STATEMENT BY ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENCE BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE INTRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BY THE SOVIET UNION INTO CUBA 30 JANUARY 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100170034-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: January 30, 1963
• Content Type: STATEMENT

Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP65B00383R00010? 70034-8
Not for Publication Until
Released by the House
Armed Services Committee
STATEMENT BY ROBERT1S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON THE INTRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
BY THE SOVIET UNION INTO CUBA
30 JANUARY 1963
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.
This is the story of the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba by
the Soviet Union, as viewed from the Department of Defense.
Up to the spring of 1962, the Soviet Union had supplied the Cuban Army
with great quantities of conventional weapons and supplies, framt pistols
and rifles to heavy artillery and medium tanks. MIG-15, 17 and .19 aircraft
and helicopters had been provided the Cuban Air Force, and motor torpedo
boats and coastal patrol vessels of the KRONSHTADT.Class had been delivered
to the Cuban Navy.
of August, an
During the latter part of July=and the early part
unusual number of Soviet ships unloaded cargo and_:paspengers at Cuban
ports. There. were also reports that during the. unloading process, all
Cubans were'eCcluded from the dock areas and that. the.stevedoring was
accomplished by Soviet personnel accompanying the?equipment. By the
middle of August, analysis of these reports highl ghted .the- possibil.it3r
that the Soviet Union was probably introducing surface-to air missile
systems in Cuba, and accordingly special attention was.:fbcused on the
suspected areas of deployment. As a...result of the next high altitude'
reconnaissance mission, flown?..on.the. 29th of August, .positive ideutift-"
cation: was established of SA-2'surface-to?--air missile :(SAM) sites at `'
of these.-suspect locations and at six others.also in Western Cuba. A
short-range coastal defense cruise..missile installation was also sub-
sequently identified.
.:Up to this time, high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba
were flown on a regular schedule, weather permitting. These missions
were directed to cover the principal airfields, ports, and areas of
particular military significance. As a result, we were able to keep
close watch on the progress of aircraft deliveries and assembly, airfield
improvements, new construction of military installations, development of
defensive works around critical areas, delivery and operational readiness
of naval units, and the security of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo..
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Each flight after 29 August through 7 October discovered new SAM sites,
and three additional cruise missi=le sites were reve,ed.. Still, there
was no evidence indicating the presence of an offenolve capability;
all these missile systems were defensive in nature.
In addition, Soviet equipment en route to Cuba,was kept under visual
surveillance during the daylight hours while it was, at sea in the vicinity.
of Cuba and when the ships were in Cuban, ports T1 vou&h this m?eQ.lumm, and
through other sources, we were able t6 keep abreast, of `the accelerated
shipment of arms in Soviet bottoms--but none of this equipment could be
identified with offensive missile systems: It now appears, based on what
we have subsequently observed, that the offensive missiles and associated
equipment were clandestinely loaded and transported to Cuba in holds of
large hatch Soviet ships and apparently began arriving in Cuban ports in
approximately mid-September. Since all of the strategic missile-associated
equipment--such as erectors and transporters--and the missiles themselves
were concealed in the holds of the ships and unloaded under the cover of
darkness, and under the most stringent Soviet-controlled security
restrictions, photographic surveillance at the time was un=able to discover
the initial introduction of offensive 34issi~47s into ba
was developed in this sequence:
Firm htel l gerice on '-the e i =tehce of of ansiv x st i.: ea
v 'First, from April to late September, a great volume of unconfirmed
reports and rumors, principally from refugees and exile organizations,
was received concerning the situation in Cuba. Many thousands of refugees
were interviewed and several thousand specific written reports were produced.,
analyzed for intelligence value, and collated with bother-source meterial.
Although ,a large number of these ands other reports received in Washington
iitai'bulu #one'dt#,"d? ecuat:ed to strategic
" Lt
related tb the eens;[tle
he
weapon whey. "cA efs y^' oh ke *t , ~'& 1 , JtV 14
altitude photographs taken before ii 1962 of the areas which refugee
reports indicated asthe, mope. e y 1 o,s atir no,,, t c utai a sile$, either
disproved the presence of missiles or linked the suspected activity to SAM
or cruise-type missilesthat posed no offensive threat to the United States.
The second crucial stage of the story started in late September when
a recently arrived Cuban refugee gave the first description of equipment
that could be equated: with a medium-range ballistic missile. Although raw
and unevaluated, this report was an indication of the possible :presence
in Cuba of offensive ballistic missiles.
The third and final stage in our detection of strategic missiles
resulted from earefta~l,..eva7 cation., of :th ,s >:refu ee..yeport-:-together with other
intelligence, In cor,unetion with a suspicious pstten ofeploysen vex SAM .sites noted in the same?general aye's; a,"?pa;ttera wlieh 'cs~uld ?hc5t bex`''`relate
any known military installations--analysis of this single report resulted in
the designation. of a specific area as a suspect medium-range ballistic
missile site. Photographic coverage was thereupon proposed, and on the
11th of October a military high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft flew a
flight route specifically planned to cover this suspect MRBM area. This
led to the discovery of the San Cristobal MRBM complex. The aircraft flew
directly over the assigned target area and emerged with hard photographic
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 t ,.
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i- his mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba was then
followed by a concentrated reconnaissanc5'effort by both high-flying and
low-flying reconnaissance aircraft of the':Navy and the Air Force..
VAfter this successful flight of the il+th, the next operational task
was to obtain aerial photography of the complete island to determine the
precise nature of the build-up and the exkct configuration of missile sites,
their number and location, and the status`of their readiness along with
other related activity. The program was planned so as to photograph at
high altitude all of the known or suspected, sites and, at the same time,
perform search reconnaissance over the entire island to determine possible
additional missile locations, or other significant military activity.
When the high-flying aircraft located the objectives, then low-flying air-
craft could be dispatched over selected targets to obtain detailed information.
With large-scalee, photography of selected objectives from aircraft flying at
altitudes of 50() to 1, 000 feet, this informations could be readily obtained.
On the day following the President's message, specifically on the
23rd of October, low altitude flights were initiated. These flights, flown
at high speed, were generally over Cuban territory_a maximum of from four
to seven minutes. The results were of course outstanding, and these missions
were continued on a regular basis with both Navy F8U's and Air Force BF-101's
participating.
Thus, during the crisis, with the high-altitude aircraft providing
reconnaissance of wide areas, and the low flying aircraft providing close-up
reconnaissance of selected objectives, the J.S. Intelligence Community was
provided with a continuous stream of photography on the basis of which a
complete assessment of the situation could be made.
Some comments regarding the present status of Soviet military forces in
Cuba, as compared to last July, are appropriate. About 17,000 Soviet military
personnel remain. in Cuba. Since last July the Soviets have introduced and.
deployed, in addition to the MRBMs and IL-28 jet light bombers subsequently
removed, some 2I surface-to-air (SAM)L sites and' several.o9as tai. de en e
cruise .~, ,; '~ ~.e s tes < They have also i1 trgduc cl 12 I ~ s g guise,-
missile motor boats about 10 MIS.-21 j t ghters ( i addition to the more than
60 MIG-15/17/19s previously introduced), substantial numbers of late model
tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery weapons, anti-tank missiles,
and other battlefield weapons.
At present, the principal elements of the air defense systems, including
the SAM sites and the MIG-21 jet fig>'i,te;xs ,ire ,,robab].y,controlled and. manned
by the Soviets. The more modern ground. equipment is integral to four highly
mobile Soviet ground forces which still remain in Cuba.
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We are convinced beyond any reasonable. doubt that 42 medium-range
ballistic missiles were removed from Cuba aboard eight Soviet ships between
5 and 9 November,. and that 42 IL-28 bombers were similarly removed between
5 and 6 December,
All of the IL-28 bombers and,thirty six of the missile/transporters
were uncovered for photographic and visual alongside inspection while the
Soviet vessels were at sea and the remainder of the missiles were observed
covered in exactly the same observable condition as previously noted at the
specific missile sites. We are convinced that the Soviets did not have
sufficient time between the decision to dismantle and the actual shipment
dates to construct dummy missiles and transporters possessing the fine detail
and precise measurements of the equipment shipped out. Photographic evidence
also is available showing both outloading and outshipping of missile erectors
and of fuel and oxidizer trailers. Without this associated equipment, a
missile system is inoperative. Since removal of the missiles, our coverage
has not revealed, the existence of strategie.weapons systems in Cuba.
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