STAFF STUDY FOR SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 3 F. EDWARD HEBERT, CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 3516, FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM 88TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5
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FORSUBCO TT3EN'~
F. EDWARD HEBERT, CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REIPRESENTATIVES
ON H. R. 3516, FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM
88th CONGRESS, 1 st SESSION
--- By Philip W. Kelleher*,. Counsel
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Mr. Chairman:
Your Subcommittee has for consideration H. R. 3516, a bill "To further
amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, to provide for
shelter in Federal structures, to authorize payment toward the construction
or modification of approved public shelter space, and for other purposes. "
In accordance with your direction I have prepared a staff study on the
general subject of fallout shelters and other matters related thereto. May
I at the outset suggest that this bill, H. R. 3516, could have such far
reaching effects that it would be helpful to the Subcommittee to deliberate
upon not only fallout shelters themselves but a number of other matters
which in one way or another relate to the subject.
This study is designed to present and suggest discussion on many basic
considerations relating to the shelter program -- considerations which, I
feel, could broadly and deeply affect our country, perhaps our allies, and,
quite certainly, every Member of the Armed Services Committee and of the
Congress.
To place the matter in its broadest perspective, I suggest that the
question which the Congress will ultimately be called upon to answer is
whether the prosecution of the currently planned fallout shelter program,
or any extension or expansion of it would work a cruel and dangerous
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deception on the American people, or would it, on the other 'hand, constitute
the salvation of this country both for itself and as the leader of the free world.
The considerations underlying this question range from the point of
mere technical feasibility of a fallout shelter program to whether, granting
its technical feasibility, its collateral effects would be such as to render
its prosecution unwise.
The distance between thege two points is a long one. I shall try to
travel that distance as quickly as possible.
THE BILL
The bill, H. R. 3516, is before each Member of the Committee. It
can be seen that the bill is a relatively brief one and extremely broad in
its language.
THE LAW
As we all know, the original enabling legislation for Civil Defense
was the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 approved by the President :on
January 12, 1951, over 13 years ago. Since then Civil Defense has not,
had a happy history. Until the issuance of Executive Orde.r 10952 by the
President on July 20, 1961, it had gotten nowhere. No one thing can be
blamed for this picture other than perhaps the lack of interest on the part
of the American people. It had lacked funds, leadership, and any true
sense of direction.
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On July 20, 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10952.
The White House press release accompanying the Executive Order quoted
the President as follows:
"More than ever, a strong Civil Defense program
is vital to the nation's security. Today, Civil Defense
is of direct concern to every citizen and at every
level of Government. "
In his letter of August 2, 1962, to the Chairmen of the Armed Services
and Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate, concerning the
need for early affirmative action on the Administration's civil defense
recommendations, the President stated:
"The Secretary of Defense and my other senior
advisors on this subject had intensively reviewed
what is known and what is not known about the
possible effects of nuclear warfare. The conclu-
sion was clear that, for the foreseeable future,
under a wide range of attack assumptions, large
numbers of lives could be saved by adequate fallout
shelter space. "
Secretary McNamara, in his posture briefing to the Committee,
maintains that the President's civil defense program is an essential element
in the total defense effort and is a complement to any future anti-ballistic
missile system.
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Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, which placed the
authority of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 in the President, Executive
Order 10952 transferred from. the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
to the Secretary of Defense the civil defense functions authorized by the
Act, with certain exceptions. The President from a legal standpoint retains
all final authority for the civil defense program and for defense mobilization.
The authority of the Secretary of Defense is therefore delegated from
the President.
Seven specific Civil Defense functions were transferred to the Secretary
of Defense. They are as follows:
(1) A fallout shelter program;
(2) A chemical, biological, and radiological warfare
defense program;
(3) All steps necessary to warn or alert Federal military
and civilian authorities, State officials, and the
civilian population;
(4) All functions pertaining to communications including
a warning network, reporting on monitoring, instructions
to shelters, and communications between authorities;
(5) Emergency assistance to State.and local governments
in a postattack period, including water, debris, fire,
health, traffic, police, and evacuation capabilities;
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(6) Protection and emergency operational capability
of State and local government agencies in keeping
with plans for the continuity of government;
(7) Programs for making financial contributions to
the States (including personnel and administrative
expenses) for civil defense purposes.
The first of these, the fallout shelter program., is the subject of
PROGRAM
The program. contemplated by H. R. 3516 has a number of elements
which I will delineate as briefly as possible.
--- The cost of the shelter payments to nonprofit institutions
proposed by the Bill is estimated at $175 million for the first year of
ope ration.
This would provide for the first year an estimated 10 million
shelter spaces in public or private non-profit institutions. Over a five-
year period, the estimate totals 95 million spaces.
--- Eligible non-profit institutions would include both governmental
(state or local) and non-profit private institutions. These include schools,
hospitals, welfare institutions and State and local government owned
buildings.
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The non-profit character of private institutions would be
determined generally by the Internal Revenue Service criteria.
The reason for selecting only non-profit institutions is because
(1) They are usually large organizations, occupying
substantial facilities and with available personnel
readily adaptable for emergency leadership and
organized efforts in shelters, but with limited access
to sources of financing;
(2) Are engaged in activities of a public service nature;
(3) Are well located in relation to homes;
(4) Are occupied in part by school children, invalids,
and others for whom society must take a special
responsibility;
(5) The school building is often the most substantial
community facility;
(6) The building of schools represents the largest share
of construction in the United States today, except
housing;
(7) Schools are organized institutions with responsible
leaders and orderly procedures;
(8) Hospitals provide emergency supplies and a trained
cadre, organized for emergency operations.
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(9) Dual purpose space capable of daily use is encouraged
rather than prohibited. In confining payments to non-
profit activities, there is no danger of favoring one
competitive position over another due to the accident
of being located where shelter is needed.
An official statement of Civil Defense says that on the basis
of the foregoing, "there is a logic to discrimination in favor of these
institutions. "
The rate of shelter incentive payments will be set at $2. 50 per
square foot, or the cost of the shelter construction or modification, which-
ever is less. At 10 square feet per person, this equals $25.
Typical shelter space is estimated at $40. 00 in new construction.
In this case, the Federal Government would pay $25 and the institution would
pay $15.
If an institution wanted to spend more than $40 in order, for
example, to make the shelter blast proof as well as fallout proof, it could
spend as much as it wanted but it still would receive only $25 per space.
In order to qualify for incentive payments, each shelter must
accommodate a minimum of 50 people and must be open for public use in
time of emergency.
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--- Based on available cost data and estimates of public response,
the total cost of the program. for shelter development is projected at $2. 1
billion. The objective is substantially to meet the national fallout shelter
requirements over a five-year period.
--- Larger sum.s -- which have been referred to in the press and
elsewhere -- $5 billion, and $7 billion -- refer to the total Civil Defense
program rather than the shelter program itself.
The very much larger sums $100 billion, $200 billion, and
even more -- refer to a total blast shelter program. for the whole United
States.
For eligible institutions to receive payment, the shelter space
(1) Meet shelter standards prescribed by the Office of
Civil Defense;
(2) Be located in an area where existing shelter is
inadequate in the opinion of local civil defense officials;
(3) Provide shelter space for fifty or more persons in
one structure;
(4) Be immediately available for public use as shelter
in an emergency in accordance with the plan or
direction of the local civil defense organization or
local government; and
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(5) Not involve peacetime use which would prohibit,
restrict or interfere with the immediate use of
the area in an emergency as public shelter (e. g. ,
use of the shelter space for heavy or extensive
storage would be prohibited).
There is a procedure for allocation of funds based upon
population and immediate need for shelter in the localities.
The foregoing is one part of the shelter program which is covered
by the bill.
The total shelter program has three other elements, only one of
which is involved in the bill.
The first of these is the shelter survey financed primarily from. Fiscal
Year 1962 funds. Funds were also appropriated in 1963 for this program.
This survey is taking inventory of all fallout shelter space for 50 or more
people in existing structures throughout the United States. The shelter
area is then licensed, marked and stocked with austere food and other
necessary supplies. The Defense Department estimates that it will locate
spaces for over 100 million people, of which over 70 million can be brought
into use (that is, licensed, marked and provisioned). This program is
going on at the present time. The department expects that there will be
a continuing survey program to locate an additional 4 million spaces per
year for a total of 20 million spaces by the end of Fiscal Year 1968.
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The second part (new section 206), which is relatively small insofar
as spaces are concerned but which is important as far as example and
leadership is concerned, relates to shelter spaces to be built into Federal
-- civil and military -- structures. The estimated total number of spaces
from. this source through Fiscal Year 1968 is estimated at 5 million spaces.
This provision would require the incorporation of shelter in all Federal
buildings, new or existing, owned or occupied by the Government unless
an exemption from the requirement were granted in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the President. Reasons for the exemption could
include design and construction characteristics of the building, lack of
need in the locality, excessive cost, etc.
The third element is those shelters which would be provided by
private means. Here the department estimates an average of 10 million
unsubsidized shelter spaces per year for a 5-year total of 50 million
shelter spaces.
These rough estimates add up to 240 million shelter spaces by the
end of Fiscal Year 1968.
In summary, the 240 million spaces are made up of 95 million spaces
from the bill's shelter development program; up to one million per year
or 5 million in Federal civil and military construction; 90 million as a
result of the survey, and 50 million unsubsidized privately constructed
shelters.
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BROADNESS OF BILL
That is the program. contemplated by H. R. 3516. The sources of
information as to what the program contemplates are various statements
made by the Executive Branch, including the letter which transmitted the
bill to the Congress and statements before Committees by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense, Mr. Pittman.
The bill does not, of course, set out any of these details. It is
very broad in its language and would leave a great deal of the prosecution
of the program up to administrative decision.
CONSIDERATIONS
Lengthy as the foregoing has been, it appears necessary to possess
this background information in order that the matters to be brought from.
here on can be considered in the context of what is planned by the Department
of Defense. Any other course would cause this matter to be discussed in
a vacuum.
Approval of this bill or any variation of it would, very probably,
constitute the taking of an irretraceable step. This bill is, in truth, only
a first step and the decision made and'the course followed at this time may
well be a virtually irreversible one.
For this reason, it is submitted, more care and more deliberation
is necessary than would be the case with respect to legislation of the kind
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usually dealt with by this Committee. All of the matters to be mentioned
are brought up as considerations which should be thought about and dis-
cussed. None of the information is of a classified nature and all of it has
been taken from public sources.
It is my belief that all or most of what I will call "facts" are substan-
tially correct, and this because only well-informed, well-intentioned, and
responsible people are quoted or paraphrased.
It should be stated that, at the outset for the most part, the matters
raised and the arguments presented are against the fallout shelter program.
The reason for this will become evident I think.
This program, of course, is a fallout shelter program and not a blast
shelter program. Analysis of the whole problem, however, has caused
me to believe that any -attempt to concentrate on the single aspect of shelter
directed only to fallout could well lead to erroneous conclusions -- for blast <
and fallout in a nuclear attack are inextricably entwined. Indeed, this same
entwinement extends to all of the multitudinous dangers involved in a nuclear
attack. For what does one gain to survive the radiation effects of a nuclear
attack only to be suffocated in a shelter by a fire storm which, has' consumed
the oxygen necessary for life?
The first matter to be discussed is the feasibility of constructing
shelters which will provide a true measure of protection.
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There are those who say that the fallout shelter poses for the creative
engineer problems which are well-nigh insuperable. Standards of engineer-
ing are required for shelters as they are for autos, trains, and airplanes.
But can such standards be extrapolated from virtually non-existent data
and operational experience? Only two atomic bombs, and no thermonuclear
bombs, have been used in war. Many people feel that at the present time
shelter engineering must be based on sheer imagination and without the
certainty that is the normal result of reasonably established standards.
Even the strongest proponent of civil defense and of the fallout shelter
program, Herman Kahn, agrees with this when he says:
"In considering civil defense against nuclear weapons,
we enter a field which is, in a critical sense, new:
there is no adequate experience; no one has fought
and survived more than a comparatively small and
one-sided nuclear war. If, therefore, we wish to
understand what the existence of these weapons of
unprecedented destructiveness may mean for us, we
have no choice but to rely on theoretical analysis and
extrapolation, while trying to relate our theories as
closely as possible to the known facts and lessons of
the real past."
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Even a Research Chief for the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civil
Defense has said:
"We know far less than we would like to. about fallout
from a major weapon. The statement that we need
shelters, and we need good shelters, is about the best
information we have. "
Dr. Alexander Langsdorf, Jr. , a physicist at the Argonne Laboratories,
in an interview with a Chicago newspaperman said that if the Russians know
that we had an adequate fallout protection, they would explode. the bomb in
the air rather than on the surface. Dr. Langsdorf said:
"From an airburst you get a massive firestorm which
might set all Chicago on fire. Concrete fallout shelters
would turn into ovens, cooking the people inside. If
they don't burn, they would probably suffocate, because
all the oxygen would be consumed."
In this connection, we do have some non-nuclear experience on which
James R. Newman, who was chief intelligence officer for the U. S.
Embassy in London during World War II, has described what happened
during the Hamburg firestorm. On July 24, 1943, the British dropped the
equivalent of 2, 400 tons of conventional explosives on that city. There were,
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admittedly, circumstances favoring combustion--dry weather, some wooden
houses. The first bombs were especially powerful and put the water mains
out of commission. In succeeding days the Allies dropped tens of thousands
of small fire bombs, as well as more.. blockbusters--8, 000 tons in all. "We
got a phenomenon, " Newman reported, :'that man has never seen before,
except perhaps in pre-history. Fires joined together 'in a radius of three
miles. Hot gasses rose, while surrounding cool air was pulled in and acted
as a bellow. Seventy thousand of Hamburg's 100, 000 street trees splintered
to earth. Two hundred and fifty thousand dwelling units, out of 556, 000,
were completely destroyed. The fire lasted for seven days. Temperatures
flared to 1, 400 and 1, 800 degrees so that the bricks themselves actually
burned. Thousands and thousands of people were in shelters at the time;
all but a negligible fraction died anyway. Bodies were still being dug up
six months later, most of them completely unmarked by fire. They had
died of suffocation and caxbon monpxade--70, 004 in l1: In Dregden, where
another firestorm occurred, 300, 000 * were killed in a single night, and
only 2, 000 tons of explosives were dropped."
It has also been suggested that the Russians could combine nuclear
attack with other forms of destruction. For instance, if they dropped
chemical or biological weapons a few hours or a few days after the bombs,
the pumps drawing in air for the shelters would simultaneously draw in
*The writer has been unable
to confirm the accuracy of
this figure.
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poison. Admittedly, chemical and biological weapons are far from perfected,
but they are almost certain to become manageable in the near future.
So far as I have been able to determine, the current fallout, shelter
program does not contemplate protection against chemical or biological
agents, even though in 19.61, Major ..general Marshall Stubbs, as Chief
Chemical Officer, stated:
"All available information points with certainty to the
fact that the Sino-Soviet bloc is ahead of the United States
and our allies, an both-offensive and defensive chemical
and biological research and development, and have a
stronger capability to wage a chemical and biological
attack. "
A previous Chief Chemical Officer, Major General William M. Creasy,
said seven years ago that a"s he saw it, the use of nuclear weapons didn't
make sense economically for an aggressor, because such weapons "cause
physical destruction not only to the human element, but also to the build-
ings and machines those humans operate." He said, "Poisoning, sickness,
radioactivity, starvation, and mental derangement can cause death or
dehabilitation among humans, but do not destroy material things. "
Hanson Baldwin, military editor of the New York Times, says in an
article which appeared in the March 31, 1962 issue of the Saturday Evening
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"Shelters are a gamble and a poor one at that.
If a rocket aimed at Philadelphia hits nearby
Haverford, you have had it if you live in Have.rford--
shelter or not. If there's a strong westerly wind
over Los Angeles on D-day, Pasadena may well be
out of luck from both fire and fallout. Nobody- -but
nobody--can make allowances for all of the variables
and fill in all the unknowns in the equation: Size and
number of weapons used; accuracy of the weapons;
targets selected; height of burst; the winds and
weather; sunshine or mist; the intentions of the
enemy, and so -..on.
In the same article, Mr. Baldwin said:
"A 20, 000-ton bomb wiped out Hiroshima and killed
70, 000 people. Today, some sixteen years later, the
Russians claim to have a 100, 000, 000-ton weapon. And
a 100-megaton weapon is by no means the ultimate.
There's an open-end progression possible and no per-
ceptible limit to the power that can be produced by a
thermonuclear explosion.
"The 100-megaton weapon already has invalidated the'
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civil defense concepts of yesterday. Its explosion and-
the resulting fire storm would probably ignite anything
flammable out to thirty-five to sixty miles from the
center and incinerate or asphyxiate the occupants of
shelters. Thus, the concept of shelters against radio-
in great cities or in their surrounding suburbs
activity
has little technical validity--unless you assume, as so
many supporters of the shelter program do--that cities
will not be targets..
"All of this means that civil defense planners are con-
fronted with the nearly insoluble problem of technical
obsolescence. The programs of yesterday are of limited
usefulness today; today's shelters may not be worth
the cost of tearing them down tomorrow. In an age
when the offensive has such a great advantage over the
defensive, the enemy can `easily nullify all except the
most elaborate and expensive attempts to provide
passive protection."
Many people have pointed out that protection against fallout is one and
only one of the many hazards that man must surmount if he is to survive a
nuclear attack. Again quoting Mr. Baldwin:
"The terrific blast of a nuclear explosion, the intense
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heat and the burst of radioactivity released at the
instant of the detonation, as well as the later fallout,
make it almost impossible to provide shelters against
big bombs near ground zero. The ground burst of a
100-megaton weapon would scoop out a crater 350 feet
deep and a mile in diameter--in solid granite. And if
nice, solidly built shelters hundreds of feet deep saved
one from. blast, the searing heat and exhaustion of
oxygen caused by the fire storm. would trap most of
the survivors within a radius of twenty to sixty miles."
Assuming that one has not been killed or incapacitated by reason of
blast, radiation, or suffocation, one still must face the question of survival
afterwards. Dr. John N. Wolfe, Chief, Environmental Sciences Branch of
the Biology and Medicine Division of the Atomic Energy Commission, epit-
omizes the whole question in a speech. Dr. Wolfe said:
"Fallout shelters in many areas seem only a means of delaying
death and represent only a part of a survival plan. With
an environment so completely modified, the question is,
where does man go after his sojourn in shelters? What
does he do upon emergence?"
What Dr. Wolfe means is that the survivor emerges from his shelter
only to find that communications and distribution systems are damaged or
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destroyed.. If there is food still undestroyed it may well be contaminated
as will be 'the water supply. It is at least possible that the land which he
must stand on is dangerously radioactive. Under these circumstances, he
may survive but if so it will be through pure luck.
This picture is presented, again by Mr. Hanson Baldwin, who says=
"The survivor may emerge, into an area uninhabitable
for days, weeks, months, years, or a lifetime. His
immediate need is to know where to go to reach an area
relatively uncontaminated by radioactivity. His ancillary
need is transportation to get there. If he has to walk,
he may receive a lethal dose of radioactivity before he
reaches safety. To surmount all these hazards pre-
supposes. nation-wide reporting, communications,
transportation and control systems relatively intact--
and people to operate them.
"And it presupposes, if the survivor reaches a safe
area, the existence of prestocked foods, pure water,
uncontaminated farmlands, and a muscle instead of a
gasoline economy. 11
In a recent statement, Dr. James Van Allen and his associates at the
University of Iowa stated that:
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"It is extremely dangerous to give the impression to
the public that the building of fallout shelters will enable
the average citizen to survive a nuclear war. "
The New York Herald Tribune for May 31, 1962, contained a summary
of four articles by, a group of Boston physicians that appeared in the New
England Journal of Medicine, The articles deal with the probable effects'
of a twenty-eight-megaton attack on the Boston area. The.doctors estimate
that there. would be 2, 250, 000 deaths from heat and blast alone. In the
metropolitan Boston area there are 6, 560 physicians of which perhaps 900
would survive. This would leave a ratio of one physician to every 2, 300
injured. Probably only 10, 000 hospital beds of the 65, 000 in Massachusetts
would survive. This would present the impossible task of putting over
2, 000, 000 sick and wounded human beings in 10, 000 already occupied beds
in hospitals without water, electricity, sewage disposal, refrigeration,
transportation or communication.
The'foregoing presents a dismal and even horrifying picture of what
nuclear war can mean. And does not this disturbing question present itself-
In whose hands might rest the success or failure of a.fallout shelter program?
Is it not possible that this might rest entirely in the hands of the enemy, the
Soviet Union? Could not the Soviet Union wait until we have completed the
currently proposed fallout shelter program. and then so conduct an attack
as to render it useless?. Those who. claim-to know say that this could be
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done in a fashion which I have already -referred to - - by exploding their
nuclear weapons at high altitudes so as to cause widespre'a'd fires and no
fallout whatsoever. In other words, we would commit ourselves to a par-
ticular position only to find that that position is overcome by events in the
form of a simple tactical manuever,
NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS
As I have indicated, the current program contemplates that incentive
payments would be made only to non-profit institutions.
Let us look at this matter for a moment. There are those who feel
that our schools, colleges, hospitals, and welfare institutions are going to
be unwilling or unable to make the contributions contemplated by the fallout
shelter program. As I understand it, the Civil Defense organization believes
that many institutions will not require ,more than the $25 per space that the
Federal Government would pay. On th'e?other hand, if, as they say, the
average cost of shelter space is $40, then for every space costing below
$25, there must be another space costing as much as $55.- . And for those
higher cost spaces, a $30 payment per space would be required.
For the current fiscal year the Federal Government appropriate
$49. 5 million for grants and loans to schools to aid the teaaching of science,
mathematics, and foreign languages; $72.,9 million for grants for vocational
rehabilitation programs; $220 million for grants and loans-'for hospital
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construction; and $75 million for the Housing for the Elderly Fund. This
totals over $417 million. The fallout 'shelter program would in Fiscal ' Year
.J.
1964, in effect, ask that a substantial portion of this amount be returned
in the form of contributions toward the fallout shelter program.
If these institutions can't afford Cheese services without Federal help,
is it reasonable to suppose that they can or would want to find the money
for fallout shelters ?
Incidentally, schools would play a prominent part in the -shelter pro-
gram, but children are in schools only one-eighth of the hours of.ttbe year.
Allied to this question. of contributions from sources which concededly
have limited access to funds is the question of public acceptance of such a
program -- and those who would make the decisions as to whether any -
amount would be contributed are part of'the public.
The apathy toward fallout protection which settled over the country
since the relaxation of the Berlin crisis is well known. At the peak of the
crisis there was a great surge toward building home shelters. This quickly
died down and, as we have seen in the'press, those who were engaged in the
manufacture of shelters have been left with unsaleable stocks. The Cuban
crisis and its aftermath reflects very much the same picture. .
When a newspaper columnist encouraged one of her inquiring readers
to build a fallout shelter, she received thousands of letters. in response to
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her suggestion. The letters were 9. to 1 in opposition to her advice. This
was, of course, not a public opinion poll taken under controlled conditions
but it might be revealing as to how the public, appears to feel. If the pre-
ponderance of feeling is as great as it would appear to be against fallout
shelters, can it reasonably be expected that the local officials responsible
for health, education, and welfare institutions will be willing to raise and
expend the funds necessary to make the program an effective one?
With respect to discrimination, many situations can be imagined
which would envisage shelter for one group and no shelter for another group
in exactly similar circumstances, one having funds available and the other
not. This same kind of discrimination could be one of mere geography. An
area with a high water table would not have basements, and the provision
of fallout shelters would impose a great financial burden. On the other
hand, in another area the situation would be ideal for fallout shelters and
the cost would be minimal. These examples could be multiplied indefinitely.
Is it reasonable to assume that this will not cause disquiet and result in the
greatest possible pressure to expand the program so as to have Federal
funds available for fallout shelters for all the people regardless of their
situation?
Perhaps' the answer is not obvious but I will say that it presents an
interesting area for conjecture.
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"I U
BUSINESS AXWMUNICLPAL INTEREST
Not wholly unrelated to'ti e:,t}taestigns jiis? brought up is the question
of pressures from the buai e.ss. 4rsltf ulana;y ,td^'engatge in an ever expanding
c-irogram of shelters.
ame s Reston of the Neer York, dime a, pointed o'i t on Ncyve mbe r 12,' 1961:
"`No group. oaf citizens is show og-ore solicitude for
the future well-being of the, ria, iq 1Ftliati the builders
off lout aliel!ter's)-. '1'We Iron and Steel Institute, the
cement ma-nu a: tuarev's,. avid" the makers oil brick and
Grier c'2*y.!products are 41. vying,.,: th. one another to
matte abetter shelter, and' the National I;,umber Manu-
f* ctur a ra A'ssociation', has piS duc ed a dandy little number
t (*rlade)~out of wood, which{ a_e" everybody knows, doesn't
Lijurm,
oh.B.a1dwiu:.has:.touched gonerall on this''
subject. He sa
L 'There remain, moreover. the ecq+Aotnic and social
('r' costs of a shelter'-prp ram. T1ie'costs staxt modestly
by,; today! s standards abbut $170, 000, 0Y0--(for, All Federal
civo1 + e{pse} ;for: the next (1; 6) fiscal~tyear, - according
f ,1 M1.'
tafpree t plans ,But they a nd with the years,
A etmously anyl unendingly. jgviernm.ent fallout'sheiters,
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if built for every,.person, will yult mately , price out
at a roughly calculated $40 per capita to at least
j,2 40, 000, 0000--probably twice that.. , Food, water,
accessgriesm??all perishable and requiring periodic
replac entm?will add more billions. The possibilities
,of political chicanery and graft are legion. Even at
best such a program could be a gigantic boondoggle;.
To be completely realistic about the pressures which might be exerted
so .e*paD4,t ri4 program far beyond its present confines, one merely needs
to.ask bi 06if. What- city, town, or village doesn?t have a requirement,
argil or im3gipary, for a municipal structure for which a large injection
of j'ederal funds would be most desirable. How many cities but would like
to build a downtown garage under the Common which could serve the double
function Of' g ,rage and fallout shelter. Even the mention of this consideration
presents each meriaer of Congress with his own Pandora?s box.
FLDERAL RESPONSIBILITY
T1here are, of course, responsible people who feel that. the totality of
1 is program is a Federal responsibi?ity, and that it should not: be dependent
upon cbntributious from any segment of the public,
On November 9, 1961, the Columbia B roi.dca sti*g System presented
as hour tong` show on Civil Defense Appearing on thi*,.sshow were Mr. Holifield,
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then
/ Chairman of the Joint Committee:. on tic Stre igy and Chairman of a
Subcommittee of the -Iouse ' Committee' on, Governihent O erations which
has- for years been holding hea.rtng' s an Civil Defense, and Secretary of
Defense McNamara, In response to a question raised by. CBS reporter
Howard K. Smith as to who was to do what about what', Secretary McNamara
said:
"Certainly. the federal government, the, state, and local
governments all' have partb to pls.y, Wt most importantly;
it' a the ree sonsibility of each individ*Vjo `prepare him-
self'and its family for that (thefrnondclear) strike .... ~'
Mr. Holifield said:
"The American people are net, individually, going to
be able to tackle this any more than they can tackle-
modern war as an indiviii"I 'o 46'a `fanilly or as 'a
city, or as a state... This is a challenge for 'survival '
to the nation. The response has to be a national responses
and the only way we''can do tkat'is