and the assumption of supreme au-
3363.) at Buenos Aires, May 23; 1939. (Superseded.) thority with respect to Germany by the ted
es, the Protocol prolonging the international sugar (54 Statutes at Large 2049.) United Kingdom, and the iU.S.S.R., tend the
agreement of May 6, 1937, signed at Lon- Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941 (Dec-
don August 31, 1949. (Expired together with laration of principles, known as the Atlantic Provisional Government of the French Re-
the 1937 agreement.) (TIAS 2114.) Charter, by the President of the United States public; declaration made and released at
Convention on road traffic, with annexes, of America and the Prime Minister of the Berlin June 5, 1945. (Department of State
done at Geneva September 19, 1949. (TIAS United Kingdom), as reaffirmed in the Dec- Bulletin, June 10, 1945, pp. 1051-1055.)
2487.) laration by United Nations (see below) to (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet
Protocol modifying the convention'of July which the U.S.S.R. adhered. (EAS 236.) Union has violated this Declaration.)
5, 1890, relating to the creation of an Inter- (Comment: It is considered that the Soviet Potsdam agreements (protocol of the pro-
national Union for the Publication of Cus- Union has violated the principles affirmed ceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference,
toms Tariffs, done at Brussels December 16, in this charter.) United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.,
1949. (TIAS 3922.) Declaration by United Nations, signed at and proclamation defining terms for Japa-
Protocols prolonging the international Washington January 1, 1942. (EAS 236.) nese surrender, United States and United
sugar agreement of May 6, 1937, signed at (Comment: See above; it is considered that Kingdom, with later U.S.S.R. concurrence);
London August 31, 1950, August 31, 1951, and the principles of the Atlantic Charter as re- protocol concluded August 2, 1945; procla-
_August 30, 1952. (All three of these proto- affirmed by this declaration have been vio- mation signed July 26, 1945. (Department
cols expired together with the 1937 agree- lated by the Soviet Union.) of State press release 238, March 24, 1947
ment.) (TIAS 2525, 2526, and 2862.) Moscow agreements of November 1, 1943 (protocol); Department of State Bulletin,
International telecommunication Conven- (declarations of joint policies, United States, July 29, 1945, pp. 137-138 (proclamation);
tion, signed at Buenos Aires December 22, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., Conference of Foreign Relations, Conference of Berlin
1952. (Superseded.) (TIAS 3266.) Foreign Ministers). (Department of State (Potsdam) 1945, vol. II, p. 1478 ff.) (Com-
International sugar agreement of 1953, Bulletin, Nov. 6, 1943, pp. 307-311.) (Com- ment: It is considered that the Soviet Union
done at London October 1, 1953. (Expired ment: It is considered that the Soviet Union has violated these agreements.)
December 31, 1958:) (TIAS 8177.) has violated understandings relating to Ger- 'Agreement for the prosecution and pun-
Customs convention on the temporary im- mans charged with certain crimes.) ishment of the major war criminals of the
portation of private road vehicles, done at Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, to European Axis, signed at London August 8,
New York June. 4, 1954. (TIAS 3943.) which the U.S.S.R. adhered August 9, 1945, 1945. (EAS 472.)
Convention concerning customs facilities pursuant to the Potsdam Protocol (see be- Four-Power agreement on certain addi-
for touring, stone at New York June 4, 1954. low) : tional requirements to be imposed on Ger-
(TIAS 3879.) Statement of joint understandings on many, done at Berlin September 20, 1945. eaty of an independent
Sepetident and for 4 the crattio -Ashment signed d future military operations against Japan; (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 7,
955. 3298, sig
at "'Vienna May 15, 1 1955. (TIAS 3298.) statement of purpose that "Korea shall be- 1945, pp. -?) (Comment: It is considered
come free and Independent." that the Soviet Union has violated this
Protocol to the international convention Department of State Bulletin, December 11, agreement.)
5.fisheries, done 412-413. (Comment: It is con- Constitution of the United Nations Edu-
for aghiNngt horthwest A5, 19 (TIAS 1943, pp.
at Vgas
Statute n;i Atomic Energy sidered Statute of the Inteed that the Soviet Union has violated cational, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-
Agency, done at New York October 26, 1956. understandings set forth in this declaration.) tion (UNESCO), concluded at London No-
l -a+io of December 1, 1943 vember 16, 1945. (TIAS 1580.)
. _w _ De
c
$o. 152-2
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16908 CONGRESSIONAL R1 CORD - SENATE September 24F
Moscow agreements of December 27, 1945 Universal Postal Union Convention (with The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr'.
(report of the Foreign Ministers meeting, final protocol, annex, regulations of execu- R1s10oFF in the Chair). Without objec-
United States, United Kingdom, and tion, and provisions regarding airmail, with tion it is so ordered.
U.S.S.R.), signed at Moscow December 27, final protocol), signed at Ottawa October 3,
1945. (Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 1957. (TIAS 4202.)p Mrs. SMITH': Mr. President, the vote
30, 1945, pp. 1027-1032.) (Comment: It is Resolutions by the General Conference of on ratification of the nuclear test ban
considered that the Soviet Union has violated the UNESCO amending the constitution of treaty is one of the most difficult votes
Constitution of the World Health Organi-
zation, opened for signature at New York
July 22, 1946. (TIAS 1808.)
Instrument for the amendment of the
constitution of the International Labor Or-
ganization, dated at Montreal October 9,
1946. (TIAS 1868.)
Moscow agreements of April 23, 1947 (re-
port of Council of Foreign Ministers regard-
ing German prisoners of war), done at Mos-
cow April 23, 1947. (See Department of
State Bulletin, June 26, 1949, p. 824.) (Com-
ment: It is considered that the Soviet Union
has violated these agreements.)
Universal Postal Union Convention, signed
at Paris July 5, 1947. (Superseded.) (TIAS
1850.)
Regulations for preventing collisions at
sea, approved by the International Confer-
ence on Safety of Life at Sea, London, April
23-June 10, 1948. (TIAS 2899.)
World Health Organization Regulations
No. 1 regarding nomenclature (including the
compilation and publication of statistics)
with .respect to diseases and causes of death,
adopted at Geneva July 24, 1948. (TIAS
3482.) (Also amendments to these regula-
tions adopted June 30, 1949, TIAS 3482, and
May 21, 1956, TIAS 4409.)
Quadripartite (Berlin Blockade) agree-
ment of May 4, 1949 (agreement relating to
the lifting of restrictions imposed since
March 1, 1948 on communications, transpor-
tation, and trade with Berlin), dated at New
York May 4, 1949. (TIAS 1915,) (Com-
ment: It is considered that the Soviet Union
has violated this agreement.)
Council of Foreign Ministers communique
regarding communications, transportation,
and trade between Berlin and Western Zones
of Germany and between Eastern .and West-
ern Zones, made and released at Paris, June
20, 1949. (Department of State Bulletin,
July 4, 1949, pp. 857-858.) (Comment: It is
considered that the Soviet Union has vio-
lated the understandings set "forth in this
the organization, adopted at the 2d-7th and that I have ever cast as a U.,115. Senator---
10th 1:1959) sessions. (T$AS 4230.) or even in my 23 years in Congress. The
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the difficulty is not with respect to my single
World Health Organization constitution, vote having any effect on the outcome
adopted at Geneva May 28, 1959. (TIAS of the final vote by the Senate. That
4643.) outcome was a foregone conclusion from
Additional regulations amending the in-
ternational sanitary regulations with re- the very start--overwhelmingly for rati..
spect to the health part of the aircraft gen- fication.
eral declaration, adopted at Geneva May 19, During the debate I have raised sev-?
1960. (TIAS 4896.) eral questions. I had hoped that the
Declaration of understanding regarding answers to these questions could be deft-
the international convention of February 8, Hite and clear--at least enough for the
opened 1949 for for the signature Northwest at Atlantic Washington Fisheries April , resolution of any doubts that I had about 24, 1931. (TIAS 5380.) the treaty. But they have not been.
Recommendations relating to the fur- Admittedly, the answers have been spec -?
therance of the principles and objectives ulative.
of the Antarctic Treaty, adopted at Can- This issue is not only dominated by
berra July 24, 1961. (TI1